TACTICAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CANADA: AN EXPLORATORY SURVEY OF CANADIAN POLICE AGENCIES
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A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

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Abstract

The following paper offers a descriptive analysis of baseline data regarding an overlooked trend in Canadian policing: the growth in number and shift in character of police tactical units (PTU's). A survey of all police departments with fifty sworn officers or more provides the first comprehensive national data on PTUs in Canada. Findings document a rise in the number of PTUs, an escalation in their level of activity, a normalization of these units into mainstream policing and a direct link between Canadian and American PTU's as well as the Canadian Armed Forces. These findings are similar to trends in the United States suggesting that behind the rhetoric of democratic reforms such as community and problem-oriented policing, we are seeing the rise of Tactical Law Enforcement.
Main Entry: tactical
Pronunciation: 'tak-ti-kəl
Function: adjective
Date: 1570
1: of or relating to combat tactics: as
(a) of or occurring at the battlefront <tactical defense> <tactical first strike> (b) using or being weapons or forces employed at the battlefront <tactical missiles> b of an air force: of, relating to, or designed for air attack in close support of friendly ground forces
2 a: of or relating to tactics: as (1): of or relating to small-scale actions serving a larger purpose (2): made or carried out with only a limited or immediate end in view b: adroit in planning or maneuvering to accomplish a purpose
tac-ti-cal-ly /-kəl/ adverb

Webster's1913 Revised Unabridged Dictionary
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Chapter One: An Introduction to Tactical Law Enforcement

The appearance of militaristic, or rather paramilitaristic law enforcement, is not a new phenomenon. Presently, even as community policing is being celebrated as a return to Sir Robert Peel's policing principles, the military character of policing is finding renewed emphasis in Police Tactical Units (PTUs). Since development of the Los Angeles Police Department's tactical unit in 1967, the United States has seen an increase in the number of instances of these tactical units being called upon to maintain order in their society. Some cases have ended in disaster such as Waco, Ruby Ridge and The Christian Movement for Life. At the same time, albeit to a lesser extent, Canadian society was also witness to several widely publicized events involving; police tactical units such as Oka in Quebec (before the situation was turned over to the military), the Gustafsen Lake stand-off in British Columbia (where multiple Royal Canadian Mounted Police Emergency Response Teams were deployed to resolve the situation), and in Ontario at Ipperwash (where the Ontario Provincial Police Tactics and Rescue Units were called upon to restore order).

In a national study of medium to large police departments in the United States, conducted by Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler in 1997 it was found that Police Tactical Units have not only grown in numbers but have become

1. Since there are numerous police tactical units that go by a myriad of names such as: Special Weapons and Tactics, Emergency Task Force, Tactical Rescue Unit, Special Emergency Response Unit, Joint Task Force, etc... these units, for the purposes of our discussion will all be called Police Tactical Units (PTU's).
increasingly pro-active (Kraska and Kappeler: 1997). This American study has provoked and acted as a guide to the research presented here. This paper documents the first comprehensive survey of police tactical units across Canada.

**Previous Research and Objectives**

While academic literature concerning policing is vast, the realm of scholarly work concerning tactical policing is not. We will review the body of knowledge surrounding Police Tactical Units that until now has been essentially confined to the American literature. The first attempt in the United States to study this type of policing was conducted by Stevens and MacKenna in 1988, and focused primarily upon selection procedures and equipment use. The work carried out in the 1990’s, by Peter Kraska and his colleagues in the United States has made him the leading authority on the subject.

A review of the extant Canadian sociological literature surrounding policing reveals a conspicuous absence of theoretical and empirical work on Police Tactical Units. Moreover, no official Canadian records are being kept on the purpose, prevalence and uses of these types of police units. These gaps stand in stark contrast to the path-breaking work of American critical criminologist Peter Kraska and his colleagues, (Kraska 1996, Kraska and Kappeler 1996,

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2 A major strength of this study is the fact that there was an eighty percent response rate to the survey.
4 The British literature has also looked at tactical policing; however their focus has been riot police rather than tactical police.
5 It should be noted however, that they received only a 40 percent response rate to their national survey.
Kraska and Cubellis 1997, Kraska and Paulson 1997) who have discovered an increase and normalization of these types of units during the past twenty years. This project adds to the sociology of policing literature by providing the first overview of police tactical units in Canada.

The primary goal of this study was to develop a national database on police tactical units in Canada. This was accomplished by conducting a national police services tactical operations survey. The survey included police services from the federal, provincial and municipal levels, a necessary first step toward determining trends, prevalence rates, and in providing operational information concerning these police tactical units.

A Note on Terminology

Several terms need to be clarified for the reader. It is my contention that the police institution has always been a "paramilitary" organization and that the term "police tactical unit" is a more accurate description for the units discussed here rather than what the international literature defines as a Police Paramilitary Unit. To clarify this, the functions of the military and the police within society will be discussed. Furthermore there has been a debate raging in the international literature (see Jefferson: 1987; 1990; 1993, Waddington: 1987; 1991; 1993; 1999, Hills: 1995, Kraska: 1999) concerning "paramilitarism"; this debate however is guilty of "sloppy" usage concerning this terminology.

In 1995, Alice Hills attempted to rectify this by redefining the term: paramilitary, strictly speaking, refers to policing that is on the behalf of the military
or a term to describe a disliked or despised style of policing (Hills:1995). Kraska (1999) charges this definition, and rightfully so, with being narrow. This would mean that police scholars would have to ignore an entire body of sociological literature concerning policing (Kraska: 1999). "Moreover it would mean that no matter how closely squads of police officers act... or resemble... a military special operations unit the descriptor paramilitary is off limits unless the unit works under the auspices of a military agency" (Kraska 1999:147).

The essence of this debate does not lie in misuse of the terminology but rather in that these authors come from two different continents with differing tactical police structures. The police in Europe, in some cases such as the Gendarmeries in France, Carabinieri in Italy and Bundesgrenzschutz in Germany, actually do work under the military. Some scholars are correct in using their terminology to describe them; yet, those units are not comparable to Special Weapons and Tactics teams in the United States nor the Canadian Emergency Response Teams.

Delineating the Police from the Military

Since there has been hardly any comparative analysis of the military and the police, the distinction between these two institutions remains vague. In studying these two institutions, especially in the case of Police Tactical Units, it becomes central to draw distinctions between these two services. We will review the work of Cynthia Enloe (1980) who was one of the first scholars to
attempt a comparison of the military and police, and we will look at the paramilitarization of the police. In its simplest form, Enloe sets out what she calls "differentiating attributes" of these two institutions. Below are characteristics she outlined to be of pre-militarized police and military forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Police Forces</strong></th>
<th><strong>Military Forces</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do not perform extra-national functions</td>
<td>Principal raison d’etre is defence of nation-state from external threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have personnel posted throughout national territory</td>
<td>Personnel may not be concentrated in just one to two bases, but they are likely to be scattered throughout the national territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operate in relatively small units</td>
<td>Operational units are relatively large, numbering in hundreds not dozens of units of men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are under the authority of civilian officials—either local government or ministries of the interior</td>
<td>Face adversaries who are likely to operate in large units as well and often at some distance which increases dependency on weaponry and makes suppression via &quot;arrest&quot; less likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave transgressions to be defined by extrapolicing authorities, typically legislative bodies</td>
<td>Internally, are subject to organizational differentiation according to mission and technical orientation, with the major boundaries being those between army, navy and air force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign individual officers authority to arrest civilians</td>
<td>Have a standing force that can be supplemented by special mobilization of reserves or conscripted civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are on continual and routine call rather than subject to periodic mobilizations</td>
<td>Include regular military personnel who live in spatially separated compounds and have access to services of their own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely draw upon manpower from national conscription</td>
<td>Have uniformed officials who, even when not themselves members of executive cabinets, are likely to be represented in policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow individual members to live in civilian community existence when off duty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Enloe, 1980:131-132

Of course, as Enloe points out none of these indicators are universal.

One main factor of similarity between the police and the military, as Enloe and other police scholars have pointed out; is that they were both formed to consolidate and maintain state authority by using state sanctioned violence in a society. Thus policing is at the heart of the functioning of the state, and central to
an understanding of the legal and political organization. The police were born out of the military organizational structure and therefore, in essence they cannot be considered anything but paramilitary. It is important, however, to make the distinction between the two: police tactical units although patterned after specialized military units are not the same as the military units. They are comprised of police officers who are trained to use military skills, not soldiers trained to be police officers. While it may seem redundant to look at the work of Enloe, several interesting points are brought to light. For example the police do not work outside of the nation state, officers are given the power by the state to arrest people, and allow its members to live in a civilian community. Meanwhile as Byers notes the “raison d’etre of a professional military force is to apply or threaten to apply force on behalf of the state and at the lawful direction of the duly constituted government of the nation” (Byers:1973:11). The military, however, does not have the authority of arrest, but sometimes the power to conscript, and more importantly, military personnel generally live within the influence of a military setting such as a military base.

One further distinction I wish to make here before we leave this discussion, is the concept of evidence. It can be argued, that a central component of the traditional police officer’s role in society has been the need to collect evidence, later to be presented in a court of law. The rules of evidence are generally the same in Canada, Britain and the United States. "All these countries conduct criminal trials by the "accusatorial" or adversary system which, if necessary, elicits evidence without the assistance of the accused person. In this
system the judge acts mainly as an arbiter to ensure that there is no abuse of the rules of evidence under which the trials are held” (Kelly and Kelly: 1976:247). If there is one skill that the military does not normally teach, it is the competence to collect evidence.\(^6\) Now that we have grounding in what the military and police functions are, we can turn towards the concept of paramilitarism.

**The Concept of Paramilitarism and the Police**

Having reviewed the work of Enloe, which has provided us with some insights into the differences between the military and the police, we turn to James Auten and the concept of “paramilitary”. Auten defines “paramilitary” as

Organized military, but not part of or in-cooperation with the official armed forces of a country; having to do with military force in its tactics, or existing where there are no military services, or existing alongside the military services and professional non-military but formed on an underlying military pattern as a potential auxiliary or diversionary military organization (Auten: 1986:68).

Auten outlines nineteen points that would characterize a paramilitary organization. I will not review all of them, only those that expressly show what a paramilitary organization is:

- A centralized command structure with a rigidly adhered to chain of command.
- A rigid superior-subordinate relationship defined by prerogatives of rank.
- Control exerted through the issuance of commands, directives, or general orders.
- Clearly delineated lines of communication and authority.
- The communications process primarily vertical from top to bottom.
- Employees who are encouraged to work primarily through threats or coercion.
- An authoritarian style of leadership.
- Emphasis on the maintenance of the status quo.

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\(^6\) To illustrate this point; the Canadian military has a special unit to deal with nuclear, biological or chemical terrorism. This unit has members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the express purpose of collecting evidence (Alvaro: 1997). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) action in Kosovo, once it was completed, used members of Canadian police services to collect evidence in support of war crimes.
Highly structured system of sanctions and discipline procedures to deal with non-conformists within the organization. Usually a highly centralized system of operations. (Auten: 1986: 70)

If any individual were to examine this list, without being told the subject, they would most likely guess that the above presented list describes a military organization. Auten argues that the police are a paramilitary organization by nature and cites numerous studies to prove his point (see Auten 1986). It is a fact that the police in general are a paramilitary organization, according to Auten’s points.

Defining Police Tactical Units

In Ottawa during the afternoon of Tuesday April 6 1998, one would have thought the city had gone mad. Five people had been shot by a former employee at the local bus depot and the Ottawa-Carleton Police Tactical Unit was doing a room by room search of the terminal to find the individual and prevent him from further harming anyone else. Meanwhile, across town, the bridges connecting Ontario and Quebec were being blockaded by labour demonstrators and the Quebec Provincial Police Riot Squad was on hand to restore order. While both these situations involved a Police Paramilitary Unit only Police Tactical Units will be discussed here not Police Riots Squads/Public Order Units. Essentially the difference between the two is that Police Public Order Units, while paramilitary, are larger in size and are used in instances of public disorder such as civil disobedience, strikes, and demonstrations, while Tactical police officers have traditionally been called-out to situations involving
hostages, terrorists and instances of weapons.  

The United States literature compares these units to military special forces and special operations units and at times the academics use these terms interchangeably and, occasionally, in error. The first clarification I wish to make here is the distinction between riot and tactical officers. Tactical officers are not riot police in that their job is not to contain “politically-motivated civil disorder” (Jefferson: 1987:47). There has been much debate primarily in the British and to a lesser degree American literature around what a police paramilitary unit actually is. Some have defined paramilitary policing as: “the quasi-military training, equipment, philosophy, and organization to questions of policing” (Jefferson: 1993:374), “Police wearing protective clothing and carrying shields; the existence of specialist public order units,...the deployment of police in squad formations, and the willingness to use force” (Waddington: 1993:353). These definitions could also be and have been used to define a riot unit, a tactical unit or a police search and rescue team.

Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler, seek not to define but rather to distinguish these officers. As opposed to traditional police units, PTUs can be distinguished in the following ways. PTU’s are equipped with an array of militaristic equipment and technology. They often refer to themselves in military jargon as the “heavy weapons units,” implying that what distinguishes them from regular police is the power and number of their weapons (Kraska and Kappeler: 1997:3). In a later article Kraska, the lead authority in the United States, gives us

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7 In fact while Police Tactical Units in the United States did evolve out of riotous situations, today they do
a definition of these units and based them on three main points:

- Must train and function as a military special operations team with a strict military command structure and discipline (or pretense thereof) Similar to that of the Navy SEALs.

- The Unit must have at the forefront of their function to threaten or use force collectively, and not always as an option of last resort.

- The unit must operate under legitimate state authority, and its authorities must be sanctioned by the state coordinated by a government agency. This criterion would exclude common thuggery, militia organizations, and guerrilla groups (Kraska and Cubellis 1997:610).

Kraska also adds that there are contributing factors that also define these units such as that they outfit themselves with black or urban camouflage, lace-up combat boots, body armour, kevlar helmets, and ninja-style hoods (Kraska and Cubellis 1997:610).

While, in part, I agree with this definition, I feel that Kraska has also defined several other units that some police services have. For example, most police services also have a riot unit, a bomb squad, and some also have search and rescue units, and a Haz-Mat (Hazardous Material) team. Also, what about police air support units, and K-9 units? Some, if not all of these, could also be considered a paramilitary police unit using the definition put forth by Kraska.

The literature has located these units within the realm of military jargon, (Kraska and Kappeler 1997, Kraska and Paulsen 1997, Kraska and Cubellis 1997 and Kraska 1999) yet there is some perplexity concerning what one could consider Military special forces and special operations forces in comparison with not deal with instances of public disorder.
the police organization. Special forces would include the American Green Berets, Navy Sea Air Land SEALs, and the British Special Air Service and Special Boat Service. The Special Forces soldier is defined by his role and his training, operating in small groups, and using technology that is specific for the task at hand (Neillands: 1998).

Special Operations Forces would include the United States Marine Corp, and British Royal Marine Commandos, in that they have a special task (Neillands: 1998). For example, a Royal Marine Commando Unit can quell a riot on the streets of Belfast, while, the Special Air Service would not be utilized in such a situation (Neillands: 1998). So if the police analogues are correct to the military terms, then the riot unit would be a "special operations force" while the tactical unit would be "special forces". "In recent years the dividing line between the police function and military action by Special Force units has become blurred and another one needs to be drawn" (Neillands:1998:308).

Thus, PTUs can be defined by employing certain extended specifications of Kraska's earlier definition:

1) They exist where there are no military services, or existing alongside the military but formed on an underlying military pattern as a potential auxiliary or diversionary military organization" (Auten:1986:68).

2) Must train and function as a military special forces team with a strict military command structure and discipline (or pretense thereof) Similar to that of the United States Navy Sea Air Land Teams or the British Special Air Service

3) The Unit must have at the forefront of their function to threaten or use force collectively, and not always as an option of last resort (Kraska and Cubelliis:1997:610).
4) The unit must operate under legitimate state authority, and its authorities must be sanctioned by the state coordinated by a government agency. This criterion would exclude common thuggery, militia organizations, and guerrilla groups (Kraska and Cubellis 1997:610).

5) The unit must be expressly used internally within a state's jurisdiction, unlike a military unit which is used externally or under extreme circumstances internally.

In other words, these units become the special elite forces of the police. Tactical law enforcement officers encompass our previous definition of "police". However there is one extended specification that makes a police officer a tactical officer: he or she trains and functions as part of a unit that is based upon a military special forces team with a strict military command, similar to the United States Navy Sea Air Land Teams or the British Special Air Service.

**Organization of the Paper**

Now that we have examined the background information surrounding this subject let us turn to the organization of the rest of paper. The paper will be broken down into five parts. In the first section we will look at Theorizing about Police Tactical Operations, where the military foundations of policing will be looked at, particularly Peel's two traditions, Military and Civil. Further in this chapter we will delve into the social conditions surrounding the rise of Tactical Law Enforcement Units. Issues to be discussed here will center around the paramilitary culture, the use of the "War" metaphor, terrorist incidents in the 1970's, and end with discussing why this new type of social control is significant at the present time in society. The next chapter will outline the methods
employed for this thesis to obtain data concerning police tactical units. The following two chapters will look at the results of the study and have been broken down into two questions, Who are they? and What do they do? In these chapters we explore police service demographic information, tactical Unit demographics, the practice of rotation and length of time spent in tactical service as well as the date of unit formation and the rationale for their formation, training and selection, tactical deployments, proactive patrol, and their finances. The closing chapter will draw upon the data presented and attempt to reconcile tactical and community policing. Afterwards remarks will be made pertaining to the future implications of Tactical Law Enforcement into the next century.
Chapter Two: Theorizing about Tactical Law Enforcement

In this chapter we will endeavor to theorize about several issues surrounding not only Police Tactical Units, but also the police institution itself. There are three sections here organized along historical lines. The purpose of the first section is to illustrate to the reader that the origins of policing were based upon the military model, resulting in the police being a paramilitarized organization. Military influences upon policing leading up to and after the formation of modern police services will be explored. This will illustrate that, particularly in Canada, the link between the police and the military is more real than perceived. To answer this, we will review those who police Canada, paying particular attention to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police due to their prominence in Canadian law enforcement.

At times the explanatory theorizing concerning the proliferation of police tactical units, as the reader will see, is at the onset tenuous at best.\textsuperscript{8} The second section reviews the current theoretical literature at the end of which, we offer an alternate plausible theoretical explanation for the origins of these units in Canada. Beginning with the formation of the first SWAT team in Los Angeles and ending with the 1976 Montreal Olympics we will see what has influenced the policing institution to form these units and conclude with the significance of this

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{8} Kraska and Cubellis (1997) note that valid theory testing and model building is arduous due to the storage of relevant longitudinal and national-level data.}
new type of social control. The last section will review the current status of research in the United States by Peter Kraska and his colleagues and what literature there is in Canada.

**Military Foundations of Policing**

The police paramilitary organizational structure is modeled after military special operations teams, in that they “operate and train collectively under a quasi-military command structure” (Jefferson: 1990:324). Thus, we can assume that paramilitary units are a derivation from the military model. “Assuming that the police structure could be anything but paramilitary, denies the existence of the hereditary connection the police share historically, politically and sociologically with the military” (Kraska and Kappeler: 1997:2). Austin Turk clarifies this hereditary bond in his discussion regarding the formation of civilian forces within emerging states. “As military dominance and jurisdiction are achieved in emerging governments, authorities consolidate their position by instituting a system in which internal control is accomplished by the process of policing instead of the more costly, more overt, and less efficient one of military control” (Turk: 1982:21). We can say, then, that the role of the police in a society is to buttress the state’s need for control of its citizenry, thereby becoming “specialists in violence” to maintain the state’s authority.

Prior to the formation of the first police force in 1829 in London, England, there were two major agencies that maintained civil order in society. First was the military, as “the army was frequently used to suppress domestic violence.... A
major reason for continued military participation in policing was the need to deal with widespread, prolonged, or severe outbursts of violence by large numbers of people" (Bayley: 1985:42). Since military units are utilized primarily to defend communities externally, their use domestically, which has occurred almost everywhere historically, represents an imperfect specialization in policing (Bayley:1985:40). The second force to be used in maintaining peace in society was the militia, typically made up of local men who were called upon to suppress larger scale disorders. "But their loyalties and good sense precluded action whenever a large segment of the population was involved in the disorder. Often they were not even called, for members of the elite themselves sometimes supported and led riots" (ILEC:1982:21). Consequently, as the military became overzealous, and the militia unreliable when dealing with the public, the stage was set for the modern age of policing to fill a void that others were unable to fill.

Peel's Two Traditions

Any time that the words "police" and "military" are used in the same sentence, it tends to become a politically charged matter. In fact, the first modern police agencies and the military had much more in common than most would think. Sir Robert Peel has been principally remembered for his role in the founding of the London Metropolitan Police in 1829, which has since been the used as a model for policing in Canada, the United States and many other countries where the United Kingdom has had influence. The first commissioners of the modern police services were 'battle-hardened' military officers, as were
many of the police officers who enlisted with them. It is interesting that an organization formed out of an acute fear of military control, would be established so closely along military lines. "Policing literature rarely examines police/military connections except when lamenting the poor decision made by policing's forefathers in choosing the traditional paramilitary police model" (Kraska and Kappeler: 1997:2).

