

Margaret Isabel Catherine Campbell

**HARMONY AND DISSONANCE. A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF  
FOREIGN POLICY GOALS ON MILITARY DECISION-MAKING WITH  
RESPECT TO THE CANADIAN NATO BRIGADE IN GERMANY, 1951-1964**

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*To Darya Helen Mary Campbell, 1961-1998*

### ***Résumé court***

L'hypothèse de la dissertation est la suivante: les objectifs à long terme du ministère des Affaires extérieures du Canada ont influencé les décisions militaires en ce qui concerne la brigade canadienne de l'OTAN, en Allemagne. D'autres facteurs, comme les limitations financières, les traditions, le moral et l'efficacité militaire, ainsi que la rivalité entre les services ont aussi joué un rôle et doivent être pris en ligne de compte dans l'analyse. Nos recherches nous ont permis de découvrir que la sécurité nationale - entendue dans un sens large, comprenait le domaine idéologique, la culture et le commerce - et la protection de l'Europe de l'Ouest formaient la base des objectifs du Canada et ont eu une grande influence sur les décisions militaires. Tel a été le cas pour celle d'envoyer une brigade en Allemagne, ainsi que pour la détermination de son statut, de son rôle et de son emplacement.

*Isabel Campbell*

*Richard Jones*



## *Résumé long*

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Notre méthode de recherche a consisté à utiliser, analyser et interpréter les sources primaires, pour vérifier la valeur de notre hypothèse. Nous avons étudié la correspondance, les rapports et les messages échangés entre les diplomates, les politiciens et les officiers supérieurs, pour connaître leurs motivations, leurs pensées et leurs différends.

À cause de ses engagements envers l'OTAN, le Canada dut se doter d'une force militaire supérieure en nombre et améliorer les conditions de service de ses soldats, afin d'attirer de nouvelles recrues et de les garder ensuite dans les rangs de son armée.

Les dossiers du service des relations publiques de la brigade et les rapports de l'ambassade canadienne à Bonn montrent les rapports qui existaient entre le comportement des soldats canadiens et les objectifs secondaires et militaires du gouvernement. Les incidents entre les soldats canadiens et les civils allemands étaient utilisés par les partis politiques allemands contre l'OTAN.

Finalement, il y eut des accords et des désaccords entre les buts à long terme, les autres facteurs en jeu et les exigences de la réalité. Chaque décision était unique et fondée sur des facteurs qui différaient peu ou prou selon les circonstances.

*Isabel Campbell*

*Richard Jones*

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The errors of fact and interpretation are mine.

## **Abbreviations:**

ACE - Allied Command Europe  
BAOR - British Army of the Rhine  
CCOS - Chairman, Chiefs of Staff (Canadian)  
CGS - Chief of the General Staff (Canadian)  
CIBG - Canadian Infantry Brigade Group  
CIGS - Chief of the Imperial Staff (British)  
EDC- European Defence Community  
FRG - Federal Republic of Germany  
HQS - Headquarters  
MC - Military Committee  
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NORTHAG - Northern Army Group

SACEUR - Supreme Allied Commander Europe  
SACLANT - Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic  
SHAPE - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe  
SOFA - Status of Forces (NATO)

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***Harmony and Dissonance. A study of the influence of foreign policy goals on military decision-making with respect to the Canadian NATO brigade in Germany, 1951-1964***

***Introduction:***

**Background and Context:**

We, the people of the United Nations, believe in the worth and dignity of the individual, in the rule of law and justice among nations and in respect for the pledged word. We are persuaded that men and nations can by their joint and sustained efforts live together as good neighbours free from fear and want and with liberty of thought and worship. We are resolved to save ourselves and our children from the scourge of war which twice in our time has brought us untold loss and sorrow. Therefore we unite our strength to keep the peace.<sup>1</sup>

The ideals expressed in this quotation summarize well the Canadian vision for world peace in 1945. Backed by participation in collective security, they formed a basis for foreign policy in the decades to come. Further, John Holmes, the Canadian diplomat, stressed that one of the lessons learned from the experiences of the 1930s and the Second World War was the need for serious collective military preparation against potential aggressors.<sup>2</sup> But if a strong military was essential to preserve peace, this lesson was only reluctantly learned as W.L.M. King, the Canadian Prime Minister, examined defence expenditures after the war and initiated significant cuts to all services in 1946 and 1947.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Escott Reid, *Radical Mandarin. The Memoirs of Escott Reid*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989, p. 199. Here Reid quotes from the official Canadian report on the San Francisco conference where the United Nations charter was being drafted in the spring of 1945.

<sup>2</sup>John Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace. Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, Volume 2*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup>C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume 2, 1921-1948, The Mackenzie King Era*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981, pp. 396-398.

Reductions in Canadian forces occurred just as tensions were beginning to mount between the Soviet Union and the western allies in the early years of the Cold War. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed on 4 April 1949 in order to deter Soviet aggression in western Europe. A defensive organization, it included Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States as charter members. After the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950, the Canadian government rapidly began to expand its defence programmes.<sup>4</sup>

NATO enlarged as Greece and Turkey joined it in 1952. The entry of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) into NATO was more difficult. The populations of the European NATO countries, such as France, Belgium and the Netherlands, had recently experienced Nazi invasion, occupation, collaboration and resistance. German rearmament was not easily accepted. The FRG formally became a NATO member in 1955, only ten years after Germany's surrender near the end of the Second World War. The interplay of diplomacy and military necessity produced no magic formula to transform these former enemies into allies and the relationship remained somewhat ambiguous. My thesis will address the place of Germany in Canada's foreign policy and it will describe Canadian efforts to improve the relationship, while assisting with German integration into the western alliance.

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<sup>4</sup>James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada. Growing Up Allied*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980, p. 192.

In 1951, the Canadian government authorized the despatch of 12,000 servicemen to Europe; this number included approximately 6,500 Royal Canadian Air Force personnel and 5,500 Army personnel.<sup>5</sup> The Canadian Army sent an infantry brigade group to serve with the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) in Northern Germany in late 1951 as a part of its NATO contribution.<sup>6</sup>

The legal status of forces located in Germany was a matter of concern for the Canadian government and discussions on this issue marked the beginnings of a complicated relationship with the FRG as Canadian officials negotiated with the Three Powers (Britain, France and the United States) in an effort to establish an independent Canadian policy. In the end, they were successful: Canadian forces did not take on occupation duties in the FRG.<sup>7</sup> The Canadians involved hoped that non-occupation status would promote West German acceptance of NATO and ease the entry of the FRG into the alliance. In addition, they wished to improve German-Canadian relations.

However, the decision to send troops, taken in the aftermath of the first Berlin crisis of

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<sup>5</sup>Canada. Privy Council, Order-in-Council, PC 5598, 18 October 1951. The actual number of Army officers and men sent by December 1951 was closer to 5900 which crept up to 6214 by 1956. This number was then reduced.

<sup>6</sup> In this thesis, the term "Germany" may be taken for West Germany, and "Germans" to mean West Germans unless otherwise specified. The term "brigade", "brigade group" or "NATO troops" will refer to the various Army units stationed in Europe which comprised 27 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (1951-1953), 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (1953-1955), 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (1955-1957) and 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (1957-1968).

<sup>7</sup>The significance of "non-occupation" status will be dealt with in detail in Chapter two.

1948 and in view of actual combat in Korea in 1950, was originally intended as a short term measure to reinforce European security during a time of high tension. As a temporary measure it was intended to further the long term goals of European stability, independence and integration.<sup>8</sup> Canadians assumed that the Europeans would take responsibility for their own defence when they had recovered from the Second World War. Yet the soldiers remained. Some high ranking officers in the Department of National Defence questioned the necessity and the role of Canadian troops in Europe, especially after the adoption of the forward defence and nuclear deterrence strategy in late 1954.<sup>9</sup>

As the Cold War continued, the mere presence of Canadian soldiers in Germany gained psychological significance as a statement of NATO solidarity, though the numbers were small. During the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the number of Canadian servicemen in Europe was raised to 14,000 with the Army receiving an additional 1,106

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<sup>8</sup> Lester B. Pearson, *Mike. The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 2, 1948-1957*, edited by John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973, pp. 75-6.

<sup>9</sup> This was particularly the case after 1954 and with the adoption of MC 48. The role of the brigade changed as NATO's strategy of nuclear deterrence and forward defence, known as MC 48, gradually filtered down to the operational level. MC 48 required a defence as far east of the Rhine as possible to include most of West Germany. This strategy was essential to West German support for NATO. It depended upon "the advent of new weapons [tactical nuclear weapons], plus a German contribution." Gregory W. Pedlow (ed.), *NATO Strategy Documents, 1949-1969*, Brussels: SHAPE, 1997, p. 242. Extract from MC 48.



of this number.<sup>10</sup> The Canadian government came under pressure to provide greater resources to NATO as a result of the gradual implementation of plans for forward defence in Europe; at the same time, continental defence was a higher national priority.<sup>11</sup> In February 1964, the Army was authorized to keep 7,000 servicemen in Europe.<sup>12</sup> This higher number provided the administrative and logistical support required as a result of NATO's implementation of the defence of German territory east of the Rhine to the intra-German border.

The brigade was an important expression of Canada's commitment to NATO and to European security, but even with the slightly larger numbers, its military significance declined as the Europeans recovered and became better able to defend themselves in

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<sup>10</sup>Canada. Privy Council, Order-in-Council, PC 1961-1276, 22 August 1961. The Americans increased their forces in Europe by 40,000. Richard L. Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose. How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War*, Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1993, p. 138. By contrast, the French and Belgians retained forces in colonial engagements. The French hoped to reinstall a force of 60,000 men in Germany by 1962, but Algeria continued to take significant resources from the European theatre. Of course, by 1960, the French had also adopted nuclear weapons. Frédéric Guelton, "The French Army During the Second Berlin Crisis (November 1958-August 1961)" in William W. Epley (ed.), *International Cold War Military Records and History. Proceedings of the International Conference*, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1996, pp. 160-161.

<sup>11</sup>Jon B. McLin, *Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963. The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance*, Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins Press, 1967.

<sup>12</sup>Directorate of History and Heritage (hereafter DHH), Lindsey/Sutherland Collection, 87/253-II-15.4, *The Canadian Defence Budget, Historical Background*, p. 3. The austerity program of June 1962 created by an exchange crisis reduced the overall military and civilian personnel by about 6000 by March 1963. This change did not affect the brigade.

the 1960s. NATO's strategy of deterrence proved effective in avoiding warfare, but it was not easily accepted by high ranking Canadian army officers. If the experience of two world wars and the loss of Canadian lives in these wars had demonstrated that stability in Central Europe, and especially in Germany, was key to national security,<sup>13</sup> then the notion that relatively few soldiers armed with tactical nuclear weapons might be enough to deter a Soviet invasion seemed at best deeply troubling.

A continued mistrust and fear of the German military also seemed evident. The terms and conditions under which Germany joined NATO restricted its military activities and independence. Through NATO, Canada and its allies hoped to contain German military potential and to benefit from Germany's military contribution. Even in the early 1960s, these factors affected consideration of plans for German re-unification. Escott Reid, the Canadian Ambassador in Bonn, raised the possibilities of a military resurgence and a combined German-Soviet partnership as plans for German reunification were being discussed by Canada and its allies.<sup>14</sup>

NATO remained chiefly a military alliance, though Article Two of the NATO Treaty was

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<sup>13</sup>Angelika Elisabeth Sauer, "The Respectable Course. Canada's Department of External Affairs, The Great Powers, and the 'German Problem', 1943-1947", Doctoral Thesis, University of Waterloo, 1994, p. 3

<sup>14</sup>National Archives of Canada (hereafter NA), Record Group 25, (hereafter RG 25), Volume 5406, File 10935-B-40, pt. 6, Message on Policy toward Germany, from Escott Reid, the Canadian Ambassador in Bonn, to the Department of External Affairs, 30 March 1961. This lengthy message was sent to all the major Canadian embassies and delegations.

intended to broaden its scope of activities into other fields. Louis St. Laurent, the Canadian Prime Minister, Lester B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and the outspoken Reid pushed hard for inclusion of Article Two in negotiations in 1949.<sup>15</sup> It was eventually included in the Treaty against the strong opposition of Dean Acheson, the American Secretary of State. A compromise resulted in a vaguely worded paragraph:

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.<sup>16</sup>

In the end, Canadian diplomats wavered and were inconsistent in their support of Article Two.<sup>17</sup> Even if not much was achieved by Article Two, it provided a statement of values pertinent to Canadian motivation in NATO and it was also an acknowledgement that the success of the military alliance might be influenced by economic development and

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<sup>15</sup>James Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980, pp. 175-189; Escott Reid, *Radical Mandarin. The Memoirs of Escott Reid*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989, pp. 221-240; Lester B. Pearson, *Mike. The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 2, 1948-1957*, pp. 37-60.

<sup>16</sup>North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Facts and Figures. An Alliance for the 1990s*, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989, p. 376.

<sup>17</sup> John Milloy, "Article 2 and the Non-Military Development of NATO, 1948-1957 with Special Reference to Canada ", Doctoral Thesis, Oxford, University of Oxford, 1994.

cooperation. For the most part, however, Canadian officials preferred to use other measures to achieve their goals, including the liberalization of trade through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the integration of Germany into a European community. GATT was then associated with international peace and security as well as prosperity.<sup>18</sup>

Through GATT, diplomats and others hoped to emphasize common interests and to reduce tensions among nations as well as to promote Canadian prosperity through increased trade.<sup>19</sup> Greater commerce with the Europeans was intended to offset increasing dependence upon the Americans. Germany's potential as a trading partner was recognized very early on.<sup>20</sup> If progress in the European market fell short of expectations, it is still worth considering Canadian efforts and examining how hopes for improvement in trade influenced Canadian decision-making.

My thesis will examine evidence that the NATO troop contribution was made in light of these long term foreign policy goals, but it will also establish the extent to which defence policy and the actual behaviour of the troops supported these goals. The connection

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<sup>18</sup>Hector Mackenzie (ed.), *External Relations, 1949, Volume 15*, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1995. See Chapter VII on International Economic relations, especially the material on the implications of European integration.

<sup>19</sup>Frank Stone, *Canada, the Gatt and the International Trade System*, 2nd edition, Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1992, pp. 18-19.

<sup>20</sup> NA, RG 25, Volume 4293, File 10935-B-40, pt. 1, Heeney to Reid, 29 April 1952. See Chapter 1 for further discussion.

here is at times tenuous. In fact, the term dissonance used in the title of this thesis is intended to highlight this difficulty which forms the central thrust of the conclusions. By examining various areas of military decision-making related to the NATO troop contribution, this study is designed to allow the influence of foreign policy goals to be analysed.

To some extent, Canadian officials recognized that the behaviour of individuals might reflect upon Canada's reputation and, eventually and cumulatively, their actions might affect foreign policy goals. When Jules Léger served as the Canadian Ambassador to NATO in 1959, he observed:

A foreign policy, to be effective, depends to a high degree on the projection of a favourable image of Canada in the minds of the largest possible number of people abroad.... But these generalized images are built up from history and folklore, from propaganda, from fortuitous and often inaccurate news reports and commentaries, and to an extent that should not be underrated - from personal contacts...every Canadian who travels abroad helps to create or modify the image of Canada... the image that a country projects to foreigners is always generalized and often anthropomorphic, France is cultured, Britain is class-conscious, Russia is communist, Austria waltzes, Germany is aggressive, Belgium is brave and so on...." <sup>21</sup>

If an individual Canadian could affect Canada's image, certainly, Canadian soldiers, their families and the civilians serving with them could influence European and

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<sup>21</sup> NA, MG 32 A 3, *Fonds Léger*, Volume 14, Discours - le bilinguisme dans la fonction publique, les relations franco-canadiennes et les arts et la culture, 1957-1977 (dossier 2). draft. n.d..

especially German opinions about Canadians, their values, and culture for the better or for the worse. As the Canadian government held long term goals to increase trade with Europe, to reduce tension among nations, and to encourage the integration of Germany into the western alliance, the relationship of the brigade with the local German communities gains significance beyond the normal practical everyday dealings of a military with its local community.

### **The current literature.**

In an article in *Diplomatic History*, Melvyn P. Leffler argues that national security goes beyond the defence of territory and includes defending "core values... organizing ideology, and free political and economic institutions".<sup>22</sup> This definition of national security combines elements of social, cultural, and economic history with the more traditional study of diplomatic and military history. Leffler's broad definition is used in this study to highlight the values being promoted in Canadian foreign policy and ultimately, the extent to which the military was able to exemplify these values.

A thorough examination of the German record and views is well beyond the scope of this thesis; a team of German historians at the *Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt*, with the assistance of various eminent international scholars, are undertaking a thorough eight-volume examination of the influence of NATO on Germany. These volumes will include studies on economic, political, domestic, international and strategic

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<sup>22</sup>Melvyn P. Leffler, "New approaches, old interpretations and prospectives re: configurative", *Diplomatic History*, Volume 19, No. 2, Spring 1995.

aspects of NATO.<sup>23</sup> Canada was a minor player in the German context, as is evident in historical studies of post war Germany and in public surveys conducted in Germany during the late 1950s.<sup>24</sup>

Yet closer relations did develop. Though it might seem paradoxical, Canada's motives for improving relations with Germany developed in part from the experience of the two

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<sup>23</sup>Major Winfried Heinemann, "The German Armed Forces Military History Research Office: Ongoing Work on Post-World War II Subjects ", in *International Cold War Military Records and History. Proceedings of the International Conference*, edited by William W. Epley, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1996, pp. 431-442.

<sup>24</sup>Hans Speier, *From The Ashes of Disgrace. A Journal from Germany, 1945-1955*. Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1981 in which Speier examines the German notion of equality in defence and the worry that defence might interfere with economic recovery. Canadians do not receive mention, though the Americans are dealt with in detail. See also Rudolph Walter Leonhardt *This Germany. The Story since the Third Reich* translated and adapted for the American edition by Catherine Hutter, Greenwich, Conn.: New York Graphic Society, ca. 1964. p. 248. Here Leonhardt recounts the results of a 1959 survey of West Germans. The survey listed nine countries and asked West Germans to identify the countries they preferred to see chosen as close future allies of the FRG. Leonhardt reported the following results:

1. United States - 81 percent
2. England - 49 percent
3. France - 48 percent
4. Japan - 32 percent
5. Italy - 31 percent
6. Russia - 31percent
7. Spain - 27 percent
8. Poland - 25 percent
9. Israel - 19 percent

Canada did not even appear as a choice on the survey. Note that almost one-third of West Germans supported close association with Russia, though the vast majority, 81 percent chose the United States. Even if the survey reflects a bias on the part of the questioner, Canadian diplomats also complained that it was difficult to get good coverage from the German press. See footnote 61, Chapter one.

world wars. Angelika Sauer, a Canadian historian of German origin, has examined the question of Canadian policies with respect to Germany during and immediately after the Second World War. Sauer argues that the Canadian government recognized that Germany was a key element in Canadian national security and that resolution of the German problem in the post war period was a matter in which Canada had a legitimate and abiding interest.<sup>26</sup>

This emphasis in Canadian national security in the immediate post war period sheds light upon the effect of the experience of warfare upon Canadian attitudes. Sauer convincingly argues that Germany's aggressive potential troubled officials in Ottawa, but that they saw the German problem within its broader European context and did not generally favour a hard peace.<sup>27</sup>

Despite its significant role in the Second World War, Canada was hardly a major player in the planning for peace. During the war and immediately after it, Canadian diplomats relied heavily upon Great Britain, for the most part, for information on the progress of the Three Power plans (that is the plans of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States) with respect to Germany.<sup>28</sup> Canadian attempts to support and influence

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<sup>26</sup>Angelika Sauer, "The Respectable Course. Canada's Department of External Affairs, The Great Powers, and the 'German Problem', 1943-1947", p. 3.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 383-4.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 15. Note well that the term "Three Powers" for the most part in this thesis refers to Britain, France and the United States in the 1950s. It is only in the Second World War context that the term includes the Soviet Union rather than France.



the British will be apparent in the body of this thesis. The general problems of the British decline and its impact upon Canada have been the topic of several excellent studies.<sup>29</sup>

Another Canadian historian, Mary Halloran, has addressed the reaction of several Canadian diplomats to the Three Powers plans with respect to Germany. She agrees with Sauer's view that they generally favoured a soft peace and felt the dismembering of Germany into separate parts was a risky option.<sup>30</sup> Halloran notes that Pierre Dupuy, a Canadian diplomat, supported plans to divide Germany, severing Prussia from the rest and offering leniency to those German states who were most amenable to international co-operation. Dana Wilgress, a more influential diplomat located in Moscow, also considered that "splitting up Germany into parts... [was] the only really satisfactory solution of the German problem".<sup>31</sup> Yet, Canadian opinions mattered little.

Halloran demonstrates that the Canadian decision to withdraw forces from occupation duty immediately at the end of the Second World War was not a return to Prime

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<sup>29</sup>J.L. Granatstein, *How Britain's Weakness forced Canada into the Arms of the United States*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989 ; B.W. Muirhead, *The Failure of the Anglo-European Option. The Development of Postwar Canadian Trade Policy*, Montreal: McGill-Queens Press, 1992.

<sup>30</sup> Mary Halloran, "Canada and the Origins of the Post-War Commitment" in *Canada and NATO. Uneasy Past, Uncertain Future*, edited by Margaret O. MacMillan and David S. Sorenson, Waterloo, University of Waterloo Press, 1990, pp. 1-14.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 9 see also: Lawrence Aronsen and Martin Kitchen, *The Origins of the Cold War in Comparative Perspective. American, British and Canadian Relations with the Soviet Union, 1941-48*, London: Macmillan, 1988, pp. 125-6. These pages cover discussion among the allies on the future division and possible integration of West Germany into a western defensive bloc in 1946.

Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King's 1930s policy of isolationism as much as a rejection of the terms being offered to Canada. The Canadian decision surprised and displeased the British. King's argument concerning the cost and administrative difficulties of keeping a small number of soldiers overseas was undoubtedly powerful from the Canadian perspective, but met with little sympathy from the British. This same argument and reaction arose in the late 1950s with respect to Canada's NATO brigade. By the late 1950s, the costs included the creation and maintenance of distinctively Canadian military communities in Germany.

Halloran's interpretation draws attention to the aims expressed by several diplomats to convert the Germans into a "democratic peace-loving people". She quotes, for example, Escott Reid who emphasized the need to nurture liberalism and values similar to those shared by Canadians as a possible solution to the German problem.<sup>32</sup> Yet she concludes that those concerned with post war plans for Germany recognized that the process of cultural, social and political transformation might be time-consuming and difficult, if it was possible. Indeed much Canadian commentary on German affairs written throughout the late 1940s, 1950s and even into the 1960s contains the underlying assumption that the German national character was flawed and that politics

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<sup>32</sup> Pierre Dupuy argued that a decade or two would be too little time for the emergence of "democratic, peace-loving people, reasoning as we do on important matters of justice, and political and social progress". See Halloran, "Canada and the Origins of the Post-War Commitment", pp. 8-9. Reid's comments are from p. 15 of the same article.

in Germany required careful monitoring.<sup>33</sup>

The Americans and the British with long term occupation duties in Germany were far more concerned with these issues. The term de-Nazification was coined to describe the process by which eminent Nazis would be removed from positions of influence in German society and democratic and peaceful values would be cultivated among the Germans. Yet, several historians have noted that using occupation soldiers to achieve such cultural change was contradictory as military culture was generally antipathetic towards the values being espoused by the policy.<sup>34</sup> John Gimbel, in his path breaking study of the de-Nazification of Marburg, noted that most Germans there thought that the "little man" was powerless. American soldiers, in their view, were forced to implement policies whether they agreed with them or not in much the same way many Germans

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<sup>33</sup>R. A. Spencer, *Canada in World Affairs, 1946-1949, From UN To NATO, Volume V*. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1951; Canada, House of Commons. *Debates*, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1949-1964, see especially the debate in 1954 concerning German rearmament and membership in NATO; James Iain Gow. "The Opinions of French Canadians in Quebec on the Problems of War and Peace, 1945-1960", Doctoral Thesis, University of Laval, 1969, p. 929. Noting that *L'Action Catholique, Relations, Le Droit, Le Soleil*, and *Le Petit Journal*, stressed the political importance of the unity of the EEC and recalled the support of the Pope for the movement which was Christian-Democratic in its inspiration. ; NA, RG 25, Volume 7329, File 10934-F-40, pt. 2.1, Numbered Letters from Bonn. Many of these were written by Charles Ritchie and others by John Starnes.

<sup>34</sup>John Gimbel, *A German Community under American Occupation. Marburg 1945-1952* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1961. Chapter 13 entitled "Paradox" focuses primarily on this point. See also Noel Annan, *Changing Enemies. The Defeat and Regeneration of Germany*, London: Harper Collins, 1995, for a British analysis of the experience in that zone.

had obeyed the Nazis. This belief created cynicism about democracy and American intentions.

Franklin M. Davis, who served with the American occupation forces, notes that the American troop information program initially concentrated upon negative aspects of the German character. Then in 1947, it was altered to emphasize more positive interaction between Americans and Germans. American forces and their families were encouraged to serve as "ambassadors of the American way of life" and it was believed that the influx of American families to Germany would accelerate German-American cooperative efforts.<sup>35</sup>

Recent British scholarship examining the Anglo-German relationship reveals similarly complex motivations at work. Noel Annan, who served as a British intelligence officer and later with the Allied Control Commission in Germany, argues that British policy became in effect a "colonizing" of Germany by occupation. By Annan's criteria, they were successful as "West Germany became a peace-loving country, locked into the Western alliance of NATO."<sup>36</sup> He notes that the British were seeking economic benefits, but were less successful in this endeavour and had grave difficulties gaining

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<sup>35</sup> Franklin M. Davis, *Come as a Conqueror. The United States Army's Occupation of Germany, 1945-49*, New York: Macmillan, 1967, p. 195.

<sup>36</sup>Noel Annan, *Changing Enemies. The Defeat and Regeneration of Germany*, p. 233.

entry to the European Economic Community on advantageous terms.<sup>37</sup>

Saki Dockerill, in her doctoral thesis and in a recent book based partially on it, examines the economic and military motivations for the re-armament of the Germans from the British perspective.<sup>38</sup> The long-term commitment of British soldiers to German defence was the culmination of steps taken in the abortive European Defence Community initiative as the British manoeuvred to keep Americans involved and to appease French fears. Canada is hardly mentioned in these works, yet because Canadian diplomats and military officers worked very closely with the British in Germany, the British context is crucial in understanding the Canadian experience.<sup>39</sup>

As argued by the political scientist, Joel Sokolsky, Canada has not received much attention from international scholars for its role in NATO; its role and influence in the alliance was limited.<sup>40</sup> This thesis will illustrate some of the factors which may have

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<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 234. Serge Bernier, *Relations politiques Franco-Britanniques, 1947-1988. Étude du comportement d'une alliance*, Sherbrooke: Éditions Naaman, 1984, contains an analysis of French-British relations which explains the difficulties and complications of the British relationship with respect to Europe.

<sup>38</sup> Saki Dockerill, *Britain's Policy for West German rearmament, 1950-1955*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

<sup>39</sup> For a more general study of the close British-Canadian defence relationship see: Peter Michael Archambault, "The Informal Alliance: Anglo-Canadian Defence Relations, 1945-1960", Doctoral thesis, Calgary: University of Calgary, 1997.

<sup>40</sup> Joel J. Sokolsky, "Le Canada, les États-Unis et l'Otan: l'histoire de deux piliers" in Paul Létourneau (directeur), *Le Canada et L'Otan après 40 ans, 1949-1989*, Québec: Centre québécois de relations internationales, Université Laval, 1992, p. 83.

discouraged Canadians from making a greater military contribution to NATO, building upon ideas first expressed by David J. Bercuson. Bercuson points out that the high cost of being a leading member of NATO and the limited influence which Canada was able to wield in spite of high defence spending in the early 1950s resulted in a decline in expenditures after 1954.<sup>41</sup>

Why did Canadians continue to commit forces to Europe at all? Canadian historian Paul Létourneau, argues that Canadian motivation in NATO was first of all related to balancing American dominance in Canada. In part, this might be achieved by establishing closer relations with revived European countries. A strong interest in economic progress and political stability in Europe was also manifested by those who pursued Article Two of the NATO Treaty. In view of the Canadian government's continued attempts to broaden NATO's interests, he concludes that: "Sans doute plus que pour d'autres nations alliées, dès le début, l'OTAN sera conçue à Ottawa non seulement comme un renforcement du traité de Bruxelles, mais aussi comme un support politique, économique et psychologique supplémentaire dans un moment de grand danger politique pour les démocraties européennes ".<sup>42</sup> Stéphane Roussel also stresses the significance of balancing American influence and of promoting bilateral

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<sup>41</sup>David J. Bercuson, "Canada, NATO and Rearmament, 1950-1954: Why Canada Made a Difference (but not for very long)" in John English and Norman Hillmer, eds., *Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order*, Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992, pp. 103-124.

<sup>42</sup>Paul Létourneau, "Les motivations originales du Canada lors de la création de l'OTAN (1948-1950)" in *Le Canada et L'Otan après 40 ans, 1949-1989*, p. 62.

relations with the Germans in his work on Canadian motivation in NATO.<sup>43</sup> He, Paul Létourneau and Roch Legault raise another point which seems often overlooked: "D'une part, ce vaste pays, peu peuplé, n'a pas les ressources nécessaires pour assurer seul sa défense, et doit donc s'allier avec des États plus puissants."<sup>44</sup>

In spite of these considerations, continental defence became more significant in the mid-1950s and the Canadian government began to emphasize it over commitments in Europe. The American author, Jon McLin, argues that NATO tended to ignore questions of North American defence and that Canada had difficulty developing and marketing new weapons systems as the cost of defence rose rapidly during the arms race.<sup>45</sup>

James Eayrs' s work, *Growing Up Allied*, reveals the complexity of Canadian motivations in joining and participating in NATO. By including detailed accounts of disagreements among Canada's politicians, diplomats and military officers, Eayrs demonstrates the individuality and independence of mind which characterised them and allowed them to produce useful criticisms of NATO's strategies, policies and plans.

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<sup>43</sup> Stéphane Roussel, "Amère Amérique.... L'OTAN et l'intérêt national du Canada" in *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Volume 22, No 4, March 1993, pp. 35-42.

<sup>44</sup> Stéphane Roussel, Paul Létourneau and Roch Legault, "Le Canada et la sécurité européenne (1943-1952): À la recherche de l'équilibre des puissances" in *Revue canadienne de défense*, Volume 23, No. 4 and 5, juin, septembre 1994, pp. 23-27.

<sup>45</sup> Jon B. McLin, *Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963. The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance*.

Eayrs illustrates the intensity of conflict and how, by allowing it, Canadians were able to contribute more fully to the planning process.<sup>46</sup> Such conflict also suggests that there was no monolithic Canadian viewpoint about NATO and, as a consequence, sometimes Canadian efforts were not well-coordinated.

John Milloy studied Article Two and the non-military development of NATO in a 1994 doctoral thesis.<sup>47</sup> He demonstrated that Canadians did not consistently pursue and support Article Two; at times the British and Americans were more enthusiastic about certain aspects of it. The philosophy behind Article Two is examined further in Chapter One. This philosophy illustrates some of basic values and ideas which may have influenced Canadian diplomats who sought more trade with Europe and who encouraged closer relations with some non-NATO European nations.<sup>48</sup>

In terms of biographical and autobiographical studies, I was able to draw upon J.L. Granatstein's *A Man of Influence, Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-68*; Escott's Reid's *Radical Mandarin. The Memoirs of Escott Reid*; John English's

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<sup>46</sup>James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada. Growing Up Allied*.

<sup>47</sup>John Milloy, "Article 2 and the Non-Military Development of NATO, 1948-1957"; Joseph Sinasac, "The Three Wise Men: The Effects of the 1956 Committee of Three on NATO" in Margaret O. MacMillan and David S. Sorenson, *Canada and NATO. Uneasy Past, Uncertain Future*, Waterloo: University of Waterloo Press, 1990, pp. 27-46.

<sup>48</sup> Arthur Andrew, *The Rise and Fall of a Middle Power. Canadian diplomacy from King to Mulroney*, Toronto: James Lorimer, 1993, xi. Arthur Andrew served as Head of the Information Division responsible for projecting Canada abroad in the mid-1950s. See also: Bruce Muirhead, *The Development of Postwar Canadian Trade Policy. The Failure of the Anglo-European Option*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992.



two volume, *The Life of Lester Pearson, Shadow of Heaven and the Worldly Years*; and David J. Bercuson's *True Patriot. The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960*, among others listed in the bibliography. These works were crucial in evaluating Canada's broader foreign policy goals and in placing the brigade's contribution in a wider context.

The brigade and its activities have attracted little scholarly attention. Sean Maloney's *War Without Battles. Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany*, a commissioned operational history, is an important source which I drew upon in Chapter three of this thesis, although I did not always agree with his conclusions. Dr. Maloney's much longer time frame and operational focus were useful. Given the brigade's vulnerable role on the broad German plains, Maloney concludes that the Canadian government should have supported the brigade's operational requirements and divisional reinforcements at a much higher level.<sup>49</sup>

Roy Rempel's *Counterweights. The Failure of Canada's German and European Policy, 1955-1995* is relevant too.<sup>50</sup> Rempel argues that Canadian politicians and diplomats failed to realize the influence that the Canadian military contribution could have had on bilateral relations with Germany. However, his work ignores the difficulties experienced in GATT negotiations with members of the European Economic Community (the EEC),

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<sup>49</sup>Sean Maloney, *War Without Battles. Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951-1993* Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1997, p. 188. The differences are dealt with in Chapter three.

<sup>50</sup>Roy Rempel, *Counterweights. The Failure of Canada's German and European Policy, 1955-1995*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1996.

including Germany, in the 1950s.<sup>51</sup> Domestic imperatives affected French, German and other European trading negotiations.<sup>52</sup> The possibility of European division and a subsequent weakening of the western alliance were significant considerations in Canadian diplomatic plans. Bilateral relations with Germany in Rempel's work are not placed in the broader framework of Europe, NATO and, ultimately, the apparent Soviet threat to western security.

The brigade in Germany took part in the deterrence of the Soviets. Its task, as part of NATO, was to avoid warfare, providing enough force to prevent invasion and no more. NATO's deterrence strategy was successful; the Soviet Union and communism were contained and did not spread to western Europe. Conceding this fact, Canadian military historian John A. English, points out that the plans went untested in actual warfare.<sup>53</sup> English examines deterrence strategy critically, demonstrating that it did not succeed in all instances during the Cold War. He stresses the utility of conventional forces in such battles as the Israeli-Arab conflicts, among others. His ideas and the work of Colin McInnes, a British strategic analyst, are useful in evaluating the military role planned for the brigade during the 1950s and early 1960s. The Canadian brigade, along with most of the British Army of the Rhine, could not have held territory for very long if the Soviets

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<sup>51</sup>See Chapter one for details.

<sup>52</sup>See for example: Serge Bernier, *Relations Politiques Franco-Britanniques (1947-1958). Étude du Comportement D'une Alliance*, Sherbrooke, Quebec: Naaman, 1984, pp. 172-188.

<sup>53</sup> John A. English, *Marching through Chaos. The Descent of Armies in Theory and Practice*, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996.

had invaded.<sup>54</sup>

### **Hypothesis and thesis outline:**

The hypothesis in this thesis is that long term foreign policy goals influenced military decision-making with respect to the Canadian NATO brigade located in Germany. The term military decision-making includes an examination of troop comportment as evidence of the success of the decision-making process. This hypothesis does not preclude consideration of other factors, such as domestic budgetary limitations, efficiency, morale and inter-service rivalry, in military decision-making.<sup>55</sup> In fact, careful attention to other factors allows some areas of dissonance between foreign policy and military decision-making to be demonstrated.

This examination of military decision-making goes beyond consideration of the strategy of deterrence with a critical evaluation of operational plans. It includes the development of personnel policies, the creation and maintenance of Canadian communities in Germany and an exploration of the public relations with the local German communities. This descent from high policy produces a deeper appreciation of how policy was filtered by the bureaucracy and how it was actually implemented. In particular, this process will

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<sup>54</sup>Colin McInnes, *NATO's Changing Strategic Agenda. The Conventional Defence of Central Europe*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990 and *Hot War. Cold War. The British Army's way in warfare, 1945-95*, London: Brassey's, 1996.

<sup>55</sup>It is noted that the maintenance of community relations was also a concern for units located in Canada. Evidence presented in Chapter five suggests the uniqueness of the experience in Germany and also its relevance to Canada's foreign policy.

highlight problems in utilizing the military as a vehicle for promoting the core values identified in Canadian foreign policy statements. Decision-making in the Army and behaviour in the brigade itself are important aspects of this study.

Although German-Canadian relations are an important theme to be followed, areas where German-Canadian relations were less than smooth or where other factors predominated, are examined as they illustrated the limits of the hypothesis. Each chapter addresses a different area and level of decision-making; different factors became evident in the examination of evidence. As the hypothesis provided a more powerful explanation of some decisions than others, the incongruity itself became a conclusion of the thesis. In other words, foreign policy goals were not always evident in decision-making.

Chapter one of the thesis describes Canada's foreign policy goals in very general terms. Taking Leffler's broad definition of national security, this chapter identifies the core values being promoted in Canada's foreign policy. Article Two is relevant as it provides a statement of core values and it specifically addresses the connection between core values and the military alliance.<sup>56</sup>

This chapter also establishes some of Canada's broader economic aims. The

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<sup>56</sup>Milloy's thesis is not challenged here. While the lack of accomplishment is noted, the ideals expressed in Article Two are nonetheless important to understanding Canadian motives in NATO.

underlying motivation for promoting the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and for encouraging more European-Canadian trade to offset increasing American dominance in Canada is well known.<sup>57</sup> This chapter deals with some specific measures taken to improve German-Canadian trade and to increase the Canadian presence in the FRG.

Chapter one identifies the long term foreign policy goals which are a key element in the hypothesis. If German-Canadian relations form an important theme to follow here, the broader context of NATO and relations with other allies are also significant.

Building upon the framework established in Chapter one, Chapter two will examine the decision to place the brigade with the British Army of Rhine and the legal status of the brigade. The Three Powers (Britain, France and the United States in this post war context) were still in control of matters of defence and some elements of foreign policy in Germany in 1951. This chapter will focus on the complexities of developing and implementing independent Canadian policies in these circumstances.

Long term foreign policy goals such as the Canadian government's concern for encouraging balance within NATO, the more mundane matters of budgetary limits and communication difficulties among the allies and within the Canadian government are considered and illustrate the combination and complexity of various factors in military

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<sup>57</sup> B.W. Muirhead, *The Development of Postwar Canadian Trade Policy. The Failure of the Anglo-European Option.*

decision-making.

In Chapter three, NATO's strategy of nuclear deterrence and forward defence and the subsequent changes in the operational plans for the brigade will be examined. The focus here is on discussion among high-ranking Canadian Army officers, and others, who were concerned about changes to plans for the brigade in Germany. The gap between strategy and operations is the focus of the chapter. An additional thread of German-Canadian relations remains, but the influence of the Three Powers and the NATO context established in Chapter two forms an important context here. Other factors, such as the complexity of defence planning with new technologies and the rising cost of developing weapons systems, will be at least briefly discussed where the archival evidence suggests that they also had an influence.

Chapter four contains an analysis of the development of Army personnel policies with respect to recruitment and the decision to send dependents to Europe. Here the other factors identified in the statement of the hypothesis will be examined at greater length. Defence spending on personnel grew, while less of the budget was available for the purchase of equipment. An evaluation of Army Headquarters' discussions reveals the importance of inter-service politics in military decision-making and suggests that certain traditional Army values, especially those concerning families, were challenged before 1964. Here the influence of the air force is of interest. Yet German-Canadian relations and over-all foreign policy goals will also be considered for direct and indirect influence in this area of decision-making which took place for most part in the confines of Ottawa.

Chapter five consists of three sections. In the first, the efforts by the Bureau of Current Affairs to prepare soldiers for service in Germany will be addressed. Foreign policy goals, especially the thread of German-Canadian relations, and other factors, such as the elements of army culture developed in Chapter four, are brought more closely together here. This section will be followed by an examination of the quality of life for Canadian soldiers in Germany and the extent to which they were able to portray Canada in positive light. The last section will assess the public relations between the brigade and the communities located in Germany.

This chapter is drawn in part from information from the Canadian Embassy in Bonn as diplomats were involved in the analysis of press information about the brigade. The brigade in Germany undertook an active public relations campaign, aimed at improving relations with the Germans and the embassy monitored information and the effect of troop behaviour upon German opinion. The reality of life in Germany will be closely evaluated as far as the evidence allows to produce a critical analysis. By disclosing specific details about German-Canadian relations, some effects of foreign policy and military plans on individual lives are revealed and the opposite, the effects of individual actions on the goals, is also suggested.

The hypothesis of the influence of foreign policy goals on military decision-making extends from official government plans to individual interactions between soldiers and civilians. This descent from high policy into the chaos of life allows some of the problems and limitations of using military means to achieve long term foreign policy goals to be

revealed. If national security means the protection of “core values” as well as territory then it is a task also carried out by individual people who collectively contribute to the end result. This thesis is an exploration of territory between high policy and the reality of life in Canadian military communities in Germany.

### **Sources and Methodology Used:**

The methodology consisted of examining a wide variety of primary sources and testing the validity of the hypothesis, that long term foreign policy goals affected military decision-making, against the information contained in the documents. As the hypothesis was based upon the role of particular factors in decision-making, letters, memoranda, minutes and other primary documents were evaluated in an effort to understand the motives of those involved. The written evidence preserved in archives originating from high ranking Army officers, diplomats and politicians was revealing: They were for the most part a highly articulate and often contentious group of individuals. Many documents were originally classified top secret, secret or confidential due to the sensitivity of the information in them; others were marked personal to the recipient. For the most part, in correspondence at a senior level, views were expressed in a frank and direct manner. Few of these documents were originally intended for public consumption.

This thesis employs, analyses and interprets documents held at the National Archives of Canada, mainly from Record Group 24, the records of the Department of National Defence, and Record Group 25, the records of the Department of External Affairs, with



some other records from Cabinet, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce as well as many manuscript papers, especially those of Escott Reid, L.B. Pearson and Brooke Claxton. The Raymont Papers, the fonds Allard and Kardex files, especially those emanating from the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Chief of the General Staff, and the brigade itself, as well as Operational Research Army Establishment documents all held at the Directorate of History and Heritage of the Department of National Defence, provided basic evidence for historical analysis as well. Footnotes throughout retain the anomalies found in the original file, document and message titles so that the exact originals may be located as standardizing the terms makes it difficult to distinguish between similar materials produced on the same date.

Some records of the American Army European Command (Record Groups 338 and 496) and records from the Army Chief of Chaplains (Record Group 247) held at the National Archives in Washington as well as historical reports held at the United States Army Centre for Military History in Washington were viewed. These together with some materials ordered from the Public Record Office in Kew, England, provided useful background for analysis of Canadian materials and assisted in placing Canadian difficulties in a comparative context.

No source is without bias. The Canadian Army produced much propaganda, such as news releases which stressed how positively the troops were received in Germany, and it suppressed negative information about their troops from the Canadian public and even

controlled the flow of information within the military hierarchy.<sup>58</sup> Chapter five of the thesis will address the quality of information available from the brigade in Germany in more detail.

Sean Maloney, the author of *War Without Battles. Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951-1993*, was generous with records which had been photocopied in the process of preparing his book. The Brigade hired Dr. Maloney to undertake its history and he and a team of Canadian soldiers travelled throughout Europe, gathering and photocopying many relevant German documents which otherwise would have been difficult to obtain.

Erich Reichel, a German civilian and the former Public Relations officer for the brigade in Soest, was responsible for examining every single local and national German newspaper and ensuring that all articles which mentioned the brigade were clipped out. These articles were translated into English and both the original articles and the translations were then passed to the Canadian commander of the brigade for his perusal. Reichel analyzed the clippings, reported every month on the number of positive, neutral and negative lines about brigade in the form of charts and provided details on which brigade activities produced these results.

His entire collection was photocopied by Maloney's team and was made available to me.

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<sup>58</sup>See Chapter five for details.

The effort put into gathering and analyzing German newspapers itself demonstrates the importance of public relations with the Germans. Unfortunately, most of the newspaper stories and much of the information used in Chapter five were purely anecdotal. For example, some of the news stories and other evidence suggests that alcoholism was a problem for soldiers, but there were no reliable statistical measures of its frequency. It is therefore difficult to conclude based on available sources if the problem was widespread. One unidentified Canadian wrote in hand upon one of the articles, wryly noting the assumption that Canadian drivers were drunk every time they were involved in an accident. As a reflection of the German viewpoint, however, these newspaper clippings were valuable. Not only were there many clippings, but they seemed to contain a relatively complete range of positive and negative impressions about the brigade.<sup>59</sup>

Interviews were used to fill in gaps in the written evidence, to verify information in documents and to get opinions on controversial points in the written sources. No standardized oral history methodology was used in the course of the research, rather, each interview was custom-designed to address particular questions about specific documents or events. I was able to interview an ambassador, a Chief of the General Staff and brigade commander, a brigade major, a logistics lieutenant, an armoured corps lieutenant, an engineering senior non-commissioned officer, and an infantry private. These individuals represented very different roles and viewpoints and served at

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<sup>59</sup>It was not possible in Chapter five to cover the range of material gathered. Hockey and sports were actively reported in German newspapers and constituted a significant cultural exchange between the two communities which was beyond my scope, but would make an interesting topic for another scholar to develop.

different times.

After more than forty years, memories become clouded. Some of those interviewed had a very clear recollection of events and kept personal records which they used to assist their memories; these records included scrapbooks, letters home, photographs and cherished memorabilia which were examined in the course of the interviews. Archival records were used to verify factual information and footnotes indicate if information came from an oral interview.

Though Courts Martial records were examined, it became evident that these files posed significant methodological problems.<sup>60</sup> Rarely did they reveal much about the impact of a particular offense on relations with Germans, though they tended to support the notion that alcohol was frequently a factor in the crimes committed.<sup>61</sup> From a statistical viewpoint, they also posed problems. It might seem that units with poor morale and poor relations with the surrounding community would have a high number of charges.

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<sup>60</sup>See Robert Tooley, "Appearance or Reality? Variations in Infantry Courts Martial: 1st Canadian Infantry Division, 1940-1945" *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Volume 22, Nos 2 and 3, October and December 1992, pp. 33-39, 40-47. Tooley concludes in this careful study of the notable variations in courts martial rates between various infantry units in Second World War Courts Martial that "It is doubtful whether the administration of military justice was, or is ever likely to be, monolithic, and the numerical variability between 1st Canadian Infantry Divisions's[sic] infantry battalions was probably more apparent than real.", p. 46.

<sup>61</sup>There was one Court Martial, involving a German-Canadian romance, which was a marked exception as the file indicated clearly its impact upon the Germans. The case was well reported in the German press as it captured the public imagination and there was even a German play written based upon this event.

However, if problems are being addressed in a timely efficient manner, a high number of charges might result, creating better morale and a good image. A low number of charges could indicate that problems are not being addressed in units or that the unit simply has few problems to address. Without other detailed sources, the Courts Martial statistics alone tell little.

Investigation files, which were used under a clause in the Privacy Act which prohibits the identification of individuals named in them, confirmed suspicions that Courts Martial cases could be misleading and supplemented the information in them with respect to relations with the Germans. The investigation files from the early 1950s and discipline policy files from the early 1960s showed that charges were not consistently made for the same types of offenses over time, but the sample size was very small. Together the investigation and discipline policy documents give some idea of how offenses against Germans were viewed. A few investigation cases presented evidence which suggested prosecution should have been undertaken but was not.<sup>62</sup>

As German-Canadian relations are the theme of Chapter five and as troop behaviour was recognized to affect German-Canadian relations and ultimately, though perhaps indirectly, foreign policy goals, the text includes information on a brief description of one of the cases in which a major in a Provost Unit, responsible for carrying out an

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<sup>62</sup>In one case, evidence was verified with a lawyer who indicated that the rules for evidence in the 1950s were followed as children under the age of twelve were not considered fit to testify. The perspective of the 1990s is very different from that of the 1950s so a strong attempt was made to evaluate the evidence in light of 1950s procedures.

investigation, argued that a charge of rape should have been brought against a soldier. In his opinion, the failure to charge the soldier with rape would reinforce already negative opinions about the Canadian soldiers in German communities. The information in the 1960s discipline policy cases suggested that more rigorous prosecution was being enforced at this time, but investigation files were not available for the period for verification. The German newspaper clippings tend to support the notion that fewer serious problems were encountered in the 1960s.

Wastage, the rate at which men leave the army, was used as the best, though not a perfect, indicator of army morale. Morale was worth investigating to a degree as it is associated with discipline and behaviour and thus had an effect upon German-Canadian relations. As the Canadian Army relied upon volunteers, the rate at which men left the service seemed a relatively fair measure. In the early 1950s, many recruits joined for a very short period of time and may not have intended to remain long in service. This factor and the speed with which men were recruited probably heightened the wastage rate from 1951 to 1953. However, as few men re-enlisted, the wastage rate suggests poor morale as well as competition from private industry. After that, men were recruited for three or six years, but a high wastage rate persisted until the late 1950s when the conditions of service had improved.

The defence estimates for each year contain the actual expenditures for the previous year and sometimes include an analysis of several previous years' expenditures for categories where expenses changed or were likely to be questioned by the Minister,

Cabinet or Parliament. These brief analyses were very useful. In one case, the cost of having dependents with the Brigade Group was analyzed for 1954 to 1957. The estimate included moving expenses, the price of chapels, schools, and permanent married quarters. Analysis and research indicated that these types of facilities frequently cost more to construct in Canada and that civilian labour was more expensive in Canada. As the Canadian government approved significant resources for improving conditions of service in Canada as well as Germany, these financial statistics allowed other information about the new facilities being provided in Germany to be placed in a broader and comparative context.<sup>63</sup> Army Council minutes were also carefully and systematically checked.

The methodology included the comparison of viewpoints from a wide range of sources in order to ensure that the hypothesis was fully tested rather than merely selecting material which supported the hypothesis. This process increased the complexity of the thesis but it allowed for a more complete analysis of the historical events involving Canadian soldiers in Germany. The analysis which follows suggests a complex and, at times, inconsistent, relationship between Canadian foreign policy goals and military decision-making.

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<sup>63</sup> It was not possible to prepare complete financial charts as was done for foreign trade in Chapter one because the reporting categories for the Department of National Defence are not consistent from 1951 to 1964. The estimates were all open records so research and verification is facilitated. NATO annual reviews and financial reports were not used as many are still classified and they could not be declassified in their entirety for the time period.

***Chapter one: Painting the big picture. Canada's foreign policy goals and how Germany fit in.***

This chapter consists of four separate sections. The first concerns statements of the "core values" underlying Canada's foreign policies. This section will include discussion of Article Two. The second section will address general economic policy including GATT and multilateralism and will relate these policies to international peace and security. The third section examines the attempt to increase trade with Europe and the last section addresses German-Canadian bilateral relations. The chapter is intended to identify Canadian foreign policy goals and the place of Germany within those broader goals.

***Core values and Article two***

The underlying principles of Canadian foreign policy were identified by Louis St. Laurent, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, on 13 January 1947 in the Gray Lecture, given at the University of Toronto. He first mentioned national unity, followed by political liberty, noting that "we have consistently sought and found our friends amongst those of like political traditions. It means equally that we have realized that a threat to the liberty of western Europe, where our political ideas were nurtured, was a threat to our own way of life".<sup>64</sup> St. Laurent continued with the rule of law, the values of a Christian civilization, and the acceptance of international responsibility as the other fundamental concepts underlying Canada's foreign policy.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>64</sup>L. B. Pearson, *Mike. The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. Volume 2, 1948-1957*, pp. 25-6. Pearson quoted St. Laurent's address at the University of Toronto in his text.

<sup>65</sup>*Ibid.*



For the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the question of national security was directly linked to ideology, values and the western way of life. These principles applied to Canadian actions in the First and Second World Wars, as well as to post war policy, and concerned any threat directed against the liberty of western Europe, and not just potential actions by Soviet communists. Canadian military actions in Europe were designed to protect the Canadian way of life.<sup>66</sup>

In his memoirs, L. B. Pearson cited these principles mentioned by St. Laurent as guidelines he had followed when he became the Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1948. Pearson added Canadian national interest, the promotion of freer trade, the recognition of the limitations and imperatives of geography and the need to ensure Canada's survival as a state in the face of American dominance as important additional ideas in the development of long term policy.<sup>67</sup>

Western ideology, grounded in democratic values, and liberal economic theories, was associated with freer trade and cooperation among nations as a basis for the pursuit of peace and security ; these were the concepts evident in the discussions about Article Two of the NATO Treaty.<sup>68</sup> That economic cooperation and democratic values were

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<sup>66</sup>Canadian foreign policy here supports Melvyn Leffler's definition of national security. Clearly, "core values" were at the heart of the policy being formulated and were being articulated in these key statements by Canada's leaders.

<sup>67</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup>John Milloy, "Article 2 and the Non-Military Development of NATO, 1948-1957"

mentioned in the treaty suggests some influence of foreign policy goals in military decision-making. However, a good many Canadian politicians, diplomats and bureaucrats felt Article Two was unrealistic in view of international priorities; they proved correct as it ultimately failed to have much effect.

A good early summary of Article Two was provided by K.W. Taylor, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance, in a paper on Canada and the North Atlantic Community to the Royal Society of Canada in Quebec. Taylor began with a broad historic look at the concept, capturing much of its romantic appeal:

The Community of the North Atlantic is both quite old and quite new. Its origins can be dated back to Christopher Columbus and John Cabot, or at least to 1776...Its beginnings can be found in the great transformation of the first Elizabethan age which shifted the centre of gravity of European power from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic sea-board...

...The recent accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty has extended the boundaries ... beyond the area which ... constitutes the North Atlantic community. ...Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, and perhaps Spain, are in fact part of our community, but they are outside NATO. NATO ... represents the beginnings of an attempt at conscious organization of the North Atlantic community, but it is not it.

The North Atlantic community comprises a closely-knit area the peoples of which have fundamentally a common heritage, a common view of life, common patterns of thought, common interests, and who subscribe to the broad principle of the primary value and dignity of the individual... Its area is not dissimilar from

that of Western Christendom.<sup>69</sup>

Taylor captured some of the missionary zeal exhibited by those who pushed for Article Two and also elucidated the close connection between national security, ideology, and heritage which was promoted by them. The concept of Western Christendom had an idealistic appeal and the term was used by others, such as Escott Reid. The notion of values, especially the primacy and dignity of the individual, tied Article Two to those fundamental principles of foreign policy laid down by St. Laurent in 1947. From the philosophical and historical background, Taylor continued on to more practical economic problems and Canada's relationship with the United States.

The United States as a market for our exports has gone up from less than 40 per cent to more than 60 per cent, and as source of our imports from the 55-65 per cent range to 70 per cent or higher...

We could hardly get into a position where the United States was almost our sole market and sole supplier and retain indefinitely the substance of our independence.... The relative power of the United Kingdom is not likely to recover to a point where it can restore this balance. To the weight of the United Kingdom must be added the weight of a healthy Western Europe...We also have an interest in promoting the North Atlantic community as an alternative to a discriminatory trading bloc in Western Europe. ...

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<sup>69</sup> NA, Escott Reid Fonds, MG 31, E 46, Volume 7, File 14, K.W. Taylor, *A Paper to the Royal Society of Canada, Section II*, 3 June 1952, No. 52/28, Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Canada. K.W. Taylor was the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Department of Finance at this time. Both Pearson and Reid also used the phrase Western Christendom and promoted a similar idealistic, philosophical framework for NATO.

Little has yet been done to make progress along the lines of Article 2...we do well to be suspicious of grandiose schemes and intricate multilateral pacts...much better progress ...can be made through numerous bilateral or small group arrangements ...<sup>70</sup>

Taylor's speech was an excellent and even prescient summary of Article Two. The entire concept of the North Atlantic Community had a history and a philosophy which were not shared by all NATO nations. So while Article Two appealed to the Christian idealism expressed by some, the reality of implementation would be practical and profitable dealings which were mostly bilateral in nature. Thus economic progress would be outside the NATO structure, perhaps not among NATO nations and, ultimately, not associated with Article Two.

Taylor did not mention Germany, but the German problem was relevant to the pursuit of Article Two. In a thesis examining Article Two, John Milloy addresses the failure of NATO to develop the non-military side of the alliance during its early years. According to Milloy, "many believed that an alliance structure that linked Western Europe and North America economically and politically, as well as militarily, would provide a stable framework for German reintegration as well as deal more effectively with Western economic problems. "<sup>71</sup> The stable framework was intended to reinforce German democracy and those elements of German society which favoured the western alliance.

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<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup> John Milloy, "Article 2 and the Non-Military Development of NATO, 1948-1957 with Special Reference to Canada", p. 1

Milloy traces developments on the non-military side, noting that both the British and the Americans championed specific aspects of Article Two at various times and that, though Canadians were associated with it and generally supported it, there were specific instances in which Canadians actually impeded Article Two negotiations and other occasions where they had little or no input.

For those Canadians who pushed hard for Article Two, especially L.B. Pearson and Escott Reid, questions of NATO organization and responsibilities were significant. NATO, it was hoped, would provide a means for allowing Canadians access to the European markets at a time when Canada was becoming increasingly dependent upon the American economy. We must ponder the implications of this factor in terms of Canadian motivation for NATO involvement and, in more specific terms, of the rationale for decisions involving Canadian troops.<sup>72</sup>

One of the problems with promoting mechanisms for consultation among all NATO nations was that Canadian diplomats and military officers often received better treatment from their British and American counterparts than those from other smaller NATO nations.<sup>73</sup> Information sharing and consultation would be even more pronounced

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<sup>72</sup>See Chapter Two, for the rationale on the location of the brigade with the British Army of Rhine in Northern Germany.

