

University of Alberta

The Single Transferable Vote in Alberta and Manitoba

by

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the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

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To my parents

John and Grace Jansen

with thanks

for their love and support

Abstract

This thesis examines the impact of the use of the single transferable vote (STV) electoral system by the Canadian provinces of Alberta and Manitoba. From 1926 through 1955, Alberta used the Hare system in Edmonton and Calgary while using alternative voting (AV) in rural areas. Manitoba used the Hare system in Winnipeg from 1920 to 1953 and AV in rural Manitoba from 1927 to 1953. The adoption of STV was motivated largely by the concerns of the Progressive movement which was influential in the Canadian prairies at the time.

STV proved to be a workable electoral system in the two provinces. Neither the Hare system or AV had much effect on voter turnout or the number of candidates; it did seem to result in an increased rate of ballot spoilage, particularly in Alberta because of its stringent ballot marking provisions. The Hare system resulted in more proportional electoral outcomes than were the case when plurality was used in the three cities. In Manitoba, the adoption of the Hare system was accompanied by a fragmentation of the party system. It is difficult to attribute this to the adoption of STV as Edmonton and Calgary did not experience a similar phenomenon. AV in the rural areas of both provinces had a negligible impact on both proportionality and the party system.

Despite the non-partisan climate of both provinces, voters generally did not take advantage of the freedom of choice given to them by the STV ballot, largely restricting themselves to party slates while voting. In Alberta and Manitoba, those parties that were

best able to retain their supporters' transfers were more effective at converting their support into legislative seats.

Alberta's Social Credit government abandoned the STV system primarily because of increasing opposition skill at using STV to defeat government candidates. In Manitoba, the repeal of STV was overshadowed by more pressing representational concerns, particularly the underrepresentation of Winnipeg in the provincial legislature.

The study concludes that the effects of electoral systems are not straightforward or mechanical, but are mediated and shaped by social structure.

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Chapter One

The Single Transferable Vote, Provincial Politics, and the Comparative Method

In 1955, the government of Manitoba passed amendments to its Election Act which changed the province's electoral system to a single-member plurality system. A year later, the government of Alberta followed suit and passed a new Election Act for Alberta that restored the single-member plurality system in that province as well. These two pieces of legislation marked the end of an era in Canadian politics: the use of single transferable vote (STV) in provincial politics. Manitoba had adopted STV in 1920; Alberta had done the same in 1924. For over thirty-five years, this unusual form of proportional representation (PR) had been in use; after 1956, all the provinces used the plurality rule to determine electoral winners.

It is surprising how quickly this period of electoral reform has faded from memory. It is very rare to come across a reference to either province's experimentation with alternatives to the plurality rule. In the realm of contemporary politics, public opinion, and recent memory, few people seem to remember that there was a time when elections were fought in some parts of Canada by other electoral formulas. For example, a recent article on an impending municipal election in Edmonton tried to place the city's electoral law in a broader comparative context. The reporter, Bill Sass, described the operation of "preferential balloting" (the alternative vote) in Australia. He went on to express amazement at the complexity of the electoral system used in Australia: "Leave it to the Aussies to use a system that might befuddle a university accounting department."¹

¹ Bill Sass, "Exercise the freedom to make your choice," *The Edmonton Journal* 16 October 1995, B1.

The ironic thing about the article was that the rural areas of Alberta used this very system during Alberta's experiments with STV. In fact, the system used in provincial elections in Edmonton between 1924 and 1956 was even more complex than that described by Sass as the same principle was extended to a large multi-member constituency. This is but one example of how the electoral experiments of Canadian provinces have faded from popular memory.

What is even more surprising is the extent to which these experiments have faded from academic memory as well. There is virtually no academic work that deals directly with the use of STV in Alberta and Manitoba. In addition, many works on provincial politics ignore the potential role that STV might have played in shaping electoral politics and the party systems in these provinces. A good example is a work by three prominent Canadian political scientists who examined provincial politics in Canada from the standpoint of "representative democracy."² Despite the fact that electoral systems are the central mechanisms that translate citizens' preferences for who is to represent them into reality, and thus are central to the problem of representative democracy, Kornberg, Mishler, and Clarke completely ignore the Alberta and Manitoba experiences in their work. They discuss the role of the plurality electoral system in distorting the translation of votes into seats and, hence, in exacerbating single party dominance in Canadian politics. They go on to claim all provinces have used the plurality rule exclusively except for the 1952 and 1953 elections in British Columbia.³ They are correct about British Columbia which used STV for those two elections, but Kornberg, Mishler, and Clarke completely miss the nine elections in Manitoba and the eight elections in Alberta that used STV. The

² Allan Kornberg, William Mishler, and Harold D. Clarke, *Representative Democracy in the Canadian Provinces* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1982), chapter 1.

³ Kornberg, Mishler, and Clarke, 112.

ironic thing about their discussion is that the book ends with a discussion of possible institutional reforms that would improve the representative and democratic character of provincial government in Canada. One of the reforms they discuss is proportional representation.⁴

The problem in Canadian political science is not a lack of appreciation for the important role that electoral systems play in Canadian politics in general and in shaping party politics in particular. In 1968, the *Canadian Journal of Political Science* published an influential article by Alan Cairns which drew careful attention to the ways that the single-member plurality system has influenced Canadian party politics. Cairns pointed to the way the electoral system distorted party standings in the House of Commons and encouraged party policy, campaign strategies, and voter perceptions of parties to become skewed along regional lines.⁵ Cairns' argument has shaped much of the subsequent work on electoral systems in Canada, as researchers either attempt to refute it⁶ or update its argument.⁷ Another important stream in the Canadian literature on electoral systems has focused on possible reforms to the Canadian electoral system. This concern became especially prominent in Canadian political science around 1979-1980 when successive federal elections produced regionally unbalanced caucuses for the governing parties: Joe

⁴ Kornberg, Mishler, and Clarke, 275-277.

⁵ Alan C. Cairns, "The electoral system and the party system in Canada, 1921-1965," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 1 (1968): 55-80.

⁶ See, for example, J.A.A. Lovink, "On analysing the impact of the electoral system on the party system in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 3 (1970): 497-516, and Cairns' reply: "A reply to J.A.A. Lovink, 'On analysing the impact of the electoral system on the party system in Canada,'" *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 3 (1970): 517-521.

⁷ Nelson Wiseman, "Cairns revisited — the electoral system and the party system in Canada," in Paul W. Fox and Graham White, eds., *Politics: Canada*, 7th. ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1991), 265-274.

Clark's Conservative minority government in 1979 had few representatives from the province of Quebec while Pierre Trudeau's Liberal government in 1980 came with only two caucus members from western Canada. Many analysts pointed out the role that Canada's single-member plurality system played in this situation and a number of political scientists, most notably William Irvine, studied and proposed reforms to the Canadian electoral system.⁸ Whatever the faults of Canadian political science, inattention to the role of the single-member plurality electoral system in influencing the shape of party competition in Canada is not one of them.

Provincial experiences with electoral reform

The root of the lack of attention given to provincial electoral systems seems to lie in a larger problem in the study of Canadian politics and government: a neglect of provincial politics. While there is a healthy and vibrant literature on Canadian federalism, political scientists have devoted relatively little energy to the study of the political experiences of the Canadian provinces. This is surprising, as Tupper and Gibbins note, for Canadian political science is full of "incessant assertions about the political, social and

⁸ William Irvine, *Does Canada Need a New Electoral System?* (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1979); David Elton and Roger Gibbins, *Electoral Reform: The Time is Pressing, the Need is Now* (Calgary: Canada West Foundation, 1980); John C. Courtney, "Reflections on reforming the Canadian electoral system," *Canadian Public Administration* 23 (1980): 427-457; William Irvine, "A review and evaluation of electoral system reform proposals," in Peter Aucoin, ed., *Institutional Reforms for Representative Government* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 71-109. More recently, see Michael Cassidy, "Fairness and stability in Canadian elections: the case for an alternative electoral system." (n.p.: 1992), John Hiemstra and Harold Jansen, "Getting what you vote for," in Mark Charlton and Paul Barker, eds., *Crosscurrents: Contemporary Political Issues*, 3rd. ed. (Scarborough: Nelson, forthcoming), Leslie Seidle, "The Canadian electoral system and proposals for reform." in A. Brian Tanguay and Alain-G. Gagnon, eds., *Canadian Parties in Transition*, 2nd. ed. (Scarborough: Nelson, 1995), 282-306; Nick Loenen, *Citizenship and Democracy: A Case of Proportional Representation* (Toronto: Dundurn, 1997), and a special issue of *Policy Options* devoted to electoral reform, vol. 18, no. 9 (November 1997).

economic significance of contemporary provincial governments.⁹ Furthermore, upon first being introduced to federalism, most students of political science learn that federalism allows for innovation and experimentation.¹⁰ In the study of Canadian politics, however, political scientists have generally not seriously examined the experimentation of Canadian provinces.

This oversight is readily apparent in the area of electoral systems. As mentioned earlier, there is a large and healthy literature on the national electoral system and its possible reform. This is surprising, given the relative lack of innovation at the national level. Canada has used a single-member plurality electoral system throughout its history, except for five dual member districts in 1921, four dual member districts between 1915 and 1930 and two dual member districts which remained in use from 1935 until the redistribution of 1966.¹¹ Except for this very limited use of dual member districts, Canada has adhered strictly to single-member districts and has never once altered the electoral formula from the plurality system.

This is in contrast to the comparatively wide variety seen in provincial politics. There is a long history of innovation and experimentation with electoral law and representational practices at the provincial level in Canada. Three provinces (Alberta, Manitoba, and British Columbia) have used preferential voting instead of the plurality electoral formula. Almost all provinces have experimented with multi-member districts and other methods of changing the institutional implementation of representation.

⁹ Allan Tupper and Roger Gibbins, eds., *Government and Politics in Alberta* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1992), viii.

¹⁰ Mark O. Dickerson and Thomas Flanagan, *An Introduction to Government & Politics: A Conceptual Approach*, 3rd. ed. (Scarborough: Nelson, 1990), 252.

¹¹ T.H. Qualter, *The Election Process in Canada* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 118.

In the Atlantic provinces, a key consideration has been the need to balance the representation of different religious groups, usually Protestants and Catholics, in the provincial legislatures. All four Atlantic provinces have deviated from the single-member plurality electoral system in order to deal with this concern. Prior to 1933, two-thirds to three-quarters of Nova Scotia's provincial election districts elected two representatives; the remaining districts elected anywhere from 3 to 5 members.¹² Rand Dyck notes that Nova Scotia's political parties usually would nominate a Catholic and a Protestant candidate in districts with a relatively equal balance between the two groups.¹³ While single-member districts came to dominate Nova Scotia's legislature after 1933, a few dual-member districts remained in use until the 1978 provincial election.

New Brunswick's electoral system has also seen the extensive use of multi-member districts. From Confederation until 1974, most districts elected from two to five members. This enabled political parties in New Brunswick to present balanced slates of candidates which represented the linguistic and religious diversity of the province. The Liberals and Conservatives did not have to worry about this in relatively homogeneous constituencies, but in ethnically and religiously heterogeneous areas, both parties nominated carefully weighted combinations of French Catholic, English Protestant, and English Catholic candidates.¹⁴ Since multi-member plurality districts tend to elect slates of

¹² Qualter, 120.

¹³ Rand Dyck, *Provincial Politics in Canada*, 3rd. ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1996), 135.

¹⁴ Edmund A. Aunger, *In Search of Political Stability: A Comparative Study of New Brunswick and Northern Ireland* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1981), 144-146.

candidates from one party,¹⁵ it was important for parties to reflect accurately the dominant groups in the province in their slates of candidates. This way, the MLAs from each constituency would represent the linguistic and religious diversity of their district. Furthermore, this enabled New Brunswick's governing party caucuses to be representative of the dominant groups in society.

Prince Edward Island was the last province to eliminate multi-member constituencies in Canada, having decided to adopt single member districts in 1994. This system was the aftermath of the bicameral provincial legislature which PEI maintained when it joined Canada in 1873. In 1893, the province merged its Legislative Council (the upper house) into the Legislative Assembly. From that point on, each electoral district continued to elect both a Councillor and an Assemblyman.¹⁶ It should be noted, however, that the electoral districts did not function as true dual-member constituencies. The Assemblyman and Councillor ran on different ballots; they did not compete against each other. Voters cast one vote on a list of candidates for the position of Assemblyman and one vote on a list of candidates for the position of Councillor, rather than two votes from a list of candidates for both positions. Although traditionalism is a frequently noted feature of the province's political culture,¹⁷ tradition is not the only reason that PEI maintained dual member districts for so long. As in other Atlantic provinces, maintaining a balanced religious representation in the provincial legislature and party caucuses has

¹⁵ See P.J. Fitzpatrick, "New Brunswick: The Politics of Pragmatism," in Martin Robin, ed., *Canadian Provincial Politics* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 118 for a demonstration of this point in the 1967 provincial election in New Brunswick.