**Military Policing**

In 1812, Sir Robert Peel became the Chief Secretary for Ireland. It was during this time he formed the Irish Peace Preservation Force the forerunner of the Royal Irish Constabulary and the modern Royal Ulster Constabulary. "This Peace Preservation Force was intended as an experiment to provide emergency response to real and anticipated disruption in the rural areas" (McKenna: 1998:4). It is a much neglected fact that Peel created his prototype of policing prior to his formation of the London Metropolitan Police. It was through this Irish organization that Peel refined his concept of policing. He left Ireland in 1818 to become the British Home Secretary in 1822 and through the Constabulary Act, Peel reformed the Irish Peace Preservation Force into 'The Constabulary of Ireland'. This Act allowed for the first time the systematic establishment of an organized police force on a national level. To signify this new unity, the members of the force were removed from their home areas and were required to relocate to counties where neither they nor their spouses had relatives or close connections. From its inception the Irish constabulary was a barracked force. It
was thinly spread throughout the country, with only four or five policemen to each barrack. At first, the constabulary continued to wear an inconsistent uniform. Some members were returning soldiers from the Napoleonic Wars. Consequently a variety of military uniforms were worn, but by 1828 a standard dress was developed (Mackenna: 1998).

Some authors (Mackenna: 1998; Marquis: 1997) have noted that Sir Robert Peel used Ireland as a "laboratory" for police system development. In effect, The Royal Irish Constabulary has become a model for the establishment for future police agencies throughout the United Kingdom and ultimately in the developing colonies of the British Empire such as Canada. Greg Marquis, has documented that many members of the Royal Irish Constabulary upon their migration to Canada served not only with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and its predecessor the North West Mounted Police, but also with police services in Toronto, Montreal, Quebec City, British Columbia, and Newfoundland among others. (Marquis:1997) It is hard to dismiss the influence that this force had upon the development of Canadian policing when many of the major police forces during their infancy where staffed with Royal Irish Constabulary veterans.

Civilian Policing

Later that century in 1829, Peel established the London Metropolitan Police force in Britain. "This innovation became the model for urban policing and enhanced the cause for public policing" (McKenna:1998:4). He believed that ultimately police must be stable, efficient, and organized, consistent with military
rationale. Peel also singled out former non-commissioned officers in the military as being "particularly suited for inclusion in the department" (Auten:1986:67). Some of the first commissioners of this new police force had previously served as British army officers. Naturally, someone arriving from such an organization would look to the past success of military structure in developing this new police force (Auten:1986:68). Peel also realized that there should be discernible differences between the military and the police, not only philosophically but also visibly. Hence, he took great care to distinguish the police from the military. Since the military wore red coats and carried firearms, the police would wear blue coats and would not be issued firearms but rather batons. This had not been the case in Ireland where the constables wore military uniforms and carried weapons (Mackenna: 1998). Hence the two traditions. Society found itself with an organization which was militaristic, but not connected to the military. The police, from its earliest beginnings, were given the hereditary genes to mature into a paramilitary organization. These two traditions of military and civilian policing have plagued modern police agencies and have resulted in a convergence culminating in the formation of Police Tactical Units.

In the United States, where police structure was less "military" in nature than the British system, corruption became widespread and departments became grossly inefficient in the early part of this century (Auten:1986:68). "To correct these deficiencies in organization and operations, police reformers turned to the military model as a foundation upon which the police structure could be established, thus, hoping to eliminate corruption. As a result the legacy of the
Peelian model has continued to dominate American policing" (Auten: 1986:68).

While there has been a separation from the military in some countries such as the United States, Canada and Great Britain, it still tends to play a central role in the policing of others. For example, in continental Europe, there are numerous police forces that are controlled by civilian authorities, while the military retains control over budget, recruitment and training. Some examples of this would be the Italian Carabinieri, the Spanish Guardia Service, and the French Gendarmerie (Bayley: 1985:41).

Military Influences Upon Canadian Policing

If we are to examine tactical law enforcement in Canada, a central issue becomes, who is responsible for policing in Canada? There are three levels of government within the Dominion of Canada; Federal, Provincial and Municipal with police forces operating at each level. While there are hundreds of municipal police forces in Canada at the end of the 20th century there are only two true provincial police forces: Ontario and Quebec. While Newfoundland does have a provincial police force it does not encompass all of the province's territory, only several highly populated areas; the rest of the province is policed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.9

The origins of the Ontario Provincial Police force dates back to the last half of the last century where as in many colonies, the role of policing was carried out by local citizens. "In 1864, by order-in-council a constabulary force was

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9 Other provinces such as Manitoba, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and the Atlantic provinces also at one time or another had provincial police forces. They all however, have turned over provincial policing duties to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
created in Essex County in Upper Canada, a "frontier" police with constables named by the magistrate" (Forcese:1992:21). Over the next forty-five years, these frontier police became Provincial Constables and in 1909 the Ontario Provincial Police was founded. Similar to other police forces, the Ontario Provincial Police had a strong military influence. "The early commissioners had military backgrounds, with two successors coming from the British and Canadian services...new recruits largely came from military service" (Forcese:1992:22)

Today the force is the third largest in Canada, with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force respectively being the two largest. The second largest Provincial force is the Sûreté du Québec, originally founded in 1870, but with limited authority and duties. It has grown, however into a modern police force with a "full range of tasks including intelligence operation, with labour/political surveillance role similar to that which the RCMP has played historically" (Forcese:1992:22).

When the Canadian West was being settled in the late 19th century, a report by a young British army officer, William Butler "recommended sending a military force from 150 to 250 mounted riflemen to establish law and order in the west...a Canadian military officer was later sent to review the recommendation; he agreed with the original report and suggested that the new constabulary should wear red coats, in order to resemble the British Army that the Indians of the area had grown to trust" (Kelly:1973:15). This was exactly what Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald had envisaged in 1869; a police force with a military bearing (Marquis:1997). Whether this ideal of police-militarism was
shared by the rest of the Canadian government is not clear. History has shown that “Military, rather than police experience (not to mention political suitability) seems to have dictated the governments selection of North West Mounted Police commissioners” (Marquis:209:1997). This selection of military officers was not only directed to the command officers but also to constables who were deliberately recruited from the graduates of Canada’s Royal Military College and from active militia officers (Marquis:1997).

In 1920, when the Royal North West Mounted Police and the Dominion Police amalgamated, difficulties arose due to the military nature of the Mounted Police (Brown and Brown:1978). Indeed, section 56 of the current Canadian Criminal Code states that any one who:

(a) persuades or counsels a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to desert or absent himself without leave,

(b) aids, assists, harbours or conceals a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who he knows is a deserter or absentee without leave, or

(c) aids or assists a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to desert or absent himself without leave, knowing that the member is about to desert or absent himself without leave,

is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

R.S., 1999, c. C-46, s. 56; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 8.

Further still, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 1999 that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police may not unionize, which would prevent them from striking and making it illegal to strike. This is the only police agency in Canada, which may
not associate regionally or otherwise. This affirms the need for an essential national service by the government of Canada, even though RCMP members are compensated on the same basis as other large municipal police services (Forcese: 1992).

Shortly after the amalgamation of the Dominion and the Royal North West Mounted Police, the new Royal Canadian Mounted police which was under the control of the Department of Justice was very nearly transferred to the control of the military (see Macgillivray:1985). The political purpose of this was to give the Canadian Government one undivided force under the control of a single branch of the government rather than several in times of Aid to the Civil Powers or in times of emergency. In the end it was decided not to include the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in the Department of National Defence.

The modern Royal Canadian Mounted Police is a nation-wide federal police agency, which has the primary duty of contract policing in all provinces and territories of Canada with the exception of Ontario and Quebec. This arrangement provides for a source of experienced personnel to assist in major investigations, emergencies and special events where increased resources are required. As aforementioned, this sometimes mythological force has its traditions in the military and at times takes on external duties which have traditionally been done by the military. The RCMP today sends squads of its members who volunteer across the world to be United Nations’ peacekeepers, helping restore order to troubled countries around the world. This modern practice began in 1989.
with the first UN mission to Namibia.

From our discussion it becomes clear that the institution now called the Royal Canadian Mounted Police has its origins in the British army, especially the Calvary, and the majority of its original members, be it senior or junior officers, were from the military or had a military background.11

**Origins of Tactical Law Enforcement**

Kraska and Kappeler (1997) give the common sense explanation that the Police Tactical Unit phenomenon is a reflection of a rational response to crime in modern society. While this may be the case, we must, nevertheless, first recognize, as the American literature does, that the shadow of the military model still haunts contemporary policing despite the rhetoric of democratic reforms of community and problem-oriented policing (Kraska and Kappeler: 1997, Kraska and Cubellis: 1997, Kraska and Paulsen: 1997). Kraska and Cubellis argue the point, based upon their research, that “In learning that a component of the police institution is reorganizing itself into and conducting operations that could be characterized as militaristic, we find strong support for the thesis that the military model is still a powerful force guiding the ideology and activities of American police” (Kraska and Cubellis:622). Curiously some critical factors such as the rise of “terrorism” during the 1970’s have been neglected by the American literature.

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10 To put this into historical context, the Canadian government between 1867 and 1933 called upon Canadian military to come to the Aid of the Civil Power on at least 133 separate occasions (Pariseau: 1973)

11 As a side note, members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police today are prohibited to enter the military in a reserve capacity while being a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Also an officer with the rank higher than Staff Sargent receives a commission from the Queen the same as an officer in the Canadian Armed Forces would.
Instead, it has consistently focused upon three contributing factors that have caused the expansion of police tactical units. A paramilitary culture that seems to perpetuate itself in American popular culture, the "War" metaphor that has manifested itself in the current "drug war", and lastly a shift in the state administration of violence. Let us begin with the American paramilitary culture and the war on drugs, then later examine the Canadian situation and conclude with the significance of this new type of social control.

The Genesis of SWAT

Sociologist Rodney Stark conducted a study of police riots in 1972. I have chosen a passage from his work that illustrates a comparison between the regular military, the militia or what the American's call their National Guard and municipal police. The excerpt shows the differences among these three organizations in using violent measures of social control during the 1967 Detroit riot.

Responsibility was divided between U.S. Army paratroops on one side and a combination of Detroit police and National Guard on the other. The Guard proved as untrained and unreliable as the police and between the two forces thousands of rounds of ammunition were expended and perhaps 30 persons were killed, while disorder continued. In paratrooper territory only 201 rounds of ammunition were fired, mostly in the first several hours before stricter fire discipline was imposed, and only one person was killed. Within a few hours, according to the Kerner Commission testimony, quiet and order were restored in the section of the paratroop jurisdiction... The army had ordered the light back on and the troopers to show themselves as conspicuously as possible; the police and guardsmen shot wildly and often at one another. The troopers were ordered to unload their weapons and did so. The guardsmen were so ordered, but did not comply. The police logged hundreds of reports of sniper fire, the Army logged only ten such reports (Stark1972:128-29).
The crucial question now becomes, Why? In retrospect we can see that the professional soldiers were well disciplined and capable in a high stress situation while the guardsmen and police were not. The commanding officer at the riot stated that the key to quelling a riot is with "calm", determined professional soldiers. This passage illustrates that the police during this period in the United States were failing at social control. Further, the military especially, highly trained units such the above-mentioned paratroopers, seemed able to succeed were the police had not.

The initial response by police strategists to the preceding situations during the 1960's has been described as follows:

Initially, police strategists responding to the crises of the 1960's relied mainly on adapting already tried and tested managerial and military principles to problems of domestic 'order'. The result was a concentration of money and research on the development of improved technology, especially in weapons...usually borrowed from the military. Although from the beginning some lip service was paid to the need for subtle approaches involved "community relations,"...the overall thrust was toward reorganizing the police as an effective combat organization (ILEC:1982:76).

This resulted in special training programs offered by the army in the handling of civil disorders for domestic police, the evolution of the International Chiefs of Police Bomb Detection School, new weaponry and technological systems which were all designed to counter the "threat from within" (ILEC: 1982:93). However, such instances as the 1967 Detroit riot were becoming all too frequent, as America later watched the borough of Watts in Los Angeles burn in flames on
television for several days.

If there was one incident in American history that can be considered the birth date of the police tactical unit, it occurred on August 1, 1966. In Austin Texas a man named Charles Whitman using a high-powered rifle indiscriminately killed fifteen people and wounded over thirty more from his position atop a clock tower at the University of Texas. Prior to his killing spree, he had also killed his wife and mother. The country was still in shock over the murder of eight nurses by Richard Speck only weeks earlier in Chicago.

But more than this, police chiefs across the country in 1966 were on edge from the recent riots in Watts, and from the simmering violence they knew was ready to erupt at any moment in many of American's inner-city neighborhoods. On top of this, the growing antiwar feeling in the country in 1966 threatened to turn violent (Snow: 1996:6).

As with the influence carried by the United Kingdom in policing in Canada, so has the Los Angeles Police Department played an instrumental part in North American policing development. Much of this influence originates with Chief William H. Parker “who shaped a department that throughout the 1950’s and the early 1960’s, and was considered a model for others…but he had done so by developing an efficient and semi-military organization” (Skolnick and Fyfe:1993:77). That being said, it should not be surprising that this environment would be the birthplace of “SWAT”. The establishment of the first, Police Tactical Units in the United States took place in 1967 by the Los Angeles Police Department, which was to be a precursor of a trend.

This unit code-named SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics), was the brain-child of Daryl Gates, a former Marine who would later became the Police...
Chief of Los Angeles. The development of this SWAT unit, the first of its kind, was in response to the Watts riots a year earlier in a suburb of Los Angeles to combat the perceived domestic unrest and "in particular the emergence of the sniper as threat to police operations, the appearance of the political assassin and the threat of urban guerrilla warfare...Many police officers were being killed due to carelessness and poor training" (ILEC:1982:93).

The initial SWAT officers were trained by United States Marines at Marine base Camp Pendleton. Presently, SWAT team members train their own officers, who go through an extensive and rigorous screening process. "Many SWAT members have had military experience and all are volunteers, they see themselves as a military unit fighting a domestic war..." (ILEC:1982:94). In fact this unit was formed shortly after the Texas incident and carried out operations against "urban guerrillas" such as the Black Panthers in 1969 and the Symbionese Liberation Army in 1973 which gained widespread publicity when they kidnapped Patty Hearst, from her Berkeley apartment. These Los Angeles operations encouraged other police departments which had previously hesitated to form their own tactical unit. These "terrorist" groups combined with government officials declaring "War on Crime" were all catalysts for the development of PTU's in the United States. Herein lies a potential problem: should military skills, expressly skills used in managing violence, be used in a civilian setting?
The Paramilitary Culture

As aforementioned, the Los Angeles Police Department has played a role in police development, in part, due to the media. In 1975, there were twenty police television programs, seven of which were clearly based in Los Angeles, three were based in New York and the remainder in various states. One of these television shows was SWAT which debuted on February 24, 1975 (ILEC: 1982: 10). This was the first time that many members of the general public were exposed to the concept of a police tactical unit, not only in the United States but also in Canada, Mexico and other countries that aired the show. For thirty-eight episodes the exploits of the "Special Weapons And Tactics unit of the West California Police Department, a group of five Vietnam war veterans whose military training and weaponry allowed them to tackle urban-jungle criminals such as snipers and terrorists for whom the regular police were ill-prepared" (www.epguides.com). This show had been loosely modeled after the Los Angeles Police Department's own unit and once again we can see the influence that this police agency wields. This television program was highly successful and added to the myth of tactical units, and more than likely started America's infatuation with Police Tactical Units. In the same vein as the fictional television series, real life shows such as COPS, and numerous programs concerning these units made by television networks have permeated popular culture (Kraska: 1995)

The American literature argues that to understand the state of militarism in American policing, the growth of a paramilitary culture in the United States
especially during the Ronald Reagan and George Bush Administrations together with the end of the Cold War must be considered (Gibson: 1994, Hamm:1993, Kraska: 1996, Kraska and Kappeler:1997). It should be pointed out that there are two separate existing sub-cultures of the paramilitary culture. First, there is the American paramilitary sub-culture which is best characterized in the media through popular culture movies, television programs and printed literature. The second, is a relatively powerful Tactical Law Enforcement community which is comprised of active and retired police and at times military officers. Kraska and his colleagues do not make the distinction between “paramilitary” police and civilian culture; rather they lump them together.

_Warrior Dreams_ (1994) by J. Gibson has informed much of Kraska’s work. Gibson believes that a ubiquitous culture of paramilitarism has risen during the last two decades. Indications of this include the popularity of paramilitary themes in films movies, politics, and the news media during the 1980s; the rise of PTU’s at the federal and local levels; the popularity of military special operations teams such as the Navy SEALs, the Army Rangers and the Delta Force; the rise of informal/paramilitary groups and the paramilitarism found in some urban gangs (Kraska and Kappeler: 1997). The United States has a hierarchy of specialized units with military special operations squads with units such as the Navy SEALs, Marine Force Re-Con and Army Delta Force followed by the FBI and BATF police paramilitary teams; then large metropolitan paramilitary units, and, finally PTU’s in smaller locales (Kraska: 1996, Kraska and Cubelliis:1997). Kraska, through his field work has documented:
magazines and literature from the practicing SWAT community which have demonstrated that the highly popular militaristic subculture surrounding military special operations teams... also provides the central ideological fuel driving Police Paramilitary Unit subculture (Kraska:1999:143).

The allure of police paramilitary subculture stems from the enjoyment, excitement, high status, and male camaraderie that accompany the heavy weapons, new technologies, dangerous assignments, and heightened anticipation of using force in most PTU work. (Kraska 1996, Kraska and Paulsen 1997, Kraska and Cubellis 1997). This suggests that there is a strong civilian based subculture in the United States society as well as another powerful subculture comprised of police officers who are members of a police tactical unit.

While the Kraska and Kappeler suggestion of a paramilitary sub-culture may seem viable it does not explain a rise in Canadian of PTUs, nor in other parts of the world such as Europe which do not have a paramilitary sub-culture as prominent as in the United States. Now that we have discussed the American paramilitary sub-culture, we will now examine the other part of this subculture, what I term the Tactical Law Enforcement Community. In 1983 a group of tactical officers formed what is now called the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA). This has developed into a relatively large community of over ten-thousand tactical officers including members from Canada. This organization publishes its own periodical and provides a wide range of training courses relating to Tactical Units. The NTOA offers numerous courses throughout the United States and the following are some of the courses offered: Basic SWAT, Containment & Movement Training, Advanced SWAT Tactics, Less Lethal
Projectiles, Instructor Certification, Policing the Militia, Civil Liability & Critical Incident Response Seminar, High Risk Warrant Service Training Urban Rifle for Patrol Officers, Tactical Emergency Medical Support, Booby Trap & Explosive Recognition, and a 6 Day MP5 Instructor Certification Training.

The last course mentioned relating to the 6 Day MP5 Instructor Certification Training for police is of particular pertinence to our discussion. The side arm of choice for most tactical units is the Heckler and Koch MP5 (HKMP5). Its technical details are not important here, but this is the same weapon issued to military Special Forces. The American literature alludes to the fact that the HKMP5 is used by Police Tactical Units because of its use in the military. This has given one company a strong hold on the "Tactical Market". Even in Canada a tactical community has formed in Ontario, called the Ontario Tactical Advisory Body, that operates on a similar, albeit, smaller scale than the NTOA. Through the formation of these units a "Tactical Market" has forged itself around them. This is not to say that Police Tactical Units, were formed to support an economic market; however, it is clear that the rise of PTUs has allowed an ever increasing "Tactical Market" to be formed.

In order to clarify what I mean by the Tactical Law Enforcement Community, I have chosen to examine the NTOA since it is the largest tactical

12 In a debate between Peter Kraska and Peter Waddington the MP5 was a topic of contention. One gives a technical explanation the other a describes the prestige of such a weapon. Through my research for this paper I encountered a ballistics expert, who explained to me that the Heckler and Koch Company has an agreement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to supply these weapons at a reduced cost to NATO countries and that the weapon also had a low penetration rate giving the police added assurance that their weapons will hit the target and not penetrate further.
law enforcement organization in the world. Other groups, of course, have grown up, as for example the Ontario Tactical Advisory Board. In addition regional tactical police associations in the United States similar to the NTOA have formed. On the international stage the International Association of Chief’s of Police have also begun to offer tactical training and equipment. Besides these non-profit police organizations there are numerous private companies that offer tactical courses to police tactical units as well as to the general public. Furthermore Kraska (1996) has noted that companies that once sold equipment solely to the military are now selling to police services. In an equipment advertisement in a leading police magazine there was a caption reading “from the Gulf War to the Drug War” (Kraska:1996).

The War Metaphor

Politicians, media, and government officials joined in fueling the drug hysteria during the 1980’s, leading Congress and two presidents to transform drug war discourse into tangible militarized action. This provided a new rationale for aggressive use of state sponsored violence and by the early 1990’s all branches of the U.S. military where involved (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). The U.S. data show that “increases in paramilitary deployments began in 1988 at the apex of the drug war activity and hysteria” (Kraska and Cubellis 1997:623). The government rhetoric surrounding the drug war was centered on national security and combined with the end of the cold war it provided the rationale for the reallocation of military resources. "The U.S. military in an attempt to become
"socially useful" in the post-cold era is donating or selling a massive amount of military weaponry, surplus, and technology to the police institution" (Kraska 1999:143).