<sup>73</sup>Some documents on information sharing, ABC (American, British and Canadian) plans are still classified, but many have been available for years. See DHH document collection under the headings ABC and ABCA (American, British, Canadian, Australian) for more

in the military sphere where personal connections resulted in informal consultation. Military plans involved close intelligence sharing, troops trained and engaged in exercises together, and some officers were exchanged and served for a time with the forces of other NATO nations, but especially with the British and Americans. Such intimacy could hardly be reflected in formal agreements, though there were formal agreements limited to the American, British and Canadians. Canadians might speak on behalf of the smaller NATO nations and protest lack of consultation, but they were not about to trade their position of comparative privilege for one of mere equality.<sup>74</sup>

In terms of domestic politics, St. Laurent, whose first principle in the formulation of foreign policy had been national unity, drew attention to the actions of the Soviet State against Christian authorities, hoping to influence the Quebec Roman Catholic clergy and Quebec public opinion in favour of NATO.<sup>75</sup> Canada was the only NATO nation, other than Iceland which had no defence forces, not to implement any form of conscription or even national registration in these early years of NATO's existence.<sup>76</sup>

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details.

<sup>74</sup>For example see: Peter Archambault, "The Informal Alliance. Anglo-Canadian Defence Relations, 1945-1960", Doctoral Thesis, University of Calgary, 1997, pp. 38-9.

<sup>75</sup> Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire. Canada and the World to the 1990s*, Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994, pp. 202-205.

<sup>76</sup> 73/1223, *Raymont Collection*, file 1325, Cabinet Conclusions, 25 October 1950. While noting that the Canadian approach was unique, it is perhaps fitting to add that Iceland's approach was more at odds. Article Two was unrealistic in view of the diversity of NATO members. For more on conscription, please see Chapter four where the 1950s conscription debate is discussed further.

There was little domestic opposition to NATO in Canada and few doubts expressed about the righteousness of its cause. Even if Article Two did not result in real economic cooperation, the ideological aspect of NATO was emphasized in the Canadian domestic context and it seemed to enhance public acceptance of NATO.<sup>77</sup>

A more direct link between Canada's NATO troops and foreign policy was suggested by Escott Reid, in speeches made at the University of Toronto and at Camp Borden, in November 1951. "Never let your diplomacy outrun your resources", he warned.<sup>78</sup> He went on to discuss the "war for men's minds" and the nature of modern warfare, pointing out that the North American continent was no longer immune from direct attacks from the Soviet Union. In this context, sending troops to Germany was a form of forward defence where defence and foreign policy united well.<sup>79</sup> Troops in Europe

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<sup>77</sup> Opposition came from *Le Devoir* and the Communist Labor Progressive Party. See J. I. Gow, "Les Québécois, la guerre et la paix, 1945-60" *Canadian Journal of Political Science* III, March 1970.

<sup>78</sup>NA, MG 31, E46, Volume 3, Article 62, Talk by Mr. Escott Reid at Camp Borden and at the Modern History Club of the University of Toronto, 9 November 1951. Escott Reid's address at Camp Borden was part of a program created by the Bureau of Current Affairs in the Department of National Defence. See Chapter five for a more detailed description of this program and also Christopher J. Cran, *The Bureau of Current Affairs, The Royal Canadian Navy and The 'Struggle for Men's Minds, 1950-1957'*, Master of Arts Thesis, Carleton University, 1996.

<sup>79</sup>The notion of forward defence will be expanded further in Chapter three, but from the European viewpoint, there was sometimes a concern that Americans (and Canadians by extension) used the whole of Europe as a forward defensive zone for North America. The Europeans not surprisingly pushed for forward defence as far east in Europe as possible. See: André Beaufre, *NATO & Europe*, London: Faber and Faber, 1967, for the French viewpoint.

might prevent attack on the North American continent and reinforce what Reid defined as long-term interests - " the promotion of economic strength and social stability".<sup>80</sup> This was the rhetoric of early Cold War foreign policy. Geography, defence, politics, economics and ideology were all pillars of foreign policy and inter-related, as Pearson and St. Laurent had also noted.

Reid went even further in his memoirs and suggested that the Canadian policy for promoting foreign aid by NATO allies was derived from Article Two. He stated: "Each ally has undertaken to promote conditions of stability and well-being in the world. Since there cannot be stability and well-being as long as one-fifth of the men, women and children of the world live in the most squalid and degrading poverty, this means that each ally is under an obligation to give aid to poor countries to help them speed up their economic and social development."<sup>81</sup>

In Reid's view, the Germans were part of "Western Christendom."<sup>82</sup> The emphasis

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<sup>80</sup>*Ibid.*, Talk by Escott Reid, p. 16.

<sup>81</sup>Reid, *Radical Mandarin*, pp. 387-388. Reid was especially critical of the Americans in this regard.

<sup>82</sup>The term "Western Christendom", including the whole of Germany, is a phrase one finds used by Escott Reid as well as K.W. Taylor. See NA, MG 31, E 46, *Escott Reid Fonds*, Volume 9, File 28, E. Reid, *Western European Integration*, 15 January 1959. p. 2; and James Iain Gow, "The Opinions of French Canadians in Quebec on the Problems of War and Peace, 1945-1960", pp. 357-382. Pope Pius XI had endorsed the NATO movement in 1948. Gow notes his statements that a just war must be a question of survival or of " those things which give life its value and significance." These broad statements were ambiguous enough to be used by both supporters of the alliance as well as by neutralists and isolationists who opposed it.



upon spiritual and cultural values tied into that part of the German tradition which Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was also emphasizing in the Christian Democratic Party in Germany at this time.<sup>83</sup> The contrast between these values and those of the Nazis and the Communists could be highlighted, allowing for the inclusion of a wide body of people and opinions in opposition to totalitarianism.<sup>84</sup> Though the integration of Germany into the western alliance was of paramount importance, various measures outside of the NATO structure were used to achieve this goal.

Other bodies existed to promote European economic cooperation. These were noted by "the Three Wise Men", L.B. Pearson, Gaetano Martino, the Italian Foreign Minister and Harvard Lange, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, who wrote a report on non-military cooperation in NATO which the NATO Council approved in December 1956. The Organization for European Cooperation and Development (OECD), GATT, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other organizations were highlighted and NATO members were advised to pursue cooperation through these agencies rather than duplicate functions.<sup>85</sup> The OECD was a European body which included the United

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<sup>83</sup> Noel Annan, *Changing Enemies*, pp. 171-173. Annan notes that the British were initially uncomfortable with Adenauer's concern for *westliches Christentum und abendländische Kultur* (western Christianity and culture).

<sup>84</sup> In Germany, in the 1950s, Chancellor Adenauer deliberately tolerated a number of former Nazis in the German government adopting policies partially to create support for a liberal democracy from individuals who might otherwise seek to sabotage it. Michael Balfour, *West Germany. A Contemporary History*, London: Croom Helm, 1982. pp. 188-191.

<sup>85</sup> A copy of the text of the *Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO* may be found in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Facts and*

States and Canada as full members in 1960. Its aim was to encourage economic growth and expansion to include non-member countries and to promote multilateral trade. It was also designed to assist in the co-ordination of aid to under-developed countries . It acted only in an advisory capacity and included countries which were not members of NATO.<sup>86</sup>

The stumbling blocks to Article Two's implementation seemed insurmountable. The continued integration of Europe conflicted with the Atlantic vision.<sup>87</sup> On the economic front, non-NATO countries, developing nations, other Commonwealth nations, and even nations of the Soviet bloc had to be considered.

On the American side, Jack Hickerson, Ted Achilles and George Kennan had shared and promoted the Atlantic vision.<sup>88</sup> Dean Acheson, the American Secretary of State, was particularly opposed, and Article Two was only included in the North Atlantic Treaty

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*Figures, 1989*, pp. 384-404.

<sup>86</sup>Richard A. Preston, *Canada in World Affairs*, Volume XI, 1959-1961, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 211-212. Canada and the United States had been associate members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The reconstituting of the body in 1959 gave it wider membership and broader interests.

<sup>87</sup> John Milloy, "Article 2 and the Non-Military Development of NATO, 1948-1957 with Special Reference to Canada". See also André Beaufre, *NATO & Europe*.

<sup>88</sup>For an American account of these same events see: Don Cook, *Forging the Alliance. The birth of the NATO Treaty and the Dramatic Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy between 1945 and 1950*, New York: Arbor House, 1989, pp. 204-227. The crucial role of key Americans in strengthening the NATO treaty and the complexities of American domestic politics receive attention here.

after exceptional pressure was brought to bear by Canadian diplomats.<sup>89</sup> In 1949, Acheson had good reason to emphasize military priorities considering American domestic politics and his doubts about Soviet intentions in Central Europe. Soviet nuclear capabilities had developed faster than expected and the continued presence of Soviet land forces stationed in Central Europe was a real concern.<sup>90</sup> Acheson and others, including Canadian defence minister Brooke Claxton in 1950, had already foreseen the problem with relying too heavily on nuclear weapons, and they hoped that the provision of additional conventional forces would be an effective deterrent.<sup>91</sup>

A few Canadians questioned the pursuit of Article Two. Dana Wilgress, the High

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<sup>89</sup> James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada. Growing up Allied*; See also Escott Reid, *Radical Mandarin*, pp. 236-240 and *Time of Fear and Hope*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977.

<sup>90</sup> Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power. National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992; David S. McLellan, *Dean Acheson. The State Department Years*, New York: Dodd, Mead, & Company, 1976; and Douglas Brinkley, *Dean Acheson, The Cold War Years, 1953-1971*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992. Note also The Americans had supported the Marshall Plan, intended to revive the European economies and which benefitted Canada as European nations made some off-shore purchases. It was in effect until 1953. The American Senate was reluctant to accept a broadened NATO mandate and greater commitments.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, See especially: McLellan, *Dean Acheson*, pp. 339-346. "Acheson held that the Soviet possession of an atomic capability made it all the more imperative that the United States be able to defence its vital interests in Europe without having to depend upon the atomic bomb." pp. 344-5. Claxton in May of 1950 wrote "our side [NATO] did not have enough ground forces to produce concentrations of the Russian troops which would make good targets for atomic weapons.... " quoted from: Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, p. 262. More on these issues as they specifically affect the Canadian brigade will appear in Chapter three.

Commissioner for Canada in London and the Canadian deputy to the North Atlantic Council, wrote to Charles Ritchie, on 30 October 1951. He stated: " As you know, I have long been mystified as to what exactly was the reason why we sponsored Article 2 of the Treaty....I have never been able to take seriously the proposal for closer integration of the North Atlantic countries."<sup>92</sup> He also expressed doubts about European economic integration and suggested that there were some traces of American imperialism in the approach of those Americans who were in favour of Atlantic integration. As might be surmised, some Europeans and Soviets shared these views.<sup>93</sup>

Hume Wrong, in Washington during this time, also expressed skepticism: " I can detect no interest [in Article 2] in the [American] Department of Defense or other Departments concerned with NATO... Were Canadians trying to divert attention away from inadequacies in their military programme?" he wondered. <sup>94</sup> He worried that the cumulative effect of Canadian actions in NATO might diminish Canadian influence on other issues in Washington and suggested caution.<sup>95</sup>

Thus, Wilgress and Wrong, both of whom were influential, clearly saw difficulties in

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<sup>92</sup>NA, MG 31, E46, Volume 7, File 14, Dana Wilgress to Charles Ritchie, 30 October 1951.

<sup>93</sup>André Beaufre, *NATO & Europe*, pp. 98-100.

<sup>94</sup>NA, MG 31, E46 Volume 7, file 14. H.H. Wrong , *Memorandum entitled Some thoughts on Canada, the North Atlantic Community, and Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty*, 15 October 1951.

<sup>95</sup>*Ibid.*

using the military alliance to achieve long term foreign policy goals. The ideas expressed in Article Two were important on the domestic political front; yet it was never really implemented and military priorities dominated NATO. From the perspective of the hypothesis, Article Two was an important expression of "core values", but not all Canadian diplomats or officials felt that NATO was the appropriate forum for the activities associated with it. Thus a divergence between an idealist vision expressed in Article Two and a more practical short term view seems evident.

With the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950, immediate military requirements took unquestioned precedence over long term goals. This same urgency affected the implementation of Article Three of the NATO Treaty, concerning mutual aid among NATO nations, in 1950. E.W.T. Gill, an External Affairs counsellor to the High Commissioner in London, wrote to Brooke Claxton suggesting that the mutual aid items be "typically Canadian, and therefore politically acceptable; .. [made in Canada ] in small quantities for our armed forces and [where] a larger production run would effect economies for us; ..and if produced would have other collateral advantages such as assisting to overcome local unemployment problems etc...".<sup>96</sup> His ideas proved too optimistic.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>96</sup>DCER, 1950, Volume 16, pp. 899-903. Gill to Claxton, 18 April 1950.

<sup>97</sup>Gill was hardly alone in his attempts to use NATO for marketing Canadian goods. In the Department of National Defence, *Annual Report, 1950*, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1951, p. 9. It was noted that "in any full scale emergency, Canada would be fighting along with other friendly powers. That principle of specialization which is so effective in modern industry must be applied....". Unfortunately, for many of

Claxton replied favourably, but emphasized the limits of the defence budget and the positive advantages to both the United States and Canada of sending British equipment to NATO countries and replacing it with American equipment for Canadian troops. Claxton even hoped that the Americans would pay for some of this equipment in the interests of continental standardization.<sup>98</sup> These measures certainly enhanced European readiness, but slowed long term standardization. Mutual aid, even through the provision of British equipment, helped Canadians create a presence in Europe which both Gill and Claxton indicated was desirable.

At this level, foreign policy goals were considered and efforts were made to achieve them through the NATO alliance, though the results fell far short of expectations.

#### **GATT :**

Economics and security were closely related but, as Taylor and others observed, they might be pursued outside of the NATO framework. The philosophy behind GATT, which promoted international trade through multilateral reductions on tariffs, was that conflicts among nations might be reduced by these measures. GATT assisted in the long term transformation of international relations and was essential to the broader Canadian

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the projects attempted, the high investment required for development combined with difficulties in marketing in Europe and the States, led to abandonment. The British also experienced similar problems. See Jon B. McLin, *Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963. The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance.*

<sup>98</sup>*External Affairs*, 1950, Volume 16, pp. 899-903, Claxton to Gill, 27 April 1950.

efforts at the United Nations to maintain world peace.<sup>99</sup> Economic liberalism was important, but Canadian bureaucrats tempered it with practical considerations of the effect of GATT policies on the Canadian, British and other economies.<sup>100</sup> As the Cold War began, the promotion of GATT began to include elements of anti-communism, and may be seen in light of competing economic philosophies as well as national self interest.<sup>101</sup>

Concentration upon bilateral trade was against the multilateral principles associated with GATT.<sup>102</sup> In theory, international peace and security was linked to the expansion of multilateral trade among all nations.<sup>103</sup> In practice, anti-communism and opportunism would sometimes coincide. Moreover, trading with respect to strategic materials

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<sup>99</sup>Frank Stone, *Canada, the Gatt and the International Trade System*, pp. 18-19.

<sup>100</sup>J.L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men. The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957*, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982. pp. 139-143, 256-263.

<sup>101</sup>Hector Mackenzie, *DCER, Volume 15, 1949*, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1995, pp. 1054-55. A.F. W. Plumptre, *Trade with Russia and Eastern Europe*, 23 April 1949. Plumptre commented on British memoranda concerning their trade with Russia and Eastern Europe.

<sup>102</sup> Michael Hart, *Fifty Years of Canadian Tradecraft. Canada at the GATT, 1947-1997*, Ottawa: Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 1998, pp. 27-28. Hart traces Canada's pursuit of multilateralism back to the 1930s.

<sup>103</sup> GATT was originally intended to include all nations. Czechoslovakia was a signatory. With the change in government in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the Americans asked for and received Canadian support to exclude Czechoslovakia from GATT concessions. St. Laurent guessed that this action was intended to exclude satellite countries of the U.S.S.R. from future benefits and marked a change in international political relationships and future GATT policies. DHH, 73/1223, Cabinet Conclusions, 31 March 1948. The US then reversed its policy without informing Canada. See: *DCER, Volume 14, 1948*, Ottawa: Dept of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1994, p. 890.

required prudence. Supplies which might be used for military purposes were usually reserved for trade with trusted allies or under agreements which restricted their use.<sup>104</sup> Even non-strategic materials had some security implications. The Soviet Union and its satellites were potential competitors with respect to wheat and other goods.<sup>105</sup>

The Canadian government began applying the agreement on a provisional basis in 1948 and continued to be active in GATT negotiations.<sup>106</sup> Canada, as a large geographic entity with a small population, and hence a small internal market, and with many raw or semi-processed materials for export, was dependent upon the world market for economic growth. Multilateralism through the promotion of GATT was intended to allow Canadians to diversify in the international market.<sup>107</sup> GATT was intended to promote trade and to protect independence and sovereignty for Canadians through strong economic growth. It also assisted in the lowering of tariffs between the United States and Canada. Canada's interest in promoting GATT provides a contextual background for consideration, especially given the philosophical linkage between

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<sup>104</sup>Aluminum and uranium were for example restricted.

<sup>105</sup>NA, MG 31 E 46, Volume 3 , Article 80, p. 4. The Soviet Union could become a serious competitor in Germany for both foodstuffs and industrial raw materials. Although the FRG did not recognize many of the satellite governments, it still undertook commercial relations with them although on a limited basis during this period of time. Consideration of possible Soviet trading policies was a factor in Canadian plans.

<sup>106</sup>Mackenzie, *DCER*, 15, 1949, p. 873. Memorandum by A.D.P. Heeney to the Cabinet to Cabinet, 3 January 1949, approved by Cabinet, 5 January 1949.

<sup>107</sup>Michael Hart, *Fifty years of Canadian Tradecraft. Canada at the GATT, 1947-1997*, pp. 56-9.



security and trade.

***The European Option and German-Canadian bilateral relations:***

Historian B. W. Muirhead describes how Canadian officials attempted to overcome difficulties in British-Canadian trade relations.<sup>108</sup> The British government, still using the sterling area to protect its global interests, had encountered severe dollar shortages and balance of trade problems. As a result, British trade officials sought to limit imports from Canada, particularly bacon and other agricultural goods. The Canadian government attempted to cushion the blow to affected sectors of the economy, to diversify trade, and to develop the European market as an alternative to reliance upon American and British trade. Muirhead concludes that the European option failed; with his broad focus, he necessarily overlooks the specifics of Canadian-German trade. Canadian-German trade increased steadily, though not nearly enough to offset increasing American dominance of the Canadian economy.<sup>109</sup>

During the 1920s and 1930s, a unified Germany had imported many agricultural goods from Bulgaria, Roumania, Yugoslavia and other South-east European countries in exchange for manufactured goods.<sup>110</sup> With the division of Germany, these trading

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<sup>108</sup>B. W. Muirhead, *The Development of Postwar Canadian Trade Policy. The Failure of the Anglo-European Option*.

<sup>109</sup>See Appendix A, Charts 1, 2 and 3.

<sup>110</sup> Robert E. Dickinson, *Germany. A General and Regional Geography*, 2nd edition, London: Methuen, 1961, pp. 292-303 and Norman J.G. Pounds, *The Economic Pattern of Modern Germany*, 2nd edition, London: John Murray, 1966, pp. 43-60, 125.

patterns were altered and opportunities were created for Canadian products. The FRG maintained high tariffs on agricultural goods and also reformed its agricultural system, eventually producing more than unified Germany at its height. German and European tariffs against agricultural imports continued to restrict the entry of Canadian goods, although wheat became the largest single Canadian export to Germany by the 1950s.<sup>111</sup>

Canadian officials in Germany were concerned with both security and trade; they recognized that stability was key factor in creating better economic opportunities for Canadian goods. A military mission was established in Berlin, well recognized to be a sensitive location, in January 1946.<sup>112</sup> Lieutenant-General Maurice Pope headed this mission to the Quadpartite Allied Control Council. Pope's instructions mentioned the possible economic opportunities created for Canada as German industrial capacity was curtailed. Pope was also to report on developments in the balance of power and Control Council policies, de-Nazification, German public opinion, and social and economic conditions, including the position of churches and religion. Trade was important, but

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<sup>111</sup>The specific products exported to West Germany in 1953 included wheat (39.5 million), barley (21 million) and other agricultural items. Other exports of over 2 million in that year were: iron and lead ore, crude asbestos, and synthetic rubber. Significant manufactured goods included whiskey, newsprint, cigarettes and skates. Imports encompassed metalworking machinery (2.5 million), cars, scrap copper, cameras, oil well casings, hand tools, surgical and scientific instruments and other manufactured goods in small quantities. NA, RG 25, Vol. 6618, File 11271-40 pt. 2.1 Memorandum from B.G. Barrow, Asst Dir, International Trade Relations Branch, Canada. Department of Trade and Commerce to N.F. Berlin, Department of External Affairs, concerning statements for inclusion with Letter of Instruction for Mr. Charles Ritchie, 31 May 1954.

<sup>112</sup>Donald M. Page, *DCER, 1946*, Volume 16, Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1977, pp. 154-159. N.A. Robertson to General Maurice Pope, 29 January 1946.

ideology seemed of interest as well.

Canada signed a Most Favoured Nation Agreement with the Bizonal Government which controlled West Germany in 1947. A lengthy, point-form and informal note was prepared on this matter, outlining the numerous advantages and disadvantages of this agreement. The terms were favourable and Canadians might be able to sell wheat, linseed oil, beans and barley, wool, and other surplus goods. The German recovery might be beneficial to Canada and others. The note expressed concern that the Germans might want strategic goods like aluminum\* and that the agreement was not in spirit of GATT. In addition, it mentioned the possibilities that the United States might not like the agreement and that other countries in Europe and South America might establish trade with the Bizonal Government with the effect of leaving Canada out.<sup>113</sup> And so it was with misgivings that the Canadian government concluded the bilateral negotiation with the Bizonal government.<sup>114</sup>

The Bizonal government had already signed trade and payment agreements with

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<sup>113</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6543, File 10399-40, pt. 1. Proposal on bilateral trade and payments agreements with Bizonia, n.d.. The memorandum was very informal and lengthy, containing over thirty items for consideration. \* Germany was forbidden to produce aluminum at the end of the war. As aluminum was a strategic good, its distribution was limited.

<sup>114</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6543, File 10399-40, pt. 2, Canada Treaty Series, 1948, No. 19.

twenty two countries, including Britain and the United States.<sup>115</sup> The informal note suggested hostile Canadian public opinion and a reluctance to trade with the Germans. In fact, the files concerning trade relations with Germany are filled with letters from Canadian citizens protesting the resumption of trade with the "Nazis".<sup>116</sup> If the Canadian government had shown a willingness to discriminate between Germans and the Nazis, many Canadian citizens continued to express distrust and, at least on the part of some people, there was no distinction between Germans and Nazis.<sup>117</sup>

Trade with Germany increased steadily over the years.<sup>118</sup> Other European and South America countries also expanded trade with Germany and thus Canada was only one of many countries which experienced a rise in trade as the German economic miracle got underway.<sup>119</sup>

Maurice Pope continued his mission in Berlin as the Four Power (American, British, French, and Soviet) control broke down in 1947 and with the invasion of

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<sup>115</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>116</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 5437, file 11271-40, pt. 4. Various memoranda and letters; Volume 4293, File 10935-B-40, pt. 1, Various letters.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*; Angelika Sauer, "A matter of Domestic Policy? Canadian Immigration Policy and the Admission of Germans, 1945-1950", *Canadian Historical Review*, June 1993, pp. 226-263. This article covers many of the intricacies of Canadian government policies with respect to the admission of Germans as immigrants to Canada and describes some of the attitudes held by officials towards German immigrants.

<sup>118</sup>See Charts 1,2 and 3 in Appendix A.

<sup>119</sup>Pounds, *The Economic Pattern of Modern Germany*.

Czechoslovakia in 1948 and the Berlin Airlift in that same year. A consulate in Frankfurt was set up in 1948. It was responsible for the coordination of immigration teams, to assist if "things got worse", and to promote Canadian trading interests in Western Germany.<sup>120</sup> By December 1949, the Allied High Commission was still in control of the western half of Germany and a Canadian mission opened in Bonn in March 1950.

T.C. Davis replaced Pope in June 1950. Canadians continued to maintain a military mission in Berlin along with the mission in Bonn. The Canadian presence was symbolic of a continued commitment to stability in this area. For both missions, the provision of advice and information was clearly a primary duty. The Germans, for their part, sent representatives to Canada even before they received recognition. Dr. Werner Dankwort served as the first post war German Consul General in Ottawa. He moved to Ottawa some months before receiving official recognition in September 1950. Interest in Canada at this time was primarily due to emigration from Germany.<sup>121</sup> The FRG's acceptance in the international community had not come without a price. The FRG undertook to settle German economic debts with the western world as a part of its recognition that Germany had to take responsibility for the mistakes of the Third Reich.

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<sup>120</sup> Mackenzie, *DCER, 1948, Volume 14*, Ottawa: Dept of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1994, pp. 21-22. Memorandum from L. B. Pearson, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 20 May 1948. See also: Angelika Sauer, "A matter of Domestic Policy? Canadian Immigration Policy and the Admission of Germans, 1945-1950".

<sup>121</sup> See Sauer, "A matter of Domestic Policy?..."

Canadian diplomats and trade officials continued to push for the FRG to become a signatory to GATT as their first preference.<sup>122</sup> Canadians let the Most Favoured Nation Agreement lapse in the 1951 once the FRG became a signatory to GATT. In the words of L. B. Pearson:

The accession of Western Germany to the General Agreement, if it decides to participate, will be particularly important. It will make possible a broad attack on a part of the United States tariff which has hitherto remained untouched because of the rule that countries negotiate only with "principal supplier" of any item. Western Germany has been the principal supplier to the United States of a large number of items, especially manufactures, on which Canadians would welcome reductions in the United States tariff.<sup>123</sup>

That statement epitomized much of Canadian multilateralism and motivation; consideration of American influence and policies was often present in the development of Canadian positions on issues.

The FRG was gradually becoming integrated into the western community. The Canadian government issued a proclamation of the Termination of the State of War which was approved by Cabinet on 27 June and issued on the tenth of July 1951, following a similar decision by the Three Powers (Britain, France and the United

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<sup>122</sup> Mackenzie, *DCER, 1949, Volume 15*, See Chapter VII on International Economic relations.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 880, quoting a *Memorandum from the Secretary of State for External Affairs to Cabinet*, 24 October 1949.

States).<sup>124</sup> That the Germans were still on probation was evident and the Three Powers maintained occupation forces in Germany until 1955. The threat of communism in Europe was very real and German potential formidable.

Germany remained an important element in Canada's security interests, though Canadians had little input in the plans for its future. In the late summer of 1951, R.E. Collins, Jules Léger and Ross Campbell of the European Division of External Affairs, prepared a memorandum entitled "Some aspects of Canadian policy in Europe":

The main policy of the West in Europe during the cold war period is... containment [of the Soviet Union]. ... the greatest care must be exercised in formulating interim arrangements for Germany....Up to the present, Canada has not been involved in the formulation of Western policy towards Germany, but with the NATO umbrella already extended to include West Germany and Berlin, Canada may yet have an opportunity to express its views as a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The time has, of course, passed when an ideal solution to the German problem can be found... In the absence of a substantial improvement in the relations between Moscow and the Western Powers it is the Germans themselves, both East and West, who will eventually exert pressure to bring about unification of their country.

It should therefore be the ultimate aim of the Western Powers to bring about a unified, non-Communist Germany associated as closely as possible with the Western community of nations, and in the meantime to proceed with the

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<sup>124</sup>Greg Donaghy, *DCER, 1951 Volume 17*, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996, pp. 1693-1695.

integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into Western Europe. To meet the challenge posed by the long-term aim, the Western Powers will have to concentrate on gaining the respect and confidence of Germany as a whole, while taking every reasonable opportunity to keep alive the possibility of ultimate Four-Power negotiations as a means of general detente.<sup>125</sup>

NATO was thus a possible venue for the expression of Canadian opinions on Germany which Canada had been denied in spite of its active role in the Second World War.<sup>126</sup> Canadians believed in promoting active friendship with the Germans to ensure their support in the face of the Soviet threat, but the term "détente" was already being used in the hope of a long term peaceful solution in 1951.

Canadian involvement in NATO might ensure that Canadians had a voice in matters of long term international security. While only partially explicit in the documents, the need for adequate defence of West Germany to restore economic confidence, supporting investment, trade, and stability, underlay the decision to send troops to Germany. In 1951, T.C. Davis visited Hamburg, located just 40 kilometres from the Iron Curtain, and an important marketing location which depended upon imports and exports with the

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<sup>125</sup>NA, MG 31, E 46, Volume 7, File 16, *Escott Reid fonds*, Memorandum entitled: "Some aspects of Canadian policy in Europe", 9 August 1951.

<sup>126</sup> Canadians had been left out of discussions to resolve the German problem and objected forcefully when they were not even consulted about the Potsdam Conference. Norman Robertson, the Canadian High Commissioner in London and one of Mackenzie King's advisors during the Second World War had been dismayed by the lack of results. See J.L. Granatstein, *A Man of Influence. Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-1968*, Toronto: Deneau, 1981, pp. 140-150.



Russian zone.<sup>127</sup> He was a guest of Alfred C. Toepfer, "one of Germany's leading business men... the leading importer of grains." Davis reported on a round table conference of fifty leading Hamburg businessmen where many questions about trade with Canada and the possibility of immigration to Canada of Germany's surplus population were raised. Davis expressed surprise that this particular group of individuals believed that "successful negotiations can only be entered into [with the Soviets on possible unification]... with a hope of success when the West is strong in a military sense."<sup>128</sup>

The West Germans were forbidden to arm themselves and many felt threatened by the presence of Soviet troops along the intra-German border, perhaps particularly after the first Berlin Crisis in 1948.<sup>129</sup> A sense of stability and well-being might be enhanced through the presence of Canadian and other NATO troops whose role was to defend German territory from possible invasion.<sup>130</sup> In this respect, the Canadian contribution, though small, was psychologically significant. The Canadian troops were the first NATO forces without occupation duties, an important distinction which will be expanded upon

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<sup>127</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 10935-B-40, pt. 1, T.C. Davis to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 25 September 1951.

<sup>128</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>129</sup> Donald Abenheim, *Re-forging the Iron Cross. The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 54, 64-65.

<sup>130</sup>Chapter three will address the notion of forward defence to include German territory east of the Rhine. Even with the line of defence at the Rhine, the presence of NATO forces no doubt contributed to deterrence.

further in Chapter two.

Tentative efforts for closer bilateral relations were made by both sides. Davis contacted the Canadian Wheat Board to encourage the promotion of wheat products in Germany in 1951. Over the years, representatives of the Board visited frequently and negotiations over the entry of Canadian wheat into the German and, later, European markets continued to be a significant activity. Wheat was a primary export to Germany, but it faced a variety of economic barriers which varied according to the grade of wheat.<sup>131</sup> The Germans and other Europeans maintained high tariffs to protect European agriculture.

Canadian diplomats were hardly blind to economic opportunity, but the German nation could not be embraced with open arms in the face of recent memories. Davis suggested that Adenauer be invited to visit Canada in the summer of 1952, at the same time as a planned visit to the United States. Arnold Heeney, the Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, wrote to Reid, then the Deputy Under-Secretary, on 4 April 1952, enthusiastically reporting that " Every day makes me realize more and more that this country [West Germany] is going to be the great economic force on this continent and from every standpoint we should build up as much good will for Canada

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<sup>131</sup> NA, RG 25, Volume 5437, File 11271-40, pt. 4. See: Invitation from Escott Reid, Canadian Ambassador in Bonn to the German Federal Minister for Food and Agriculture re: an arrangement with the Canadian Wheat Board for a three week visit to Canada, 4 July 1960 and additional correspondence between the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Department of External Affairs on wheat trade in this file.

here as we possibly can."<sup>132</sup>

Yet Reid was uncharacteristically hesitant, replying that "I am not convinced that public opinion in Canada is quite ready to welcome a visit from the German Chancellor. It seems probable that the ordinary Canadian citizen who has not followed the rapid development of Allied policy towards the Federal Republic of Germany would give but a lukewarm welcome to Dr. Adenauer ." Reid spoke to Pearson who felt that perhaps the matter could be left for the time being.<sup>133</sup> In the end, Ludwig Erhard, the West German Minister of Economic Affairs and a future German President, did pay a visit Canada on 16 September 1952, to discuss trading between the Canada and Germany with officials of the Department of Trade and Commerce, but there was little publicity about these meetings.<sup>134</sup>

Adenauer visited Ottawa on 17 and 18 April in 1953 and thanked Canada for the presence of Canadian troops as part of the integrated forces. He and St. Laurent issued a joint press release on "the struggle for freedom" and emphasized the close relations between the FRG and Canada on defence, trade and immigration.

At the official level, closer relations had been established and the troops were positively

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<sup>132</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 4293, File 10935-B-40, pt. 1, Heeney to Reid, 29 April 1952.

<sup>133</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 4293, File 10935-B-40, pt. 1, Reid to the Minister, 13 May 1952 and Reid to Heeney, now as Permanent Representative of Canada to the NATO Council, 16 May 1952, Reid, quoting Pearson in this second letter.

<sup>134</sup>Donald Barry, *DCER*, 18, 1952, Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade, 1990, pp. 1450-1452,

received. But the visit was very low key, with little coverage in the Canadian press.<sup>135</sup> In the public forum, the transition of Germany into the allied camp had just begun.

As closer relations developed and trade increased, the Canadians opened a consulate in Hamburg to serve that city, Bremen, Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony in 1956. Germany was already third behind the United States and the United Kingdom in accepting Canadian exports and was fourth in imports to Canada.<sup>136</sup> The Canadian troops by this time were in Soest, part of the Northern Rhineland still served by the embassy at Bonn. Much of the Canadian training area was to the north in the same area served by the Hamburg consulate and their activities were at times a matter of some concern to the consulate.<sup>137</sup>

Both the embassy and the consulate at Hamburg prepared annual reports, noting that the Americans were more aggressive businessmen and had managed to increase their share of the pulp and paper market in the northern area.<sup>138</sup> Canadians seemed less successful. Government policy could create favourable or unfavourable conditions to some extent and the establishment of consulates was intended to increase trade, but much would depend upon Canadian and German businessmen, their interests, and

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<sup>135</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6570, File 10935-B-40, Pt. 2. Press release, 18 April 1953.

<sup>136</sup>See Charts 2 and 3 in Appendix 1.

<sup>137</sup>Chapter five will address this relationship in more detail.

<sup>138</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 5437, File 11271-40 pt. 4, Annual Statement on Trade Prospects, Hamburg, 31 October 1960.

activities.

Though the Conservatives under Diefenbaker had emphasized trade with Britain, the government continued to pursue trade with other European countries.<sup>139</sup> Diefenbaker visited Germany in the autumn of 1958, met with Adenauer, and was enthusiastic about the meeting.<sup>140</sup> Under the Conservative government, diplomats hoped to achieve trading advantages in Europe much as they had done under the Liberals. Yet by 1958 it was becoming clear that plans for the entry of Canadian goods into the EEC were not coming to fruition.<sup>141</sup>

Charles Ritchie, the Canadian Ambassador to Bonn, requested advice from External Affairs before he visited Konrad Adenauer in spring 1958. The European Economic Division of External Affairs advised him to raise the following points:

You might refer to the drift away from internationally agreed concepts of international trade and payments; the growing strains on the GATT and other institutions in this field; evidence in Europe and elsewhere of increasing

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<sup>139</sup>Costas Melakopides, *Pragmatic Idealism. Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1995*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1998, pp. 52-65, generally notes the lines of continuity in the Diefenbaker era in his work but says little about Europe or Germany.

<sup>140</sup>Escott Reid, *Radical Mandarin. The Memoirs of Escott Reid*, pp. 301-302.

<sup>141</sup>The complexities of the issue were reflected in public opinion in Canada. See: Gow, "The Opinions of French Canadians on war and peace", pp. 928-930. Catholic newspapers tended to support the movement for European unity, especially for France and Germany, while Liberal newspapers were concerned with the question of Canadian trade in Europe. Lionel Chevrier spoke in the House of Commons in favour of an Atlantic Free Trade Area in view of the potential divisions in Europe at this time.

protectionism and discrimination; and the general problem of liquidity.<sup>142</sup>

The memorandum went on to associate GATT with the economic prosperity of the "free world" and its political strength, describing Soviet attempts to undermine the west. The European Common Market with its exclusive trading policies was particularly an issue. Finally, it summed up:

Canada has looked to Germany as a strong and devoted supporter of efforts to reduce restrictions... We have ...been greatly disappointed by and failed to understand the reason for, the continued refusal by the German government to bring its system of import restrictions into accord with its obligations under the GATT and the IMF.<sup>143</sup>

Canadians had been anxious to promote the development of the EEC as a means of containing Germany, but they were also concerned about the difficulties Canadian products encountered in this market. Wheat, timber and fish were all important Canadian exports to Europe which might be affected if the Europeans developed greater self sufficiency.<sup>144</sup> While the atmosphere of the early 1950s had been optimistic, the late 1950s seemed filled with despondency. Canadian officials raised the issue of

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<sup>142</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 7330, File 10935-B-40, Pt. 3.2, Message from J.E. Hyndman and W.F. Stone, European Economic Division to the Embassy in Bonn (with information to NATO Paris). Re: Call on Chancellor Adenauer, 28 March 1958.

<sup>143</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>144</sup> *DCER, 1950*, pp. 1623. Memorandum of the Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade Policy, 10 February 1950. PCO. RG 2, "European self sufficiency for such products as wheat, timber and fish.. would have painful results here...".

Canadian agricultural exports to the EEC at virtually every GATT meeting.<sup>145</sup> While progress was made on specific products at various times, Canadians were reaching a high point of frustration in their dealings with the Europeans, including the Germans.

Reid replaced Ritchie as the Canadian Ambassador in Bonn in 1958. On 11 December 1958, Reid addressed the Canadian Heads of Missions Meeting in Paris.<sup>146</sup> He spoke of the failed hope that the EEC would become a part of a "Free Trade Area which would extend over the whole of Western Europe".<sup>147</sup> His recollection of Canadian policies in the early 1950s were that differences of opinion were glossed over as "we in Canada believed in western European integration as a step towards closer unity on a North Atlantic basis and ultimately on a free world basis."<sup>148</sup> Reid had been a most ardent proponent of Article Two and his disillusion with efforts in Europe and with European policies seemed complete.<sup>149</sup>

Reid continued :

The sky was now black with those platitudes coming home to roost... Was little

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<sup>145</sup> Bruce W. Wilkinson, "General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" in *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Volume II, Edmonton: Hurtig, 1988, p. 879.

<sup>146</sup> Heads of Missions refer to those diplomats who were in charge of the missions in various countries. These individuals were nearly all entitled to be called Ambassadors.

<sup>147</sup> NA, MG 31, E 46, Volume 28, Escott Reid Fonds, Germany Despatches, 1 of 2, "Western European Integration", 15 January 1959.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>149</sup> Escott Reid, *Radical Mandarin*, pp. 384-392.

Europe ( the 6 EEC nations - France, Germany, Italy and 3 Benelux countries) going to be inward-looking, protective of special interests and unwilling to make the adjustments ...necessary in order that it be trade-creating and not trade-diverting?.. Canadians were now admitting that the notion that a Free Trade area would weaken protection might be reversed into the development of a "so-called Free Area" which was in itself protectionist and restrictionist. The EEC would merely extend the area of protectionism and discrimination....<sup>150</sup>

Canadians faced an additional dilemma as the British and other non-EEC European nations formed the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) . EFTA raised fears about division in Europe as well as complications in terms of the conditions for trading Canadian goods in the European market.<sup>151</sup>

In 1956, British and French actions in the Suez were perceived in Germany in almost the same light as Russian actions in Hungary that same year.<sup>152</sup> German businessmen pursued trade with various Arab nations and considered the Middle East as a potential market for their goods. Canadians in Germany were closely associated with the British

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<sup>150</sup>NA, MG 31, E 46, Volume 28, Escott Reid Fonds, Germany Despatches, 1 of 2, "Western European Integration", 15 January 1959.

<sup>151</sup> Robert Spencer, "External Affairs and Defence" in *Canadian Annual Review for 1960*, edited by John T. Saywell, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961, pp. 79-80. By the middle of 1959, British efforts to organize Europe into a free trade area, including the six common market countries (Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries) had failed. EFTA consisted of the outer seven, including Britain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, Switzerland and Austria. EFTA allowed Britain to retain Commonwealth preferences which most analysts considered the EEC probably would not have.

<sup>152</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 7330, File 10935-B-40, pt. 3.1, C.S.A. Ritchie, Annual Report for Germany, 1956.



and they had good reason to worry about anti-British feeling and any perception in Germany that NATO supported the actions of Britain and France.<sup>153</sup>

In spite of the disappointments experienced in the 1950s, Canadians established another consulate in Germany, this time in Dusseldorf, in view of the importance of the Ruhr and in order to promote further bilateral trade in 1961. Canadian military spending in the Soest area was important to the local economy and these defence expenditures were used in negotiations with the German government. German investment in Canada was also a factor as the government sought to diversify foreign investment. In sectors, like steel and banking, German investment was significant to economic development, especially at the local level.<sup>154</sup> The total estimated German foreign investment in Canada in 1960 was 125 million dollars compared with a total of mostly American foreign investment of over a half billion dollars.<sup>155</sup>

A brief look at the uranium trade illustrates well how the Canadian government pursued

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<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>154</sup> NA, RG 25, Volume 5437, File 11271-10, pt. 4. For example: The Canadian Western Pipe mills at Port Moody, B.C. and Alberta Phoenix Tube and Pipe in Edmonton were two wholly owned subsidiaries. In addition, Germans had significant investments in Algoma Steel in Sault Ste. Marie (\$53 million in 1960). Much like Canadian investment in the Soest area, these figures do not appear large at the national level, but represented a considerable investment at the local level. The total foreign investment in Canada in 1959 was half a billion dollars, mostly from American sources. See: Douglas G. Hartle, "The National Economy" in John T. Saywell, *Canadian Annual Review for 1960*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961, p. 174.

<sup>155</sup> For a good short summary of the debate over foreign investment in 1960, see: Douglas G. Hartle, "The National Economy", pp.173-185.

trade with the FRG to balance dependence upon the Americans in the late 1950s.<sup>156</sup>

Uranium as a strategic item was restricted to countries in which the Canadian government had trust and confidence. Uranium was a promising Canadian mining industry: in 1957, almost 90 percent of Canadian uranium exports went to the United States with the United Kingdom absorbing virtually all the rest. In 1960, the bottom dropped out of the American market with the cessation of nuclear testing after September 1958, the slow development of nuclear energy for non-military purposes and an increase in American domestic uranium production.<sup>157</sup> Canadian diplomats and business persons sought new markets further afield. In July and August 1960, Dr. Siegfried Baller, the FRG's Minister of Atomic Affairs and Water Recovery, visited various Canadian nuclear energy plants.<sup>158</sup> The FRG began to import uranium, allowing for increased diversification and stability at an uncertain time for the Canadian industry. The existence of this trade and information sharing suggests a higher level of trust and

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<sup>156</sup>Robert Bothwell, *Eldorado. Canada's National Uranium Company*, Toronto: University of Toronto, 1984, covers the history of this company until 1960. He describes in detail the American and British trade, but of course, the trade with the Germans is outside his time frame.

<sup>157</sup> John D. Harbron, "International Affairs", in Saywell, *Canadian Annual Review for 1960*, pp. 221-222. In this essay, the seriousness of this dependency is evident. Unemployment in 1960 experienced the most serious rise since the depression of the 1930s. The tone of this essay which describes the ominous chronic rise brings home the sense that most adult Canadians at this time experienced the depression first hand. In fact, Harbron argued that unemployment, sharper foreign competition and tightening world markets were major crises facing the Diefenbaker government at this time. While this viewpoint may not have been shared by all Canadians, it places trade with the Germans and with the EEC in perspective.

<sup>158</sup> NA, RG 25, vol. 5406 file 10935-B-40, pt. 6, various messages and press releases.

confidence between the two governments.<sup>159</sup> A bilateral agreement between the FRG and Canada allowed for inspection to ensure that these materials were used for non-military purposes, but the Canadian Embassy in Bonn reported that there would be significant political consequences if Canadians actually decided to implement inspection. The Germans were sensitive to any suspicions or mistrust.<sup>160</sup>

Canadian and German officials continued to build on mutual good will based upon a growing perception of shared interests. In 1961, a comprehensive analysis of German-Canadian relations was prepared by the Department of External Affairs. It indicated that the principal interests of Canada in Germany arose out of NATO and the defence commitment to West Germany. Germany was the key territory in NATO defence planning.<sup>161</sup> The Canadian government believed that its defence contribution to German territory gave it a legitimate interest in the FRG and its foreign policy. The analysis noted that, while Germany had increased its exports to under-developed nations, its foreign aid programme was weak and Canadians joined the American government in pushing the FRG to increase its aid.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>159</sup>Bothwell, *Eldorado*, p. 432. Bothwell here notes that Britain was trusted to use uranium for any purpose, but France was informed that it had to guarantee civilian use to qualify for export. India also became an importer of Canadian uranium.

<sup>160</sup> NA, RG 25, Volume. 5406, File 10935-B-40, pt. 6. Message from Bonn to External, 25 June 1960.

<sup>161</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 5406, File 10935-B-40, pt. 6, "Germany 1961".

<sup>162</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 5406, File 10935-B-40, pt. 6, "Germany 1961".

The same concerns arose again in a more general context the next year when the Joint Canada-United States Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs met in January 1962. The following points were summarized in a Memorandum prepared by External Affairs:

1. Canada recognizes and appreciates the importance of European integration....
2. Canada shares with the U.S. a concern to ensure that in the interests of a strong Europe and in the interests of the international trading community these regional arrangements develop in an outward-looking direction. Canada, like the U.S., has world trading interests, not only in Europe, but also in other areas, including the Pacific.
3. Canada and the U.S. both have a direct interest in getting European tariffs down.
4. Canada and the United States, as agricultural exporting countries have a common interest in preventing the development of excessive agricultural protectionism in Europe, both with respect to continental European countries and Britain.
5. The area of conflict is with respect to the Commonwealth preferences. Canada attaches major importance to the safeguarding of Commonwealth interests in relation to Britain's negotiations with the EEC... Further, if it was felt in Canada that Canadian losses in the British market were the result of U.S. intervention, this could raise difficulties in the Canada-U.S. relations generally.
6. Concerning the problem of less-developed countries, as far as tropical products are concerned, in the past Canada has indicated interest in the world

wide solution proposed by the U.S. (free entry)....<sup>163</sup>

If Canada and the United States shared many goals, Canadian diplomats seemed to emphasize their concerns for British interests.

As the European governments belonging to the EEC considered Britain's application for membership, Canadian diplomats involved in trade issues reflected upon how this might affect Commonwealth trade and the position of less developed countries. The EEC had extended preferred treatment to colonial territories of EEC members and continued preferred treatment when these territories obtained independence, but there was no guarantee that this policy would be extended to include the Commonwealth. Even if it did, what of those developing nations which would be left out? Diefenbaker expressed some of these concerns at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in September 1962. At it turned out, the French President, Charles De Gaulle, opposed Britain's entry in early 1963.<sup>164</sup>

The significance of the American-Canadian discussion on these issues is that officials in both countries shared fears about the EEC tariffs with regard to their own trade and the trade of under-developed nations. Even the United States did not have enough influence to reduce the European tariffs as desired. On some key issues, American and

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<sup>163</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 3489, File 3-4-1, 1962/1, Joint Canada-United States Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, 9 January 1962.

<sup>164</sup>Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire. Canada and the World to the 1990s*, Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994, pp. 249-251.

Canadian officials together could only hope to influence the opinions and await decisions by others. As the Europeans, especially the Germans, grew more powerful, able to defend themselves and economically strong, Canada's significance declined. Even at the height of its influence, diplomat John Holmes noted that in the play among the various Cold War countries, "Canada's role was bound to be supplementary rather than decisive".<sup>165</sup>

The ambivalence of the Diefenbaker government, particularly with regard to access to nuclear weapons for Canadian forces, had an impact upon German-Canadian relations.<sup>166</sup> Protest in Canada and West Germany with respect to the acquisition and control of nuclear material and especially nuclear weapons tended to focus around a growing anti-American movement. The Diefenbaker government's delay on an agreement which would allow Canadian forces to be armed with American nuclear weapons was publicly interpreted by at least one German anti-nuclear group as support

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<sup>165</sup>John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace*, p. 15.

<sup>166</sup>The Canadian government had failed to negotiate an agreement with the American government for access to nuclear weapons for various pieces of equipment purchased including the Honest John, the Bomarc, the CF 104 Starfighter and other systems. The NATO strategic plan, MC 70, adopted in 1957, called for these weapons to be acquired and to be nuclear-armed. Howard Green, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and Douglas Harkness, the Minister for National Defence, were at logger-heads with Green promoting disarmament and Harkness attempting to ensure the Canadian military had the best possible equipment for their forces and met their NATO commitments. There are many accounts of these events, see for example: Basil Robinson, *Diefenbaker's World. A Populist in Foreign Affairs*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981. There are also more details on the Honest John in Chapter three.

for their stance.<sup>167</sup> The nuclear weapons issue became a foremost topic in the election in 1963 which Diefenbaker lost in part because of his indecision on this matter. The Liberals under Pearson supported the negotiation of an agreement to fulfil Canada's NATO commitments.

In the interlude after Diefenbaker had been defeated in February 1963, but before Pearson took office in April 1963, the Embassy in Bonn was faced with a tricky public relations problem. The German Movement for Nuclear Disarmament planned an Easter march and demonstration to end in front of the Canadian Embassy in support for what it declared to be Canadian opposition to nuclear weapons. This movement comprised leaders of the Communist Front Party, the German Peace Union as well as pacifists, neutralists and others with representatives from the areas where Canadian troops were located. They intended to request that the disarmament policy of Diefenbaker be continued.<sup>168</sup>

There was disagreement on the handling of this demonstration. While it was not legal for the German police to prevent the demonstration, they were prepared to stop it from taking place in front of the embassy if Canadian officials so wished. Norman Robertson, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and several other Canadian officials

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<sup>167</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 5406, File 10935-B-40, pt. 7. A series of telegrams, messages and notes went back and forth between Bonn, Ottawa and Vancouver (where Howard Green was now located) over this issue in March of 1963.

<sup>168</sup>*Ibid.*

felt that such a heavy handed policy might backfire and were inclined to let matters take their course. John Starnes, the Ambassador in Bonn, worried that inaction would be interpreted as support for the group and might be detrimental to German-Canadian relations.

Starnes proposed that the German Foreign Office be requested to intervene with the peace movement.<sup>169</sup> The ambassador had no objection to receiving a communication from the peace demonstrators during normal working hours, but he did not wish to encourage them nor to be associated with their ideas in public. Howard Green, the Secretary of State for External Affairs under Diefenbaker's Conservative government, was known for his opposition to nuclear weapons and support for disarmament. As he was still the Minister, he was consulted and he backed Starnes's proposal. The demonstration apparently took place, but members of the German movement sent their communication to the embassy during business hours and did not demonstrate in front of it as requested.<sup>170</sup>

Protest against NATO's strategy of nuclear deterrence had been evident in Canada as well.<sup>171</sup> While the Germans as a whole accepted and supported the strategy of nuclear

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<sup>169</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>170</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>171</sup>Gow, "The Opinions of French Canadians", pp. 1202- 1223. Opinions in the newspapers in Quebec were split with some resigned to the use of nuclear weapons, but many questioned a Canadian policy for arming the forces with nuclear weapons and associated this stance with a colonial mentalité. Also noting that for many, this question



deterrence and the presence of foreign troops, there was also a smaller portion of the German population who objected to both.<sup>172</sup> The Easter march and demonstration illustrates well how Canadian government policy with respect to nuclear weapons was perceived in Germany and might be used by various groups to bolster their stand. By the early 1960s, there were significant peace movements in both countries and protests over the adoption of nuclear weapons.

The Canadian government re-assessed its commitment to NATO when the Parliamentary Special Committee on Defence met in autumn 1963. Not every one felt that the Canadian army brigade in Germany was an essential aspect of Canadian defence.<sup>173</sup> When the Canadian government originally committed troops to Europe in 1951, the Korean conflict was on and the troop commitment reflected the high level of global tension. Few had foreseen that Germany would remain divided and that the Cold War would extend over a long period of time. After the FRG began to re-arm within the NATO framework, the role of Canadian troops in Germany seemed less a

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was not the key issue in the election in 1963. Even in the earlier period, the Minister for National Defence, George R. Pearkes, probably "received more letters [on the nuclear issue] from citizens and organizations across Canada" than on any other issue. Reginald. R. Roy, *For Most Conspicuous Bravery. A Biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C., through Two World Wars*, Vancouver, University of British Columbia, 1977, p. 336.

<sup>172</sup> David G. Haglund and Olaf Mager, "Introduction" and Harmut Pohlman "The Domestic Impact of Allied Troops in Germany" in David G. Haglund and Olaf Mager's *Homeward Bound? Allied Forces in the New Germany*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992.

<sup>173</sup> See Chapter three for details.

clear matter of military necessity and more a symbolic reminder of Canadian commitment to German stability and NATO cohesion. Many of those who testified to the Special Committee questioned Canada's role in NATO, as will be further described in Chapter Three.

Information that the Canadian government was questioning its NATO commitments reached the German government even before the Special Committee convened. The German reaction is worth noting here for various documents suggest that the presence of Canada's NATO troops in Germany was important enough to the German government that it could be used as a possible negotiating point by the Canadian government.

During the visit of the German Foreign Minister, Dr. Gerhard Schröder, to Canada in May 1963, Prime Minister L.B. Pearson was warned that the German government would seek confirmation that there were "no present plans for withdrawing Canadian forces from Germany".<sup>174</sup> Canadians confirmed their commitment of forces. However, they used the occasion for a general discussion of East-West questions (with special reference to Germany and Berlin), NATO nuclear arrangements, Canadian views of British entry into the EEC and the Kennedy round of GATT negotiations, and finally French attitudes to NATO and Western European integration.

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<sup>174</sup> NA, RG 25, Volume 5406, File 10935-B-40, pt. 7, Memorandum from Paul Martin to the Prime Minister, 16 May 1963 (drafted by D.R. Hill).

Both E.M. Drury, the Deputy Minister for the Department of National Defence, and Paul Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, asked Pearson to raise the question of German defence procurement in Canada, noting: "You might wish to do this in relation to any reference he [Schröder] may make to our forces in Germany... ".<sup>175</sup> As the Germans had recently increased their conventional forces and made large financial commitments to the multilateral nuclear force, the prospects for substantial German purchases in Canada were less encouraging than six months before.<sup>176</sup> Drury and Martin noted that Canada had expended almost 40 million dollars of its foreign exchange to maintain her defence forces, including the Royal Canadian Air Force contingent, in Germany. They hoped to offset Canadian balance of payments problems by stimulating German defence purchases in Canada.<sup>177</sup>

The Germans took action. In early May 1963, the Canadian government approved the accreditation of a German military logistics representative in Canada and the establishment of a German Military Logistics Office in Montreal.<sup>178</sup> These two measures

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<sup>175</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>176</sup>John Starnes who was the Canadian Ambassador to Germany indicated that the Americans could always negotiate better deals as they had larger scales of economy and more troops. There was some frustration on the part of Canadians negotiating on these issues. Interview with John Starnes, June 1997.

<sup>177</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 5406, File 10935-B-40, pt. 7. Memorandum from Paul Martin to the prime minister, 16 May 1963 with supporting documents. It was also noted that Britain and the United States had concluded defence-purchasing agreements with Germany.

<sup>178</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 21211, File CSC, 1533, pt. 1.1, No. 41, External Affairs to the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 9 May 1963.

were intended to expedite the shipment of defence material purchased in Canada.

Ambassador Starnes remarked that even a modest expenditure for the Germans would make a difference to the Canadian government in terms of the difficulties which Canadians were experiencing with foreign exchange in the early 1960s.<sup>179</sup>

The transformation of these former enemies into friends had been successful at least at the political level. Paul Martin noted in 1963 that "Germany is now in many respects one of the most important friendly powers. The closeness of our relations has arisen, first, out of the political and defence relations between our two countries within NATO, and secondly, from our important trading relationship. In particular, the problem of a divided Germany and the isolation of West Berlin, surrounded by a hostile communist regime, have been matters of continuing concern to all NATO members."<sup>180</sup>

Economic cooperation and possible advantages in a bilateral economic arrangements were relevant factors. Not only was the presence of Canadian troops associated with possible German defence spending in Canada, it was also used as an occasional lever in other negotiations. During Schröder's visit to Ottawa in mid-May 1963, just prior to a NATO conference in Ottawa, he and Pearson discussed the nuclear weapons issue.<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>179</sup>*Ibid.*, Starnes to Ottawa, 7 May 1963 and 13 May 1963.

<sup>180</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 5406, File 10935-B-40, pt. 7, Memorandum from Paul Martin to the Prime Minister, 16 May 1963 (drafted by D.R. Hill).

<sup>181</sup>Germany's membership in NATO specified that Germany could not produce nuclear weapons. Many countries had serious worries about allowing the German military access to nuclear weapons. The Multilateral Force was one method being considered which

Schröder reviewed the German government's interest in the Multilateral Force, a proposed NATO mechanism for the control and use of nuclear weapons by NATO countries. Pearson explained that Canada's pending bilateral agreement with the United States was not intended to increase the nuclear club, but would provide Canadian troops with access to existing American nuclear stockpiles.<sup>182</sup> While both governments were attempting to make arrangements for access to nuclear weapons for their forces, the issue of defence expenditures was raised. Pearson indicated that defence policy would be reviewed by Parliament; Canadian forces in Europe were expensive. The brigade group cost as much as two or three Dutch divisions.<sup>183</sup>

According to Pearson, even if the Government was strongly motivated to withdraw its forces, it would not do so in the face of the probable strong objections of other NATO members. However, he followed this point with a discussion of the disappointing results so far of the GATT negotiations in Geneva, indicating that now was the time to move on the tariff concessions which President Kennedy had won from Congress. Schröder indicated that the EEC countries hoped to reach a satisfactory compromise from the

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might allow German forces to use nuclear weapons. NATO Ministers were to study a report by the Permanent Council on the Multilateral Force in Ottawa in 1963. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Facts and Figures. An Alliance for the 1990s*, pp. 64, 67.