¹⁶ Dyck, 101.

¹⁷ Ian Stewart, "Prince Edward Island: 'a damned queer parliament,'" in Gary Levy and Graham White, eds., *Provincial and Territorial Legislatures in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 16-17.

been an important goal. Dual member districts allowed parties to nominate a Protestant for one position and a Catholic for the other position.¹⁸

Newfoundland has used multi-member districts on a more limited basis than its Atlantic neighbors. When the province joined Confederation in 1949, it had three dual-member districts; by the 1956 election, only one district elected two members.¹⁹ That district, Harbour Main, was split up for the 1975 provincial election and Newfoundland has used single-member districts exclusively since that time. Newfoundland accommodated its religious diversity primarily through the drawing of electoral boundaries. Before Newfoundland joined Confederation, it was the practice to try to draw the electoral boundaries so that each electoral district would contain a majority of people belonging to one religious denomination. Population mobility made this increasingly difficult. After Confederation, premier Joey Smallwood revised the goal and attempted to provide representation according to a "one-third, one-third, one-third" rule, where the province would draw electoral boundaries to provide relatively equal representation for Roman Catholics, Anglicans, and "others."²⁰ This practice of affirmative gerrymandering continued until 1974-75.²¹

While all of the Atlantic provinces have experimented with multi-member constituencies, none has deviated from the plurality rule and used proportional representation in provincial elections. The overarching goal was to attempt to provide a balance in the representation of various religious groups in provincial legislatures. The

¹⁸ Dyck, 96.

¹⁹ Qualter, 121.

²⁰ Susan McCorquodale, "Newfoundland: the only living father's realm." in Martin Robin, ed., *Canadian Provincial Politics* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 150.

²¹ Dyck, 51.

representational mechanisms used to accomplish this goal focused on accommodating religious disagreements and representation within parties, rather than between parties. Religion, in other words, was to be a matter of intraparty rather than interparty accommodation. Proportional representation formulae focus on ensuring fair and equitable distribution of parliamentary seats between parties, an issue which, in this context, was less relevant than the nomination strategies of the established parties. If religious lines significantly divided political parties in Atlantic Canada, then some form of proportional representation would probably have been a relevant reform.

In contrast to Atlantic Canada, central Canada has been relatively unadventurous with its electoral systems. Quebec has always used a single-member plurality electoral system. The only unusual feature of Quebec's electoral system was the protection of English-speaking minority ridings in Quebec in section 80 of the original BNA Act.²² Quebec is, however, the only province in recent years to consider seriously the adoption of a system of proportional representation. After having received considerably fewer seats than their share of the popular vote entitled them to in the 1970 and 1973 elections, the Parti Québécois set up a Ministry of State for Parliamentary and Electoral Reform. In 1982, the Ministry proposed a party list form of proportional representation and in 1984, a commission chaired by Quebec's Chief Electoral Officer recommended a similar reform. The reform movement quickly fizzled out as disagreements between the cabinet, caucus, and extra-parliamentary party surfaced.²³ Ontario has not been very innovative in its electoral law either, having replaced its last few dual-member districts with single-member

²² Dyck, 233.

²³ Henry Milner, "Legislators' interests versus informed political participation: lessons from Quebec 1982-84 about the prospects for electoral reform in Canada," paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, 1994, 5-7.

districts after the 1923 provincial election.²⁴ It has never used anything but the plurality rule in allocating seats for its provincial legislature.

The most innovative region of the country in electoral institutions has been the West. All four western provinces have experimented with multi-member districts. Three of the four provinces have used the single transferable vote in provincial elections at some point in their histories. Saskatchewan has been the least adventurous of the four western provinces, never having used anything but the plurality formula. While it has not experimented with changes to the electoral formula, Saskatchewan has made use of multi-member districts to represent its largest cities, a familiar pattern on the Canadian Prairies. From 1921 to 1948, Regina, Saskatoon, and Moose Jaw were all two-member districts. In the 1952 election, Regina was a three member district, while the other two cities continued to function as dual member districts. In 1960, Regina elected four members, Saskatoon three, and Moose Jaw two. In 1964, Saskatoon elected five members, Moose Jaw sent two members to the legislature, while Regina consisted of two dual-member districts and two single-member districts.²⁵

British Columbia has experimented with its electoral mechanisms frequently. Dyck argues that "the British Columbia electoral system has probably had more distinctive features than that of any other province."²⁶ From its first provincial election, BC used multi-member districts and the province used dual member districts as recently as 1986. During the course of the 1986 election campaign, however, then premier Bill Vander

²⁴ Qualter, 120.

²⁵ Dyck, 448 disagrees with Qualter, 119 on this point. Qualter suggests that Regina elected three members in 1948, but Saskatchewan's Chief Electoral Office reports only two members elected from Regina in that election, confirming Dyck's claim. See Saskatchewan, Chief Electoral Office, *Provincial Elections in Saskatchewan 1905-1986* (Regina, 1987).

²⁶ Dyck, 588.

Zalm promised to eliminate the remaining dual member districts.²⁷ In the elections since 1991, British Columbia has used single-member districts. While the use of multi-member constituencies is not unusual among the Canadian provinces, British Columbia is one of only three provinces to alter its electoral formula. In the 1952 and 1953 provincial elections, BC used the single transferable vote. Most of the districts in 1952 and 1953 elected one member — the use of STV in those districts was a simple application of alternative voting. In the multi-member districts in Victoria and Vancouver, each seat had its own ballot and had its own list of candidates. Voters in the three member district of Victoria City, for example, cast their votes on three separate ballots — A, B, and C. The returning officers used alternative voting counting rules to determine the winner in each ballot.²⁸

The politics of the use of STV in British Columbia are very interesting. The Liberal and Conservative parties settled on STV to contain the rise of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in the province. The Liberal/Conservative coalition instituted STV across the province, in single and multi-member districts. The leadership of the Liberal-Conservative coalition felt that STV would allow Liberal voters to use their second preferences to support Conservatives and vice versa. This attempt at partisan manipulation of the electoral law backfired on the coalition, however. Increasing animosity between the two coalition partners led voters to choose the Social Credit party with their second choices, rather than the other older party. CCF members, too, expressed their dislike for the coalition and used their second preferences to vote for Social Credit.

²⁷ Norman J. Ruff, "The right to vote and inequality of voting power in British Columbia: the jurisprudence and politics of the Dixon case," in John C. Courtney, Peter MacKinnon, and David E. Smith, eds., *Drawing Boundaries: Legislatures, Courts, and Electoral Values* (Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1992), 131.

²⁸ British Columbia, Elections British Columbia, *Electoral History of British Columbia 1871-1986* (Victoria, 1988), 5. See election results on pp. 221-262.

The Social Credit party won a minority victory in 1952 and, in the election of 1953, won a majority of the seats.²⁹ The party used its majority to amend the province's electoral law to abolish STV and restore the plurality formula which British Columbia has used ever since.

While British Columbia's electoral innovations have received the most academic attention, probably because of the dramatic role which the adoption of STV played in the rise of the Social Credit party to power, the province of Manitoba is the true pioneer in electoral system reform in Canada and in North America. While a few municipalities in the United States and Canada adopted STV prior to 1920, Manitoba was the first province or state to use STV for elections to its legislature.³⁰ In the Spring of 1920, the provincial legislature adopted STV for use in the city of Winnipeg's election of members to the legislature.³¹ Winnipeg was one large constituency with a district magnitude of ten, that is, the city elected ten MLAs. The districts outside Winnipeg continued to elect single members using the plurality rule. The election later in 1920 and in 1922 used STV to elect the representatives from the provincial capitol. In 1924, the legislature again amended its *Election Act* to use STV in the single-member districts as well.³² The province made

²⁹ Dyck, 606; Alan Cairns and Daniel Wong, "Socialism, federalism, and the B.C. party systems 1933-1983," in Hugh G. Thorburn, ed., *Party Politics in Canada*, 6th ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1991), 474-477; H.F. Angus, "The British Columbia election, June, 1952," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 18 (1952): 518-525; David J. Elkins, "Politics makes strange bedfellows: The B.C. party system in the 1952 and 1953 provincial elections," *BC Studies*, no. 30 (1976): 3-26.

³⁰ Clarence Gilbert Hoag and George Hervey Hallett, *Proportional Representation* (New York: Macmillan, 1926), 275-277.

³¹ *Statutes of Manitoba*, 1920, c. 33.

³² *Statutes of Manitoba*, 1924, c.15. M.S. Donnelly, *The Government of Manitoba* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 76 confuses this amendment with the 1920 amendment and erroneously states that 1924 was when STV was adopted in Manitoba.

minor changes to the electoral system periodically, but the basic framework of multi-member STV in Winnipeg and single-member STV (the alternative vote) outside the capitol remained in place through five provincial elections. In 1949, amendments to the *Election Act* divided Winnipeg into three districts — Winnipeg North, Centre, and South — each with a magnitude of four. Its neighbouring city of St. Boniface elected two MLAs to the provincial legislature. The 1949 legislation made no changes to the electoral formula as STV remained in use for all constituencies. The elections of 1949 and 1953 used this new arrangement. In 1955, the provincial government once again amended its election legislation and established single-member districts across the province. Most significantly, the newly amended *Election Act* read: “The returning officer shall ... declare to be duly elected that candidate who ... is found to have obtained the largest number of votes.”³³ The plurality rule replaced STV as the electoral formula. Since 1955, the province of Manitoba has continued to elect its members of the legislature by the plurality rule in single-member districts.

If Manitoba “experimented earlier and with more alternatives than did other provinces,”³⁴ Alberta is not far behind. It was the first province to allow municipalities the option of using STV for elected bodies. Calgary was the first city to use STV for municipal elections in Canada.³⁵ For provincial elections, Alberta lagged only slightly behind Manitoba in adopting STV. Alberta began with an orthodox single-member plurality electoral system. In the 1909 provincial election, Calgary and Edmonton each elected two members according to the plurality rule; that is, each voter chose two candidates and the two candidates with the most votes won the election. In 1913, Calgary

³³ *Statutes of Manitoba*, 1955, c. 16, s. 28(c)(5).

³⁴ Dyck, 387.

³⁵ Hoag and Hallett, 223-226, 276.

elected only one MLA. For the wartime election of 1917, the province reverted to single-member districts, but MLAs serving in the armed forces automatically retained their seats in the legislature without having to face re-election. Furthermore, nurses and soldiers from Alberta elected two special representatives. In 1921, Calgary and Edmonton each elected five members while the city of Medicine Hat elected two. All elections, urban and rural, used the plurality rule in 1921.³⁶ In 1924, Alberta passed new election legislation which maintained multi-member districts for the two large cities. Except for a few minor changes to electoral boundaries and the conversion of Medicine Hat from a dual to a single-member district, the single-member districts in the rest of the province remained. All of the electoral districts used STV.³⁷ Between 1926 and 1955, the province held eight elections under these rules. During this period, there were minor revisions to the electoral framework, the most significant of which were the minor alterations in district magnitude for Edmonton and Calgary. As Table 1 shows, Edmonton and Calgary elected between five and seven members during this period. Only in the 1952 and 1955 elections did the two cities elect different numbers of representatives. In 1956, the province passed new election legislation which removed STV from Alberta's statutes. The Social Credit government replaced STV with the plurality system and single-member districts throughout the province.³⁸ This ended Alberta's lengthy experimentation with STV at the provincial level.

³⁶ Thomas E. Flanagan, "Statistical synopsis of Alberta elections," in Carlo Caldarola, ed., *Society and Politics in Alberta: Research Papers* (Toronto: Methuen, 1979), 372.

³⁷ *Statutes of Alberta*, 1924, c. 34; J. Paul Johnston, "The single transferable vote in Alberta provincial elections," paper presented to the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1992, 7; Flanagan, 372; Dyck, 519.

³⁸ *Statutes of Alberta*, 1956, c. 15; Johnston, 34; Bob Hesketh, "The abolition of preferential voting in Alberta," *Prairie Forum* 12 (1987): 123-143.