The "War" metaphor has been used by a number of American Presidents for a variety of reasons. It was first employed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in the 1950's. It would be typical for a man who was a career military officer to employ such a phrase. He had rallied the troops to win the war in Europe and could now rally the police to win the war on crime. President Lyndon Johnson, was the first to declare war on drugs in the 1960's, then followed by Richard Nixon declaring War on Drugs in 1969, Ronald Reagan declaring War on Drugs in 1982, and George Bush declaring War on Drugs in 1989 (Hazlett:1993). The American presidents since the middle of this century have had a mandate to win the war on either crime or drugs. "Indeed by the time of Bush's 1989 announcement, the drug war had been so often and loudly declared that citizens might wonder when it began or might end" (Sherry:1995:445). This weakens Kraska argument, that the drug war caused the increase in Police Tactical Unit formation, but it does provide an excuse for the expansion of these unit's activities. If the drug war was the primary reason for expansion of these unit's activities then it would have begun well before the 1980's. What his research does point to is that the end of the Cold War did cause a problem for the American military. What do we do now, since the Cold War is over? The answer seemed simple: thrust the American military against the most evil social problem to plague the United States, drugs. The end of the Cold War merged with the
Drug War provided a new situation and rationale for not only military tactics but for more military resources to be allocated in combating the drug war. The Military-Civil Affairs committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police went "on record in support of cooperative training programs between military and civil law enforcement communities" (Lockett and Conroy:1989:22), creating a new partnership between the military and the police in countering the drug problem (Kraska and Kappeler:1997).

A good example of this partnership is the role NORAD (North American Aerospace Defence Command), played and still plays in this partnership. In 1991 it was given a mandate to use its resources to detect and monitor air traffic suspected of carrying illegal drugs into Canada and the United States. The U.S. government consulted with the Canadian government on the counter-drug mission and Canada fully concurred with proposed NORAD drug interdiction efforts. In cooperation with U.S. drug law enforcement agencies and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, NORAD monitors all air traffic approaching the coast of Canada. Any aircraft that has not filed a flight plan may be directed by Canadian NORAD resources to land and be inspected by the RCMP and Customs Canada (www.norad.com).

Canadian sociologist Dennis Forcese, draws an interesting parallel of the "drug war" and one that influenced early policing in England:

The "war on drugs," dramatically promoted in the United States and happily embraced in Canada by politicians and law enforcement officers, may be seen in part as a pseudo-medical excuse for additional intrusions to control class and racial minorities, just as in the nineteenth century England the creation of the London Metropolitan Police was part of the
war on gin and drunkenness among the unruly “dangerous classes” (Forcese: 1997: 151).

While the parallel is interesting, it does suggest that when the state is unable to deal with current social problems it will resort to more extreme forms of social control to solve the problem. This seems to be magnified during this incarnation of the “drug war”, since the end of the cold war in both Canada and the United States military resources are being used in association with the law enforcement community. Needless to say we should not consider the War metaphor the only reason for the rise and expansion of Police Tactical Units, but the Drug War combined with the end of the Cold War has been a major influence in the mandate expansion of Police Tactical Units.

The Canadian Situation

Unlike the United States which had a disenfranchised population that led to the riots of 1967 in Detroit and Watts, Canada did not encounter violent social unrest on the same scale. During the late sixties and early seventies Canada was prone to labour unrest and a separatist movement in the province of Quebec. While there were many strikes during that time the Quebec General Strike in 1972 seemed to be the most memorable although not comparable to the violence and social unrest of the Watts riots. Canada has had its labour problems and the police were frequently used as “strike breakers” (Brown and Brown: 1978) yet Canadian police tactical units did not arise due to labour unrest. Rather, two violent “terrorist actions” on two continents would have an effect on
Canada that would be felt until today.

The extant literature has proposed several explanations for the rise in tactical law enforcement that would seem to be American centric and not all would apply directly to Canadian Society. Canada while heavily influenced socially, politically, culturally and militarily by its neighbor south of the border, does not have a "para-military" culture as found in the United States. The use of the "War" metaphor, be it for crime or drugs is not a common statement declared by Canadian politicians or Police Chiefs or used in common prevalence as it is in the United States.

It may be useful to keep in mind that these units are the pinnacle in managing "high risk situations" in society. While the situations to follow can be defined as "terrorist", it is also feasible to define them solely as "high risk situations". For the purposes of this paper and as it pertains to the police, for a situation to be a "high risk situation" it must have two components: first, there must be a real or perceived threat to human life, and or to the status quo; second, the situations must be beyond the training and scope of the frontline, or the greater community of, law enforcement officers.

Front de Liberation du Quebec

The Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) in 1968 began a bombing campaign which would last until 1970 climaxing in events which marked a dark period of Canadian history. The FLQ was not going to confine this bombing campaign solely to Quebec; the national capital, Ottawa, and the National Defence Headquarters also became targets. Military analysis suggested that the
FLQ was conducting a five-stage Maoist revolutionary war doctrine which had been successful in Cuba and Algeria: mass organization; political mobilization; armed resistance; preparations for mobile warfare; and national liberation (Maloney: 1997).

In October of 1970, the FLQ stepped up their terrorist activities with two political kidnappings. Under the National Defence Act on October 15, 1970, Canadian troops entered Montreal and other highly populated areas. The next day the federal government invoked the War Measures Act, which would suspend civil liberties and declare the FLQ an illegal organization.

This was an extraordinary moment in Canadian history: the War Measures Act had been invoked during peace time by the federal government. The Act had been proclaimed only twice before, in 1914 and 1939, during the two world wars. As a matter of law once the War Measures Act is invoked, the Dominion of Canada was considered to be in a state of war. This affected the entire country, although the terrorist situation was centered in Montreal and believed to be confined to Quebec. No one could have predicted the results of this proclamation. This Act gave special powers to the police and military: "Anyone suspected of having participated in FLQ activities could be arrested and detained without warrant and those arrested could be detained up to twenty-one days without charges, and up to ninety days without trial (Kelly and Kelly: 1976:153). Between October 16, 1970 and January 4, 1971, almost five hundred people were arrested and jailed without hearing. There were also cases of police chiefs in some western provinces who had decided to use the suspension of civil
liberties to crackdown on harmless counter culture groups (Maloney:1997). This was to last until January 4 1971 when Military operations in Quebec were terminated and the War Measures Act was repealed. Since the end of what has been called the October Crisis the FLQ has not conducted any terrorist operations.

The governmental authority to proclaim the War Measures Act is a testimonial to the power that the federal government has to replace ordinary law with a more restrictive one when deemed necessary in the national interest (Kelly and Kelly:169). While many Canadian's were in favor of the measures taken by the government, this situation provokes several lines of inquiry. A provincial government was unable to deal with public disorder. This lack of control resulted in drastic measures being taken by the federal government, which led to a loss of civil liberties.

Munich Olympics

Just over a year after the end of the crisis in Quebec, another critical incident took place that, while it may not have been an important factor for the formation of these units in the United States, it has been for Canada and other Western Nations. In 1972, during the Munich Olympics in Germany, a "terrorist" action took place which was both heinous and dramatic. Members of the Palestinian terrorist group Black September stormed into the Olympic village and took most of the Israeli contingent hostage. Two of the Israeli athletes were killed inside the village. The remaining nine along with the terrorists themselves
were killed at the airport. This terrible end came when a vain attempt by the German police to release them at the Munich airport failed as the terrorists were about to leave. If there is one event that can be considered the starting point of the rise of police tactical units, it is the Munich Olympics (PTUI: 1988, Neillands 1998, Katz: 1998). "This event and several less dramatic ones convinced various western powers that standing forces should be created for such incidents, cobbling together a reaction force when a terrorist action was in progress left to much too chance - as in Munich - could lead to tragedy" (Neillands 1998:208).

As Kraska and Kappeler's (1997) data indicate, there was a sharp increase in PTU formations after this incident. They fail to mention, however, this event as a causal variable. In defence of this oversight, the Munich Olympics was not a major concern for the United States, but it was for Canada because the next Olympics were to be held in Montreal, in 1976. The province of Ontario saw an increase, in the formation of these units shortly after the 1972 but before the 1976 Olympics. This also occurred in Europe; Germany formed the GSG-9, in France the national Gendarmerie established the Groupe d'Intervention Gendarmerie Nationale, Italy created the Gruppo de Intervento Speciale and the Austrians assembled GEK Cobra. Israel also established similar units to deal with internal terrorist incidents (Calahan: 1995). All these units were formed as a result of the incident at the Munich Olympics. Some of these units are under military command of their respective governments, some are under police jurisdiction. In several cases, for example, Germany, due to GSG-9's national mandate have caused police departments to develop what they call
Spezialeinstzkommandos, a mini local version of GSG-9 to deal with “High Risk Situations”.

The preceding situations were not the only acts of “terrorism” that occurred. In fact, “terrorism” gained much publicity in the 1970’s. The world was able to watch, via television, these athletes being killed, as well as viewing other hostage situations.13 All in someway contributed to the worldwide rise in formation of these units being formed (Katz:1998). A terrorist threat, real or perceived, was provided by the October Crisis and in combination with the impending 1976 Olympic games, provided the womb, which would give birth to the first Canadian Police Tactical Units. Now provincial governments which had such units would be able to deal with “high risk situations” of such a nature, and drastic measures such as calling in the military, would not be the only solution to such a “terrorist” threat, similar to the actions taken by the federal government during the October Crisis.

Jock Young (1999) documents in his path-breaking work, The Exclusive Society that during the past thirty years the vast majority of countries have seen a rise in crime. He writes: “...the rising crime rate has been accompanied by a penumbra of incivilities and crime has become increasingly internecine in its nature” (Young:1999:69). The threat of such ‘high risk situations’ to society has caused “an increasing importance of ‘risk management’ to become apparent in a very wide variety of contexts... evident in international exercises of social control... ideas of ‘risk assessment’ and ‘risk management’ are absolutely central
to the new strategies and tactics of international police organizations" (Taylor: 1999:205). We can include tactical law enforcement as a new form of "risk management" by police administrators. When an unrestrained military becomes involved with law enforcement it, by its very nature, displaces the civilian process. The military is a broadsword not a scalpel, this is why police officers rather than military officers are used internally in a democratic society. Once the military is used under the "War Measures Act" to enforce the law as we saw in the October Crisis, citizens' civil liberties are suspended."

The Significance

The escalation and the increase in PTU's has coincided with demands for the police to reform their operational focus via democratic reforms such as community policing. Police scholars have advocated a change from reacting to individual calls for service by one or two officers to adopting a proactive model, which establishes "teams" of officers that work collectively to "maintain order" or solve "community problems" (Goldstein 1990; Kelling 1988; Trojanwicz and Bucqueroux 1990; Kraska and Cubeilhis 1997).

A guiding principle of Community Policing was to bring police officers back to the community, and remove them from their patrol cars and assign them to walking beats. While there are many diverse definitions of community policing, it boils down to police treating a neighborhood the way a security guard treats a client's property (Sherman: 1995:339). It is not important that we evaluate

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14. The 1999 military coup in Pakistan however, has shown that a military need not necessarily be repressive. This brings us to the significance of these police tactical units in a free society, which is
community policing here, but mainly to examine the relationship between tactical law enforcement and community policing. Tojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1989:3) describe community policing as the:

... first major reform in policing since the departments embraced scientific management principles more than half a century ago. It is a major dramatic change in the way police departments interact with the public, a new philosophy that broadens the police mission from narrow focus on crime to a mandate that encourages the police to explore creative solutions for a host of community concerns, including crime, fear of disorder, and neighborhood decay.

A commander of a PTU interviewed by Kraska and Kappeler commented that community and tactical policing are symbiotically linked.

We conduct a lot of saturation patrol. We do terry stops and aggressive field interviews. These tactics are successful as long as the pressure stays on relentlessly. The key to our success is that we're an elite crime fighting team that is not bogged down in the regular bureaucracy. We focus on the quality of life issues like illegal parking, loud music, bums, neighbor troubles. We have the freedom to stay in a hot area and clean it up—particularly gangs. Our tactical enforcement team works nicely with our departments emphasis on community policing (Kraska and Kappeler:1997:13).

It would seem that pro-active patrolling Police Tactical Units have accomplished this. Perhaps as the above-mentioned PTU commander suggested, PTUs are symbolically linked to community based policing. At first glance one might assume that a trend towards "para-militarization" must be in opposition to the community policing "revolution". In the real world of policing, some police officials are interpreting the reformers' call to adopt a proactive stance, and to "actively create a climate of order" (Bayley:1996), as being a call to develop more currently calling for more democratic reforms in policing.
aggressive, or perhaps a more para-militaristic approach to law. It would seem that while tactical and community policing are philosophically contradictory, they are in harmony operationally.

**High Risk Managers**

Kraska and Cubellis (1997) contend that the rise in these units is a signal towards larger shifts in formal social control and that this phenomenon can be understood by the structure of these units. PTU's are deployed to deal with situations that police agencies perceive as requiring a team of officers with a strong focus on the threatened or actual use of violence. They argue that this is a shift away from an individual with discretionary powers, with respect to using violence, to a team oriented policing which uses collective violence. “Street-level policing has always been individually based, discretionary and unregulated” (Bittner 1970; Skolnick 1966; Kraska and Cubellis 1997: 624). Kraska and Cubellis (1997) compare this phenomenon to a trend occurring in U.S. corrections, which they believe cross-validates the notion that paramilitary units may indicate modernizing changes in the handling of violence by social control agents in the larger criminal justice apparatus (Christie 1994; Feeley and Simon 1992; Kraska and Cubellis 1997). Correctional administrators have begun to develop their own paramilitary units modeled after police and military special units to deal with serious inmate disturbances. In the past few years, they have expanded their mandate to include cell searches, lesser inmate disturbances, “extractions” of inmates of cells, and the forced administration of medicines
While the American literature suggests that a new type of social control is being developed via the development of Police Tactical Units and it is taking place within a macro shift in social control, they neglect, however, to take this line of inquiry further, a step which is truly needed to explain the phenomenon of tactical law enforcement. A body of knowledge has developed over the past decade or so that has centered around a transition from the neo-classicist to a new administrative or actuarial criminology, commonly called “risk” discourse (Young:1999). This perspective explains, in a post-fordist society, crime as being an unavoidable side effect when the-less-than perfect human is presented with an opportunity to misbehave. This line of thought is useful in explaining the rise of PTUs in society.

The task is to create barriers to restrict such opportunities and to construct a crime prevention policy which minimizes risks and limits the damage. An actuarial approach is adopted which is concerned with the calculation of risk rather than either individual guilt or motivation (Feeley and Simon, 1992,1994; Young:1999:45).

In a seminal article by Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon titled “The New Penology” concerning actuarial discourse, the authors state that “the new penology is markedly less concerned with responsibility, fault, moral sensibility, diagnosis, or intervention and treatment of the individual offender. Rather it is concerned with techniques to identify, classify and manage groupings sorted by dangerousness” (Feeley and Simion:1991:452). In a later article, Simon attributes appeal of actuarial prediction after World War II to the “prestige that
systematic quantitative analyses gained in military use" (1994:172).

There can be no doubt that these units do signal a shift in police tactics to control extremely dangerous and volatile situations. This rise also coincides with a macro-shift in formal social control in society via the utilization of "risk management". These units can be considered the zenith of risk disposal by police administrators. Policing has always been individually based where the lone officer has had the discretionary power to act, but now we see groups of officers acting as a unit, to manage a risky situation. The tactical literature to date use the term "violence specialists" (Kraska and Kappeler:1997). The research to date is not extensive enough to deem these officers experts in producing violence or suppressing it, although as Dennis Stevens (1999) has shown, these units are more likely to prevent violence than to cause it. Perhaps it is more conducive to think of tactical policing not only as an adaptation to conditions of high modernity, in the war against crime (Kraska and Cubellis:1997), but rather as a new form of managing high risk situations in society by police administrators.

The Current Status of Research

The United States today is facing a dramatic increase in the number of PTU's and has seen a rapid expansion of their roles since the early 1980's. In a recently conducted, extensive survey of PTU's in the United States, Peter Kraska and his colleague Victor Kappeler concluded that there was an indication of police militarization in the United States through a rise and normalization of Police Tactical Units.
Of the 548 departments that responded to their survey (there was an 80% response rate) 89.4% served cities with populations of more than 50,000 and have active PTU’s, in comparison to 1982, when only 59% of departments had these units, and in 1990, 78%. Over 20% that did not have such a unit were planning on establishing one over the next few years. "The bulk of these newer units came from smaller municipalities and state police agencies" (Kraska & Kappeler:1997:6). Following the results pertaining to smaller localities of the Kraska and Kappeler (1997) study, a separate study was conducted by Kraska and Cubellis (1997) of police agencies serving 25,000 to 50,000 people. They discovered a more disturbing trend: smaller communities developing PTU’s.

Kraska and Cubellis have labeled this the "militarizing Mayberry" phenomena, after a television show set in a small town (Kraska and Cubellis 1997). The level of PTU activity had more than doubled by 1986, and almost tripled by 1989, and quadrupled by 1995. The study found that the rise by 1995 in paramilitary police activity had increased by 538% (Kraska and Kappeler:1997:6).

In addition to an increase in the number of PTU’s, their roles have also expanded. Traditionally utilized for highly specialized engagements, such as barricaded suspects, hostage situations and dealing with terrorists, the teams are increasingly engaged in traditional police work, especially work related to anti-drug efforts (Kraska & Kappeler:1997:12). The research shows that between 1990 and 1995, PTU’s were deployed in their ‘traditional’ roles on only a small number of occasions. Instead 75% of their activities were devoted to serving "high risk" warrants, such as "no-knock" warrants, but mostly drug searches.
Twenty percent of the departments also use their PTU's as an active patrol unit in "pro-active policing." Since 1982 there has been almost a 300% rise in departments using their units in such a manner (Kraska and Kappeler:1997:9).

It is critical to note that several of the PTU commanders, interviewed were shocked, and others displeased to hear that other departments were patrolling in full tactical gear...a commander commented. As he put it, "I can't blame them, we're a very elite unit, they just want to be distinguishable." The elite self-perception and status granted these police units stems from the high status military special operations groups have in military culture (Kraska and Kappeler: 1997:11).

Cohen (1978:55) has pointed out that the military has encountered certain problems with elite units, such as instances of self-importance. Jealousy and resentment caused by such prominence of elite squads can lead to costly military foolishness and may cause ill feeling between troops.

The Kraska and Kappeler study also saw a correlation between the rise in PTU's, and their activities, following an increase in resources used to fight the anti-drug effort.

During the late 1980's, the Bush administration launched the "Anti-Drug War", and this established new "Joint Task Forces" between the military and civilian police forces, to the point of having the armed forces' elite special operations teams cross-train with U.S. civilian police forces (Kraska and Kappeler: 1997:11).

Joseph McNamara, former Chief of Police in San Jose and Kansas City stated that "It's a very dangerous thing, when you're telling cops they're soldiers and there's an enemy out there, I don't like it all." (Katz:1998:71). Kraska and Kappeler allude to the fact that the new weaponry and paramilitary-style tactics being employed by PTU's is attracting a different kind of officer, "less the cop as a social worker and more the cop as an elite special operations soldier." It was
also found that many PTU’s are being instructed by active and retired U.S. military experts in special operations and they also receive training from the FBI, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and the National Tactical Officers Association (Kraska and Kappeler: 1997:14).

The authors concluded that there were several trends occurring in the United States and not only was there a militarization of the police by the increased rise of these units and their expansion into conventional policing, but that these units themselves have a heightened belief in militarism. The evidence concerning whether these units actually protect the public and other law officials was inconclusive.

Now that we have reviewed the American information, we turn to what Canadian literature exists concerning this type of policing. A library search of Police Tactical Units in Canada revealed that with the exception of newspaper and magazine articles there is very little public literature concerning PTU’s in Canada and there is no government department at any level that keeps statistics on these units. The only publicly-published report concerning PTU’s in Canada was done in 1989 when the Ontario Police Commission was directed by the Solicitor General of Ontario to examine the use of police tactical units in Ontario. The commission was directed to “probe into and make recommendations on police tactical units and the functions assigned to them; the formation, developments and utilization of existing units; the selection and training of personnel and the equipment provided for their use” (P.T.U.I.:1989:1). It should be noted that this report was only initiated after five incidents resulted in fatalities
between 1983 and 1988, in which police tactical units were involved.

PTU's in Ontario began to be formalized in and around 1976. As of 1989, there were 15 PTU's under control by the province or a municipality, with a combined force of 274 men. The average force had 18 men assigned to their units. The largest of these was the Emergency Task Force in Toronto with 48 men followed by the Niagara Regional Police and the Ontario Provincial Police (Table 1).