<sup>182</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 5406, File 10935-B-40, pt.1.1, Memorandum to the Under-Secretary of States for External Affairs from the European Division, 24 May 1963.

<sup>183</sup>*Ibid.*

French.<sup>184</sup>

Here there was a hint of some link between the presence of troops in Germany and a possible concession in trading negotiations, but for the most part, the trading relationship and the military contribution were dealt with as separate issues from 1951 to 1964. Increased trade with Europe and the NATO military contribution were intended to protect Canada's national security, but a careful examination of the evidence reveals that, even with Canadian promotion of Article Two, the two were hardly intertwined.<sup>185</sup>

The hypothesis stated that foreign policy goals influenced military decision-making. The analysis here suggests that the military alliance was not the ideal environment for the pursuit of broader aims and that some Canadian diplomats questioned using NATO in this manner from the beginning. However, Canadians were able to make limited progress by pursuing their broader aims through a variety of means while at the same

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<sup>184</sup>*Ibid.*, Memorandum, Jean Fournier to the Under-Secretary, 24 May 1963. A more in-depth discussion of the Kennedy Round appears in J.R. Granatstein, *A Man of Influence. Norman A. Robertson and Canadian statecraft, 1929-1968*, Toronto: Deneau, 1981. See Chapter twelve. Robertson was frustrated with the lack of progress. However, it was in May 1963 that Canada received recognition as a special case by GATT - so that across-the-board tariff cuts - which would hurt Canada as an exporter of raw materials and importer of manufactured goods - were not implemented to the distress of some Common Market and American negotiators. Eventually by 1967, Canadians won significant trading concessions from the Americans. As with most sources on Canadian trade and GATT, the specifics of Canadian-German bilateral relations are not mentioned. No document was found to show that Pearson's statement to Schroöder actually affected GATT negotiations and the timing might be coincidental.

<sup>185</sup>This divergence, especially in the face of continued official Canadian efforts to increase trade, suggests that Roy Rempel's arguments do not hold for this time period.

time participating in NATO. Note well that the decisions to participate in NATO and to expand trade in Europe came from the notion that Canada's national security depended upon "the liberty of western Europe" as expressed early on by St. Laurent and also upon a perceived need to balance American influence.<sup>186</sup>

Analysis of the relations between Canada and Germany demonstrates how, at the official level, Germany was recognized as a closer ally and as formidable potential trading partner. The failure to develop greater exchange was not due to a lack of insight on the part of officials though the specific steps taken, including the opening of consulates, to increase the Canadian presence in Germany suggest the modest nature of these endeavours.<sup>187</sup> John Starnes who served as an ambassador in Bonn in the early 1960s expressed the frustration felt by Canadians as Americans and others were able to draw upon larger resources and close various commercial agreements, such as those related to defence.<sup>188</sup> Other factors, including European domestic considerations, must also be considered in assessing the relative success of Canada's foreign policy with respect to Germany.

At the level of public relations, nuclear weapons posed a problem for both the Canadian

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<sup>186</sup>See footnotes 63 and 64.

<sup>187</sup> John Hilliker and Don Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs. Coming of Age, 1946-1968, Volume 2*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1995, p. 56. It is here noted that the Frankfurt office was closed in 1951, but that opening of the posts was intended to shift emphasis to commercial activities nonetheless.

<sup>188</sup>Interview with John Starnes, July 1997.

and German governments. However, the fear of arming German forces with nuclear weapons seemed particularly pronounced. In May of 1963, the NATO defence ministers met in Ottawa and examined the possibility of a NATO multilateral nuclear force. In the public eye, the Germans were still often associated with the Nazis and the events of the Second World War were hardly forgotten. While the NATO Conference was in session, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) ran a documentary entitled "Balance of Terror". It juxtaposed pictures from the Concentration Camp at Bergen-Belsen with footage of German NATO troops having showers. These sequences were accompanied by discussion of the German government's policy on nuclear weapons for their NATO forces. By emphasizing that only two decades before the Germans had threatened the peace and security of the world and had been responsible for the Holocaust, the documentary hinted that they were not to be trusted with weapons of mass destruction.

If the German-Canadian relationship improved by the 1960s, the Canadian media still sometimes portrayed stereotypical images of Germans. The German government made a number of protests about the characterization of Germans in Canadian newspapers and on Canadian television, but to no avail. The German Ambassador to Ottawa found it difficult to understand why the Canadian government did not intervene more actively in the face of his protests.<sup>189</sup> He was particularly offended by the proliferation of films produced during the 1950s which characterized villains with German accents and all

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<sup>189</sup>In Germany, the state controlled television and other media far more directly than the Canadian government did. Though the CBC received government funding, the government did not approve programming and the CBC operated through an independent board. Canadians held a broader concept of freedom of the press than Germans did.



Germans as Nazis. Worse still, Gordon Donaldson published a piece in the *Toronto Telegram* which dealt with former Nazis in the German government and received the \$1000.00 Bowater journalism award for it.<sup>190</sup> In a *Globe and Mail* editorial, another journalist commented that the division of Germany was all to the good.<sup>191</sup> These negative comments were noted by the German Embassy in Ottawa and brought to the attention of the Canadian government.

Canadian views of Germany changed gradually, but, by 1964, relations between the two governments were, in the optimistic words of Peyton Lyon, a Canadian political scientist and a former officer of the Canadian Embassy in Bonn, "easier than with any other ally."<sup>192</sup> The German Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, and the German Foreign Minister, Gerhard Schroöder, visited Ottawa in May of 1964 for discussion of bilateral relations and were congratulated by the Speaker of the House of Commons for "the central role [they]... had played in the 'emergence of a new Germany and the establishment of a democratic society based upon the dignity of the individual and the

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<sup>190</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 5406, File 10935-B-40, pt. 6, Telegram from Bonn to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 9 September 1960, noting this article and others and the strong negative reaction in Germany to these Canadian publications.

<sup>191</sup>*Ibid.*, Letter No. 662, From Bonn to the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, 23 August 1963. This matter had been raised by a German official in the Foreign Ministry who complained about the poor press Germany received in Canada.

<sup>192</sup>Peyton Lyon, "External Affairs and Defence" in *Canadian Annual Review for 1964*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965, p. 205.

At the official level and between the governments, relations seemed good. The perception that Germany had embraced the "core values" which St. Laurent had identified as underlying Canadian foreign policy in 1947 is evident in the statement above. By encouraging and actively assisting in the integration of Germany into the western alliance, the Canadian government was strengthening those in Germany who supported a more democratic, Christian ideology. The link between national security and ideology is manifest in these statements.

In summary, the overall goals of the Canadian government with respect to Germany were to support the democratic and Christian elements in German society, to assist with the integration of Germany into European society, to improve Canadian trade with Germany (and the rest of Europe if possible), and to influence the Germans to assist developing nations. As noted in the late 1950s, European domestic interests and the significant differences among the countries of Europe in terms of their economic policies affected Canada's ability to make progress with the EEC.

Canada's foreign policy with respect to Germany was moderately successful, even if the amount of trade with Germany could not balance heavy reliance upon the Americans . Germany went from being a trading partner of very little consequence to Canada in

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<sup>193</sup>Charlotte S.M. Girard, *Canada in World Affairs. Volume VIII, 1963-1965*, Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1979, p. 141.

1938 to being one of Canada's closest partners in 1950s and 1960s.<sup>194</sup> The transformation of enemies into friends was dramatic, if incomplete. The persistence of stereotypical German characters and fears of Nazi resurgence in the Canadian media in the early 1960s suggests that though many Germans, such as Adenauer himself, had resisted the Nazis, the FRG had not completely redeemed the German nation in the Canadian public mind.<sup>195</sup>

The complexity of Canadian foreign policy goals with respect to Germany is evident here. In the next two chapters, the underlying fear of a German military resurgence on the part of British and French officials will reappear as a factor of some significance in Canadian plans. Concern about Germany affected NATO planning and the legal status of forces in Germany. The actual decision to send forces must be seen in light of St. Laurent's statement in 1947 that "a threat to the liberty of western Europe... was a threat to our way of life." Relations with Germany and specific arrangements for the troops were thus part of a broader concern for western Europe and for the preservation of the Canadian way of life.

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<sup>194</sup>See Charts 1 to 3 in Appendix 1. See also NA, RG 25, Volume 6618, File 11271-40, pt. 2.1, Statement on Canada's trade relations, sent by B.G. Barrow, Assistant Director, International Trade Relations Branch, to N.F. Berlin, Department of External Affairs, 31 May 1954, noting that both Eastern and Western German exports to Canada totalled less than \$10,000 and imports from Canada less than \$19,000 in 1938.

<sup>195</sup>Alfred Grosser, "L'Allemagne se réconcilie avec ses résistants" in *Historia*, no. 618, Juin 1998, pp. 80-83.

## **Chapter two. The Status of Forces, the Three Powers and British-Canadian relations. Developing an independent Canadian policy?**

In Chapter one, the developing relationship between Canada and Germany was placed in the broader context of Canada's foreign policy goals. Chapter two will address the decision to place the brigade in Germany with the British Army of the Rhine rather than with American forces. It will also examine the legal status of the brigade, illustrating how the Three Powers, Britain, France and the United States, affected Canadian and German bilateral relations.

Domestic considerations, especially the defence budget, limited the options available. The Canadian Army used various British facilities and resources in efforts to reduce costs. Given the small size of the Canadian contribution, Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), saw no reason to duplicate British logistical, administrative and social support functions. This decision and the use of occupation funds for the construction of facilities in the early 1950s limited Canadian control over some aspects of spending in the communities located in Europe. This chapter will provide further details on the British-Canadian military relationship in Germany and set the legal and political context for the next chapter on military planning for the brigade.

In September 1950, at a NATO meeting, Dean Acheson, the American Secretary of State, made it clear that American willingness to remain in Europe was contingent

upon an agreement to rearm Germany as a matter of urgency.<sup>196</sup> By 19 December, the Americans, the British and the French agreed in principle to a proposal by René Pleven, the French Prime Minister, to create a supra-national European Army for defence which would include German forces. While this plan for a European Defence Community (EDC) eventually failed, it was intended to provide a structure to allow for the participation of German forces and to prevent a German military resurgence.<sup>197</sup>

Adenauer, the German Chancellor, sought equality for the FRG's defence forces as a key element in the rehabilitation of the soldier and in gradually gaining public acceptance for rearming among the disillusioned German population<sup>198</sup> The phrase *ohne mich* [include me out] was coined to express the reluctant attitude of German men towards military service at this time. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), held discussions with Hans Speidel and Adolph Heusinger, two former German military officials, in January 1951. He then announced that "there is a real difference between the regular German soldier and

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<sup>196</sup>Michael Balfour, *West Germany. A Contemporary History*, London: Croon Helm, 1982, p. 177 and David S. McLellan, *Dean Acheson. The State Department Years*, New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1976, p. 329.

<sup>197</sup>Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, 1950-1955*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

<sup>198</sup>Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain and the FRG. Nuclear strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000*, London: Macmillan, 1997, pp. 124-6 and Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power. National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War*, Sanford: Sanford University Press, 1992, pp. 453-460.

officer and Hitler and his criminal group... ".<sup>199</sup> The traditional honour of the German soldier was an important aspect of German military culture. Eisenhower's statement was intended to assist with the rehabilitation of German soldiers and the re-integration of the FRG into the western alliance.

On 5 February 1951, Brooke Claxton, the Canadian Minister of National Defence, announced decisions to send a "brigade group ... to provide a strategic reserve" to Europe and to begin an ambitious defence programme with over five billion dollars planned to rebuild and re-equip Canadian forces over the next three years.<sup>200</sup> These Canadian decisions were partially in reaction to American, British and French pressure for more military support in western Europe, but as pointed out by St. Laurent, in 1950, in reaction to a speech made by Winston Churchill, the authority for such decisions rested solely with the Canadian government and Parliament.<sup>201</sup>

The Occupation Statute was revised in March 1951, restoring the FRG's control of foreign policy except for certain reserved areas such as that of the forces located in Germany. The Germans insisting on taking part in discussion on the EDC on a equal footing with other European governments.<sup>202</sup> Canadians were aware of these

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<sup>199</sup>Abenheim, *Re-forging the Iron Cross*, p. 70.

<sup>200</sup>Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, *C.D. Howe. A Biography*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979, p. 257.

<sup>201</sup>James Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, p. 204.

<sup>202</sup>Michael Balfour, *West Germany. A Contemporary History*, p. 178.

developments and of the requirement for West German military support, although they and other smaller NATO nations were left out of many Three Power deliberations.

The Canadian government, fully occupied with fighting in Korea and with recruiting and training its forces, was caught off guard on a number of issues, including the legal status of their forces, financial arrangements to be made for their support, and their relationships with other forces and the German population. Canadians could not act independently in any of these matters. Though the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (which later became known as SOFA) was signed by Canada on 19 June 1951, Germany was not a member of NATO and the other allied forces in Germany still had occupation status.<sup>203</sup> In July 1951, L.B. Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, briefly visited Bonn. Pearson publically recommended that Germany be admitted to "the defence system of the west". Several German newspapers reported favourably on his announcement and, in addition, they commented enthusiastically upon Canada's defence programme.<sup>204</sup> The summer of 1951 marked the beginnings of a promising understanding between Germany and Canada with respect to defence matters.

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<sup>203</sup>North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Facts and Figures. An Alliance for the 1990s*, p. 39. Please note that ratification of SOFA took much longer and Canadians decided not to use it for their troops in Germany as it had much less favourable conditions than those for the occupation forces.

<sup>204</sup>NA, MG 26, N1, *L.B. Pearson Fonds*, Volume 3, T.C. Davis to Pearson, 20 July 1951, with enclosed clippings from the *Bonner Rundschau* and *Die Welt* with translations.

The Canadian government had not at this time decided exactly where its brigade group in Europe was going to be placed.<sup>205</sup> General Charles Foulkes, the Canadian Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, was expected to provide co-ordination among the various services, though each of the Service Chiefs retained access to the Minister of National Defence. Foulkes was in favour of locating the brigade in the American zone partially because in 1945 the Canadian Cabinet had adopted a policy of standardization of equipment and training with the Americans in support of plans for joint continental defence.<sup>206</sup> The possibility of this brigade location became known to the British through a British liaison officer on Eisenhower's staff who worried that the placement of a Commonwealth contingent under American command would have political implications

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<sup>205</sup> Two standard accounts of this decision-making are: James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Growing Up Allied*, pp. 212-215 and David J. Bercuson, "The Return of the Canadians to Europe: Britannia Rules the Rhine" in Margaret O. MacMillan and David S. Sorenson's *Canada and NATO. Uneasy Past, Uncertain Future*, Waterloo: University of Waterloo Press, 1990, pp. 15-26. My interpretation of the decision to place the troops with the British is based upon a broad framework which includes the influence of foreign policy goals upon military decision-making and questions of governance. I disagree with Bercuson's conclusion that this decision should have been made on purely military grounds. Balance of power within NATO was a legitimate consideration for officials of the Canadian government. There were also good military grounds for the arguments presented by both Simonds and Foulkes. In addition, while the Canadian government approached Eisenhower and welcomed his recommendation, James Eayrs correctly writes that the decision to place the brigade with the British was made by the Canadian government. In seeking Eisenhower's recommendation, the government did not abrogate its right to decide. That said, Bercuson's article is very instructive as he calls attention to British manoeuvring in NATO and its consequences in the decision-making process in Canada.

<sup>206</sup>NA, RG 2, Cabinet Conclusions, 19 December 1945.



for the British.<sup>207</sup> Behind the scenes, various officials at the British Commonwealth Relations Office and British military officials met to discuss the question. Approaches were made to Guy Simonds, the Canadian Chief of the General Staff and to Air Marshal W.A. Curtis, the Canadian Chief of the Air Staff. These were reported to Claxton, noting that the British were "'most anxious' to tie Canada's forces in Europe to those of the United Kingdom".<sup>208</sup> Curtis opposed the plans for the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), but Simonds supported the British stand with respect to the brigade.

Simonds won the battle to place the Canadian brigade with the British Army of the Rhine. Arnold Heeney, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, who had observed the decline of British and French influence and the growth of American power with some uneasiness, expressed his support for Simonds' stance.<sup>209</sup> The British, Simonds argued, were more sensitive to Canadian interests; he and many in the diplomatic corps worried about American inexperience and over-reaction in the international sphere. The choice of serving with the British was intended to enhance Canadian independence and the military traditions and organization which Canadians shared with the British.<sup>210</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> David J. Bercuson, "The Return of the Canadians to Europe: Britannia Rules the Rhine" pp. 16-17.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>209</sup> James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada. Growing up Allied*, pp. 212-213. See David J. Bercuson, "The Return of the Canadians to Europe. Britannia Rules the Rhine", p. 22.

<sup>210</sup> David J. Bercuson, "The Return of the Canadians to Europe. Britannia Rules the Rhine", pp. 15-26 and DHH, Kardex, (hereafter Kardex) 112.1 (d96), G.G. Simonds to

Foulkes continued to favour the placement of the brigade with American troops in the southern area of Germany, where they eventually were situated in 1970.<sup>211</sup> Though he raised the issue of administrative convenience and the better American logistical support, two arguments which would arise again, his rationale went further. American internal strength and prosperity allowed them to dominate in NATO, but Canadians, he argued, could influence others without any alignment with one NATO power or another.<sup>212</sup> If the brigade was going to use the British line of supplies, Foulkes argued, it should use British equipment.<sup>213</sup> He recommended reversing the earlier decision to adopt American equipment in the event of placement in the British zone.

Eisenhower, in his role as SACEUR, was eventually asked to resolve the question of Canadian troop location. On 13 September 1951, he recommended placement with the British Army of the Rhine.<sup>214</sup> The decision, approved by the Canadian Cabinet, was a

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the Minister, 16 July 1951, paragraph 16. It is noted here that "Canadian Army organization is similar to the British Army...". More about this aspect of the character of the Canadian Army will be addressed in Chapter four.

<sup>211</sup>For some, particularly Jean Allard, who had served as a divisional commander with the British Army of the Rhine, placement with the British seemed a continuation of a colonial relationship. See: Serge Bernier, "L'accession du général Allard au commandement de la 4e Division d'infanterie britannique", *La revue Legion*, mars/avril 1997, pp. 20-2. Bernier commented, in reference to the decision to move the brigade south to the American zone made in the late 1960s, "Le général Allard était assez heureux d'avoir pu mettre un point final à un des derniers relents du vieux colonialisme militaire anglais vis-à-vis du Canada."

<sup>212</sup>Kardex, 112.1(d96) *CCOS notes on CGS Paper*, 16 July 1951.

<sup>213</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>214</sup>Bercuson, p. 24.

compromise in which allied opinion became the deciding factor because the Canadian military hierarchy remained divided on the issue. Both Foulkes and Simonds had sophisticated ideas about international politics and, though their conclusions were very different, neither ignored national self-interest. The location issue involved a delicate balance of power and, as observed in Chapter one, a significant motivation for Simonds and Canadian diplomats was reducing reliance upon the Americans. Foulkes's view was that the Americans were already very involved in continental defence planning. Canadians were going to have to depend upon American strength in any case.

In the meantime, the Americans, especially Acheson and Eisenhower, were becoming impatient with French reluctance to proceed with German re-armament and, throughout the summer of 1951, were pushing for the recruitment of German soldiers beginning in November of that year.<sup>215</sup> Though Acheson claimed that the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman agreed to this date, the French Foreign Office denied it. By November, Acheson set deadlines for passage of the EDC and the acceptance of German "contractuals" to end occupation, to restore sovereignty and to open the way for rearmament.<sup>216</sup> The issue of German rearmament was closely linked to the end of occupation and restoration of sovereignty as it eventually came to pass in 1954 and 1955 when the FRG formally joined NATO.

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<sup>215</sup>McLellan, *Dean Acheson*, p. 355.

<sup>216</sup>*Ibid.* p. 357. The term "contractuals" was used to refer to new legal and financial agreements to establish a basis for German payment for the presence of foreign forces to defend German soil.

The principle of equality of Germans was a key element in the Canadian plan to convert them into western allies. In this matter, Canadian policy appeared to be in agreement with the general tenor of Three Power negotiations with Germany in September 1951. Relations with the Germans were being transformed quickly, but not as rapidly as some American and Canadian officials expected. Pearson, Claxton and others in the Canadian government were under the impression that the Germans would soon be responsible for at least part of their defence according to Acheson's timetable.<sup>217</sup>

On 21 September 1951, M. H. Wershof, the Defence Liaison Officer at External Affairs, advised that "at present the U.K.-U.S. forces in Germany are occupation forces and presumably are governed by the Occupation Statute... the Occupation Statute will be terminated within a few months, and the U.S.-U.K. forces in Germany will be given an entirely new status...".<sup>218</sup> He based his advice to the Legal Division of External Affairs upon NATO Council statements by Acheson, which implied that a new agreement with Germany would be underway on the subject of the status of the forces.

The Canadian brigade was to leave for Germany at the end of October. Both the

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<sup>217</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 1.2, Various Memorandum.

<sup>218</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 1.1., Wershof to the Legal Division, 21 September 1951. Note that David J. Bercuson prepared a short paper entitled "Allies or Occupiers. The Canadian Forces in Germany, 1951-1954" on this topic for the Canadian Historical Association, June 1989. In this unpublished account and in the previously cited article by Bercuson, at least so far as footnotes reveal, he apparently did not consult either Pearson's papers or RG 25 and so the British version of the events found in Dominion Office papers was used to draw conclusions. The British version was incomplete in many respects.

Canadian Department of National Defence and the British War Office put out press releases on 18 September, announcing the decisions on the imminent troop departure and Eisenhower's recommendation to place the troops in the British zone. These facts were reported in various newspapers but were not communicated internally within the respective governments. The first news of this decision thus reached T. C. Davis, the Canadian Ambassador in Bonn and Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the British High Commissioner in Bonn, through an announcement in the *London Times*.<sup>219</sup>

Davis wrote to Pearson, unhappy that he had not been informed by his own Department of this decision before it was made public. He worried that the "relationship with [the] United Kingdom and status of Canadian troops here would be liable to misconstruction if we were to ignore this occasion particularly as they will be a North Atlantic Treaty organization [sic] contribution as distinct from occupation troops."<sup>220</sup> Davis, like many others, was under the impression that the occupation was to end very soon. The British retained a technical legal right to inform the German authorities about the Canadian brigade's arrival and location, but Davis strongly recommended that the Canadian government should directly inform the German government.<sup>221</sup>

Accordingly, a draft letter from Davis to Adenauer was prepared in Ottawa and was

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<sup>219</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 1.1., Davis to Pearson, 2 October 1951.

<sup>220</sup>*Ibid.*, Davis to Pearson, 28 September 1951.

<sup>221</sup>*Ibid.*, Davis to A.D.P. Heeney, 24 September 1951.

seen and approved by both Pearson and Claxton.<sup>222</sup> This letter indicated that "the Brigade Group will form part of the North Atlantic forces... and will be deployed in the northern part of the Central European Command in association with United Kingdom, Netherlands and Belgian forces."<sup>223</sup> It made no mention of financial arrangements; in fact, Davis was extremely cautious, and he was well aware that any statement he made might be used by the Germans in negotiations with the Three Powers.<sup>224</sup>

On 30 September, before Davis could consult with the British or send his letter, Major-General C.J. G. Dalton, the Service Relations Officer of the United Kingdom High Commissioner, passed along a draft of a British letter for the German Chancellor to the Canadian Embassy and stated that a press release was due to be issued at noon on 2 October, simultaneously in Ottawa, London and by the British Army of the Rhine, announcing the decision with respect to the Canadian brigade. Davis immediately visited Kirkpatrick to express his opinion that he thought "it was completely inappropriate that a communication to the German Government in which the Canadian

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<sup>222</sup>*Ibid.*, Heeney to Pearson, 26 September 1951, stamped seen L.B. Pearson, 27 September 1951 and Brooke Claxton to L.B. Pearson, 28 September 1951.

<sup>223</sup>*Ibid.*, Davis to Adenauer, 2 October 1951.

<sup>224</sup>*Ibid.*, Davis to Adenauer, 2 October 1951, and Davis to Pearson, 2 October 1951. Davis' letter to Adenauer was misrepresented by the British. None of the three Canadian drafts nor the final copy sent to Adenauer mentioned financial arrangements. Only the British letter mentioned the contentious financial arrangements. This situation is exactly the opposite to that reported by the British and in the unpublished account presented by Bercuson in "Allies or Occupiers". This version of events, based upon Bercuson's account and some archival records, is also quoted in Roy Rempel's *Counterweight*, pp. 116-7.

Government was so directly interested should be made through the Government of another country". <sup>225</sup> Kirkpatrick claimed to know little of the whole matter, indicating that it had all been arranged by the British Army. A.D.P. Heeney, the Under-Secretary of State, wrote to Pearson remarking that the British had not consulted the Canadian government on the note or the press release and that more consultation would have been helpful. <sup>226</sup>

At Davis' behest, the British letter was altered to include a mention of the requirement for Canadian Parliamentary approval for the decision. He also requested that the British remove statements on Canadian financial arrangements. <sup>227</sup> The final British letter to the Chancellor opened:

I [Kirkpatrick] mentioned to you last week that His Majesty's Canadian Government had agreed to send an Army Brigade to join the Allied Forces in Western Germany, and that General Eisenhower had decided that the Brigade would be stationed in the British Zone under command of the Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine. <sup>228</sup>

The letter also included the sentence that, "the stationing of the Brigade in the British Zone will not result in any increase to the occupation account during this financial year."

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<sup>225</sup>*Ibid.*, Davis to Pearson, 2 October 1951.

<sup>226</sup>*Ibid.*, Heeney to Pearson, 12 October 1951.

<sup>227</sup>*Ibid.*, Davis to Pearson, 2 October 1951.

<sup>228</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt 1.1, Office of the United Kingdom High Commissioner to Mr. Chancellor, dated 1 October 1951 and apparently delivered on 2 October.

<sup>229</sup> This sentence was the only written communication made to the Germans on finance up to this time.

While Davis attempted to have the Canadian letter replace the British letter, it was finally agreed to have both letters presented to the Chancellor at about the same time. Adenauer was an astute politician; he interpreted the Canadian note, describing the forces as defence forces not occupation forces, as a signal that occupation forces no longer existed and presented it shortly afterwards to a meeting of the Three Powers. The Canadian government's decision to pay for the maintenance of its own troops, it was argued, was further evidence of this change. The Three Powers replied to Adenauer that this decision was "an act of grace" by the Canadian government which did not affect occupation status. A few days later, the German government released information on these notes to the German press. <sup>230</sup>

On 9 October, a representative of the Frankfurter *Rundschau* visited the Canadian Embassy and inquired about the status of the Canadian troops. According to the *Rundschau*'s article published two days later, members of the German Parliament attached enormous importance to the legal circumstances involving the Canadian brigade. While various German newspapers printed stories that the German government was being asked by the Canadian government if the brigade could come,

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<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, see also draft by Dalton to Davis, 28 September 1951.

<sup>230</sup> NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 1-2, Various messages, Bonn to Ottawa and Ottawa to Bonn, October 1951.



the Germans were merely informed. There was nothing in the Canadian note to suggest otherwise. The decision to locate Canadian troops in Germany still rested with the Allied High Commission.<sup>231</sup>

When this information came out, the SPD opposition in the German Bundestag inquired if additional maintenance costs would be taken from the occupation budget. Adenauer's support for allied policies, and especially for the North Atlantic Treaty, came under attack. Various German political parties and newspapers representing different viewpoints examined Canadian policies with respect to the brigade carefully and used the information, or misinformation in some cases, to support or attack the whole western alliance as well as to further German national interests.<sup>232</sup>

General Simonds, Brigadier Moncel and T.C. Davis spoke with Kirkpatrick about the legal status of Canadian troops. Kirkpatrick revealed that the German authorities were in the process of negotiating contractual arrangements for the occupation forces and that these very issues, occupation status and financial arrangements, were great bones

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<sup>231</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 1-2, Various memos between the Departments of National Defence and External Affairs, including advice from the legal division of External Affairs, the Judge Advocate General and the Deputy Minister of National Defence. The fluid situation in Germany made it difficult for the Canadian government to provide advice.

<sup>232</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 1.1, Including analyses of various German newspapers.

of contention.<sup>233</sup> Several French diplomats in particular and other allies generally worried that the Canadian example was internationally embarrassing to them and set a bad precedent.<sup>234</sup> Essentially, both the British and the French wanted the Germans to continue to pay for the presence of occupation forces in Germany and were reluctant to have the Germans re-arm. The Germans were simply not yet trusted allies.<sup>235</sup>

Kirkpatrick prepared a joint press release which the Canadians refused to sign as it deliberately obfuscated the non-occupation force status of the Canadian troops, which was a key element in Canadian policy. On this issue, Canadians were clear and they held firm.<sup>236</sup> The Canadian government had not adequately consulted its allies on these issues nor had its allies thought to provide it with background information which might

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<sup>233</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 1.1. Message from T.C. Davis to L.B. Pearson, 13 October 1951, pt. 1.2, Message from T.C. Davis to L.B. Pearson, 17 October 1951.

<sup>234</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 1.2 - from Alex Ross to Drury, the Deputy Minister of National Defence, 26 October 1951 and pt. 2-3, from Defence Liaison, to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 14 October 1952. A year later, French officials still worried about independent Canadian actions and the possibility that Canadian direct negotiation with the Germans might affect them.

<sup>235</sup> Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG. Nuclear strategies and forces for Europe, 1949-2000*, and Leffler, *Preponderance of Power*, pp. 446-462. The French were not content with proposals for the equality of Germans in a European defence organization. When the Americans did not threaten to use nuclear force to rescue beleaguered French forces at Dien Bien Phu, French discontent grew. These events contributed to the eventual development of an independent French nuclear force.

<sup>236</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 1.2, T.C. Davis to L.B. Pearson, 17 October 1951, para. 17.

have alleviated the difficulties which continued.<sup>237</sup> The crux of the problem was dissension among the Three Powers and especially differences between the Americans and Europeans with respect to the timing of German re-armament and integration into the western alliance.

Difficulties between the allies were further complicated by poor communications between the Canadian Departments of External Affairs and National Defence. Heeney apologetically told Davis that:

The interested members of this Department were entirely preoccupied with the NATO Council meeting during the week commencing September 15th ...[and]... The Department did not have advance notice of Mr. Claxton's release of September 18th, or for that matter of the final decision to deploy the brigade in the U.K. Zone of Germany. <sup>238</sup>

The NATO meeting in Ottawa had begun the task of examining in detail the financial capacities of each of the NATO nations under the Temporary Council Committee (TCC) known as the "Twelve Apostles". The TCC had an inner group as its Executive Council consisting of Averell Harriman of the United States, Sir Edwin Plowden of the United

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<sup>237</sup>*Ibid.* A series of confusing telegrams went back and forth between T.C. Davis and Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, during October of 1951. Pearson sent instructions to Davis based on the mistaken assumption that the High Commission would soon relinquish its responsibilities for defence. These were received in Bonn on 14 October. T.C. Davis had just finished providing Pearson with a telegram stating that the German Government was "without competence and that under any future arrangements it would remain debarred from dealing with defence forces located within its territory." and so he could not follow the instructions provided.

<sup>238</sup>*Ibid.*, Heeney to Davis, 15 October 1951.

Kingdom and Jean Monnet of France, who were known as the "Three Wise Men".<sup>239</sup>

This financial exercise was intended to create more equitable burden sharing. The Minister of Finance, Douglas Abbott, served as the Canadian representative. This group was just beginning to lay the ground work for arrangements for the sharing of NATO expenses, including specific matters which would affect the brigade's position. The Canadian troops were sent to Europe before the details on financial matters were worked out.

There had been some communication difficulties between the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence during the autumn of 1951, but Heeney and Pearson were well aware that Claxton had communicated with General Simonds on 11 October reserving the Canadian government's right to further consideration with respect to the use of their troops rather than to acquiesce in assuming occupation status and they agreed with Claxton in principle.<sup>240</sup>

Pearson personally wrote to Davis at the end of October to request that the Occupation Statute be revised rather than allow the appellation "occupation forces" to be used for the Canadian brigade even for a few months. He and others still expected that the

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<sup>239</sup>James Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, 291-292. Note that this group was the first NATO group to be called the "Three Wise Men". This term was used again for a group including Pearson in 1957, as noted in Chapter one.

<sup>240</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt.1.1, Heeney to Pearson, 12 October 1951, with Mike Pearson handwritten annotations noting that "this is going to be a very tricky business". Pearson and Claxton met together to discuss the matter before the Cabinet meeting later on.

Occupation Statute would be abolished very shortly, but the term "occupation force" had become a matter of importance . <sup>241</sup>

In part, the Canadians wished to avoid unpleasant tasks associated with occupation forces like prison duty at Werl which were bad for military morale and for relations with the Germans and, in part, the issue seemed to have become a matter of establishing an independent Canadian policy with respect to Germany. It was noted by Charles Ritchie that Canadian soldiers would be subject not to German laws, but to those of the Allied High Commission. <sup>242</sup> It was up to the Three Powers governing Germany to approve of the presence of foreign troops on German soil. Although Canadians made much of not being occupation forces, it was through a clause in the Allied High Commission Law No. 69 that on 24 December 1951 Canadians were finally given legal authority to serve, some weeks after the first troops arrived. While the Brigade had no occupation force duties, it enjoyed the same status as occupation forces with respect to rights and immunities. <sup>243</sup>

In the midst of these difficulties in early October, Davis had written to Arnold Heeney:

Let me say that there are very few Englishmen over here ... who seem to have

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<sup>241</sup>*Ibid.*, Pearson to Davis, 30 October 1951.

<sup>242</sup>*Ibid.*, Ritchie to Drury, 25 October 1951.

<sup>243</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40 pt. 2-2, Memorandum from T.C. Davis to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, re: Visit to Germany of Canadian Ministers of Finance and Justice, 4 Feb 1952 and NA, RG 25, Volume 6632 File 11381-40 , pt. 3-2.

any knowledge of the constitutional changes which have taken place in Commonwealth relations in recent years. To most of them Canada is still a colony. I think that perhaps this conception may be a bit stronger in the army than elsewhere..... This way of thinking may have some repercussions ... because of the tendencies of British Army personnel, unless a very close relationship is established between this Mission and the Canadian Brigade <sup>244</sup>

As a result, Davis asked that it be made clear that "this is a Canadian force created and provided for by Canada". He noted that the RCAF was meticulous in keeping him advised on various matters, but that the Army had not been so careful. Finally he summed up that " It is through our Department and through it alone that the official voice of Canada speaks to the German Government. Only in that way can we speak with a single voice, and I foresee and fear great trouble if the Department of Defence followed its tendency to 'go it alone'. "<sup>245</sup>

Heeney followed up on Davis' concerns and met with C.M. Drury, the Deputy Minister of National Defence, and General Simonds to discuss coordination. Simonds was preparing command instructions for Geoffrey Walsh, the commander of the first brigade group, and felt that political matters should be contained in a separate document. Simonds mentioned the possibility that the brigade might be simply placed at the

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<sup>244</sup>*Ibid.*, Davis to Heeney, 2 October 1951.

<sup>245</sup>*Ibid.*

disposal of General Eisenhower; however, this arrangement did not come to fruition.<sup>246</sup>

Concerns about the complex diplomatic relationships required lengthy supplementary instructions to be prepared for the brigadier. These instructions covered the political situation in Germany and ensured that the Ambassador in Bonn was involved in all matters with political or public relations aspects.<sup>247</sup> Every subsequent brigadier received a similar set of instructions and the Ambassador in Bonn remained a key individual with respect to relations with the Three Powers and the Germans.<sup>248</sup>

The supplementary instructions addressed the thorny and confusing relations with the

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<sup>246</sup>While Eisenhower had recommended the placement of the brigade, approval of the decision rested with the Canadian government as Davis had insisted be mentioned in the British announcement on this subject.

<sup>247</sup>*Ibid.*, see various memoranda, but especially, W. H. Wershof to the Under-Secretary, noting that "something like this was in the directive to C.M.H.Q., London, in the last war." 3 October 1951 and Heeney's handwritten note on the memorandum suggesting it was a good short summary for discussion with Simmonds [sic] and Drury.

<sup>248</sup>This same issue had arisen for troops located in Britain during the Second World War. See: C.P. Stacey, *Six Years of War. The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific*, Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, 1987, pp. 67, 74-5, 212- 215 especially p. 214 which defines the relationship of the High Commissioner for Canada with the Canadian Military Headquarters. The High Commissioner was the channel for all communications on policy and the Canadian Military Headquarters was directed to keep him advised on all military matters as required. See also Brereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, William C. Johnston, and William G.P. Rawling, *The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Volume III*, Ottawa, National Defence Headquarters, 1995, pp. 25-27, 92-93 - similarly noting that on all matters of policy communications were to be through the High Commissioner to or from the Department of National Defence in Ottawa. The tension between the British and the Canadians over control of Canadian forces in fact comprises a fair amount of the text of both books.

FRG. As just demonstrated, the Three Powers did not agree on the details and the timing of German rearmament. Canadians continued to operate under the impression that the occupation would end soon and the following clause was inserted in the instructions to the brigadier:

At the conclusion of the tripartite meetings in Washington in September 1951, the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States and France announced that they had agreed to the negotiation of mutually acceptable arrangements with the German Federal Republic which would completely transform the existing relationships with Germany. The guiding principle was described as "integration on the basis of equality within a European community, itself included in a developing Atlantic community" - a development which would be "inconsistent with the retention in future of occupation status or of the powers to interfere in the Federal Republic's domestic affairs." <sup>249</sup>

The principle of equality for Germans continued to be mentioned in the supplementary instructions prepared for the brigadier until well into the 1960s. Yet there was no question that the brigade's presence in Germany was in itself an intrusion into German domestic affairs. The supplementary instructions clearly indicated that the brigade's presence and other Canadian policies were intended to assist in the integration of Germany into the western alliance. This stance was direct support for Adenauer and the Christian Democratic Party. By sending troops to Germany, the Canadian government was strengthening those elements in Germany most sympathetic to the

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<sup>249</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 1.2, "Letter of Guidance", 27 October 1951. Note that this particular clause was still being repeated in May of 1954, see pt. 3., Supplementary instructions to Brigadier W.A.B. Anderson.



western alliance and St. Laurent, Pearson, Claxton, other cabinet ministers and the bureaucrats certainly knew it.<sup>250</sup>

The Three Powers did not follow through on proposed changes with respect to Germany until 1955 and even then the terms under which Germany joined NATO could hardly be considered equal in military matters.<sup>251</sup> The FRG did not have a general staff until the end of the Cold War and it was the only military force compelled to operate only within the NATO framework. In addition, Germany had no say over the use of nuclear weapons located on its own territory. Germany's nuclear weapons policy was in contrast to that of Britain and France, which both developed an independent nuclear capability denied the FRG.<sup>252</sup>

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<sup>250</sup>The CDU formed the elected government of the FRG and so this intrusion may be perceived as being with the tacit approval of the German people, though the various legal negotiations on the status of forces lasted for so long. For statements by politicians, see various House of Commons *Debates* on the entry of the FRG into NATO in late 1954 and early 1955. In particular, the Minister of National Defence, Ralph Campney, made an address from Parliament Hill on 30 January 1955 to be broadcast on the radio. He quoted Pearson saying "if Herr Adenauer and the German leaders of today had been in power in 1914 and 1939, we would likely have avoided two world wars." Campney went on to discuss Canada's role in NATO, associating the troop contribution with closer and more cooperative relations with the FRG. DHH, 72/918, Brooke Claxton's speeches, including Ralph Campney and George Pearkes.

<sup>251</sup>Abenheim, *Re-Forging the Iron Cross*, pp. 165-174- noting the hostility in Germany to re-armament and domestic constraints facing Adenauer and Theodor Blank, his Minister of National Defence. See also: Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG. Nuclear strategies and forces for Europe, 1949-2000* pp. 124-126.

<sup>252</sup>Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and The FRG*, various sections. Both Britain and France sought to balance dependence upon the Americans and this motivation accounted for much of the investment in an independent nuclear capability.

The issues went well beyond nuclear weapons and addressed potential military development. Soviet and Western intelligence experts and military scholars studied the German military experience very closely to see what had made them so successful in warfare and to incorporate elements of this success into their own militaries. The German staff system, official training, doctrine, scientific and technological developments were areas where the German experience was influential in contributing to Soviet and Western military developments during the Cold War.<sup>253</sup> From the military perspective, including Canada's military, the German forces had epitomized a military ideal; they were admired and even emulated, but they would not be allowed to recreate the system which had earlier threatened Europe.<sup>254</sup>

In early 1952, the terms under which Germany would eventually be integrated into the western alliance were not obvious to Canadians, to Germans nor to anyone else. Canada's Minister of Finance, D.C. Abbott, and its Minister of Justice, Stuart Garson, and a group of Canadians, including John Deutsch, Gordon Blair and several members of Parliament, visited Germany early in 1952. They emphasized that the French, the Americans, the British, the Belgians, the Norwegians and the Danes stayed in Germany

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<sup>253</sup>John A. English *Marching through Chaos. The descent of Armies in Theory and Practice*. The footnotes for both Chapters three and four for example list numerous American and Soviet studies of German practices.

<sup>254</sup>Abenheim, *Re-forging the Iron Cross. The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces*, pp. 72-73. Abenheim in fact argues that a German army recruited in 1951 might not have accepted the liberal democratic society of post war Germany and might have lived outside of the constitutional framework of the FRG. While only a few years are involved, the FRG and liberal democracy were very young in 1951.

as occupation forces. The Canadians were defenders of the German soil and the German people. These were delicate words.<sup>255</sup> By now it was evident to everyone that the Three Powers controlled the decision-making through the Allied High Commission.

Even so, Canadians made what they could of public relations with the Germans. Abbott went on to say that Canadians paid their own way and occupied a favourable position.<sup>256</sup> In fact, the Canadian government was responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of facilities, but the buildings themselves were financed through occupation funds at no cost to Canada.<sup>257</sup> Copies of Abbott's speeches were translated and distributed to the German press. As Davis addressed the arriving troops, he expressed the hope that Canadians might be instrumental in getting West German support for NATO.<sup>258</sup> Equality of treatment was an important aspect of this plan.

While Abbott might be mincing his words, statements about the need to build up friendship and good will were not just for public relations. In private and even secret correspondence, these were stressed all the more.<sup>259</sup> Canadians were attempting to

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<sup>255</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, file 11381-40, pt. 2.2 - Memorandum from T.C. Davis to L.B. Pearson, 4 January 1952.

<sup>256</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>257</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>258</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>259</sup>Examples may be found in NA, MG 26, N 1, Pearson fonds as well as RG 25, various files cited in this chapter.

establish an independent policy for their brigade which would allow Germans to distinguish them from occupation forces, but they wished no disadvantage in comparison with other forces located in Germany. The Canadian Government formed an Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee on the Status of Canadian Forces in Germany to examine the issues of the legal status of the forces and the financial arrangements. Canada's position was difficult as the Convention had been created to meet the requirements of the Three Powers. If Canada assumed the status of a "Power Concerned", it would be in the same category as Denmark or Norway, which were fully dependent upon the Three Powers, while Canada was committed to pay maintenance costs of forces in Germany.<sup>260</sup> In essence, Canadians were willing to pay for some element of independence.

By 1952, there were a series of agreements, including the "Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany" with supplementary conventions on the status of foreign forces, the German financial contribution, and related matters.<sup>261</sup> When, in May 1954, the occupation of Germany continued long after Canadians had thought it would have ended, the supplementary instructions to Brigadier Anderson prepared by the Department of External Affairs reflected the Canadian diplomatic stance:

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<sup>260</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 19903, File 5-DND/12, Report to Ministers by an Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee on the Status of Canadian Forces in Germany, Appendix A attached to Memorandum for Cabinet Defence Committee, November 1952.

<sup>261</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 3, noted in Supplementary Instructions for W.A.B. Anderson, 21 May 1954.

Whatever the technical legal position may be, the important fact is that the Brigade is not stationed in Germany as an occupation force. At the same time, Canadian forces stationed in Germany have enjoyed all rights and privileges of the occupation forces and you should be wary of repeating too often that it is not part of the occupation....

...your attitude in dealing with the Germans should be based on the fact that Germany is an important potential ally... It is important that this position be understood by all ranks under your command and particularly by those who may deal directly with the Germans.<sup>262</sup>

Canadians had an independent diplomatic policy with respect to Germany and they expected the brigade in Germany to assist in implementing this policy in terms of community relations.<sup>263</sup>

Later in October 1954, the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Republic of Germany became the legal basis for Canadian forces in Germany as negotiations continued even after Germany joined NATO.<sup>264</sup> In August of 1959, Canada signed a supplementary agreement, but Germany was not able to accede to SOFA until the ratification of the supplementary agreement by the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands. These countries had still not ratified the agreement in the summer of 1962, though the terms of the agreement were considered to be necessary

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<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>263</sup> Chapter five will address the actual implementation of this policy at the brigade level.

<sup>264</sup> NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 3, Supplementary Instructions to Brigadier R. Rowley, 6 September 1955.

in view of the fact that Germany was a "forward zone" and forces might be required to act very quickly in an emergency.<sup>265</sup>

In terms of the deployment of forces, SACEUR reported directly to the NATO Military Committee which represented all the NATO nations, and not a particular government, so he had some freedom with respect to the forces under his command.<sup>266</sup>

Nonetheless, Canadians made it clear that no part of the brigade group was to be separated from it without consultation. While both Foulkes and Wilgress thought that SACEUR might have the right to deploy the brigade to West Berlin, for example, the question of the placement of the troops remained one which the Canadian government reserved for consultation. The Canadian government in Foulkes' s view, "must reserve the right to be responsible for the general welfare and safe conduct of its troops generally."<sup>267</sup> In peacetime, any redeployment of forces was to be in consultation with

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<sup>265</sup>Kardex.112.046(d12), Supplementary Instructions to the Commander 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, 18 July 1962. When more logistical and administrative support was required with the implementation of forward defence, Canadian Base Units Europe was formed to assist in the provision of support beyond the Canadian Brigade Group and to liaise with NATO Headquarters, British and other national authorities for the maintenance of the Brigade Group. The new command instructions issued in June of 1963 indicated that the legal agreement had still not been ratified. See NA, RG 25, Volume 7626, File 11381-40, pt. 4.2, Command Instructions to Commander Canadian Base Units Europe and Commander 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, 7 June 1963.

<sup>266</sup>North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Facts and Figures*, pp. 337-344.

<sup>267</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 2.3, Redeployment of Canadian Forces assigned to SACEUR, position of the Canadian Government, 16 June 1952. The incident at Kojima Island in Korea where Canadian troops had been redeployed to guard Prisoners of War without consultation with the Canadian government had resulted in a

the appropriate "National Authorities ".<sup>268</sup>

Canadian policies and attitudes towards Germany and the possible deployment of troops shifted gradually.<sup>269</sup> On 22 October 1951, as the first Canadian troops were leaving for Germany, Pearson addressed the Canadian House of Commons: "We welcome the progress that has been made toward the closer association of Western Germany with the free world, both at the political level and in terms of German participation in European defence." Yet he added a cautionary note: "No encouragement should be given to tendencies in Germany to ... obtaining unconditional guarantees of security or for assuring that almost any price would be paid for German assistance in Western defence."<sup>270</sup> These would be words to consider carefully years later when Canadians were pressured to provide greater resources for forward defence on the broad German plains.<sup>271</sup> Canadians were willing to contribute to NATO, but there were limits to their involvement from the beginning.

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series of memos with respect to the Brigade. The Brigade Commanders' instructions already contained specific details about maintaining the principle of the separate entity of the Canadian forces.

<sup>268</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>269</sup> See for example, Leigh E. Sarty, "The Limits of Internationalism: Canada and the Soviet Blockade of Berlin, 1948-1949" in *Nearly Neighbours. Canada and the Soviet Union: from Cold War to Détente and Beyond*, edited by J.L. Black and Norman Hillmer, Kingston, Ont.: Ronald P. Frye, 1988. Sarty argues that "high handed actions by allies loomed larger than the Soviet threat".

<sup>270</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 4293, File 10935-B-40, pt. 1, Relations between Canada and Germany, 30 October 1951.

<sup>271</sup>See Chapter three.

Yet St. Laurent, Pearson and Heeney were clearly aware as the Canadian troops were leaving Canada for Europe that, in an emergency, there might be little time for consultation with the Canadian Parliament or even the Canadian government in some circumstances. In late October, Heeney prepared a note for St. Laurent indicating: " the Canadian Unit [brigade group] might have to go into action in a matter of hours on the authority of the Government or of General Eisenhower or, conceivably, purely on the authority of the Commanding Officer as a measure of self-defence." <sup>272</sup> St. Laurent and Pearson decided not to discuss the matter with the House of Commons or in the Cabinet Defence Committee, but to prepare a statement to be used in the House for answering potential questions. The statement indicated that Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty committed Canada to regard an attack upon any member of the treaty as an attack against them all and that in the event of a surprise attack, the forces would have to react very quickly.

The Canadian government supported the Three Power declaration of 22 October 1954 that they would "treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack on their forces and themselves" and it also endorsed the NATO declaration of the 16 December 1958, that:

...the member States could not approve a solution of the Berlin question which jeopardized the right of the three Western powers to remain in Berlin as long as their responsibilities required it and did not assure freedom of communication

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<sup>272</sup>NA, MG 26, N1, Volume 5, Pearson, L.B., Nominal Files, Pre-1958, Heeney, A.D. P., Canada-External Affairs, 1946-57, Heeney to the Prime Minister, 29 October 1951.



between that city and the free world.<sup>273</sup>

Although the possibility of an emergency situation was recognized, the Canadian government reserved the right to judge for itself the *casus foederis* and how best to meet an attack.<sup>274</sup>

The Canadian brigade was deemed to be "serving together" with the British forces in the Northern Army Group rather than "in combination" with them under section 6(4) (a) of the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act of 1933, though in an emergency it might be placed "in combination" with the British.<sup>275</sup> These legal terms affected disciplinary and administrative matters and were similar to conditions established during the Second World War.<sup>276</sup> In addition, no limit was placed upon the brigadier's direct

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<sup>273</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 3489, File 6-A-GER-1949/, Memorandum to Cabinet. Germany and Berlin. 1 July 1961. It was also recognized in this document that military measures to demonstrate preparedness and determination to maintain freedom of access to Berlin might involve Canadian forces in Europe and NORAD.

<sup>274</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>275</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 3, Command Instructions to Brigadier R. Rowley, 6 September 1955, para. 12. This clause had implications for military law as while "serving together", each nation's own law applied to its own forces. In combination, each nation's own law also applied to its own forces, but the combined force commander had the authority to convene and confirm the findings and sentences of courts martial.

<sup>276</sup>C.P. Stacey, *Six Years of War. The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific*, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1955, pp. 67, 74-5, 212-215 and Brereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, William C. Johnston and William G.P. Rawling, *The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Volume III*, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1994, pp. 24-7, 92-93.

channel of communication on any matter with the Chief of the General Staff. Copies of these instructions were provided not only to all concerned Canadians, but also to the War Office and to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). <sup>277</sup>

In 1962, the brigadier was asked to inform the Ambassador of "any major problems resulting from your relations with the Commander, Northern Army Group, or with the German authorities or public" as difficulties with respect to plans for the Canadian brigade in the late 1950s had come to head.<sup>278</sup> This was followed by the usual instructions to ensure that "the officers and men under your command should maintain the best possible relations with the officers and men of the various allied forces in Germany and particularly with those who make up the Northern Army Group [which was mostly British]. <sup>279</sup> The relations with British forces were often cooperative, but conflict and tensions arose.<sup>280</sup>

Though the legal arrangements for the brigade specified that it was to enjoy all the privileges and rights of other forces, contractual agreements and policies varied among

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<sup>277</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>278</sup> Kardex, 112.045(d12) Supplementary Instructions to Command Instructions to the Commander 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, 18 July 1962. See Chapter three for a discussion of the problems. Brigadier Michael Dare did in fact communicate these problems to John Starnes, but there is some indication that previous brigadiers had been impeded from discussing plans with the Ambassador or with the CGS.

<sup>279</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>280</sup> For example, Chapter three illustrates the tension between the British and Canadians with respect to the brigade's role and the Canadian push for more influence.

the forces stationed in Germany. The most evident difference for Canadian soldiers in the early years was that their families were not officially accompanying them. Davis had pointed out that Canadian "wives, for example, will see their British counterparts very comfortably housed and looked after while they will find it difficult to find a place to live, and impossible to keep up with occupation society unless they are extremely well-to-do".<sup>281</sup> Through the occupation funds, the British soldiers received family rations, and other ranks from sergeant and above and all officers had free domestic service until 1957 when the British government cut back on expenditures as a result of lower payments from the Germans.<sup>282</sup> The Canadians had none of this available to them.

The class system in Europe was far more evident than in Canadian society; British officers had considerable privilege and better facilities than those available to other ranks.<sup>283</sup> Canadian servicemen in Canada had far less differentiation between officers and other ranks. The British requested that the brigade adopt British scales of housing in Germany.<sup>284</sup> Claxton wrote a very detailed memorandum to Simonds after his visit to

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<sup>281</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 1.1, Despatch No. 760, Davis to Pearson, 2 October 1951.

<sup>282</sup>Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), Cabinet Records, (hereafter CAB) CAB 129/82, C.P. (56) 157, Forces conditions of service in Germany, 27 June 1956.

<sup>283</sup>The term "men" is also used here to distinguish officers from men. The generic term servicemen includes both officers and men.

<sup>284</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 19903, Brigadier Pangman to T.C. Davis, 31 May 1953 - "The Americans embarrassed them [the British] considerably by accepting a single standard for all ranks thereby weakening the bargaining argument with the Germans. ...[they] are most anxious that we keep to their scales of housing."

Germany in April of 1953, noting with much bitterness that the barracks had fifteen men to a room, according to the British standard rather than the two or three that he had requested. He indicated that he had hoped for a "Canadian atmosphere" for the troops in Soest.<sup>285</sup> Simonds had opposed expenditures on these items and evidently much had been built to the British scale. The British Army of the Rhine was in charge of construction and they were using occupation funds.<sup>286</sup>

The British Army opposed the building of two chapels - one Roman Catholic and one Protestant - per camp as plans proceeded for the move of the brigade from Hannover\* where it was first located in 1951 south to Soest in 1952-1953. The two chapel plan was finally approved in view of the strong religious feelings in Canada on this matter.<sup>287</sup> While negotiations at the political level were fairly smooth, even items which had been promised could be difficult to get. Canadian Army officers had to negotiate with the British Army of the Rhine for British approval of items which had already been ordered by the Canadian Department of National Defence and then they often had to negotiate further to actually have the items delivered to the camps. Such requisitions as fly

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<sup>285</sup> Kardex, 112.1(D99) Claxton to Simonds, 30 April 1953.

<sup>286</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 3, Notes of the Adenauer visit, 9 April 1953.

<sup>287</sup>Kardex, 112.1(d148) From Hq 1 Cdn Inf Bde Gp to CANARMY (QMG), 26 January 1954. The estimated cost of the 8 chapels was three million deutschmarks. \* Note that the spelling of Hannover is consistent with British and Canadian documents of the time and not the current North American spelling "Hanover".

screens for windows became the subject of prolonged and frustrating wrangling.<sup>288</sup> In a piece of very sharp dealing, the British also handled all financial exchanges for Canadian soldiers. Canadian soldiers received 12 Deutschmarks per pound rather than the preferred rate of 40 Deutschmarks per pound which was available to others. Canadian soldiers had no legal access to direct exchange and the Canadian officer who complained about this policy was told it was simply not his concern.<sup>289</sup> This matter was eventually regulated.

There were many incidents between British and Canadian soldiers over the years. While friendships and marriages resulted from British and Canadian interactions, there were also some nasty fights which sometimes were reported in local papers.<sup>290</sup> Relations between the Canadian and the British at the hospital in Iserlohn were strained for various reasons. Canadian civilians used the hospital, but were charged for the use and sometimes did not make payments. British civilians received treatment without payment. Canadian rations were better, creating a morale problem for the British in hospital so all patients received the British rations.<sup>291</sup> The British beef was too fat, the

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<sup>288</sup>*Ibid.*, The British continued to insist that fly screens were not justified and that screening could be carried out gradually. The Canadians particularly emphasized the need for these for messes and medical facilities. There was quite a bit of correspondence on this issue.

<sup>289</sup>Kardex, 112.1(D97)Memorandum for Mr. Davis from A.J. A. (?) 22 January 1952.

<sup>290</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 3, C.M. Drury to R.A. MacKay, the Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 21 June 1955.