Table 1

District Magnitude in Edmonton and Calgary, 1926-1955

Election Year	Edmonton	Calgary
1926	5	5
1930	6	6
1935	6	6
1940	5	5
1944	5	5
1948	5	5
1952	7	6
1955	7	6

It is quite clear that the Canadian provinces have been relatively innovative in their representational practices and electoral systems despite the lack of academic attention. All provinces except Quebec have used multi-member constituencies at some point in their histories; most have continued to use them until quite recently. Only three provinces have made changes to their electoral formulae and have deviated from the plurality rule. British Columbia, however, only used STV for two elections. Furthermore, although BC used STV in multi-member districts, it applied the formula on separate ballots, essentially using the alternative vote. The two provinces which have been the most innovative in their electoral systems have been Manitoba and Alberta. Both provinces used STV throughout their provinces. Both used STV in relatively large multi-member districts in their large cities. Both provinces used STV over a long period of time, allowing for reasonable generalizations to be made about its effects in the two provinces. Furthermore, as Appendix A documents, the electoral records for both provinces have been preserved for this period, allowing extensive quantitative analysis.

Research strategies

While Alberta and Manitoba are interesting cases in their own right, the particular circumstances of their use of STV make them ideal candidates for comparative study. In

particular, they are suitable for the “comparable cases” strategy of comparative research. Arend Lijphart succinctly describes the basic problem of comparative research as “many variables, small number of cases.”³⁹ In social science, trying to determine relationships between variables is a difficult endeavour because of the large number of variables which might come into play. For example, if a researcher is interested in exploring the relationship between electoral systems and party systems, he or she faces the problem that electoral systems are merely one among many variables which might play a role in determining the shape of party systems: social structure, ideas, and the character of the governing institutions are just a few of the other possible variables that might be factors along with electoral systems. It is difficult to hold all of the other variables constant because of the limited number of cases available for study.

Studies of electoral systems have tended to follow one of two paths. The first is that of intensive case studies of how electoral systems interact with the politics of particular countries. Individual case studies have certain inherent advantages. Most notably, they provide opportunities for researchers to explore the complex relationships between variables in historically concrete situations.⁴⁰ Intensive case studies are able to provide more nuanced explanations of socio-political developments. The article by Cairns, mentioned above, is a good example of such a study. Cairns explores the relationship between the electoral system and regionalism in Canada in a way that a research design incorporating large numbers of cases might not be able to do. Case studies, however, have their weaknesses. It is often difficult to get beyond the particularities of a case and try to sort out which variables are affecting each other. In the case of Cairns’ seminal

³⁹ Arend Lijphart, “Comparative politics and the comparative method,” *American Political Science Review* 65 (1971): 685.

⁴⁰ Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), chapter 3.

article, it is difficult to determine how much the single member plurality electoral system causes regionalism in Canada and how much federalism, parliamentary democracy, or Canadian social structure leads to regionalism.

The other predominant approach in the research on electoral system is the large statistically oriented study. In studies such as these, the researcher gathers data from as many relevant cases as possible. Analysis usually involves trying to determine relationships between variables that stand up across a variety of settings.⁴¹ The classic and most influential studies of electoral systems and their effects have tended to be statistically oriented studies. Douglas Rae's famous work on the political consequences of electoral systems uses this methodology. More recently, Lijphart has tried to update and take further many of Rae's claims, but he employs essentially the very same methodology.⁴² This type of analysis has provided many useful insights and has clarified our understanding of the relationships between key variables. They do, however, form only broad generalizations, often relying on simplifying assumptions.⁴³ Such large studies lose much of the nuance found in case studies.

The comparable cases strategy is an attempt to provide a middle ground between these two approaches. It attempts to control for as many variables as possible through careful selection of cases. By selecting cases that hold certain relevant variables constant, a researcher can effectively control for the effect of those variables and focus on the variables of interest.⁴⁴ For example, if a researcher suspects that the structure of the

⁴¹ Ragin, chapter 4.

⁴² Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, 2nd. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) ; Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

⁴³ Ragin, 64.

⁴⁴ Arend Lijphart, "The comparable-cases strategy in comparative research," *Comparative Political Studies* 8 (1975): 163-165.

legislative institutions may, along with electoral systems, affect the character of party systems, a comparable cases research strategy will lead him or her to select cases which have as similar legislative institutions as possible, in order to control for that variable and focus on the relationship between electoral systems and party systems. As Lijphart points out, sub-national units are especially appropriate cases for the comparable cases strategy.⁴⁵ Sub-national units like provinces are especially likely to have similar institutional structures and they share a broader cultural and political context. Thus, we are likely to find a higher degree of similarity than we would find if we limited the use of the comparative method to national units.

Manitoba and Alberta provide excellent cases for a comparable cases comparative study. Alberta adopted STV only four years after Manitoba; both provinces abandoned STV and reverted to a single-member plurality electoral system within a year of each other. In other words, the time frame is virtually identical. Furthermore, the particular way both provinces used STV is very similar. Both Alberta and Manitoba used STV in multi-member constituencies in their large cities. In the rural areas, Alberta used STV in single-member districts for the entire period under consideration; Manitoba did not use it for the 1920 and 1922 elections. Except for a few minor differences, both provinces used essentially the same electoral law.⁴⁶

Manitoba and Alberta are also highly similar in their broader institutional structures. Most comparative studies are between countries with all kinds of institutional differences which can have significant implications for the politics of the respective countries. This is not a significant problem in this case. Both Alberta and Manitoba had

⁴⁵ Lijphart, "The comparable-cases strategy," 167.

⁴⁶ In the debate over Alberta's STV legislation in 1924, Alberta's UFA government admitted that their legislation was basically the same as Manitoba's laws. See Chapter 2.

and continue to have basically the same institutional structures: responsible cabinet government in a Westminster style legislative assembly.⁴⁷ In most significant respects, the provinces are highly comparable. The one area in which they differed at the time is in their socio-economic structures. Manitoba's economy was considerably more diversified and developed than was Alberta's. Winnipeg's position as the most important metropolis in western Canada at the time gave Manitoba greater variety in economic activity, containing some features of prairie economies, but also some features of its eastern neighbour, Ontario.⁴⁸ Alberta's economy was more dependent on staples production such as wheat.⁴⁹ As a result, the class composition of the two provinces is distinct. Furthermore, Alberta and Manitoba attracted different types of immigrants with distinct ideological patterns. As Nelson Wiseman demonstrates, Manitoba resembles Ontario while the influence of American immigrants in Alberta gave that province a distinct identity.⁵⁰ Alberta and Manitoba thus differ in their socio-economic compositions.

A comparative study of Alberta and Manitoba thus presents the opportunity to observe the effects of an institutional change (the adoption of a new electoral system) introduced into essentially similar political institutions operating in different socio-economic contexts. As such, this comparison functions as what Skocpol and Somers

⁴⁷ See Dyck, 392-396 and 523-528 for a brief overview of the institutional evolution of the two provinces.

⁴⁸ Dyck, 374-376; W.L. Morton, *Manitoba: A History*, 2nd. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), chapters 13 and 16.

⁴⁹ C.B. Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System*, 2nd. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 10-20.

⁵⁰ Nelson Wiseman, "The pattern of prairie politics," in Hugh Thorburn, ed., *Party Politics in Canada*, 7th. ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1996), 433-436, 440-443.

describe as "the parallel demonstration of theory."⁵¹ It will enable us to see whether the relationships between electoral systems and features of party systems that large scale studies of electoral systems have developed bear up in a detailed examination of these two cases.

There is an implicit third case in this study as well: the Republic of Ireland. Much of what political scientists know about STV comes from the experience of Ireland, one of only two nations in the world to use STV in its lower house of parliament. Malta, the other nation which uses STV, has not been the subject of much study.⁵² Australia uses STV in single member districts for elections to its House of Commons and STV in multi-member districts for its Senate elections, but the idiosyncratic elements of Australian electoral law limits the broader comparative value of Australian elections.⁵³ By contrast, there is a relatively large body of literature on the effects of STV in Ireland. As a result, the Irish case is the source of much of the empirical evidence on STV. This leaves open the possibility, however, that much of what we attribute to STV may in fact be due to

⁵¹ Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, "The uses of comparative history in macrosocial inquiry," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22 (1980): 176.

⁵² See Wolfgang Hirczy de Miño, "Malta: STV in a two-party system," paper presented to the conference on Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine, 1996, for a rare discussion of the operation of STV in Malta.

⁵³ Unlike Ireland, Malta, Alberta, or Manitoba, Australian electoral law in national and most provincial elections requires that voters indicate a full set of preferences and allows parties to indicate a predetermined preference ordering for elections to the Senate. See Ben Reilly and Michael Maley, "Single transferable vote and the alternative vote compared," paper presented to the conference on Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine, 1996 for a discussion of these unique features. See also Jack F.H. Wright, "Australian experience with majority-preferential and quota-preferential systems," in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds., *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences* (New York: Agathon, 1986), 124-138.

other features of the Irish political system or its socio-economic composition. By testing the conclusions about STV derived from studies of its use in Ireland against the evidence in Alberta and Manitoba, we can hopefully sort out the effects of the electoral system from the specific idiosyncrasies of Irish politics and society.⁵⁴

While the comparative study will focus on the cases of Alberta and Manitoba, there is another way to conceive of comparable cases. Each province also consists of three smaller cases — the province with plurality, with STV, and reverting back to plurality. Each time period can function as a separate case, with one significant variable changed each time: the electoral system. Properly speaking, this is also an example of a comparable cases strategy.⁵⁵ Comparing Alberta with STV to the period in which Alberta did not use STV is a comparison of two highly similar cases. There is, of course, one relevant variable besides the electoral system which differentiates the two cases: history. At times, this can provide inconvenient problems and limitations on the comparability of one case to the other. Manitoba has a number of serious limitations. Between the 1915 and 1920 elections, the adoption of STV in Winnipeg was only one of three significant changes to electoral law. In that time period, the province of Manitoba allowed for advance voting for people who could not vote on election day because of their employment and, even more significantly, the province extended the franchise to women.

⁵⁴ Lijphart, "The comparable-cases strategy," 168-169, criticizes Douglas Rae for his over-reliance on Ireland for his understanding of STV and suggests that Rae overcome the "whole nation bias" and include cases like the Tasmanian lower house and the Australian Senate which provide opportunities to study the effects of STV in larger district magnitudes. The same argument applies to studying the Alberta and Manitoba cases.

⁵⁵ Lijphart, "Comparative politics," 689. See Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), 6-12 and 37-43 for a discussion of the methodological issues and limitations in this type of comparison.

The 1920 election is not just the first which used STV: it was also the first election in which a class of workers who may previously have been unable to vote was able to participate. This is a relatively small number of people, however. The extension of the franchise to women was a more significant event in that it significantly altered the composition of the electorate. When examining the 1920 Manitoba election results for the city of Winnipeg, it is not clear if the differences from the pre-1920 elections are due to the adoption of STV or due to the extension of the franchise. Besides the changes to electoral law, the province experienced another event which may limit the comparability of the period prior to adopting STV to the period in which STV was in use: the Winnipeg General Strike. This event increased the salience of class politics in Manitoba in general and in Winnipeg in particular. This again raises problems in interpreting the election results after 1920: if there is increased support for labour candidates in that election, is that due to their improved prospects under STV or is that due to the increased salience of class issues in the electorate? Fortunately, the presence of the Alberta case enables us to control for these specific historical circumstances. Alberta adopted STV well after it adopted universal suffrage and staged one provincial election under plurality with women voting and running as candidates before it switched to STV. Furthermore, the General Strike took place in Winnipeg, not Alberta, and although it was an event of national significance, it likely did not have as profound an effect as it had in Manitoba. Furthermore, Alberta's first election under STV did not take place until 1926, well after the General Strike, providing a convenient "cooling off" period from an academic point of view.

There are other limits to this study as well, inherent in the cases. Most significantly, the most extensive use of STV in the two provinces happened in Edmonton, Calgary, and Winnipeg, the largest cities. Those three places used STV with multi-member districts and in those major cities, the contrast with plurality was most stark.

Both Alberta and Manitoba, however, engaged in significant urban underrepresentation. Winnipeg contained a third of the population, but averaged about 18% of the seats in the provincial legislature.⁵⁶ According to Dyck, the two large Alberta cities were “notoriously underrepresented” as the parties in power tried to enhance their electoral prospects by overrepresenting their predominantly rural support base in the provincial legislature.⁵⁷ As a result, the effects of STV on the province’s electoral results become washed out and lost in the larger election results for the province. This necessitates considering the three cities separately. While we may not see the effects of STV on the province’s electoral results and party system as a whole, we should see the effects when considering the three cities separately.⁵⁸ This is an unfortunate consequence of the specific character of the cases involved, but some researchers have suggested similar approaches for cases with similar problems. Lijphart has suggested studying the Irish use of STV by sub-dividing the country into three sectors: those with 3-member, 4-member, and 5-member districts and observing differences between them.⁵⁹ As Lijphart argues, this requires a broader view of comparative study that overcomes the bias towards considering nations.