Table 1: Police Tactical Units in Ontario as of 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police Force</th>
<th>Date of Establishment</th>
<th>Tactical Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niagara Regional Police</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario Provincial Police</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa City Police</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peel Regional Police</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guelph Police Force</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Force</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Toronto Police Force</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brantford City Police</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterloo City Police</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windsor City Police</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>York Regional Police</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halton Regional Police</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingston City Police</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belleville City Police</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham Regional Police</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rise of these units was a direct result of several incident reviews and studies that the Ontario Provincial Police conducted:

In 1968 two Ontario Provincial Police officers... were gunned down in a high risk arrest of a deranged person in Minden, Ontario. A 1975 bungled robbery and hostage incident presented further need for organized and expert response. The 1975 incident involved one, Donald Cline in a mobile hostage incident which might have been contained at the source... These incidents plus world terrorist activity and the upcoming Olympics provided the rationale and impetus for tactics and rescue units. (P.T.U.I.: 1989:34)

The creation of these PTU's would seem to have been the logical response to a "perceived threat in the community" (P.T.U.I.: 1989:34).

There were two areas of concern: The first, terrorist activity, the report found, to have been extremely rare in Canada. This is however incorrect, between "1960 and 1989 there were 366 incidents of domestic terrorism, of which 246 occurred in the 1960's, 64 in the 1970's and 56 in the 1980's. The most prolific periods being, 1961-63, 1968-71, and 1973-1976" (Kellet: 1995:288). What the report should have found was that of the 366 incidents of terrorism only seven took place in Ontario, while the majority had taken place in Quebec and British Columbia. Of these seven acts, all were located in either Ottawa or Toronto (Kellet: 1995:288). This raises the question as to why certain agencies outside these areas with only limited resources still felt it necessary to develop PTU's?

The second area of concern were incidents involving hostage-taking, armed and barricaded persons, and increased gun calls. These high risk
situations seemed to provide the legitimization for the formation of these units (P.T.U.I.: 1989:45). The Ontario Provincial Police created on July 1, 1975, the Police Tactics and Rescue Unit, which was broken down into five teams deployed in Downsview Toronto, Kingston, London, North Bay, and Thunder Bay. As of 1989 the teams were amalgamated into three teams located at London, Barrie, and Belleville (P.T.U.I.: 1989:55). These changes came about due to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) establishing two Emergency Response Teams (ERT) in Ontario at Toronto and Ottawa. These teams were primarily developed to “respond to incidents involving international protected persons” (P.T.U.I.: 1989:55).

The Regional Municipality of Peel implemented their team in 1976 due to the rise of world terrorist activity, and their jurisdiction included Canada’s busiest airport Pearson International Airport. Following this, the Peel and York Regional Police forces assigned “tactical officers to plain clothes patrol in unmarked vehicles” (P.T.U.I.: 1989:67) in the area.

The Metropolitan Toronto Police Force from 1966 to 1975 had rudimentary response to crowd control situations by selecting officers with minimal specialized training. Toward the middle seventies it was established that an increase of dangerous calls involving guns required a more organized and better equipped unit. Thus in 1976 the Emergency Task Force created tactical units to respond to dangerous situations. Crowd control and strike situations were still part of the mandate. By 1980 the modern version of the emergency task force weapons teams was clearly mandated to support the regular patrol function in high risk incidents. These included hostage taking barricaded and armed persons and gun calls (P.T.U.I.: 1989:76).

The rest of the forces in Ontario which have PTU’s were established under
the rationale to deal with "high risk situations" and should be considered as part-time units. "They utilize officers who are assigned to regular patrol divisions and these officers are "borrowed" from their assigned duties for training and emergency call-outs" (P.T.U.I.:1989:78)

The report identified several areas that could be problematic. Response time and limitation of resources in certain areas may cause these teams not to be called out when needed. There has been concern that forces such as Peel and York Regions, by allowing their PTU's to be assigned to plain clothes duties "may have the effect of an elitist posture within the force and thus may alienate tactical from the rest of the force." (P.T.U.I.: 1989:100) The commission concluded that these units had the respect and confidence of the rest of the force. Unity among part-time units was also called into question. However, the commission also found no instances where excessive force was an issue with these units. "Just over two thousand occurrences in the last five years involved dangerous or barricaded persons (1,685) high risk arrests (332) and hostage incidents (75). In addition a total of 637 high risk raids or searches were conducted with tactical support" (P.T.U.I.:1989:120). The report came up with forty-eight recommendations, ranging from supporting the continued use of these units to reprimanding particular police agencies for less than satisfactory procedures of their tactical unit.

The other constabulary force where PTU activities have been documented is the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The RCMP has 31 Emergency Response Teams located around the country consisting of 350 men (Saunders:1987:25).
"A cabinet committee met in December of 1985, to discusses the problem of terrorism. Out of these discussions emerged the authorization to create a dedicated hostage rescue force within the RCMP" (Saunders: 1987:27). In 1986 the government authorized establishment of the RCMP Special Emergency Response Team (SERT) for the purposes of resolving terrorist hostage incidents requiring skills beyond the capability of conventional law enforcement resources (NCTP: 1989:79). In 1992 the federal government decided the Department of National Defence (DND) would assume responsibilities for hostage rescue role in Canada which, until then, had been the job of the RCMP SERT (DND: 1996:11). The Department of National Defence formed the last unit to be mentioned: Joint Task Force - 2 (JTF-2). On April 1, 1993 the RCMP handed over all duties formerly held by SERT and JTF-2 was operational. a joint unit with members of the Canadian Military. This unit was mandated for:

Counter-terrorism operations, aid to the civil power activities and armed assistance to other government departments. The unit’s mandate is to respond as a "force of last resort" to terrorist events or major disturbances of the peace affecting national security. Although the primary role is to counter terrorism, JTF 2 can be employed on other tasks" (DND:1996:11).

Kraska (1996), Kraska and Kappeler (1997) discovered a direct selection and training link between PTU's in the United States and world famous anti-terrorist units such as the British Special Air Service (SAS) and the American Sea Air Land Teams (SEALs). Culturally significant American PTU's admire and emulate these Special Forces units. Unlike the United States military which has been lax about disseminating information concerning their Special Forces units
the Canadian military has classified nearly all information concerning JTF-2 (http://www.dnd.faq.ca).

In this section, we have reviewed the relevant literature by Peter Kraska and his fellow colleagues in the United States. Where research has shown a marked increase and a normalization of PTU’s and the widening of their mandate. We have also seen that it is not only a large urban phenomena but that rural police services have also begun to develop these units. We have also examined extant Canadian literature concerning police tactical units and have discovered little beyond a provincial report conducted in 1989. There is, for all intents and purposes, "no Canadian literature".

**Summary**

In this chapter I have analyzed the reasons for the rise and expansion of Police Tactical Units in the United States and presented an alternate theory for their formation in Canada. Before we turn towards the methodology section of this paper I would like to review what the last two chapters have attempted to convey to the reader.

Through a brief history of the police we note the hereditary connection between the police and the military. We began with how society maintained order prior to the formation of the police, then the beginnings of the modern police force by Sir Robert Peel and his two traditions of "military" and "civilian" policing. Historically and structurally the police have a military foundation, which the majority of literature pertaining to tactical policing to date has overlooked.
Through investigating military influences on Canadian policing we have seen that the military link amid police services in the Dominion is more real than perceived, especially concerning the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Once this was done the stage was set to discuss the social conditions surrounding the rise of tactical law enforcement.

We have seen the genesis of SWAT in Los Angeles and the influence of the Los Angeles Police Department upon this phenomenon. Also we have looked at the paramilitary cultures of the general population and the tactical community in the United States and have rejected this as a reason surrounding the formation of tactical policing in Canada. Then the “War” metaphor was examined and found that this has provided a rationale for tactical units to expand their mandate and role in society but not a reason why these units were originally formed. As we reviewed the social conditions in Canada we have seen that two separate instances precipitated the rise of these units in Canada; the October Crisis of 1970 in Canada and the terrorist action at the 1972 Munich Olympics. Further still, the next Olympics (1976) were to be held in Montreal were much of the October Crisis took place. Lastly, the significance of tactical law enforcement in democratic societies was discussed and we have seen that democratic policing reforms may be operationally the same but are philosophically different.

We have reviewed the current status of literature in the United States and found that it has been expanding largely during the last decade of this century. Moreover we have found essentially no literature on the subject in Canada apart from a provincial government report. Now we turn to correcting this oversight.
Chapter Three: Methods of Inquiry into Police Tactical Units

The preceding chapters have outlined the previous research conducted in the United States where there has been a dramatic increase in the creation of Police Tactical Units, their deployment and a widening of their traditional reactive mandate. As this subject pertains to Canada an extensive examination of Canadian policing literature found no academic research on this phenomenon. Furthermore, no Canadian data exist concerning these units, governmental or otherwise. Earlier I outlined specifically what these units are, hence, we can now turn toward filling a gap in the extant Canadian sociological literature concerning policing. It should be noted that there is one explicit question underlying this research:

By documenting the proliferation of these units and the operations they conduct in Canada, will we be able to deduce if there is a trend towards increased police paramilitarization?

In seeking to answer this question, several supplementary questions come into play and will be addressed. Where are these units located? Are small police service's also developing these units? What do Police services without a unit do in such a situation? When were these units formed and what was the rationale for their formation? What activities do these units conduct and how often are they used? Is there a connection between the Canadian Military and these units? Is there a connection between Canadian units and American units?
Community Policing incompatible with Tactical Policing? How does one obtain data on police tactical units from police agencies?

**Design and Distinction of the Survey**

Since there are no Canadian data relating to police tactical units the researcher was tasked with collecting national level data. To allow for future comparisons it made sense initially to replicate the Kraska and Kappeler 1997 survey.¹⁵ The American survey was a 40 item survey (98 variables) designed to examine the growth and normalization of military tactics and ideology among American law enforcement agencies. The instrument sought demographic, descriptive, longitudinal data on their formation, prevalence and the activities of PTU's. The survey also allowed the respondents an opportunity to be contacted (see Appendix). This survey was sent to police services serving population centers of 50,000 or more persons and had at least 100 sworn officers.

Initially meant to be a replication of Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler 's 1997 40 item, 98 variable American survey (see Appendix), the Canadian version was reconstructed into a 54 item, 136 variable instrument (see Appendix). Instead of designing a completely new survey, by quasi-replicating the American survey, redesigned with a Canadian tone, the instrument retained the potential for future comparative studies to be conducted concerning American and Canadian police tactical units. This was done at the pretest level by police

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¹⁵ The principal author was contacted and a copy of the survey was procured. The author wishes to extend his thanks to Peter Kraska for all his assistance in this matter.
officers currently commanding or overseeing Canadian police tactical units.\textsuperscript{16} The pretest instrument sought demographic, financial, descriptive, longitudinal data and prevalence rates, administrative information and attitudinal information regarding the respondents rationale for having and using a PTU. There were also sections allowing the respondents to make comments concerning areas such as the rationale for the establishment of their unit, their mandate, their objectives and philosophies concerning community policing. The respondents were also asked if they could be contacted for further questions. Many valuable suggestions were made during this time which resulted in a final re-designed instrument that was clearly distinct from the original.

In the final version of the Canadian questionnaire two major design differences from the American design were evident. Firstly while many of the same questions were asked on both questionnaires some were reformatted to allow the respondents to either rank several key criteria in areas such as training and selection of tactical officers or allow them to voice their own opinion on matters such as community policing. The second major difference were several critical questions that would examine aspects of tactical law enforcement that had previously not been considered. Inquiries were made regarding the rationale for the creation of the tactical unit, their current service and tactical unit budget. In-depth questions were asked concerning tactical personnel, for example, if any were female or had served in the military, and further questions were asked

\textsuperscript{16} One officer was a municipal police tactical unit commander with a large city unit, the other a was a federal tactical unit commander, both with over 25 years experience each.
concerning the length of time tactical officers spend in tactical units.

Traditionally, police services have had a secretive disposition (Manning 1978; Skolnick 1966; Westly 1956) and past researchers have found difficulty in examining police units (Kraska and Kappeler: 1997, Kraska: 1996). Because of this pattern, an official sponsor was sought to legitimize the project. After several failed attempts at finding a sponsor, one was found; The Police Futures Group. The sponsor provided a list of the entire population of police services across Canada. The American version had been sent to police organizations with 100 sworn officers or more. In Canada this yielded a sampling frame of only 49 police services from all levels of government, ranging from municipal to the federal. It was then determined in the Canadian survey to lower the number of officers to include organizations with 50 sworn officers or more. This would allow the researcher to also replicate the Kraska and Cubellis 1997 survey concerning smaller local police services and their tactical units. This change resulted in an additional 29 departments. Since some police services such as the RCMP and the provincial police forces of Quebec and Ontario have more than one division and the survey would have to be to be sent to all of these divisions, this further increased the sample size. Therefore, a total population of 78 police services (105 with their divisions) across Canada with more than 50 officers, were

17 The sponsoring association requested the opportunity to proofread the survey prior to it being mailed out, after which time the associations letter head was provided. It was agreed upon that the sponsoring association would have access to these data upon completion of the thesis.

18 The Police Futures Group is a “think tank” attached to the Canadian Association of Police Chiefs.

19 In a few instances a police service with more than one unit, compiled the information for all units for the researcher.
selected as our population base to whom questionnaires would be sent (Table 2). When the responses were received, two police services had been disbanded or were under management of the RCMP, the two provincial police agencies had returned one survey for their respective services and each individual division of the RCMP was treated as a separate police service therefore the analysis will consist of 89 police services.

The initial mailing was sent to the whole group, with the exception of the province of Quebec. It was thought best to have the survey translated into French; the later version was sent out shortly after the translation was completed (see Appendix). The survey package consisted of: 1) an introductory letter on the recognized sponsor's letter head and signed by the director of the organization, 2) a letter signed by the researcher noting university affiliation and under whose auspices he was working; and 3) the survey instrument with a return self addressed envelope.

20 In October 1998 as a special request by the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, a list of all police services across Canada and the number of officers was generated by Statistics Canada. From this list, a second list was composed with police services with 50 officers or more.
Table 2: Breakdown of Police Services with over 50 Officers by Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Questionnaires Distributed</th>
<th>Percentage of Distribution</th>
<th>Questionnaires Returned</th>
<th>Percentage of Returns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West Territories</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Foundland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yukon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>89</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>83</strong></td>
<td><strong>93.2%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Police Services with Incomplete Data
** Some Police Departments Have More than One Unit and In Some Cases Two Police Agencies use the Same Unit. Therefore the Number Maybe Deceiving
Response

Within four weeks there was a 50 percent response rate. At this point it was more feasible (financially) to contact the outstanding respondents by phone, asking them to return the survey instrument rather than send the survey out a second time. As time and funds permitted the rest of the police services were contacted by the researcher. When the police services were called, the author asked to speak to the Tactical Commander of the police service. If they did not have one, then the pertinent information concerning the police service was taken over the phone; if they did have a tactical unit then a new survey was either mailed or faxed to them. The consequence of these efforts resulted in 93.2% response rate. Such a high response rate predetermined that inferential statistics would not be needed in the analysis of the data, since it can be argued that the data collected constituted the universe. At any rate, the data presented here will be descriptive and will not rely upon probability theory to present its analysis.

After the data had been collected, it geographically covered all ten provinces in the Dominion and one territory. Special attention was paid to at least obtain data of the twenty-five most populous centers in Canada. This turned out to be needless worrying by the author; a majority of these cities police services sent out information in the first mailing. The author was surprised at the overwhelming response to the survey and the attitudes of the officers. These

21 While some police services did have more than one Tactical Unit and not all responded this was marked down as incomplete and when possible every effort was made to gather the missing information. For example while some police services had more than one unit throughout their jurisdictions, they did have an
units are generally perceived by the public as being non-hospitable and while I did encounter some officers who were, the majority of officers who were involved in the survey were helpful, insightful, sought to find out more information about the research by requesting copies of previous research and took care to answer questions with exact detail and offered sources which the author had previously not been aware of.

A section of the survey asked the respondents if they could be contacted and, with few exceptions, the majority of officers were willing to be contacted. While some officers were not forthcoming or rather guarded about information, we can see from the abnormally high response rate, these units or perhaps just their commanders welcomed the study. Some of the respondents who had given their name and phone number received a phone call thanking them for their help and included a follow up telephone interview. Each phone call began with a brief introduction and verification of data provided on the completed survey. We then explored the more sensitive issues and controversial aspects of Tactical Law Enforcement. In several instances Tactical Commanders contacted the author asking questions, concerning the survey and offered insights and suggestions.

Telephone interviews on average lasted approximately twenty minutes; the longest an hour and the shortest five minutes. The author also had the opportunity to visit several tactical unit commanders. When these occasions occurred the interviews lasted up to five hours with the shortest being four. When these opportunities became available very candid responses were made.

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officer in charge of all of their units who was helpful in most cases to give information.
by the officers interviewed which prompted new questions for further research. Having outlined the methods of data collection and the analysis used I will now turn towards answering the first question. Who are they?
Chapter Four: Who are They?

In the two chapters which follow we will examine the data collected from the first survey of the Canadian Tactical Law Enforcement Community. In this chapter we will answer: Where are they located? How many are there? What do police services without a tactical unit do when one is required? What are the demographics of these units? Are the members of these units experienced policemen? When were these units formed and what was the rationale behind their formation? What is the financial cost of maintaining a tactical law enforcement unit. Let us begin by answering the first question. Where are they? Whenever possible large population centers will be compared on varying dimensions, such as national aggregate data, provincially, and the status of the units, whether they are full or part-time. Further, in certain cases the largest three metropolitan centres will be compared so as to provide specific details about our three largest urban centers.

Geographical Information

The geographical location of these units in Canada provides certain observations that will prove useful through the analysis (Map 1). As most would expect the location pattern of these units follows the pattern of population centers in Canada. The units tend to be located around the largest census metropolitan areas and there are police tactical units in every province and territory. With the exception of a few provinces there is more than one unit per province. five provinces have full time units
Map 1: Geographical Location of Canadian Police Tactical Units

Source: Alvaro Survey, Ottawa, 1999
*Not all information presented here is based upon the Alvaro Survey
and the remainder only part-time. Ontario has the majority of full time units while British Columbia has the majority of part time units. One surprising element in the geographical data shows that the province of Quebec does not have nearly as many PTUs when compared to other provinces of similar geographical size and population, such as Ontario or British Columbia.

**Demographic Information**

There were several attitudinal questions (see Appendix) asked of the tactical commanders who responded to the survey, questions concerning their views surrounding tactical policing. One hundred percent of the respondents answering the survey stated that tactical operation units are a vital part of modern policing and 98% agree that policing will become more tactical in the future. Hence it is not surprising that of the 83 police services surveyed 65.1% reported having a Police Tactical Unit (Table 3). It worthy of note that population size does not appear to have an effect on whether police services have a unit or not. When examined by population size, with few exceptions, jurisdictions serving a population larger than 101,000 currently maintain a unit. On the other hand in those areas of 51,000-100,000 less than half (46.7%) have PTUs and in the smallest population groups, under 51,000, only 30.8% of the police services have such a unit.
Table 3: Population of Jurisdiction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population of Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51,000-100,000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101,000-250,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251,000-500,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501,000-1,000,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000,001 or above</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65.1%</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alvaro Survey, 1999

This stands in contrast to the data that Kraska and Cubellis (1997) collected concerning police services in jurisdictions between 25,000 to 50,000 in the United States where more than 65% have a PTU.

Full and Part Time Units

Thirty seven percent of the 54 police services operate PTU’s on a full time basis and 55.6% on a part-time basis; the remaining 7.4 percent are multi-jurisdictional units, which work in conjunction with one or more police services in either full-time or part-time capacity (Table 4). Full-time tactical officers devote all their time solely to tactical unit duties while part-time officers may work in any number of other capacities within the department, from traffic duty to supervisory
positions. Part-time officers when needed would be called upon to form the tactical unit and help to resolve the situation at hand.

In total there are 84 PPU's in Canada of which the majority are in Ontario; (42.6%) followed a distant second by British Columbia (11.1%); then Alberta (9.3%) and lastly Quebec (7.4%). It is important to point out that some police services with jurisdictions in major metropolitan centers, or for example, provincial police and RCMP divisions serving relatively vast geographic areas, maintain more than one unit to provide an adequate and efficient response to situations that may demand a PTU.

Table 4: Status of Police Tactical Units by Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Full Time</th>
<th>Part Time</th>
<th>Full Time in Conjunction</th>
<th>Part Time in Conjunction</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West Territories</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alvaro Survey 1999
Police Services without a Tactical Unit

The majority of police services that do not have a PTU of their own tend to rely upon larger police services such as the RCMP, or in Quebec and Ontario, upon the provincial police PTUs. Several respondents also indicated that should they require assistance they would request a unit from a neighboring police service. In fact, many of the police services that do not have a unit have an agreement with a neighboring police service in place to deal with such situations. Through the course of interviewing some of the respondents and collecting the data it was discovered that each time these units are “borrowed” the police service requesting the unit is billed for the use of the unit.