<sup>291</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 19912, DND/Army 16-1, Volume 1, Goldsmith to Alex Ross, 10 January 1955.

potatoes too small, and the bread too stale. The hospital remained an unhappy place in the nineteen sixties with much quarrelling among the British and Canadian staff.<sup>292</sup>

In 1963, three troopers of the Fort Garry Horse, a unit which was stationed in Iserlohn, were beaten up by an organized group of British soldiers. One was very badly injured.<sup>293</sup> While the British and Canadians took precautions with more patrolling of pubs to avoid further violence, there was a serious fight between the units in the local pub several nights later with more hospitalization of soldiers. The local press did not play up the "incidents" between the British and Canadian soldiers and the military police patrols of both were stepped up again.<sup>294</sup> Violence continued. One young lieutenant serving with the Garrys during this time indicated that the quality of life for the single soldier was bleak. The Garrys were in a urban setting unlike the other Canadian camps which were located in more rural areas. In a British garrison town, like Iserlohn, the atmosphere was one of gang warfare. Pubs were within walking distance and there were few other options available to soldiers without cars when they wished to seek relaxation when off-

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<sup>292</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 10971, from Kardex 260c4.009 series transfer, (d36), Canadians complained that the British nursing staff blamed them whenever articles went missing regardless of evidence. When the Canadian government approved a new Canadian flag and requested that it be flown at Iserlohn, the British officer in charge of the hospital replied that he did not think the flag should be flown as a symbol of mutual cooperation until mutual cooperation existed. Colonel Kerr, Commander officer to CO BMH Iserlohn, in reply to the British memorandum of 8 March 1965.

<sup>293</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 22460, CBUE 1690-1, Volume 2, Major F.E. Caza to Canadian Army, 11 May 1963.

<sup>294</sup>*Ibid.*, Various messages from CAN ARMY to 4 CIBG and 4CIBG to CAN ARMY, 11, 13, 14, May 1963.

duty.<sup>295</sup>

This evidence of difficulties between the British and the Canadians provides some context for the analysis of German-Canadian problems which had a greater impact upon public relations than these skirmishes. Canada and Britain were extremely close allies in these years and Canadian soldiers had served with British soldiers before. Chapter five will continue with analysis of the quality of life for Canadian soldiers and their families, but here it is important to note the existence of problems for individual soldiers because of diplomatic, legal and financial arrangements made at a high level. Arrangements at the highest levels filtered down and profoundly affected the life of each serving soldier and officer and each dependent as well.

By 1964, the British received about one-third of the total cost of maintaining the brigade from the Canadian government as they continued to supply many of the items required for the brigade. These were useful Canadian dollars for the British government which had experienced severe exchange difficulties in the late 1940s and 1950s and again in 1964.<sup>296</sup> British imperial defence commitments and financial difficulties affected their

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<sup>295</sup>Interview with Major Robert Caldwell (retd.), 31 March 1999.

<sup>296</sup>In 1964, the British imposed a 15 percent emergency surcharge on imports due to an exchange crisis. They exempted many Canadian agricultural imports, but other sectors were affected. See Donald Forster, "The National Economy" in *Canadian Annual Review for 1964*, edited by John Saywell, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965.

ability to meet NATO military commitments and some conflict was likely.<sup>297</sup> The British government was also aware by the late 1950s that the British Army requests for various privileges in Germany led other NATO nations to question British arguments about financial problems.<sup>298</sup> Similarly, the relatively high standard of living in Canada meant that many other NATO nations, including Britain and Germany, felt the Canadians could do more. NATO members tended to discount continental defence expenditures.<sup>299</sup>

The actual decision to locate the Canadian brigade with the British Army of the Rhine was clearly influenced by the need to balance American dominance, but this factor had not been decisive. The Canadian government's consultation with Eisenhower resulted in a recommendation only.<sup>300</sup> It was the Canadian Parliament which approved the decision to place Canadian troops in the British zone. Canada's policy with respect to

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<sup>297</sup>Michael Chichester and John Wilkinson, *The Uncertain Ally. British Defence Policy, 1960-1990*, Aldershot, Hampshire: Gower, 1982, pp. 3-7.

<sup>298</sup>PRO, CAB 129/82, C.P. (56) 157, Forces conditions of service in Germany, 27 June 1956.

<sup>299</sup>James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada. Growing Up Allied*, pp. 273-318.

<sup>300</sup>See Kardex 112.1(d96) from DEFENSOR to Secretary, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., For Taber from CGS, "General Eisenhower has recommended the positioning of 27 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group in the Northern Sector of Central Europe in association with British cma [comma] Netherlands and Belgian land forces... This recommendation was based primarily on the requirements of the military situation which calls for a strengthening of the position on the northern flank of the Ruhr". Note that the term recommendation used here varies with the interpretation put forward by Bercuson in "The Return of the Canadians to Europe: Britannia Rules the Rhine" and supports the interpretation originally made by James Eayrs in *Growing up Allied*.



the legal status of the brigade demonstrates well how foreign policy goals were influential in military decision-making. The refusal to take on occupation duties related as much to maintaining an independent Canadian stance as it did to improving Canadian-German relations. Both factors were important and German and Canadian officials used the stance to maximum public relations advantage.

The Three Powers and NATO officially promoted the eventual re-armament of Germany and its integration into the western alliance. T.C. Davis and other officials hoped that Canada's refusal to take on occupation duties or status might allow Canada to be more instrumental in Germany's integration. The inclusion of lengthy supplementary instructions, including specific directions on the behaviour of troops towards Germans, was recognition that beyond the military role of defending territory, Canadian troops might affect German public opinion even if the numbers of troops were small. But from the beginning, it was apparent that the Three Powers, with far larger numbers of troops and with the continuation of the occupation status, held the authority, regulated the timing of change and made the decisions.

In summary, Canada had to operate within the legal international framework which existed in Europe. It could not pursue a bilateral agreement with the FRG with respect to troops in Germany. Yet, the brigade achieved a non-occupation status and it still enjoyed all the rights and privileges of the occupation forces so a measure of independence was established within the framework. The brigadier was to keep open lines of communication with the Ambassador in Bonn and the Chief of the General

Staff. Apart from the maintenance of good public relations in Germany, these measures were also intended to ensure that the Canadian government remained well informed on plans for the brigade.

In Chapter three, the effectiveness of these measures will be examined. The Canadian government had carefully guarded what sovereignty it could over its forces; however, there were still formidable problems facing high ranking Canadian army officers concerned with plans for the brigade.<sup>301</sup> The decision to locate the brigade with the British and to use the British logistics system had consequences for Canadian planning and independence. Chapter three will focus upon the dichotomy between strategy and military operations.

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<sup>301</sup>Geoffrey Ashcroft, *Military Logistics Systems in NATO: The Goal of Integration, Part I, Economic Aspects*, Adelphi Papers, No. 62, London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969. In this analysis which seems in part a reply to the Canadian decision to relocate south and use the American logistical system, Ashcroft notes that the British acted as a supplier and the Canadians as a customer. The initial set up meant that even in the 1960s, Canadians contracted for German labour through the British line and that Canadians did not shop around to buy different support functions so that Canadians accepted some charges that might have been bettered elsewhere. p. 26.

### ***Chapter three. Shades of Hong Kong: The dichotomy of strategy and operations.***

As demonstrated in Chapters one and two, the Canadian government was seeking to expand markets in Europe and particular effort had been made in Germany. The promotion of stable economic conditions and the integration of Germany into a western European infrastructure were key elements in Canadian plans. These economic goals together with nuclear deterrence and a declining threat assessment provided a rationale for military policies and decisions.

While the focus of this chapter is the tension between strategy at highest level and planning at the tactical level, the complexity of Canadian motivations and the difficulty of formulating clear military objectives in the face of international changes beyond national control are factors which impeded the resolution of certain problems. The problems included unrealistic tactics, inadequate logistical and combat support, as well as lack of manpower and equipment. The difficulties were certainly recognized at the time. There was no consensus on the role of the brigade or even on a long term commitment of troops to Germany among high ranking Canadian army officers. This was a time for fertile consideration of alternatives. Individual officers did not hold fixed or unchanging viewpoints, but rather demonstrated fluidity and growth as they moved from one post to another and became familiar with new demands and the implications of growing German power and declining British influence in NATO.

In 1951, when Canadian NATO troops were first stationed in Germany, many analysts felt there was some possibility of a Soviet invasion of Europe in the next decade or so, but few predicted an attack before 1954. Given the existence of NATO and the demonstration of strong resolution it had made in sending additional forces to defend Europe, most British and American analysts hoped that the Soviet Union could be contained without warfare.<sup>302</sup> Yet General Dwight Eisenhower, the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and his deputy, Field-Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, noted that NATO had far too few troops to hope to defend Europe in the early 1950s.<sup>303</sup> Conventional military strength remained a foremost concern for NATO planners. Simonds, the Canadian CGS, actually expected imminent Soviet invasion in Europe during these early years.<sup>304</sup>

The Canadian government performed its own analyses and made its own decisions, but

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<sup>302</sup>Melvyn Leffler, *Preponderance of Power. National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War*, p. 511.

<sup>303</sup>Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower. Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, pp. 505-510 and Nigel Hamilton, *Monty. the Field-Marshal, 1944-1976*, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986, pp. 790-835.

<sup>304</sup>Kardex, 410B27.016(d1) Extracts of CGS Army Council meetings re fmns & emplt [formations and employment] of Cdn Bde Gp [Canadian Brigade Group] in Europe 1950/55, CGS conference no.133, 17 December 1951.

it relied heavily upon foreign intelligence and planning in this process.<sup>305</sup> The Korean conflict heightened the sense of urgency. Before men were sent overseas, Claxton set clear defence priorities. He believed that the Soviet Union was deliberately involving the western nations in Asia and that it was essential to recognize that Europe was the heart of the west.<sup>306</sup> L.B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, agreed. The choice of troops for Europe, even while the Korean Conflict was on-going, reflected this priority. While fighting in Korea was not intense or expected to result in high casualties, the Adjutant General, W.H.S. Macklin, recommended that units in Korea be left at less than full strength in order to provide strong support in Europe. Consideration was given to sending less than fully trained troops to Korea in order to ensure that the brigade in Europe had adequate men.<sup>307</sup> Korea was a sideshow.<sup>308</sup> This priority was in keeping with the close friendship with western Europe which St. Laurent identified as a fundamental underlying principle of Canadian foreign policy.

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<sup>305</sup> Such dependence was clearly articulated by both Liberal and Conservative administrations in defence annual reports. See: Canada. Department of National Defence, *Report on National Defence 1957*, (under Ralph Campney, the Liberal Minister of National Defence), Ottawa, Dept. of National Defence, 1957, pp.5-7 for an excellent summary of the situation. See also: Canada. Department of National Defence, *Defence 1959*, (under G.R. Pearkes, the Conservative Minister of National Defence), Ottawa: Dept. of National Defence, 1959, pp. 5-8.

<sup>306</sup> James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada. Growing up Allied*, pp. 206-7.

<sup>307</sup> Kardex file, 112.1.003(d34), Manpower and manpower ceiling. Memo from Macklin to CGS Simonds, 20 May 1952.

<sup>308</sup> DHH, 73/1223, file 434, Raymont collection, British global strategy file. Defence Policy and Global strategy, report by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, 9 July 1952.

By 1953, the British global strategy plan noted that "open aggression by the Chinese against the United Nations' forces in Korea made world war seem much more imminent." The British plan concluded that Korea was "an area of small strategic importance."<sup>309</sup> A. D. P. Heeney, the Head of the Canadian Delegation to the NATO Council and the OEEC, commenting upon the British plan, argued that "except for... an almost catastrophic contingency, a threat outside the NATO area is likely to be met by the larger NATO countries and a more probable implication for Canada would be, in such a case, an increase in her commitments within the NATO area to the extent that the larger countries were reducing their own commitments in that area."<sup>310</sup> As it turned out, by the late 1950s, the governments of France, Belgium, and Britain were preoccupied with colonial problems and they were unable to meet their NATO commitments; under these circumstances, Canada did come under pressure to increase its military commitment to Germany.

Before the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) became a member of NATO in 1955, NATO's emergency plans for the brigade were for a fighting withdrawal from the Weser river to the Rhine. A difficult operation with a likelihood of high casualties, such plans left most of West Germany in the hands of overwhelming Soviet forces.<sup>311</sup> It seemed

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<sup>309</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>310</sup> DHH, 73/1223, file 434, British Global Strategy, Memorandum from A.D.P. Heeney to the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, 24 February 1953.

<sup>311</sup> Hamilton, Nigel Monty. *The Field-Marshal, 1944-1976*, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986 ; Interview with G. Walsh, June 1997, RG 24, Volumes 18256-18259, War Diaries for 27 Brigade, 1951 to 1953. Please note the war diaries began in June in Canada when

likely that NATO forces could only hold the Rhine for a short time. If NATO relied on purely conventional forces, these forces would probably have to withdraw quickly from Europe.<sup>312</sup> Energy would then be concentrated upon a counter-offensive.

Almost from the moment of Hiroshima, nuclear deterrence theory had been articulated by such distinguished strategists as Bernard Brodie.<sup>313</sup> While not officially adopted by NATO until 1954, elements of it were evident in NATO's plans from the beginning.<sup>314</sup> The mere existence of the bomb created a significant deterrent. Yet, by 1951, two years after the first Soviet bomb was tested, the presence of occupation forces in Europe and the American bomb, were not enough. Conventional NATO forces in Europe were intended to send a clear message to Moscow. It is perhaps obvious that the commitment of even small numbers of foreign forces intended for the defence of western Europe would create a greater sense of security among the West Germans, who were after all not armed for battle in these early days and among Western

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the units were forming and training.

<sup>312</sup> Nigel Hamilton, *Monty. The Field-Marshal, 1944-1976*, pp. 806, 814, 824-8. Geoffrey Ashcroft, *Military Logistics Systems in NATO: The Goal of Integration, Part I, Economic Aspects*, Adelphi Papers, No. 62, London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969. These plans may have horrified Montgomery, the Deputy Supreme Commander, yet his own analysis of the weakness of NATO troops revealed the difficulty of defending Europe without the Germans.

<sup>313</sup> Bernard Brodie (ed.), *Absolute Weapon. Atomic Power and World Order*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946.

<sup>314</sup> Gregory W. Pedlow, *NATO Strategy Documents, 1949-1969*, Brussels: SHAPE, 1999, xi-xiii.

Europeans who were still recovering from the Second World War.<sup>315</sup> The creation of a military shield in Europe was intended to encourage economic growth and to allow integration in Western Europe to proceed with some confidence in a stable future. Claxton summed up the limitations of the tactical nuclear weapons which the Americans were considering for use to prevent the Soviets from crossing the Rhine.

At this time, very little weight seemed to be attached to the atomic bomb as a means of stopping [the Russians]. Probably this was the right concept because our side did not have enough ground forces to produce concentrations of the Russian troops which would make good targets for atomic weapons... it was unlikely that any country, still less all the countries, would be able to produce the ground and air force necessary to slow up a Russian advance seriously without atomic weapons. But I did find that it would be possible to build up strength to hold on long enough to bring atomic weapons into full play.<sup>316</sup>

The psychological significance of providing Canadian men on the ground overrode recognition that greater military value might be had by provision of equipment to other forces already located there.<sup>317</sup> Conventional forces existed to buy time and restore

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<sup>315</sup>Donald Abenheim, *Re-forging the Iron Cross. The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces*. This excellent work includes discussion of the secret defence planning undertaken under Adenauer before the army was formed. In addition, West Germany had some border patrols. Still, it could not be considered armed in any conventional sense. Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 462-3.

<sup>316</sup>NA, MG 32 B5, *Brooke Claxton Fonds*, unpublished memoirs, 1256-7, Claxton was writing about the period around 1950, just after the first ideas about tactical nuclear weapons arose in 1949, and when tactical thinking about these weapons was in its infancy.

<sup>317</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, *Canada's Defence Programme, 1951-2*, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1951, p. 14.



European confidence; nuclear weapons remained the ultimate sanction. This plan marked the beginnings of a game of bluff with the Soviets.

NATO staff created an emergency defence plan, but they concentrated upon medium term defence plans intended to be implemented in the mid-1950s.<sup>318</sup> Initially, NATO countries committed to extremely high conventional force goals: the Lisbon force goals, adopted in February 1952, provided for 50 divisions for NATO and by 1954, a total of 96 NATO divisions after ninety days of mobilization.<sup>319</sup> These numbers were gradually revised downwards as the threat assessment declined and as NATO formally adopted a strategy of nuclear deterrence in view of the actual forces available.<sup>320</sup> The role of Canadian troops became more comparable to a garrison role, though they trained for battle.<sup>321</sup>

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<sup>318</sup>*Ibid.* See Melvyn Leffler, *Preponderance of Power. National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, p. 499. "From the outset, George Kennan and Charles Bohlen believed that the Soviet Union was fundamentally weak and would not engage in premeditated aggression. Notwithstanding Soviet Russia's huge comparative military superiority over other Eurasian countries, either defeated or weakened by World War II, the men in the Kremlin were purported to have an enormous respect for America's superior war-making capabilities as well as its atomic monopoly." More extensive discussion of General Guy Simonds's expectation of imminent warfare is found in Chapter four of this thesis. See also Pedlow, *NATO Strategy Documents, 1949-1969*, xiv.

<sup>319</sup>Pedlow, xvii.

<sup>320</sup>North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Facts and Figures*, pp. 41, 215-6. These goals were for 50 divisions, 4,000 aircraft and strong naval forces by the end of 1952, with growing numbers available in 1953 and 1954.

<sup>321</sup>The term garrison has various military meanings. In this context, it implies a semi-permanent locale for the troops with a supporting structure and families. The troops were not intended to defend the garrison, but rather territory located close by. It was a symbol

The military historian, John A. English, asserts that "within five years of its formation, NATO had become hopelessly dependent on nuclear weapons".<sup>322</sup> The use of tactical nuclear weapons allowed all NATO nations to lower the numbers of conventional forces they had initially intended to supply to NATO.<sup>323</sup> During the early 1960s, the NATO strategy of forward defence gradually filtered down to the operational level for the British Army of the Rhine, including the Canadian brigade. British cutbacks, combined with the adoption of tactical nuclear weapons and the gradual implementation of forward defence, resulting in a highly unrealistic operational role for nearly all troops on the broad German plains.<sup>324</sup>

Canadian officers with Second World War experience were far from happy with these plans. To a certain extent, any analysis of military plans and operations is likely to reveal some distance between the military ideal and the operational reality; one may expect to find that military commanders will complain about lack of equipment and manpower in the normal course of events. From 1951 to 1964, Generals Guy Simonds,

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of Canadian military presence abroad and a place where Canadian lifestyle and values might be reproduced amidst a population which had different values and culture. The use of garrison in this context does not imply second class troops.

<sup>322</sup>John A. English, *Marching Through Chaos. The Descent of Armies in Theory and Practice*, p. 131.

<sup>323</sup>Pedlow, *NATO Strategy documents, 1949-1969*, xvii-xviii. In MC 48, one finds the first mention of "forces in being equipped with an integrated atomic capability".

<sup>324</sup>Colin McInnes makes the same argument in two works, *Hot War , Cold War. The British Army's Way in Warfare, 1945-95*, London: Brassey's, 1996 and *NATO's Changing Strategic Agenda. The Conventional Defence of Central Europe*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1990.

Howard Graham, S.F.(Finn) Clark, and Geoffrey Walsh served as Chiefs of the General Staff.<sup>325</sup> All these men had served in the Second World War and the transition from war fighting to deterrence was particularly difficult for them. In this respect, these officers mirrored their British and American NATO counterparts and the transition for many was perhaps incomplete.<sup>326</sup> Knowing the results of poor preparation, they did not easily accept plans based upon deterrence which were inadequate for actual battle.

It was this dichotomy between NATO's strategy and operational plans which caused the most serious problems for Canadian army planning. The underlying diplomatic motivation to make friends with Germans was an important consideration throughout and it certainly affected NATO strategy at the highest level. As a motivating factor, it was rarely directly articulated in documents. Canadian army officers concentrated upon the complexities of the changing nuclear battlefield. In the NATO context of the mid-1950s, forward defence meant any defence beyond the Rhine.<sup>327</sup> In essence the whole notion of forward defence came out of a need to include Germans in the defence of

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<sup>325</sup> Dominick Graham, *The Price of Command. A Biography of General Guy Simonds*. Toronto: Stoddard, 1993; Howard Graham, *Citizen and Soldier. The Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Howard Graham*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987; and DHH, Biographical Files, S.F. Clark and Geoffrey Walsh.

<sup>326</sup> Steven Metz, *Eisenhower as Strategist. The coherent use of military power in war and peace*, Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: U.S. Army War College, February 1993. pp. 43-74.

<sup>327</sup> NATO plans for the later time period have not been released, but it is well known that the FRG continued to push for forward defence further to the east.

Europe and under the NATO umbrella.<sup>328</sup> Naturally, other western Europeans promoted the idea of defending Europe as far east as possible.<sup>329</sup>

In the search for increased Canadian influence and rationalization of defence spending, Canada's role in the Northern Army Group under British command was seriously questioned. A variety of options, including withdrawal of troops, was contemplated. While Canada's membership in NATO was not an issue, there were doubts about whether the presence of a single brigade group with plans for reinforcement for the remainder of a division in the event of war, was the best option. There was no magic moment when the troop contribution became a long term commitment; rather decision-makers within the Canadian Army and elsewhere in the government struggled with daily decisions and problems in the face of an uncertain future. The international framework was crucial in decision-making. Well aware of the problems and considering many options, those responsible concluded that the consequences of withdrawal outweighed the costs of continued participation.

Plans for the Canadian brigade depended upon corps level plans produced by the British and approved by SACEUR. SACEUR in turn received overall direction from

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<sup>328</sup>R.J. Walker, "The German strategy of forward defence: Has anything changed?", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Volume 22, No. 6, July 1993, p.24.

<sup>329</sup>André Beaufre, *NATO & Europe*, translated from the French by Joseph Green and R.H. Barry, London: Faber and Faber, 1966, p. 48 and Eayrs, *Growing Up Allied*, p. 205.

NATO's Military Committee.<sup>330</sup> As pointed out by Colin McInnes, a British analyst, there was a shift away from defence towards deterrence. The plans were increasingly unrealistic from the military perspective. Moreover there was little military co-operation on the ground. The British lacked a coherent army group plan and viewed the defence of Germany as a "series of small tactical-level engagements"<sup>331</sup> In part, this approach was justified by allowing for flexibility under unpredictable and chaotic conditions of battle. Several senior officers in the Canadian military, and, indeed, many in the British Army, were far from content. The brigade trained for combat, yet the military plans and their own commanders' comments show that in actual battle they would have simply been slaughtered as would most of the British infantry.

Although NATO plans were not accepted without question, dissension among the allies was a thorny problem for the government to address in public as an image of solidarity was an important element in deterrence. From the beginning, secrecy in military planning was essential and justifiable. However, evidence also suggests that secrecy and loyalty within the military structure were used to avoid public debate of more controversial decisions.

In 1952, George Pearkes, who had served as a Second World War general and was the Conservative defence critic in the House of Commons, raised the issue of armoured

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<sup>330</sup>NATO, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Facts and Figures*, pp. 337-345.

<sup>331</sup>Colin McInnes, *Hot War. Cold War*. p. 54

support for the brigade. He wondered if an armoured brigade would have been more appropriate than an infantry brigade.<sup>332</sup> In a telling memorandum to Claxton, Simonds conceded the point that Pearkes had raised, but indicated that the real problem related to NATO's strategy.<sup>333</sup> The answer provided in Parliament merely indicated that Canadians were fulfilling the infantry role which the British and SACEUR had assigned to them. The fact that Pearkes had identified a weakness in NATO's plans for the Canadian brigade was not acknowledged. Nor was it mentioned that the West Germans had rejected an infantry brigade group concept intended to allow them to participate in the European Defence Community in 1950 as they insisted on divisions as the smallest effective unit.<sup>334</sup> The Germans recognized what some Canadians would come to regret. A brigade group did not allow for much in the way of independence or even influence.

With the entry of the FRG into the alliance in 1954, NATO's Military Committee formally adopted a document entitled MC 48, which outlined the requirement for forward

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<sup>332</sup> Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. *Debates*, 14 April 1953. pages 3816-3819. One of the curious aspects of this time was the relatively poor information available to Canadians about the role of their troops in Europe. In contrast, the German population was well informed. The situation was so bizarre that, while working as an archivist, I had occasion to declassify translated copies of *Der Spiegel* which had been sent to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff from the brigade as TOP SECRET. Even now, many documents remain classified and it is difficult to provide a complete critical analysis of the operational plans.

<sup>333</sup> Kardex, 112.1 (d97) - file partially declassified. Also interview with Geoffrey Walsh, June 1997.

<sup>334</sup> Saki Dockerill, *Britain's Policy for West German rearmament, 1950-1955*, p. 61.

defence to include German territory.<sup>335</sup> While adopted at the strategic level, actual operational plans to implement this strategy only gradually came into effect over the next decade. In time the FRG was able to boost NATO's conventional forces. As the Germans increased their forces and defence expenditure, they also reduced and then refused to pay for the presence of foreign troops on their territory. Simultaneously, the British cut defence expenditures and reduced the size of their conventional forces. While there is much British scholarship about the 1957 and 1958 British *White Papers*, the effect of reduced occupation payments from Germany is scarcely mentioned.<sup>336</sup> The Germans had been paying for a large portion of the expenses for British forces in West Germany up until this time. While Canadians as NATO forces had been largely paying their own way, they had relied upon the British corps for combat and logistical support and the Germans to provide facilities. The combined introduction of forward defence and the reduction of British conventional forces placed an enormous strain

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<sup>335</sup> There were a series of MC (Military Committee) documents reflecting strategic changes. NATO has now released MC 48, MC 14/1, MC14/2 , MC 14/3 and MC 70 of which I hold copies and which are available to all members of the public. These documents gave general strategic guidance and were used to set more specific military goals and plans. However, they should be used with caution - for it is clear from my research that their guidelines were rarely actually implemented, though SACEUR did use their statements to attempt to force various national governments to contribute more resources to NATO.

<sup>336</sup> British accounts of this time period certainly focus on the high cost of imperial defence, the anti-colonialism of American policy and the decision to focus upon nuclear rather than conventional forces. Suez is pinpointed as the watershed of British influence and the various fiscal difficulties of maintaining the Sterling area receive due attention in its decline. See Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall's *The Chiefs. The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff*, London: Brassey's, 1992 ; and Nigel Hamilton's *Monty. The Field-Marshal, 1944-1976*.

upon resources assigned to support the brigade.

Duncan Sandys, the British Minister of Defence, produced white papers in 1957 and 1958 which introduced the gradual elimination of national service and other cuts without reducing commitments.<sup>337</sup> Initially, the British planned to reduce the British Army of Rhine by 26,000 men. This figure was changed to a reduction of about 13,500 men in the wake of acrimonious discussions which followed the first announcements. The British Service Chiefs opposed many of the proposed changes.<sup>338</sup> The British government decided to continue to develop an independent nuclear capability which reduced its ability to support conventional warfare.

At the diplomatic level, Canadians were concerned about the dramatic decline in the relative power of Britain and France.<sup>339</sup> The reduction of payments from the FRG was one of the issues at stake. As the Germans paid for less, Canadian diplomats, involved in an *ad hoc* committee to resolve the issue, expressed the hope that the Germans might be persuaded to pay for most of the local costs of five British brigades in Germany. They also pressured the Americans to renounce their claim for support cost, in view of the "grave political and military consequences this [British cuts] implies for

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<sup>337</sup> Jackson and Bramall, *The Chiefs*, Chapter 10.

<sup>338</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>339</sup> DHH, 73/1223, file 224. Paper prepared by Arnold Smith, "Some reflections on the "crisis" in NATO" , November-December 1957.



NATO".<sup>340</sup> Even with these actions, British weakness would plague Canadian planning.

The British emphasis upon nuclear deterrence was in line with the NATO strategy for the use of nuclear weapons as a sword and limited conventional forces as a shield. In May 1957, nuclear weapons became a principal element in the deterrent with the adoption of MC 14/2 and, by December 1957, SACEUR, General Alfred Gruenther, decided to establish stockpiles of nuclear weapons in Europe and intermediate range ballistic missiles were placed at his disposal.<sup>341</sup>

It was apparent by this time that, although the West Germans strengthened NATO forces, they would not be able to provide the numbers of troops they had initially promised.<sup>342</sup> The FRG had seven divisions available for NATO by 1960 rather than twelve divisions ready by 1958 and the period of conscription was shortened from eighteen months to twelve. The Belgians were responsible for an area on the right flank of the Canadians, but there were doubts about whether the Belgians would be able to arrive in time to fight.<sup>343</sup> The Northern Army Area Group (NORTHAG), where the

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<sup>340</sup>NA, MG 31 E 6 Douglas LePan fonds, Volume 5, file 57, Summary Reports, 1958, No. 21, 21 March 1958.

<sup>341</sup> DHH, 73/1223, uncatalogued, NATO working papers, 13-3.n-12, NATO, April 1967, p. 2.

<sup>342</sup>Saki Dockerill, "Britain's Troop Reductions in West Germany", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume 20, No. 3, September 1997, pp. 54-55.

<sup>343</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 7626, File 11381-40, pt. 4.2, Starnes to Robertson; DHH, 84/126, File 16, Galloway to Allard; John A. English, *Marching Through Chaos*, p. 161. The Netherlands and Belgians corps were "widely seen as penetrations about to happen"

Canadians were located, was weak.

In the midst of NATO's strategic changes during the mid-1950s, General Charles Foulkes, the Canadian Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, like some of his counterparts in other NATO nations, questioned the need for Canadian troops stationed in Germany at all. As discussed in Chapter two, the chairman was expected to provide co-ordination among the various services, but each of the Service Chiefs retained access to the Minister of National Defence. There were inevitable service rivalries especially as the Royal Canadian Air Force grew in size and influence both at home and in NATO.<sup>344</sup>

The brigade in Europe provided the Canadian Army with a potential fighting role which was motivating for the professional soldier. By 1959, it was the only part of the army equipped to war scales.<sup>345</sup> If the brigade was eliminated, the army would be dramatically reduced in significance. After the mid-1950s, the threat to North America was believed to be more serious and the army was responsible for a national survival role. Under Pearkes, who became the Conservative Minister of National Defence in

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according to English.

<sup>344</sup>The British became aware of the resentment of senior Canadian army officers towards the Royal Canadian Air Force's relatively better representation in NATO in the late 1950s. PRO, DEFE 13/104, Notes on Conversation with Lieutenant-General Clark, Chief of General Staff, Canadian Army, F.W. Festing, 14 June 1960.

<sup>345</sup> Canada. Dept. of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence*, 1959, p.9. The summary notes that the Army's role in national survival affected it. Troops in Canada were equipped only to training scales, leaving just the brigade in Europe equipped to war scales. The Air Division, however, converted from an air defence role to a strike and reconnaissance role and was to be re-equipped with the CF-104.

1957, the reserves were expected to concentrate upon national survival. This role was deeply resented in many quarters and it was widely blamed as many soldiers left the reserves in the late 1950s.<sup>346</sup> Several senior Army officers began to press for a more active and influential army role within NATO, though this was clearly at odds with the priorities for continental defence set by the government. Some of the conflict between Foulkes and various Chiefs of the General Staff may be attributed to service rivalry as well as to differences of tradition and temperament.

In June 1955, the Department of National Defence prepared a reassessment of Canada's defence policy for the period 1955-1960. It pointed out what various officials would continue to say from time to time for the next decade and a half. Maintaining a brigade overseas was expensive; the supply line inadequate; it was highly questionable whether the remaining 2/3 of a division which Canada had committed to NATO in the event of war would be able to get into operations in the first period of a world war; and any heavy equipment stored on the continent was vulnerable. As it now seemed the Germans might defend themselves, Canadians hoped to contribute to the defence of Europe in a more efficient and economical fashion.<sup>347</sup>

Not only was the threat of imminent invasion in Europe reduced, but the North

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<sup>346</sup>Stephen J. Harris, "The Post-War Army in Canada and NATO" in John Martenson's *We stand on Guard. An Illustrated History of the Canadian Army*, Montreal: Ovalle, 1992, pp. 393-6.

<sup>347</sup>DHH, 73/1223, *Raymont Collection*, uncatalogued files, Canada's Commitments to NATO, 13-3-N-5, Volume 1.

American continent was believed to be more vulnerable as the Russians developed their nuclear arsenal.<sup>348</sup> Air defence in Canada became a key element in priorities and took a significant portion of the overall defence budget. While never a foremost concern, planning for civil defence and the survival of the population during nuclear warfare took a higher profile under the Conservative government.

In 1957, with the Germans now actively involved in European defence, a brief was prepared for discussion with Senator Theodore F. Green, the Chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It suggested that Canadians increase their role in the defence of North America and decrease their commitments in Europe. NATO, it was observed, emphasized European defence at the expense of the whole of its territories. Its headquarters and administration were far too heavy for the size of armies. The 33 million dollars in recurring costs to keep the brigade in Europe was too high. Canadian soldiers, it was argued, should now be defending Canada.<sup>349</sup>

Canadian diplomats had long argued that Canada's small population and vast territory to defend should be considered in the various NATO burden-sharing formulas

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<sup>348</sup> Isabel Campbell, "Canada, Sovereignty, Moral Superiority and The Cold War" , *Papers of a Conference on the Cold War*, Office of the Secretary of Defence, Washington, D.C., 1996 and DHH, 73/1223, *Raymont Collection*, File 1106, declassified.

<sup>349</sup>DHH, 73/1223, *Raymont collection*, uncatalogued documents. Canada's contribution to NATO, 13-3.N-5, "Brief for discussion with Senator Green.... ", 9 October 1957.

devised.<sup>350</sup> What emerged was a conundrum. The questions were many. Why were Canadians to die on German soil defending Germans if Canada itself was in some danger? What were the benefits to Canada? Canadians hoped to reap direct economic benefits in terms of European trade, but by the late 1950s, Canadian diplomats were thoroughly disillusioned with the EEC and its high tariffs. Well informed Canadians might question the high expenditure of Canadian dollars to keep a brigade group in Europe when the Europeans did not seem to be making many concessions to Canada.<sup>351</sup>

There was no acrimonious debate in Canada and very little public knowledge of the problems facing the army until the Parliamentary Special Committee on Defence met in 1963 and the matter was resolved with the 1964 Canadian *White Paper* on defence. However, in the late 1950s, social democrats in both Canada and the FRG considered the possible withdrawal of Canadian troops from Germany. M.J. Coldwell, the federal leader of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, visited Soest in mid-September 1956. His visit coincided with announcements in the local German press about the possible withdrawal of Canadian troops if the situation in Europe remained "relaxed". This stance was low key and the Canadian public was barely aware of the issue. In the

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<sup>350</sup>NA, RG 25, Accession 90-91/008, Volume 58, File 50030 A-H-40, pt. 3, Memorandum on possible burden sharing formulas, 28 February 1952.

<sup>351</sup> David Jay Bercuson " Making a difference, Not very much and not for very long" in John English and Norman Hillmer, *Making a difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order*, Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992.

FRG itself, the presence of troops was more controversial.<sup>352</sup>

With a decreasing threat in Europe and a stronger concern for the security of Canadian territory, it seemed obvious that the Conservative government would not increase manpower or resources dedicated to the brigade in Europe. What seemed logical in Canada was not so evident to those serving in Europe. In 1957, NATO adopted controversial MC 70 requirements in an attempt to get various NATO nations to provide more resources to NATO. NATO officials and senior Canadian officials in Europe used the MC 70 goals to pressure the Canadian government. MC 70 became contentious; it was never approved by the Canadian Parliament and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff objected strenuously to some of its content.<sup>353</sup> Foulkes argued with General Lauris Norstad, SACEUR, that as a planning document, MC 70 was not binding upon the Canadian government. Although Canada was politically committed to NATO, the possible withdrawal of Canadians troops still came up from time to time, as Charles Foulkes and George Pearkes threatened it again in 1960 when Norstad proved too demanding in pressing for fulfilment of MC 70 requirements.<sup>354</sup>

Foulkes objected forcefully to the idea that Canadians should have to provide any more

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<sup>352</sup> This matter will be discussed in detail in Chapter five.

<sup>353</sup> DHH, 73/1223, Strategic guidance, 4 July 1957, see also 73/1223, File 224, Minimum force studies, partially declassified.

<sup>354</sup> DHH, 73/1223, file 225, file partially released, MC 70. The purely Canadian documents have been declassified. NATO has also released MC70.

troops to Europe. Pearkes also indicated that the cost of maintaining troops so far away from Canada did not seem to be the best method of supporting NATO or of spending the Canadian defence dollar as Norstad pressed Canadians to supply more support troops in the face of British withdrawals.<sup>355</sup> Canadian defence officials had good reason to be disillusioned with NATO, and especially with the British, by the early 1960s.

Standardization of equipment proceeded with difficulty and the Canadians supplied Second World War British equipment through NATO mutual aid.<sup>356</sup> A high threat assessment and the need to have operational troops in Europe armed immediately had worked against the adoption of American equipment as the NATO standard. In the early 1950s, as progress on the long term goal of NATO standardization was just beginning, Canadians hoped to specialize in the development and production of some NATO equipment.<sup>357</sup> The British encouraged this hope.<sup>358</sup>

The Heller, an anti-tank gun, and the Bobcat, an armoured personnel carrier, were attempts to develop Canadian products for marketing to other NATO nations.<sup>359</sup> By the

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<sup>355</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>356</sup> Simonds had been under the impression that this equipment would be replaced by new purchases. It was not.

<sup>357</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, *Annual Report, 1950*, Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951, p. 9.

<sup>358</sup>Peter Archambault, "The informal alliance", pp. 156-160.

<sup>359</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 312-318. Also interview with John Starnes, June 1997.

late 1950s and early 1960s, the high cost of development, industrial scales of production, international competition and marketing problems plagued Canadian projects and little progress was made. The British bought a Swedish weapon in preference to the Heller. The Bobcat, designed to improve the mobility of the brigade in Europe, was abandoned in the face of cost overruns and the lack of substantive purchases by the Americans, the British or other NATO partners.

In this respect, placing the brigade with the British had not paid off and NATO membership had not provided the equipment sales that Canadian suppliers might have liked. The British had no obligation to buy Canadian equipment as a result of the brigade's presence with the British Army of the Rhine. Major General George Kitching, the Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff in London, England, concluded that, by 1961, the Europeans were buying almost exclusively from each other. In his view, Canadians could not make progress in the British market because of exchange problems and the British tendency to develop their own equipment and markets.<sup>364</sup> Kitching, a former British officer who had been well disposed towards the British Army, finally came to the conclusion that Canadians would do better developing a closer relationship with the Americans.<sup>365</sup>

The goal of increasing trade with the Europeans to diminish dependence upon the

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<sup>364</sup> DHH, 73/1223 file 449, UK defence policy, 1959-1962, Kitching to Miller, 18 June 1962.

<sup>365</sup> *Ibid.*



Americans clearly motivated Canadian military officials and efforts were made to use the NATO connection for the marketing of Canadian military products. They did not succeed because of market conditions beyond Canadian control. In addition, technological change was rapid and the investment required for the development of new weapons limited possibilities for smaller countries. The pace of change affected other areas of military planning as well.

NATO's strategy was formulated at a high level. Operational doctrine, such as existed, was an attempt to create reasonable principles based upon the strategy.<sup>366</sup> Doctrine forms a body of thought about the nature of operations, partially based upon the analysis of past battles and partially upon ideas about future warfare considering new technologies and ideas. Gradually, NATO created bodies for the development of doctrine, but there was little in the way of coordination in the 1950s so that the continental Europeans did not follow or approve of British doctrine.<sup>367</sup>

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<sup>366</sup>See DHH, 73/772, *Canadian Army Combat Development Guide*, Ottawa: Army Headquarters, 1 June 1961. There was a close relationship between American, British and Canadian doctrine and the beginnings of NATO doctrine.

<sup>367</sup>The German Minister of Defence, Franz-Josef Strauss, noted during his visit to Canada in 1959 that doctrinal difference between the British and the Europeans precluded German consideration of purchase of the Bobcat. The Germans preferred tanks. see: NA, RG 25, Volume 4294, File 10935-B-40, pt. 4, The Canadian Ambassador in Bonn to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 23 October 1959 no. 781. By the early 1960s, Operational Research Army Establishment studies would indicate that tanks would hold ground longer under conditions of nuclear warfare. The Bobcat was intended to provide mobility to the infantry force, but then, even the British did not purchase it as had been intended.

The Canadian Army created the Gold -Rush Committee in 1954 to investigate the nature of future war. The committee's report called for a brigade group organization, full-mechanization of the combat arms, close integration of nuclear firepower, organic army aviation and widely dispersed tactical deployments. These ideas culminated in a Canadian publication, *The Canadian Infantry Brigade Group in Battle*, and the establishment of a Directorate of Combat Development in early 1958, responsible for the study of combat development.<sup>368</sup> Canadian officers responsible for combat development met with the British and the Americans and, later in the early 1960s, with NATO groups. Those responsible for Canadian doctrine had no access to the British nuclear fire plan for the brigade and, in the late 1950s, the brigade's commander was apparently forbidden from revealing British plans to the Canadian Chief of the General Staff.<sup>369</sup> There was strong disagreement between the Canadians and British on the operational role of the brigade, at least in so far as the Canadians were informed about British plans.

In 1958, Lieutenant-Colonel Strome Galloway, one of the officers at the Directorate of Combat Development, reported to Major-General Jean Victor Allard, the Vice Chief of

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<sup>368</sup>DHH, 73/772, *Canadian Army Combat Development Guide*, 1961, Annex A. This annex describes NATO, ABC (American, British, Canadian) planning and the separate American, British and Canadian organization for doctrinal development. While co-ordination had begun, practice remained problematic in the 1980s. See John A. English, *Marching Through Chaos*, pp. 160-161.

<sup>369</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 7626, File 11381-40, pt. 4.2. Starnes to Robertson, 20 December 1962. Please note the entire memorandum is discussed later in this paper and is reproduced in Appendix B of the thesis.

the General Staff, on the plans for the current operational role of the brigade. Galloway had been influential in the development of Canadian doctrine and was largely responsible for a pamphlet on the use of the corps on the nuclear battlefield.<sup>370</sup> He noted that while the British plan for the brigade included dispersion for nuclear warfare, there was little mobility and he recommended the acquisition of armoured personnel carriers and light aircraft or helicopters. Noting that he had not been given access to British plans for other troops, he concluded that " I feel there will be NO battle worth contemplating under present conditions.... at the moment *it* [the brigade group's tactical position] *violates nearly all our tactical beliefs.*"<sup>371</sup>

No one was quite sure what the use of tactical nuclear weapons would do to the battlefield. The Canadian Bobcat was intended to allow for mobility for infantry, but the Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment studies concluded that the Bobcat would provide very little protection to troops under nuclear fire. Tanks, such as the Centurion, which was used by the British and Canadian troops, provided superior protection. Even if the brigade's role was limited to holding ground until nuclear weapons could be used, tanks would allow soldiers to stay alive for a longer period,

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<sup>370</sup>George Kitching, *Mud and Green Fields. The memoirs of General George Kitching*, Langley, B.C.: Battleline Books, 1986, p. 298. This pamphlet was circulated to General Hans Speidel, the German commander of the NATO land forces, Central Region and other German generals. It stressed battlefield mobility, dispersion, the use of helicopters, amphibious tanks and armoured personnel carriers.

<sup>371</sup>DHH, 84/126, *Fonds Allard*, File 16, "Report on 4 CIBG Operational Role" by A.S.A. Galloway, 12 November 1958. Galloway's emphasis. The entire document is reproduced in Appendix B of this thesis.

though the tanks made attractive targets for Soviet anti-tank weapons.<sup>372</sup>

Other officers in the British, French and German armies were also critical of British plans. Some criticism was even published in the *British Army Review* which had restricted circulation, but was widely read by British servicemen. An analysis of Soviet and British tactics published in the *British Army Review* of September 1958 revealed that, even if there were "considerable doubt" about the Soviet High Command's ability to develop ground operations according to the tactical attack doctrine they held, changes to the British Army of the Rhine were required. "Is the bulk of our defending force to be infantry moving on its feet and in soft-skinned transport, relying on the spade for immunity from the effects of the missile?" asked l'Heretique - who remained unidentified other than that the author's regiment was neither cavalry nor the Royal Tank Regiment.<sup>373</sup>

Another article on British tactics in nuclear war was portrayed as "the views of a foreign writer".<sup>374</sup> It similarly stressed the requirement for mobility and armour. The author questioned whether the British regimental system had not acted against the highest standard of cooperation between tanks and infantry, asking "Why let your infantry be

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<sup>372</sup>DHH, 81/262, Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment, Semi-annual progress report, 1959-1961. Survival times were important for holding ground.

<sup>373</sup>l'Heretique, "Soviet Tactics" , *The British Army Review*, No. 7, September 1958, pp. 55-60.

<sup>374</sup> There was a hint in a quotation that the writer might be German.

decimated ?"<sup>375</sup> In 1959, The Army League in Britain published a work entitled, *The British Army in the Nuclear Age*. It contended that there was no evidence that tactical nuclear weapons favoured defence and stated that the British formations in Europe were of extremely inferior quality.<sup>376</sup>

George Kitching argued that the "British pay only lip service to the accepted NATO doctrine that forces in Europe must be ready to fight without warning".<sup>377</sup> The British defence cuts affected the Canadian brigade as the level of support which the Canadians had expected from the Corps level was not available. This reduced support and the gradual implementation of forward strategy placed the Canadian brigade in a vulnerable position on the Weser, where natural obstacles provided almost no cover.<sup>378</sup> Some changes to the brigade were made. In 1957, Pearkes increased the armoured squadron to an armoured regiment and added an independent reconnaissance squadron, though the infantry brigade group was not replaced with an armoured brigade as he had earlier suggested. The brigade was still not mobile nor was

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<sup>375</sup> Alfred Klinkrade, "British Tactics in Nuclear War or "do not stray into Hoopoeland" , *The British Army Review*, No. 7, September 1958, pp. 60-64.

<sup>376</sup> DHH, 73/1223, File 449, File partially declassified. It contains a complete copy of the Army League. *The British Army in the Nuclear Age* as well as Canadian analysis of it.

<sup>377</sup> *Ibid.*, Kitching to Air Marshal Miller, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, 18 June 1962.

<sup>378</sup> Galloway's memorandum appears in appendix A of this thesis. In June of 1997, Galloway confirmed his views on this subject in an interview with the author.

adequately armed, but it was a powerful unit in terms of fighting capability.<sup>379</sup>

The emphasis upon nuclear deterrence and the lack of a coherent corps doctrine resulted in weakness in the British Army of the Rhine. NATO as whole lacked such a doctrine and it was not evident that Canadians would be better off elsewhere.<sup>380</sup> At the highest levels in the Canadian Army, a battle raged over whether one should cut forces in Germany, move them south, build them in the north, develop a mobile striking force, or settle for the status quo. This debate reflected changes within NATO as the possibility of border incursions was considered, with rising tension in Berlin, and the beginnings of discussions on flexible response. From 1958 until 1963, various roles were considered both because of Canadian dissatisfaction with British plans and, because General Hans Speidel, the Commander of Land Forces in Central Germany, made several proposals for the use of the Canadians under his command or in another role.<sup>381</sup>

Speidel's proposals were attractive given the British cuts and the tendency of Canadian

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<sup>379</sup>From 1958 to early 1963, the British planned to place artificial obstacles to force the Soviets to concentrate and present worthwhile targets for tactical nuclear weapons. However, the covering forces under this plan accepted some penetration, allowing the enemy to bypass and then call down nuclear fire. It was this role as a covering force which caused concern for the brigade. See Maloney, *War Without Battles. Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951-1993*, pp. 137-139 and DHH. 73/1223, uncatalogued Raymont papers, NATO- working papers, 13-3-N-12.

<sup>380</sup>McInnes, pp. 11-14.

<sup>381</sup>Sean Maloney, *War Without Battles. Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951-1993*, pp. 149-150.

Army officers occupying positions overseas to fight for a better role for the brigade with more resources and influence. Within Canada itself, the position was less clear and Charles Foulkes was particularly difficult to pin down. Those in Canada, with the exception of S.F. Clark, the Chief of the General Staff, 1958- 1961, were inclined to re-evaluate the European commitment from time to time with a view to possible reductions or withdrawal. This was true even of Geoffrey Walsh, a protégé of Simonds, who held the positions of Quarter-Master General of the Canadian Army in Canada from 1955 to 1959 and Chief of the General Staff from 1962 to 1964.<sup>382</sup> Still, most high ranking Army officers in Canada and Europe were willing to consider options which might increase Canada's influence and improve the role of the brigade from an operational perspective. There were two simultaneous and opposite pulls. The questioning of the brigade's role was accompanied and counterbalanced by the active pursuit of more influence in NATO.

While threatening to withdraw, Canadians negotiated for the appointment of a Canadian general at Northern Army Headquarters. In these pre-unification days, a brigadier was not regarded as a general, but just below that level. Canadians were hoping to get a Canadian general (at the major-general or lieutenant-general level) appointed. Major-General George Kitching, on the Canadian Joint Staff in London, corresponded with the Chief of the General Staff, S.F. Clark, with regard to the lack of Canadian influence at Northern Army Group Headquarters." I told him [British General

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<sup>382</sup>Walsh was also Vice Chief of the Defence Staff from 1964 to 1966. He was responsible for revision of supply and logistics and the concept of the service battalion.

Sir Alfred Dudley Ward - the commander of the British Army of the Rhine] we required one of the senior positions presently occupied by a British officer and that we required the position fairly soon."<sup>383</sup>

The British, whose own prestige had slipped so dramatically, were reluctant to give any more influence to Canadians. General Allard visited General Jean Valluy in Fontainebleau (SHAPE) to discuss a senior Canadian position there in May 1959.<sup>384</sup> In July 1959, Kitching went directly to Generals Norstad and Schuyler, both Americans, at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in an effort to pressure Dudley Ward. Pearkes was going to raise the issue with his British counterpart, Duncan Sandys. All this was "unofficial" negotiating as Canadian policy was not to ask for positions, but to accept those offered. Such delicacy was hardly successful. Canadians were, with the greatest reluctance, offered a Canadian brigadier's position with General Valluy provided that the individual was not shown on any Table of Organization and was extra to the establishment.<sup>385</sup> At the same time, consideration was given to a possible Canadian position in the central region of NATO, which was under German command, just south of the British Army of the Rhine and possibly

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<sup>383</sup>Kardex, 112.1.003 (d18) CGS personal correspondence to commanders, CCOS, MND etc. for the period Jul 57 to Dec 63, ref. equipment development (Bobcat) , rocket range... correspondence between Clark and Kitching.

<sup>384</sup>*Ibid.* Message from Kitching to CGS, 22 April 1959. Please note that General Allard was in fact the only Canadian ever to hold a divisional command in NATO.

<sup>385</sup>*Ibid.*, Kitching to Clark, 22 July 1959.



elsewhere.<sup>386</sup>

As Canadians sought more influence, they were asked to provide more support and to raise the manpower ceiling for NATO forces beyond the 12,000 mark (including 6500 Air force personnel) approved by Parliament on 18 October 1951 when the threat assessment had been high and the Europeans relatively weak.<sup>387</sup> Recognition of the vulnerability of the operational role of the brigade in the late 1950s was highly motivating, especially at the Chief of the General Staff level. Lieutenant-General Clark attempted to provide better support, particularly for crucial signals personnel as various exercises revealed weaknesses. The conflict between continental defence and NATO was apparent because the Army had just recently taken on new signals responsibilities in the Canadian north with Alert and in the provision of emergency communications as a part of survival operations. Clark attempted to get light and medium helicopters to provide the all important airlift capability need to supply units of the brigade from brigade headquarters.<sup>388</sup>

However, resources were restricted. The Canadian strategic reserve was committed to two roles and with limited new equipment planned, its capabilities would be increasingly

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<sup>386</sup>Kardex, 112.1.003 (d18) CGS personal correspondence to commanders, CCOS, MND etc. for the period Jul 57 to Dec 63, ref. equipment development (Bobcat) , rocket range... Kitching to Clark, 7 November 1958 and later, Kitching to Foulkes, 22 July 1959 - regarding Canadian correspondence with the Americans.

<sup>387</sup>Canada. Privy Council, Order-in-Council, PC 5298, 18 October 1951.

<sup>388</sup>Kardex, 112.1.003(d18) Clark to Kitching, 28 May 1959.

circumscribed. One of the problems was that equipment for the strategic reserve was required for training in Canada; Norstad hoped to stockpile sufficient equipment for the division in Europe.<sup>389</sup> Canadians were reluctant to do this and the issue remained unresolved. The correspondence between Kitching and Clark regarding deficiencies in the brigade revealed a key consideration. The various proposals for an increased role in NATO were at odds with Canada's defence policy and the threat assessments which emphasized the possibility of attack on North America. The brigade was becoming increasingly vulnerable and there was not much the Chief of the General Staff was able to do.

The White Paper of 1959 mentioned the necessity for an agreement with the Americans for the nuclear arming of Canadian weapons, including the provision of short range nuclear weapons for the brigade in Europe. It did not address MC 70 goals which were still the subject of disagreement. General Norstad regarded MC 70 goals as a target. Both Pearkes and Foulkes pointed out that these had been set by NATO without Canadian Parliamentary approval; they actually hoped to reduce Canadian commitments in Europe in favour of continental defence.<sup>390</sup> Kitching complained that Pearkes and Foulkes were acting as obstacles in negotiations with the Americans for the transport of the remainder of the reserve overseas.<sup>391</sup> Foulkes, in particular,

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<sup>389</sup>*Ibid.* Clark to Kitching, 28 May 1959.

<sup>390</sup>Kardex, 112.1003 (d9) Memo from J.J. McCardle to Jules Léger, 15 February 1960.

<sup>391</sup>*Ibid.*, Kitching to Clark, 5 May 1959.

provided evasive responses which Kitching found very frustrating, worrying as he did that Canada would be "put in the same category as many of the nations of Europe who have consistently fallen down on their commitments."<sup>392</sup>

Kitching hoped to ensure that the brigade was as well equipped and prepared as possible. Communications between Canada and Europe were not smooth and, as it turned out, Foulkes was not the only one being elusive about Canadian commitments. In January 1959, Clark addressed the Conference of Defence Associations and indicated that probably " we will not be able to move two brigade groups and equipment to Europe... to take part in [the] initial battle. In [the] event of General War, all regular forces in Canada and [the] Militia must be prepared to participate in [the] battle for national survival. In view of [the] uncertainty of being able to move regular brigade groups to Europe in event [of] war,[ there is] no use planning to train and send militia overseas ... [we] will not be able to provide [the] militia with field equipment not needed in survival ops [sic]..."<sup>393</sup> Kitching, located in Europe, only found out about this change in government policy in bits and pieces over the next year. SACEUR also remained under the impression that Canada was going to supply the rest of the Division if requested to do so.<sup>394</sup>

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<sup>392</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>393</sup>Kardex, 112.1.003 (D18) S.F. Clark to COGs, 29 January 1959.

<sup>394</sup>*Ibid.*, Kitching to Clark, 5 May 1959.

Throughout 1959, messages and letters continued to point out the deficiencies and the embarrassment experienced by Canadian military staff in Europe as inadequacies were revealed but not resolved. There was a lack of coordination among the NATO allies as well as a shortage of resources. In one instance, Kitching said his staff had been caught off guard when no one had thought to inform them that a Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) exercise was underway. As a result, several days passed before the Canadians were able to respond to constant requests from NORTHAG regarding Canadian reinforcements and logistical support during this exercise.<sup>395</sup>

These events culminated in Exercise Flashback carried out in 1960. It identified the problems of reinforcements and of supply for the brigade. It is tempting to blame the problems on the Diefenbaker government. It had recently imposed equipment limitations on the military.<sup>396</sup> Yet the root of the difficulties may be traced back to 1951. The Canadians had been unable to get a written agreement on logistical support as the officer responsible reported that the Americans were very reluctant to place any of their supplies in the hands of the "slippery British". American officers apparently did not trust the British and refused to approve any of the Canadian draft proposals put forward as a

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<sup>395</sup>Kardex, 112.1003 (D9), Kitching to Clark, 5 May 1959. The Northern Army Group was NATO command in the Central Region, subordinate to Allied Forces, Central Europe (AFCENT) or Land Force, Central Europe (LANDCENT). Central Army Group (CENTAG) was the NATO Command with a northern boundary running along the southern boundary of NORTHAG. It was also subordinate to AFCENT or LANDCENT. See Maloney, *War Without Battles*, pp. xiii-xxii and NATO, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Facts and Figures*, p. 346.

<sup>396</sup>Sean Maloney, *War Without Battles*, p. 154.

result.<sup>397</sup> The lack of co-ordination was NATO-wide.

In 1960, Geoffrey Walsh, now a Major-General and Quartermaster-General of the Canadian Army, pointed out that the recent limitations on new equipments did not yet have an effect upon the brigade. After several years, in his view, its capability would decline and it might be necessary to re-assess the NATO commitment. Walsh was not questioning the Canadian political commitment to NATO, but, like other high ranking Army officers in Canada in the late 1950s, he was inclined to doubt whether the continued presence of Canadian ground troops in Europe was an essential element of Canadian participation in NATO. In other words, the military situation was still fluid. The Canadian Army was unsure whether Canadian ground troops needed to be in Europe to provide deterrence in the long term. In Walsh's view, the informal verbal arrangements between Foulkes and General Maxwell Taylor of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff for assistance in the movement of 2/3 of the division to Europe as reinforcements and with the British War Office regarding logistical support were sufficient for the time being.<sup>398</sup>

Yet the issues of reinforcement, logistical support and equipment would not go away. Kitching and Clark continued to correspond as contradictory information became available about the effect of British cut military cutbacks and as the British attempted to

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<sup>397</sup>Kardex, 112.1 (d95) Correspondence with General Gruenther from CGS, re: 27 CIB, 26 December 1951.

<sup>398</sup>Kardex, 112.003(d18), Walsh to Clark, 4 June 1959.

get the Canadians to supply more of the brigade's and even the British corps' requirements. Kitching wrote that, during a visit to the British War Office, he was told that while the British "have always accepted responsibility for the logistic support of the brigade, they have never accepted the responsibility for combat support".<sup>399</sup> The logistical support was far from adequate and worse was to come. Kitching was informed that, by October of 1960, the British would withdraw medium artillery support. While the British were planning for "intimate atomic support" with the use of the eight-inch howitzer in addition to long range surface-to-surface missiles in corps artillery, they were making no provision for the support of the Canadians.<sup>400</sup> Clark made frantic inquiries from Canada and wrote back to Kitching to say that he had been reassured that the British would provide missile support and that merely the medium artillery would be withdrawn.<sup>401</sup>

Major-General J.D.B. Smith replaced Clark temporarily as Chief of the General Staff in Canada during July of 1959. He spoke with Pearkes, this time with respect to air defence for the brigade. Smith worried that Pearkes might too easily accept British reassurances at the political level about their ability to provide air defence for the

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<sup>399</sup>*Ibid.*, Kitching to Clark, 5 June 1959.