A further limitation inherent in these cases has to do with the fact that these are *provincial* cases and not self-sufficient. Provincial parties are not closed entities: their counterparts in other provinces may influence them or, more likely, federal parties may affect them. A nice feature of these cases is that the parties in power through most of the period in both provinces — the United Farmers of Alberta and Social Credit in Alberta

⁵⁶ Dyck, 388.

⁵⁷ Dyck, 519.

⁵⁸ See Appendices B and C for provincial election results for Manitoba and Alberta, broken down between rural areas and the major cities.

⁵⁹ Lijphart, “The comparable-cases strategy,” 169.

and the Liberal-Progressives in Manitoba — did not have influential federal counterparts. Furthermore, this effect (if it exists) will likely be relatively constant between the periods and provinces in question, so it should be of negligible impact. The possibility exists, however, that provincial party systems may not be comparable to party systems at national levels, which may limit the comparability of the effects of STV found in these cases with the effects found in national party systems elsewhere. It is possible, however, that developments in the party systems of sub-national units may also significantly influence national party systems and that no one has explored this relationship.

While these limitations in comparison are real and relevant, comparative politics deals with real cases in the real world. As much as social scientists may wish it, there are never perfect cases which provide laboratory-like conditions for comparison. There are always little idiosyncrasies that may affect the interpretation of results. Comparing the three periods in each province with each other and with the experience in the other province provides as close to an ideal comparative situation as can be reasonably expected in the real world. This comparative study brings two cases with virtually identical institutional configurations introducing the same electoral system changes at almost the same time. It provides the opportunity to examine the effects of the shifts in the electoral system and replicate the results in two different socio-economic contexts. To some extent, many of the limitations described above are also present in the more statistically oriented examinations of electoral systems. All types of idiosyncratic factors and specific circumstances may influence the development of party systems. These circumstances are less obvious in the large number of cases involved in such studies, but are still relevant and have an effect. Smaller comparisons such as these provide an opportunity for a more nuanced consideration of such effects. To some extent, they provide some of the benefits of the case study method, but apply them in a more analytically rigorous framework.

Skocpol and Somers argue that different types of comparative inquiry work together to aid in our understanding of socio-political phenomena. Comparative work that is macro-analytical focuses on the relationship between variables and helps to develop general theory from specific hypotheses. Studies that apply the theory in different historical circumstances can show that the theory provides a fruitful way to understand and explain specific cases. They can also show how contexts alter the way in which a hypothesized relationship between two variables unfolds, thus showing the limits to theory and perhaps suggesting other variables that may play a role. This may generate new hypotheses that macro-analytic comparisons can incorporate.⁶⁰ The key point is the dialogue between the general — theorized relationships between important political variables — and the specific, the way in which these relationships work themselves out in concrete contexts. It is to this dialogue that this study seeks to contribute.

Conclusion

This study will examine the use of the single transferable vote by Alberta and Manitoba and its impact on the party systems of the two provinces. The heart of this study is a comparative examination of the impact of STV on elections in Alberta and Manitoba. Chapter 3 examines the mechanics of the operation of the STV electoral system. It explains how the system operated in the two provinces, and studies the effects it had on mechanical aspects of elections, such as voter turnout and ballot spoilage. Chapter 4 considers one of the classic topics in studies of electoral systems — their impact on proportionality. Chapter 5 addresses another controversy in electoral systems research, the relationship between electoral systems and the number of political parties. Chapters 6 and 7 examine some of the electoral mechanisms that are unique to STV, particularly the freedom it gives voters to choose candidates from any combination of

⁶⁰ Skocpol and Somers, 196-197.

parties. These chapters will consider the extent to which voters in Alberta and Manitoba took advantage of this freedom and the ability of parties to use the electoral system effectively and successfully.

These central chapters are bracketed by two others that attempt to place this study in its historical context. Chapters 2 and 8 consider the politics of electoral reform in Alberta and Manitoba. Chapter 2 will look at the politics of the Progressive era and examine how both provinces adopted essentially similar electoral regimes. Chapter 8 will try to understand why both provinces abruptly ended their use of STV after thirty-five years of experience with it. Chapter 9 will draw conclusions from this study and make suggestions for future research.

The study of Alberta and Manitoba's electoral systems can contribute to our understanding of the impact of STV. Very few countries in the world have used STV: Alberta and Manitoba add valuable new cases to a short list. These two provinces will enable us to test some of the conclusions from other studies of STV in settings other than Ireland, Malta, or Australia. This study also attempts to contribute to efforts to correct an omission in the study of Canadian politics: the neglect of Canada's provincial governments. Although most provinces have toyed with alternatives, none rejected established electoral practice as decisively as these two provinces. Alberta and Manitoba's abandonment of the plurality system in favour of preferential voting in the 1920s was the most dramatic innovation in a colourful history of experiments with representational practices by Canada's provinces.

Chapter Two

From Plurality to Proportional Representation

The electoral reforms that Manitoba and Alberta introduced between 1920 and 1924 were the most dramatic changes to provincial electoral systems in Canadian history. Both provinces rejected the plurality electoral system that had been dominant in all provinces and in federal politics and adopted a system that had never been tried in a Canadian context except for some uses in municipal politics. This radical change in electoral practice is important to explain, particularly because it challenges the perception of Canadian conservatism when it comes to electoral systems.¹

Alberta and Manitoba provide interesting cases in which to examine the politics of electoral reform. Although both reforms happened shortly after World War I, these reforms took place as a part of normal politics, not crisis politics as is often the case with changes to electoral systems.² This chapter will examine the politics of electoral reform in Alberta and Manitoba. In both provinces, the ideas of the Progressive movement influenced the adoption of STV. Despite the widespread support for proportional representation evident in Alberta and Manitoba, both provinces decided to limit the Hare system to the major cities and use the majoritarian system of alternative voting in rural

¹ David J. Elkins, "Electoral reform and political culture," in Malcolm Alexander and Brian Galligan, eds., *Comparative Political Studies: Australia and Canada* (Melbourne: Pitman, 1992), 59-71.

² Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts, "Understanding the dynamics of electoral reform," *International Political Science Review* 16 (1995): 10-11.

areas. A commitment to the ideals of the Progressive movement collided with partisan considerations to produce the hybrid electoral system used in both provinces.

The Progressive movement

The dominance of agriculture in the prairie economy meant that farmers would be an important force in both provinces. The first two decades of the twentieth century saw the increase of political consciousness and organization by farmers in the West. By the early 1920s, the Progressive movement, as the farmers' movements were known, dominated politics in the Canadian prairies. According to W.L. Morton's classic study of the Progressives, there were two central themes of the movement. First, the farmers were critical of Canadian economic policy, particularly the tariff protection of central Canadian industry. Second, the farmers sought to subvert the character of Canadian party politics.³ The farmers were critical of the parties' essential similarity on major policy questions, rigid party discipline, and campaign finance.⁴ William Irvine, a leading representative of the Progressive movement, wrote of the "moral degeneration of the party system."⁵

Over the course of the 1910s, the Canadian Council of Agriculture developed the Farmers' Platform, a series of policy prescriptions that described exactly what the farmers wanted. The first platform, developed in 1910, dealt only with economic policy. The second revision (1916) introduced a number of non-economic elements to the platform, including the initiative, referenda, and recall, reform to election finance legislation, abolition of patronage, and extension of the franchise to women. The 1919 version was

³ W.L. Morton, *The Progressive Party in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 288-291.

⁴ Morton, *Progressive Party*, 291.

⁵ William Irvine, *The Farmers in Politics* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1920), 55.

the most significant, as it guided the Progressives in Ottawa, as well as the UFM in Manitoba and the UFA in Alberta. It contained a longer list of political reforms designed to “bring about a greater measure of democracy in government.” One of these reforms was proportional representation.⁶

Coinciding with the adoption of proportional representation as a plank in the farmers’ platform was a series of articles in the *Grain Growers’ Guide*, a publication that served as an unofficial mouthpiece of the Progressive movement.⁷ While the *Guide* had carried articles on the single transferable vote for years, the number of editorials and articles on STV increased dramatically in 1919. Editorials repeatedly endorsed STV and called for its adoption in provincial legislatures and in parliament. The essence of the *Guide*’s argument was that STV would elect legislatures more representative of the electorate’s opinions. One editorial summarized this argument: “If our institutions are to be truly democratic, they must be truly representative.”⁸ A number of longer articles carried detailed descriptions of the operation of the STV system.⁹ The *Guide* also published a number of articles which explained why STV was a desired reform and how it fit into the broader Progressive political philosophy. A key argument was that proportional representation would allow greater minority representation. One article described STV as “a protest against the political extinction of the minority.”¹⁰ While the

⁶ Morton, *Progressive Party*, 297-305.

⁷ Morton, *Progressive Party*, 15.

⁸ *Grain Growers’ Guide*, 5 November 1919, p. 6.

⁹ See, for example, S.W. Yates, “Studies in farmers’ platform: No. VI. — Proportional representation,” *Grain Growers’ Guide*, 12 February 1919, 40-41; Charles A. Bowman, “How proportional representation works,” *Grain Growers’ Guide*, 10 December 1919, 7, 10-11; J.T. Hull, “Counting transferable vote,” *Grain Growers’ Guide*, 26 April 1922, 9.

¹⁰ Yates, 40.

Progressives' primary motivation was a desire for more accurate representation. it was obviously a particular concern for them because under plurality they had to build up a critical mass in one district before they could elect any representatives. In the words of W.R. Wood, whose *Guide* article was also part of a larger publication on the Farmers' Platform: "If a progressive movement arises it must practically wait till it has secured a majority in some one member constituency before it can have any direct representation."¹¹

The Progressives also hoped that STV would reduce patronage by discouraging politicians from trying to "buy" their districts. Since proportional representation reduces the impact of the swing vote in constituencies, the Progressives hoped that PR would reduce the impact of political "machines" that tried to use patronage and spending to cause votes to swing.¹² Authors in the *Guide* also believed that STV would give voters more independence and freedom, thus reducing partisanship.¹³ They felt that the adoption of PR would encourage parties to take more distinct stands on issues, as they could limit their appeals to voters with whom they are in agreement. Wood argued that PR would lead to a "greater emphasis upon the great fundamental questions and elimination of petty and personal issues."¹⁴ Finally, Ronald Hooper, the secretary of the Proportional Representation Society in Canada, wrote that PR would give politicians greater security of tenure, allowing them to develop greater skills and be more effective legislators.¹⁵

¹¹ W.R. Wood, "Proportional representation," *Grain Growers' Guide*, 2 July 1919, 24; see also Yates, 40.

¹² Ronald Hooper, "Electoral justice by P.R.," *Grain Growers' Guide*, 23 June 1920, 10; Charles A. Bowman, "Proportional representation," *Grain Growers' Guide*, 3 December 1919, 38; Wood, 26.

¹³ Yates, 41; Bowman, "Proportional representation," 38; Wood, 26.

¹⁴ Wood, 26; Yates, 41.

¹⁵ Hooper, 11.

The Progressive movement thus strongly advocated proportional representation. The farmers saw STV as a way to end the fundamental unfairness of the conversion of votes into seats, thus ensuring that legislatures more accurately reflected the opinions of the people. More importantly for the Progressives, however, STV was a way to deal with the ills of party-dominated politics. STV, they believed, would reduce patronage and corruption and would reward and encourage the independence of voters and their representatives. It is no surprise, then, that the federal Progressives used their position in Ottawa to promote STV on any possible occasion.¹⁶ The Progressives' position as the third party doomed these efforts in federal politics to failure, however. In provincial politics, the farmers' movement was more influential and much more successful in realizing its goals.

Manitoba

In Manitoba, the Liberals rather than the farmers directly initiated electoral reform. The Norris Liberal government took office in 1915 after the resignation of the scandal-tainted Roblin Conservative government which had governed the province for 15 years. A coalition of reform minded groups propelled the Liberals to office. The Liberals adopted elements of the legislative programme of the Direct Legislation League, tax reform proponents, suffragettes, the Temperance movement, the Social Service Council, and elements of the social gospel movement.¹⁷ This reform platform won the Liberals the endorsement of many of these groups and helped to propel the party to a landslide victory in the 1915 provincial election.

¹⁶ Morton, *Progressive Party*, 159, 180.

¹⁷ Lionel Orlikow, "A survey of the reform movement in Manitoba 1910 to 1920" (M.A. thesis, University of Manitoba, 1955), 123-125; W.L. Morton, *Manitoba: A History*, 2nd. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 336-337; M.S. Donnelly, *The Government of Manitoba* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 51-52.