The majority (86%) of these police services without a PTU were found to be population centers under 100,000; however, there were several police services whose jurisdictions exceeded 100,000 that were also without a PTU. When some of these police services where contacted, reasons given for not having a unit were “lack of funding” and that agreements were in place with larger police services in case of such a situation arising. Only two of the police services that did not have a PTU (N=29) were planning on setting up a unit of their own and were expected to be operational by 2002. When these new units become operational, there will be a total of 56 police services in Canada with a PTU.
Tactical Unit Features

Unlike their U.S. counterparts, Canadian units do not use the politically charged acronym SWAT, which stands for Special Weapons and Tactics. In fact less than 2% (N=1) of the Canadian units surveyed use the name. The name that is most popular among Canadian teams is Emergency Response Team (41%); the next most popular name is Emergency Response Unit (10%). The rest of the police services used an array of names ranging from Emergency Task Force, Emergency Services Unit, Groupe D'intervention, Section Technique, and Tactical and Rescue Unit, to name a few.

There are 54,722 police officers across Canada; of those 1,242 are tactical officers (JursStatsCan:1999). This translates into 2% of all police officers that are part of tactical unit (Table 5). When unit status data were examined they show that full time units have more than fifty percent of all tactical officers and, on average, have 34 officers per unit while part-time units have 18 officers per unit. It is interesting to note that 55% of the police services replying reported an increase in tactical personnel since the beginning of the 1990's. When this was further analyzed, it was discovered that the western provinces, part-time units and units serving population centers between 51,000 and 100,000 were most likely not to have seen an increase in personnel. Curiously when the three largest CMA's were looked at, only one had seen an increase.
Personnel

In contrast to the national figure, the survey data indicate that some police services have less than 1% of their total officers on the tactical unit, and some have as high as 20% (mean 5.7%) of their entire service in their tactical section. It was found consistently that the smaller the police service the greater was the percentage of tactical officers. This can be accounted for simply by noting that the average part-time tactical unit has 18 officers. Hence, when there are only 100 officers in the police service and a ten men unit, then, that is already 10% of the total police service. All things being equal large police agencies that maintain full time units have less than one half of one percent of all their officers in the tactical section.

Table 5: Police Tactical Unit Demographics by Unit Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full/Part Time</th>
<th>Full Time</th>
<th>Part Time</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Officers in PPU</td>
<td>34.21</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>18.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Females</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Officers having served with the military</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Special Forces Experience</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Experience with PPU</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Service Prior to PPU</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Years in PPU</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Age</td>
<td>33.78</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>34.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alvaro Survey 1999

As someone might expect these units typically will have a member who has had prior military experience. Surprisingly and of importance is the fact that these units are more likely to have a female team member rather than an officer who
has had Special Forces experience in the military. This datum on the surface is a definite departure from the United States hyper-masculine experience that is painted by Peter Kraska (1995) in his ethnographic research and the data of the 1997 survey (Kraska and Kappeler: 1997). One tactical commander commented: "There are police officers out there that have special operations experience, but they choose not to enter the tactical unit. I know of guys who were in the military that are now are doing traffic and investigations" (Survey 3).

**Prototypical Tactical Officer**

The results suggest that the prototypical tactical law enforcement officer is a male, 34 years of age who has had slightly over seven years police experience prior to becoming a tactical officer and is likely to remain a tactical officer for approximately six years but less than ten. This would imply then, that the typical tactical officer is an experienced police officer prior to entering the tactical unit and is dedicated enough to commit a sizeable portion of his career to tactical duties.

**Gender**

According to Messerschmidit’s (1993) line of reasoning, men in these units are placed in a high stress atmosphere of constant competition and danger through which they are reconstituting their masculinity. Other’s have claimed that hyper-masculine subcultures such as the police do not provide receptive environments for females (Rigakos:1998). Prior to the results presented here, it
was considered that police tactical units were entirely a male phenomenon. In examining the notion of hyper-masculinity within these units the respondents were asked whether any females operate within the units? Analysis revealed that there are females on tactical units in a number of provinces and over a wide range of population areas. However, among the three largest CMA units only one had females in its tactical section. Of the 58 police services that have such a unit, nine (15.5%) have between one and six females actively on the unit, for a total of 16 female tactical officers across Canada, translating into 1.2% of all tactical officers; this is far below the national average of 12.2% (N=6,686) of female police officers in Canada (JursStatsCan:1999). While 1.2% seems to be insignificant, upon further analysis women officers were found in a majority of provinces, at all population levels and in full-time and part-time teams. In fact, the majority of women are in full-time units (Figure 1). This is similar to the military which for centuries did not allow females into combat arms and now we see police forces following suit, although the population of women in the military is increasing, including combat arms.
The tactical commander in the unit with the most women in Canada under his command was asked if integrating women into the unit had been a problem. "We have had women on the team since 1995. We did not have an open problem, but more of a subversive problem" (Survey 1). He explained that his unit has seen an increase in deployments involving women and it made sense to
have women join the team. These women, however, had to be the “right” officers, in the sense they must meet all the qualifications necessary to be an active member of the unit and not a token female member.

Rotation Policies

“Within the rhetoric of community policing, officers in specialized units are being depicted as isolated and out of touch with real police work” (Ford:1995:42)

Paul Ford, a tactical officer has said succinctly that:

As SWAT officers, we should be willing to do our part so the concepts of Community Policing and SWAT can work together in harmony. However, some officers, particularly those in specialized positions, are finding it difficult, the primary reason for that difficulty seems to lie in one of the central goals of Community Policing, “...to integrate all police services (patrol, investigation, etc.), with team members functioning as generalists’.” (Ford:1995:42).

A mainstay of the community policing philosophy has been to have an officer that is more multi-faceted, a “generalist” not an officer who is highly-specialized in one aspect of policing. This has caused year limitations or mandatory rotation policies to be implemented by police services. By doing so the patrol officer is able to widen his skill-set and knowledge base. Some feel this has no relation to law enforcement let alone to tactical policing. This is the mentality of a little league baseball coach (Ford:1995:42). It is fascinating that the rhetoric of community policing, which is bringing about democratic reforms to make the policing institution “less militarized” would itself use the tradition of “re-mustering” which is still a standing policy of many militaries around the world.
To investigate how the "generalist" attitude of community policing affected Police Tactical Units the question was asked if Canadian units have a policy of rotating their officers. It was discovered that almost half the units (45.3%) have a practice in place whereby officers are rotated in and out of the tactical unit. This was higher for full-time units (55%) and lower for part-time units (36%). The range of years spent in rotation amongst the rotating officers fluctuated from a minimum of 1 year to a maximum of 12 years, the average being 6 years that an officer would stay active in the tactical unit. Since this question was not asked in the U.S. survey, it may be useful to explore these results.

If police services do not have such a practice, ideally, the police officer becomes highly specialized in tactical law enforcement and excels in that position. Of course then they are not necessarily specialized in any other aspect of law enforcement. This type of policy "by definition reduces a SWAT unit's efficiency, skill level and knowledge base by removing the most experienced officers. It interferes with the professionalization of SWAT and attempts to diminish for our existence, the desire to save lives" (Ford: 1995:42) As for any team, or group activity it takes time for new "players" to work themselves into the team much as on a professional sports team. To take the example of a team sport such as football, new players as well as old are needed to work together to make the team as successful as possible, so as to not interfere with its operation. This is no different for a tactical unit. However as the data indicate a tactical officer spends on average five years on the unit and if he has already spent five years prior in other duties for a total of ten years this is a sizeable portion of the
officer's career. While a mandatory rotation, for instance, of a year up and down, may be detrimental to a unit, a five year rotation which is properly managed should be adequate for not only the efficient operation of the unit but also for the officer's own personal career. Such a rotation policy may be better adapted to tactical officers, if for example the policy was based upon physical standards, which some units already have in place, or upon performance evaluations. Regardless, new officers will enter these units and it becomes the responsibility of whoever is in charge to make sure that the transition runs smoothly so as to not interfere with the unit's operation.

*Police Tactical Units Budgets*

Close to 18 million dollars was spent in Canada on Police Tactical Units in 1997 (Figure 6), this figure however does not include the salaries of the 1,242 Tactical Officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6: Police Tactical Unit Budgets by Unit Status, 1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police Tactical Unit Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Annual Tactical Unit Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Time in Conjunction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Time in Conjunction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alvaro Survey 1999

"Police expenditures totaled 5.99 billion in 1997...In general, salaries and wages..."
make up over 80% of the policing dollar” (JursStatsCan:1999:11-12). If we accept this formula, then less than one percent of all policing dollars in Canada is being spent on tactical units. This situation is reflected when the individual police services responding to the survey are examined. Some tactical commanders (2.7%) indicated that they did not have a tactical budget in 1997, while some reported that up to three percent of their total police budget was being allocated to their tactical Unit. In today’s society of cost cutting, if the prototypical unit spends less then one percent of the total police budget, under these conditions it makes sense for police executives to have a unit, when the rewards are so great. When all levels of status are considered, the average unit spent slightly over $400,000 in 1997. When broken down in to unit status however, full time units spent over $1 million while part time teams spent only slightly over $54,000 per year. Over $16 million (91%) of all tactical dollars being spent in Canada is being spent by 34.1% (N=15) of all tactical units, all of which are full-time units. In addition, Ontario accounts for the majority of money being spent on tactical law enforcement.

Yearly Formations

The first PTU in Canada was formed in 1968 in Toronto. This unit was primarily designed to deal with civil unrest occurring at that time and later became formalized into a tactical unit during the early 1970’s. With the exception of a few years in each decade since the late 1960’s there has been at least one unit formed every year in Canada (Figure 2). The data gathered here show that
there was not a substantial rise in the formation of these units until 1974 and this
growth continued until 1985. In Canada during 1974, two units were formed; the
following year three, then in 1976 six units. By 1976 almost 30% of all units in
service today had been formed, by 1980, 56%, an increase of 26%. There was a
greater increase during those four years than in all of the 1980's. By the
beginning of 1990, over 80% of units in service today were up and running. After
1985 there was only one unit formed per year until 1992 when there was a
dramatic increase in new units not seen since the seventies.

By 1997 the 54 separate police agencies in Canada had 84 tactical units.22
This trend is similar to that found in the U.S. Yet the rise in the United States has
not been as pronounced as that in Canada. Since 1986, the majority of units
being formed have been from police jurisdictions serving less than 250,000
people. Initially, it was thought that population size of the jurisdiction may have
been a factor in the formation of these units, but, on closer inspection of the data,
population size did not appear to play an important role. When we discussed the
social conditions surrounding the rise of police tactical units, it was suggested
that the October Crisis, the Munich and Montreal

22 Some police agencies have more than one police tactical unit.
Figure 2: Annual Formations of Police Tactical Units Since 1968

Yearly Observations of Police Services Forming PPU's

Source: Alvaro Survey 1999
Olympics were factors surrounding the creation of police tactical units. The data would suggest it to be true that PTUs began forming in Canada shortly after the problems Quebec encountered with the FLQ, and there is a slight rise in unit formation after the October Crisis. However, it is hard to dismiss the temporal correlation between the 1972 Munich and the 1973 dramatic increase in the formation of PTUs that begins in Canada and lasts for ten years. Furthermore, the data for formation of PTUs in the early 1990's could be interpreted as resulting from the “War on Drugs”.

**Rationale for Formation**

It is necessary and important to look at why these units were formed in order to paint an accurate picture of the origins of Canadian Tactical Law Enforcement. The data indicate there are four prominent rationales for the creation of a PTU (Figure 3). The most popular of which, was the occurrence of a High Risk Situation (38.8%). One of the descriptions of a high risk situation was defined as:

an increase in high risk situations such as hostage takings, man with gun etc...prompted the need for a team trained in special weapons & tactics to resolve these matters. The general police membership possessed little training in dealing with these situations and were unequipped with the specialized tools required. (Survey 23)
Figure 3: Rationale for Formation of Police Tactical Units in Canada

Source: Alvaro Survey 1999

The second most likely rationale for the formation of a PTU were situations involving weapons (16.3%), the third was terrorism (10.2%) and the fourth (8.2%) was an operational requirement by their police service or government to do so. Other popular reasons given were to prevent high risk situations from occurring, the presence of the Olympics and officer safety. It is important to note that six percent of the respondents did not know why their unit was formed. As will be argued later, the majority of these units lack a proper
methodology concerning their own records or, until recently, have been lax in keeping proper records. Other interesting rationales given for the formation of these units were geographic isolation, mentally ill persons, organized crime, and bikers. As we can see, there is no one rationale that seems to have precipitated the creation of a PTU. The most likely reasons during the 70's and 80's were terrorism and high risk situations as well as an increase in weapons in the community. Nevertheless, upon further examination it appears that during the 1990's governments are beginning to mandate the formation of these units. One such example is the Ontario provincial government which has mandated police agencies to have a PTU or enter into an agreement with another agency to access to one. Other reasons, such as the geographic location can contribute to police services having a PTU. For example, a police service which is distant from other police services would want to maintain its own unit for economic and efficiency reasons. One of the tactical commanders interviewed said that in such cases, when an isolated community is in need of a PTU, it may take up to several hours before a unit can be brought in to deal with the situation. In the time that it takes to bring in the unit the situation may have resolved itself or have escalated to dangerous levels. Regardless of whether or not the unit is used, the police service requesting the help must still pay for the use of the unit.

Summary

In this chapter we have answered some of the questions raised in the opening of this chapter. We now know that the location pattern of these units
follows the pattern of population centers in Canada, and further, that the units
tend to be located around the largest census metropolitan areas. In addition, the
majority of full time units are in Ontario and the majority of part time units are in
British Columbia. Of the police services surveyed two-thirds (65.1%) of the 83
police services surveyed reported having a Police Tactical Unit and of those
PTUs 35% percent are operating on a full time basis and 55.6% are part time.
The majority (43.1%) of these units are in Ontario and 2% (1242) of all police
officers in Canada belong to a tactical unit. Of the 58 police services that have
such a unit, nine (15.5%) have between one and six females actively on the unit,
for a total of 16 female tactical officers across Canada. The data have further
suggested that the four most popular rationales for creation of a PTU are: High
Risk Situations, weapons, terrorism and being mandated as an operational
requirement by their police service or government to do so. Lastly, we now know
that in 1997 police tactical units across Canada spent less than one percent of all
policing dollars. In the next chapter we will look at the second half of the data
and answer the critical question; what do they do? By doing so we take a look at
the inside operations of the Canadian Tactical Law Enforcement" community.
Chapter Five: What do they do?

Traditionally tactical units have been reactive. For example, when a person is taken hostage, these units are activated. As we enter into the inside operations of Canadian tactical units we will examine if this is still the case or are these units becoming more proactive. Here we seek to answer several questions. How is an officer selected for the tactical unit? What sources of training do these units use? Is there an American influence upon tactical policing and is it from the Los Angeles Police Department? How many times per year are these units called out? What kind of operations do they conduct? Once again, whenever possible tactical units will be compared by varying dimensions, such as national aggregate data, provincially, and the status of the units, whether they are full or part-time. Further, in certain cases the largest three metropolitan centres will be compared so as to provide specific details about our three largest large urban centers.

Selection of Officers

The selection process for entry to most police services in Canada is already quite meticulous and arduous. To fully comprehend specifics regarding how these officers are selected from an already strenuous set of criteria, tactical commanders were asked to rank a set of criteria concerning the selection of their officers. These criteria ranged from psychological and physical fitness, to military
experience, to education and seniority. The purpose of this question was two-fold. First, to see upon what basis are these officers selected for what 88% of respondents believed to be a prestigious position within their own department, but, more profoundly, to discover, following the U.S. experience, how previous military experience and military special operations experience factored into the selection process of new officers.

To shed some light on how the selection process works, in the interviews tactical commanders were asked how a regular officer would go about applying to become a tactical officer. The officer must first send in his résumé and application to the tactical commander. In addition, some police services have certain basic requirement policies prior to application; the officer in some cases must have minimum number of years police experience and meet rigorous physical fitness standards. Some police services also regularly recruit officers for the specific purpose of preparing them to become tactical unit officers, but this seems to be a rare. Then the officer, depending upon the size of the department, will go through a series of interviews with not only the unit commander, but the tactical commander, squad leaders and even with some team members. These interviews tend to center around the individual's personality, to probe the officer about team work and the individual's ability to work in a team setting. Bearing in mind that police work traditionally lends itself towards individual efforts, tactical units work in teams and it is imperative that these officers work well together. In any military unit, the priority of the team precedes that of the individual.

The next level is the psychological examination stage; i.e. is the officer a
generally well adjusted individual? If the officers successfully pass these phases, they must then go through a period of in-depth training which differs widely depending upon the department. Some will make the officer endure one month of 10-16 hours a day of training; others, as in the case of the RCMP, have a central training center that offers a six week course through which all of their tactical officers must pass. In the case of many of the smaller police departments, they will send their officers to a larger police service for training or bring officers in to their jurisdiction to perform the instruction. In fact, one tactical commander interviewed said that he now has a small group of officers whose positions are solely dedicated to training officers inside and outside of his department.

The survey also found that 23 of the police services perform training with at least one other police service, a sign of cooperation amongst neighboring police services. There are also units in place that send instructors from Ontario as far away as Nova Scotia and in several instances, Canadian officers have been sent to the United States to give instruction to American police officers. Upon the completion of the applicant's initial training, the tactical commander takes one of two courses of action; the first is to keep the trainee on the unit as a new member of the team, and the second is to send the officer back to his or her original division. The latter choice does not necessarily mean that the officer has unsuccessfully completed his training or is inadequate to the task but it is possible that the unit may not have the requirement of or the place for a new team member at such time. If the decision is made to keep the officer he will...
then go through a probationary period which varies from team to team. One
tactical commander stated that his officers are always on probation (Interview 3).
Throughout the probationary period, the officer is monitored closely and
evaluated: relationship with the supervisor and the team, risk assessment,
tenacity, motivation, stress, self-confidence, motivation, safety, and a host of
other criteria (see Appendix).

We asked tactical commanders to rank in descending importance certain
criteria sought in a tactical unit officer (Figure 4). The results varied little when
comparing full and part time teams, population of jurisdiction and size of police
department. Overwhelmingly, the most desired criterion in selection of a tactical
officer is psychological fitness.

Figure 4: Selection Criteria for Tactical Officers

| 1. Psychological Fitness     |
| 2. Physical Fitness          |
| 3. Firearms proficiency      |
| 4. Performance on written or oral exam |
| 5. Seniority                 |
| 6. Education                 |
| 7. Military Experience       |
| 8. Special Operations Experience in the Military |

Source: Alvaro Survey 1999

One tactical commander who regarded psychological evaluation as unimportant
commented:

For years we sent new applicants to be tested, they all came back fine.
We felt that it was a waste of resources. Also what do you do with an
officer who has been on the force for five or more years, then he fails the
psyche test. This can cause a lot of problems, the officer’s entire record
must then be reviewed and then you have to go back and ask, hey how
did he get on the force in the first place? To get on the force you must go
through a psyche exam we feel that is enough (Interview 3).
This review of psychological testing for tactical officers was a recommendation of the 1989 Drinkwater Report. The report found that in Ontario some of the psychological tests being used were thirty to forty years old and one self-administered test was dated 1922 (PTUI:1988). While this tactical commander makes a strong point, psychological fitness tends to be selected as the number one criterion in selecting a tactical officer. John Super (1995) did a study to see if certain psychological tests could distinguish between a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ tactical officer during the pre-employment phase. He discovered that “good” tactical officers score high on femininity/masculinity scales suggesting that they are more sympathetic and helpful. As one tactical commander put it, “ten years ago you might have had these macho types of officers on the unit, but no more. We need officers who can think and that have impulse control” (Interview 0).

The next most valued criterion was physical fitness, followed by firearms proficiency and then performance on written or oral exams, seniority and education. The criteria that were found to be least important were military experience and special operations experience within the military. This provides important evidence in Canada that while there has been a rise in these units and that they are becoming an increasing part of mainstream policing, they do not overly value military experience as a requirement for becoming a tactical officer. This has been a central component of the current American literature that, tactical units in the United States highly value military training and skill (Kraska
and Kappeler:1997). It has been suggested that using such information acts as a selection tool itself. In large police departments where, at times, over a hundred applicants are fighting for a limited number of positions, American tactical commanders can shorten the list by selecting officers with military backgrounds. This was the case with the original SWAT teams in the United States which used officers that were returning from the conflict in south east Asia (ILDC:1980).

**Training**

Training of these units also deserves mention, as it is a central component of their sub-culture. The question was posed in the survey as to how many hours per year a tactical unit spends actively in training. In total, Canadian PTUs collectively spend 21,493 hours per year for training purposes, and on average each officer spends over 438 hours per year training. This is well over 200 hours beyond the training time of their American counterparts, who spend, on average 225 hours per year training (Kraska and Kappeler: 1997). This may suggest that due to the lack of importance placed upon military experience by Canadian tactical units, they may need to spend this amount of time training to learn military type skills. When this was broken down by full and part time units, we find that full time units spend, on average, over 750 hours a year on training with some spending close to two thousand hours per year on training while part-time units spent on average 230 hours on training. The least amount of hours being spent annually by a PTU was 72. With such a sizeable amount of time being spent on training, a scrutiny of this training becomes relevant.