<sup>400</sup>*Ibid.*, Note that the term intimate atomic support was used by the British. The real hope was that the Soviet troops would concentrate to make targets for the use of these weapons, but it was acknowledged by NATO planners that these weapons posed problems both for the NATO troops and for the German population. See Maloney, pp. 133-135.

<sup>401</sup>*Ibid.*, message from Clark to Kitching, 12 June 1959.

brigade.<sup>402</sup> Allard had just visited the British and remained unimpressed with their anti-aircraft protection. In view of this weakness, Smith hoped that Canada would provide air defence for the brigade in the form of a surface-to-air missile.<sup>403</sup> Smith and Kitching now continued a troubling correspondence on British and NATO plans with respect to the brigade. Kitching attended a conference on air defence at SHAPE and he disclosed that SHAPE had not considered air defence of the combat area at all.<sup>404</sup> The present British defence contribution was "pathetically weak" in his view and there was a swing by Holland and Belgian away from Britain towards German and American power.<sup>405</sup> The British would likely further cut even the promised logistical support.

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<sup>402</sup>PRO. Ministry of Defence. (hereafter DEFE ), DEFE 13/104. Canadian brigade in Germany. Defensive Brief for the Minister, May 1960. This brief noted that Pearkes had approached Mr. Sandys on several occasions with respect to Canadian worries on various issues with respect to the brigade. It concluded that with the lack of resources, the British were prepared to accept calculated risks which would be the same for their troops as for the Canadians.

<sup>403</sup> *Ibid.*, Smith to Kitching, 10 July 1959.

<sup>404</sup> Kardex, 112.1.003(d18), Kitching to Foulkes, 21 January 1959. The Canadians had considered the Hawk missile system for defence of the brigade. Kitching noted that the air force favoured using the Hawk to protect the long range atomic capability (that is the deterrent air forces) while the Army favoured it to protect forward formations. As the UK was not acquiring it, though MC 70 required it and as the Germans were acquiring only a fraction of their requirements, the British formations in NORTHAG, including the Canadian brigade, were virtually unprotected. See also: Kitching to Major-General Desmond Smith, 17 July 1959.

<sup>405</sup> *Ibid.* Kitching to Smith, 17 July 1959. See also: Major D.W. Coyle, "Close Air Support in 1963" in *The British Army Review*, number 7, September 1958. This article points out, in guarded terms, that "there is a gap in the weapons likely to be available for providing supporting and reinforcing fire for the Army... A new weapon, capable of being used from the air or from the ground, will be required by 1963...".

In the midst of these discussions with the British, Speidel proposed that Canadian troops might be used as a reserve force for SACEUR. General Foulkes visited Fontainebleau on 11 December 1959 and expressed Canadian discontent with their role in NORTHAG.<sup>406</sup> The lack of army and corps support for the brigade as well as its location were raised as issues. Foulkes, Clark and Pearkes all favoured the idea of using the brigade as a reserve force, but in a limited role in the central region rather than for the whole of SACEUR. The mobility required for this role might be provided with helicopters and the Bobcat which the Canadians were still developing and hoping to market to other NATO nations. Possibly, the brigade could remain in Soest during peacetime.<sup>407</sup>

Foulkes met with General Norstad who suggested that the brigade might move south to use the American logistical system and to be co-located with the Air Division.<sup>408</sup> This idea was similar to one originally proposed by Foulkes in 1951. Air Marshal R. (Larry) Dunlap, a Canadian who was serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, at SHAPE, was instructed to examine the idea which naturally had considerable merit according to Foulkes. That Dunlap, an air force officer, was investigating this idea must have rankled senior army officials. The Royal Canadian Air Force, with a division in Europe and the approval of the strike and reconnaissance role for it, had a higher

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<sup>406</sup> DHH, Uncatalogued Raymont papers, Role of 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group.

<sup>407</sup> *Ibid.*, note to file, 11 December 1959.

<sup>408</sup> Kardex, 112.1.003(d13) Notes on Meeting Between General Norstad and General Foulkes, SHAPE, 1600 hours, 11 December 1959 .



profile than the army.<sup>409</sup> They therefore had greater influence and representation at SHAPE.<sup>410</sup>

Norstad and Foulkes discussed the possibility of a NATO nuclear force designed to keep the French and perhaps later the Germans from developing an independent nuclear capability. In this concept, proposed by Norstad, small American custodial parties would remain, "but as far as possible... the weapons would belong to the NATO Alliance without any other strings".<sup>411</sup> From the Canadian perspective, there was little hope for support of this idea. The divergence between the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence on the issue of allowing Canadian forces access to nuclear weapons was beginning to affect Canadian defence policy. The notes prepared on the meeting in 1959 between Foulkes and Norstad indicated that:

Mr. Green [the Secretary of State for External Affairs] had been quoting General Norstad as favouring some form of disarmament in Western Europe. General Foulkes felt that Mr. Green had misunderstood General Norstad and wanted confirmation of this. General Norstad was most positive that his proposal was one of inspection only and involved no reductions in forces nor withdrawals in forces ...<sup>412</sup>

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<sup>409</sup>Kardex, 112.003(d18), Kitching to Foulkes, 17 April 1959.

<sup>410</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>411</sup>Kardex, 112.003(d13), Notes on Meeting Between General Norstad and General Foulkes, SHAPE, 11 December 1959.

<sup>412</sup>*Ibid.* 1959. Yet Foulkes and Pearkes threatened Norstad with withdrawal of Canadian forces one year later. See DHH, 73/1223, file 225 as noted earlier.

While tactical nuclear weapons seemed to be required on the European battlefield, there was genuine fear about their use and it seemed well recognized, that in the event of an actual Soviet invasion, there would be no time for political consultation.

Brigadier Michael Dare, who later became a commander of the brigade, testified before the House of Commons Special Committee on Defence Expenditure in 1960 that "we would have to use nuclear weapons against a larger number of Soviet conventional forces in Europe".<sup>413</sup> He raised another pertinent point which would continue to concern Canadians. In Germany, the brigade's nuclear weapons would be controlled at the corps level, not the brigade level. The corps level was British so there was some question and even confusion about Canadian control of the unit which was assigned to use nuclear weapons. This confusion continued to trouble the brigadier in Germany during the early 1960s.

The failure of the Diefenbaker government to resolve the differences between the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence is well known, especially with respect to this issue of providing access to nuclear weapons for Canadian forces.<sup>414</sup> To some extent, the focus upon this political failure has masked a greater difficulty in defence planning in all NATO nations. Nuclear deterrence created real problems for

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<sup>413</sup>Canada, House of Commons, *Special Committee on Defence Expenditure, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960, pp. 730-731.

<sup>414</sup>Basil Robinson, *Diefenbaker's World. A Populist in Foreign Affairs*; J.L. Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967. The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986.

ground forces at the tactical level. Canadians had at first been reassured by the Americans that they would not be obligated to buy the Honest John missile when MC 70 was first adopted in 1957. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff at that time concluded that "the contention that a 762 mm. rocket.... is a suitable weapon to support a battalion in either attack or defence, is tactical nonsense... , noting that the corps and army artillery is for special use on special occasions." The Chiefs of Staff refused to support its acquisition and recommended waiting until a suitable weapon for ground-to-ground support was developed.<sup>415</sup> They were fully aware of the limitations of the Honest John; it made no sense to acquire it for use at the brigade level.<sup>416</sup> The Canadian Cabinet approved purchase of the Lacrosse missile system still in development in October 1958 because it was believed to have better capabilities.

The British pushed hard for the Honest John missile. In 1959, Dudley Ward suggested the purchase of one Honest John per division - a range and scale of

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<sup>415</sup>DHH, 73/1223, uncatalogued Rayment papers, Strategic Guidance file, 4 July 1957. See also 73/1223, file 224, Minimum force studies file.

<sup>416</sup>Stephen J. Harris, "The Post-War Army in Canada and NATO", in John Marteinson's, *We stand on Guard. An illustrated history of the Canadian Army*, p. 388 and John Murray Clearwater, *Canadian Nuclear Weapons, The Untold Story of Canada's Cold War Arsenal*, Toronto: Dundurn, 1998, p. 157. Clearwater notes that the Honest John had to be warmed by electric blankets for 24 to 48 hours before it could be launched. It also had other operational shortcoming and Harris argues that in actual battle it might have been as much a threat to the allies as to the enemy. Yet, a former artillery officer who served with the battery in the mid-1960s, Brian A. Reid argues the battle plans for the use of the Honest John called for a complete change in doctrine. In essence, by forcing Soviet troop concentrations, NORTHAG plans attempted to create those special situations which might favour the use of tactical nuclear weapons. See his Biographical file, DHH.

equipment which would be controlled by British divisional headquarters and requested that the Canadians do their share.<sup>417</sup> Foulkes, acting under advice from the Chief of the General Staff, S.F. Clark, continued to insist upon the Lacrosse missile still in development.

This position was reversed when trials of the Lacrosse went badly and the Americans decided not to develop the version planned. In April 1960, Cabinet Defence Committee approved the procurement of the Honest John launchers in order to meet the MC 70 requirements. Pierre Sévigny, the Associate Minister of National Defence, informed the House of Commons that the Honest John could be armed with conventional or nuclear weapons.<sup>418</sup> That the Honest John was a corps level weapon not capable of providing close support for the brigade remained a serious problem which was not communicated to Parliament.<sup>419</sup>

Discussion of alternative roles for the Canadian brigade continued. Air Marshal Dunlap suggested a possible course of action. First, Speidel and Norstad might formally agree that the Canadian Brigade could be used as mobile reserve and the Canadian

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<sup>417</sup>Kardex, 112.1.003(d18) CGS personal correspondence, November 1959 - December 1963. S.F. Clark to Foulkes, 17 November 1958 "Should you be talking to General Ward you may wish to ask him, if he persists in recommending a scale and type of weapon with which we do not agree and controlled by a British Divisional Headquarters, is the United Kingdom prepared to provide with no costs to Canada the support we need."

<sup>418</sup>Canada. House of Commons. *Debates*, 31 March 1960, pp. 3644, Pierre Sévigny, Associate Minister of National Defence answering a question posed by Paul Hellyer.

<sup>419</sup>*Ibid.* See also: Clearwater, *Canadian Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 156-7.

government could approve this decision. Then, it might be determined whether or not moving the Brigade south to consolidate with the Air Force into one community served by one line of logistical supply was a matter of real importance to Canada. If it was, then Norstad would raise the matter of the move with various authorities.<sup>420</sup> SHAPE staff studied this suggestion. They concluded that the Canadians were suitable for the mobile reserve role, but that NORTHAG would be seriously weakened by the loss of the brigade in the front line. German forces might be willing to exchange some of their quarters for those occupied by Canadians and, as the Germans were still building their army, they might strengthen NORTHAG with additional forces.<sup>421</sup> Kitching, who was now filling the role of the Canadian National Military Representative to NATO in Paris at SHAPE, suggested that Canadians phase these changes in during 1961 and 1962.<sup>422</sup> Accordingly, Pearkes requested that a Memorandum to Cabinet be prepared on 1 March 1960.<sup>423</sup>

Foulkes attempted to avoid cabinet discussion. He replied to Pearkes the next day, noting that the brigade group had been assigned to SACEUR without any strings attached in terms of its role. He concluded that it would not be advisable to seek

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<sup>420</sup>Kardex, 112.1.003(d18), Dunlap to Foulkes, 12 December 1959.

<sup>421</sup>Kardex, 112.1.003 (d13) Notes on Meeting between General Norstad and General Foulkes, SHAPE, 11 December 1959 and General Foulkes's visit to Fontainebleau .

<sup>422</sup>*Ibid.*, Kitching to Foulkes, 12 February 1960.

<sup>423</sup>Kardex, 112.1.003 (d18) Foulkes to Minister, 1 March 1960, with Pearkes's handwritten notes.

Government approval of the change in role. Rather, he recommended that Pearkes merely inform the Cabinet that SACEUR was considering withdrawing the Canadian brigade into mobile reserve for the Central Army Group as the Republic of Germany could now hold the forward role on the East German front and that the Chiefs of Staff concurred with this change.<sup>424</sup> No action was taken. By May, Pearkes again asked for a proposal, and a formal Memorandum to the Cabinet Defence Committee was finally prepared just prior to General S.F. Clark's visit to Europe in June 1960. Clark was authorized to discuss without commitment the implications of such a change.

In the meantime, the British became aware of Canadian plans. The British Ministry of Defence prepared instructions to Harold Watkinson, the British Defence Minister, suggesting that "it is, from our point of view, most important that the Canadian brigade should remain in the First British Corps: its withdrawal would greatly weaken the Corps and be very embarrassing to us."<sup>425</sup> On 13 June 1960, R.W.D. Fowler, the Acting British High Commissioner in Ottawa, proceeding upon instructions from London, wrote to Pearkes expressing distress over the possible withdrawal of the Canadians from the British Army of the Rhine and suggesting that General Clark might discuss the matter with Earl Mountbatten, the British Chief of Defence Staff, and Sir Francis Festing, the

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<sup>424</sup>Kardex, 112.1.003 (d18) Foulkes to Minister, 1 March 1960.

<sup>425</sup>PRO, DEFE 13/104, Canadian Brigade in Germany, Defensive Brief for the Minister, Ministry of Defence, May 1960. This same brief noted that Pearkes might well soon be removed from his portfolio and noted that there was "no coherent fountain-head of policy-making and command from which sensible decisions can emanate." Watkinson was the British Defence Minister from 1959 to July 1962.

Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who would also be in Paris for the NATO meetings.<sup>426</sup>

In a secret and personal message from Pearkes, Clark was authorized to discuss the changes with the British some days before the meeting in Paris. Festing wrote an account of this meeting, noting that Clark seemed embarrassed by the proposal to withdraw the brigade:

A good deal of intrigue has taken place... there have been a number of different protagonists, acting from different motives.... I have a strong feeling that the real "niggers in the woodpile" have been Major-Generals Kitchin [sic] and Allard....

The Canadian military authorities are not too happy about the present role of their brigade in Germany. They are apprehensive that the wide front on which it is deployed and the fact that its flank is dependent on the Belgian forces could result, in the event of war, in their taking heavy punishment...

..They would like a more glamorous role... The Canadian Army feels it is in a position of inferiority vis a vis the Canadian Air Force [sic] contingent in Germany in the matter of senior commands. They would dearly like to have one Major-General's command in Germany.<sup>427</sup>

Most of this analysis was accurate, but it was unfair to suggest that Allard and Kitching were the main source of the discontent. Festing must have been aware that British

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<sup>426</sup>*Ibid*, R.W.D. Fowler to Pearkes, 13 June 1960. See also PRO, DEFE 13/104, Ministry of Defence, London to U.K. High Commissioner, London, containing instructions for a private and personal message to Pearkes from Watkinson.

<sup>427</sup>PRO, DEFE, Note on Conversation with Lieutenant-General Clark, Chief of General Staff, Canadian Army, 14 June 1960.

officers and Army associations were also expressing doubt about the plans. Still the British intervention had been successful to a degree. It was noted in an anonymous hand in the Canadian file containing this correspondence that SACEUR's formal terms of reference in peace gave him the authority to determine the location and deployment of forces, *after consultation and agreement with the national authorities concerned*.<sup>428</sup> Foulkes's attempt to implement the change without discussion had not come off. The Canadian government and the British would be intimately involved in the changes contemplated.

The British Army was in a bad way. Watkinson wrote to Pearkes, indicating that the British Army was prepared to give the brigade a more important and flexible role and might consider appointing a Canadian divisional commander in I British Corps from time to time.<sup>429</sup> The Commander of the British Army of the Rhine proposed using the brigade group as a mobile reserve for NORTHAG. Watkinson finally gave Pearkes written reassurance that the British would handle the controversial logistical line.<sup>430</sup> The British began a series of delaying tactics and a variety of proposals came forward, including the possibility of transferring responsibility for the southern boundary of NORTHAG to

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<sup>428</sup>As noted in Chapter two, consultation with the Canadian government might be problematic in the event of an actual attack, but Foulkes himself had suggested the requirement for consultation with the Canadian government in the early 1950s when the legal status of the forces was being discussed.

<sup>429</sup>Kardex, 112.1.003(d18), Harold Watkinson to George Pearkes, 7 July 1960.

<sup>430</sup>*Ibid.* By September 1960, Exercise Flashback would reveal the weakness of these plans.



CENTAG, and withdrawing the Belgians into reserve.<sup>431</sup> Clark wrote to Kitching in November 1960 that the British requested a delay as the withdrawal of Belgian troops sent to the Congo had created problems which precluded giving attention to the matter of the Canadian role for time being.<sup>432</sup>

Speidel and British General Sir James Cassells of NORTHAG considered various proposals and, by the summer of 1961, Kitching was cautiously reporting positive results of meetings. Speidel reiterated his request for the brigade and had worked out a formula with General Sir Richard Gale, Deputy SACEUR. The brigade could remain under NORTHAG in peacetime as a reserve and would not be committed to holding ground. In wartime, the brigade would come under Speidel's command. NORTHAG would not commit the brigade for emergencies without the authority of Speidel, the Commander of Land Forces, Central Command. Speidel believed that the brigade should stay where it was, for the greatest threat to his area was from the North. He also anticipated that the brigade would be equipped with helicopters, armoured personnel carriers and nuclear weapons for the Honest John Battery.<sup>433</sup>

The Berlin crisis in 1961, followed by the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, created a higher

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<sup>431</sup>It was known that the Belgians would have to pass through Canadian lines to reach their position and were not expected to reach the critical right flank of the Canadians in time to be of use anyway with the result that Canadians expected that in battle they would be required to defend the territory assigned to the Belgians as well as their own.

<sup>432</sup>Kardex, 112.1.003 (d13) CGS to Kitching, 30 November 1960.

<sup>433</sup>*Ibid.* Kitching to Clark, 10 July 1961.

expectation of possible border incursions and incidents. The Americans with British, French and West German military planners concentrated upon LIVE OAK, emergency planning for the protection of Berlin.<sup>434</sup> The heightened tension gave operational requirements a higher priority as Canadians sought to introduce new weapons and equipment within the manpower ceiling established in 1951. Consideration was given to reducing or eliminating dependents and changing the system of rotation as well as changing the military operational role of the brigade.

Allard made a trip to Europe in February of 1961 to visit the brigade, liaise with NATO headquarters and SHAPE, and make visits to key French military personnel. He immediately noted the conflict between military requirements and secondary goals and reported that "our desire to maintain good relations with the German population, to protect Canadians on foreign soil and to keep soldiers' families together, are [sic] the cause of discrepancy between our present administrative effort and the one we should be making to maintain our operational readiness."<sup>435</sup> While his report had a positive and optimistic tone and included the basic assumption that "we do not consider the brigade a 'Sacrifice Force'", he could not help observing during his reconnaissance of the operational area for the brigade that "the units would be so thin on the ground that the

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<sup>434</sup> Gregory W. Pedlow, "Allied crisis management for Berlin: The Live Oak organization, 1959-1963", in William P. Epley (editor) *International Cold War Military Records and History*. Pedlow notes that Berlin contingency planning preceded the formal adoption of flexible response, but in essence gave Western government realistic alternatives to massive retaliation before the strategy had formally changed in 1967.

<sup>435</sup> DHH, *Fonds Allard*, 84/126, file 167, Report on VCGS visit to Europe.

enemy could not be halted for a period sufficient to use Honest John atomic weapons."<sup>436</sup>

Allard met with General Sir Hugh Stockwell, Stockwell's staff, and two Canadians serving with NATO, Kitching and Air Marshal Dunlap to discuss air support. The Canadians were advised that NATO had no common doctrine in this area due to differences between the Royal Air Force and the United States Air Force. As the Canadian air force units were located in the south with the Americans, they followed American doctrine and naturally would be used according to the priorities where they served. Allard made recommendations to take action on administrative and operational balances within the brigade and to take an initiative (on the advice of Jules Léger, the ambassador to NATO) on Canada's role within NATO. He also suggested improvement to air support which he still felt was extremely weak.

In more detailed annexes, Allard noted that helicopters could not be introduced without weakening the ground element beyond acceptable limits. The removal of one artillery battery did not provide sufficient manpower for the Honest John Battery. The removal of the one battery moreover created a problem for close artillery support which was "largely academic"- considering the weakness of the present support which Allard compared unfavourably with support provided to troops in Second World War.<sup>437</sup>

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<sup>436</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>437</sup> *Ibid.*

Allard went on to observe that the Honest John could not be regarded as a close support weapon. This was the same observation the Chiefs of Staff Committee had made when the Honest John was first proposed as part of MC 70. Even the most optimistic analysis could not conceal the difficulties. Allard noted that it was with loyalty that those concerned expressed their fears and that he supported their views.<sup>438</sup> The question of nuclear arms for the Honest John required resolution, but it was far from the most significant problem in terms of the operational role of the brigade. The Honest John was not to be used in support of the brigade anyway. As it turned out, the Canadian government responded to the Berlin Crisis and approved sending an additional 1106 soldiers to the brigade which it retained after the crisis was over.<sup>439</sup>

SACEUR, responding to German pressure, began implementing forward defence plans at the operational level. As new plans providing for a covering force well beyond the Weser River came from NORTHAG, Brigadier Cameron Ware, the commander of the Canadian brigade, wrote to Walsh, expressing distress and seeking guidance.<sup>440</sup> The plans called for the use of the Canadian Honest John Battery well in advance of the brigade, possibly 60 kilometres ahead, which would entail its separation from the brigade

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<sup>438</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>439</sup>Canada. Privy Council, Order-in-Council, PC 1961-1276, 22 August 1961.

<sup>440</sup>Kardex, 112.1.002(d2), Personal correspondence (4 folders) from CGS to Commanders, Ware to CGS, 28 November 1961. Walsh had just been appointed Chief of the General Staff.

and the possible loss of it for brigade support for which it was not suitable in any case.<sup>441</sup> The Honest John battery was intended to engage targets identified at the corps level and fire in depth while forward troops were engaged in close combat. Control of atomic fire support was not delegated down to the brigade command level.

Walsh was far less worried than Ware. While the Germans and the Canadians had been wooing each other, his observation was that there was no particular reason for the Germans to be more forthcoming on logistical or other matters than the British. He noted that they might well be even less helpful and understanding over time. The proposed role under NORTHAG seemed a step in the right direction. Walsh summarized the situation for Ware as follows: under the brigade group concept, the Canadians were a national entity, but a brigade group could not operate independently. They remained dependent upon a division and corps for support. There could be no independent role for the Canadian brigade in Europe. Under the British Division, it was understood that the brigade could not be broken up to reinforce British formations. Otherwise, they were to fulfil the roles assigned to them.<sup>442</sup>

With respect to the use of the Honest John, Walsh's analysis was revealing. The Honest John battery could not be committed until political approval for its nuclear arming took place. Canadians could reserve the use of it but, with the brigadier's approval, it could be

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<sup>441</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>442</sup>*Ibid.*, Walsh to Ware, 29 November 1961.

used elsewhere provided the British were willing to support Canadian demands if priorities changed.<sup>443</sup> In other words, Walsh was used to dealing with the British and he was prepared to barter. Walsh has since confirmed that he regarded the Honest John as useless at the brigade level, nuclear- armed or not. Moreover, he regarded NATO strategy as matter well beyond his area of responsibility as the Canadian Chief of the General Staff.<sup>444</sup>

Cameron Ware was replaced by Mike Dare in August 1962. Dare, a respected Armoured Corps officer with Second World War experience, was also deeply troubled by the plans recently implemented for a forward defence role for the brigade. Like many loyal military officers, he was careful not to communicate his doubts about the plans for brigade to those serving under him, probably for fear of creating poor morale. Both Allard, who was now in command of a British Division in NORTHAG, and Dare spoke with the Canadian Ambassador in Bonn, John Starnes, in late 1962. Starnes wrote a long Top Secret and Personal letter to Norman Robertson, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.<sup>445</sup>

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<sup>443</sup>*Ibid.* Walsh to Ware, 29 November 1961. Part of the problem was maintaining flexibility in planning as without experience in nuclear warfare, doctrine and tactics were theoretical and no one was quite sure what kind of war they might be facing as the Russians still had massive conventional superiority.

<sup>444</sup>Interview with Walsh, June 1997.

<sup>445</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 5406, File 10935-B-40, pt. 1.7, Starnes to Robertson, 20 December 1962. I interviewed John Starnes, who remembered nothing of this particular letter or the situation after almost forty years. Unfortunately both Dare and Allard are now deceased. Allard makes a passing reference to British strategy in Jean Victor Allard and Serge Bernier, *The Memoirs of General Jean V. Allard*, Vancouver, University of

Dare revealed to Starnes that "until recently...the Brigade Commander was forbidden by the Corps commander (a British general) from giving the Canadian Ambassador in Bonn or indeed even the Chief of the Canadian General Staff any clear idea of the Brigade's role in War."<sup>446</sup> Starnes noted, "the British units are seriously under strength and the Belgians are a skeleton Force [sic]..... Units despatched from Belgium would *pass through* the Canadians at the time the Canadian units were advancing to their defensive positions! ... In some ways, although I realize the differences, one is reminded of the words *Hong Kong*, and particularly in considering the new Canadian role in the *forward strategy* concept which only recently has been adopted."<sup>447</sup> Starnes was alluding to the Canadian military disaster in December 1941 when the Japanese attacked two Canadian battalions which had been placed in Hong Kong to deter them.<sup>448</sup> In this case, the strategy of deterrence had proved to be a tragic error.

These worries were not unique to Canadian forces, but existed to some degree for all

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British of Columbia, 1988, p. 209, noting that it would not be appropriate to discuss it. At the time he wrote his memoirs, much about NATO strategy and especially its weaknesses was still classified. The Department of External Affairs released these documents at my request in December 1997.

<sup>446</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>447</sup> *Ibid.* Emphasis in text.

<sup>448</sup> See Brereton Greenhous, *"C" Force to Hong Kong, A Canadian Catastrophe, 1941-1945* Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997. Greenhous argues that the strategy of deterring the Japanese from attacking Hong Kong placed the Canadian battalions in a suicidal role. The Canadian brigade in Germany, unlike those troops in Hong Kong, were well trained and prepared, what is similar is the fact that in battle, both roles were based upon unrealistic operational plans. Deterrence was based upon bluff. In Germany it worked; in Hong Kong, it didn't.

NATO forces in Western Europe. The Royal United Service Institution, (R.U.S.I), a British organization for promoting knowledge among the British services, held meetings with lectures by various eminent British officers followed by discussion by members during these years. In December 1960, General Sir Richard Gale gave a talk entitled "A Critical Appraisal of N.A.T.O." Gale stated :

Advising the Council on military matters is the Military Committee. It consists of the Chiefs and Defence Staff of each of the 14 contributing countries. Thus no military decision is made without the knowledge and concurrence of each country..... By common agreement among the nations there is an executive body called the Standing Group which, in order to save time and unnecessarily long consultation, consists of representatives of only three countries, France, the United States and Great Britain... It is inevitable that a certain feeling that their interests might be overlooked should develop in unrepresented countries and in the smaller nations... On all matters of policy, the Supreme Commanders receive their instructions from the Military Committee... These policy papers cover overall strategy, strength, and composition of forces, as well as certain problems of defence, as, for example, air defence. The Supreme Commanders do not, therefore, invent their own strategy or make the decisions on their own force goals; they merely plan in accordance with the instructions they have received...<sup>449</sup>

All countries surrendered an element of sovereignty by their membership in NATO. With the Supreme Commanders taking direction on strategy from the Military Committee, it can well be appreciated that operational plans involved political factors as well as military factors. No country, including the United States, was able to act completely

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<sup>449</sup>Richard N. Gale, "A Critical Appraisal of N.A.T.O." , *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, Volume 106, No. 622, May 1961, pp.154-163.



independently in this matter.

In March 1961, R.H.S. Crossman, the well known and opinionated British Labour Party defence critic, presented a paper on "Western Defence in the 1960s" to R.U.S.I. . He noted the huge disparity between Britain's defence commitments and capabilities and he argued that fear of Germany was part of the British motivation for keeping troops in Central Europe. Crossman presented his ideas:

After all, the French decision to permit German rearmament was only extracted from them by Sir Anthony Eden's solemn pledge to keep four British divisions in Europe for 99 years...The West German Army is already some eight divisions strong and within the next year or two will achieve its full strength of 12 divisions. Compared with this, our contribution, whittled away by successive reductions, is now dangerously small. To reduce it still further would be to surrender to the Germans any influence we may still possess over the strategy and defence policy of the S.H.A.P.E. armies.<sup>450</sup>

The problems of Belgian and British weaknesses clearly affected Canada's brigade, and so did the continuing British distrust of the Germans.<sup>451</sup> Many of the problems facing the

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<sup>450</sup>R.H. S. Crossman, "Western defence in the 1960s", *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, Volume 106, No. 623, pp. 324-341. Crossman noted that the British Army of the Rhine was seriously under-manned in many units in the early 1960s and that without conscription, matters were unlikely to improve.

<sup>451</sup>Edward Foster and Peter Schmidt, *Anglo-German Relations in Security and Defence. Taking Stock*, London: Royal United Service Institute for Defence Studies, 1997. This work notes the continuing distrust and even that the close French-German alliance " is held together more by anxiety over possible negative consequences that could result from its failure than by an actual convergence of political interests". p. 3.

brigade were well beyond the control of the Canadian government and were related directly to NATO's reliance upon nuclear deterrence. Under these circumstances, Diefenbaker's failure to resolve the issue of access to nuclear weapons was a problem which no doubt troubled Norstad as SACEUR; his statement to the Canadian press in January 1963 that Canada was not keeping its promises to NATO is well known.<sup>452</sup> Yet the reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons, especially the Honest John, and the weakness of Canada's allies in NORTHAG, were even more serious problems from the operational viewpoint. The Canadian brigade was still one of the better equipped and trained forces available in NORTHAG in 1963. Nearly all the NATO nations, including the FRG, had failed to meet their initial promises to NATO.<sup>453</sup>

With the change in government in early 1963, as Diefenbaker was defeated by Pearson who promised to negotiate an agreement to allow Canadian forces to be armed with nuclear weapons, NORTHAG planners became more optimistic about additional Canadian support. General Lyman Lemnitzer, who replaced Norstad as SACEUR, directed that the forward defence concept become fully effective on the first of September 1963.<sup>454</sup> This plan called for the main battle forces to be deployed east of the

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<sup>452</sup>Peyton V. Lyon, *Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963*, Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968, chapter 3.

<sup>453</sup>See: Donald Abenheim, *Re-forging the Iron Cross. The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces*, especially chapter 9, "Inner strangulation".

<sup>454</sup>Kardex, 112.100112.1.009(d38) CGS personal and confidential correspondence to MOD for period Jan 63 to Apr 65, Walsh to the Minister, 23 April 1963.

Weser with peacetime restationing of six brigade groups.<sup>455</sup> By 1966, two-thirds of NORTHAG were to be deployed in the forward zone east of the Weser. There was recognized to be considerable risk in this plan, though not any greater than under the previous emergency plan. The forward units posed logistical problems and the British War Office again pressed the Canadians for additional units and for more specific information on the balance of the division which Canada was to provide in the event of war.<sup>456</sup> Lieutenant-General Sir William Pike, the British Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, suggested that a multi-national working party be convened to work out costs of this new plan.

NATO had adopted forward defence as an official strategy in late 1954 when the FRG had joined NATO and forward defence clearly related to German interests. The operational plans for forward defence were only very gradually being implemented and it was not until 1963 that the plans actually included the full territorial defence of West Germany.<sup>457</sup> The European nations, Germany included, were not providing the numbers of conventional forces which SACEUR had counted upon in 1954. Without forward defence, more than eighty percent of Germany would have been subjected to possible

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<sup>455</sup>This first stage did not include redeployment of the Canadian brigade.

<sup>456</sup>*Ibid.* In June of 1963, the Canadian government formed the Canadian Base Units Europe (CBUE) to serve under the Canadian Army National Force Commander with NATO to provide Canadian administrative support of the brigade and control of the units of CBUE. See: NA, RG 25, Volume 7626, File 11381-40, pt. 4.2. The Brigadier held the post of the Canadian Army National Force Commander.

<sup>457</sup>Hugh Faringdon, *Confrontation. The Strategic Geography of NATO and the Warsaw Pact*, London: Routledge and Keegan, 1986, p. 260.

Soviet invasion and nuclear warfare.<sup>458</sup> From the German political perspective, the further east the front line could be pushed, the better.

The line between the two Germanys was an artificial one; there was no natural boundary like the Rhine. NATO's military advisors had reacted in outrage when forward defence was first adopted.<sup>459</sup> From the German perspective derived from Clausewitz, "The overall objective of defence must be a favourable peace. This is the aim for which one strives, and for which no temporary sacrifice should be considered too severe".<sup>460</sup> From the Canadian perspective, the initial contribution of Canadian troops to NATO had been perceived as a temporary measure until the Europeans had recovered. There was sufficient reason to question SACEUR's and NORTHAG's continued requests for a higher level of Canadian contributions. Canadians were hardly alone in questioning the implementation of forward defence plans and the proposed use of tactical nuclear weapons. The plans were far more attractive at a political level than at the operational level.

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<sup>458</sup>Sean Maloney, *War Without Battles*, pp. 133-178. Maloney's work covers many of the specific changes in plans and includes useful maps as well as descriptions of exercises. My reading of the documents confirms the thoroughness and accuracy of his accounts. However, in Maloney's work which was commissioned by the brigade, it is not evident that the Canadians would have been decimated in warfare. My interpretation based upon the sources I read is that the plans were unrealistic. In Chapter five, more details about propaganda are addressed. Certainly, some exercise reports glossed over the problems which were evident to high ranking officers and others.

<sup>459</sup>R.J. Walker, "The German strategy of forward defence: Has anything changed?" in *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Volume 22, No. 6, July 1993, p. 24.

<sup>460</sup>Goetz Sperling, *German Perspectives on the Defence of Europe. An Analysis of Alternative Approaches to NATO Strategy*, Kingston: Queen's University, ca. 1986, p. 17.

In autumn 1963, Walsh had two NATO officers present a briefing on the forward strategy concept to the Minister of National Defence, Paul Hellyer, and the Chiefs of Staff. They emphasized the forward holding role planned for the Canadian brigade. In the wake of this presentation, Hellyer sent Pierre Cardin, the associate minister of National Defence, to SHAPE to evaluate the importance, at both the political and military levels, of the role of the brigade in the front line with its present equipment. The final result of Liberal consideration was the 1964 *White Paper*, which confirmed the forward holding role of the brigade and a long term commitment of ground troops to NATO.

While the 1964 *White Paper* acknowledged the vulnerability of the brigade's location, this very point reinforced, in the government's view, the need for Canadian soldiers. The weak spot in NATO defences would be strengthened by the presence of highly qualified and well trained professional soldiers; the primary role for the brigade was deterrence. The need for NATO solidarity and consideration of the possible interpretations by European allies and the Soviet bloc of any change in the Canadian role were cited as important secondary considerations in keeping the brigade exactly where it was.<sup>461</sup> None of these factors had really changed from 1951 to 1964. If the threat assessment had generally declined, the recent tensions over Berlin and Cuba were no doubt considerations in the background. Although the FRG was now armed and in better economic condition, the Canadian government decided to keep Canadian troops and their families in Germany. The total number of troops authorized was raised to 7000, up

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<sup>461</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence*, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964.

from the figure of 5,500 which was authorized in the late 1950s.<sup>462</sup>

The change in government and the decision to fully commit the Canadian brigade to the front line role did not resolve many of the military problems facing the brigade. In 1964, Brigadier Dare was able to show that covering forces from the British Corps would be routed very quickly in Exercise Treble Chance.<sup>463</sup> This exercise essentially demonstrated a point that Dare had been attempting to make since he took command in 1962. The British plans for the Canadian brigade were simply not feasible.<sup>464</sup> While the Liberal

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<sup>462</sup>DHH, Lindsey/Sutherland Collection, 87/253-II-15.4, *The Canadian Defence Budget. Historical Background*, p. 3. The higher number assisted with the administrative and logistical support required for forward defence.

<sup>463</sup> While the Canadians formed the Redland or enemy force for the purposes of the exercise, their role in the plans was to be part of the covering force. In a meeting of the military history group in Ottawa in January of 1997, John Marteinson, a former helicopter pilot and military historian, suggested that there was an unofficial second set of secret military plans for the brigade in the early 1960s. Marteinson's service in Germany was after 1964, but as a helicopter pilot, he apparently sometimes overheard conversations between the brigadier and others. I spoke with Ramsay Withers, the brigade major from 1962 to 1964 and was informed by him that this was certainly not the case during his service in Germany. The Canadian plans were based upon very tight German railway schedules so that any change in position would affect the Canadians' ability to get equipment which was arriving at designated places according to a pre-planned schedule. Sean Maloney's *War Without Battles* is the best current source for accurate plans. Yet, it seems probable that the Germans had plans to defend very far to the east. During late 1950s, the Germans were training airborne troops, but Canadian military liaison officers reported that the Germans did not seem to know exactly what role these troops might be required to perform in the existing official plans.

<sup>464</sup>Maloney, pp. 212-214. Note here that Maloney's account is accurate, but glosses over the real meaning of the exercise result. The Canadians did very well in the exercise playing the part of Redland, that is the part of the Russians. The Canadians beat the exercise deadline of twelve hours by six and one-half hours, withdrew in advance of the British counter-attack, and then counter-attacked again. In doing so, they demonstrated that the British plans were too optimistic. Interviews with Major Bob Caldwell who took

government ended the Diefenbaker era of wavering and negotiated access to nuclear weapons, significant greater difficulties remained unresolved.<sup>465</sup>

The Bobcat, initially planned to provide mobility for the brigade, was scrapped at this time and, in 1964, the Canadian government purchased American M113s, an armoured personnel carrier, which improved the tactical capabilities of the brigade. Yet the problems of close air support, artillery support and reinforcement difficulties remained unresolved though Frank Miller, the Chief of the Defence Staff, brought them to the attention of Hellyer.<sup>466</sup>

General Allard was appointed to a British divisional command in NORTHAG in 1962. He

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part in Exercise Treble Chance.

<sup>465</sup>Charlotte Girard, *Canada in World Affairs, 1963-1965*, Volume XIII, Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1979, p. 258. Girard notes that France's opposition to NATO's plans to store nuclear weapons on French soil culminated in the moving of Canada's squadrons out of France. Canadian focus upon Diefenbaker's wavering masked deeper divisions in NATO.

<sup>466</sup>Kardex, 112.1.009(d37) Dare to CGS, 20 November 1963, noting that "we needed an armoured personnel carrier now and in future would need a replacement for the 105 mm howitzer and the centurion tank. I pointed out that this was not a peculiar Canadian problem as the majority of NATO countries were seeking a longer range artillery piece with a heavier shell and a newer tank [and also] ... under your direction trials were being conducted in Canada for a services battalion and the employment of cargo helicopters..." See also Miller to the Minister, 7 August 1964, which points to the requirement for close support artillery. Note that under Hellyer, the Department reorganized, eliminating the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff and creating a Chief of the Defence Staff to provide for greater coordination and reduce costs in what eventually became unification of the Canadian Armed Forces in February 1968.

took command of the 4th Infantry Division which often trained with the Canadians.<sup>467</sup>

Canadians had pushed for this appointment, hoping to gain more influence in NORTHAG. Allard had expressed distress that secondary goals such as German friendship were taking resources away from military priorities in 1961. Now, he observed that one of his highest priorities as a divisional commander was to improve relations with the Germans. Sir Richard Hull, the British Chief of Staff, met with him shortly after his appointment to stress this priority.<sup>468</sup> Allard noted that the relationship was troubled by the vestiges of the Second World War and he further argued: "In my opinion, we had to stop playing the role of occupier - officially ended in 1955 - and instead create links with the civilian population, to make it understand the solidarity aspect of our presence."<sup>469</sup>

Brigadier A.G. Chubb wrote to Walsh just after Allard left his post, indicating that in a conversation with Major-General W.D.E. Brown, the War Office Director of Equipment Policy, Allard's very successful recent tour as General Officer in Command of the 4th British Division had been discussed. Brown twice brought up the idea that a Canadian should be appointed at least once in every three changes of command if Canada guaranteed the brigade commitment.<sup>470</sup>

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<sup>467</sup>Allard and Bernier, *The Memoirs of General Jean V. Allard*, p. 207.

<sup>468</sup>*Ibid*, p. 210.

<sup>469</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>470</sup>Kardex 112.1.009(d39) CGS Personal and Confidential correspondence for period Oct 61 to May 65 to GOC Commands, 4 CIBG , CDLS (L), CDLS(W)..., Chubb to Walsh, 1964.



The Canadian brigade was valued and German friendship was required. The British would do what they could to keep the Canadian brigade, and NATO would adopt the strategy and military plans required to ensure that the FRG remained committed to the western alliance. As Allard changed posts from the Vice Chief of General Staff to a Divisional Command, he became more aware of political factors, especially the requirement for German civilian support, which had seemed less relevant to him before. In part, the move to Europe allowed for a better appreciation of European political factors which played an important role in NATO planning.

Other Canadian officers, like Clark, Kitching and Walsh, changed their views over time as priorities changed and as they were exposed to new considerations and ideas. There was no monolithic view on NATO priorities. While there was often open debate and frank discussion of issues among the officers, the analysis in this chapter and chapter two has shown that there were some cases of subterfuge and lack of communication, not only among Canadian officers, but also among the NATO allies. The lack of adequate resources for realistic defence plans was evidently very troubling at the operational levels of command.

In conclusion, deterrence not battle was the paramount role of the Canadian brigade in Germany. The difficulty of reconciling the strategic imperative with the operational reality remained glossed over in public statements on defence policy, with the result that it was

poorly articulated and understood by most Canadians.<sup>471</sup> The requirement for the FRG in NATO and the consequent shift to forward defence along with the adoption of nuclear deterrence illustrates well the impact of secondary goals upon military planning for the brigade. It is important to note that this situation affected all of NATO and not just the Canadian brigade. The political imperative for German support overrode operational concerns; further, the German NATO troop contribution was a significant military benefit for NATO and by extension for Canada. It was a price Canadians seemed willing to pay.

Expanding Canadian trade was hardly paramount in Canadian military planning, yet Canadian officials had attempted to use the NATO countries as a market for their products. In the end, they were unable to make progress and scrapped the Bobcat which had been planned for their own brigade. The complexity and cost of developing military weapons affected the success of these endeavours. Ultimately, the budget had to be considered; the investment required seemed beyond Canadian resources. Both foreign policy goals and other factors were important in the decision-making process. Even if trade was a secondary goal here, Canadian military officers, like Kitching, became disillusioned in their dealings with the European allies. NATO has not provided the market which the Canadian anticipated.

In Chapter four, the influence of foreign policy goals and other factors on military

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<sup>471</sup>The very best source which outlines the dichotomy of strategy and operation at the NATO level is John A. English's *Marching Through Chaos. The Descent of Armies in Theory and Practice*.

decision-making upon personnel policies will be analysed. This chapter will address the question of the character of the Canadian Army, dealing with the presence of dependents and the re-distribution of resources away from combat readiness. The continued influence of British and American policies upon Canadian developments is also traced as Canadian officers considered various options in personnel policies.

#### **Chapter four: A Question of Character: Combat Soldiers or Representatives of Canada?**

In 1949, the Canadian Army consisted of a small professional force of fewer than 19,000 men, with a militia of just over 36,000 men. Many soldiers and officers had experience in warfare. For the most part, these servicemen saw the militia as fulfilling a key role in times of emergency and war. By 1963, the army had expanded to 49,475 professional soldiers with a militia of 65,558 personnel.<sup>472</sup> This militia was reduced to 30,000 in 1964.<sup>473</sup> By the 1960s, the regular force was responsible for the most significant and demanding army functions, including the NATO brigade role, the protection of Canadian territory through continental defence and peacekeeping duties. The regulars dominated army resources and militia prestige had declined.<sup>474</sup>

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<sup>472</sup>Canada, Department of National Defence, *Annual Reports, 1949- 1959*. Ottawa: DND, 1950-1961. and DHH, statistics files: 1949: Regular forces - 18,970; Reserve - 36,311; 1958: Regular forces - 48,682; Reserve - 41,640. The reserves hit their low point in the late 1950s as a national survival role was emphasized. By 1963, the reserves had grown and were training for combat again. Fascinating though the reserve role is, my concentration will be on the regular force. Those interested in the reserve are advised to examine: T.C. Willett, *Heritage at Risk. The Canadian Militia as a Social Institution*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987 and DHH, Stephen J. Harris, Biographical file, especially his "Militia Reform", an unpublished paper presented to the Land Force Command Headquarters, 30 March 1995. The terms militia and reserve refer to part-time soldiers. The terms regular or professional refer to full-time soldiers. Though women served in the Canadian Women's Army Corps (CWAC) during this time, there was no consideration of combat roles for them. There are some interesting studies available on them and some good archival materials. Their role is well beyond the scope of this thesis.

<sup>473</sup>T.C. Willett, *A Heritage at Risk. The Canadian Militia as a Social Institution*, pp. 79-80.

<sup>474</sup>Stephen J. Harris, "The Post War Army in Canada and NATO" in Marteinson's, *We Stand On Guard. An Illustrated History of the Canadian Army*, pp. 391-396. See also DHH, 85/334, *A. C. Grant fonds*, Department of National Defence, Army, Minister's Estimate Book, 1964-5, Section A includes the actual expenditures for the Regular Army

The character of the small professional force gradually changed as it grew and took on new responsibilities. Personnel stability improved, more men married, had families, and became better qualified in their trades. Personnel costs rose. In following these developments, this chapter will examine policies on recruitment, rotation, organization, and the decision to send dependents to Europe. In identifying the factors which influenced decision-making in Army Headquarters, several key questions will be addressed. Were secondary goals, like improving relations with the Germans, important considerations in these specific areas? Was the requirement for combat capability in conflict with other goals? How did the other two services, the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force, influence army decision-making? And finally, to what extent does the hypothesis apply to the decisions examined in this chapter of the thesis?

One significant conclusion may be drawn from previous chapters. The decision to send soldiers to Germany was derived from a broad view of Canada's security, including the importance of peace in Central Europe. This decision created the immediate requirement for a large number of soldiers on active service and eventually, it was used to justify a larger regular force. An overriding need to recruit and keep a larger number of regular soldiers drove many of the changes in personnel policy examined here. Therefore, maintaining security in Central Europe was an important underlying factor affecting personnel policy.

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in the fiscal year 1963-4 which were \$ 372,349,407 compared with \$19,290,760 for the Militia and the COTC (Canadian Officers' Training Corps).

When the brigade first went to Europe, it was the first time in peace that Canada's professional force had a role outside Canada. The militia was traditionally viewed as the source of "citizen-soldiers."<sup>475</sup> Not only did the brigade role in Germany create a much higher profile with more resources for the professional army, it also meant that these soldiers gradually were perceived to be representatives of Canada rather than simply a fighting force or a force to train and lead the militia. In the words of military historian, Richard A. Preston, "Because of Canadian commitments to NATO, NORAD and the United Nations, large numbers of Canadian troops are stationed in foreign countries. They inevitably act as what political orators are fond of calling 'emissaries of Canada' in a semi-official capacity."<sup>476</sup>

However, as Canadian troops were not initially expected to stay in Europe for a long time, it was difficult for the army to develop long term strategies with respect to organization, roles and numbers. The new role of representing Canada did not produce a fundamental reconsideration of personnel policies for the regular force. Neither did senior army officers perceive a requirement to redefine the relationship between the force and Canadian society in view of the implied responsibility for it to represent Canadians. With the simultaneous and mostly unforeseen demands of producing soldiers for Korea and Germany, a host of difficulties occupied the attention of army administrators.

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<sup>475</sup>See T.C. Willett, *Heritage at Risk*, for a discussion of this term p. 51, 75-80.

<sup>476</sup>Richard A. Preston, *Canada in World Affairs, 1959-1961, Volume XI*, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 17-18.

While the 1950s are often viewed by various former Army officers as a golden age for the Canadian Army, there were serious morale problems in the regular army in the early part of this decade.<sup>477</sup> Morale improved as policies to improve the quality of life for servicemen and their families were developed and implemented in an incremental and ad hoc manner. It is well beyond the scope of this chapter and indeed the thesis to cover all personnel, organizational and training policies for the army in detail; rather, particular issues will be used to demonstrate how the character of the army began to adapt to new circumstances and to illustrate how the requirement for higher numbers influenced the transition.

In the early 1950s, Generals Simonds, W.H.S. Macklin and others envisioned a small professional army made up of dedicated combat soldiers.<sup>478</sup> These men might function

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<sup>477</sup>See John A. English, *Lament for an Army. The Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism*, Toronto: Irwin, 1998 and Douglas Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947 to 1985*, Kingston, Ont.: R.P. Frye, 1987 and his *Chiefs of Defence. Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces*, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995 and R.J. Walker, *Poles Apart: Civil-Military Relations in the Pursuit of a Canadian National Army*, Master of Arts in War Studies Thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, 1991.

<sup>478</sup> I will use the term the Army hierarchy to include those serving on the Army Council from 1951 to 1964. While those serving changed their views over time and sometimes disagreed with each other (and may not always have expressed this disagreement in archival records), the term "hierarchy" will be used on issues where there was an apparent consensus among these members. Where the documents show dissent, it will be mentioned.

as almost a priesthood with few obligations outside of the military.<sup>479</sup> Various developments worked against this concept. Gradually, the idea that soldiers should have a quality of life similar to that of Canadian civilians began to appear in some Army personnel policies. The air force, with a different culture, grew in importance. With the adoption of more uniform conditions of service for the army, navy and air force, the characters of all three services were altered. With competition from the private sector for men, the need to provide careers for a larger number of officers and soldiers was becoming evident. Few foresaw these developments at the outset.

Douglas LePan, a Canadian diplomat, showed remarkable farsightedness in his observation of 1951 that the Canadian forces in a deterrence role would come to represent Canada, especially in roles abroad. His ideas about conscription were much less realistic and were also included in the memorandum he prepared for the Secretary of State for External Affairs, L. B. Pearson:

We must accept the stationing of military forces abroad, and indeed, military

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<sup>479</sup> Simonds and Burns, for example, shared fairly similar ideas about the combat soldier, his motivation and requirements. They had however very different ideas about the organization of the army. In his "Commentary and Observations" in Hector J. Massey, *The Canadian Military. A Profile*, Toronto: Copp Clark, 1977, Simonds reiterated fundamental ideas about loyalty, discipline and morale, but he indicated that large reserves made more sense than "forces-in-being" (regular forces). One finds that Burns seems to share many of Simonds ideas about motivation and morale in his *Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945*, Toronto, Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1956, pp. 166-167. However, he emphasizes that wastage and improper distribution of manpower were problems rather than a need for a large reserve in his analysis of the Second World War conscription crisis. For a more general theoretical analysis of the exclusively masculine nature of combat forces, see: Cynthia Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarisation of Women's Lives*, London: Pluto Press, 1983.



action abroad by Canadian forces as one of the continuing activities of our society... . We have had very small standing forces...Now when what we are fighting is a world-wide conspiracy of Communist imperialism..., a radical readjustment of the attitude of Canadians towards the armed forces is necessary... They [the forces] must be regarded as performing one of the continuing functions of Canadian society; and they themselves must be regarded as an integral part of that society.

It follows, I think, that in these circumstances the only fair and socially wholesome way of raising military forces is by some system of selective service. I do not think that in the long run Canadian society can remain sound and healthy if our military commitments are fulfilled by mercenaries....

We in Canada also have our full share of riff-raff, men who are brutal and vicious or, what is worse, weak and vicious.... Recruits of this kind may in some instances make good fighting men; but they will be very poor representatives of Canadian life...

They should give the people of Asia and Western Europe with whom they may come in contact a good impression on the whole of Canada. This will only be possible if they are broadly representative of all types of Canadian life... <sup>480</sup>

LePan`s ideas about the army forming an integral part of society and the need for soldiers to represent all Canadians, especially in relations with other countries, pointed to a new development. Unfortunately, by associating these ideas with

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<sup>480</sup> NA, MG 26, N1, *Pearson fonds*, Volume 7, D.V LePan to Pearson, May 1951.

conscription, LePan lost all chance of affecting government policy.<sup>481</sup>

Similar ideas were being expressed through the Bureau of Current Affairs and were communicated to all soldiers on active service.<sup>482</sup> These were innovative ideas, but with the pressure of combat in Korea and the brigade's role in Europe, resources were directed to immediate requirements. The quality of recruits in the early 1950s was a concern, but it was only gradually and partially that the Army hierarchy came to appreciate a broader long term role for the professional force.

Few senior army officers had the time or inclination to record their thoughts on the relationship between changes made in personnel policies and the underlying philosophical concepts which might have influenced them.<sup>483</sup> Once action in Korea was over as expected, the NATO role of deterrence was gradually adopted and accepted, though not without question. It began to be acknowledged that a larger regular force was required to maintain the NATO role. The duration of this commitment was not

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<sup>481</sup> *Ibid.* I corresponded and spoken with LePan just before his death in November 1998. He stated that this memorandum was based upon his experience as McNaughton's civilian educational advisor and later as a gunner in the Italian campaign. His first hand experience as an other rank led him to strong conclusions about the brutality of volunteers. Telephone conversation, LePan - Campbell, 30 October 1998.

<sup>482</sup> For details see Chapter five.

<sup>483</sup> Most attention has focused upon the militia and its role in terms of representing Canadians. See T.C. Willett, *A Heritage at Risk. The Canadian Militia as a Social Institution*, and DHH, Harris, Stephen J., *Biographical file*, especially his "Militia Reform". There was also consideration of these issues in the formation of courses at the service colleges, in the establishing of service colleges and ideas of about officer training. These are outside the scope of the thesis.

evident even by the mid-1950s and so senior army officers were unsure of what the requirements of Canada's professional army might be. With little prospect of combat as time went on, soldiers, their families and the civilians serving with them, became *de facto* diplomats for Canada in Europe. This function eventually applied to almost the whole of the regular army as one unit after another were rotated to Europe.

As the requirement for a larger regular force endured, conditions of service improved. Combat readiness took first place in priorities, even as the attention of senior army officers began to shift towards retaining long term professional soldiers. There were many demands to meet - NATO, continental defence, national survival and peacekeeping.<sup>484</sup> With rapid technological changes and development of the nuclear battlefield, the requirements for better education and high technical skills for both officers and servicemen were recognized. This realization came from the demands of warfare rather than from a re-evaluation of the relationship between the forces and society.<sup>485</sup>

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<sup>484</sup>The introduction of nuclear weapons had changed the battlefield and also created a new army role of national survival. National survival was essentially civil defence and it was not welcomed by the Army. See: Isabel Campbell, "Canada: Sovereignty, Superiority, and the Cold War " in William P. Epley (ed.), *International Cold War Military Records and History*, pp. 268-270.

<sup>485</sup>DHH, 73/303, *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Regular Officers' Training Plan*, December 1957, p. 3. Both officers and servicemen were becoming better educated and more skilled technically. These developments were linked to military and technical requirements. The technical demands were even more evident for the air force and navy, but also affected the army.

Simonds, and his long standing adversary, General Harry Crerar, actively promoted conscription. The Canadian Legion, the Conference of Defence Associations and a few individual Canadians and some less vocal army officers shared these views.<sup>486</sup> Simonds and Crerar fully expected Soviet invasion in Europe in the early 1950s.<sup>487</sup> Crerar wrote, "To me certainly, this Third World War is *not* a prospective event. It is a tragic fact."<sup>488</sup> This high sense of urgency caused him, Simonds and others to suggest national registration as a first step for what seemed an inevitable battle with the Soviets. They, moreover, believed that military service would improve the character of Canada's young and assist the country as a whole by imparting values of self discipline and loyalty as well as preparing for war.<sup>489</sup>

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<sup>486</sup>J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, *Broken Promises. A History of Conscription in Canada*, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 245-258; Dominck Graham. *The Price of Command. A Biography of General Guy Simonds*, Toronto: Stoddart, 1993. As will be seen in Chapter five Lionel Shapiro, a journalist proposed it in *Maclean's*. *Legion Magazine* also carried articles proposing conscription at this time.

<sup>487</sup>DHH, 72/68, Crerar speeches, 1931 to 1953, "The issue of compulsory military training and service" to the Canadian Club, Ottawa, 8 March 1951 ; and Kardex, 112.1(d97), Simonds to Walsh, 3 January 1952; and 410B27.016 (d1) Extracts of CGS Army Council meetings re fmns & empl't of Cdn Bde Gp in Europe d 1950/55, CGS conference no 133, 17 December 1951, Paragraph 3.

<sup>488</sup> DHH, 72/68, "The issue of compulsory military training and service" address to the Canadian Club, 8 March 1951. Emphasis in original text.

<sup>489</sup>Many years after his retirement, Simonds elaborated on these ideas in his "Commentary and observations" in H.J. Massey's *The Canadian Military. A Profile*, Toronto: Copp Clark, 1972. Essentially, Simonds promoted the idea that the military transmit its values to Canadian society through universal service rather than that the army absorb the values of civilian society.

The government's approach was naturally more cautious.<sup>490</sup> Most Canadians did not share the views of these officers, but according to a 1951 survey, many were willing to support universal military training for young men, provided that service overseas was limited to volunteers.<sup>491</sup> Yet, in view of past history, even national registration evoked unpleasant controversy. It is well known that the conscription issue created a national crisis for the Canadian government during the First World War and to a lesser extent during the Second World War. It alienated many French Canadians and others.<sup>492</sup> One public opinion poll showed that 83 percent of French Canadians were opposed to conscription for service in the war in Korea in 1951. An immediate national registration, the first step before conscription, or conscription itself was too controversial to implement under the circumstances.