While in power, the Liberals implemented an ambitious legislative program and Manitoba became a leader in social and political reform. The Liberals introduced temperance, extended the vote to women, made primary education compulsory, limited the working day to eight hours, passed legislation enabling the use of the mechanisms of direct democracy, reformed the province's election legislation, and implemented a number of reforms in the areas of labour and agriculture.¹⁸ In return for their support, the Liberals delivered the desired policies to their supporters. Morton concludes: "the reform movement made the Liberal party its instrument and brought it to power in Manitoba."¹⁹

Proportional representation was not a part of the Liberal electoral platform in the 1914 or 1915 elections. The Liberals promised women's suffrage, direct legislation, and laws against corruption in elections,²⁰ but PR was not a significant priority for the Norris government. It was, however, an important matter for elements of the Liberals' electoral coalition. As part of the Liberals' efforts to eliminate electoral corruption, the legislature's committee on election laws held public hearings in 1916 on reforming the province's electoral laws. The committee dealt primarily with more mundane matters such as compulsory voting, educational tests, election expenses, the roles of official agents, and polling hours.²¹ A number of the people who appeared before the committee, however, used the opportunity to promote proportional representation.

In the first public meeting, S.J. Farmer appeared before the committee as an unofficial representative of the Direct Legislation League, and asked the committee to

¹⁸ Orlikow, 163-170; Donnelly, 52-56; Morton, *Manitoba*, 348-355.

¹⁹ W.L. Morton, *Progressive Party*, 34.

²⁰ Orlikow, 219.

²¹ Manitoba, Committee of the Legislature on Election Laws, *Secretary's Report*, Provincial Archives of Manitoba, GR 1542 r. 31, b. 6, box 3.

consider proportional representation. He noted the disproportionality of electoral results in recent Canadian provincial elections and urged the legislature to consider adopting some form of proportional representation. Farmer indicated that he favoured STV over list systems of PR. An unofficial representative of the Women's Civic League also urged the committee to consider PR, as did a representative of the Trades and Labour Council. Three representatives of the Social Service Council also appeared at the first meeting and gave a ringing endorsement for proportional representation, arguing that "there is a very strong and growing and very general feeling that the principle itself is right." The representatives of the council argued that, although the ballots might take longer to count, it was well worth the effort for more fair results. Arthur Puttee, a representative of the Council, strongly argued that the end of two-party politics in Manitoba would make PR necessary; he also argued for a relatively large district magnitude in order to ensure more proportional results. When questioned by A.B. Hudson, the attorney general and chair of the legislative committee, Puttee argued that the plurality system discouraged parties from forming and earning representation in the legislature. He argued that a lower number of parties was "artificial and the result of ... election law rather than the state of public opinion." Puttee concluded: "There would be more interests and those interests would be better represented." Some of the committee members expressed concern that PR would make effective government impossible. The proponents of PR argued that if public opinion was split in a way that made a majority government impossible, the legislature should reflect it. Rev. Salem Bland, a Methodist minister and one of the leading social gospel proponents, argued that PR would "unquestionably" destroy party government and suggested that this would be "an expression of a higher state of mutual development, so that party government, which is a clumsy expedient, will pass away." The consensus of those appearing before the first public meeting on election law was clearly behind the adoption of STV; the only dissenting voices were some of the government members of

the committee. Despite the terms of reference of the committee, much of the first public meeting centred on PR, leading Rev. Harkness of the Social Service Council to declare: "I had not anticipated that there would be so much discussion along this Proportional Representation line at this meeting."²²

The second public hearing of the committee featured return visits of some of the people who had appeared at the first meeting. In his second appearance, Harkness argued that PR allowed representation of "every substantial group in the community" and the failure to provide adequate representation would cause unrest. Harkness proposed that it might be too early to implement PR, but urged the government to study the matter and adopt STV as soon as it is feasible. D.W. Buchanan of the Single Tax League appeared before the committee and urged "very strongly" that STV be written into the new election law "as the most complete and scientific system of Proportional Representation yet devised." Buchanan argued that STV would provide for clean elections, make MLAs more independent of party lines, and end gerrymandering. His key concern was that STV would end the "disenfranchisement of the minority."²³

The third public meeting featured representation from the Winnipeg business community and the first dissenting voices on proportional representation. A.L. Crossin of the Winnipeg Board of Trade defended the two-party system and concluded: "I cannot see there is much to be gained from Proportional Representation." He expressed concern about the possible multiplication of political parties and other divisions in the legislature. J.H. Ashdown, also of the Board of Trade, argued that PR would lead to the politicization of ethnic divisions in Manitoba. F.J. Dixon, a member of the legislature and

²² Committee on Election Laws, 24-25, 28, 39-56.

²³ Committee on Election Laws, 77-78, 84-85.

STV supporter,²⁴ challenged this argument. He argued that the plurality system was more likely to cause ethnic strife because blocs of ethnic support could be “swing” votes in single member districts. Puttee of the Social Service Council addressed the PR question once again and argued that it was the most important possible reform to the electoral system and argued that the opponents who appeared before the committee were dismissing STV in a “cursory way.” He argued that Ashdown’s criticism was without merit because, internationally, plural societies such as Switzerland were the very countries leading the move to proportional representation. Puttee decried the plurality system as a “blot on democratic government” and suggested: “If you are going to have a representative legislature, why not take means to have one.”²⁵

In the end, the committee recommended that the government study STV for a few years because there was, in the opinion of the committee, “very little conception ... of what Proportional Representation means.”²⁶ The government’s election legislation dealt with disclosure requirements for business contributions, limits on campaign spending, and matters such as the use of vehicles on election day and proxy voting.²⁷ It is clear from the transcripts of the public hearings of the committee, however, that the Liberals’ electoral coalition was solidly behind STV. Representatives of the social gospel movement, the Direct Legislation League, Single Tax League, Social Service Council, labour, and the suffrage movement all came out in favour of STV as a badly needed reform. The only

²⁴ Dixon, in fact, wrote an article on the use of STV in Lethbridge for the *Grain Growers’ Guide*: F.J. Dixon, “Preferential ballot used by Lethbridge voters,” *Grain Growers’ Guide*, 15 April 1915, 8.

²⁵ Committee on Election Laws, 133, 137-138, 141-142, 160-166.

²⁶ Committee on Election Laws, 10.

²⁷ Orlikow, 165.

defenders of the existing electoral system were representatives of Winnipeg's business community.

The extent of discussion about proportional representation at the committee hearings indicates the degree to which STV was "in the air" in Manitoba, particularly among members of the reform movement. Rumours abounded throughout the 1915-1920 Manitoba legislature that the government would adopt PR for Winnipeg.²⁸ Finally, on 22 March 1920, just before the legislature prorogued, the Norris government introduced the bill that brought proportional representation to Winnipeg. There was little opposition in the provincial legislature; the bill passed second reading without debate. The attorney-general who introduced the bill insisted that the Liberals had not introduced PR for political advantage, but for the general improvement of Manitoba's electoral law. He explained the workings of the bill to the legislature after which it was voted on and passed to committee without debate.²⁹ The bill worked its way through committee and third reading and received royal assent on 27 March 1920, the day the legislature prorogued. The legislation passed through the legislature quickly partly because of the Liberals' large majority in the legislature, but also because proportional representation was uncontroversial. The *Winnipeg Evening Tribune* let the introduction of PR pass without editorial comment. The *Manitoba Free Press* was self-congratulatory about the application of PR, noting that it had consistently argued in favour of STV and now Manitoba had implemented it for use in municipal and provincial politics. They noted Manitoba's leadership in electoral matters and argued that it was only a matter of time before all jurisdictions in Canada used PR. The *Free Press* saw the introduction of STV in

²⁸ Bowman, "Proportional representation," *Grain Growers' Guide*, 3 December 1919, 38.

²⁹ *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 24 March 1920; *Manitoba Free Press*, 24 March 1920.

Winnipeg as the first step to its use in the rest of the province.³⁰ The *Grain Growers' Guide* also agreed that it would not be long before the entire province used STV, but agreed with the government that it was "probably wise" to use STV on a trial basis in Winnipeg before using it throughout Manitoba.³¹

The reform coalition that propelled and sustained the Norris government in office thus appears to have pushed the Liberals to adopt proportional representation. It does not seem that the Liberals were attempting to manipulate electoral rules for their own advantage. When the Liberals passed the PR legislation, they controlled four of the six Winnipeg seats. F.J. Dixon, a frequent supporter of government initiatives, held one of the seats they did not control; in fact, the Liberals did not even run a candidate against Dixon in 1915.³² In essence, the Liberals controlled five of the six seats in the city after the 1915 election. They earned almost half of the popular vote which means that the introduction of PR would likely not have been to their partisan advantage. The Liberals had benefited from a leading party bonus which the plurality system typically gives to dominant parties.

Of course, the Liberals were not fighting the 1915 election over again, but were looking ahead to the 1920 election, with the increased salience of class politics and rising support for labour candidates. Some academic commentators have argued that PR was a way of preventing labour's strength from growing.³³ There is some evidence for this as

³⁰ *Manitoba Free Press*, 25 March 1920.

³¹ *Grain Growers' Guide*, 31 March 1920, 5.

³² Harry Gutkin and Mildred Gutkin, *Profiles in Dissent: The Shaping of Radical Thought in the Canadian West* (Edmonton: NeWest, 1997), 20.

³³ See, for example, T. Peterson, "Ethnic and class politics in Manitoba," in Martin Robin, ed., *Canadian Provincial Politics: The Party Systems of the Ten Provinces* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 84; Kathleen O'Gorman Wormsbecker, "The rise and fall of the labour political movement in Manitoba, 1919-1927" (M.A. Thesis, Queen's

labour candidates did win a plurality of the vote in 1920 which suggests that their seat totals would have been higher under the plurality system. Much of labour's support, however, was personal support for F.J. Dixon, who ran for the Dominion Labor Party in 1920; he won a plurality of support in 13 of the 18 polling districts.³⁴ Furthermore, Dixon was given a preference ordering on 80% of the ballots cast in 1920³⁵ and a significant portion of his surplus ballots transferred to non-labour candidates after he was elected.³⁶ If the 1920 election had been conducted under the plurality rule, Dixon's votes would only have been earned by him in his constituency. It is not clear, then, that labour's performance would have been much better, particularly since Winnipeg's class divisions are also geographically skewed, with Winnipeg's North and Centre areas containing a much higher proportion of working class people than the relatively affluent South. Furthermore, labour had generally been supportive of the move to PR as subsequent debates over electoral reform in Manitoba revealed. It is also difficult to argue that the Liberals were directing this reform against labour as the Liberals also faced a threat from farmer candidates who ran for the first time in 1920. If the Liberals were using PR to fragment their opposition, it seems likely that they would also have extended it to the rural areas to minimize the political strength of farmers. While self-interest may have played some role in the Liberals' adoption of PR in 1920, it seems likely that it was primarily motivated by the reform programme the Liberals had implemented upon taking office in 1915.

University, 1977), 194-195; Dennis Pilon, "Proportional representation in Canada: An historical sketch," paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, St. John's, 1997, 21.

³⁴ Wormsbecker, 71-72; Gutkin and Gutkin, 45.

³⁵ Ernest Thomas, "Proportional representation and the Winnipeg election," *The Canadian Forum*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (December 1920): 73.

³⁶ *Grain Growers' Guide*, 14 July 1920, 5.

The General Strike also appears to have motivated the Liberals to some extent. A royal commission on the causes of industrial unrest in Winnipeg leading up to the strike had concluded that the problem lay partly in the inadequate structures of representation: the commission argued that PR might have prevented some of the problems that caused the General Strike. The attorney general cited this commission in introducing the bill for second reading.³⁷ In January 1920, the premier and the attorney general visited Hooper of the P.R. Society in Ottawa to seek his advice on whether a more proportional electoral system would be a valuable reform in the aftermath of the strike.³⁸

While the adoption of proportional representation in Winnipeg was a widely supported measure, the same cannot be said for the adoption of alternative voting in rural Manitoba. The Liberals were re-elected in 1920, this time with a minority government. The 1920 election saw a tremendous breakthrough for labour and farmer candidates which ate into two of the pillars of Liberal party support. The Liberals controlled only 21 seats of the 55 in the Manitoba legislature. As a result, it was difficult to pass controversial legislation as was seen in the attempts of the Liberals to extend electoral reform to rural areas. A *Free Press* editorial carried the first hint of the Liberal plan on 17 February 1921, one week after the throne speech opened the first session of the new legislature. The *Free Press* pointed out that one-quarter of MLAs had won election with less than a majority of the voters in their constituencies. They argued that the multiplication of parties seen in Manitoba meant that the plurality system was outdated and that the province needed a new electoral system that would be able to deal with three-cornered contests. The *Free Press* suggested the alternative vote for single member

³⁷ *Manitoba Free Press*, 24 March 1920; *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 24 March 1920; Pilon, 19.