23 A technical examination about the teams equipment would be one such an example.
In looking at the militarization of these units, it was felt that the sources of training or expertise during the startup period as well as current sources would reveal military or American connections. Tactical commanders were asked to rank: books/ videos/ magazines/ training manual, tactical operations units training from another department, training provided by professional tactical schools, police officers’ experience in the military, information from tactical units in the United States or Europe, assistance or information from Department of Justice, training with active duty military experts, and other, with the opportunity to list the sources they currently or have previously used (Figure 5). These results varied little between full and part time units. Factors such as population of jurisdiction and size of the police service played only small roles, with the exception of some older teams who tend to conduct all their training "in house" (14.8% N=8). This implies, some police services do not require any of the sources listed and rely solely upon the resources within their own department. "Initially we went to the Canadian Military for training. Since then, we have relied on the expertise of other "police" tactical units . . . and our own experience, as well as training courses that become available" (Survey 4). As one tactical commander stated, "we do not recognize military techniques as a priority in training. We find the use of in-house training as a better form of training" (Interview 0). Another tactical commander who also conducts in-house training said, "We now do our own training expertise with instructor certifications received from varied sources. However, we still send officers to outside agencies for information purposes- To tactical schools" (Survey 23).
is the Los Angeles Police Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Trained with an American police service. The most common of these to train with
listed any European police services. 22.3% (N=12) indicated that they had
information from tactical units in the United States and Europe, and while no one
Officers' Association 12.9% (N=7), and Hecker and Koch 5.5% (N=3). Third, was
provided by professional tactical schools (20.3% N=12) such as National Tactical
Mounted Police. The second most popular source of expertise was training
popular source of training in Canada than the trans-national Royal Canadian
holds in the United States. Further the Toronto Emergency Task Force is a more
service and the RCMP that the Los Angeles Police Department SWAT team
This suggests a similar position in Canada for the Metropolitan Toronto Police
Toronto Police Service (18.5% N=10), the second being the RCMP (12.9% N=7).
police services, the most predominant of such cases has been the Metropolitan
their tactical unit. Many of the larger police forces also provide training to smaller
Of those surveyed, 55.5% (N=30) had used a Canadian police service to train
expertise reported was tactical operations unit training from another department.

The data here provide very interesting results. The primary source of

Source: Survey 1999

Figure 5: Sources of Training Expertise for Police Tactical Units
This is very interesting in that the Los Angeles Police Department despite its distance has a significant influence upon Canadian tactical policing. The next most popular sources of expertise were books/ videos/ magazines/ training manuals and then police officers with experience in the military. While training with active duty experts was ranked sixth overall, some very interesting results were found. A small percentage, 16.6% (N=9), had trained with the Canadian military, 5.5% (N=3) with the United States military with one instance of training with the Navy SEALs and one instance of a unit training with the British special forces Special Air Service unit. Now that we have looked at the selection process and training sources of tactical units in Canada we can now turn towards the activities that these units conduct.

**Tactical Deployments**

The research indicates that a tactical call-out means many things. Some police services consider a tactical call-out to be an entire unit deployment, others when any one member is deployed to a situation. For example, one tactical unit commander has a team of two officers on a six week deployment conducting surveillance operations. Should this be considered a tactical call-out? When a tactical unit arrives on a scene of a hostage taking and the kidnappers give up after they are informed that the tactical unit is on the scene, which happens more frequently than most would think, is this a call-out? This raises an important matter: perhaps a nation wide methodology should be developed to keep accurate and standardized records. That being said, the number of call-outs
made by these units can be a sign of their integration into mainstream policing. Figure 6 reports two sets of data concerning call-outs between 1980 and 1997. In 1980 units were being called out 24 times a year on average, that is, about twice a month (Total Call-outs-Figure 6). That number almost doubles by 1982, then dips well until the mid-eighties when it starts to increase again.

24 I would like to add that many police services were not able to give accurate numbers as to their call-outs and also concerning their activities. This seems to me a cause for concern, while units such as these are needed in today’s society, they must keep accurate records. We have created the police to protect us and they have created the tactical unit to protect them. However who watches the watchmen, they must police themselves at least in this respect.
The line marked "total" indicates a total average of all police services providing their callout data, the line marked "complete" indicates police services (N=10) that were able to provide complete data for every year starting from 1980.
Figure 7: Police Tactical Unit Deployments by Unit Status 1980-1997

Yearly Observations of Police Tactical Unit Deployments by Status

Source: Alvaro Survey 1999
There is a dramatic increase in 1993 call-outs which continues until the present day. If we look at the units that gave complete data (Complete Call-outs Figure 6), then the pattern in call-outs has been steady and does not decrease by more than 7 call-outs in any one year. Both sets of data affirm that these units, by 1997, are being called out approximately 17 times per month, i.e., eight times the 1980 call-out rate.

While these units appear to becoming a normal part of police operations there is considerable difference between the full time and part-time units (Figure 7). In 1980, part-time units were being called-out five times per year, by 1997 this rose to 15 times per year, or just over one call-out per month. On the other hand in 1980 the full time units reported 61 call-outs per year, about five times a month. By 1997 they are responding to 178 call-outs, translating into one call-out every other day. Subsequent analysis of the three largest CMAs revealed that those units on average conducted just over 400 deployments in 1997, that is, more than one deployment a day. These data strongly suggest that these full-time units have already become part of everyday police operations.

Types of Tactical Deployments

Now that we know how often these units are being deployed it is crucial to determine why they are being deployed. Although we could not reasonably expect the police services surveyed to break down their activities for all the years their unit has been in operation, we did ask them to break down their activities for the last calendar year (Figure 8). The respondents were asked to break down
these activities by certain categories: barricaded situations (when a person has barricaded him or herself to prevent capture), hostage situations (when a person is being detained without his or her consent), terrorist activities, dangerous search/arrest warrants (these are situations were the persons named in the warrant are considered armed and or dangerous), civil disturbances, drug warrants, VIP security (at times these units provide security for dignitaries and politicians), and surveillance (an example of this was provided by a tactical commander that indicated: in certain circumstances that his people are better at surveillance due to their training in concealment). Respondents were also allowed, in open-ended questions, to describe any additional activities that their unit may have undertaken in addition to those above mentioned. What was found was almost identical to the U.S. figures uncovered by Kraska and Kappeler (1997) (Figure 11).

There has been a marked change in the activities of these units over time as they have taken on a more proactive role and the scope of their roles has broadened. Half of the operations these units conduct (49.3%) are devoted to either drug or dangerous search/arrest warrants. The are next most likely call-out for these units is one concerning a Barricaded situation (20.2%). The next largest call-out was for the Other category; this provided for some interesting answers. In addition to more mainstream activities of warrants, searches, and barricaded situations, PTUs in Canada have also served warrants for immigration and customs, aided surveillance groups, provided courtroom security and high-

25 Categories for PTU activities were taken from the Kraska and Kappeler 1997 study with some revisions
risk prisoner escorts.

They have conducted armed ship-boardings at sea, manhunts and search-and-rescue operations for missing persons. In addition, they have provided witness protection, have been involved with robberies, organized crime and motorcycle gang situations and, they have also conducted high risk vehicle stops and intervened in suicide situations. This list of PTU deployments shows several things: primarily, the mandate or traditional activities of the PTUs have widened. Secondly, these officers provide more a specialized police service that seems to be needed. Lastly, these units appear now to spend more time in a proactive stance rather than reacting to particular situations.
As discussed previously, the most frequently reported rationales for the creation of these units were high risk situations, weapons, mandate and terrorism. With the exception of being mandated by a government body, these rationales are all reactive. When the activities of these units are broken down into reactive and proactive categories, drug and dangerous search, arrests warrants, surveillance, and VIP security details, are all proactive duties and
represent 60.1% of the deployments these units are conducting. Reactive activities such as barricaded, hostage situations, and civil disturbances which have been traditionally the role of these units now account for only 24.6% of the operations they perform. This is strong evidence that these units are widening their mandate as well as becoming an integral part of mainstream policing.

Further, while these units do deal with criminals as one Tactical Commander put it:

Call-outs of our Crisis Intervention Teams are spent with the Mad, Bad and Sad, most likely armed people but not always with weapons. Thirty percent of the time we are with emotionally disturbed persons, 30% of the time dealing with the traditional criminals and the rest of time with people who are just having a bad day (Interview 0).

Pro-active Patrol

We have already seen that a large percentage of units are full-time, and there is an implication that many full time units proactively patrol their jurisdictions. In looking at the normalization of these units, the question arises as to whether these units are being used pro-actively to patrol areas with high crime rates. The survey discovered that 23% (N=15) of the units responding, where using their units proactively, furthermore 20% (N=3) were part-time units. This was thought to deserve further discussion. In conversation with a tactical commander discussing the mystique of the "SWAT" team, he recounted an incident which had happened in his jurisdiction.

A rookie officer on patrol was in his vehicle and went into a park. Unbeknownst to the officer, the park was deemed "out of bounds" to police
officers by the local street gang. The youths, after telling the officers to leave the area, proceeded to shake the patrol car which precipitated the officer to leave. When the officer returned to his base of operations, he told his supervisor what had happened. His supervisor then told him that "we don't go in there". The commander of the district heard what had happened and suggested to the tactical commander to send his pro-active unit into the park for a few days. "We put the gun truck in the middle of the park, the kids came up and said "hello", the men were there the first, second, and the third day, all day. The kids got the message and now there are no problems in that park and we did nothing but show up" (Interview 0). This example suggests that the term "proactive" can mean many things, and to be "proactive" does not necessarily mean that these officers become soldiers as if they were peacekeepers in West Beirut.

Most proactive units do not patrol in groups as large as 10 or 30; they are usually two to four man teams spread out across a jurisdiction. For example, if there is a 10 man unit, it breaks up into three teams of two and one of four with the supervisor included in the four man team. These four squads of the tactical unit will be sent into four different quadrants of the jurisdiction in the interests of wider-spread patrol. In this configuration, a two man unit can resolve many situations on their own, with the rest of the unit prepared as back-up, if required. When in their vehicles, the officers monitor police broadcasts and if they feel that their presence may be required, they then proceed directly to the scene for further assessment of the situation at hand. As noted earlier these units do not necessarily belong to large jurisdictions; they may range from police services
with jurisdictions as small as 51,000 to population centers accounting for over a million people. As one tactical commander put it: "It made good sense, this avoids the 'fire hall syndrome'" (Survey1). The fire hall syndrome is the process of continuous training, while waiting to be called out to an incident, without regular practical, hands-on experience.

It is not without interest that not all units became proactive immediately after their formation (Figure 9). Several units did become proactive in the same year in which they were formed during the 1970's but, notably, during the 1980's, no units began proactively patrolling their jurisdictions immediately.

Figure 9: Proactive Use of Police Tactical Units in Canada

![Proactive Use of Police Tactical Units in Canada](image)

Yearly Observations of Proactive Use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Proactive Practice Began</th>
<th>Number of Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alvare Survey 1999
Within that ten year gap, police services utilized their tactical unit to perform proactive patrol in their jurisdictions. PTUs proactively patrolling their jurisdictions, while not a relatively new phenomena, was not popular in Canada during the 1980’s when a majority of units had just been formed. The majority of units that are proactive, began this practice during the mid to late 1990’s, coinciding with the rise in formation of PTUs. Upon closer inspection, it was discovered that a third of the units that began proactively patrolling their jurisdictions during the 1990’s were also formed during 1990’s and that the majority of these units were also located within Ontario. An instance was also found of a unit that waited 22 years between its formation and the proactive use of their unit. In an attitudinal question, the survey asked if PTUs should be selectively deployed to patrol only high crime areas. Of the respondents, 73.5% agreed with the statement. While not as high as some of the other responses, this may be an indication that Tactical units are being normalized into mainstream policing and that we can expect that more units will tend to become proactive. This raises some crucial questions as to the adequacy of these units in their proactive training. Perhaps it is not necessarily fair to impugn the abilities of the officers. Research has shown that these units have an abundance of training but they are lacking in practical experience. Also, one may ask, should there be a waiting period from the formation of a unit to the proactive use of a unit?
A central issue of these units for some is the equipment that they use. An equipment list was included in the survey, when the results were analyzed by population, unit status, and province there was little differentiation (Figure 10). While the majority of units had the entire list that was provided, some interesting implications can be drawn from these findings. The results suggested that the Heckler and Koch MP5 is very popular among Canadian units with 79.6% (N=43) using this piece of equipment. This provides added evidence of a "tactical market" (see page35). This company while also providing the equipment will also train members tactical units in its operation, on a cost recovery basis. As well, the M16 was another popular weapon among the Canadian Units, an American firearm produced especially at first for the American military by numerous contractors since it was first developed. Its use was made popular during the Vietnam war. This would suggest not only a connection between Canadian units and United States military technology but would also echo the findings that Kraska and Kappeler, that the tactical community is closely linked to the Military-Industrial complex.

Curiously the most unlikely piece of equipment for a tactical unit to have was the Laser Sight, made popular by Action Movies. Less than half (40.8%) of the units responding to the survey used laser sights. This would seem to negate the common belief that these units are technology driven. This technology now is relatively inexpensive and the general public may buy one at local places of
When tactical commanders were asked why they do not use this piece of technology, the common response was that it just doesn't work.

Figure 10: Canadian Police Tactical Unit Equipment Inventory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police Tactical Unit Equipment List</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Command Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Camouflage BDU's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thunderflash Grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS Diversionary Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic Entry Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Headsets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Surveillance Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H&amp;K MP5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M16 A2 or A3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Response Shotgun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghillie Sniper Suits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sniper Rifle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laser Sights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Vision Scopes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alvaro Survey 1999

Some Comparison Commentary

Some comparative observations with the American data of the Kraska and Kappeler 1997 survey seem necessary here. In contrast to the American data
only 65.1% of all police services surveyed in Canada had a unit compared to 89.4% in the United States. Furthermore, only 30.1% of the police services in smaller locales have a unit. This stands in contrast to the data that Kraska and Cubellis (1997) collected concerning police services in jurisdictions between 25,000 to 50,000 in the United States where more than 65% have a Police Tactical Unit.

The formation of these units closely parallels the American data with a greater number of units being formed in the mid to late seventies and again in the early 1990's. There are two differences in the data here. Firstly, Canada had a number of years where no units were created. Secondly, there more police services without a unit in the United States who are planning on establishing one over the next few years. Both countries have seen the level of Tactical Law Enforcement activity significantly rise. In the United States tactical activity was doubled by 1986, almost tripled by 1989, and quadrupled by 1995; the study found that the rise in paramilitary police activity had increased by 538% (Kraska and Kappeler:1997:6). Similar to the American data, Canadian unit activity also doubled by 1986, but did not triple until the early 1990's. While the American units on average by 1995 are being called out 53 times a year, the Canadian units are being deployed 76 times a year. This would suggest that Canadian units are more active than American counterparts. Furthermore since the American survey used only national aggregate data and did not include unit status, we cannot compare the differences between full and part time units.

The Canadian data have shown that full-time units have already become
part of everyday police operations. On average a full-time unit is being called out every other day. In relation to the operations that these units conduct, they were similar to the United States (Figure 11). The greatest difference is that while Canadian units only spend half their time conducting warrant work and drug raids the Americans spend two thirds of there time doing this work. More importantly, one thing is clear these units have become more proactive than their traditionally reactive role.

Figure 11: Comparative Observations of Canadian and American Tactical Deployments

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police Tactical Unit Activities</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Canada</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Disturbance</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorist Incidents</td>
<td>.09%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage Situations</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barricaded Persons</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>High Risk Warrant Work/Drug Raids</td>
<td>75.9%</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the results of the American data showed, 20% of the units that responded to the Kraska and Kappeler survey were proactively patrolling their jurisdictions. This average was slightly higher in Canada with 23% of the units responding using their unit proactively. However, under further examination the Canadian units tend to patrol their entire jurisdiction proactively and not just "high crime areas".
A significant difference between the American and Canadian units is the fact that military training and especially Special Forces experience in the military is highly valued and prevalent in the United States with more than forty percent having had or currently training with the military special operations personnel (Kraska and Kappeler: 1997) while in Canada this was not found to be the case. In examining the training and selection criteria of Canadian unit it was discovered that military background was not highly valued by Canadian Police Tactical Units. Furthermore only 6% of all tactical officers have a military background and less than one percent have had special forces training. Furthermore this is a strong connection between the American and Canadian units as many Canadian units have gone to the United States for training and in turn have disseminated that knowledge among other Canadian units. Therefore the skills being taught to American police tactical units have been passed along to those Canadian units which have trained in the United States.

Summary

The explicit purpose of this chapter was to illustrate to the reader that these units have become more proactive and have expanded their mandate. We did this through three themes, (1) their training and selection processes; (2) the operations that they conduct; and (3) proactive use of these units in Canadian society. This section of the survey has provided very interesting results. Although Canadian PTU’s claim not to value military experts, this survey uncovered a connection between the two, and not solely within the Canadian
military but also links to the United States and United Kingdom militaries as well. Additionally, the Canadian community of PTUs not only share a strong connection with one another but also with their American counterparts, of which the Los Angeles Police Department seems to have the most influence.

Furthermore the Metropolitan Toronto Police service Emergency Task Force would seem to have acquired the same status as the Los Angeles Police Department has in the United States. At the same time by looking at their equipment and training we see that there is strong evidence of a “Tactical Market” not only in Canada but internationally as well, via the training provided by tactical schools such as Heckler & Koch and organizations such as the American-based National Tactical Officers Association.27 In the final chapter we turn towards examining tactical and community policing and tactical commanders’ attitudes towards issues pertaining to the future of tactical law enforcement. We started with the query that in a time of democratic reforms why are these police units being created. We will review the information and draw our discussion to a close with considering the future of tactical law enforcement.

26 All information concerning the National Tactical Officers Association was received by the author through personal correspondence with the association. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by the association and extends special thanks to Dot Branson.
Chapter Six: Into the Next Century

The last section to be presented will interweave information from the survey and discuss the possible implications of Tactical Law Enforcement in next the century. I began by stating that even as community policing is being celebrated as a return to Sir Robert Peel's policing principles, the military character of policing is finding renewed emphasis in PTUs. When we discussed the military foundations of policing we saw that Peel had in fact developed two models of policing; military and civilian. These two traditions of policing have characterized policing agencies, as we saw with the Los Angeles Police Department during the late 1960's; when they were unable to deal with social control, they fell back upon the military principles, knowledge and equipment to develop a new organized response to social control. The "tactical unit" concept has influenced other police agencies to create their own unit to deal with "high risk situations".

Through a review of the existing literature in Canada we discovered that there has been no formal academic research conducted on this subject and we set out to obtain data concerning PTUs. The results indicate that there are over eighty such units in all of Canada, belonging to police agencies at all levels of government. The data would suggest that full-time PTUs have become involved in the mainstream policing strategy within their respective agencies. This is due to their activity on daily basis and expansion of their traditional reactive mandate to a more proactive one. At the same time, the data would also suggest that part-
time PTUs have also become more proactive; however, they are on average, only deployed on a monthly basis. This would imply that police agencies with full-time units are using Tactical Law Enforcement as a mainstream policing strategy and are becoming increasingly paramilitarized due to this. The same cannot be said of police agencies with part-time units. While having become more paramilitarized by having such a unit, they are not using it as a mainstream policing strategy.

**Community Policing**

As stated earlier policing is possibly undergoing a "quiet revolution" of democratic reforms relating to community policing. It is was unclear how Tactical Law Enforcement might play a part, or should play a part, in this new philosophy. On the surface PTU's may seem in fact the antithesis of community policing. Ninety-six percent of respondents agreed that their tactical unit supports the community policing philosophy. As well, and more importantly, 80% agreed that tactical units play an important role in community policing. Over 85% of the police services that maintain a tactical unit have a Community Policing mandate. I discovered through this research that everybody has a different concept of community policing, from academics, police administrators, to the tactical officers. But how does a tactical unit play a role in community policing?

This was discussed in several interviews with some of the tactical commanders. One of the commanders interviewed noted that his unit was involved in community meetings and that they had cultivated relationships with
community leaders from various ethnic groups in their jurisdiction. By being proactive within the community, the unit already has opened lines of communication for use in times of tactical situations. An interesting finding is that numerous PTUs visit our public schools, educating students about tactical policing. These officers enter the classroom in full tactical gear and describe who they are and what they do, and explain to the students the weaponry they use and how they work. One tactical commander informed me that children who see his officers refer to them as "The Men In Black". This is an analogy to a 1997 popular culture movie "The Men In Black", which was about a secret governmental group of agents defending the earth against aliens. Throughout this paper I have given examples of how the media have mythically portrayed these units and how it has affected the public's perception of them. In many cases, the Police Tactical Unit is represented as the last line of defence for a citizen of the state.

Some respondents indicated that their unit works in conjunction with private security forces of corporations. Examples of public-private security cooperation would be corporations that manufacture weapons or operate publicly needed utilities such as a hydro or a nuclear power plant. This collaboration is done in case of a terrorist action taking place on premises of a private corporation. Is this community policing? Well, perhaps, for a tactical unit it is.

One tactical commander was asked by the author: "At the end of the year when you receive the report from the police public complaints commission, what is the most common complaint?" The officer's response as to what the most
common complaint from the public was not being informed as to what the tactical unit was doing. He then proceeded to explain what he called the five-minute follow up. "Once the incident is over and the masks are off, we go around and see the people who are affected and give them a brief overview of why we were there" (Interview 1). The result, he concluded, was an increase in public confidence because at the end of the day "the community is the client." In further conversations, I discovered that other police tactical units were also conducting the five-minute follow up. "If you are in some guy's driveway, you have to tell him why there is a truck of men in masks there" (Interview 2).