The Department of National Defence quietly considered plans for national registration in

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<sup>490</sup>James Iain Gow, "The Opinions of French Canadians", pp. 460-465, noting St. Laurent's cautious reply that conscription would be considered on its merits, but that for now it was unnecessary and noting that most Liberal and Catholic French newspapers praised St. Laurent's stand which emphasized Canada's industrial production and contribution through arms rather than men.

<sup>491</sup>*Ibid.*, pp 463-4. Polls conducted in 1951 indicated that 58 percent of Canadian favoured volunteers with 31 percent favouring conscription for the forces. Gow notes that polls which addressed the requirement for training, but not service overseas, gave rather different results during this time with 62 percent of Canadians supporting a year of training without overseas service and 28 percent opposing it in 1950.

<sup>492</sup> See: Granatstein and Hitsman, *Broken Promises*, and R. Douglas Francis, Richard Jones and Donald B. Smith, *Destinies, Canadian History Since Confederation*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Toronto: Harcourt Bruce, 1996, pp. 218-9, 297-8 for discussion and summaries of these events.

the early 1950s, but no active steps were taken.<sup>493</sup> Claxton, Foulkes, Pearson and many at the Department of External Affairs did not really expect that the Soviets would invade central Europe in the short term; there was, in their view, no point in creating a political storm in Canada.<sup>494</sup> In fact, they hoped that by sending volunteers to Europe on a temporary basis, war would be entirely avoided.

Characteristically, Simonds continued to push the issue; he argued that most other NATO countries had some form of conscription. National service was a supplement to the professional force of volunteers. In his view, while the militia formed a "grass roots" link between the armed forces and civilian society, the professional force was the main source of senior and non-commissioned officers and professional knowledge.<sup>495</sup> This view of the professional army envisioned an elite of dedicated military experts who would lead a larger group of part-time citizen soldiers in the event of war; all male citizens had an obligation to serve.

In retrospect, Simonds and the other Army officers who spoke of the imminent Soviet threat and the need for conscription in the 1950s might appear self-serving. By emphasizing the threat and recruitment difficulties, they avoided admitting that the Army might have a morale problem. There was an extraordinarily high rate of men choosing

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<sup>493</sup>Granatstein and Hitsman, *Broken Promises*, p. 254.

<sup>494</sup>Eayrs, *Growing up Allied*, pp. 222-233.

<sup>495</sup>Simonds, "Commentary and Observations" p. 286.

to leave the army rather than sign up for an additional term of service during Simonds' tenure as Chief of the General Staff. Yet Simonds undoubtedly believed what he said. He finally resigned in 1955 because he persisted in making public addresses on conscription against ministerial orders.<sup>496</sup> On balance, the lessons of the 1930s and the need to prepare a large reserve of trained men for warfare seemed evident to many Second World War veterans and, certainly, to Crerar and Simonds. The politicians and diplomats had not adequately prepared for war in the 1930s and no one could say with certainty that the Soviets were not going to attack soon or at some point in the future.<sup>497</sup>

The early recruitment plans reflected the view that a large number of soldiers would be required only for a short time. In 1951, Claxton approved Operation PANDA (Pacific and Atlantic), a massive recruitment effort using militia units across Canada. It was designed to bring in many volunteers for immediate training and service in Korea and Germany.<sup>498</sup> These militia units were placed on Active Service.

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<sup>496</sup>Graham, *The Price of Command*, p. 258.

<sup>497</sup>It is useful to compare at this point American and British assessments. In their global strategy papers, the British saw Europe as the focal point, but felt it unlikely the Soviets would invade soon. The American Army with occupational duties stressed the importance to the Ruhr/Rhine area for the western allies and took a long term economic approach to recovery, but neither country had a monolithic approach and there were high ranking army officers in both nations who disagreed.

<sup>498</sup> A number of individuals have suggested that Claxton acted like Sir Sam Hughes who operated outside the military chain of command in organizing recruitment for the First World War. Ron Haycock, *Sam Hughes. The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916*, Ottawa: The National Museums of Canada, 1986. pp. 179-183 and Desmond Morton, *A Peculiar Kind of Politics. Canada's Overseas Ministry in the First World War*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982. pp. 15-23. Claxton, unlike Hughes, operated

Recruits signed up for a first engagement of three years; officers and men were permitted to leave after overseas service of one year for married men and two years for single men. At this time, recruits had to be Canadian or British citizens.<sup>499</sup> Recruitment standards were dropped so that a large number of volunteers could be enrolled. Few had much time to train with their home units. Thus while the traditions and reputations of the militia units were an incentive to recruitment, some of those who joined at this time did not develop a strong identification with a particular regiment.<sup>500</sup> These recruits were supposed to serve for a temporary purpose and, while even short-term retention

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through his military chain of command. However, his recruitment scheme somewhat disrupted the unit identification which was preserved for example in the mobilization for the Second World War. Drawing upon Anthony Kellett's work, this thesis will argue, such unit identification was a fundamental aspect of combat motivation and the maintenance of discipline. While Operation Panda resulted in some serious difficulties for the brigade, the problems created were not comparable to either the Hughes method nor even to that created in first recruitment for Korea only some months prior. See Herbert Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battleground. The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on The Defence Policy of Canada*, Ottawa: National Defence, 1966, pp. 27-32.

<sup>499</sup> Kardex, 112.1(93a), CGS copy of the plan for PANDA, Organization of 27 CIB, 27 April 1951.

<sup>500</sup> Anthony Kellett, *Motivation and Behaviour. The Influence of the Regimental System. Part I. Esprit de corps* Report No. R109, Ottawa: Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, June 1991, pp. 127-129. Other documentary evidence of lack of unit affiliation exists, though it varied from unit to unit.. see *Unit designations headache for Canadian CO's in Germany* Ottawa Journal, 13 April 1953. For Highland Battalions, kilts and bonnets posed complicated changes. Lt Col H.A.A. Parker pointed out that he had soldiers who were North Nova Scotia Highlanders by day and 48th Highlanders by night. The next week, they might serve as Seaforth Highlanders. Under these circumstances, the expense and nuisance of changing serge dress and mess kits was ridiculous. Apparently things were better for the Queen's Own Rifles which had mainly men from one locality and maintained close relations with its parent unit. Language problems for Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal limited cross postings and promotion and training opportunities for them.



was a problem, it was never the intent that most PANDA volunteers would become long serving soldiers in the regular force.

However, even before the first recruitment for Korea and later Operation PANDA got underway, the Canadian Army suffered from morale and wastage (the rate at which soldiers left the forces) problems. A study conducted by the Department of National Defence in the summer of 1950 concluded that the private soldier was alienated from his unit.<sup>501</sup> Comparisons with the Royal Canadian Air Force in 1950 had revealed that the Army was experiencing a much higher loss of men.<sup>502</sup> The small regular force was required to provide training to the large number of new recruits. Figures in 1951 showed that more than half the recruitment for the Army was lost each month with an average enrollment of 1087 and losses of 599.<sup>503</sup> Even if recruitment standards had dropped, the loss of such high numbers of men who had volunteered to serve in the Army demonstrates grave difficulties; it is not credible to accept that more than one half the volunteers were unsuitable for service.

Given the already sagging morale in 1950 and the subsequent hasty recruitment, it is

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<sup>501</sup> O. Hall, H.W.F. McKay and D.N. Solomon, *Civilian to Soldier. A Sociological Study of Canadian Infantry*. Operational Research Memorandum No. 7, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1950. Note that while recruitment for Korea was underway in August of 1950, it was not included in the study results.

<sup>502</sup>The figures represented both pre and post Korea numbers.

<sup>503</sup>Kardex, 112.1.003 (d34), from Macklin to CGS, 20 May 1952.

hardly surprising that a high turnover of soldiers and discipline problems were a feature of service in Germany in 1952 and 1953.<sup>504</sup> Geoffrey Walsh recalled "losing one really excellent NCO [ non-commissioned officer ] when his long, nasty criminal record caught up with him".<sup>505</sup> Walsh also sent home a number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men who proved overly susceptible to the availability of cheap liquor in Europe. A tough disciplinarian and a Second World War veteran, he was not so worried about the relationship with the German population. Rather, he wanted to produce a highly effective fighting force as quickly as possible.<sup>506</sup> As long as key army officers thought that battle seemed likely, the priority of producing fighting men rapidly would take precedence over every other consideration.

As the sense of urgency declined, the hastily assembled PANDA recruits gradually either settled into the army life and became regular soldiers or left the service. Over the next decade or so, the voluntary and professional nature of the Canadian brigade in Germany became a source of pride rather than embarrassment as they were

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<sup>504</sup>Kardex, 112.1.003(d34), To CGS from W.H.S. Macklin, Adjutant General, 13 November 1952.

<sup>505</sup> Interview with Geoffrey Walsh, June 1997.

<sup>506</sup>*Ibid.* In his interview, Walsh made no bones about his tough policies. He had fought in the Second World War and was ready to fight again. Weakness cost lives. His job was to produce a fighting brigade quickly and efficiently. Analysis of the Kardex 410.b27 series confirms that 27 CIBG had started out with some problems and improved quickly to win sincere accolades from various British commanders. See Kardex 410.b27.061(d2), F.F. Worthington to CGS, 26 November 1953, with excerpts from various British letters attached as an example.

contrasted with other NATO forces largely made up of conscripts in the 1950s.<sup>507</sup> Yet the high turnover of soldiers continued to be a concern into the late 1950s.

The debate over how to improve army morale reveals much about the character of the Canadian Army and how professional soldiers were viewed. Both Simonds and Macklin envisioned a dedicated group of men without families, almost a priesthood. Those with families were expected to spend large amounts of time away from them and dedicate themselves fully to duty.<sup>508</sup>

These views were not shared by Claxton, or the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, Charles Foulkes, both of whom believed that families were a positive influence on soldiers, providing them with stability and a home environment when they were not working.<sup>509</sup> Claxton, Foulkes and others believed that the presence of families prevented some of the drunkenness, venereal disease and violent interaction which gave servicemen an unpleasant reputation and with improvement in behaviour, they might even assist in the

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<sup>507</sup>Colin McInnes, *Hot War, Cold War. The British Army's Way in Warfare, 1945-95*, p. 12, noting that "many in the British Army welcomed the end of National Service and the accompanying chores of training unenthusiastic conscripts."

<sup>508</sup>Captain Harry Thornton (now deceased) lamented not having seen his children growing up in the 1950s and 1960s, having always been on training or occupied with his men. (Chats with Harry when he was providing full-time day care to his granddaughter in the 1980s).

<sup>509</sup>Kardex, 112.1 (d99) 27 CIB, October 1952 to July 1953, Memorandum from Brooke Claxton to Simonds, 30 April 1953.

retention of a better quality of recruit.<sup>510</sup> Soldiers with families received an allowance and were therefore more expensive to retain. Yet, both the minister and the chairman favoured their presence.<sup>511</sup>

In 1952, Army headquarters began to reassess recruitment, training and organization. With special service forces for Korea and Europe and a regular force and a militia, each with its own conditions and terms of service, administration had become cumbersome. Macklin reported on the personnel situation in 1951 and 1952. Married men in the brigade in Germany were believed to be the source of several difficulties. Married men were only required to serve for one year. Many of them were non-commissioned officers and were expected to provide leadership and experience, to know their men well and, through this knowledge, to guide carefully the younger recruits through adjustment problems. It was estimated that it took about a year for these leaders to become effective in a unit and, just as they became effective, most of them left.

Other problems were also identified in Macklin's report. Poor screening on enrollment,

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<sup>510</sup>Kardex 493.009(d147) Correspondence, instructions, reports, etc re: Organization of Canadian Infantry Brigade Germany, October 1953 - March 1957. Notes for Brigadier Anderson, encouraging stable family lives for soldiers and contact with decent girls to improve morale and behaviour, n.d..

<sup>511</sup>One can even see aspects of this debate in Parliament. See for example: *Hansard*, 15 April 1953. Conservative Member of Parliament, Walter Dinsdale, stated that recruit advertising should stress the duties and obligation of service instead of the attractive lifestyle; and *Hansard*, 15 April 1953. Liberal Member of Parliament, David Croll argued that it was unfair to regard wading pools, refrigerators, rugs and similar commodities as frills when most civilians had them.

including the recruitment of mentally defective and delinquent men as well as hardened criminals, with a concentration upon numbers rather than quality, had resulted in poor quality recruits. In addition, Macklin cited the existence of good civilian opportunities for employment (created in part by the expansion of defence industry) and some lack of management skills as factors affecting the re-enlistment of soldiers.<sup>512</sup> Finally, he noted that some regiments had better retention than others, confirming his view that good officers who knew their men well could make a difference in their decisions to stay in the forces.<sup>513</sup>

Macklin and Simonds proposed that married men not be recruited for service. They were especially opposed to recruits with large families which might result in compassionate postings. Macklin suggested that unmarried soldiers be denied permission to marry. Married soldiers were not simply more expensive, he argued; they

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<sup>512</sup> Kardex file, 112.1.003(d34), Manpower and Manpower Ceiling. Notes on the result of the visit of the AG to Petawawa Camp, November 1951. Please note that the discourse in these files was exclusively masculine confirming Cynthia Enloe's conclusion that combat forces were drawn from an ideological construction excluding women. See her *Does Khaki Become You ?* and notions explored by Ruth Roach Pierson in *They're Still Women After all. The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986, pp. 14-21, 262. The language used in the files and the content of the files here confirms Pierson's finding that "Above all, women's exclusion/exemption from combat duty and official arms bearing ensured that the male sex retained exclusive access to positions of high command within the military." Thus it is important to note that while I have used such non-sexist phrases as "personnel" and "management", the original text used the term "man management" and other phrases which referred only to the male sex.

<sup>513</sup> *Ibid.*

were divided in loyalties and responsibilities.<sup>514</sup> During the crucial time of training, all servicemen had to be completely dedicated to the task at hand, he went on. They could not be distracted by domestic life. The army and their men required an absolute concentration of attention.

In John Baynes's classic study, *Morale. A Study of Men and Courage. The Second Scottish Rifles at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle*, he notes that army units actually mimicked family structure and provided soldiers with a sense of camaraderie and closeness which was essential to their fighting morale.<sup>515</sup> The emotional ties of families might, therefore, impede the development of unit cohesion.<sup>516</sup> Macklin and Simonds derived their vision from a tradition in which combat motivation was derived from the closeness experienced by men who were somewhat isolated from others and who shared meals, troubles and activities as well as work. Family attachments were not encouraged.

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<sup>514</sup> Married soldiers were more expensive because they were entitled to support for their families. At the outbreak of the Second World War, men without dependents were preferred; married men with four or more dependents were not to be enlisted. At one point, men with more than 3 dependents were asked either to accept payment for a maximum of three dependents or take a discharge. This policy was relaxed in November 1941 to allow for payments for the third and fourth children of some classes of soldiers and, by January 1943, to allow for payments to up to six dependent children and a dependent father or mother. C.P. Stacey, *Six Years of War. The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific*, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960, pp. 52-3.

<sup>515</sup> John Baynes, *Morale. A Study of Men and Courage. The Second Scottish Rifles at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, 1915*, London: Cassell, 1967, pp. 150-151, 210-212.

<sup>516</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 150-151.

Given this tradition, the decision to send dependents over to Europe seemed puzzling. In the formulation of my original hypothesis, some evidence that the first brigade in Europe, officially without dependents, had poor relations with the German community had led me to propose that the decision to include dependents was intended to improve relations with the Germans. My investigation of Canadian Army Headquarters files has not supported this contention. Although many documents produced in 1952 and 1953, especially from those emanating from officials in Germany and from the Department of External Affairs, indicate the importance of establishing good relations with the German community, there is simply no evidence that this factor played any part in the decision to send dependents to Europe. In fact, the evidence that exists suggests that dependents were not welcomed at this time.

In 1953, many German dwellings were still requisitioned for use by foreign troops and, with many displaced people in camps, there was a severe shortage of good accommodation. The West German government, having no say at all in the matter from a legal perspective, asked to be informed well in advance of any decision to allow dependents to come to Germany. Both the Canadian and German governments worried about the complex problems which might arise if dependents violated German laws. Dependents were not covered by the clause in the Occupation Forces Law, which had been extended to include Canadian troops.<sup>517</sup>

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<sup>517</sup> Kardex, 493.009 (d147) Correspondence, Instructions, Reports, etc Re: Organization of Canadian Infantry Brigade in Germany, October 1953 - March 1957. See Chapter five for further details.

Claxton considered sending families to Europe in 1951: he decided against this measure in view of the difficulty of evacuating them in the event of war.<sup>518</sup> By 1953, with the death of Stalin and Soviet policies to improve economic conditions in Eastern Europe, the threat assessment in Central Europe had diminished. In the mid-1950s, Canadian attention shifted to the Soviet bomber threat to North America and plans for continental defence, national survival and nuclear warfare. The traditional lines between combat zones and safe areas were blurred as North American cities became targets for Soviet nuclear weapons.<sup>519</sup>

While Simonds had opposed the inclusion of families, his successors as Chiefs of the General Staff, Graham, Clark and Walsh, favoured policies for the inclusion and welfare of dependents.<sup>520</sup> Walsh had unofficially brought his wife to Europe when he served as the first brigadier, although he knew Simonds disapproved.<sup>521</sup> Simonds was forced to

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<sup>518</sup>DHH, 73/1223, Raymont Papers, Minutes of Cabinet Defence Committee, 15 January 1951.

<sup>519</sup>John A. English, *Marching through Chaos. The Descent of Armies in Theory and Practice*. In Chapter five, English points out that nuclear strategy was derived from Douhet's strategic bombing theories. The targets were the economic, industrial, well-populated heartland.

<sup>520</sup>See DHH, 73/1223, files 734-737

<sup>521</sup> Several hundred other wives went to Germany on an unofficial basis. An additional several hundred soldiers married overseas. During my interview with Walsh, he indicated he had been away from his family for much of his career and enough was enough. His wife stayed in a hotel close by in Hannover. He ate dinner and spent a few hours with her once a week. It was difficult for officers and men to get overnight passes so even for those families in Germany, there was little opportunity to be together for extended periods of time. Brigadier Bill Anderson also brought his wife against Simond's wishes. See Dominck Graham, *The Price of Command*, p. 271.



allow dependents to accompany the troops when the Royal Canadian Air Force decided to send its servicemen's families to Europe in 1953. As a new service, the air force had a different culture than the army and was not as bound by tradition. There was probably less sense of risk to families located at these bases as the air force thought more in terms of strategic targets located away from the bases.<sup>522</sup> For the brigade in Europe at least, combat was expected to take place very close to where families would be located.<sup>523</sup>

In 1953, the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal W. A. Curtis, based his decision to send dependents overseas on the fact that one third of the airmen already had their families with them and were facing all the problems of supporting them without a structure to assist. In a time of war, he argued, families were willing to accept separation, but in the absence of battle, in a country with voluntary service, service families as a small group of the population could not be expected to make such unusual sacrifices.<sup>524</sup> The policy to allow dependents to accompany the airmen was justified by an expected beneficial effect upon recruitment, re-engagement, morale, and a lessening of welfare problems.

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<sup>522</sup> As strategic bombing and nuclear missiles resulted in cities becoming potential targets, although air bases were also targets, the families of airmen located close to air bases were not really more exposed than many other civilians. The air force was used to thinking in terms of combat at a distance from the air bases where their families would be located.

<sup>523</sup> Sean Maloney, *War Without Battles. Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951-1993*, pp. 130-167. Even with the adoption of forward defence, the combat zone was still very close to Soest.

<sup>524</sup> DHH, 73/1223, file 888, Curtis to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 16 September 1952. He appended an extract from the wife of an airman.

While technical skills were required in all services, they were particularly emphasized in the air force. Curtis indicated that his most experienced men were usually married and, in his view, fathers were needed to bring up children properly and to assist with family problems. He wanted key personnel to stay in place for some time and, by allowing dependents to remain with airmen and by supporting families, he hoped to retain married personnel. Given these priorities, the Royal Canadian Air Force had a more positive view of married officers and men seeing them as valuable long term assets.<sup>525</sup>

During the discussion of this issue, comparisons with the Americans and British reinforced the idea that the presence of dependents would improve morale. Curtis briefly referred to Eisenhower's desire to create a "we are here to stay" impression on the French population. Though it was later recognized that dependents increased the sense of stability, a crucial part of the NATO role in Germany, this line of reasoning was not used extensively in the debate.<sup>526</sup> Arguments addressed issues of morale, efficiency and character rather than long term foreign policy goals.

Admiral Edmond R. Mainguy, the Chief of the Naval Staff, generally agreed with the views presented by the air force. His staff prepared a memorandum which demonstrated that the expense of maintaining separated families in Canada was not

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<sup>525</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>526</sup> DHH, 73/1223, file 888, Dependents - Service Personnel, 1953-1970.

much less than sending dependents overseas.<sup>527</sup> This argument undermined Simonds, who had used the navy as an example of a service where separations of families had been well accepted by all members.<sup>528</sup>

Simonds made little comment upon Curtis' reference to Eisenhower's dictum, except to point out that he knew that "neither the British nor the US Commanders on the spot are satisfied with the situation" and that anomalies between different categories of personnel allowed to bring dependents had created morale problems in American forces.<sup>529</sup> In fact, Eisenhower had not meant the phrase "we are here to stay" to imply service beyond the 1950s. He declared that "if in ten years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national defence purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project will have failed."<sup>530</sup>

Simonds finally decided to send the soldiers' dependents to Germany because Army morale, already very low, would further decline if the Air Force men were allowed to

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<sup>527</sup>DHH, 73/1223, file 888, Memorandum to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, from Mainguy, 18 October 1952.

<sup>528</sup> Richard Gimblett, "Crescent Reflections: The Post War Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian External Policy, and the cruise of H.M.C.S. Crescent to China, 1949", draft Doctoral thesis, Laval University, 1999. While the Navy experienced problems in the immediate post war period, Gimblett argues that, by late 1948, morale was improving and wastage was at an acceptable rate, though percentages are not available.

<sup>529</sup>DHH, 73/1223, file 888, Simonds to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, 5 November 1952.

<sup>530</sup>Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower. Soldier, General of the Army, President-elect, 1890-1952*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, p. 506.

bring their dependents overseas, and the soldiers were not. The sending of dependents to Europe and the building of facilities to support them was not indicative of a long term commitment of troops to Europe on the part of the Americans or for the Canadians. Rather, dependents were included as they were perceived to improve the morale and retention of servicemen.

Simonds' objections to the presence of dependents were derived from his vision of the professional soldier. Simonds regretted that the Army had built married quarters rather than good officers' and sergeants' messes at the end of the Second World War. Officers' and sergeants' messes increased camaraderie and cohesiveness in the unit.<sup>531</sup> Though some married quarters were required, policies which favoured the needs of married officers and men, in his view, resulted in early marriages among servicemen.<sup>532</sup> Simonds was emphatic and bitter on this subject. His own unhappy marriage may well have coloured his views.<sup>533</sup> Even in conceding the decision, he added several paragraphs to his memorandum, describing the dangers of early marriages, noting that young soldiers acted upon romantic notions, but soon found the burdens of maintaining wives and families far greater than they had first supposed. Cost

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<sup>531</sup>These messes sometimes allowed guests, but only at particular restricted times. Women were virtually excluded most of the time along with nearly anyone who was not a member.

<sup>532</sup>DHH, 73/1223, file 888, Simonds to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, 5 November 1952.

<sup>533</sup>Dominick Graham, *The Price of Command. A Biography of General Guy Simonds*. Simonds fell in love with a married woman he met in England during the war and just before his retirement began another long term liaison. His unhappy marriage was no secret.

was not the real issue, he continued; professional servicemen should not be distracted from their duties, and early marriages, in particular, were damaging to the individual and to the service.<sup>534</sup>

Simonds and Mainguy had noted that there might be considerably more expense involved if the government became responsible for the education of children, medical care of dependents, provision of welfare and amenities and the diplomatic status of dependents.<sup>535</sup> They were right. The government had begun to take responsibility for the education of servicemen's children at the end of Second World War.<sup>536</sup> Resources required for the maintenance of entire communities in Europe took away from the fighting capabilities of the brigade.<sup>537</sup>

The policy on the evacuation of dependents from Europe remained unresolved. In 1953, Macklin pointed out that the brigade and the Air Force Division located in Europe

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<sup>534</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>535</sup>DHH, 73/1223, file 888, Simonds to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, 5 November 1952.

<sup>536</sup>René Morin, *DND Dependents's Schools, 1921-1983*, Ottawa: Directorate of History, National Defence Headquarters, 1986. Morin records that before the Second World War, little was done to assist servicemen with respect to education of their children. In 1947, with small regular forces, the government recognized its obligation to provide free education to the children of servicemen stationed in places where access to schools was difficult or costly. As the forces grew, this obligation would become far more costly, especially as schools were established overseas.

<sup>537</sup>Pay and allowances went from \$139,110,000 in the fiscal year 1955-6 to \$206,365,883 in the fiscal year 1963-4. During this same time, the rental of accommodation went from \$1,100,000 to \$1,742,000 and the amount spent upon repair and upkeep of equipment, for example, declined from \$ 9,645,000 to \$8,500,000. DHH, 84/334, A. C. Grant Fonds.

would have about 13,000 dependents, with additional teachers and other support personnel, but that it would be impossible to evacuate them in an emergency situation.<sup>538</sup> No firm or realistic plan was developed even in 1963, though a number of possible escape routes were discussed.<sup>539</sup> These included travel by land to Spain as the initial proposals to move dependents to Britain were abandoned when it became clear that it was vulnerable to nuclear attack.

The Berlin and Cuban missile crises caused the evacuation problem to be re-addressed, though not resolved, as the possibility of warfare increased again in the early 1960s. Diplomats briefly considered the possibility of withdrawing Canadian dependents from Germany. Possible panic amongst West Germans was one of the main reasons given by the Department of External Affairs for keeping Canadians in Germany during the Berlin Crisis of 1961. Canadians sought to reinforce an impression of stability and security in face of various Soviet postures. American policy was also a key issue, diplomats flatly stating that Canada would not act independently of the United States in this regard.<sup>540</sup>

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<sup>538</sup>Kardex, 112.3M2.003 (d29) Macklin to Simonds, 28 January 1953.

<sup>539</sup>Canada. House of Commons, Special Committee on Defence, *Minutes of Proceedings and evidence no. 17* October 1963, Witness: Geoffrey Walsh. Noting a plan to have dependents go to a safe-keeping area, but nothing for actual withdrawal.

<sup>540</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 3489, file 6-A-GER-1949/1- The file also illustrates the significance of American plans to Canadian consideration. The Americans were deliberately leaking information about their readiness to defend Berlin in order discourage possible Soviet, or more likely, East German action. NATO solidarity was crucial.

Many Canadian servicemen and their families in Europe took the crises and the possibility of Soviet attack very seriously, though a few did not.<sup>541</sup> Some officers put gold aside for their dependents to use in negotiation in case they suddenly had to escape from Germany; others had dependents who intended to wait for them in the basements of their homes. All indicated that their families were willing to share the risks and that they preferred to be together.<sup>542</sup> Geoffrey Walsh, as the Chief of the General Staff in 1963, argued that most soldiers would fight even harder to protect territory with the knowledge that their families were vulnerable, though he acknowledged that a few might find their anxiety affected their concentration.<sup>543</sup>

The high turnover of soldiers diminished as policies addressed the quality of life and, by 1957, better and more accommodation for families was recognized to be an important

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<sup>541</sup> While dependents were not withdrawn, in September 1961, the government decided not send new dependents over with soldiers. nonetheless, families continued to accompany soldiers unofficially. By 14 December 1961, ten families had come at their own expense and more were expected. The British, it was noted, continued to build permanent married quarters and to bring dependents. Brigadier Cameron Ware recommended that dependents be allowed to come under these circumstances. See DHH, Kardex, 112.1.009 (d37) Ware to Walsh, 14 December 1961.

<sup>542</sup> Interviews with Geoffrey Walsh, John Starnes, Ramsay Withers, Bob Rayment, Bob Caldwell, John Martenson, and in some cases, brief consultations with their wives, 1995-1998. This particular issue and the issue of combat motivation - with families in the areas, warrants further investigation - though not in this thesis. Nonetheless, reaction from the audience at an Ottawa military history colloquia on 28 January 1998 indicated that while the documents, especially those at the diplomatic level, might show a fairly low expectation of actual invasion during these two crises, many people, though certainly not all in Germany, experienced a very real sense of threat at this time.

<sup>543</sup> Canada. Special Committee on Defence. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 17* October 1963, Witnesses: Paul Hellyer and Geoffrey Walsh.

factor keeping good soldiers in service under the Chiefs of the General Staff, Howard Graham and, later, S.F. Clark.<sup>544</sup> Walsh, drawing upon his own experiences, noted in 1962 that morale was linked to disruption in family life. He requested that postings be announced well in advance so that families could plan their moves with a minimum of difficulties for all family members.<sup>545</sup> As most officers and non-commissioned officers were married, Walsh believed that stability in manpower was better achieved by including families.<sup>546</sup>

But the issue of whether families really belonged in Europe was raised again. In 1961, as mentioned in Chapter Three, Jean Allard, the Vice Chief of the General Staff, observed that a substantial portion of the manpower assigned to the brigade was required for the support of dependents at the expense of the military role.<sup>547</sup> The Royal Canadian Air Force was required to re-examine its policies with respect to the Air Division dependents at this time. The Acting Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice Marshal D.M. Smith, went back to all the original arguments about efficiency, recruitment, morale and

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<sup>544</sup>For example: see Canada. Department of National Defence. *Annual Report, 1957* Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1957, p. 18.

<sup>545</sup>DHH, 73/1223, file 736, Rank Structure Committee. Walsh to the Chairman of the Rank Structure Committee, 24 April 1962.

<sup>546</sup>Canada, Special Committee on Defence, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 17* October 1963, Witnesses: Paul Hellyer and Geoffrey Walsh.

<sup>547</sup>DHH, 84/126, *Fonds Allard*, file 167, Report on VCGS visit to Europe.



loss of men.<sup>548</sup> So it was on military grounds, and almost purely military grounds, that the air force justified the presence of dependents.

Walsh agreed with these arguments. Moreover, the army could not hope to keep their soldiers content if the airmen had families with them and they did not. There was pressure to develop uniform conditions of service not simply for administrative convenience but in order to ensure that army morale remained better than it had been under Simonds.

The inclusion of families was only one of several issues considered in the debate to improve morale. During the Korean Conflict, soldiers might serve in Korea, be sent back to a Canadian post located far away from their families, and then be required to serve in Germany, never having the opportunity to spend much time with their families. Simonds suggested the creation of home stations for units in Canada to provide for more unit and family stability. The idea behind home stations was that families could stay there while the soldiers were rotated to and from the stations. There were still cases where families separated from soldiers in Germany might be required to leave married quarters at home stations in order to make room for the families of soldiers

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<sup>548</sup> DHH, 73/1223, file 888. D.M. Smith, Air Vice Marshal, Acting Chief of the Air Staff to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, (now F.S. Miller), 23 August 1961. The Army continued to be less enthusiastic and General Allard, as VCGS, particularly pointed to the resources used for dependents as a problem in his 1961 analysis of the brigade's weaknesses.

currently serving at the units themselves.<sup>549</sup> So this solution was far from perfect.

A variety of systems for rotating troops was used by allied forces: Canadians studied the American and British examples when they made their decisions. Expense, administrative expediency, and operational requirements for specialized skills were significant considerations. The relationship with the German communities was hardly mentioned in these policies developed by the Army hierarchy in Ottawa. This lack of evidence suggests that these army officers were somewhat isolated from diplomatic considerations. There was little close communication between the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence with respect to how the army's character might affect the achievement of foreign policy goals.

The decision to provide the brigade for service in Germany was undoubtedly derived from the recognition that Canada had long term interests preserving peace and security in this region. Yet neither the diplomats nor the military realized at the outset that the brigade was going to remain in Germany for a long time. The temporary nature of the original commitment undoubtedly made it more difficult to develop personnel policies to support it.

Canadians had relied upon a citizen army in both world wars. The militia regimental system was designed so that soldiers from one geographical area served together,

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<sup>549</sup>Kardex, 112.1.003 (d34), Memorandum to CGS from W.H.S. Macklin, 13 November 1952.

enhancing regimental loyalty and combat motivation.<sup>550</sup> There was a sense of association with the local community which was a part of the militia experience. In war, this system worked imperfectly. Even during the Second World War when there was an concerted attempt to maintain regiments, soldiers were sometimes transferred to units as replacement for casualties without consideration of their regimental identity, creating problems if they were required to fight before being socially integrated into the new unit.<sup>551</sup>

In peacetime, the militia regiments allowed a broad spectrum of Canadian men to train part-time while living in one community, maintaining civilian careers and having families if they wished.<sup>552</sup> The militia formed in times of peace and citizen armies formed in times of war were more representative of all Canadians than the small professional army had ever been.<sup>553</sup> The relationship between the militia and regular force was re-evaluated by

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<sup>550</sup>Anthony Kellett, *Regimental Organization*, DSEA Staff note no. 3/85. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, February 1985 and *Combat Motivation. The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle*.

<sup>551</sup>Kellett, *Combat Motivation*, pp. 123-129.

<sup>552</sup>T.C. Willett, *A Heritage at risk*. pp. 122-3. Willett notes that militia demands interfered with family life. He describes the high number of students and single subalterns, commenting upon the persistence of the traditional idea that subalterns be single. Most of commanding officers and majors in his study which focuses on 1976 to 1980 were married.

<sup>553</sup>Although the Canadian Women's Army Corps (CWAC) was brought back into service during the 1950s and 1960s, women were excluded from combat. CWACs were brought back to free able-bodied men for combat roles and there were very few in the regular forces. As is well known, Francophones were also less represented, but there were no regulations which prohibited their participation as was the case for women. See Jean Pariseau and Serge Bernier, *Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces, volumes 1 and 2* Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1988, 1994.

the Kennedy Report. It was prepared, at the request of Simonds, by a committee chaired by Lieutenant-General Howard Kennedy in 1953. While the linkages between militia and regular units were strengthened by its implementation, for the first time "the militia would become subordinate in every sense to the regular army".<sup>554</sup> It was still not realized, however, that the regular army had taken on a permanent overseas commitment.

The professional army was the choice of a select group of men with the inclination and abilities to plan and prepare for combat as a full time career. Few could develop the kind of community roots on which the militia depended as transfers were frequent. Conditions of modern warfare resulted in the growth of support functions, logistics, administration, and technical skills, but the army hierarchy emphasized fighting capabilities and limited the number of support personnel enlisted until the late 1950s.<sup>555</sup> In Germany, civilians were preferred for these duties because they were much cheaper and some combat soldiers, especially the younger ones, complained about being

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<sup>554</sup> DHH, Stephen J. Harris, "Militia Reform" in his biographical file. See also T.C. Willett, *A Heritage at risk. The Canadian Militia as a social institution*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1987, pp. 189-191. While this policy preceded MC 48 which was adopted by NATO in 1954, it was in line with NATO's policy of emphasis upon "forces-in-being" which was mentioned in MC 48. See Pedlow, *NATO Strategy Documents*, xviii.

<sup>555</sup> E.L.M. Burns, *Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945*. Burns compares American and Canadian statistics on combat soldiers during the Second World War, arguing that the ratio of support troops for Canada was far too high and that Canadians might not have had to send National Registration Mobilization Act (NRMA) men overseas in 1944 had they been able to draw upon volunteers for combat.

assigned non-combat duties.<sup>556</sup>

At the end of the Second World War, many capable men left the Army. A good number of those that remained were seasoned in battle and many who joined in the 1950s had either served in the Second World War or Korea.<sup>557</sup> Canadians generally maintained high recruitment standards, including physical fitness, psychological profile testing, education and other criteria which, even when they were temporarily lowered, compared favourably with many other nations.<sup>558</sup>

French Canadians were still not represented in the army in proportion to their numbers in Canada. The idea that bilingualism might benefit the forces began to appear in some statements, though there was resistance to such policies, particularly from Simonds.<sup>559</sup> Ralph Campney, the Minister of National Defence, addressed the Canadian Services Colleges Advisory Board on 21 January 1955.

A bilingual officer is much better prepared for his responsibilities... And with our

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<sup>556</sup>Kardex, 112.1 (d99) Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence to General Simonds, Chief of the General Staff, 30 April 1953.

<sup>557</sup> A survey of 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group in May of 1954, revealed that 89 or 28 percent of the officers and 1386 or 27 percent of the other ranks had served in Korea; 263 or 84 percent of the officers and 1684 or 32 percent of the other ranks had served in the Second World War. It also mentioned that 252 Officers and 1786 other ranks were married. See Kardex, 112.1 (d148) *Statistic 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade Group*.

<sup>558</sup> Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, *The Defence Policies of Nations. A comparative study*. 2nd edition, Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1989. see pp. 59, 172-174, 280, 285, 305-6, 311, 373, 535-6.

<sup>559</sup>Jean Pariseau and Serge Bernier, *French Canadians and bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces, Volume 1, 1763-1969. The fear of a parallel army*, pp. 150-169, noting that French Canadians were recruited, but left the forces.

NATO allies in Europe, the second language is a great help in increasing understanding and speeding up communication... In these days an officer must have some of the qualities of a diplomat, both for military purposes and as a representative of Canada abroad...<sup>560</sup>

This recognition of bilingual requirements was crucial, but a bare beginning in terms of policy development. Campney not only believed that bilingual officers were required, he articulated the notion that officers required some diplomatic skills. The idea that bilingual qualifications improved Canada's representation abroad was apparent in his speech and he also suggested that more French Canadians were required in the officer corps.<sup>561</sup>

In principle, at least one French Canadian unit was always assigned to duty in Germany, and, as new units were formed, the recruitment of French Canadians and the use of the French language in at least some units stationed in Germany was a continuing consideration, but this requirement for representation did not result in providing much in the way of French services for francophone families.<sup>562</sup>

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<sup>560</sup>DHH, 72/918 - Brooke Claxton's speeches, includes Ralph Campney and George Pearkes.

<sup>561</sup>*Ibid.* Unsurprisingly, Campney also suggested that bilingual officers were an advantage in Canada.

<sup>562</sup>DHH, Graham Papers, declassified and accessioned but not catalogued, Graham to the Minister, 14 December 1956, discussing organization of the Canadian Army and Jean Pariseau and Serge Bernier, *French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces. Volume I. 1763-1969: The Fear of a Parallel Army*, Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, 1986, pp. 144-206 and René Morin, *DND Dependents' Schools, 1921-1983*, Ottawa: Directorate of History, National Defence Headquarters, 1986, pp. 35-75.

Gradually between 1951 and 1964, the professional army increased in size and importance and, with the decline of the militia in the late 1950s, the notion that the professional army represented Canada and Canadians may be discerned in a few defence documents. In 1963, R.J. Sutherland, the chair of a committee on defence policy and a Canadian strategist, noted that in Europe land forces had a symbolic and psychological value based upon their historical roles as representatives of national will.<sup>563</sup> Air forces and navies did not have this historic association in European societies. Although most Canadians did not share this concept of the army, the brigade group in Europe might benefit from European perceptions about this broader function. For this reason, Sutherland argued that the presence of the Canadian brigade in Europe was more crucial than the RCAF's air division because Europeans perceived the army as a stronger symbol of Canadian intent.<sup>564</sup>

With the *White Paper* of 1964, the symbolic and psychological value of the brigade in a long-term commitment was finally acknowledged. By this time, it was evident that the

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<sup>563</sup>The concept of the nation in arms was Napoleonic. By the First World War, this concept was replaced by nations at war. Both the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century wars had involved massive struggles of European land forces in a way which shaped thinking about armies and their relations to their societies. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to Present*, Second Revised Edition, New York: Harper & Row, 1986, p. 916.

<sup>564</sup> DHH, 72/153, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Defence policy, 30 September 1963. Chairman: R. J. Sutherland, p. 115. While this was Sutherland's argument, please note that the Royal Canadian Air Force's strike and reconnaissance capability was impressive compared with most European Air Forces at this time.

behaviour of Canadian soldiers would reflect on Canada. This development was still a long way from the notion that the professional Army, rather than the militia, should represent Canadian citizens.<sup>565</sup>

As noted, the regimental system was enhanced by regional loyalties, allowing recruits from similar backgrounds and localities to remain together, increasing their sense of belonging which led to unit cohesiveness, combat motivation and good morale.<sup>566</sup> A system of battle honours and regimental histories reinforced pride. While allowing for the formation of French-speaking regiments and units, it also resulted in some isolation for these units. This difficulty was exacerbated in Europe where specialist training was not provided in French. The army was still ahead of the air force and the navy in allowing Francophones to operate in French units using the French language, and so it might be regarded as more representative of Canadians than these forces for that reason.<sup>567</sup> Yet the clannishness and competition associated with regimental organization sometimes created obstacles for rotation, reinforcement and administration and impeded cooperation between units.

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<sup>565</sup>Gow, "The Opinions of French Canadians", pp. 465-468, noting that several French Canadian observers criticized the lack of French in the forces and that very few senior officers were French in 1951, but that the establishment of the military college in St. Jean improved matters.

<sup>566</sup> Kellett, *Motivation and Behaviour. The Influence of the Regimental System. Part I. Esprit de corps*, Report No. R109.

<sup>567</sup>Jean Pariseau and Serge Bernier, *French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces. Volume 1, 1763-1969. The Fear of a Parallel Army*, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1988, pp. 143-175.



The Army re-organized in 1953 and again in 1957 and rotation changed to allow for greater continuity of service. In 1953, the regular army was expanded with new regiments created.<sup>568</sup> The entire brigade in Europe rotated together as an entity every two years which allowed men serving together to remain together.<sup>569</sup> The rate of loss of men began to improve and reached twelve percent in 1958.<sup>570</sup> In this year, the Army adopted a three year rotation for most units in Europe to allow for better unit cohesion and to improve continuity of service. However, the brigade as whole did not rotate and units often experienced some changes in personnel in between rotations because individuals were required for postings at various times.<sup>571</sup> Yet overall, conditions were better and unit cohesion improved under the new system.

Enlistment criteria changed with the new organization in 1953. Any legally landed person with two years of residence in Canada was a potential recruit. A soldier did not

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<sup>568</sup> Additional battalions were added to the Royal Canadian Regiment, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and the Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Regiment. New infantry units were formed including: The Canadian Guards, the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada and The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada. The last two were created from militia regiments. The 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's ) and The Fort Garry Horse from the militia were also added to the regular armoured regiments.

<sup>569</sup>Anthony Kellett, *Combat Motivation*, pp. 128-131.

<sup>570</sup>Canada, Department of National Defence, *Annual Report, 1959*, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1960, p. 43. By 1958, the army wastage rate was 12 percent which was lower than it had been in many years, though not as low as in the RCAF at 10.7 percent. Interestingly enough, in the 1981, the Sub-Committee on National Defence of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs noted that the attrition rate for the forces as a whole remained "unacceptably high" at around 13 percent per year. See Anthony. Kellett, *The Impact of Personnel Stability on Unit Cohesion*, p. 16.

<sup>571</sup>Anthony Kellett, *The impact of personnel stability on unit cohesion*, DSEA Staff Note no. 4/85 Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1985, p. 26.

have to be a Canadian citizen to join the regular force and to serve in Germany.

Individuals with criminal records were considered and accepted if they were otherwise outstanding, a criterion which reinforces the notion that a successful soldier might not have impeccable behaviour by some civilian standards. As the Army provided structure, discipline and guidance, it was seen by some as an appropriate environment to improve the performance of less well behaved young men.<sup>572</sup> Army headquarters was responsible for approving the acceptance of individuals with criminal records.

Individuals with family or financial problems, those with personality or mental defects, and married applicants under the age of 21 were all deemed ineligible. The age range for recruits was between 18 and 40, and 17 year olds were accepted with their parents' permission.<sup>573</sup> The initial terms of service were for three or six years, which allowed soldiers to make a short commitment similar to the Special Service force. To avoid the loss of men, personnel were encouraged to transfer to the corps of their choice provided they re-engaged. As a wife was a greater liability than a criminal record for a young recruit, the emphasis upon fighting capability seems evident, though cost was also a factor. Married soldiers received an allowance.

The Army wanted young soldiers fit for combat. With the growth of the regular army,

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<sup>572</sup>At least one retired soldier whose childhood was partially spent in foster homes indicated that the Army probably prevented him from becoming a full time criminal as it was the first time in his life that he had regular meals, consistent discipline and a sense of belonging. His name is not included among those interviewed for reasons of privacy.

<sup>573</sup>Kardex, 113.3M3.009 (d2) - AG policy book 1956. Directorate of Manning.

better retention of men and changes in the nature of warfare, the long term career soldier and the highly trained soldier were becoming more common. In 1955, the Canadian Army enrollment of soldiers in Britain continued to favour single soldiers and those with fewer than three dependents, but soldiers with special skills, some of them former British soldiers, could be enrolled even if they had more than three dependents.<sup>574</sup> Canadian citizenship was not a requirement and, though exact figures are unavailable, many non-Canadians were recruited.<sup>575</sup>

Flexibility was crucial. In 1957, M.L. Brennan, the Adjutant General, reported that large families experienced problems in Europe. Howard Graham, the Chief of the General Staff, placed no restrictions on the movement to Europe of soldiers with large families. However, these soldiers were informed of the difficulties they might experience in Europe with the hopes that those soldiers concerned might consent to remain in

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<sup>574</sup> The Canadian Army continued to enroll British citizens and former British soldiers in the 1950s. One of these, a non-Commissioned Officer, had five children when he was enrolled. Interview with Norman Patrick, July 1997.

<sup>575</sup> The Canadian Citizenship Act was proclaimed 1 July 1946 by Parliament. It came into force on 1 January 1947. Kardex, 364.009 (d5) *Canadian Citizenship Status*, C.A. Ballard, AAG, Headquarters, Prairie Command, 1 October 1956. This memorandum noted that many service personnel and their dependents did not possess Canadian Citizenship status, including individuals who thought they did have it. The memorandum requested that all personnel be advised of the advantages of Canadian citizenship, especially in view of the difficulties and delays experienced by those non-Canadians rotating to the brigade in Europe. However, note that there were very few documents found which addressed the issue of citizenship. See for example : 84/66, *Personnel Selection Services in the Canadian Forces, 1938-1964*, by Major R.J. Fantham and Captain M.D. McCormack, 1968 which does not mention the need for Canadian citizenship.

Canada.<sup>576</sup> The Army Council also sought ministerial approval for the payment of married allowances to soldiers under the age of twenty-one who were sent outside of Canada.<sup>577</sup> In 1958, S. F. Clark, the Chief of the General Staff, directed that soldiers who objected to going to Europe be discharged at once unless investigation revealed good compassionate grounds for their objections.<sup>578</sup>

Recruitment of non-Canadians into the regular Canadian Army continued into the 1960s, but, in 1963, Chief of the General Staff Walsh raised the issue of Canadian citizenship for soldiers posted abroad. Walsh indicated that it was wrong "in principle" to send non-Canadian citizens abroad as soldiers and directed W. A. B. Anderson, the Adjutant General, to ensure that all those posted outside of Canada were citizens of Canada.<sup>579</sup> Because more expensive technical training was provided to regular soldiers, there were attempts to ensure that they would continue to serve, especially if they were due to renew their contracts.<sup>580</sup>

Gradually the character of the army was changing. The changes were far from systematic and decisions tended to address the current pragmatic requirements of the army. One of the problems identified by the Army Council was insufficient career opportunities for officers. In 1961, a study comparing the American, British and

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<sup>576</sup>DHH, 73/1223, file 1707, Army Council Minutes, 18 June 1957.

<sup>577</sup>*Ibid.*, 19 March 1957.

<sup>578</sup>DHH, 73/1223, file 1712, Army Council Minutes, 25 August 1959.

<sup>579</sup>DHH, 73/1223, file 1722, Army Council Minutes, 6 February 1963. Service abroad included peacekeeping tours as well as service in Germany.

<sup>580</sup>DHH, 73/1223 file 1717, Army Council Minutes, 7 May 1962, Item 2.

Canadian armies concluded that Canadian Army officers suffered from a lack of promotion opportunities.<sup>581</sup> At the highest levels in NATO, posts were reserved for officers from the larger powers. Even with the appointment of General Allard to a British NATO division in 1962, Canadian officers could not hope for peace time careers which matched their American and British counterparts even if they were highly talented individuals.<sup>582</sup> The use of an American and British comparative framework, considering the far larger population bases and rather different defence requirements involved, suggests some lack of realism on the part of the Army Council. Yet the close working relationships developed in NATO may have caused some bitterness as Canadian Army officers watched their American and British friends and colleagues receive cherished postings that remained unavailable to them.

This bitterness would hardly be sweetened as the RCAF grew in size and influence and, in 1960, Treasury Board sought to limit defence expenditures and suggested that some positions in Army headquarters might be more cheaply filled by civilians.<sup>583</sup> The Army

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<sup>581</sup> DHH, 73/1223 file 735, Rank Structure - Canadian Army 1960-61, Report from S.F. Clark, CGS to Minister, Officer Rank Structure, 28 September 1961. Clark concluded that the Canadian government would have to expend more than 2 million dollars to provide attractive careers if they intended to compare with the British. Though the report recognized that the British and Americans had larger forces, neither Canadian defence requirements nor the fact that the British and Americans had larger population bases were mentioned in this paper.

<sup>582</sup> See: J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals. The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* Toronto: Stoddart, 1993. The fact that the lack of opportunity for Canadians to command higher formations during peacetime affected their initial performance in war seems apparent. Yet the arguments of the Army Council in the 1950s were based upon offering attractive careers to officers rather than preparation for war.

<sup>583</sup> DHH, 73/1223, file 1713b, Special Army Council Minutes, 22 March 1960.

Council opposed this development and, in a reversal of its earlier policy, recommended the use of soldiers to fill housekeeping duties and other civilian tasks. Soldiers, it was argued, could serve anywhere and civilians could be brought in to replace them in an emergency.<sup>584</sup>

In 1960, George Pearkes, the Minister of National Defence, testified to a House of Commons Special Committee on Defence Expenditure, depicting how over time the larger regular force affected the military budget. Men re-enlisted and their qualifications increased. They sometimes got married and had children. The government provided a variety of allowances for soldiers with families, for special qualifications attained and in other circumstances, such as isolated postings.<sup>585</sup> The personnel portion of expenditures grew and less money was available for equipment and other items.<sup>586</sup> This was hardly news and was exactly what Simonds and Mainguy had warned would

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<sup>584</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>585</sup>DHH, 84/334, A. C. *Grant fonds*, The estimates for 1956-7 for example list some of the expenses, including: marriage allowances, clothing allowances, subsistence and ration allowances, separated family allowances, responsibility and risk allowances, dental and medical fees, training and tuition payments and many other costs associated with a highly trained and larger permanent force.

<sup>586</sup>Canada, House of Commons Special Committee on Defence Expenditure, *Minutes and Proceedings*, Testimony of George Pearkes, Minister of National Defence, p. 26. I was unable to get consistent percentages for the whole time frame, but for example, in 1956-7, military personnel were 26 percent of the budget, in 1957-8, 28.9 percent, in 1958-9, 30 percent and in 1959-1960, 33.1 percent. For these same years, equipment went from 28.8 percent in 1956-7, to 27.8 percent in 1957-8, up to 28.2 percent in 1957-8 and down much further to 21.3 percent in 1959-60. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Reports, 1957-1959*, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1958-1960. Note that defence estimates do exist for these years, but they do not include total percentages and the categories of reporting expenditures vary from 1951 to 1964.

happen, but the experience of the early 1950s had demonstrated that Canadian professional soldiers were not going to remain in service for long if it demanded the sacrifice of all the comforts available to Canadian civilians, especially during a time of relative prosperity.

In May of 1963, Paul Hellyer, the Liberal Minister of National Defence, established the Ad Hoc Committee on Defence Policy. One of the documents prepared under the guidance of R.J. Sutherland, Chairman of committee, addressed the trends in defence expenditures.<sup>587</sup> Since 1952-3, he noted that defence spending had declined by 13 percent in dollars, by 38 percent in purchasing power, by 45 percent in terms of the federal budget, by 49 percent of gross national product at current prices and by 57 percent of gross national product in constant dollars. Not only had the total defence budget declined, but running costs (personnel, operations and maintenance) had gone from 45 percent to 77.6 percent, resulting in a dramatic decline in expenditure upon equipment.<sup>588</sup>

The conclusion of this paper was that more expenditure would be required if the present Canadian commitments were maintained. Otherwise, Sutherland hypothesized that the numbers of servicemen, already below the required levels, would have to be further cut in order to purchase essential equipment. Replacements for Centurion tanks for the

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<sup>587</sup>DHH, Lindsey/Sutherland Collection, 87/253-II-15.4, *The Canadian Defence Budget*, August 1963, pp. 1-2.

<sup>588</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 2.

brigade were among the items considered necessary. The rise in personnel costs came mostly from higher pay, with pay and allowances raised by 90 percent and numbers rising by 25 percent in the Regular Forces between 1953 and 1963.<sup>589</sup> The high wastage rates experienced in 1953, the many servicemen on short term contracts at that time and the fact that Canada was also involved in the Korean Conflict were not mentioned, but all these factors would affect the figures and analysis. The requirement for personnel stability was a part of the rise in costs.

The reserve army gained attention in early 1964, as Brigadier E. R. Suttie was appointed to the Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army Militia. The emphasis of the militia upon civil defence had already been altered in practice as combat training resumed in the early 1960s under Walsh. In 1964, the Suttie Commission examined the organization of the Militia as its primary role changed from survival to support of the Regular Army. The Militia was also assigned a secondary role of training and a third role of internal security with national survival coming fourth.<sup>590</sup> Though these roles were more significant, the reserve force was to be cut in size to 30,000 and the number of units were reduced.<sup>591</sup> The Militia's function of representing

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<sup>589</sup>*Ibid.* The time perspective chosen emphasized this factor. A broader time frame, for example, 1947 to 1963, certainly would have emphasized numbers and shown more clearly how the NATO role affected expenditures.

<sup>590</sup>Kardex, 112.1.009 (d37), CGS Personal and Confidential correspondence for the period November 1962 to April 1965 to and from his commanders in foreign countries. Walsh to the Associate Minister, 16 January 1964, including the terms of reference for the E. R. Suttie Commission.

<sup>591</sup>T.C. Willett, *A Heritage at Risk. The Canadian Militia as a Social Institution.* pp. 79-80.



Canadian citizens was not formally addressed. Nor was there a recognition that gradually the regular force was taking on a part of this role.

The character of the army as a whole changed as the regular force came into ascendancy. Well before unification of the Canadian Armed Forces in 1968, the army had already begun to be affected by requirements for more uniform conditions of service among the three forces.<sup>592</sup> The growth of a professional volunteer army changed the character of the army in more subtle ways. Over time, the soldiers who renewed their contracts became older, better qualified and more had families. Not only did army life have to be more attractive for men, it would have to be attractive for their wives and families too.

The ad hoc nature of changes in personnel policies with respect to the regular force as a whole and the myth of a Canadian Army golden age in the 1950s has masked the changes in character during those years.<sup>593</sup> As the regular army became responsible for representing Canada as a country and not simply for defending its territory, changes were made. Yet there was no significant philosophical debate or conceptual development behind the changes being made. A practical approach predominated.

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<sup>592</sup> By the 1980s, the Canadian military would reach a crisis point in this development. See Peter C. Kasurak "Civilianization and the military ethos. Civil-military relations in Canada" in *Canadian Public Administration/administration publique du Canada*, Volume 25, No.1, 108-129.

<sup>593</sup> Stephan B. Flemming, "The Hearts and Minds of Soldiers and Citizens in Canada" in *Ethics and Canadian Defence Policy*, edited by David R. Jones, Fred W. Crickard and Todd R. Yates, Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1992, pp. 39-47.

Nearly all the rationale for change seems to have been simply to attract and keep qualified soldiers in service and to meet immediate requirements of the army rather than to fundamentally alter the army's character.

Secondary goals were hardly considered in the military decision-making covered here. The Army Council debated policies in a dynamic manner, compared Canadian practices with British and American examples and they took part in inter-service discussions on many issues. While some Parliamentarians and members of the public were interested in the lives of soldiers and their families, little of this filtered through to the Army Council discussions. Members of the Council drew conclusions from their own personal experiences and from comparisons with other services and other forces. They rarely discussed personnel issues with members of the Department of External Affairs or other non-military bodies. The result was that the foreign policy goals, including improved relations with the Germans, were almost never mentioned in personnel policy documents.

The connection between the military policies and foreign policy goals is indirect, but it exists and is relevant. The first conclusion drawn in this chapter was that the requirement for a large regular force came largely from the additional role of the brigade in Germany and the need to train troops in Canada for rotation to the brigade. The Canadian Army had fewer than 20,000 professional soldiers in 1949; at that time, there was no perceived need to attract and keep a larger group of men dedicated to the task of full-time soldiering. The other factors, including budgetary restrictions, national unity,

military culture and traditions, and inter-service rivalry, were very apparent in the discussions held and clearly influenced the decision-making on personnel policies. However, the need to retain a large number of volunteers was probably the single most important consideration throughout.

The Canadian Army grew in response to the government's decision to commit a brigade group to the defence of broad German plans. The rationale for the creation of the larger professional army was based almost completely upon this specific foreign policy decision, even though the broader foreign policy goals were not articulated in military decision-making. The idea that the regular army now had to represent Canadians as well as to prepare for combat begins to be seen in the statements emanating from defence officials.

The notion that the brigade in Germany represented Canada and was furthering foreign policy goals becomes far more evident in Chapter five. The requirements to improve relations with the Germans and to present a positive view of Canadian life were very evident to those serving in Europe and to those diplomats who negotiated agreements on their behalf. Chapter five will examine the work of the Bureau of Current Affairs and many policies with respect to the brigade itself, and demonstrate the requirement for German support and its effect upon military decision-making in these areas.