³⁸ John Gall Glashan, "Proportional Representation in Canada," (M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1951), 25-26.

districts as a way to deal with these problems.³⁹ Furthermore, a meeting of the United Farmers of Manitoba had passed a resolution favoring the adoption of AV in rural Manitoba. The government introduced a bill to implement AV to rural Manitoba in mid-March, citing the UFM's request. On 15 March, the debate on second reading of the bill began and it carried on intermittently over two weeks. Labour representatives raised the main objection to the bill and argued for the extension of PR to rural Manitoba as well. They contended that the goal of PR was increased minority representation while AV was decidedly majoritarian. John Queen of the Social Democrats argued that it was against the interest of workers and claimed that the Liberals were trying to limit the future electoral success of the farmers in rural Manitoba, thus preserving the position of the Liberals and Conservatives.⁴⁰ Taylor, the Conservative leader, also opposed the legislation, but for different reasons. He argued that there was little need or public desire for AV. The farmers in the legislature were split on the measure, some noting the UFM's request for AV, others expressing concern over the added complexity and potential multiplication of candidates.

The vote on second reading was a dramatic one. It initially appeared that the government had lost the vote on the bill by one vote and would have to seek a dissolution of the legislature. Interrupting the celebrations in the opposition benches, F.J. Dixon complained that his vote in favour of the motion had not been counted; a subsequent check of the records indicated this was the case and that the vote on second reading was tied, the first time in Manitoba's history that this had happened. The Speaker had to break the tie and voted in favour of the measure, allowing it to proceed to the committee

³⁹ *Manitoba Free Press*, 17 February 1921.

⁴⁰ *Manitoba Free Press*, 19 March 1921; *Manitoba Free Press*, 22 March 1921; *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 19 March 1921; *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 22 March 1921.

phase.⁴¹ In committee, Social Democrat John Queen moved to strip all references to AV from the bill. The committee vote was decidedly against AV, and the only item left in the 1921 election bill was a clause extending the time between nomination day and election day by three days.⁴² The *Tribune*'s gossipy "In the Legislature" columnist argued that MLAs worried about their political futures had killed the bill and suggested that they had gutted the bill in committee instead of on third reading to prevent the government from falling.⁴³

The AV bill enjoyed solid editorial support. The *Grain Growers' Guide* ran two editorials endorsing the plan.⁴⁴ The *Free Press* argued that opposition to the bill was not well founded, suggesting that Manitoba was not ready for the full application of PR desired by labour. The editorial argued that while proportional representation was clearly more desirable, AV was the next best thing and "surely a great deal more democratic than the existing system."⁴⁵ It suggested that AV was a step toward the application of PR throughout the province. The *Tribune* took a similar editorial stance, arguing that the AV bill was "not open to reasonable criticism." It was more pessimistic about PR, arguing that it was too difficult to apply PR in rural areas. The editorial claimed that AV was "the natural correlative" of PR in rural Manitoba.⁴⁶ Both the *Tribune* and the *Free Press* agreed that the bill's defeat in committee was a temporary setback and that the

⁴¹ *Manitoba Free Press*, 31 March 1921; *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 31 March 1921.

⁴² *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 19 April 1921.

⁴³ *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 20 April 1921.

⁴⁴ *Grain Growers' Guide*, 30 March 1921, 5; *Grain Growers' Guide*, 6 April 1921, 6.

⁴⁵ *Manitoba Free Press*, 22 March 1921.

⁴⁶ *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 15 April 1921.

government would likely reintroduce the legislation in some form in the legislature's next session.⁴⁷

Those editorials proved to be prophetic as the Norris government reintroduced the AV bill in the second session of the legislature. The partisan situation of the 1921 legislature was essentially unchanged and the debate over AV in 1922 echoed the earlier debate. The Liberals introduced the bill in the Manitoba legislature about a month into the session. The impetus for the AV bill, they argued, was a UFM resolution calling for AV in single-member constituencies. The Liberals' plan received strong editorial endorsement from the *Free Press*. They noted that the UFM had supported AV unanimously at its convention and that the principle had wide public support. The editorial argued that the plurality system was merely a "lottery" which resulted in an unrepresentative legislature.⁴⁸

Once again, labour vociferously opposed the move. Labour MLA William Ivens argued that the adoption of AV would be a blow to labour and farmer candidates as the strict ballot marking provisions that considered any ballot marked with an "X" to be spoiled would particularly hit voters who were less educated.⁴⁹ The central thrust of labour's criticism was that proportional representation would be much more fair. To that end, A.E. Smith, a labour MLA from Brandon introduced a resolution that would extend the Hare system to rural Manitoba. This resolution had the support of a number of MLAs, particularly from the labour side. Dixon noted that the Smith resolution was more true to the UFM's request as the UFM wanted the Hare system in grouped constituencies and the alternative vote as a last resort if it was necessary to maintain single member districts.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ *Manitoba Free Press*, 13 April 1921; *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 21 April 1921.

⁴⁸ *Manitoba Free Press*, 3 February 1922.

⁴⁹ *Manitoba Free Press*, 2 February 1922.

⁵⁰ *Manitoba Free Press*, 10 February 1922.

John Queen added a further dimension to the debate when he argued that all representation systems were flawed as long as Winnipeg continued to be underrepresented in the legislature. Queen proposed a redistribution committee to deal with Manitoba's malapportionment problem.⁵¹ In the end, the legislature defeated both the Smith and Queen resolutions.

The independent farmer members of the house expressed a different set of concerns: many seemed to prefer the plurality method, despite the UFM resolution. Matthew Stanbridge, a member from St. Clements, argued that the old-line parties wanted to use AV to protect themselves from the farmers' movement. He claimed that, as an MLA elected by less than a majority of his constituents, he was a particular target of this legislation. Dmytro Yakimschak of Emerson argued that AV would encourage too many independent candidates and lead to unacceptably high numbers of spoiled ballots.⁵² Many farmers also opposed the Smith resolution, arguing that it was the product of urban Manitoba and misread the intentions of the UFM resolution.⁵³

Given this opposition from both sides in a minority government situation, pundits predicted that the AV bill was going to have difficulty passing.⁵⁴ The *Free Press* weighed in with an editorial urging the adoption of the alternative vote, arguing that most Manitobans favoured it and that legislators should discuss it in a "non-partisan spirit." In a

⁵¹ *Manitoba Free Press*, 15 February 1922; *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 15 February 1922.

⁵² *Manitoba Free Press*, 2 February 1922.

⁵³ *Manitoba Free Press*, 10 February 1922.

⁵⁴ *Manitoba Free Press*, 2 February 1922; *Manitoba Free Press*, 13 February 1922.

note of political fatalism, the *Free Press* said that AV would be one of the first acts after the UFM took power anyway.⁵⁵

In the end, other political events in the province overtook the AV bill. On March 14, the Liberals lost the confidence of the legislature and Premier Norris offered his resignation to the lieutenant governor. The complicating factor was that the legislature had not yet passed its supply bill. Aikins, the lieutenant governor, wrote a letter to Norris asking him to reconvene the legislature and pass the supply bill along with "such measures as are imperatively required for both the public service, and other matters if there be common consent."⁵⁶ He agreed to dissolve the legislature and issue the writs for an election after the legislature dealt with those matters. The Liberals called a conference of leaders of the main partisan groups in the legislature to determine which bills had broad consensus and could pass in the legislature. Over the next few days, the legislature proceeded to deal with the supply bill and a few other measures while the Liberals withdrew most of their other legislation. On 24 March, the attorney general withdrew the AV bill from the Manitoba legislature. He said in his speech: "The government have long felt that the application of some such electoral reform as is embodied in this bill was the most effective means of remedying the present very unsatisfactory situation of minority representation in the legislature." He said that the Liberals attempted to get all-party agreement on the bill in the conference after the government was defeated, but it soon became apparent to the government that the bill would not pass.⁵⁷ With that, the second attempt to introduce AV to rural Manitoba ended.

⁵⁵ *Manitoba Free Press*, 8 March 1922.

⁵⁶ *Manitoba Free Press*, 21 March 1922.

⁵⁷ *Manitoba Free Press*, 25 March 1922.

In the election that followed, the alternative vote was part of the platforms of both the Liberals and the UFM. At their convention prior to the 1922 election, the Liberals had adopted a resolution in favour of "the introduction of the Preferential Ballot into the election laws of this Province in single member constituencies."⁵⁸ The UFM was particularly dedicated to the AV principle, featuring it not only in their platforms, but also in their election planning documents. The UFM's Central Co-ordinating Committee recommended that constituency associations use AV in the candidate nomination process.⁵⁹ The UFM won a decisive victory in the election, aided partly by the workings of the plurality system which rewarded their one-third of the popular vote with a majority of the legislature's seats.

In the 1924 session of the legislature, the government noted that the UFM annual convention had called for AV and in the Speech from the Throne, the government promised to introduce it in this session of the legislature.⁶⁰ In the debate on the speech from the throne, Norris, now the leader of the opposition, lauded the UFM for following in the Liberals' footsteps, and promised to support the AV bill.⁶¹ Major Taylor, the Conservative leader, was less complimentary, accusing the UFM of maintaining its political strength by using a majoritarian system in the rural areas. Taylor argued that there were incompatible principles of representation at work: "The government is trying to play both ends against the middle ... and while proportional representation, adopted for

⁵⁸ Liberal campaign literature for the 1922 provincial election, Provincial Archives of Manitoba, MG14 B36 f.95.

⁵⁹ United Farmers of Manitoba, Central Co-ordinating Committee, "Plan for provincial political campaign for the United Farmers of Manitoba." Provincial Archives of Manitoba, MG14 B36 f.95.

⁶⁰ *Manitoba Free Press*, 11 January 1924.

⁶¹ *Manitoba Free Press*, 15 January 1924; *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 15 January 1924.

elections in Winnipeg, seeks to give fair play to minorities, the aim of the second preferential ballot is to make sure the minority gets nothing.”⁶² Labour was a much less significant force after the 1922 election, but the labour MLAs who remained expressed concern over the AV bill which mirrored the concerns expressed in 1920 and 1922. Charles Tanner argued that the whole system of geographical representation was outdated: “We believe in representation by population rather than in representing constituencies.”⁶³

The UFM introduced the AV bill early in the session. In his speech introducing the bill for second reading, Richard Craig, the attorney-general, said the goal of the bill was to make the legislature as representative as possible. With the advent of a multi-party system in Manitoba, he argued, the plurality system was no longer adequate as candidates often won with the support of less than a majority of their constituents. Craig said that the bill had two main purposes: to overcome split votes and to make sure that candidates had majority support.⁶⁴

In the debate, Independent Labour Party MLA S.J. Farmer challenged Craig's claim that AV would provide for fair representation, suggesting that only “representation by population,” as he called proportional representation, would allow that to happen. He cited a pamphlet by Ronald Hooper of the Proportional Representation Society of Canada, a frequent contributor to the *Grain Growers' Guide*, which said that AV does not provide adequate representation for diverse interests. Farmer argued that AV would effectively disenfranchise minorities and that adequate representation was impossible with

⁶² *Manitoba Free Press*, 17 January 1924.

⁶³ *Manitoba Free Press*, 19 January 1924.

⁶⁴ *Manitoba Free Press*, 24 January 1924.

single member districts, whether Manitoba used AV or plurality.⁶⁵ In the assessment of the *Free Press*' "Under the Dome" columnist, Farmer "shook up" the attorney general with his focus on the effect of AV on minorities at the aggregate level, not just at the constituency level.⁶⁶

Major Taylor, the Conservative leader, accused the UFM of political motivations: he argued that the Liberals had not implemented AV in 1920 because they had had a majority then and did not see it as necessary. Only when they were in a minority situation had they tried to implement AV. He claimed that many of the members who were sitting in government had voted against the AV bill when the Liberals tried to introduce it. He contended that the UFM was trying to make it possible for UFM and Liberal supporters to use their ballots to ensure that no Conservatives won. Besides these criticisms of partisan manipulation, Taylor was also critical of the substance of alternative voting procedures. He asserted that voters' choices should be as simple as possible and that some voters might become confused and mark their ballots with an "X," thus spoiling their ballots. He argued that AV would undermine party loyalty and end up multiplying the number of parties in Manitoba politics.⁶⁷

Many opponents of the measure asked the UFM why they were not extending proportional representation from Winnipeg to the rest of the province. Supporters of the AV bill responded by arguing that the province was not ready for the full-scale application of PR to all of Manitoba and that AV was a step in the right direction. William Bayley argued in the debate on second reading that AV was "a half way step to proportional representation." Others, such as William Ivens, argued that it was wrong for the province

⁶⁵ *Manitoba Free Press*, 23 January 1924.