When studying such relatively new phenomenon such as Police Tactical Units, the initial questions are: How many are there? What equipment do they use? Are there any women in these units? A most important question, however, is how the community reacts to these units? This of course, should be the subject of future research. One tactical commander put forward very succinctly, what the very essence of community policing is: "If you have an extra hundred arrogant officers on the beat, that is not community policing. Attitude is important and that first of all we are accountable to society. It all comes down to police management" (Interview 0). It would seem that these units do have a place in Community Policing, it is just a matter of finding the place for them.

I would like to revisit the National Tactical Officers Association to illustrate a point. Until 1996 this organization's membership comprised exclusively of twenty thousand active or retired, past or present, members of military or law enforcement tactical units. However, in the same year membership became open
to all sworn and active law enforcement personnel. The rationalization for this change grew out of the fact that many officers who are not on a police tactical unit also face high risk situations every day and the National Tactical Officers Association felt that these officers should also have access to the same information and technology as police tactical officers. The association is comprised of officers from over 20 countries, on four different continents. Canadian tactical officers comprise two percent of the total National Tactical Officers Association, and at 1996 levels that would translate into 400 Canadian members which is close to a third of all tactical officers in Canada. The point that I wanted to make was that this is a proud organization with a strong tradition, it would seem. I have encountered numerous police tactical organizations in the United States, Canada and elsewhere around the world, but I have yet to find a police fraternal-type of organization devoted to community policing.

Pitfalls and Advantages

While it may be argued that these units save the lives of the public and of police officers there are problems with these units that need to be addressed. Peter Kraska interviewed individuals belonging to these units while conducting field research and he describes some of them as "highly trained soldiers completely lacking respect for the military bureaucracy, disdain for the government as an institution and had an attitude of irreverence toward authority and mainstream society which would make any good leftist smile" (Kraska: 1996:408). While conducting fieldwork he notes one of these officers comments
“this shit (creation of PTU’s) is going on all over. Why serve an arrest warrant to some crack dealer with a .38? With full body armor, the right shit (pointing to a small case that contained a 9mm Glock), and training you can kick ass and have fun” (Kraska: 1996:409). Attitudes such as those expressed by this officer give cause for grave concern! This is not to say that all tactical officers are testosterone happy men who would like nothing better than to “crack heads”. Throughout my research I did not encounter any hyper-masculine males; actually on the contrary they were outgoing and sensitive to the issues concerning their units. While Kraska and his colleagues have conducted extensive ethnographic research of these units and their members, I feel that the hyper-masculinity found in the United States is not as prevalent in Canada. In future research this should be a topic of study.

There has also been debate about the full-time use of these units which could erode the public’s perception of the police as being public servants and reinforce a view of police as an occupying army (Kraska: 1996:413). On the one hand, police are coming into contact with heavily-armed individuals, such as street-gang members and drug dealers who have automatic military-type weapons. Police officers need to be prepared to counter criminals and to protect both themselves and the public. On the other hand, the wearing of fatigues, buzz hair cuts, body armour and carrying machine guns as if patrolling a war zone has the possibility of sending a message to the criminal element and to the law-abiding citizen (Macko: 1997:34). Community relations and perceptions must be taken into account for a police force to be truly effective. A police department
cannot afford to lose the confidence and cooperation of the community. Critics have said that the growing use of paramilitary style police units will threaten the idea of a civilian police force (Macko: 1997:34). The recent trend of "community policing," where the community is encouraged to work with the police to solve community problems as well as crime may have been jeopardized.

Since this area of policing is relatively new there is little empirical data concerning the views of the public on this subject. However, Dennis Stevens in a recent study examined the police resolutions to critical situations through the use of tactical units (Stevens: 1999). His analysis shows that tactical units enhanced the likelihood of a safer resolution to these critical incidents. The data collected for this survey showed that 96 percent of critical incidents were resolved without shots being fired after the tactical unit arrived on the scene. Stevens finds clear evidence that agencies with tactical units are able to resolve critical incidents far more safely than agencies without a tactical unit, 71% versus 44% of the time (Stevens: 1999). When the study turned towards the community's attitude towards these tactical units, "survey respondents revealed that they felt that police tactical units could not protect them from crime, solve crime, or prevent crime. An implication of this is that communities where highly trained paramilitary police units are operational, public confidence is lacking." (Stevens: 1999: 51) Stevens concludes from his evidence that the community is actually afraid of these police tactical units and that this may be a result of the fact that they have little involvement with such units. "The unknown is often regarded as unsafe" (Stevens: 1999: 51).
The Future of Tactical Policing

Almost all respondents feel that tactical law enforcement is a vital part of modern policing and that policing will progressively become more tactical in the future. The majority of officers also agreed that Drug Epidemic (86%), Violent Crime (82%), and the increased use of weapons (90%) were all a significant part of the need for increases in tactical activities. There were some mixed feelings towards the “drug war” and several officers commented that it just doesn’t work and that it is a waste of time. Another indicated that the drug war was a reason for the continued full-time status of his unit.

We have been around since the seventies, due to the rise in terrorism which is not a major concern now. We are the chief’s pit-bull, but when you are spending thousands of dollars a year on a unit which isn’t earning its keep, you start to wonder. The “Drug War” provided the opportunity for us to use our skills on a daily basis to earn our keep (Interview 6).

Granted, the “Drug War” has caused an expansion of tactical unit activities but, as the data suggest another activity has contributed to its expansion: dangerous/search arrest warrants which make up 22% of all deployments that these units conducted in 1997. Ninety-eight percent of the respondents agreed that tactical units should be used as often as possible in serving potentially dangerous arrest and search warrants. In addition, 73.5% agreed that a police tactical unit reduces the need for police to use force to make an arrest. As Dennis Stevens’ (1999) findings are suggested by a statement from a tactical commander in charge of one of the largest tactical units in Canada, “The majority of the events ... are resolved by the containment & negotiation. Gas and less
lethal weapons are the next step in the elevation of use of force" (Survey 36).

All officers agree that a tactical unit adds a measure of safety for all police officers (100%) and the general public (98%). Some units included their objectives in the survey. In reading them one word came up repeatedly "Safety", as exemplified here.

- Safety of the Public
- Safety of Police Personal
- Safety of the Subject(s) involved

While only 78% of the respondents felt that these units did add a measure of deterrence for the criminal element within a community, it becomes apparent that the first objective of these units is safety of human life. Even though only a few police services will create new units within the next few years, tactical commanders overwhelming feel that funding should be increased for these units (92%). We will increasingly see these units through the media and there is no doubt that, in certain jurisdictions, they are a part of mainstream policing.

**Societal Implications**

What are the implications of this research for Canada? A backstage trend toward increased paramilitarization of the police has important theoretical implications in a time when most academic discourse centers on democratic developments in policing such as community policing (Kraska and Kappler:1997:4). We have seen that the two largest provinces have very different patterns of tactical policing, Ontario is highly tactically policed, while Quebec for its size is not. How this affects the crime rate and the resolution of "high risk
situations" in these two provinces should be a consideration of future research. Furthermore, full-time units are actively being deployed on a daily basis, while the majority of units that are part-time are only deployed a few times a month, if that. As the status of units that change from part-time to full-time we will see more involvement of tactical policing into mainstream policing. It seems that this is the trend of full-time units, as the disparity of deployments between them is vast. As police officers face more and more “high risk situations", then these units will continue to proliferate.

Morris Janowitz (1960) first posited the notion of modern armed forces becoming a constabulary force. He proposed, with the advent of nuclear weapons that military forces would become more useful with international relations. “The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to a minimum use of force and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory” (Janowitz:1960:418). We have seen military forces act as constables in many countries around the world such as Korea, Cyprus, and the former Yugoslavia, among others. This concept of military forces becoming a constabulary force has been carried one step further by Peter Kraska (1999). Through his work, he discovered not only trends in what he calls the “police-ization" of the military but also the militarization of the police. One measure of the increased militarization of the police services could be seen as the increase in the specialized police tactical units modeled after military special forces units, but what are the societal implications of this?

As mentioned earlier, tactical unit commanders have indicated that proper
management is vital for policing to be effective. In a society where the roles of
the police and the military begin to coincide, we must be careful not to allow one
or the other to become too prominent. Harold Lasswell originally developed the
concept of what he called the "garrison state" at the beginning of this century
(Huntington: 1957: 348). He theorized that this state would be one where the
dominant role in society is played by the military. Lasswell stressed the
importance of the military skill set in the formation of this garrison state; he also
included the police in his theories (Huntington:1957:348).

To the extent that intimidation is threatened or applied at home, we have a
police state. In the garrison-police state the dominant group is constituted
by specialists on violence, since force is the distinctive skill of soldiers and
police. The specialist on violence rises in power as other skill groups
subside, such as the specialists on civil administration. This transformation
would come about gradually as men abandon their former roles and take
up new ones, which are thought of as temporary (Lasswell:1950:47).

Lasswell's concept of the garrison state while totalitarian, provides us with
an important element which is central to the paramilitary debate. It has not been
insinuated that the United States is a garrison state or that we may be heading
towards a police state. However, thirty years ago, C. Wright Mills expressed
concern for what he called the new emerging means of violence in connection to
the military-industrial complex (Mills:1970:246). As the American literature
indicates, what we may be seeing here is a new form of policing that is both
ideologically and materially connected to the military-industrial complex. These
units must always be managed in a proper fashion so as not to allow the
community to feel that an occupying army has overrun their community.
References


Black, D., (1994) Not Really a SWAT Call, Tactical Edge, Fall.


National Counter Terrorism Plan (1988) *Solicitor General of Canada*


Appendixes

- Kraska and Kappeler 1997 Survey
- Alvaro 1999 Survey English Version
- Alvaro 1999 Survey French Version
- Police Tactical Units Training Check List
- Attitudinal Results to Survey
KACP Tactical Operations Survey

Directions: Please check the appropriate box or fill in the blank.

1. Approximately how many people are in the jurisdiction your department serves?
   - 0 - 50,000
   - 51,000 - 100,000
   - 101,000 - 250,000
   - 251,000 - 500,000
   - 501,000 - 1,000,000
   - 1,000,001 or above.

2. Approximately how many sworn officers does your department employ?
   ___________________________(please specify the approximate number here).

3. Please select the appropriate level of government which applies to your department.
   - Municipality
   - County
   - State
   - Other _____________.

4. Does your department currently have a tactical operations unit (TOU)?
   - YES (skip to question #7)
   - NO (if no, answer questions #5 and #6 and return survey).

5. If no, how do you deal with situations that might require a tactical operations unit?
   - Internally
   - State Police
   - Municipal or Sheriffs
   - Other _____________.

6. If no, is your department planning on setting up a tactical operation unit within the next few years?
   - YES
   - NO

7. What is your rank?
   _____________________________.

8. How would you characterize the tactical operations unit?
   - Full-time unit within your department
   - Part-time unit within your department
   - Full-time unit in conjunction with one or more other departments
   - Part-time unit in conjunction with one or more other departments
   - Other, describe _______________.

9. What does your organization call its tactical operation unit (E.R.U./S.W.A.T/ S.E.R.T, etc)?
   _____________________________.

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**Please note:** The above text is a representation of the survey questions and options as they appear in the image. The actual survey may include additional instructions or context not visible in the image.
10. How many officers do you have in your tactical operations unit? ______________ (please specify the approximate number here).

11. In what year was your tactical operations unit formed? ______________ (year)?

12. Has your tactical operations unit seen an increase in support (financial and/or personnel) in the 1990s?  
☐ YES  ☐ NO

13. How many call-outs have you had for each of the following years? (Please begin with the year your unit was formed, or for the years in which you can approximate the number of call-outs).

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Call-outs</td>
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14. For the last calendar year (1995), approximate what percentage (totaling 100 percent) of call-outs were for:

- Barricaded person
- Hostage situation
- Terrorist activity
- Dangerous search or arrest warrants
- Civil Disturbances
- Other (Please specify type of situations).

15. If the tactical operations unit is used for dangerous arrest and search warrants, in what year did this practice start? ______________ (please specify the year).

16. Is your department using the tactical operations unit as a proactive patrol unit to aid high crime areas?  
☐ YES  ☐ NO

If "yes," what year did it start? ______________.

17. Please rank in importance the following criteria in selecting officers for tactical operations units (from 1-8, with one being the most important)?

- Physical fitness
- Psychological fitness
- Education
- Firearms proficiency
- Seniority
- Military experience
- Special operations experience in the military
- Performance on Written/Oral Exam

18. Approximately how many hours does your tactical operations unit train per year? ______________.
19. Does your tactical operations unit provide training for other police agencies?
☐ YES    ☐ NO

20. Setting up a tactical operations unit requires expertise. Please check which sources were influential in providing expertise during the start-up period of your tactical operations unit (check all that apply).
☐ books/videos/magazines/training manuals
☐ TOU training from another department
☐ training provided by professional tactical schools
☐ police officers with special operations experience in the military
☐ police officers with regular-duty military, or reserve/national guard experience.
☐ assistance or information from U.S. Department of Justice, Police Foundation, PERF, IACP.
☐ training with active-duty military experts in tactical operations.
other ____________________________________________

21. After the initial set-up, please check those sources which are now influential in providing expertise/training for your tactical operations unit (check all that apply).
☐ books/videos/magazines/training manuals
☐ TOU training from another department
☐ training provided by professional tactical schools
☐ police officers with special operations experience in the military
☐ police officers with regular-duty military, or reserve/national guard experience.
☐ training with active-duty military experts in tactical operations.
☐ Assistance or information from U.S. Department of Justice, Police Foundation, PERF, IACP.
other ____________________________________________

22. Tactical Unit Inventory. (Please check the following items accessible to your TOU).
☐ Mobile command center ☐ Tactical headphones ☐ USAS-12
☐ Urban camouflage BDUs ☐ Electronic surveillance equip. ☐ Sniper rifle
☐ Thunderflash grenades ☐ H&K MP5 ☐ Laser sights
☐ CS diversionary devices ☐ M16 A2 or A3 ☐ Night vision scopes
☐ Dynamic entry systems ☐ Tactical response shotgun ☐ Ghillie sniper suit

OTHERS ____________________________________________

For the statements below, please check the choice which best represents your opinion.

23. Tactical operations units are a vital part of modern day policing.
☐ Strongly Agree ☐ Agree ☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree

24. Policing will likely become more tactical in the near future.
☐ Strongly Agree ☐ Agree ☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree

25. Tactical operations units' funding should be increased.
☐ Strongly Agree ☐ Agree ☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree

26. Media and public access to information regarding tactical operations should be minimized so as to not compromise their effectiveness.
☐ Strongly Agree ☐ Agree ☐ Disagree ☐ Strongly Disagree
27. Being part of a tactical unit is a prestigious position in the department.
   □ Strongly Agree  □ Agree  □ Disagree  □ Strongly Disagree

28. Tactical units should be used as often as possible in serving potentially dangerous arrest
    and search warrants.
   □ Strongly Agree  □ Agree  □ Disagree  □ Strongly Disagree

29. Tactical units should be selectively deployed to patrol high-crime areas.
   □ Strongly Agree  □ Agree  □ Disagree  □ Strongly Disagree

30. Tactical units play an important role in community policing strategies.
    □ Strongly Agree  □ Agree  □ Disagree  □ Strongly Disagree

31. Our department supports the philosophy of community policing.
    □ Strongly Agree  □ Agree  □ Disagree  □ Strongly Disagree

32. The drug epidemic is a significant part of the need for increases in tactical activities.
    □ Strongly Agree  □ Agree  □ Disagree  □ Strongly Disagree

33. Our worsening crime problem is a significant part of the need for increases in tactical
    activities.
    □ Strongly Agree  □ Agree  □ Disagree  □ Strongly Disagree

34. The increase in weapons on the streets of the U.S. is a significant part of the need for
    increases in tactical activities.
    □ Strongly Agree  □ Agree  □ Disagree  □ Strongly Disagree

35. Domestic terrorism is a significant part of the need for increases in tactical activities.
    □ Strongly Agree  □ Agree  □ Disagree  □ Strongly Disagree

36. Tactical operations units help minimize the incidence of law suits against the police.
    □ Strongly Agree  □ Agree  □ Disagree  □ Strongly Disagree

37. The tactical image of tactical units adds a measure of deterrence for the criminal element
    within the community.
    □ Strongly Agree  □ Agree  □ Disagree  □ Strongly Disagree

38. Tactical operations units reduce the need for police to use force to make an arrest.
    □ Strongly Agree  □ Agree  □ Disagree  □ Strongly Disagree

Would you like a copy of the results of this survey?  □ Yes  □ No

This request is strictly optional: Can we contact you personally to ask any further questions?
Name ____________________________ Phone ________________

Please Return To:  KACP Survey
467 Stratton
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond KY  40475
Police Services Tactical Operations Questionnaire

Centre for Research in Community-Based Policing
Carleton University
November 20 1998
Introduction

This study replicates similar research carried out by Peter Kraska of Eastern Kentucky State University in the United States. His research showed that the United States is experiencing a dramatic increase in the number of police tactical units and a rapid expansion of their role since the early 1980's. Also, almost all American cities with more than 50,000 people have active tactical units.

The present survey of police tactical units will provide a database of information that police administrators and the tactical units themselves will be able to use. The information will also be beneficial in determining trends and developing baseline data for comparison with data from the United States.

The Police Futures Group, which is a policy think tank on Canadian Policing attached to the Canadian Association of Police Chiefs, has agreed to support this research on condition that its results are made available to the Canadian Association of Police Chiefs.

This questionnaire should be completed by the person directly in charge of your Tactical Operations Unit, or if you do not have such a unit, by a senior operations officer. If you have any questions or need information concerning the survey, please contact Sam Alvaro at (613) 730-0653, Fax (613) 520-4062 or salvaro@chat.carleton.ca. Thank you for your time and effort in completing this questionnaire.

Please return to: Sam Alvaro
Carleton University
Centre for Research in Community-Based Policing
1125 Colonel By Drive.
Ottawa, Canada
K1S 5B6

or if you prefer by Fax (613) 520-4062
1. What is the approximate size of the population in the jurisdiction your department serves?

- 0-50,000
- 51,000-100,000
- 101,000-250,000
- 251,000-500,000
- 501,000-1,000,000
- 1,000,001- or above.

2. Approximately how many sworn officers does your department employ?  

   ________

3. Please select the appropriate level of government which applies to your department?  
   (In the case of the RCMP, OPP., or QPF, indicate whether your unit is operating at the federal, provincial regional, or municipal level.)

   - Municipal
   - Regional
   - Provincial
   - Federal

4. Does your department currently have a tactical operations unit?

   - Yes, if so how many units ________ (Skip to Question 8)
   - No. (If no, would you please answer Questions 5, 6 and 7 and return the questionnaire in the envelope provided)

5. If no, how do you deal with situations that might require a tactical operations unit?

   _____________________________ _____________________________
   _____________________________
   _____________________________

6. If your department does not have tactical operations unit, is it planning to set one up?

   - Yes  - No

7. If Yes, what year is it expected to be operational? ________
8. How would you characterize your tactical operations unit?

- Full Time within your police service
- Part Time within your police service
- Full Time in conjunction with one or more other department
- Part Time in conjunction with one or more other department
- Other

9. What does your organization call its tactical operations units (Emergency Rescue Unit, Special Weapons and Tactics team, Explosives and Demolitions Unit, etc.)?
(This can be defined as: any police unit that uses para-military tactics, skills and technology in a civilian setting)

10. How many officers do you have in your tactical operations unit(s)?

- How many are female.
- How many have served with the military.
- How many have served in military special forces units within the armed services.
- How many have served with other tactical operations units in other police dept’s.
- Average number of years served in policing prior to tactical duty.
- Average number of years served in tactical unit service.
- Average age of officers in the tactical unit

11. In your service is there a practice of rotating officers from tactical to other duties?

- Yes
- No

12. If Yes, what is the average length of time spent in tactical service? 

13. In what year was your tactical operations unit formed?

14. Why was it necessary to establish this type of unit?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
15. Has your tactical operations unit received increased financial support in the 1990’s?

☐ Yes  ☐ No

16. Has your Tactical operations unit had an increase in personnel in the 1990’s?

☐ Yes  ☐ No

17. What is the current annual budget of your police department? $ _________________

18. What is the current annual budget of your tactical unit? $ _________________

19. How many calls out have you had for each of the following years (Please begin with the year your unit was formed or for the years where you can estimate the number of calls out)?

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20. For the last calendar year, approximately what percentage totaling 100 percent of the calls out were for?

☐ Barricaded situation
☐ Hostage situation
☐ Terrorist activity
☐ Dangerous search arrest warrants
☐ Civil disturbances
☐ Drug warrants
☐ VIP security
☐ Surveillance (Please specify what kind)
☐ Other (Please specify type of situation(s)
21. Is your service using the tactical operations unit as a pro-active unit for use in high crime areas?