### ***Chapter five. Ideals and realities: Canadians in Germany.***

As described in earlier chapters, the integration of Germany into the western alliance was a paramount priority for NATO. The Canadian government shared this goal with its NATO allies and hoped to improve German-Canadian relations in order to promote Canadian interests and to offset American influence. The promotion of democratic values and the concept of the dignity of the individual associated with western Christianity formed an important underlying Canadian motivation with respect to NATO. In sending troops to Germany, the Canadian government was supporting the policies of the Christian Democratic Party and strengthening those elements of German society whose values seemed similar to those of Canadians.<sup>594</sup>

The embassy in Bonn was directly involved in all relations between the Canadian and German governments and the brigade commander was instructed to inform the ambassador of any developments which might affect political or public relations.<sup>595</sup> There were two channels of communication with Ottawa. The German press was carefully monitored by the brigade public relations staff, who reported directly to the brigadier. The brigadier communicated most often with the Chief of the General Staff and less frequently with the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, on issues of press coverage. The embassy staff in Bonn examined the German national and foreign press on all

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<sup>594</sup>Michael Balfour, *West Germany. A Contemporary History*, p. 177.

<sup>595</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 1.1, Supplementary Instructions to Brigadier Walsh, 6 November 1951.

matters of interest, including reports about the brigade. The ambassador, in turn, passed significant information to the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs and sometimes directly to the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Ottawa.<sup>596</sup>

A comparable situation had arisen with respect to Canadian troops stationed in England during the Second World War and, as noted in Chapter two, the Canadian High Commissioner was involved in matters of policy.<sup>597</sup> Public relations with respect to the British civilian population was at times a delicate issue, as it was in Germany later on. For example, a member of the British press sent a copy of a letter critical of Canadian troop behaviour to L.B. Pearson at Canada House in London and Prime Minister Mackenzie King received private letters containing complaints about unsatisfactory discipline among the Canadian soldiers in England. Tougher policies were applied as a result and reduced petty crime, but according to C.P. Stacey and Barbara Wilson, "the gradual improvement in the situation probably owed quite as much to the Canadian soldiers' adjustment to a new way of life and a new society."<sup>598</sup>

While there are comparisons to be made, the Canadian NATO troop experience took

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<sup>596</sup>See the introduction to this thesis, p. 21. The press was also monitored in Canada and in virtually every other embassy. The argument here is that the brigade's behaviour was perceived to affect Canada's image and thus, to a degree, the achievement of foreign policy goals. The Embassy in Bonn had a special interest in brigade public relations given the long term aim of integrating Germans into NATO..

<sup>597</sup> See footnote 51 in Chapter two.

<sup>598</sup>C. P. Stacey and Barbara M. Wilson, *The Half-Million. The Canadians in Britain, 1939-1946*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987, pp. 36,40, 46, 58.

place during a time when the Germans were not yet fully integrated into the western alliance. Instability in German domestic politics meant that troop behaviour was a more sensitive political issue in Germany than it had been in wartime Britain. While many in western Germany no doubt feared the Soviets, the German population could not be regarded as whole-heartedly dedicated to NATO and its cause in 1951.<sup>599</sup> Yet, as noted by C.P. Stacey and Barbara Wilson, troop behaviour in the Second World War may well have affected Canada's image abroad and the collective experience of individuals, even if not decisive, remains a factor of interest in the study of foreign policy.<sup>600</sup>

The Canadian Department of National Defence, under the Bureau of Current Affairs, began ideological indoctrination of all servicemen in autumn 1951.<sup>601</sup> Though personnel policies, examined in Chapter four, had not reflected the notion that the professional soldier was a representative of Canada to any significant degree, this idea received full expression in the publications and lectures of the Bureau. The first section of Chapter five will cover those aspects of the programme related to the preparation of soldiers for

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<sup>599</sup>Hans Speier, *From The Ashes of Disgrace. A Journal from Germany, 1945-1955* and Rudolph Walter Leonhardt, *This Germany. The Story since the Third Reich*, and discussion of these works in the introduction of this thesis.

<sup>600</sup>. C. P. Stacey and Barbara M. Wilson, *The Half-Million. The Canadians in Britain, 1939-1946*, p. 180.

<sup>601</sup>The decision to create a Canadian bureau in 1951 contrasted with the practice during the Second World War of supplying troops with pamphlets produced by the British Army's Bureau of Current Affairs. see Christopher Cran, "The Bureau of Current Affairs, the Royal Canadian Navy and the 'Struggle for Men's Minds,' 1950-57," Master of Arts Thesis, Carleton University, 1996, pp. 15-16.

service in Germany.<sup>602</sup>

The relations between the Canadian military communities and the surrounding German communities will be analyzed with some attention to the idea that Canadian soldiers and their families in Germany became *de facto* representatives of Canada. The second section of Chapter five will be an examination of the quality of life for servicemen and their families. The North Atlantic Treaty was primarily for collective defence; its anti-communist orientation was based upon the preservation of western values. To what extent did Canadian military communities promote the values of western Christianity and democracy? Records from the Chaplains serving in Germany will be analyzed to illustrate some of the problems experienced and solutions suggested. Thirdly, actual interactions between the Canadians and Germans will be examined. This section will draw upon the German newspaper collection, described in the introduction of this thesis, as well as many primary records, including the records of investigations into crimes and policies with respect to discipline.

A paradox is evident here. In virtually all NATO forces, including Canada's, a military culture dominated. With a formal chain of command, a structure and discipline intended to produce obedience, and to create group conformity, and a willingness to follow orders and to sacrifice one's life, the military had its own value system and was hardly

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<sup>602</sup>Kardex, 410.b27.066 (d1) *Off to Europe*, Bureau of Current Affairs, November 1951 quoting Brooke Claxton as saying "In very truth they [Canadian servicemen] were ambassadors of Canada." p.1.

the ideal vehicle for the transmission of democratic values.<sup>603</sup> Officers were more encouraged to question orders than other ranks, but the basic training and the military structure were designed to suppress the very individualism and independence of mind which the Canadian government hoped to promote among the Germans with whom they had contact.

### ***The Bureau of Current Affairs:***

The Bureau of Current Affairs, set up in the autumn of 1951 by Harry Low, encountered various problems as a result of the incongruity between military culture and the promotion of democratic values. This Bureau was to educate servicemen on the dangers of Communism and also to encourage democratic ideology throughout the forces serving in Canada, Korea, and Germany.<sup>604</sup> If some of its work was propaganda and mere window dressing, the Bureau still filled a crucial role in preparing the troops for what lay ahead. It introduced courses in Canadian citizenship as a part of basic training, and in its lecture series offered across Canada, Germany figured as a subject of considerable interest, though the Bureau covered many other topics, including the government's policies with respect to NATO and anti-communism in general.<sup>605</sup>

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<sup>603</sup>There are many studies on military institutions and their cultures. See Kurt Lang, *Military Institutions and the sociology of war. A review of the literature with annotated bibliography* London: Sage Publications, 1972, pp. 64-75.

<sup>604</sup>Christopher J. Cran, "The Bureau of Current Affairs, the Royal Canadian Navy and the 'struggle for men's minds', 1950-57".

<sup>605</sup>As mentioned in Chapter four, Canadian soldiers did not have to be Canadian citizens. A number were British citizens, recruited in Britain or Canada, and later on, others were landed immigrants. A list of Bureau publications may be found in Christopher Cran's thesis and in Department of National Defence, *Annual Reports*, for the each year it



The information on Germany was particularly useful as nearly all the training films used in Canada in the 1950s were of Second World War vintage and still portrayed the Germans as the enemy.<sup>606</sup> Not only had many of the Canadian soldiers served during the Second World War, the events of the war and of the holocaust had been indelibly etched on the public mind. Army training films reinforced the notion that the Germans were aggressive, still a danger to democracy and hardly to be trusted friends or allies.<sup>607</sup> These firmly held beliefs could not be changed overnight. The Bureau's pamphlets were distributed to all servicemen and they included the idea that attitudes towards the Germans had to be changed as they were now potential comrades-in-arms.

Harry Low set up regional committees of officers from each command and of academics from fourteen major universities across Canada to address questions of democracy and international affairs, and to set up courses to ensure that those officers who would have responsibility for running a discussion hour for each unit would be

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existed.

<sup>606</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 18256, War Diary, 27th Brigade, August 1951, appendix with list of films and description of each film used in training the brigade. It was likely too expensive to redo all the films with Russian enemies and that the enemies were portrayed as Germans may not have even been realized as a problem. Villains with German accents appeared in many films for several decades after the Second World War.

<sup>607</sup>For example see: Bruce Hutchison, "The fateful gamble on the Rhine", *Macleans Magazine*, 15 August 1953, pp. 46-49. As noted in Chapter one, these attitudes persisted in the Canadian media in the 1960s.

properly prepared and informed.<sup>608</sup> The brigade going to Germany received intensive attention even though the Bureau of Current Affairs was just becoming established as the brigade was getting ready to sail to Europe. Teams of academics and citizenship groups were involved in the efforts to reach all parts of the brigade training across the country. These individuals lectured the troops on such topics as the role of NATO forces in Germany and the importance of troop comportment in Europe to Canada's foreign policy goals.

The brigade advance party received a current affairs pamphlet, an article on Europe by G.V. Ferguson, the editor of *Montreal Daily Star*, copies of an article by A.R.M. Lower of Queen's University entitled *Germany Re-visited*, copies of a NATO organisation chart, statements of NATO functions, a pamphlet entitled *What is communism?* Two professors from Laval, Professors Maurice Lebel and Brassard, lectured on the history of and conditions in European countries.<sup>609</sup> Professor Wolfgang Friedman of the University of Toronto spoke to the officers and men of the Brigade at Valcartier prior to their departure on the political situation in Germany. Brigadier Walsh requested four or five hours of instruction in conversational German be given daily to all the soldiers as

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<sup>608</sup>NA, RG 24, Accession 83-84/167, Volume 5115, file 3515-6, Low to DMT [Director of Military Training], 12 September 1951.

<sup>609</sup>*Ibid.*, Low to DMT, 5 October 1951. Professor Brassard was listed without a first name. A check at University of Laval Archives reveals two professor Brassards, a François-Joseph of the Music Faculty and a J.-Armand of the Science Faculty. It is not evident which professor did the lecturing on this occasion..

they prepared for departure.<sup>610</sup>

A journalist and author on the Second World War, Lionel Shapiro, was hired to produce a pamphlet for the soldiers of the brigade, explaining why they were going to Germany and instructing them on correct behaviour in Europe. This pamphlet, entitled *Off To Europe*, declared that "If you behave decently, the people of Western Europe will breathe a great sigh of relief, they will take new hope... If you behave badly, you tip the scales the other way; you may ensure an eventual Communist triumph in Europe."<sup>611</sup>

While Shapiro was vastly overstating Canadian influence on European domestic politics, the policies of the Canadian government and the behaviour of Canadian soldiers did become an issue in German domestic politics and to some extent, a part of ongoing propaganda war. The Soviets translated and read Canadian publications, including this one. Canadians' concern about the impression they might make on Europeans and possible communist victory was interpreted as weakness. The author of an article in the *Red Star*, a communist publication, examined *Off to Europe* in detail and concluded that : "The big shots of the aggressive Atlantic bloc are beginning to fear

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<sup>610</sup>*Ibid.*, Note that Low had some trouble over the language training as he agreed to it before it had been approved by the Director of Army Training who objected and insisted that access to language courses be carefully controlled through his office. Relations between civilians and military officers in the Department were sometimes strained, in part, because of the communication difficulties.

<sup>611</sup> Kardex, 410.b27.066 (d1) *Off to Europe*, p. 9.

the growing hatred of the people".<sup>612</sup> The British *Manchester Guardian* also ran an article, including an extract from the pamphlet, noting the requirement for each individual soldier to ensure the good will of Europeans, under the headline "Canadian Brigade Pays Its Way in Germany. Emphasis on Defence, Not Occupation."<sup>613</sup> The pamphlet was therefore examined carefully as a statement of Canadian intentions with respect to the brigade in Germany.

The advice in the pamphlet emphasized that the serviceman in Europe represented the Canadian people, especially when in uniform, and it proclaimed:

The people of Western Europe like Canadians; they like us because we have a reputation for bigness without bragging, for manliness without roughness... They expect Canadians to be strong, fairly silent gentlemen, to be kindly, modest and generous...

We inherited the great foundation of our country from .... Western Europe. They gave us the best of their blood and culture and wealth. ... In a national sense, they are your mother and father. Given them *that* kind of respect....<sup>614</sup>

More practical advice recommended neatness, the learning of local customs, respect

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<sup>612</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 2.2, From the Canadian Chargé d'Affaires, Moscow, to Pearson, 23 April 1953. Canadians for their part were reading and translating Soviet publications.

<sup>613</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 1.2, including a photocopied clipping from the *Manchester Guardian*, 17 January 1952.

<sup>614</sup>Kardex, 410.b27.066 (d1), *Off To Europe*, pp. 12-13.

for women and avoidance of liquor. In terms of the Germans, the soldiers were earnestly instructed that "You, as representatives of Canada, have the duty of showing the Germans, by your conduct, that the individual self-restraint required by a democratic way of life can result in good conduct that is not divorced from manliness."<sup>615</sup> This instruction complemented the notion of the ideal professional soldier presented in Chapter four. The underlying argument throughout the pamphlet was that Canadian soldiers should exemplify a masculine ideal and, by example, contribute to the conversion of Germans into democrats.<sup>616</sup>

The Bureau of Current Affairs continued to hire Canadian journalists and academics over the next six years to prepare special pamphlets on current international matters and to give advice on comportment to troops.<sup>617</sup> Shapiro not only spoke to the brigade several times before it left Canada for Germany, but he actually accompanied it on the voyage across the Atlantic so that European customs, the requirement to represent Canada in an honourable manner, Canadian citizenship and other issues could be

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<sup>615</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>616</sup>Like Simonds and Macklin, Shapiro believed that the professional soldier was part of an elite group of men, almost a priesthood.

<sup>617</sup> NA, RG 24 accession number 83-84/167 Volume 5077 file 3400-1 pt 1, Minutes of the 28th meeting of the Inter-Service Committee on Joint Training, 11 July 1951. Note that in this instance, the Army set the pace and the RCAF indicated that it was interested in following on the Army's lead. The Navy seemed less motivated.

addressed at length in a series of talks during the voyage.<sup>618</sup> Personnel from the Canadian Embassy in Bonn addressed officers further after their arrival in Europe and made it clear that they were responsible to defend Canadian values and to represent the nation as well as to protect German territory.<sup>619</sup> These efforts to impart democratic values and government policies marked the beginnings of a soldier-diplomat concept in the professional army.

The Canadian Army set the pace for the other two services, the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Royal Canadian Navy, in terms of implementing ideological training. Courses in citizenship had existed for recruits during the Second World War, but the Bureau's programme was a departure for the Canadian forces.<sup>620</sup> Generals Foulkes, Simonds and Kitching, and Brigadier Walsh were in favour of this development, though they disagreed on some aspects of implementation and emphasis.<sup>621</sup> As Chief of the General Staff, Simonds issued orders to ensure that the Bureau had the support of all

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<sup>618</sup>Kardex, 112.1 (d97) 27 CIB, 18 October 1951, LtCol. Stewart, Director of Public Relations (Army) to CGS and NA, RG 24, Volume 18256, War diary - 27 CIB Hq. - Shapiro addresses troops before embarkation, 1 Oct 1951, 7, 8, 9 Nov 1951 (Shapiro, aboard the TSS Canberra, addressing the troops ).

<sup>619</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, file 11381-40, pt. 2.2 . Memorandum from T.C. Davis to L.B. Pearson, 4 January 1952.

<sup>620</sup>Cran, *The Bureau of Current Affairs*, p. 16. Canadian servicemen during the Second World War relied upon pamphlets issues by the British Army's Bureau of Current Affairs.

<sup>621</sup> George Kitching, for example, said "Our three services were our best ambassadors in NATO" see George Kitching, *Mud and green fields. The memoirs of George Kitching*, p. 307.

Area commanders and that the weekly discussions were held and taken seriously in all army units. <sup>622</sup>

Once in Germany, efforts to improve the brigade's knowledge of current affairs and ideology continued and, a current affairs advisor, Dr. H.S.C. Archbold, was appointed to the brigade in late 1954 to assist in further training. <sup>623</sup> Archbold organized conferences for senior officers at Oxford University and junior officers at the University of Nottingham. The officers of other NATO countries, including Germany, were invited to attend. Unfortunately, these conferences clashed with the rigorous training schedule in September of each year and Walsh, now the Director of Military Training, requested that the courses be rescheduled. The September exercises were a culmination of training for the year and Archbold had, in his enthusiasm, neglected to coordinate his plans with the brigade. It had not been Walsh's intention to cancel the conferences, but their value and cost began to be questioned and eventually they were eliminated. <sup>624</sup>

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<sup>622</sup>In this respect, the Canadian Army seemed far more supportive than the Royal Canadian Navy. See Christopher Cran, *The Bureau of Current Affairs*.

<sup>623</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 5077, memorandum from LtCol. Keane, Directorate of Military Training, 22 December 1954.

<sup>624</sup>NA, RG 24, accession number 83-84/167, Volume 5077, file 3400-1, pt 1. Dana Wilgress, a diplomat serving with the Canadian delegation to NATO, wrote a letter of support for Archbold, praising his audacity and initiative in creating a mobile NATO exhibit touring amongst British units in Germany and the Head of the Troop Information Branch of NATO also lauded his efforts. Clearly few bureaucrats were praised by diplomats for audacity and Archbold's days were numbered.

The clash between combat and ideological roles came down in part to the practical questions of time and resources. Simonds, Walsh and others in the Army hierarchy actively supported German language training, discussion groups and the educational improvement of their soldiers, but they regarded all these elements as far less important than field exercises and basic preparation for battle.<sup>625</sup> Their men would be soldiers first and diplomats as time allowed.

Political problems from outside the military proved more serious and were perhaps almost inevitable given the task of the Bureau. It was controversial to create democratic discussion, to present various sides of issues, to criticise and to question government policy. There was no consensus on what constituted the Canadian values being promoted by the Bureau and, as the Bureau came under attack from the Social Credit Party and the Conservative Party, it was evident that some Canadians held very different views from others.

An article appeared in the Canadian edition of *Time Magazine* on 21 February 1955 about Charles James Woodsworth, who had been dismissed as editor of the *Ottawa Citizen* and had prepared material for the Bureau. Woodsworth apparently held slightly

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<sup>625</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 12178, 27th Field Detention Barracks, Part One Orders, 2 January 1953, Classes in conversational German were made available for all other ranks. Local High School teachers and classrooms were used in the afternoons. Classes on Opera were also offered. Pt. One Orders, 9 January 1953.



leftist views and had stood against the rearmament of Germany.<sup>626</sup> The leader of the Social Credit party, Solon E. Low, complained that Woodsworth and others who wrote for the Bureau, including Blair Fraser, were going to convert young Canadian men into communists. John Horne Blackmore, a Social Credit Member of Parliament, argued that his three sons had served Canada and they had left home believing in "God, .. the bible, the flag and the Queen, the importance of the British Commonwealth and the Anglo-Saxon race". These were the ideals which he believed ought to be promoted by the Bureau.<sup>627</sup> Moreover, Blackmore stated that he did not want his sons returning home as communists or sympathizers.

Others complained that the Bureau was now a Liberal mouthpiece, promoting a one-party state and not providing enough positive information about the accomplishments of other parties. All the criticism meant that the Bureau was scaled back and, when departmental cuts and cost savings were introduced under the Conservative Government of John Diefenbaker in 1957, the Bureau seemed an appropriate economy, even if the controversy was not directly linked to its demise.<sup>628</sup>

The attacks and the controversy demonstrated that ideological training of soldiers in a

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<sup>626</sup>Cran, p. 75

<sup>627</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>628</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 85-87

democracy was inherently contradictory. A diversity of Canadian views existed: in emphasising democratic values and discussion of controversial issues, the Bureau was bound to offend some people. While not responsible for the contents of the program, the Canadian Army had generally supported it and, even in providing feedback about booklets or proposed discussions, those in command seemed to have little difficulty with the idea that soldiers might discuss foreign and defence policy in a critical manner, provided the soldiers' comments were not passed to the public or the press and were expressed in a respectful manner.<sup>629</sup>

In the early 1950s, when Canadian public opinion about Germans hardly seemed favourable, the Bureau had addressed a real need. Still, the wife of one serviceman suggests in retrospect that the Bureau might have inadvertently contributed to problems with Germans by providing advice on conversational German which was not actually very polite.<sup>630</sup> Germans, especially those in Hannover and, to a lesser extent, in Soest,

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<sup>629</sup>See NA, RG 24, Volumes 11,12, 5007, 5115. The essay chosen for a prize in a contest run by the Bureau in 1955, stressed democratic rights, but also Canadian military rights to grieve, to seek redress, to complain and to advocate change in addition to mentioning that Canadians minimized distinctions between classes. This last item, as discussed Chapter two, would create problems in relations with the British Army of the Rhine as Canadians attempted to create communities which reflected Canadian lifestyle, rather than adopting British standards.

<sup>630</sup> Dorothy Jane Mills, "Der Kanadier", *Airforce*, Fall 1996. Mrs. Mills wrote about a booklet entitled *Conversational German for the Canadian Armed Forces* put out in 1953 by the Bureau of Canadian Affairs, suggesting that the directions for eating, drinking and buying things might have contributed to this bit of graffiti: "Yankee go home. And take those damn Canadians with you!" seen in Germany in the early 1950s.

had notions about correct comportment which were more rigid than those elsewhere in Germany, and certainly different from those of many Canadians.<sup>631</sup>

***The establishment of Canadian communities:***

Claxton hoped that the military communities in Germany might have "a Canadian atmosphere". He pushed hard for Canadian leave centres and welfare services which might enhance a sense of community among the soldiers. Simonds argued against this use of resources, indicating that Canadian soldiers could use British and American centres and there was no need to create communities that represented Canada or to provide what he deemed to be luxuries. NATO, he felt, should set an example of austerity.<sup>632</sup>

The Canadian Council of Churches pressured the government to improve welfare resources for the soldiers in Germany. The Council had been evaluating and recommending improvements to military facilities across Canada, noting the need for

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<sup>631</sup> NA, RG 25, File 11381-40, pt. 3.2, Miss Wilson to Dr. Stanbury, 26 February 1953. Miss Wilson was writing a welfare report on behalf of the Canadian Red Cross. Her observations about Hannover were reflected in several newspaper reports published in Canada at about this time. Yet, some citizens of Hannover did not agree with this Canadian assessment of their character. See Kardex, 410.b27.009 (d12), "We are not like this!" Excerpt from the *Hannover Allgemeine*, 25 February 1953, commenting upon articles in Toronto newspapers. Nonetheless, several Germans I interviewed about this topic expressed the opinion that Hannover did have a reputation for "correctness" in Germany.

<sup>632</sup> Kardex, 112.1 (d99) 27 CIB - October 1952 to July 1953. Various memoranda from Claxton to Simonds and from Simonds to Claxton.

chapels on isolated military bases and religious services for dependents. In 1952, they sent a delegation to Korea and to Germany to investigate conditions. The members of the delegation were extremely displeased with arrangements in Germany and came back to Canada, lobbying Claxton, and embarrassing Walsh who was apparently *persona non grata* with the clergy.<sup>633</sup>

The Secretary of the Council, Reverend W. Harold Young, spoke at a public Council meeting in London, Ontario upon his return from Germany. According to Young, "it was obvious that conditions in the 27th Brigade are not satisfactory": Moreover, he regarded this assertion as "a masterpiece of understatement".<sup>634</sup> When Young's comments were quoted in the press, Claxton, apparently angry at the public attack, retaliated with his own announcement, questioning Young's loyalty to Canada and suggesting that Young was sabotaging the Canadian war effort. Young was stung by these accusations and the Claxton papers contain several letters written by Young and other clergy outlining the moderate and legitimate nature of his remarks.<sup>635</sup>

If Claxton himself actually agreed with some of the suggestions put forward by the clergy, he and others in the Department of National Defence sought to suppress public

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<sup>633</sup>Kardex, 112.1 (d99), Simonds to the Minister, 15 January 1952.

<sup>634</sup>NA, MG 32, B5, Brooke Claxton fonds, Volume 98, Young to Claxton, 17 November 1952.

<sup>635</sup>*Ibid.*

criticism.<sup>636</sup> Some problems were not resolved.

A critical article, by Lionel Shapiro, the man who had accompanied the very first troops across the Atlantic and who had written several Bureau of Current Affairs pamphlets, was published in *Maclean's Magazine*. This article revealed discipline problems, difficulties in interactions with Germans, a high venereal disease rate, and much drunkenness. Shapiro argued that the brigade was a poor representative of Canada and Canadian values.<sup>637</sup>

While Simonds claimed that Shapiro exaggerated problems, he acknowledged that almost 40 percent of the soldiers had less than grade eight education with grade five or six being about average. Qualified teachers taught mandatory courses for these soldiers in the brigade: thus the army was already addressing this issue. The venereal disease rate was very high and the crime rate was higher than for the home units. Because soldiers could be charged for being absent without leave and other offences that did not apply to civilians, however, comparative crime rates with civilians were misleading.<sup>638</sup>

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<sup>636</sup>DHH, 73/1223, various files. Translations of German newspaper reports critical about the brigade were sent back to Canada classified "top secret" though those capable of reading German could order and read the original newspapers.

<sup>637</sup>Lionel Shapiro, "The Failure of the 27th" in *Maclean's Magazine*, 15 August 1953.

<sup>638</sup>112.1.003 (d36) Correspondence from CGS to MND between October 1953 and October 1962 concerning rotation, morale etc. of forces in Germany. Simonds argued that

The battle went on as problems were confirmed by a variety of reports from various social and welfare organisations, including the Red Cross and a Catholic welfare association and other independent visits from Canadian religious leaders. The Canadian Red Cross made a report on the brigade early in 1953 while it was still in Hannover. The lack of Canadian facilities created difficulties for some soldiers and it was evident from the report that Army Headquarters in Ottawa was resisting all overtures by various organisations for involvement, largely on financial grounds.<sup>639</sup> It was noted that American soldiers had access to many American facilities. By contrast, the Canadians shared British facilities with British soldiers.

Canadian motives for providing improved facilities were mixed, but so were those of other NATO nations. Recreational and sports programmes enhanced good fitness for soldiers, team spirit and morale; nearly all the NATO nations with forces stationed in Germany made expenditures in this area for these reasons.<sup>640</sup> Sports events were used to improve competitiveness, to relieve boredom and to enhance regimental or unit

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the Army could not be blamed for the poor quality of soldiers, Canadian society had produced these recruits and the Army did its best with what it got.

<sup>639</sup>NA, RG 25, Vol. 6632, file 11381-40 pt. 2.3 Miss Wilson to Dr. Stanbury, 26 February 1953 and Kardex, 410B27.009 (d1), Walsh to Miss Pauline MacGuire, National Relief Service, National Catholic Welfare Conference, 2 August 1952.

<sup>640</sup> See issues of *The Beaver*. This weekly newspaper was produced by brigade. A complete set of *The Beaver* is held at the National Library of Canada. Every issue was examined in the course of research for this thesis. See also: Photocopied German newspapers and Franklin M. Davis, Jr. *Come as a Conqueror. The United States Army's Occupation of Germany, 1945-1949*, "Mixed bowling leagues, golf tournament and swimming meets became a feature of every community" pp. 194-195.

cohesiveness.<sup>641</sup> For Canadians in Germany, the provision of sports and recreational programs assisted in the development of a community spirit and made the Canadian soldiers and their families less dependent upon resources in the German communities or within the British Army of the Rhine.<sup>642</sup> Sports also assisted Canadians in overcoming language and cultural barriers in their dealing with the Germans.<sup>643</sup>

Conditions were expected to improve with the arrival of families, but the reality of life in Germany was still a disappointment to many. The Senior Protestant Chaplain, J. Willcox Duncan, in August of 1954, wrote that "while the average public of Canada had been deceived by the political propaganda of the Press and the policy to play to the gallery and put on a wonderful show", he did not expect Colonel Forth, the Director of the Protestant Chaplain Services, to be so misguided.

There are about 160 families in the United Kingdom, and about 900 families in the Brigade area. These latter are living in pensions, hotels, leave centres, farms, villages, rooms and houses over an area about 70 miles by 30 miles.

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<sup>641</sup>G.T. Service and J.K. Martenson, *The Gate. A History of the Fort Garry Horse*. Calgary: Commercial Printers, 1971, p. 114; and G.R. Stevens, *Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, 1919-1957*, Griesbach, Alberta: Historical Committee of the Regiment, 1957, pp. 382-389, 391-394 provide descriptions of how particular sporting triumphs raised unit morale.

<sup>642</sup>Kardex, 112.1.009 (d37) CGS Personal and Confidential correspondence for period Nov 61 to Apr 65 to and from his Commanders in foreign countries. Brigadier Cameron Ware to Walsh, 1 March 1962, noting the excellent showing the Canadian teams had in competition with British units.

<sup>643</sup>See: *The Beaver*, 6 October 1961, for example.

There is simply NO community life among our families in the accepted sense. The schools will not be ready until January 1955, some later. The shopping centres are not yet begun. It is commonly said by officers and men that this brigade should have come without dependants for one year, and then the next brigade come with their families when houses are ready. ....The administrative problems created by bringing and maintaining dependants in Europe are far beyond what the former Minister of National Defence [Claxton] ever visualized when he grandly promised that families would accompany the troops to Europe...The VD [venereal disease] rate in the Brigade is not as high now as it was... It is still a problem. The fact that families are over here has made a big difference... <sup>644</sup>

Duncan finally noted that his confidential and personal report might cause embarrassment if discussed outside Colonel Forth's Office and requested that comments be withheld until he had visited Europe in person.

Impressed with the morale of the brigade, Forth noted the many challenges it faced, and he made no embarrassing remarks. Yet there is no doubt, in the many chaplains' reports and letters to Canada in 1955 and early 1956, that they were deeply troubled by the lack of facilities available for soldiers and families and also by behaviour they observed in the military communities.<sup>645</sup> The Christian moral standards, which the

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<sup>644</sup> DHH, 76/114, Personal and Confidential letter from J. Willox Duncan to Colonel J.W. Forth, 3 August 1954.

<sup>645</sup> DHH, 76/113, Submissions and monthly chaplain's conference minutes from Senior Chaplain (P) at 2 Brigade, Germany and 76/114, Chaplain's (P) reports, 1 CIBG. Please note the (P) stands for Protestant.



chaplains had an obligation to promote and protect in the brigade, were endangered.<sup>646</sup>

Available evidence gives no indication of actual numbers, but according to the chaplains' reports, there were many cases of extremely heavy drinking in the Permanent Married Quarters and the barracks. The availability of strong cheap alcohol had been an escape for single men and men away from families and the problem did not disappear when the families came.<sup>647</sup> Duncan wrote that he and others in the military had become enured to heavy drinking, but that the civilian teachers were shocked by what they observed in the families around them. In some cases, the wives were more of a problem than their husbands and, in others, both wives and husbands drank a great deal. Some wives had apparently complained to medical officers and many men were admitted to hospital, mostly after brawls, but some with cases of acute alcoholism. A number of families were sent back to Canada when their behaviour caused problems, but the chaplains protested that Army Headquarters refused to send some difficult families back.<sup>648</sup>

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<sup>646</sup>Note that St. Laurent and Pearson had indicated the importance of Christian values to foreign policy. The Chaplains directed their attention to the spiritual well-being of the military communities. The very fact that chaplains were sent to serve with soldiers was in part an expression of Canadian values and the military support for Christian values, even if the communities did not always exemplify these ideals.

<sup>647</sup> The evidence available is anecdotal, but the problems of mind-numbing boredom, immoral behaviour by soldiers, loneliness, and very heavy drinking have been confirmed by other sources. See "What's in the box, Mommy?", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 8 November 1998. An article by Rose Simpson describing her father's letters to Canada in the mid-1950s.

<sup>648</sup>DHH, 76/114, Correspondence between J.W. Forth, Director of Chaplain Services (P) and Major J.W. Duncan, 18 April 1955.

On the whole, the Army seemed far more tolerant of alcoholism than adultery; adultery on the part of soldiers' wives was regarded as a serious matter.<sup>649</sup> Originally it was proposed to send promiscuous wives back to Canada immediately; women protested that promiscuous husbands deserved the same treatment.<sup>650</sup> The possibility that libel suits might be brought against the government if an individual was sent back to Canada with a damaged reputation resulted in a re-consideration of this policy.<sup>651</sup> Finally, Army headquarters authorized sending whole families back to Canada in the event of immoral behaviour.<sup>652</sup>

Given the high cost of returning families to Canada, the operational requirements for men in the brigade, and the likelihood that returned families would continue to experience problems in Canada, Army headquarters had to carefully consider each case before it made a decision. The fact that a number of families were returned to Canada certainly suggests the need to create and maintain a good image of Canadian life in Germany. With little organizational support apart from Army facilities, some families created an "administrative burden" as unit commanders, chaplains, medical

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<sup>649</sup> DHH, 76/113, Chaplains Monthly meeting, 13 January 1956, Major H.A. Merlinger, Senior Chaplain (P) to Director of Chaplain Services (P).

<sup>650</sup> DHH, 76/114, Chaplains' Reports, 1955-1956.

<sup>651</sup> *Ibid.* Forth to Duncan, 18 April 1955.

<sup>652</sup> *Ibid.*

officers and others attempted to resolve problems.<sup>653</sup> The chaplains also requested social assistance and welfare workers for cases of child neglect as Canadian families had no access to civilian facilities provided in larger Canadian centres.<sup>654</sup> With no legal system in place for dependents, the families had to rely upon one another, community social pressure and the threat of return to Canada in lieu of other measures.<sup>655</sup>

The letters and reports from Chaplains from 1955 and early 1956 form a valuable

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<sup>653</sup>My interviews with serving officers indicates that the term "administrative burden" was generally used as a catch-all for cases returned to Canada for a variety of reasons. I have been unable to locate any compilation of numbers or even files related to actual returns. If there is information in personnel files, it would be confidential and protected by Privacy legislation. Some families were also returned for compassionate reasons such as illness in the family. In total, as there was no general discussion of this issue in Army Council Minutes or various financial documents on travel and moving expenses, apart from mention of one single convicted private and four artillery officers who were returned to Canada at the Brigadier's request in the early 1960s, the actual percentage of returns was probably fairly small. The artillery officers had not been charged and the CGS noted that in future such individuals were to be disciplined before being sent back. However, he also mentioned a working agreement with the Adjutant-General that authorized "immediate removal of an officer could be sought where discredit to the Army and the country would occur if we pressed home the charges". Kardex, 112.1009 (d37), Walsh to Ware, 19 March and 9 April 1962.

<sup>654</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>655</sup> It is well beyond the scope of my thesis to describe and analyze fully the lives of the dependents under these legal circumstances, but it should be noted that they were without much protection in some instances. Kardex 112.1 (d148 ), a multi-volume file, contains monthly reports from the mid 1950s. One may note a small number of suspicious deaths among the dependents. For example in the report of May of 1956, two small children died. One of multiple injuries and another of asphyxia. Other months contain reports of deaths of infants with fractured skulls. While these deaths may have been accidental, in Canada, such deaths would have resulted in full Coroner's investigations as matter of routine. I found no indication among the Courts Martial files or other files I examined that domestic violence was investigated or resulted in charges being laid in these years.

record of life in Germany as the Chaplains carefully recorded their observations about the soldiers' and family life. Unfortunately, in February 1956, the chaplains were requested to stop filling in the morale portion of their monthly report because the commander, Brigadier Roger Rowley, felt they were not competent to judge the fighting morale of units and that their comments might be misinterpreted if reported to higher authorities in writing. They were told they could make verbal comments directly to him if specific concerns came up.<sup>656</sup> Even before that time, comments in the reports and letters suggest that Duncan was cautious about making critical remarks and worried that he might be quoted.<sup>657</sup>

The suppression of written criticism means that substantive evidence relating to difficulties in the Canadian communities almost disappears after this point and the official records must be examined with some caution. Many reports back to Canada after this time seem artificially positive.<sup>658</sup> There are several conclusions which may be

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<sup>656</sup> DHH, 76/113, Chaplains' Report, A.F.B Knight, Vice Adjutant-General to Directors Chaplain (RC and P), 24 February 1956.

<sup>657</sup> DHH, 76/114, Personal and Confidential letter from J. Willox Duncan to Colonel J. W. Forth, 3 August 1954. See also: Chaplains Monthly Meeting, 13 January 1956. The Chaplains themselves were cautioned by the Senior Chaplain that it was "unfair and uncharitable to put something in a report which had not been previously discussed with the responsible person or persons" and were wondering about eliminating the report on morale.

<sup>658</sup> Kardex 112.1.009 (d37) CGS Personal and Confidential Correspondence for the period November 1961 to April 1965 to and from his Commanders in foreign countries. A typical 1960s liaison letter from Brigadier Cameron to Walsh dated 2 June 1962 uses the word "good" 13 times and, while it mentions the effect of foreign currency problems on

drawn from this event. From the brigadier's perspective, it is understandable that he would want the opportunity to address issues of concern directly and to act on matters before they came to the attention of Army headquarters in Ottawa. Yet some critical feedback to Ottawa had been cut off and the chaplains' influence and function diminished. At the least, the events show a lack of good communication and cooperation within the brigade and the army.

While the suppression of the Chaplains' criticism related to internal communication, the reaction of army officials to criticism passed to the public was usually more severe and also at times highly ambiguous. For example, when negative comments were reported to Shapiro in 1953, there were informal investigations initiated by Army Headquarters with attempts to identify who had been responsible for making these comments.<sup>659</sup> Brigadier J.E.C. Pangman addressed his unit commanders and, according to the war diary, stated: " [The] practice of criticising policy to press or visitors will NOT be tolerated. [The] practice is disloyal and irresponsible."<sup>660</sup> Only a few months later, Bill Boss, a journalist who visited the brigade, telegraphed Simonds indicating that the unit commanders seemed frightened to talk to him and that his visit to the brigade would be

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morale and an accident, stresses the positive side of everything possible.

<sup>659</sup>For example: NA, RG 24, Volume 18259, War diary, 27 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, Commander's meeting, 23 April 1953 - See Kardex 410B27.061 (d2) Message from 27 Public Relations Unit to Colonel Stewart, DPR (Army) concerning a telephone call from Bill Boss to CGS General Simonds. 2 October 1953.

<sup>660</sup>*Ibid.* As noted in Chapter four, Simonds himself broke this rule when he addressed groups in public on conscription while still in office and contrary to Ministerial wishes.

wasted unless he could produce a balanced report.<sup>661</sup> An officer of the Brigade Public Relations Unit replied that the Brigade Commander "has issued no repeat no instructions either written or verbal to his unit comds [commanders] in this connection nor has he discouraged them to talk with press reps [representatives]..."<sup>662</sup> Simonds responded with a denial that brigade personnel had been warned about talking to the press in a message to be passed by Pangman to Boss.<sup>663</sup>

In a similar vein, Lieutenant-General Howard Graham, as the Chief of the General Staff, wrote to Brigadier Roger Rowley in late 1956, describing the visit of Mr. Stanley Dworkin of the *Ottawa Citizen*:

He [Dworkin] was importuned by a number of officers - some of them apparently medical officers - to produce an article and have it published drawing attention to the alleged fact that hospital facilities for the Brigade and dependents are not satisfactory.... If, by discreet inquiry, you can learn who was responsible for this "bleat" .... I would like to know the name or names of the officers involved in order to relieve them from the distressing conditions which they appear to be labouring under...<sup>664</sup>

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<sup>661</sup>Kardex 410.b27.061 (d2) Bill Boss to Simonds, 2 October 1952.

<sup>662</sup>*Ibid.*, For DPR (Army) Colonel Stewart from 27 PRU, Burleson, 2 October 1953. Please note it is possible that this public relations officer was unaware of the unit commander's meeting earlier that year. The information in the file certainly points to an active public relations campaign aimed at improving the brigade's reputation and stressing positive accomplishments.

<sup>663</sup>*Ibid.*, Simonds to Boss, 2 October 1953.

<sup>664</sup>Kardex, 112.1 (d148) CGS to Rowley, 19 October 1956.

The press was evidently not an acceptable vehicle for officers or soldiers to use in order to pressure the government to improve conditions. The idea that the public had a right to know, to debate and to participate in decisions was against the principles of military loyalty. This aspect of democratic rights at least was abrogated by the military bureaucracy. The military culture was antipathetic to many democratic practices, even for matters where security was irrelevant.<sup>665</sup>

Military spending, especially after 1952, included such items as chapels, schools, swimming pools, skating rinks, and other recreational facilities to improve retention of personnel and to portray an attractive vision of Canadian life to the surrounding communities and to international visitors, but these expenditures were also made in Canada.<sup>666</sup> Policies to make Canadian television and radio, newspapers and books available and to create films about the brigade in Europe were designed partially to create and reinforce Canadian identity abroad. The Maple Leaf Services, which replaced the British NAAFI service for the brigade in Europe in the mid-1950s,<sup>667</sup> aimed

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<sup>665</sup> John Gimbel first noted this point in *A German Community under American Occupation Marburg 1945-1952* and concluded that it was the reason why the Germans were cynical about de-nazification by military forces.

<sup>666</sup> DHH, 72/918, Speech by Douglas Harkness on "Improvements in Conditions of Service, 1957-1962," 1962.

<sup>667</sup> The NAAFI services typically provided a wet (with alcohol) and dry canteen. The food was apparently heavy on sausages and pastries, but much depended upon the interests of the individual unit commander and his interest in making suggestions. Variations in accommodations were noted in the Canadian Red Cross reports. The British Women's Voluntary Service (WVS) made quite a difference in reading, writing, games rooms and other small comforts. Canadian newspapers were very old by the time they got to Germany. NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11391-40, pt. 2.3, Miss M.E. Wilson to Dr.

primarily at providing Canadians and their families with the range of consumer goods similar to those found in Canada for their comfort and morale.<sup>668</sup> All these measures attempted to foster a Canadian community spirit in Germany which might flourish independently of the British and others.<sup>669</sup> By 1960, the brigade staff were considering making Canadian television available to the communities, noting that the British and Americans were investigating the provision of television programming.<sup>670</sup> While this effort proved too expensive, even for the Americans, Radio Canadian Army Europe was established.<sup>671</sup> It included about 25 percent French programming, featuring a large percentage of CBC tapes as well as some local programming. It had eight full time staff members with various volunteers from units and their families.<sup>672</sup>

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W. S. Stanbury 26 February, 1953.

<sup>668</sup>*Maple Leaf Services serving the Canadian Army*, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1958, pp.18.

<sup>669</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 22460, CBUE 1690/1, Public Relations General, Volume 2, Campsite histories of the Brigade Group in Germany, noting that all the forts had been named after prominent fortresses in Canada's history with brief histories of the original forts, and describing efforts to "make the general public... conscious of the important and vital role played by the Canadian Armed Forces in Europe."

<sup>670</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 22460, CBUE /1695-1 Radio TV, Volume 1, DAAG to OIC ADm, 17 March 1960. In this letter, the British motivation for considering television were to ensure that their soldiers continued "thinking along British lines... and were not completely captivated by German TV programmes [sic]."

<sup>671</sup>DHH, 76/114, Chaplain's Monthly Conferences, 15 February 1956, makes note that the Brigade Radio Station was about to open. The Protestant and Catholic Chaplains shared a five minute devotion on this station each day.

<sup>672</sup>NA, RG 24, Accession 83-84/165, Volume 12, CBUE, 1252-2, Volume 2, File 1-5, Monthly reports, 1966-1967. (Unfortunately, monthly reports were not available for the earlier time frame, but a review of the programs in 1967 summarized the past practices).



While all these measures improved the quality of life for Canadians in these communities, Germans would form their opinions about Canadians from the observable actions of soldiers and their families and from direct interaction with them. Whether the Canadians knew German and displayed acceptable behaviour according to German standards was important in gaining acceptance from the German communities where they were located.

***German-Canadian relations:***

Each brigadier received supplementary instructions which not only underlined the importance of treating the Germans as equals as noted in Chapter two, but which also stressed the importance of maintaining the best possible relations between the officers and men and the German people.<sup>673</sup> These instructions were prepared by the Department of External Affairs. They clearly articulated the foreign policy goal of ensuring West German support for the NATO alliance and requested that all ranks be familiar with this goal.<sup>674</sup> These supplementary instructions illustrate well that the brigade had an important secondary role beyond the military role of defending German territory. Various efforts were made to improve relations while training hard to produce a capable fighting force.

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<sup>673</sup>Kardex, 112.045 (d2) Supplementary Instructions to Command Instructions to the Commander, 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, 18 July 1962.

<sup>674</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 1-2, "Letter of guidance", 27 October 1951. "Nevertheless, the attitude and behaviour of the forces under your command is of extreme importance from a political point of view, in fostering a spirit of whole-hearted co-operation on the part of the German people with Allied aims and objectives. Further, the German government has made clear that its participation in the Western defence effort would be on the principle of complete equality and this has now become a domestic political issue of prime importance."

During the occupation of Germany, various military forces in Germany gave annual Christmas parties for German children and supported local orphanages.<sup>675</sup> These were well received by the Germans. Early in 1952, the Roman Catholic Chaplain responsible for 79th Field Regiment, RCA, at Hohne, just north of Hannover, arranged to have his unit sponsor a local orphanage with about eighty children in it. The soldiers visited the children on weekends, took up collections on payday and held birthday parties for each child on his or her birthday as well as the usual Christmas parties.<sup>676</sup> The conditions in the orphanage were poor.<sup>677</sup> One soldier who volunteered there on Saturdays indicated that "soldiers avoided the orphanage at mealtimes as the food smelled so bad."<sup>678</sup>

Yet relations with the Germans were hardly ideal. Once when this volunteer was driving back to his unit after a Saturday with the children, he accidentally hit a dog with his vehicle. He was quickly surrounded by a mob of angry Germans and narrowly avoided being attacked before military police arrived on the scene to rescue him.<sup>679</sup> In spite of

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<sup>675</sup>Kardex 410.b27.009 (d12), Professor E. Lehnart to 58 Independent Field Squadron, Royal Canadian Engineers, 18 December 1952.

<sup>676</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 3, "Canadian in Germany leads a narrow and restricted life" by Bill Boss, *Ottawa Journal*, 10 April 1953. See also interviews with Hector Lemay and his personal scrapbook with pictures of these events and of the children.

<sup>677</sup>Kardex, 410.b27.009 (d12), Sr. M. Alexandrina, Mother Superior of the Order, Catholic Children's Home to HQ, 27 Cdn Inf Bde Gp, 21 January 1953, (file contains only the translated copy of her letter originally written in German).

<sup>678</sup>Interviews with Hector Lemay, 1996.

<sup>679</sup>*Ibid.*

this event, his memories of Germany are mostly of the children and how much they appreciated his visits.

However the memory of the holocaust remained a factor in German Canadian relations. In November 1953, Major-General F. F. Worthington visited the Brigade in Europe. He wrote to Simonds when he returned to Canada, noting that within two miles of the Royal Canadian Dragoons' camp near Hohne was the sight of Bergen-Belsen:

where more than 100,000 victims died the slow death of starvation and incredible cruelties at the hands of the prison officials... There is a tall stone column up to 100 feet high which marks the spot.... Around there are huge mounds stating the number buried there. In some graves were as many as 5,000 people... In one portion of the area, a few buildings remain occupied by D.P.s [Displaced People] who live in squalor and misery raddled with disease, so, I'm told... <sup>680</sup>

As we will see Canadians soldiers attempted to put all that behind them in their efforts to develop good German-Canadian relations, but forgiveness was not complete.<sup>681</sup>

One of the first and somewhat successful efforts to improve relations was the creation

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<sup>680</sup>Kardex, 410.b27.061 (d2), F.F. Worthington to Simonds, 18 November 1953.

<sup>681</sup>Claude Beauregard and Edwidge Munn, "Les troupes d'occupation canadiennes en Allemagne, juillet 1945-juin 1946" in *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Volume 22, No. 5, May 1993, 36-41. Though writing about Canadian troops just after German surrender, Beauregard and Munn make two central points well worth noting at this time. Soviet atrocities meant that Germans in the Canadian zone were comparatively well treated and they knew it. Canadian soldiers were at first indifferent to the Germans, but gradually warmed to them. As contacts with individual Germans increased, Canadian troops heard protestations of innocence and ignorance of Nazi crimes and softened their judgements.

of a German-Canadian Association in Hannover. A German-Canadian Committee formed with officials representing Lower Saxony, Hannover, and the brigade, an official from the recently opened Canadian immigration office in Hannover and the British resident in Hannover. Its purpose was to bring as "members of the brigade group into contact with as many sides of German life as possible and, as opportunity offers, acquainting Germans with aspects of the Canadian scene."<sup>682</sup>

But Canadian naiveté came to the fore, in part because the Brigade Commander had been instructed to treat Germans as equals. He was hardly prepared to discriminate between good and bad Germans.<sup>683</sup> Walsh was surprised by the warm reception accorded Canadian troops who first arrived in the Hannover area just before Christmas in 1951. Even the Occupation government was apparently astonished by the welcome.

<sup>684</sup> Canadian troops accepted an overwhelming number of invitations to spend their

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<sup>682</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 18259, Brigadier Pangman, Memorandum entitled German-Canadian Committee, 30 January 1953.

<sup>683</sup>Conditions in Hannover were bad. The few surviving Jews from Bergen-Belsen still faced considerable ill treatment, even from each other. Hannover's insularity was such that German-Jews there refused to accept Eastern European Jews into their community the early 1950s in spite of Rabbi Zvi Helfgott-Asaria's pleas: "The appeal from Bergen-Belsen [located close by], that we all suffered in common ... apparently fell on barren ground in Hannover". This same Rabbi reported an attack by some forty German police officers attached to the customs office, wielding rubber truncheons and flogging people assumed to be Jews. Fifteen Jews were injured in this attack based on suspicion of a customs violation in Hannover in 1950. Michael Brenner, *After the Holocaust. Rebuilding Jewish lives in Post War Germany*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997. pp. 47, 49.

<sup>684</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, file 11381-40, pt. 2.1. f.p., Davis to Pearson, 9 January 1952 and Kardex, 112.1 (d97) Walsh to CGS, 2 January 1952.

holidays with German families and Brigadier Walsh wrote an appreciative letter of thanks to Carl Doehring, the man behind this kindly gesture.

Canadians regretted their initial enthusiasm when it was revealed some months later that Doehring had considerable Nazi organisational experience and many social connections among some still very strong Nazi sympathizers in the community.<sup>685</sup>

Canadian Ambassador T. C. Davis pondered Doehring's motivations as Doehring took it upon himself to become the driving force behind the German-Canadian Association. Doehring remained as the Secretary General of this group until 1958 as the Canadian Embassy sought at first to gently discourage him and seven years later finally insisted on his resignation. He was also proclaimed *persona non grata* at the Canadian Embassy in 1959.<sup>686</sup> His influence and his persistence were factors to consider, but the incident demonstrated that the policy of treating all Germans as equals might involve difficulties. In the case of prominent ex-Nazis, were they to be accorded equal treatment or should Canadians discriminate against them? Apparently convenience and circumstances would dictate the answer. In the beginning, Doehring ensured that the Canadian soldiers and German families got to know each other, and then he became

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<sup>685</sup>While many Canadian soldiers enjoyed traditional Christmas visits with German families, the very high Canadian venereal disease rate was partially attributed to Christmas visits. Kardex 410b27.009 (d26), Minutes and Agenda of 27 CIB Staff Conferences, January 1952 to April 1953, Minutes of a Staff Conference held at HQ 1100 hours; 19 January 1952, 27 CIB/S5-14-2, HQ 27 Cdn Inf Bde Gp.

<sup>686</sup>NA, MG 26, N1, Lester B. Pearson fonds, Volume 2, file 045 German - Personal and confidential correspondence from the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to Pearson, Leader of the Opposition, 1 October 1959.

an embarrassment.<sup>687</sup>

By contrast, Canadians were more hesitant to accept the overtures of the German government and delayed an official visit by Brigadier Walsh to the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, for many months as they sought the approval of their allies.

Eventually, in May, Walsh was authorised to visit but instructed not to discuss any financial or political arrangements with the German leader.<sup>688</sup> As noted in Chapter two, the financial and political arrangements were no doubt the source of some chagrin and Adenauer had proved very skillful in his manipulation of the press and the allies to achieve the maximum in public relations and bargaining.<sup>689</sup> Yet Canadian reluctance to make simple decisions without time-consuming consultations may well have reinforced

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<sup>687</sup>NA, RG 25, vol 4293, 10936-B-40 pt. 1, John Starnes to the Under Secretary of State, 10 December 1954.

<sup>688</sup>Kardex, 112.1 (d97) 27 CIB Nov 51-Feb 52, Simonds to Walsh, [May 1952?]. There was in this correspondence no mention of Adenauer's anti-Nazi past. The concerns expressed in the file were that the Canadian visit might embarrass the British or the Americans. In other words, Canadian decision-making did not seem initially to be concerned with the individual past records of Germans. This policy was in contrast to the American and British de-Nazification programmes, though there were also inconsistencies in these programmes. See Gimbel, John, *A German Community under American Occupation Marburg 1945-1952*, Chapter eleven and Noel Annan, *Changing Enemies. The Defeat and Regeneration of Germany*, pp. 178-180.

<sup>689</sup>On the issue of troop misbehavior, during Walsh's visit, Adenauer seemed unconcerned but communication with Walsh through the embassy and the British Army of the Rhine suggested that even minor incidents were used as bargaining chips by Adenauer's government. The actual visit did not take place until July 1952. NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 2.2, Davis to Pearson, 3 July 1952.

German notions about the Canadian government's lack of independence.<sup>690</sup>

An element of hypocrisy developed in the effort to improve public relations. Canadian officers had associated socially with Kurt Meyer, a convicted German war criminal. Meyer as a German general had been convicted of ordering the murder of Canadian Prisoners of War and had served his sentence in Canada.<sup>691</sup> When he was released, he visited the brigade and succeeded in negotiating a contract to supply the Canadian camps with beer. Meyer had been a guest in the Officers' Mess on a few occasions and Canadian officers certainly knew his background.<sup>692</sup> Once the association with Meyer became known through the American troop publication, *Stars and Stripes*, the negative publicity required that the relationship be severed and so it was, though his contract to sell beer remained intact.<sup>693</sup> Meyer was respected by his fellow Germans and several Canadians wrote letters criticising the legal proceedings against Meyer and defending

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<sup>690</sup>RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 2.2 . Heeney to the Minister, 27 February 1952; Davis to Pearson, 3 May 1952. Eisenhower indicated that it was a entirely decision for the Canadian government to make. It was noted that Walsh's British and American military counterparts were not yet visiting Adenauer. The Canadians must have appeared indecisive to say the least.

<sup>691</sup> See: Howard Margolian, *Conduct Unbecoming. The Story of the Murder of Canadian Prisoners of War in Normandy*, Toronto: University of Toronto, 1998.

<sup>692</sup>Maurice A. Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians. The memoirs of Lt.-Gen. Maurice A. Pope*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962, pp. 291-292. In just one example of Canadian military views, Major-General Christopher Vokes confirmed Pope's view that Meyer's conviction had not done Canada much credit.

<sup>693</sup>RG 24, Volume 10,970, from Kardex 260c4.009 (d 24) transfers to National Archives. When Kurt Meyer's widow sent his death notice to the brigade in 1961, it was filed with a note to say that no acknowledgment or official notice was to be taken.

him. They were aware that Canadians had committed similar, but unprosecuted, crimes. Moreover, Meyer had served his sentence.<sup>694</sup>

Public relations in Germany were complex and problems mounted. The presence of large numbers of single young men and men without wives and children combined with the large number of displaced and economically disadvantaged women in German society, resulting in increased prostitution and a high rate of venereal disease. These problems existed before 1951 for occupation forces. Though prostitution was legal and regulated in Germany, Canadian soldiers were forbidden access to legal prostitutes and known brothels were out of bounds; this attempt to regulate the soldiers' behaviour and to improve their reputations backfired as a good many ended up with venereal disease through contact with the many unregulated women available.<sup>695</sup>

Hannover had a large population of prostitutes before the Canadians arrived and was oblivious to prostitution in its midst. Few respectable people in Hannover would socialize with the Canadian soldiers and the limited number of marriages was partially

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<sup>694</sup>Kardex 113.3p4 (d3) Lists of POWs still in Canada and those who died while in Canada, April 1951. The causes of death are included.

<sup>695</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 3, "Canadian in Germany leads narrow and restricted life" by Bill Boss, *Ottawa Journal*, 10 April 1953. In this article, the British venereal disease rate is estimated to be 1.3 per thousand. The American rate is about 45 to 50 per thousand and the Canadian rate is about 288 per thousand. While the Canadian Army suggested that these comparisons were incorrect, other evidence (including American Army records) tend to support these estimates, though there was great variation from one camp to another for the American figures and the British soldiers were so much closer to home that comparisons with them were felt to be unfair.



because Canadian soldiers did not often meet women who could meet the criteria required by military regulations.<sup>696</sup>

In the rural communities around Soest where Canadian soldiers were moved in 1953, behaviour had been expected to improve with less temptation available. However, the influx of "Veronikas", as the unofficial prostitutes associated with Canadian troops were dubbed, resulted in vituperative editorials in local newspapers. The local newspapers carried reports of hungry, ill-clothed women found living in muddy holes just outside the Canadian camps; many were found to carry venereal disease.<sup>697</sup> Police in Germany had the right to inspect women and those carrying venereal diseases were charged with causing "bodily injury". In Soest alone, about one hundred and thirty women registered as legal prostitutes as Canadian troops arrived.<sup>698</sup>

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<sup>696</sup>NA, RG 25, File 11381-40, pt. 3.2, Miss Wilson to Dr. Stanbury, 26 February 1953.