⁶⁶ *Manitoba Free Press*, 23 January 1924.

⁶⁷ *Manitoba Free Press*, 31 January 1924; *Manitoba Free Press*, 2 February 1924.

to employ two different electoral systems in the province.⁶⁸ In the end, however, the UFM's majority in the legislature combined with the support of the Liberals ensured that the AV bill passed second reading easily.

As was the case in all previous electoral reform attempts in Manitoba, the AV bill had the editorial support of the province's major newspapers. The *Free Press* attacked the Conservative opposition to the bill, saying that progressive parties tended to split the vote which meant that the Conservatives benefited from the plurality system which is why they opposed the reform. The *Free Press* had more sympathy for the labour critiques of the AV bill, noting that labour preferred full PR. They argued, however, that the practical choice was between plurality and AV.⁶⁹ A later editorial argued that the AV bill did not particularly benefit the UFM and that AV would provide truer representation than PR did. They argued that AV was not perfect, but that it would eventually lead to proportional representation. The *Free Press* concluded: "The case for the transferable vote as against the present system of block voting is overwhelming and unanswerable."⁷⁰

The *Tribune* was even more vociferous in its support for the AV bill, publishing a number of editorials over the course of the AV debate, despite the paper's historical ties to the Conservative party. When the UFM announced the AV plan in the Throne Speech, the *Tribune* expressed its preference for proportional representation, describing it as a "more complete reform." The paper argued, however, that if the province could not implement proportional representation, the alternative vote was the best option for single

⁶⁸ *Manitoba Free Press*, 5 February 1924; *Manitoba Free Press*, 12 February 1924.

⁶⁹ *Manitoba Free Press*, 24 January 1924.

⁷⁰ *Manitoba Free Press*, 7 February 1924.

member districts.⁷¹ A later editorial tackled some of the criticisms that the Conservative and labour MLAs had leveled against the bill. In response to S.J. Farmer's criticisms about the majoritarian character of alternative voting, the *Tribune* admitted that AV harmed minorities, but argued that minorities would always lose out in single-member districts. The editorial argued that the only alternative would be to have a minority victory in a single-member district which would be more unfair.⁷²

In the committee stage, the legislative committee amended the AV legislation to allow the use of an "X" on a ballot to indicate support for one candidate only ("plumping").⁷³ The bill returned to the legislature and passed third reading with the support of the UFM and the Liberals. Later in the session of the legislature, one labour MLA introduced a resolution proposing grouping together some constituencies in more densely populated areas outside Winnipeg in order to use the Hare system rather than alternative voting. Editorial comment in the *Tribune* was very favourable, calling the resolution "wise and timely" and "nothing revolutionary." Despite this reaction, the legislature defeated the resolution two weeks later.⁷⁴

After three attempts, the Manitoba legislature had finally extended alternative voting to rural Manitoba. Neither the Liberals or the Progressives had been able to shake the charge of partisan motivation for their decision to limit the application of the Hare system to Winnipeg. Despite the claim that AV was the single member corollary of the

⁷¹ *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 11 January 1924; *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 6 February 1924.

⁷² *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 6 February 1924.

⁷³ *Manitoba Free Press*, 8 March 1924; an earlier editorial in the *Tribune* had called for this very amendment: *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 22 February 1924.

⁷⁴ *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 19 March 1924; *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 4 April 1924.

Hare system, it was majoritarian in logic while the Hare system was proportional. The Liberals and the UFM had advanced two primary arguments for limiting the application of the Hare system. First, they claimed that it was not feasible to use PR in the entire province. Second, they maintained that multi-member districts in rural Manitoba would be too large to offer adequate representation. While both arguments had merit, they rang surprisingly hollow when labour MLAs proposed extending the Hare system to the more densely populated areas in southern Manitoba. In many cases, it would have been possible to form two or three member districts without creating districts that were too large to represent effectively in the legislature. Alternative voting enabled the UFM to maintain a majority government, an important objective, given the confused and fluctuating party system in Manitoba of the early 1920s. Furthermore, given the close ties that had existed between the Liberals and the farmers before 1920 and the subsequent cooperation and eventual merger of the Liberals and the UFM/Progressives, the AV system provided voters with a mechanism to vote for one party and then use their later preferences to assist the other party.

Shortly after the passage of the AV legislation, the *Tribune* congratulated the Manitoba legislature for once again setting the pace in Canada in electoral reform. The congratulatory editorial was surprisingly cautious, though, and warned advocates of electoral reform not to expect too much from the bill. The *Tribune* wrote: "It is admittedly only a step in the right direction, but it is a step well worth taking. That it will ultimately lead to the general application of proportional representation few will doubt."⁷⁵ In the end, the hopes of the *Tribune* for the general application of the Hare system never materialized. The hybrid Hare/AV electoral system remained in effect until the return to the plurality rule in 1955.

⁷⁵ *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 17 March 1925.

Alberta

The adoption of preferential balloting in Alberta was much more straightforward than in Manitoba, largely because the partisan situation was less complex. There are some interesting similarities between the two provinces in their political situations in this time period. Like Manitoba, Alberta in the last half of the 1910s was governed by a Liberal administration that was quite responsive to the farmers' movement.⁷⁶ Alberta premier Charles Stewart, who governed Alberta from 1917 to 1921, was particularly sympathetic to the demands of the United Farmers of Alberta. L.G. Thomas writes of Stewart: "He did not pretend that the U.F.A. was anything but a prime factor in the determination of his government's policy."⁷⁷ The pressures for direct action on the part of the farmers were overwhelming, however, and the United Farmers of Alberta opted for direct political action just as their counterparts in Manitoba had, eventually winning office in 1921.

The confrontation between the UFA and the Liberals sparked the entrance of proportional representation into partisan political debate in Alberta. The UFA's first foray into electoral politics came in a by-election in Cochrane in 1919. In the course of the campaign, Stewart promised to introduce proportional representation for use in Alberta before the next general provincial election.⁷⁸ The Liberals, however, lost the by-election and Stewart did not honour his promise so Alberta voted under the plurality rule in the 1921 provincial election.

That election marked the first time the United Farmers of Alberta waged a campaign across the entire province. The UFA's election platform mirrored the farmers'

⁷⁶ Morton, *Progressive Party*, 36.

⁷⁷ L.G. Thomas, *The Liberal Party in Alberta* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), 195.

⁷⁸ Thomas, 195; *Grain Growers' Guide*, 5 November 1919, 6.

platform discussed above. The political portion of the UFA platform promised adequate notice of elections, direct legislation, looser party discipline, and proportional representation. The UFA platform differed little from the Liberal platform except for the promise of electoral and institutional reform.⁷⁹ While it is tempting to dismiss the UFA's commitment to electoral reform as motivated by the demands of brokerage politics, the UFA's dedication to alternative voting appears to have run deeper than that. The UFA used STV to elect members of their executive at their conventions.⁸⁰ Like the UFM, the UFA appears to have been reasonably committed to the principle of electoral reform. The UFA won the 1921 election with significant help from the plurality system. The Liberals won 34% of the vote, but only 15 of the 61 seats in the legislature; the UFA won a majority (38 seats) with only 29% of the vote.

While the UFA was publicly committed to electoral reform, passing new election legislation was not the utmost priority for the UFA government. In the 1923 session of the legislature, Premier Greenfield promised that the government would introduce new election legislation in the next session. As promised, the Speech from the Throne in the 1924 session announced the government's intention to introduce STV legislation for Alberta. The *Calgary Herald* suggested that, other than the introduction of a liquor control act, the electoral reform provisions were the most important parts of the speech from the throne.⁸¹ Despite the prominence with which the government introduced its electoral reform provisions, the UFA waited until late in the session to introduce the new election act. The debate over second reading of the bill began on March 10 and lasted

⁷⁹ Susan M. Kooyman, "The policies and legislation of the United Farmers of Alberta government, 1921-1935" (M.A. thesis, University of Calgary, 1981), 5-6.

⁸⁰ E.J. Fream, "How U.F.A. used P.R. in Calgary," *Grain Growers' Guide*, 24 March 1920, 8, 16; *Grain Growers' Guide*, 4 February 1920, 5.

⁸¹ *Calgary Herald*, 28 January 1924.

only until March 11. J.R. Boyle, the Liberal opposition leader, focused his critique of the bill on the division between the major cities and rural Alberta. He accused the UFA of playing political games by limiting PR to the cities where the opposition was strong, thus allowing the UFA a chance to elect a member or two: "To put P.R. into effect in the cities and refuse it in the rural areas, is to give the government a chance of securing minority representation in the cities where they are weak, while refusing a similar opportunity in the rural constituencies where they are strong."⁸² Calgary independent MLA William Davidson echoed this criticism and suggested that the government should extend PR to all of Alberta and not just the major cities. He described the election law as "the worst political gerrymander ever inflicted on the province of Alberta."⁸³

When the legislation went to the Committee of the Whole, the STV elements of the new election legislation were relatively uncontroversial. The bulk of the debate was on the more mundane elements of the new legislation, such as the nomination process, voters' lists, and election deposits.⁸⁴ There was some debate over whether Alberta should make use of a rotating ballot, to shift the order of the names on the ballot, preventing any advantage for those candidates whose names appeared earlier in the alphabet, but there was little government support for the proposal.⁸⁵ Some members complained that the STV procedure was too complicated. J.D. Hunt, the public servant who drafted the legislation, led MLAs through a mock election using STV. One MLA exclaimed afterwards: "This whole P.R. business has me beaten and I don't see how I'll ever explain

⁸² *Edmonton Journal*, 12 March 1924; *Calgary Herald*, 12 March 1924.

⁸³ *Calgary Herald*, 12 March 1924; *Edmonton Bulletin*, 12 March 1924; *Edmonton Journal*, 12 March 1924; *Calgary Herald*, 11 March 1924.

⁸⁴ *Edmonton Bulletin*, 13 March 1924; *Edmonton Journal*, 14 March 1924; *Calgary Herald*, 13 March 1924; *Calgary Herald*, 14 March 1924.

⁸⁵ *Calgary Herald*, 15 March 1924.

it to the people of Athabasca.”⁸⁶ In response to criticisms that STV would prove unworkable in Alberta, the UFA government pointed to the Manitoba example and noted that it copied the regulations for the counting process from Manitoba’s election legislation.⁸⁷ The legislation passed the committee stage and third reading and became law at the close of the 1924 session of the legislature.

The debate during the adoption of STV in Alberta was muted, reflecting the generally broad public support for the legislation. Further evidence of this fact is the editorial endorsements of the legislation by many of the province’s newspapers. Those papers that took a position on the new electoral system for Alberta were generally positive about the changes, despite the fact that most of the province’s newspapers were allied with either the Liberal or Conservative parties and were not friendly towards the UFA government. The *Lethbridge Herald* described the move to STV as a “very welcome change,” arguing that it was particularly appropriate as Alberta had moved from a two-party to a multi-party system.⁸⁸ The *Edmonton Journal* also supported the move to the Hare system in the major cities and AV in the rural areas, saying that “there is need for action along both these lines.”⁸⁹ The *Calgary Herald* published a number of enthusiastic editorials in support of the new election act. They supported the gradual introduction of the Hare system to the major cities first, arguing that it was a good way to educate people about the working of STV.⁹⁰ In a later editorial, the *Herald* noted the broad public support for the adoption of STV, arguing that “there are few opponents of

⁸⁶ George Mills, as quoted in the *Edmonton Journal*, 15 March 1924.

⁸⁷ *Calgary Herald*, 15 March 1924.

⁸⁸ *Lethbridge Herald*, 29 January 1924.

⁸⁹ *Edmonton Journal*, 29 January 1924.

⁹⁰ *Calgary Herald*, 29 January 1924.