☐ Yes  ☐ No

22. If “Yes”, in what year did this practice start? ________

23. Please rank numerically the importance of the following criteria in selecting officers for tactical operations units. (One being the most important and eight the least important)

   _____ Education
   _____ Firearms proficiency
   _____ Military experience
   _____ Performance on written or oral exam
   _____ Physical fitness
   _____ Seniority
   _____ Psychological fitness
   _____ Special operations experience in the military

24. Approximately how many hours does your tactical operations unit train per year? ________

25. Does your tactical unit provide training for other police agencies?  ☐ Yes  ☐ No

26. If so for which departments?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

27. Setting up tactical operations units requires expertise. Please rank numerically the importance of the following sources, in providing expertise during the start up period of your tactical operations unit? (One being the most important and eight the least important.
Where possible, please name which department, manual, school, etc. in the space provided or if more room is needed attach a list.)

   _____ Books/videos/magazines/training manual
   _____ Tactical operations unit training from another department
   _____ Training provided by professional tactical schools
   _____ Police officers with experience in the military
   _____ Information from tactical units in the United States or Europe
   _____ Assistance or information from the Department of Justice
   _____ Training with active duty military experts

Other (Please specify) ______________________________________________________
28. Since set-up, please rank numerically the following sources which are now influential in providing expertise to your tactical operations unit? (One being the most important and eight the least important. Where possible, please name which department, manual, school, etc. in the space provided or if more room is needed attach a list.)

- Books/videos/magazines/training manual
- Tactical operations unit training from another department
- Training provided by professional tactical schools
- Police officers with experience in the military
- Information from tactical units in the United States or Europe
- Assistance or information from the Department of Justice
- Training with active duty military experts

Other (Please specify)

29. Please check any of the following equipment which is in your unit's inventory and/or accessible to your unit.

- Mobile command center
- Urban camouflage BDU’s
- Thunderflash grenades
- CS diversionary devices
- Dynamic entry systems
- Tactical response shotgun
- Tactical headsets
- Electronic surveillance equipment
- H&K MP5
- M16 A2 or A3
- Night vision scopes
- Ghillie sniper suits
- Sniper rifle
- Laser sights

Types of Vehicles

Others

For the statements below, please check the choice which best represents your opinion.

30. Tactical operations units are a vital part of modern day policing.

- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

31. Policing will likely become more tactical in the near future.

- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

32. Funding for tactical operations units should be increased.

- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
33. Media and public access to information regarding tactical operations should be minimized so as not to compromise operational effectiveness.

   □ Strongly Agree □ Agree □ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree

34. Being part of a tactical unit is a prestigious position in the department.

   □ Strongly Agree □ Agree □ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree

35. Tactical units should be used as often as possible in serving potentially dangerous arrest and search warrants.

   □ Strongly Agree □ Agree □ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree

36. Tactical units should be selectively deployed to patrol high-crime areas.

   □ Strongly Agree □ Agree □ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree

37. Tactical units play an important role in community policing strategies

   □ Strongly Agree □ Agree □ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree

38. Our tactical unit supports the philosophy of community policing.

   □ Strongly Agree □ Agree □ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree

39. The drug epidemic is a significant part of the need for increases in tactical activities.

   □ Strongly Agree □ Agree □ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree

40. Our violent crime problem is a significant part of the need for increases in tactical activities.

   □ Strongly Agree □ Agree □ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree

41. The increased use of weapons on the streets of Canada is a significant part of the need for increases in tactical activities.

   □ Strongly Agree □ Agree □ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree

42. Tactical units add a measure of safety for all police officers in our service.

   □ Strongly Agree □ Agree □ Disagree □ Strongly Disagree
43. Tactical units add a measure of safety for the general public.
   - Strongly Agree    - Agree    - Disagree    - Strongly Disagree

44. Domestic terrorism is a significant part of the need for increases in tactical activities.
   - Strongly Agree    - Agree    - Disagree    - Strongly Disagree

45. A tactical unit adds a measure of deterrence for the criminal element within the community.
   - Strongly Agree    - Agree    - Disagree    - Strongly Disagree

46. Tactical operations units reduce the need for police to use force to make an arrest.
   - Strongly Agree    - Agree    - Disagree    - Strongly Disagree

The following questions are related to the mandates in your department. If possible please attach a copy of your departmental mandate statement.

47. What is the mandate, of your tactical unit?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

48. What are the objectives, of your tactical unit?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
49. Does your service have a community policing mandate or mission?  ☐ Yes ☐ No

50. If so what is its mandate or mission?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

51. Rank of the person completing the questionnaire?

________________________________________________________________________

52. Would you like a copy of the results of this survey?  ☐ Yes ☐ No

If Yes, please attach a business card or if you wish to do so, you may send your request under a separate cover.

53. This request is strictly optional: May we contact you personally to ask any further questions?

Name ____________________________ Phone _______________ Email ______________________

54. If you have any comments or further information please write them in the space below, on the back of this questionnaire or attach them.

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

We would like to thank you and your department for your help in this survey. Please return the questionnaire in the envelope provided.
Questionnaire sur les unités d'opérations tactiques dans les services policiers

Center for Research in Community-based Policing

Carleton University

Le 20 novembre 1998
Introduction

Le présent sondage reproduit des recherches similaires effectuées par Peter Kraska de l’Eastern Kentucky State University aux États-Unis. Ses recherches ont révélé que le nombre d’unités de police tactiques de même que l’importance de leur rôle croissent de façon vertigineuse depuis le début des années 80. À l’heure actuelle, presque toutes les villes américaines dont la population dépasse 50 000 ont une unité tactique active.

Le présent sondage des unités de police tactiques permettra d’établir une base de données que les administrateurs de police et les unités tactiques elles-mêmes pourront utiliser. L’information nous aidera aussi à déceler des tendances et à établir une base de données de référence que nous pourrons comparer aux données américaines.

Le Police Futures Group, groupe de réflexion sur les politiques de la police canadienne lié à l’Association canadienne des chefs de police, a convenu d’appuyer cette recherche à condition que les résultats soient mis à la disposition de l’association.

Le questionnaire doit être rempli par la personne directement responsable de votre unité d’opérations tactiques ou, si vous n’avez pas de telle unité, par l’agent des opérations principal. Si vous avez des questions à propos du sondage ou si vous avez besoin d’information à son sujet, veuillez communiquer avec Sam Alvaro, par téléphone au (613) 730-0653, par télécopieur au (613) 520-4062 ou par courrier électronique à l’adresse salvaro@chat.carleton.ca. Merci à l’avance de votre collaboration.

Veuillez retourner le questionnaire dûment rempli à :

Sam Alvaro
Carleton University
Center for Research in Community-Based Policing
1125, promenade Colonel By
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1S 5B6

ou, si vous préférez, le lui envoyer par télécopieur au (613) 520-4062.
1. Quelle est la population approximative de la zone desservie par votre service?

- De 0 à 50 000
- De 51 000 à 100 000
- De 101 000 à 250 000
- De 251 000 à 500 000
- De 501 000 à 1 000 000
- 1 000 001 ou plus.

2. Environ combien d'agent(e)s assermenté(e)s y a-t-il dans votre service?

______________________________

3. Veuillez indiquer le palier gouvernemental dont votre service relève.
(Dans le cas de la GRC, de la Police provinciale de l'Ontario ou de la Sûreté du Québec, indiquez si votre unité fonctionne au palier fédéral, provincial, régional ou municipal.)

- Municipal
- Régional
- Provincial
- Fédéral

4. Votre service a-t-il actuellement une unité d'opérations tactiques?

- Oui. (Indiquez le nombre d'unités ____ et passez à la question 8.)
- Non. (Répondez aux questions 5, 6 et 7 et retournez le questionnaire dans l'enveloppe fournie.)

5. Dans la négative, comment résolvez-vous les situations qui pourraient nécessiter une unité d'opérations tactiques?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

6. Si votre service n'a pas d'unité d'opérations tactiques, avez-vous l'intention d'en établir une?

___ Oui         ___ Non

7. Dans l'affirmative, en quelle année devra-t-elle être opérationnelle? ___________
8. Comment décririez-vous votre unité d'opérations tactiques?

__ Temps plein au sein de votre service de police
__ Temps partiel au sein de votre service de police
__ Temps plein en conjonction avec un ou plusieurs autres services
__ Temps partiel en conjonction avec un ou plusieurs autres services
__ Autre

9. Quel nom votre organisme donne-t-il à ses unités d'opérations tactiques (Unité de sauvetage d'urgence, Équipe d'armes et de tactiques spéciales, Unité d'explosifs et de démolitions, etc.)? (On peut la définir comme suit : toute unité de police qui a recours à des tactiques, à des compétences et à des technologies paramilitaires dans un milieu civil.)

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

10. Combien d'agent(e)s y a-t-il dans votre unité ou vos unités d'opérations tactiques? ________

___ Combien sont des femmes?
___ Combien ont servi dans les forces armées?
___ Combien ont servi dans une unité militaire spéciale au sein des forces armées?
___ Combien ont servi dans une autre unité d'opérations tactiques au sein d'un autre service de police?
___ Nombre moyen d'années de service dans la police avant l'affectation à une unité tactique.
___ Nombre moyen d'années de service dans une unité tactique.
___ Âge moyen des agent(e)s dans l'unité tactique.

11. Dans votre service, y a-t-il la pratique d'alterner les agent(e)s entre l'unité tactique et les autres services?

___ Oui       ___ Non

12. Dans l'affirmative, quelle est la durée moyenne de service au sein de l'unité tactique?

_____

13. En quelle année votre unité tactique a-t-elle été créée? ________
14. Pourquoi fallait-il créer une telle unité?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

15. Votre unité d'opérations tactiques a-t-elle reçu un soutien financier accru au cours des années 90?

__ Oui  __ Non

16. Le personnel de votre unité d'opérations tactiques a-t-il augmenté au cours des années 90?

__ Oui  __ Non

17. Quel est le budget annuel actuel de votre service de police? ____________ $

18. Quel est le budget annuel actuel de votre unité tactique? ____________ $

19. Combien d'interventions avez-vous eues dans chacune des années suivantes? (Veuillez commencer par l'année où votre unité a été créée ou par les années où vous pouvez estimer le nombre d'interventions.)

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20. Au cours de la dernière année civile, environ quel pourcentage (total 100%) de vos interventions avaient trait :

________ à une situation de barricadage
________ à une prise d'otages
________ à des activités terroristes
________ à un mandat de perquisition / d'arrestation dangereuses
________ à une émeute
________ aux drogues
________ à la sécurité de dignitaires
________ à la surveillance (veuillez préciser) ________________
________ autre (veuillez préciser)

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

21. Votre service se sert-il de l'unité d'opérations tactiques comme unité proactive dans les zones à taux élevé de criminalité?

____ Oui     ____ Non

22. Dans l'affirmative, de quelle année date cette pratique? ____

23. Veuillez classer, par ordre d'importance, les critères suivants de sélection d'agent(e)s pour les unités d'opérations tactiques.
(1 = le plus important, 8 = le moins important)

____ Éducation
____ Compétence en utilisation d'armes
____ Expérience militaire
____ Résultats d'un examen écrit ou oral
____ Forme physique
____ Années de service
____ Condition psychologique
____ Expérience en opérations spéciales dans les forces armées

24. Environ combien d'heures votre unité d'opérations tactiques s'entraîne-t-elle chaque année?

________________

25. Votre unité tactique fournit-elle de la formation à d'autres services de police?

____ Oui     ____ Non
26. Dans l’affirmative, à quels services?

27. Il faut des compétences particulières pour établir une unité d’opérations tactiques. Veuillez classer, par ordre d’importance, les sources de formation suivantes au cours de la période de lancement. (1 = la plus importante, 8 = la moins importante. Lorsque cela est possible, veuillez donner le nom du service, du manuel, de l’école, etc. dans l’espace prévu à cet effet. Si l’espace manque, veuillez joindre une liste.)

- Livres / vidéos / revues / manuel de formation
- Formation fournie par l’unité d’opérations tactiques d’un autre service
- Formation fournie par une école d’opérations tactiques professionnelle
- Agent(e)s de police ayant de l’expérience militaire
- Information fournie par des unités d’opérations tactiques américaines ou européennes
- Aide ou information fournies par le ministère de la Justice
- Formation avec des experts militaires en service
- Autre (veuillez préciser)

28. Veuillez classer, par ordre d’importance, les sources de formation qui ont été les plus utiles pour votre unité d’opérations tactiques depuis son établissement. (1 = la plus importante, 8 = la moins importante. Lorsque cela est possible, veuillez donner le nom du service, du manuel, de l’école, etc. dans l’espace prévu à cet effet. Si l’espace manque, veuillez joindre une liste.)

- Livres / vidéos / revues / manuel de formation
- Formation fournie par l’unité d’opérations tactiques d’un autre service
- Formation fournie par une école d’opérations tactiques professionnelle
- Agent(e)s de police ayant de l’expérience militaire
- Information fournie par des unités d’opérations tactiques américaines ou européennes
- Aide ou information fournies par le ministère de la Justice
- Formation avec des experts militaires en service
- Autre (veuillez préciser)
29. Veuillez indiquer l’équipement qui fait partie de l'inventaire de votre unité ou auquel elle peut accéder.

___ Centre de commande mobile
___ Casques de communications tactiques
___ Ensembles de tireur d'élite Ghillie
___ Tenue de camouflage urbain
___ Équipement de surveillance électronique
___ Fusil de tireur d'élite
___ Grenades «Thunderflash»
___ H&K MP5
___ Viseurs laser
___ Dispositifs de diversion CS
___ M16 A2 ou A3
___ Viseurs de nuit
___ Systèmes d'entrée dynamiques
___ Fusil de chasse d'intervention tactique

Types de véhicules ___________________________________________
Autres ____________________________________________________

Pour les énoncés figurant ci-dessous, veuillez indiquer le choix qui correspond le mieux à votre avis.

30. Les unités d'opérations tactiques constituent un élément vital des services de police modernes.

___ Tout à fait d'accord ___ D'accord ___ En désaccord ___ Tout à fait en désaccord

31. Dans l'avenir immédiat, les services de police auront de plus en plus recours aux unités tactiques.

___ Tout à fait d'accord ___ D'accord ___ En désaccord ___ Tout à fait en désaccord

32. On devrait accroître le financement des unités d'opérations tactiques.

___ Tout à fait d'accord ___ D'accord ___ En désaccord ___ Tout à fait en désaccord

33. On devrait limiter l'accès par le public et les médias à l'information sur les opérations tactiques afin de ne pas compromettre leur efficacité opérationnelle.

___ Tout à fait d'accord ___ D'accord ___ En désaccord ___ Tout à fait en désaccord
34. Au sein de votre service, les membres de l’unité tactique jouissent d’un prestige particulier.

_ Tout à fait d’accord ___ D’accord ___ En désaccord ___ Tout à fait en désaccord

35. On doit avoir recours le plus souvent possible à l’unité tactique lorsqu’il s’agit de signifier un mandat de perquisition ou d’arrestation potentiellement dangereuses.

_ Tout à fait d’accord ___ D’accord ___ En désaccord ___ Tout à fait en désaccord

36. On doit déployer les unités tactiques de façon sélective pour patrouiller les zones à taux élevé de criminalité.

_ Tout à fait d’accord ___ D’accord ___ En désaccord ___ Tout à fait en désaccord

37. Les unités tactiques jouent un rôle important dans les stratégies de police communautaire.

_ Tout à fait d’accord ___ D’accord ___ En désaccord ___ Tout à fait en désaccord

38. Notre unité tactique appuie la philosophie de la police communautaire.

_ Tout à fait d’accord ___ D’accord ___ En désaccord ___ Tout à fait en désaccord

39. L’épidémie de drogues contribue de façon significative au besoin d’accroître les activités d’opérations tactiques.

_ Tout à fait d’accord ___ D’accord ___ En désaccord ___ Tout à fait en désaccord

40. Le problème des crimes violentes contribue de façon significative au besoin d’accroître les activités d’opérations tactiques.

_ Tout à fait d’accord ___ D’accord ___ En désaccord ___ Tout à fait en désaccord

41. L’utilisation accrue d’armes à feu dans les villes canadiennes contribue de façon significative au besoin d’accroître les activités d’opérations tactiques.

_ Tout à fait d’accord ___ D’accord ___ En désaccord ___ Tout à fait en désaccord

42. Les unités tactiques accroissent la sécurité de tou(te)s les agent(e)s de notre service.

_ Tout à fait d’accord ___ D’accord ___ En désaccord ___ Tout à fait en désaccord

43. Les unités tactiques accroissent la sécurité du public.
__ Tout à fait d'accord __ D'accord __ En désaccord __ Tout à fait en désaccord

44. Le terrorisme domestique contribue de façon significative au besoin d'accroître les activités d'opérations tactiques.

__ Tout à fait d'accord __ D'accord __ En désaccord __ Tout à fait en désaccord

45. Les unités tactiques découragent l'élément criminel dans la communauté.

__ Tout à fait d'accord __ D'accord __ En désaccord __ Tout à fait en désaccord

46. Les unités d'opérations tactiques réduisent le besoin de recourir à la force pour faire une arrestation.

__ Tout à fait d'accord __ D'accord __ En désaccord __ Tout à fait en désaccord

Les questions suivantes ont trait au mandat de votre service. Si cela est possible, veuillez joindre une copie de l'énoncé de mandat de votre service.

47. Quel est le mandat de votre unité tactique?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

48. Quels sont les objectifs de votre unité tactique?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

49. Votre service a-t-il un mandat ou une mission de police communautaire? __ Oui __ Non

50. Dans l'affirmative, quel est son mandat ou quelle est sa mission?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
51. Grade de la personne qui a rempli le questionnaire.

52. Aimeriez-vous recevoir une copie des résultats du présent sondage? __ Oui __ Non
Dans l’affirmative, veuillez joindre une carte d’affaires ou, si vous voulez, vous pouvez nous envoyer votre demande sous pli séparé.

53. Cette demande est strictement facultative : Pouvons-nous communiquer avec vous personnellement si nous avons d’autres questions?

Nom ___________________________ Téléphone _________ Courrier électronique _______

54. Si vous avez des commentaires ou d’autres renseignements, veuillez les écrire dans l’espace ci-dessous, au verso du questionnaire ou sur une feuille séparée.

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Nous vous remercions, vous et votre service, de votre collaboration. Veuillez retourner le questionnaire dans l’enveloppe fournie.
Respondents Attitudes Towards Aspects of Tactical Law Enforcement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Operations Units are a Vital part of Modern Day Policing</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>96.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policing will likely become more tactical in the near Future</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for Tactical Operations Units should be increased</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>54.0%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media and Public Access to information regarding Tactical Operations should be minimized</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being part of a tactical unit is a prestigious role in the department</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Units Should be used as often as possible in serving potentially dangerous arrest and search warrants</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Units should be selectively deployed to patrol high crime areas</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Units play an important role in Community Policing Strategies</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Tactical Unit Supports the Philosophy of Community Policing</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Drug Epidemic is a Significant part of the need for increases in Tactical Activities</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Our Violent Crime Problem is a Significant part of the need for increases in Tactical Activities</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>The increased use of weapons on the streets of Canada is a significant part of the need for increases in Tactical Activities</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical Units Add a Measure of Safety for a Police Officers in our Service</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical Units add a Measure of Safety for the General Public</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic Terrorism is a Significant part of the need for increases in Tactical Activities</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>A Tactical Unit Adds a Measure of Deterrence for the Criminal Element within the Community</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical Operations Units Reduce the Need for Police to Use Force to Make an Arrest</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>19</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alvaro Survey 1999
# EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT

## Alternate Selection Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tr>
<td>Relationship/Supervisor</td>
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<td>Relationship/Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self Confidence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decisiveness</td>
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<td>Physical Ability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motivation</td>
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<td>Technical Knowledge</td>
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<td>Knowledge Application</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safety</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Ratings: **Hi** to **Low**

Alt.Eva/CER
Gen. Efficiency
- overall efficiency is good
- interest level high - trying since 1993.
- puts out required effort to achieve task but does not go beyond that.
- it is believed he could give more effort.

Relationship
Supervisor
- appears to get along with authority figures
- takes direction well - observed

Relationship
Team
- appears to be an individual
- little communication between team members
- good individual effort - needs more team spirit.

Self confidence
- very self confident
- firearms/safe but slow
- lack of confidence with weapons handling
- fails to recognize limitations/weaknesses

Decisiveness
- routine decision adequate
- recognition of limitations, will not admit failure or inadequacies,
  i.e. weapons assembly problems.
- poor decision to abandon containment position to make arrest.

Physical
- excellent fitness level
- handled tasks with apparent ease.

Stress
- appears to function consistently under physical and mental stress.

Risk Assessment
- Containment position to abandoned during scenario
  - allowed for escape of 2nd suspect
  - deviated from plan, bad judgement/assessment of situation.

Adaptability
- adopted adequately during week

Tenacity
- Tom's personality/demeanour is that he does not appear to give his
  maximum effort at tasks presented.

Motivation
- applied since 1993
- appears motivated although not portrayed/recognized easily
- not motivator of other team members.

Tech. Knowledge
- written exams/tests good
  78.7%

Knowledge App.
- has some difficulty in putting in practices what is learned.
- weapons handling/assembly lack of confidence although would not admit

Communications
- stubborn, when stripping weapon had difficulty, would not ask for help.
- role playing in scenarios detected lack of authority in commands.
- knows team phonetics
- little communication between team members - give appearance of lack of
  interest.

Safety
- safe in handling weapons
- no further violations weapons observed during selection process.