<sup>697</sup> Photocopied German newspapers, courtesy of Sean Maloney. Originals with Erich Reichel, Soest. Hereafter referred to as Photocopied German newspapers. Even well after the arrival of many families, prostitutes openly served many of the men in barracks. In an interview with me, a Non-Commissioned Officer, Norman Patrick, talked of the "Pine Tree Hotel" which was a tent city located in a stand of timber at the back of the camp with convenient access for the 22e Regiment and engineers from their barracks. He reported that these were unofficial, unregulated prostitutes, many of whom were refugees from East Germany. Their presence among the soldiers was not perceived to be a security problem at this time and he mentioned that when he performed roll call in the parade ground close by, there would nearly always be men still in the tents rather than barracks. He would simply repeat the roll call several times until all the men were present. According to his memory, "everyone" knew about the Pine Tree Hotel.

<sup>698</sup>Photocopied German newspapers.

Suffering from severe housing shortages and with little cash in the communities, some formerly respectable German families rented part of their dwellings to incoming prostitutes. One German newspaper recounted how for the first time in many years a Germany family was able to repair the roof of their house, drink coffee and smoke cigarettes, all courtesy of the rent paid by the Veronikas for the use of rooms in the house.<sup>699</sup> On the whole, German newspapers from the early 1950s indicate the mixed feelings in the communities around Soest as the influx of Canadians provided more local jobs and improved the economy, but caused in disruption to community life and values.<sup>700</sup>

Canadians were seeking German public support, but even after families arrived in Germany, Canadian soldiers had access to cheap strong alcohol and many were single, young, lonely and bored. While the vast majority were well behaved, the actions of what was called the "5 percenters" of poorly behaved soldiers affected the reputations of them all. In at least a few cases found in files of investigations, the failure of the Canadian Army to prosecute cases acted against the standards which Canadians had hoped to promote and uphold and may have reinforced negative feelings about Canadian soldiers.<sup>701</sup> If the Canadian government had hoped that its soldiers would be

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<sup>699</sup>Photocopied German newspapers.

<sup>700</sup>There had been Belgian occupation forces in the area, but no huge influx of "Veronikas", possibly because they were close to home.

<sup>701</sup> See Kardex 410b29.009 (d1) for letters from Germans where no investigation were made because the Germans did not know the names of Canadian soldiers involved.

perceived in Germany as advocates of an ideal Christian and democratic life, the German newspapers and other sources suggest that this was hardly the case.

Merely to be seen with a Canadian soldier might earn a young German woman of previously good reputation the label "streetwalker".<sup>702</sup> As one Canadian provost major noted, in frustration, after charges of rape were not laid against a Canadian soldier in spite of good physical evidence, the failure of the Assistant Judge Advocate General to act reinforced the attitude of "that is what you can expect if you associate with Canadian soldiers" found in small German communities.<sup>703</sup> Several other investigations without charges being laid suggest that in the context of the early 1950s, the Germans themselves were accustomed to acts of violence by foreign troops and did not always pursue cases with vigour.<sup>704</sup>

The brigade staff took other steps to encourage more respectable interaction between their single soldiers and the local German women in the early 1950s. In 1953, they announced, in the local German newspapers, a dance to be organised by the Army and supervised by a Canadian Army Chaplain. Women who attended this dance were

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<sup>702</sup>*In den Kneipen rollte der Dollar. Invasion von leichten Mädchen im Gefolge der Kanadier-Veronikas trieben Mieten in die Höhe.* Photocopied German newspapers, 1953-1954.

<sup>703</sup>The Major responsible for the Provost detachment issued a strong written protest, requesting that Assistant for the Judge Advocate General "not be employed to assist soldiers in avoiding the consequences of such brutal outrages." There were a few other similar cases. See Kardexm 410b27.009 (d15).

<sup>704</sup>*Ibid.*

threatened by others in the community. A large crowd gathered by the buses which were picking women up in the town squares, shouting abuse at the women, throwing firecrackers under the buses and threatening to shave the women's heads. A number of Soest women attended anyway, reaching the dance by public transport.<sup>705</sup>

German newspaper coverage varied between reports that the Canadian Army was seeking to corrupt the virtue of the Soest girls who were foolish enough to go to the dance to one more generous assessment by a reporter who actually attended the dance. He observed that the Canadian Army was well intentioned, the dance was well regulated and he recognized many local respectable women among the guests, but his opinion was that the judgement of the Canadians organizing the dance had been very poor.<sup>706</sup> According to his report, the brigade had not been well informed on the correct German social etiquette. Yet the large number of local Soest women who attended the dance suggests that the newspaper reports did not reflect their views.

A non-commissioned officer interviewed for this thesis believed that Canadians were viewed as rude, uncouth, badly educated and over-paid. In his opinion, many respectable Germans avoided contact with them, though a few long-lasting friendships were made. When he with other soldiers conducted town patrols of various pubs, there

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<sup>705</sup> Photocopied German newspapers.

<sup>706</sup> Photocopied German newspapers.

were some pubs where Canadians were simply not welcome.<sup>707</sup> A dead silence would fall over the entire pub when a Canadian soldier would enter and a complete stillness and silence would continue until he left.<sup>708</sup>

While Canadians publicized their non-occupation status, newspapers in the local communities around Soest did not often differentiate between the Canadian NATO forces and occupation forces, mistakenly referring to the Canadians as occupation forces even after the FRG joined NATO.<sup>709</sup> While this mistake occurred most often in articles critical of the Canadian brigade, the confusion in terminology in newspapers was probably quite genuine, as at the local level, the legal arrangements for the Canadian troops must have seemed similar to those of occupation forces.

The Canadian embassy had recommended that facilities in the Soest area be requisitioned with reimbursement through the Occupation Forces Agreement to the German federal government. Noting that this arrangement would cause bad relations in the local community, the Canadian Army attempted to arrange direct rental agreements

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<sup>707</sup>This pub patrol was not universal in Canadian communities when troops were located close by during this period, but it was put in place in Quebec city when the brigade trained at Valcartier in the early 1950s and from time to time in other Canadian communities when problems were experienced.

<sup>708</sup>Interview with Norman Patrick, July 1997. Douglas Townend, who served in Germany as a Lieutenant in the 1960s confirmed this phenomenon. However, Sean Maloney recounts in his book that after some years, certain pubs "belonged" to certain regiments, p. 221.

<sup>709</sup>Photocopied German newspapers, SO Book 129, Press Clippings from 22 May 1952 to 8 November 1952.

with the Germans in various areas of Soest. For some facilities, arrangements were made, but sufficient progress was not possible on others with the result that requisitions were used.<sup>710</sup>

The requisition of the Werl forest for the construction of military facilities for the brigade caused particular local concern and, throughout 1952 and 1953, even before the brigade arrived, local newspapers followed the protest at the loss of this forest area. *Werlwold*, as it was called, had been preserved as an area of peace and tranquillity for many centuries and was regarded as one of the best preserved and maintained forests in West Germany. As buildings, roads and other facilities were built in it, there was nothing the members of the local community could do on legal basis and they were banned from entering the forest area as the construction commenced.<sup>711</sup> Some thirty years later, the strategic analyst, Hugh Faringdon, in evaluating the possible defensive uses of German's forested areas, noted : "Nobody who proposes to employ woods for military purposes can afford to ignore the place which this greenery occupies in the German imagination as a symbol of peace, freedom and unspoilt nature."<sup>712</sup> The requisition of Werlwold provided the facilities that the Canadians required for training,

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<sup>710</sup> Kardex, 112.1 (d99) Various correspondence between Pangman and Simonds, Simonds and Minister, Bonn and Pangman, NORTHAG and Pangman, June 1953.

<sup>711</sup> Photocopied documents received courtesy of Sean Maloney from Erich Reichel, former public relations manager with 4 Brigade, SO Book 129, Press Clippings, 1952. Excavations of the forest area revealed ancient burial grounds and many artifacts.

<sup>712</sup> Hugh Faringdon, *Confrontation. The Strategic Geography of NATO and the Warsaw Pact*, p. 278.

but it had been at the cost of much good will in the German communities.

Since the end of the war, many German dwellings had been requisitioned by the occupation forces. Resentment came to head in Unna, a small community where some Canadian families were to be placed in apartments vacated by Belgian occupation troops in 1955. The apartments had been built with German occupation funds and were vacant for several months while many Germans were homeless or in very poor quality dwellings. In August of 1956, the local police broke into these apartments, hoping to place German families in them as a test case. When they were forbidden to do so, the local Social Democratic Party (SPD) picked up the incident as an example of the complete lack of sovereignty of the German people under Adenauer. They complained that the rights of German people were being violated, arguing that the local people in Unna required self defence against the State and occupation forces.<sup>713</sup>

The episode in Unna made the national newspapers, which were carefully being analysed by the staff at the Canadian embassy. One German newspaper editor argued that the "occupation forces" had true power whatever agreements Adenauer had made.<sup>714</sup> The strong emotions evident in the local communities were reflected at a higher level in German national politics. The actual conditions and relationships at the local level might allow Germans to judge to what extent the terms "sovereignty" and

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<sup>713</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 17605, file 004-100-85/265, volume 1, various reports from Bonn, and various newspapers reports and translations also in file.

<sup>714</sup>*Ibid.*

"equality for Germans" were propaganda, to evaluate the meaning of equality with Canadians and even for that matter to form an interpretation of what Canadians actually meant when they talked about Article Two of the NATO Treaty and the provision of "well-being and stability" mentioned in it.

There was clearly some distance between events at the local level and international politics, but the news coverage of troop crime and misbehaviour, especially during German elections or when the Germans were negotiating with the Three Powers and NATO, gave local events more significance. The Canadian government was aware of this. In June of 1955, Pearson wrote to the embassy in Bonn, mentioning that there had been a number of clashes between German civilians and Canadian soldiers on training and requesting an analysis of the political significance of these events.<sup>715</sup> John Starnes, an officer in the Embassy in Bonn in the 1950s, noted that "While the incidents probably have adversely affected our reputation in East Westphalia we doubt that they have assumed much importance in the federal area as a whole" . However, the damage had been done and the clashes had been well reported in the provincial press and the daily 10 pfennigs "dreadfuls".<sup>716</sup> According to Starnes, the most lurid accounts of Canadian behaviour had likely come from a paper supporting the socialist party. He

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<sup>715</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 3, Pearson to the Canadian Embassy in Bonn, 21 June 1955.

<sup>716</sup>*Ibid.* Starnes noted that the term 10 pfennigs "dreadfuls" referred to cheap, sensational papers which often exaggerated events and were not taken as seriously as more respectable newspapers.



concluded that the incidents might have significance in local politics.<sup>717</sup>

In early July, an SPD deputy from Herford asked in writing if the German government was aware of the attacks by Canadian soldiers upon German civilians and asked what the government intended to do to protect the civilian population. Thus the incidents were raised at the federal level.<sup>718</sup> There were a few more incidents, less serious in nature, in Soest, but by the Autumn of 1955, the Minister President, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, referred to the continuing recent violence and requested that a curfew be imposed upon Canadian troops in response to a formal request by the North Rhine-Westphalian League of Cities.<sup>719</sup> The brigade was in the process of rotating troops back to Canada and bringing new troops into Germany. So the commander refused to impose a curfew on the new arrivals, but instead agreed to implement a variety of other measures, including military police patrols and the provision of transportation back to barracks for soldiers at the Red Patch Other Ranks Club in Soest.<sup>720</sup>

Canadians emphasized their non-occupation status and a myth has since been created to suggest that Canadian soldiers were more popular than other foreign troops. This myth is evident in George Kitching's *Mud and Green Fields* and Dominck Graham's *The*

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<sup>717</sup>*Ibid.*, Starnes to Pearson, 22 June 1955.

<sup>718</sup>*Ibid.*, Ritchie to Pearson, 9 July 1955.

<sup>719</sup>*Ibid.*, pt. 3.2, Herr Ministerpraesident Arnold to Mr. J.L. Paice, Land Liaison office, 17 October 1955.

<sup>720</sup>*Ibid.*, Paice to Arnold, 26 October 1956.

*Price of Command* and also appears to a degree in some regimental histories.<sup>721</sup>

Archival evidence and German newspapers do not support this contention.<sup>722</sup>

Objections to the presence of Canadian troops in Germany ranged from outrage at specific instances of drunkenness, rape, murder and other misbehaviour on the part of a few soldiers to the more profound anti-NATO, anti-nuclear stance of left wing political groups.

A 1957 public opinion poll in Germany reported that Canadians were actually the least popular force among the NATO nations located in Germany and their lack of popularity was the strongest in the areas where they were located.<sup>723</sup> Even if the reports based

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<sup>721</sup>See for example: G.W.L. Nicholson, *The Gunners of Canada. The History of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, Volume 2, 1919-1967*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972. In chapter 14, Nicholson asserts that the behaviour of this regiment was exemplary. It was not. Earlier in this chapter, it is noted that four artillery officers were actually returned to Canada as a result of their behaviour. In Brereton Greenhous' s *Dragoon. The centennial history of The Royal Canadian Dragoons, 1883-1983*, Belleville, ON: Guild of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, 1983, on the other hand, Chapter 18 includes information on difficult social relations in the early period and notes the improvement over time for the Dragoons.

<sup>722</sup>In Charles Ritchie's report of 10 June 1955, he noted "The Canadian troops have had the unfortunate honour this week of being possibly the first Allied forces since the return of German sovereignty to be involved with German civilians to an extent sufficient to warrant considerable publicity in the German newspapers. The more sensational papers, in describing attacks on German civilians by Canadian troops on manoeuvres in the Hannover area, referred to a return to the worst of the occupation days..." NA, RG 25, Volume 4293, File 10934-F-40, F.P. In terms of methodology, even if some German newspapers exaggerated Canadian misbehaviour, Ritchie's report and others suggest that this publicity was a concern for the Canadian Embassy and was perceived to affect German-Canadian relations to a degree.

<sup>723</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, file 11381-40, pt. 3-2, Numbered letter no. 158, Canadian Embassy, Bonn to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 19 February 1957. It

upon this poll were exaggerated, there is ample evidence to suggest that many Germans accepted the Canadian presence in their country only because of the Soviets. The poll in its entirety had asked Germans if they wished foreign troops removed on the basis that Soviet troops also withdrew from Central Europe, but it was only partially leaked to the international press so that the full context was not clear.

In 1957, a majority of Germans still hoped for reunification of their country. Though Germany was a NATO member, its integration into the western alliance could not be taken for granted. Canadian diplomats were well aware of the domestic German political difficulties. Adenauer was elderly and the SPD quite strong. Charles Ritchie, the Canadian ambassador in Bonn, reported on the proposed visit of Erich Ollenhauer, the SPD leader to Washington in 1957, noting that the evolution of the socialist party in Germany had considerable importance to Canada and to the United States, especially if progress could be made on the North Atlantic alliance.<sup>724</sup>

The SPD , known for its strong anti-nuclear stance, was developing a cohesive party stand promoting re-unification of Germany in a European zone with controlled limits on

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was noted that the numbers surveyed in the communities close to Canadian military communities were too small to be statistically valid. As parts of the report had made its way into the international press, the public relations damage was significant. Sadly, it was hardly an isolated report and up until the late 1950s, there were many reports of Canadian misbehaviour and unpopularity in German newspapers.

<sup>724</sup>NA, MG 26 N1, Volume 12, Pearson, L. B. Nominal files, pre-1958, Ritchie, C.S.A., Canada- External Affairs, 1947-1957, Memo from Ritchie to Pearson, 18 February 1957.

arms and free of foreign troops.<sup>725</sup> Ollenhauer spoke with Ritchie on the SPD's policy for consultation with NATO partners prior to German withdrawal from NATO, distinguishing consultation from any NATO veto on Germany's departure. Implicit in his discussions was the expectation that the reunification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from Central Europe would occur in the next few years. Ollenhauer was viewed as pro-western, reflecting a wide portion of German opinion; he supported German membership in NATO until foreign forces withdrew.<sup>726</sup> When Ritchie attempted to interest Ollenhauer in the non-military aspects of NATO, he met with a tepid response, Ollenhauer indicating that the NATO label symbolized a military alliance to the Germans. He did not see any particular economic, spiritual or other benefit to Germans.

The continued presence of Soviet forces and the actions of the communist regime in East Germany in the early 1950s, as well as the Hungarian uprising and its repression in 1956, were no doubt influential factors in the formulation of German public opinion and finally the gradual acceptance of NATO membership by the SPD leadership.<sup>727</sup> The American, British, French and other NATO forces, with far larger numbers, surely

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<sup>725</sup> Dennis L. Bark and David R. Greiss, *A History of West Germany. From Shadow to Substance, 1943-1963*, Volume 1, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Oxford, England: Blackwell, 1993, p. 447.

<sup>726</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>727</sup> NA, RG 25, Volume 7330, File 10935-B-40, pt. 3.1, Ritchie to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Annual Review for Germany, 1956*, 30 January 1957.

affected German public opinion about the presence of foreign troops on German soil more than the small numbers of Canadians.<sup>728</sup> Even so the Canadian government was well aware that the behaviour of Canadian soldiers would have an impact upon German public opinion about NATO and about Canada. A variety of measures were taken in the late 1950s and early 1960s to improve the morale of the Canadian military communities and to better their relations with the Germans.

*The Beaver*, a newspaper, began in 1957 and was written for the brigade with army funding. It ran articles on German local history and social customs to assist the families and soldiers in matters of comportment, and gave advice on practical matters and also provided a community forum.<sup>729</sup> This newspaper was deliberately produced to enhance morale; it included descriptions of units' accomplishments, local sporting events, and human interest stories. *The Beaver* provided for an official channel for requests from the Brigadier or other officials to parents asking them to ensure that their children did not damage property and respected the local communities rules.<sup>730</sup>

The Brigade began to develop various support services for families. The summer

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<sup>728</sup>Bark and Greiss, *The History of Germany*, pp. 490- 520. Note that Canada rates few mentions in discussions of foreign troops on German soil.

<sup>729</sup>Some regiments also had regimental newsletters which served a similar purpose for the members of that regiment.

<sup>730</sup> See footnote 641 re:*The Beaver* on page 269.

recreational program for brigade children, the provision of facilities for the Salvation Army and other voluntary organizations improved the quality of life.<sup>731</sup> These institutions also cultivated better German-Canadian relations.<sup>732</sup> The persistent shortage of permanent married quarters made it difficult for some families, located far away from the military communities, to take part in brigade activities, but these families naturally developed closer relations with German civilians.<sup>733</sup>

The Canadian Army financed a film through the National Film Board in 1960 to provide incoming families and soldiers with detailed instructions on preparations for life in Germany, including the necessity to present themselves in a manner which might enhance Canada's reputation.<sup>734</sup> The Canadians rotated to Germany in 1962 could

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<sup>731</sup>*The Beaver*, various issues. See for example, 5 May 1961, "The ladies in green". An article which covers the Women's Voluntary Service about unpaid British women who ran canteens for the Canadian soldiers, noting that they provided many useful services, but that as few of the women spoke any French, French Canadian soldiers benefited less from this service.

<sup>732</sup>NA, RG 24, Accession 1983-84/165, Volume 12, CBUE 1252-2, Volume 2, Minutes of a Conference on the Beaver and Radio Canadian Army Europe (CAE), held at HQ 4 CIBG 1600 hours 21 June 1967. At this time the possibility of a joint television project with the Americans was also discussed. The Americans had recently shelved a television project because of the prohibitive cost.

<sup>733</sup>On 5 May 1970 as the brigade prepared to leave Soest, apparently nearly 1000 families still lived "on the economy", a term used for Canadians renting from Germans. Some lived in renovated barns. There were complaints in the 1950s that some of the rents charged were outrageous. It was not until 1967 that *the Beaver* was considering running a regular weekly unit column for 2 R22eR in French.

<sup>734</sup>NA, RG 24, Accession 1983-84/048, Volume 3546, file 8033-7.

thus watch this film, *Begegnung mit Deutschland*.<sup>735</sup> German language lessons were also available to soldiers and their families.

In 1960, Brigadier D.C. Cameron indicated to his incoming commanders that their service in Germany would be challenging:

Not only will you command your unit, you will have entire responsibility for the unit as though you ran a small town without the full services normally provided. You will find you are a social service worker, police magistrate, marriage counsellor, speech maker, father confessor and professional greeter of guests... The Brigade staff and service here to help you and to give advice - use them. ...[we are] very much in the public eye here, and I require you to take seriously the fact that we are national representatives in Germany and any poor publicity is a slight on our country as well as on your unit.<sup>736</sup>

Cameron went on to discuss the necessity for smart dress whether in uniform or not, and the requirement for preventative discipline, especially town patrols, and he mentioned the high accident rate which plagued the Canadian communities in Europe during these years. Noting that German beer was stronger than Canadian, he allowed his unit commanders to impose curfews on units if necessary and asked them to

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<sup>735</sup>NA, RG 24, Accession 1983-84/215, Box 409, Volume 6, Various letters, and notes on a briefing for soldiers and dependents, September 1962.

<sup>736</sup>NA, RG 24 Volume 10,970, from Kardex 260c4.009 transfers to National Archives. originally 260c4.009 (d19 ), Instructions from Brigadier Cameron to all incoming commanders, 1960.

organize transport for social events to cut back on drinking and driving. Complaints from Germans now focussed for the most part upon the high number of automobile accidents which involved Canadians.

Though there were still some other incidents of violence or simple misunderstandings between Germans and Canadians, these were no longer used by the SPD or other political parties to attack NATO and the policies of the Christian Democratic Party as Germany became more fully integrated into the western alliance. By 1960, an analysis of the German press for the month of November revealed that of 7654 lines of press relating to the Canadian brigade in the Soest-Werl-Iserlohn area, about 74 percent could be regarded as favourable, 9 percent was unfavourable and 17 percent was neutral. Positive reports covered the visit of the Minister of National Defence, the Royal Canadian Dragoons Band concert, hockey and skating while negative reports referred to the high accident rate, rowdiness and drunkenness by Canadian soldiers and their dependants.<sup>737</sup>

Although analysis of the local press reveals steady improvement in the Canadian reputation over time, there were applications from local proprietors asking permission to place their facilities out of bounds to Canadian troops, as well as complaints from local residents about drunkenness and public displays of immoral behaviour by Canadian

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<sup>737</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 22460, CBUE, 1690/1, Public relations - General, Volume 2 - Appendix A to 4 CIBG/1750-1(PR).



soldiers and later about their teenage dependants who sometimes were observed destroying local property in the early 1960s.<sup>738</sup>

In 1959, Brigadier Cameron had observed that "offenses committed against the person or property of inhabitants of a friendly or allied country where our troops happen to be located should be considered more severely and require a more serious punishment than would have been the case had the offense been committed in Canada." Cameron ordered that all members be informed of this brigade policy.<sup>739</sup> By this time, German witnesses were apparently more forthcoming in their testimony against Canadians involved in various offences.<sup>740</sup> Major L.L. England, with the Judge Advocate General's Office, pointed out that, as Canadian soldiers could have their ranks affected by civil cases in Germany, civil offenses resulted in more serious consequences than for similar cases in Canada.<sup>741</sup>

The legal status of dependants remained uncertain. Commanding Officers had limited power over them and, while the military police by their presence had influence, the

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<sup>738</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 22460, CBUE, 1690-1, Volume 2 - *Westfaelisch Rundschau*, Iserlohn, 13 May 1963. There was a massive brawl, however, it was noted in file that the incident was not played up in the local press.

<sup>739</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 23461, CBUE/26501, Volume 1, Brigadier Cameron to CGS, 30 September 1959.

<sup>740</sup>*Ibid.*, Brigadier D.C. Cameron, Memorandum on Discipline, 30 September 1959.

<sup>741</sup>*Ibid.* L.L. England, DJAG to Comd, 4 November 1959.

machinery for prosecuting dependants for offences did not exist. This problem, especially as many of the families now had teenagers, also affected the Air Division. For families that presented continuing problems, the only practical solution was to return them to Canada. They were entitled to the same rights as other Canadians, but there were no civil Canadian courts in Germany to deal with them. The problem of drinking and driving was recognized to be serious and was associated with the high accident rate. The German press was very critical of this behaviour and journalists sometimes assumed Canadian drunkenness when it was not the case.<sup>742</sup>

Evidence, admittedly incomplete, suggests that by the early 1960s there was an improvement in the relations between the Canadian military communities and their German neighbours. On 24 May 1964, the Bürgermeister of Soest addressed the first Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment which was on a second tour in Germany and conferred upon it the Freedom of the City.<sup>743</sup> Such events were covered in the local German press in a positive manner. As similar events and coverage did not happen in the early 1950s, it seems as though the Canadians had more acceptance at least at the official level in these communities than had been the case earlier.<sup>744</sup>

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<sup>742</sup>NA, RG 24, Volume 23461, CBUE 2650-1, Volume 1, Cameron to the Judge Adjutant General, 20 December 1959 and Photocopied German Newclippings, nd., ca. 1960s.

<sup>743</sup> G. R. Stevens, *The Royal Canadian Regiment, Volume Two, 1933-1966*, London, Ont: London Printing and Lithographing, 1967, Chapter 19.

<sup>744</sup> It is beyond the scope of this thesis to establish exactly why the German-Canadian relationship seemed to improve. It is also important to note that with the active public

Efforts to create Canadian communities in Europe cost money. An analysis of expenditures from 1951 to 1959 revealed a redistribution of funds towards personnel costs, civilian support and less for actual fighting capability.<sup>745</sup> The cost of creating Canadian communities in Germany was high, but the government was also building permanent married quarters, schools and better recreational facilities for servicemen in Canada. In fact, it was cheaper for the Canadian government to maintain servicemen and their families in Germany than in Canada due to a higher cost of living in Canada.<sup>746</sup> While the administration required to maintain forces abroad was complex and expensive, in 1962, the still much lower cost of living in Germany actually resulted in some savings for the Canadian government.<sup>747</sup>

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relations campaign and the suppression of negative comments by the army. it is possible that the improvement was mostly a matter of appearance. The biggest difference may have been that incidents of misbehaviour were no longer being used to support or attack one German political party against another.

<sup>745</sup>Canada. Department of National Defence, *Annual Reports*, 1951-1959. The expenditures are reported in different ways over the years, but for example, civilian wages increased from 8.4 to 10.6 percent between 1956 and 1960 and military personnel costs increased from 26.0 to 33.1 percent in the same time. Contributions to NATO infrastructure and budgets went up from 1.0 to 1.3 percent. Procurement of equipment went from 28.8 percent down to 21.3 percent.

<sup>746</sup>As Canada experienced exchange difficulties in 1962, consideration was given to keeping the brigade group, but maintaining it in Canada. It was noted at that time, apart from short term expenses, that labour costs for civilians were less expensive in Germany, rations about 35 percent lower in cost in Germany and that the brigade probably was cheaper to maintain given the lower cost of living in Europe at this time. DHH, 73/1223, file 1718, Rayment papers, *Army Council Minutes*, 13 July 1962.

<sup>747</sup>See also 85/334, A.C. Grant fonds, Canadian Army estimates, 1951 to 1964-5. Please note that each year contains the previous year's actual expenditures. While expenditures,

In 1963, as a Parliamentary Committee met to consider defence questions, the retired General Foulkes pointed out that between 1951 and 1956, personnel and operating expenses had been less than half the defence budget. These elements of budget were now impeding the purchase of equipment. Foulkes particularly questioned the presence of the brigade in Europe as Canadian soldiers were better paid than most European soldiers. Foulkes concluded that NATO could provide two divisions of European forces for the same investment the Canadian government was making in its brigade.<sup>748</sup> From a purely military viewpoint, Foulkes was of course correct.

Canadian professional soldiers were expensive. The Canadian government had decided to provide them with a standard of living which might compare with other Canadians. If numbers of soldiers and costs were all that counted, than it made more sense to use European soldiers in place of Canadian soldiers in Germany. Yet the Canadian government continued to pay to send a smaller number of its soldiers to Germany and to place much effort into creating well run and comfortable military communities in Germany.

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especially for rotation of troops to Europe was high, the actual cost of maintaining them there was lower than for Canada and similar facilities were built in Canada during the same period and generally cost more to build in Canada.

<sup>748</sup>Canada. House of Commons. Special Committee on Defence, *Minutes of Proceedings* 22 October 1963, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1963. Witness: Foulkes. This statement was also made by others. In 1960, J.J. McCardle, an External Affairs officer serving with NATO, noted that Canada would have the highest per capita costs for its brigade. One could keep two European divisions for the cost of the brigade. DHH , 73/1223, file 225, McCardle to Léger, 15 February, 1960.

There was a line of continuity from the Second World War into the first decade of NATO's existence. Canadian soldiers had not escaped the stigma of being occupation forces and the transformation of their relations with the Germans took time, energy and resources. Canadian efforts to influence German behaviour largely focused upon positive public relations and improving the quality of life in the Canadian communities which were visible to Germans. The motivation was not simply to improve relations with Germans, but also to enhance Canada's reputation and to retain good soldiers in the Canadian Army.

The concept of creating Canadian communities in Germany was proposed by Claxton from the first. Policies developed on an ad hoc basis as problems were identified and addressed, as chaplains, reporters and Germans complained and as the military sought to improve and develop the communities over time. There was an articulated attempt to influence German public opinion in favour of the western alliance and democratic values evident in policy with respect to the brigade from the beginning.

### ***Conclusion. Defacto Diplomats***

The hypothesis of this thesis is that foreign policy goals influenced military decision-making with respect to the Canadian brigade located in Germany. My conclusion is that, at times, these goals were very influential in decisions made. St. Laurent's statement that "we have realized that a threat to the liberty of western Europe, where our political ideas were nurtured, was a threat to our own way of life" summarizes the link between national security and the protection of European territory.<sup>749</sup> Moreover, this statement highlights the importance of ideology, values and culture in foreign policy, reinforcing the broad definition of national security suggested by Melvyn Leffler.<sup>750</sup>

Long term goals such as, the promotion of GATT, the entry of Canadian products into the EEC and other European markets, increased German-Canadian trade and more NATO defence spending in Canada, were intended to cultivate a healthy and independent national economy and to reduce American influence. They were not on the surface incompatible with NATO aims. Article Two of the NATO treaty encouraged economic cooperation among its members, but NATO concentrated upon its military functions. Moreover, the integration of Germany into the broader European community was hardly smooth. Distrust of the Germans, European domestic politics, resistance to tariff reductions, and competition among the European and NATO countries complicated negotiations. The failure to implement Article Two and to increase trade

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<sup>749</sup> See footnote 64, page 39.

<sup>750</sup> Melvyn P. Leffler, "New approaches, old interpretations and prospectives re: configurative" in *Diplomatic History*, Volume 19, No. 2, Spring 1995.

with Europe sufficiently to offset American dominance is acknowledged. My conclusions do not therefore challenge the research of either John Milloy on Article Two or of B.W. Muirhead on Canadian trade with Europe with respect to the results of these endeavours.<sup>751</sup>

Canada was a minor player with limited influence; even it and the United States together were unable to produce the desired reductions in European tariffs. Yet the NATO contribution allowed Canadian diplomats to feel that they had some right to comment upon European and particularly German foreign policies, including such matters as aid to the Third World. Though success in the European market was limited, trade with Germany increased and closer official relations were established between the FRG and Canada. The brigade was not directly affected by these broader developments and military matters tended to be dealt with separately. What did trade, ideology and values have to do with the brigade?

The initial decision to send the brigade to Europe was based upon the broad interconnected view of national security. Brooke Claxton proposed that Canada contribute a brigade group to NATO in recognition that “we and our allies believe that ... the [presence of the] Canadian army will show ... that we stand together with our allies.”<sup>752</sup>

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<sup>751</sup>B. W. Muirhead, *The Development of Postwar Canadian Trade Policy. The Failure of the Anglo-European Option* and John Milloy, *Article 2 and the Non-Military Development of NATO, 1948-1957, with Special Reference to Canada*.

<sup>752</sup>Canada. House of Commons, *Debates*, 5 February 1951, p. 94-95.

He proclaimed that “in dealing with foreign or defence policy it must never be forgotten that the ultimate object of all our efforts is human welfare “ and he stressed the importance of western Europe as the “vital centre of our global defence.”<sup>753</sup> Germany was therefore a source of interest and the decision to send the brigade to Germany reflected the influence of Canada’s broader goals in Europe.

Canadian diplomats hoped that the FRG would integrate with western Europe and become a part of NATO. German participation in NATO was intended to control its militarism and to enlarge NATO forces engaged in deterrence of the Soviet Union. Concern for the FRG’s progress in these areas directly influenced the Canadian refusal to adopt occupation status and duties for the brigade in Germany in 1951. Cabinet ministers and diplomats hoped that this policy would encourage German acceptance of foreign NATO troops on their territory and pave the way for the participation of the FRG in western defence.

Pearson, Davis, Claxton, Foulkes and others recognized the need to establish an independent Canadian presence in Germany and to ensure that Canadians retained certain rights with respect to the use of the brigade. These interests were evident in discussions of the status of the brigade, instructions to each brigadier, and the Canadian government’s insistence on the right to judge for itself the *casus foederis* and

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<sup>753</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 91.



how best to meet an attack in reference to West Berlin.<sup>754</sup>

While the Canadian government formulated these autonomous goals, its ability to pursue an independent policy with respect to Germany was hampered from the start. The Three Powers continued their occupation of Germany for several years beyond Canadian expectations and bilateral relations between Canada and Germany were affected by Three Power and NATO negotiations with the FRG.

Other factors, especially a limited defence budget, restricted the size of the Canadian contribution. With just a brigade, Canadians were dependent upon the British Army of the Rhine for logistical and other support. The decision to locate the brigade in the British zone, though it was finally based upon Eisenhower's recommendation, reflected a Canadian consideration of balance within NATO and a fear of American dominance. There were legitimate military arguments to be made for both Foulkes's and Simonds's preferences for placement, but the analysis in Chapter three, when alternative roles were considered for the brigade, confirms that Eisenhower's recommendation was accurate. There was an operational need for the brigade in the Kassel gap, reinforcing the arguments put forward by John A. English.<sup>755</sup>

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<sup>754</sup>NA, RG 25, Volume 6632, File 11381-40, pt. 2.3, Redeployment of Canadian Forces assigned to SACEUR, position of the Canadian government, 16 June 1952; Supplementary Instructions to Brigadier W.A.B. Anderson, 21 May 1954; and Volume 3498, File 6-A-GER-1949, Memorandum to Cabinet, Germany and Berlin, 1 July 1961.

<sup>755</sup> John A. English, *Marching through Chaos. The Descent of Armies in Theory and Practice*, pp. 161-164.

The implementation of the strategy for forward defence of German territory exacerbated the already difficult role planned for the brigade. Continued efforts by senior officers to influence NATO plans demonstrate some of the frustrations experienced by members of the smaller NATO powers.<sup>756</sup> The Canadian military also attempted to develop and market the Bobcat and the Heller to other NATO nations. The high cost of developing these military items as well as marketing problems resulted in cancellation of these programmes. The argument put forth by David J. Bercuson that the brigade contribution did not result in much influence seems valid.<sup>757</sup>

Some problems were related to the failure to communicate and coordinate among the allies and within the Canadian government. Canadians and others experienced embarrassment during disagreements over the status of the brigade, its placement, its role, and the resources required for its support. Long term foreign policy goals, budgetary limitations and military requirements were sometimes in conflict. Yet, the first three chapters of the thesis demonstrate how these various factors were closely connected, even when they were at variance, in Canadian decision-making with respect to the brigade.

In what other ways did the foreign policy goals influence military decision-making with respect to the brigade? The requirement for a larger professional army came from the

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<sup>756</sup> This new research confirms the conclusions of John McLin in *Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963. The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance*.

<sup>757</sup> See footnote 40 on page 19.

decision to maintain a brigade in Europe. Ultimately, a more numerous professional force based upon volunteers had a different character from the small elite force envisioned by Generals Simonds and Macklin. In their view, a core professional force, dedicated to the task of soldiering, would be supplemented by larger reserve forces or temporary special forces designed to meet short term requirements. The initial commitment of troops to Germany, while made in support of long term goals, was intended to be a temporary measure. The emphasis was upon combat capability and quick recruitment. The ad hoc nature of Army Council personnel policies related partly to the ambivalence surrounding the brigade's role throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Such uncertainty made long term personnel planning more difficult.

The principle of national unity mentioned in 1947 in St. Laurent's speech was apparent in the issue of conscription. Canada was one of a few NATO nations which did not implement this measure. As the brigade remained in Europe and units rotated to it, the need for a larger professional army began to be realized and personnel stability became a more significant issue. Both requirements led to better conditions of service. The decision to send dependents to Europe came from these factors and from a gradual development of uniform conditions of service, and not a broader consideration of producing soldier-diplomats to further foreign policy goals. The bare beginnings of the idea that the professional army might reflect Canadian society and its citizens more broadly can just be discerned in a few statements over time. Bilingualism was mentioned, thought about, but hardly pursued as its importance to national unity began to manifest itself.

Although those involved in personnel policies did not articulate the relationship between foreign policy goals and troop comportment, it was manifest in the statements made by the Bureau of Current Affairs. The ideal, in terms of combat soldiers, was derived from an exclusive, masculine, regimental tradition similar to that expressed by Simonds. In a well publicized pamphlet produced by the Bureau of Current Affairs in the early 1950s, the model soldier was portrayed as a strong, sober, silent individual whose restraint and example might appeal to the German people and, it was suggested, even affect their acceptance of democracy.<sup>758</sup>

While this view was extreme, German political parties, especially the SPD, used incidents of troop misbehaviour and the requisitioning of German property to attack Adenauer's policies for western alignment. As other countries had far greater forces in Germany, there is no doubt that Canadians alone had limited impact. Still, the brigade's interactions with surrounding German communities reflected on both Canada and the alliance. Both the Canadian Embassy and the brigade paid careful attention to German press coverage of brigade activities and the frequent diplomatic reports between Ottawa and Bonn reveal concern with the effect of troop comportment on German public opinion. Chapter five shows that at the brigade level, the long term goals were known and they influenced public relations activities at the brigade and at the Embassy in Bonn.

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<sup>758</sup>See footnotes 615 and 616 on pages 259 and 260.

Unfortunately, the Department of National Defence was not coherent in its efforts to improve comportment and address issues of morale. Lack of cooperation and poor coordination were evident when the brigade commander asked the chaplains to stop reporting upon morale in their monthly reports in the mid-1950s.<sup>759</sup> The clergy and other vocal critics were suppressed. Like most, but not all NATO forces, the presence of chaplains in the military reflected the dominant Christian character of the society from which it came. The spiritual welfare of the Canadian soldiers and their families was an official concern of the government. The Canadian Army had both Roman Catholic and Protestant chaplains and chapels which while they reflected what the British described as the "strong religious feeling in Canada", perhaps really demonstrated the importance of both religious groups in Canadian society. These efforts and the voluntary activities of soldiers at German orphanages no doubt improved the quality of life for soldiers and their neighbours. Yet the gritty reality of life in the Canadian military communities fell short of the Christian ideals Canadians had hoped to portray.

In summary, at the level of Cabinet, Canada's broader foreign policy goals stressed the importance of security in western Europe and of culture, values and ideology. Germany was a key concern. These ideas were transmitted to every officer and soldier through the Bureau of Current Affairs. The change in General Allard's priorities when he left his post as Vice Chief of the General Staff in Canada to take command of a British Division

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<sup>759</sup> Chaplains now report directly to unit commanders and are responsible for providing advice on morale. However, they do so through the chain of command rather than outside it.

in 1962 was telling. The requirement for German participation and good will seemed more evident in Europe and at the higher military ranks in NATO. In Allard's words, it was time "to stop playing the role of occupier... and create links with the civilian population and to make it understand the solidarity aspect of our presence".<sup>760</sup> These words hint that, in the early 1960s, the German population was not completely convinced that the presence of NATO troops was to their advantage.

The inconsistencies revealed here in different areas and at different levels of decision-making are perhaps not too surprising. In 1951, the need to recruit quickly and to produce combat ready soldiers illustrates how short term exigencies overrode a long term vision. The military trained for combat. The use of the military to achieve more subtle goals, such as to assist in the conversion of German public opinion, created a soldier-diplomat role which was not fully articulated. The provision of German language training for soldiers and their families, the articles in *The Beaver*, and the films about German culture, traditions and etiquette were practical means of ensuring that life was smoother for the Canadians and their German neighbours. The soldiers and their families became *defacto* instruments of Canadian foreign policy and contributed to the image of Canada in German public mind.

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<sup>760</sup>See footnote 470 on page 199.

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## Appendix A

### Chart 1

Canadian - West German Trade (Dominion Bureau of Statistics in thousands of dollars)<sup>1</sup>

note: Statistics prior to 1952 also include Eastern Germany

Calendar Year	Canadian exports to Germany	Canadian Imports from Germany	Balance for Canada
1938	18261	9930	+ 8,331
1939	7869	8947	-1078
1947	6690	498	+6,192
1949	23451	7134	+16,317
1950	8873	11026	-2153
1951	37026	30936	+6,092
1952	94863	22529	+72,234
1953	83858	35507	+48,351

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<sup>1</sup> NA, RG 25, Vol. 6618, File 11271-40 pt. 2.1 Memorandum from B.G. Barrow, Asst Dir, International Trade Relations Branch, Canada. Department of Trade and Commerce to N.F. Berlin, Department of External Affairs, concerning statements for inclusion with Letter of Instruction for Mr. Charles Ritchie, 31 May 1954



**Chart 2 -Canadian Exports to the United States, the United Kingdom and Western Germany, 1949-1964. A Comparative Table<sup>2</sup>**

Calendar year	United States	United Kingdom	Federal Republic of Germany
1949	1503459	704956	23,451 (10th)
1950	2020988	469910	8,873 (23th)
1951	2297675	469910	37,028 (10th)
1952	2306955	745845	94,863 (5th)
1953	2418915	665232	83,858 (4th)
1954	2317153	653408	86,899 (4th)
1955	2559343	769313	90,751 (4th)
1956	2818655	812706	134,098 (3rd)
1957	2867608	737530	151,939 (3rd)
1958	2808067	771576	201,134 (3rd)
1959	3083151	785802	129,345 (4th)
1960	2,932, 171	915290	165,597 (4th)
1961	3107176	909, 344	188, 694 (4th)
1962	3608439	909041	177,688 (4th)
1963	3766380	1006838	170,969 (4th)

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<sup>2</sup> These tables have been compiled from the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Review of Foreign Trade*, Volumes, 1949-1963-1966. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1950-1967)

**Chart 3 Canadian Imports from the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-1964. A Comparative Table<sup>3</sup>**

Calendar Year	United States	United Kingdom	Federal Republic of Germany
1949	1951860	307450	7,134 (21st)
1950	2130476	404213	11,026 (22nd)
1951	2812927	420985	30,936 (9th)
1952	2976962	359757	22,629 (10th)
1953	3221214	453391	35,507 (4th)
1954	2961380	392472	44,485 (4th)
1955	3452178	400531	55,603 (4th)
1956	4161667	484679	89,346 (4th)
1957	3998549	521958	97,646 (4th)
1958	3460147	518505	102644
1959	3709065	588573	123905
1960	3693189	588930	126988
1961	3863968	618221	136530
1962	4299539	563062	141023
1963	4444556	526800	144023

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

Declined 20-1-96  
JHD 3-12  
MEMORANDUM

Service historique  
Quartier général de la  
Défense nationale  
Ottawa, (Canada)  
K1A 0K2

12 Nov 58

VCGS

Report on 4 CIBG Operational Role

1. Herewith are my personal views on the current operational role of 4 CIBG. I have underlined certain words as an "aide-memoire" for you should you refer to this paper in conversation with others.

DEPLOYMENT

2. 4 CIBG is holding a 26,000 yard "front" in what I consider a traditional deployment rather than a deployment for war under nuclear conditions. It is true that dispersion as for nuclear war is adhered to, but there is little mobility apparent - ? + and neither the layout nor movement plan meet the zonal concept very closely.

3. 4 CIBG is on the RIGHT flank of a British formation and in turn has a Belgian formation on its RIGHT flank. Although its main role is to "look to its front", there is a "switch line" possibility, due I presume, to the assessment made of the quality of the troops on the right!

4. The deployment at the brigade level is static in concept in that two battalions are "up" and one is in reserve. LEFT, 2 CBN Gds; RIGHT, 3 R22e7; reserve (spread across the rear of both forward battalions) 2 QOR.

5. There are NO dug positions, but proposed "blocking positions" with alternate blocking positions have been recce'd by Company Commanders. These blocking positions have been selected to give observation and control over the roads which enter the brigade area. A number of these blocking positions are on bald hills. Any protective digging which would take place after occupation would be, to my mind, incapable of concealment.

6. There may be a mobile reserve, supplied from British or other resources, but since the Brigade Commander would NOT disclose the deployment of troops other than Canadian I cannot say how the employment of any such mobile counter attack force is foreseen.

Reference 84/126, fonds Allard, file 16

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7. Within the brigade area it is evident that foot mobility is fancied rather than dug-in Company positions. However, the territorial restrictions imposed by present boundaries and the concept of the blocking positions makes this hard to imagine in practice.

8. There will be bank posts on a water obstacle forward of the brigade area.

#### GROUND

9. As suggested in paragraph 8 above, the brigade area is on high ground overlooking a water obstacle, with a more or less flat strip between the high ground and the water obstacle. This strip rises gradually from the water obstacle in most places and contains five villages. The water obstacle is a navigable, relatively slow moving body with easy entrances and exits. A good metalled road runs parallel to the water obstacle and at right angles to it four good roads enter the brigade area. The other side of the water obstacle has similar characteristics.

10. The high ground which the brigade occupies rises sharply in a few places, but in most rises more gradually. Some of the rises are thickly wooded. Generally, the area itself is made up of both wooded and bare hill features with broad valleys separating them. To my mind it is the type of ground which lends itself to large scale enemy infiltration, including reasonable going for armour once it has found suitable exits from the low ground along the water obstacle.

11. On one high bald hill in 2 CDN Gds area there is located a large U.S. installation for directing long-range nuclear fire. It is fully in the open. I am sure it can be easily seen from the "enemy side" of the water obstacle. I understand a platoon of 2 CDN Gds has the task of protecting this from ground attack for 48 hours after operations begin. This is vague, as I do NOT understand whether it means after the enemy begin to attack the position, or after they cross the EAST/WEST German frontier. In any event, I would think this installation would have been subjected to aerial attack either before, or coincident with, any frontier crossing which might take place. Therefore, this task appears "unreal" to me.

#### MANNING OF POSITIONS

12. The brigade group will require to "race" to the battle positions from the general area of its present domestic location. Present barracks are to be vacated and "survival areas" reached before any possible enemy air or atomic attacks take place. From the survival areas to the battle positions is anywhere from 40 - 60 miles by road, probably 75 for armour. One third of brigade is always in billets. Soldiers on mass would apparently assemble in "survival areas", though the detail of their picking up weapons and equipment is unknown to me.

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### MOBILITY

13. True tactical mobility is lacking. Attached is a D Inf paper which shows the requirement (174) in 3/4 ton vehicles to render mobile the infantry element of 4 CIBG. These vehicles would greatly assist in the "race to battle positions". It would also help in allowing some sort of a mobile battle to be fought in the area behind the static positions. Obviously APCs are an urgent requirement, the 3/4 ton trucks suggested being a poor compromise only, though absolutely necessary in the interim.

14. I consider light aircraft or helicopters essential to Commanders who may be fighting in the area behind the battle positions, as only from the air will they be able to see how such a fluid battle as I envisage is being fought. Woods and rolling ground will mask enemy armoured movement most effectively from ground observation. Yet I do not see these woods, because of their spacing, being of much value as obstacles.

### CONCLUSIONS


15. My specific conclusions are as follows:

- a. The water obstacle, unless greatly improved by artificial means, has little or no stopping power.
- b. Enemy infantry by night can cross the obstacle and swarm over the brigade area almost before we know it.
- c. Enemy non-amphibious vehicles may take several hours to cross, but bridging will not be difficult, especially if an infantry bridge-head is secured quickly (see (b) above).
- d. The brigade group will be "fixed" before the enemy crosses the water obstacle and it will either NOT survive bombardment or will have to fall back to survive. If the enemy chooses not to "nuclearize" or smother the area with his great preponderance of artillery he will easily flood the area by infantry infiltration by stealth (See (b) above).
- e. The battle must be fought in the open area behind the brigade area on ground of our own choosing.
- f. If there is no tactical mobility (a) cannot be done and the sector is open to the enemy.

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15. Generally speaking I feel there will be no battle worth contemplating under present conditions. I know there are other factors; air, nuclear retaliation, enemy intentions, etc. However, taking 4 CIBG's operational role in isolation I am more than apprehensive. To my mind there is no health in it, and the existence of other factors will help only slightly to justify our brigade group's present tactical position. At the moment it violates nearly all our tactical beliefs.

  
(ACA Galloway) Lt Col  
SSG 1

Directorate of Combat Development

~~PERSONAL CONFIDENTIAL~~

CANADIAN EMBASSY



TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

AMBASSADE DU CANADA

Bonn, February 11, 1963.

Dear Norman,

I thought I might write you a further brief personal note concerning the ~~matters referred to~~ in my personal letter to you of December 20 and in my personal telegram No. 103 of February 7.

I had a conversation in Soest with Brigadier Dare on February 9. He told me that a United States army officer and six or seven other ranks assigned to supervise the control of nuclear warheads are now stationed in one of the camps of the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group. Dare told me that while they wear United States army uniform so far they have refrained from flying the United States flag over the headquarters building constructed for their use. He said that while he was not certain, as he avoided seeking any precise information on the point, he believed that the underground installations for storing nuclear warheads which are being built nearby are nearly completed and probably also will be manned shortly.

When I wrote my letter to you of December 20 I had not realized that the headquarters unit located in the Canadian Brigade Group area is intended also to serve the British forces. Thus, whether or not an agreement is concluded between the Canadian and United States authorities for the use of warheads, the United States army personnel stationed within the Canadian Brigade area will begin to serve certain British units in the area as soon as the storage installations are completed.

Dare told me that apart from the Time Magazine correspondent there are two or three other journalists who have shown an interest recently in visiting the Brigade, including

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Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs,  
Ottawa, Canada.

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even the Chief of the Canadian General Staff any clear idea of the Brigade's role in war.

4. I propose to make my comments under three headings: nuclear capability, intelligence reports and alert procedures, and Berlin contingency planning.

#### Nuclear Capability

5. I was given a demonstration of the Honest John being hoisted on to its launcher; a very mobile beast. As you may know the Brigade is equipped with four of these launchers. The commander of the unit told me that they had recently completed a firing practice at a relatively nearby range. If I remember correctly they had fired about four rounds with an empty warhead at a range of about 14,000 metres achieving on one shot a strike within 35 yards of the target. The Brigade has not any 8-inch howitzers, which is the other weapon capable of firing ~~tactical~~ nuclear warheads. I gather, although this was not said, that these guns and warheads would be reserved for use at army level.

6. The Brigade's present role is to take up a defensive position well forward of its present barracks area. They would require a good deal of advance notice to reach their positions and adequately to prepare their defences. For example, the engineers would require 90 hours in which to prepare the demolitions which are called for in the advance defensive positions. The front the Brigade group must defend is about 27 kilometres wide; a tremendous area for such a small group.

7. At the moment the plans place the British on their left flank and the Belgians on their right. The British units are seriously under strength and the Belgians are a skeleton force. The plans call for a most complicated manoeuvre to be executed by the Belgians to bring their formations up to battle strength. Units despatched from Belgium would "pass

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through" the Canadians at the time the Canadian units were advancing to their defensive positions! On the roads available I suspect the chaos would be unbelievable.

7. Given the width of the front assigned to them and the Russian and East German forces known to be opposing them, the Canadian Brigade, to have any hope of fulfilling their assigned role against even a conventional attack if it were all-out, would require nuclear support at the outset, and particularly as their present conventional fire power is deemed too low (their heaviest weapons are 109 mm. guns).

8. Incidentally, Jean Allard, who presently commands the 4th British Infantry Division, and under whose operational command the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group would come, said that if the Canadians did not have their own nuclear support they would get it immediately, as required, from his division and from other higher commands.

10. While I was being shown the Honest John, Mike Dare drew my attention to a building near the parade ground which is nearing completion. He told me it will house members of the United States armed forces and will be occupied by them in January. This is to be the headquarters of the United States group having custody of the nuclear warheads for the Honest John. I understand they have their own communications and separate channels of command. The actual warheads are to be stored in buildings set into the hills nearby. I understand these are completed and ready to receive the warheads.

11. Thus it would seem that the Canadian troops are familiar with the nuclear delivery vehicle they have, the nuclear warheads could be available very soon (in case they are required) and in any event they probably can count on nuclear support from one flank at least.

12. Notwithstanding, the Canadians are in a vulnerable position. They do not themselves have the nuclear weapons

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or adequate conventional firepower necessary to protect their very long front in the event of an all-out attack. The troops on one flank are virtually non-existent and their other flank is protected by formations some units of which are only at half strength. In some way, although I realize the differences, one is reminded of the words "Hong Kong," and particularly in considering the new Canadian role in the "forward strategy" concept which only recently has been adopted.

13. I think there might be a disposition in looking at the Brigade and its general capabilities to consider it a more flexible force than the Air Division. On the face of it this is so. Certainly the Army with its modern means of reconnaissance (e.g. helicopters), its amphibious capability, and its conventional or nuclear fire power capability can be made a more versatile force than the RCAF units in Europe which are restricted by their aircraft to only one or two roles requiring a nuclear capability. However, the important point is that the 4 CIBG in its present role has very little flexibility, and in some circumstances will have to use nuclear weapons to survive even a conventional attack. //

14. These points relating to the equipment and role of the Canadian Brigade and its neighbours in the NATO battle order are as far as I can judge typical of the situation throughout the NATO forces in Western Europe. The general picture seems to be that the forces available are insufficient for the task, and in many cases are below strength in numbers, equipment and effectiveness. Partly because of this situation military authorities concerned in the various national and international headquarters involved are pressing ahead as rapidly as possible with the implementation of agreed NATO plans for the deployment of nuclear weapons to the combat forces to be held in United States custody but available for immediate use. We have touched on this in recent telegrams concerning the role of the German Air Force; the

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same situation holds true for the German Army, I believe for the 1st Canadian Air Division, and, as my recent visit has confirmed, for the Canadian Brigade.

Intelligence Reports and Alert Procedures

15. As you may know, the Brigade Commander in Europe has been given the powers of an officer commanding a command. He also enjoys direct communications with Canadian Army Headquarters; no limitation being placed by the Canadian authorities upon his direct channel of communication on any matter with the Chief of the General Staff. While his force is under command of the Commander, Northern Army Group, he also has been instructed; "to inform the Chief of the General Staff by the most expeditious means possible of the occurrence of any incident or event involving your force with those of the Soviet bloc. Your report will also include information on any counter action taken or contemplated by your immediate superior."

16. The Cuban crisis put some of these arrangements to a test and pointed up the unusually difficult and delicate tasks of the Brigade Commander in a period of "tension." Because his Command is relatively junior he does not receive quickly enough through any regular channel the information from higher formations which Army Headquarters expects him to provide. He showed me copies of the situation reports he was able to provide to Army Headquarters. These were good reports but the material in them was obtained by sending his intelligence officer to Northern Army Group Headquarters where he was able through personal connections to find out informally what was going on. At the same time the Brigade Commander has not available to him (in the same way as has the Air Division Commander) the periodic all-source intelligence reports which emanate from Ottawa.

17. The Brigade Commander's official sources of information both from senior formations in Northern Army Group and

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from Ottawa are almost non-existent. This makes it extremely difficult for the Commander to decide when to take the myriad and important preparatory steps which can and should be carried out short of a declared alert. His ability to take these decisions on the basis of adequate information becomes all the more important in a situation where the different stages of alert are very likely quickly to become telescoped and disorderly.

18. An aspect of these problems which I might mention is the position of dependents. About 12,000 in all, they represent a heavy responsibility and a liability which, in theory at least, should not worry the Brigade Commander as such whose principal concern is operational command of his troops. In practice, of course, in a situation such as that created by the Cuban crisis he is intimately concerned with the problem. At the moment Mike Dare tells me there are no plans for the removal of dependents to Canada. That is to say no procedures have been worked out with the RCAF or the commercial airlines for their emergency evacuation. Given the situation where an all-out nuclear exchange were to take place perhaps it does not matter much where they are. Indeed given the difficulties of reaching the political decision to evacuate dependents possibly the idea ought to be abandoned in any situation which develops rapidly, e.g., Cuba. However, clearly it would be helpful if some agreed policy existed concerning evacuation of dependents from Europe.

#### Berlin Contingency Planning

19. As far as I could understand it, Jean Allard's task in the event of military action to "defend" Berlin would be to support, virtually in corps strength, other elements of the Northern Army Group, which would advance up the axis of the autobahn. His present command, the 4th British Infantry Brigade, would be expanded for these purposes. The Canadian forces involved would not be engaged at the outset but would

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form part of his reserve force with the task of striking at a Russian force which it is expected would attempt to hit the British right flank.

20. All this, of course, is predicated on some Russian or East German action to cut the autobahn or to "probe" into West Germany in strength. The German forces, according to Allard, are to form a panzer army which, if hostilities are sustained and broadened, would punch towards Berlin from the left flank between Helmstedt and Lübeck. Allard made it quite clear that present plans do not provide for the use of German forces at the outset.

21. I am aware, of course, that all or part of the matters set out in this letter already may be known to you. However, as some of this information was new to me I thought it possible that it might also be new to you. Moreover, I thought you might find it useful, as I did, to view the various pieces against the background provided by the comments made by Dare and Allard. Needless to say I have kept only one copy of this letter and I have not referred it elsewhere or, indeed, discussed its contents with anyone here other than Kirkwood.

Yours as ever,



John Starnes.