P.R. in this province.” The newspaper noted that urban voters were familiar with STV from municipal elections, while rural voters had learned about alternative voting from UFA educational efforts. The *Herald* argued that STV was “advancing step by step in Canada.”⁹¹ One final editorial defended the government’s decision to use the more proportional Hare system only in cities, arguing that “to apply proportional representation throughout the entire province undoubtedly would be a problem of great magnitude and quite likely impossible to work out on a practical basis.” In any event, the *Herald* argued, nothing in the new act would prevent a redistribution to group some of the rural seats together in order to allow the use of the Hare system.⁹²

The *Herald*’s rival newspaper in Calgary, the *Albertan*, was equally vigorous in its support of the STV bill, calling it “badly needed.”⁹³ Like the *Herald*, the *Albertan* saw the election act as relatively uncontroversial. While the paper called PR a “striking innovation,” it argued that “it creates but little excitement, so accustomed has the public become to the principle of proportional representation.”⁹⁴ In another editorial, they noted the shift over the years in public attitudes towards the principle of proportional representation: “Proportional representation did not receive much opposition in the provincial legislature. It is only a few years ago that the system met much criticism, opposition and ridicule. But the world does move and conditions do change.” The *Albertan* was complimentary towards the UFA government, arguing that the new legislation reflected the “good intentions and sincerity of the government.”⁹⁵

⁹¹ *Calgary Herald*, 12 March 1924.

⁹² *Calgary Herald*, 18 March 1924.

⁹³ *Calgary Albertan*, 28 January 1924.

⁹⁴ *Calgary Albertan*, 15 March 1924.

⁹⁵ *Calgary Albertan*, 18 March 1924.

Newspapers criticized other elements of the bill. The *Herald* was critical of the number of bills the UFA attempted to ram through the legislature towards the end of the session and urged the government to get the legislation right, even if that meant reintroducing it in a later session of the legislature.⁹⁶ Both the *Albertan* and the *Red Deer Advocate* were critical of the election deposit provisions.⁹⁷ The most vociferous media opposition to the bill came from the *Edmonton Bulletin* which was suspicious of the UFA's motives in passing the legislation. Reflecting the paper's ties to the Liberal party, the *Bulletin* largely elaborated on Boyle's criticism of the UFA position. The *Bulletin* questioned the division between urban and rural seats in the province: "just why it is considered necessary to discriminate in this way is not at all clear." They accused the UFA of attempting to prolong its political life through manipulation of the electoral system: "The 'preferential' system will do nothing to imperil the chances of Government candidates in country constituencies, while the 'proportional' arrangement is calculated to make impossible the return of solid delegations of Opposition members from the cities. So far as the circumstances permit, the Government is trying to legislate itself into power for another term, under the cover of a pretense of 'modernizing' the election law." The *Bulletin* argued that if the province could not agree on a common system for both urban and rural areas, it should stick with the plurality system.⁹⁸

The adoption of STV in Alberta was thus more straightforward than the adoption in Manitoba. Alberta's political situation was less fluid than that in Manitoba, enabling the bill to pass relatively quickly and with little difficulty in the provincial legislature. The consensus favoring the STV project in Alberta as evidenced by the solid editorial support

⁹⁶ *Calgary Herald*, 9 April 1924.

⁹⁷ *Calgary Albertan*, 14 April 1924; *Red Deer Advocate*, 4 April 1924.

⁹⁸ *Edmonton Bulletin*, 14 March 1924.

for the new electoral system also assisted its speedy adoption. While the UFA was dedicated to the principle of preferential balloting, as seen in their use of the AV system in internal party elections, it is hard not to detect a note of partisan self-interest in the way they implemented PR in Alberta. The UFA dominated rural Alberta; the support for opposition parties was largely confined to the major cities. The Hare system meant that the UFA faced a more fragmented opposition than likely would have been the case under the plurality system. The overrepresentation of rural areas in the legislature, however, guaranteed the UFA a commanding position, no matter which electoral system was in use. Alternative voting would produce the same effects as seen in Manitoba. AV's majoritarian logic worked to the advantage of larger parties rather than smaller parties and enabled the UFA to wield the full power of majority governments.

The division of the province for electoral system purposes was, however, consistent with the UFA's philosophy of group government. Henry Wise Wood, the president of the UFA, consistently argued for a system of functional representation to replace political parties. Instead of parties, Wood wanted to see occupational groups represented in the legislature. While Wood and the UFA were not altogether clear about the existence of other natural groups in society other than farmers, the starting point of group division was between urban and rural interests. Although rural areas were divided into small towns and farmers, Wood saw them as having a close working relationship and a commonality of interests. The UFA's understanding of urban areas was relatively undifferentiated, but Wood distinguished between labour and "the general urban citizenship."⁹⁹ The UFA's electoral law thus was consistent with its broader representational philosophy. Since rural areas shared an essential commonality of interest, multiple representatives were not necessary for any constituency. Urban areas featured

⁹⁹ C.B. Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System*, 2nd. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 50-51.

more occupational groupings and proportional representation was necessary to represent the full diversity of occupations in the legislature. Seen this way, the UFA's election law was not simple self interest, but an expression of their ideas of representation

Conclusion

By the middle of 1924, both Alberta and Manitoba had essentially the same electoral system. Both provinces had adopted the Hare system for use in the major cities and alternative voting for the rural districts. The dominance of farmers' movements and the influence of Progressive ideas in Alberta and Manitoba largely explains the identical outcome in both provinces. As noted earlier, electoral reform was an important component of the farmers' platform: the Progressive movement advocated proportional representation both federally and provincially. Other reform groups agitated for electoral reform as the hearings before Manitoba's legislative committee on election law indicate. Furthermore, the major newspapers in both provinces were, for the most part, enthusiastic supporters of electoral reform and ran several editorials endorsing PR for use provincially and federally. Electoral reform was "in the air," a popular idea with many supporters in both provinces.

In Manitoba, the implementation of STV in 1920 was entirely consistent with the general reform-oriented legislative programme of the Norris Liberal government. The same cannot be said for the eventual adoption of AV by the UFM in rural Manitoba. The UFM was committed to proportional representation, but the majoritarian outcomes of alternative voting appear to have been too great a temptation. The UFA was also strongly committed to the principle of PR, but their representation philosophy coincided conveniently with their electoral self interest and they succumbed to the same temptation as their counterparts to the east.

The electoral reform movement in Alberta and Manitoba thus appears to have stalled at the boundaries of the large cities in both provinces. This situation sat somewhat

uneasily with supporters of the Progressive movement. As discussed earlier, newspaper editorials saw AV as a step towards the full application of proportional representation throughout the provinces. They saw the limitation of PR to the cities as a temporary measure. Even the *Grain Growers' Guide* was hesitant about what the former governments in Alberta and Manitoba had done. While the *Guide* favoured AV over the plurality system, it was clear that the magazine favoured the Hare system over all other alternatives and wanted to see a wider application of the principle of proportional representation. In an editorial about the 1927 Manitoba provincial election, the *Guide* noted that the proportional representation system continued to work smoothly and called for its extension to other more densely populated regions of the province.¹⁰⁰ Even though it would have been feasible for them to follow this suggestion, neither the UFM or UFA did so.

The fact, however, that both governments undertook electoral reform, however limited, is a testament to the power that the ideas of the Progressive movement had over politics in Alberta and Manitoba. Proportional representation was a popular idea, accepted across the political spectrum by a wide variety of social groupings. The proponents of PR hoped that electoral reform would create a more informed and participatory electorate, produce a legislature which more accurately reflected the ideas and wishes of the voters, increase the choices available to voters, and undermine the partisanship which they saw as crippling the country. Over the next few chapters, we will examine whether those hopes were realized.

¹⁰⁰ *Grain Growers' Guide*, 15 July 1927, 7.

Chapter Three

STV and the Mechanics of Choice

The study of electoral systems usually focuses on big questions such as disproportionality and on the number and type of parties encouraged by an electoral system. While these questions are undoubtedly of great importance and are the centre of this study, there are many practical effects of electoral systems which studies frequently overlook. These include the effects of an electoral system on voter turnout, the complexity of an electoral system as manifested in the rate of ballot spoilage and the number of counts required to determine the outcome of an election, and the number of candidates who run. We can also analyze the size of the quotas to understand the threshold of votes that parties and candidates have to attain in order to become elected. This chapter will examine these concerns, which Johnston has called "the mechanics of choice."¹

These considerations are especially important in the case of single transferable vote electoral systems because they are more complicated than single member plurality systems. STV requires more of voters in marking ballots and of electoral officials in counting ballots. This additional complexity is a frequent criticism raised by opponents of STV.² While there is no doubt that STV is more complicated to use and understand than

¹ J. Paul Johnston, "The single transferable vote in Alberta provincial elections," paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1992, 23.

² Douglas J. Amy, *Real Choices / New Voices: The Case for Proportional Representation in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 155-156.

the single member plurality system, whether it is too difficult for voters and candidates to use is a matter for empirical research. The Alberta and Manitoba cases provide excellent opportunities to examine whether STV is workable in a North American context.

How STV works

Before discussing the effects of STV, it is important to understand the procedures of voting and ballot counting used in STV elections. Alberta and Manitoba used essentially the same procedures to count ballots; their electoral laws varied in only minor ways and those differences were usually inconsequential. STV functions differently depending on whether it is being used in multi-member constituencies (the Hare system) or in single-member constituencies (alternative voting or AV). The requirements for voters are the same in both single and multi member constituencies. Voters receive a ballot listing the candidates nominated in their constituency. They must rank the candidates in order of preference, placing a "1" beside the name of the candidate they most prefer, a "2" beside the name of their second most preferred candidate, and so on down the list of candidates. There is no requirement that voters rank all the candidates in the list; they are free to vote for as many or as few candidates as they wish.

Voting rules can vary according to the strictness of the ballot marking procedures. The biggest problem in marking ballots under STV rules is how to handle situations where people vote for only one candidate, but do not use the Arabic numeral "1" as required under STV rules. The Alberta legislation regarding the marking of ballots was very strict, requiring voters to use a "1" to indicate at least one preference. If they used an "X" to indicate a preference for only one candidate, returning officers would reject their ballots.³ 1944 amendments loosened this rule in single-member constituencies and

³ *Statutes of Alberta*, 1924, c. 34, s. 87 (5).

permitted an “X” to indicate a preference for only one candidate.⁴ In Edmonton and Calgary, however, the relatively strict ballot marking rules remained in effect throughout the period in which STV was in use.

Manitoba’s first STV legislation in 1920 was equally strict in its ballot marking provisions, also requiring a “1” to be used to mark ballots.⁵ The amendments to the *Election Act* in 1924 which introduced STV to rural Manitoba softened the ballot marking rules for the entire province by introducing a “saving clause:” “A ballot paper shall not be invalid merely because the voter, without any apparent intention of identification ... shall have marked his ballot with an X, or V, or —, or O, or other mark clearly indicating an intent to vote for one only of the candidates.”⁶ This allowed voters to “plump,” or vote for one candidate using the more traditional “X” designation on their ballot. This provision remained in effect in Manitoba’s election legislation throughout the period STV was in effect.

After the polls close, the returning officers gather the ballots and begin the process of counting. The rules used for counting ballots are different for single-member and multi-member districts. Under AV, the returning officers sort the ballots into piles according to first preferences and count them. If any candidate receives a majority of the first preferences, he or she is declared elected and no further counting is necessary. If however, no one candidate receives a majority of the first preferences, the candidate who received the fewest first preference votes is removed from the election and the ballots in his or her pile are transferred to the piles of the other candidates according to the second preferences indicated by the voters. If some voters choose to vote for only one candidate

⁴ *Statutes of Alberta*, 1944, c. 22, s. 8.

⁵ *Statutes of Manitoba*, 1920, c. 33, s. 15.

⁶ *Statutes of Manitoba*, 1923-24, c. 15, s. 7.

and do not mark any subsequent preferences (a phenomenon known as “plumping”), their ballots become “exhausted ballots” and are removed from counting. If, after the second count, no candidate has received a majority of the still active ballots, the next lowest candidate is dropped and his or her ballots are redistributed until such a point that one candidate has received a majority of the still active ballots. AV thus ensures that any candidate who becomes elected had the support of a majority of the voters in his or her constituency.

Multi-member constituencies using STV rules are counted differently than single-member constituencies. These constituencies use the “Hare” system to determine election winners. Instead of a majority of votes, the Hare system requires candidates to achieve a certain quota of votes in order to become elected. There are several possible quotas, including the Hare, Droop, and Imperiali quotas. Most STV systems, including Alberta and Manitoba, have used the Droop quota which is determined by dividing the total number of valid votes by the number of seats plus one. The remaining decimal fraction is dropped and one is added to the final result to determine the quota.⁷ For example, in the 1927 Manitoba general election, Winnipeg’s voters cast 50706 valid votes. These votes were divided by eleven (the ten seats in the constituency plus one), leaving 4609.64 votes. The decimal remainder was dropped and one was added to the result, leaving a quota of 4610. Any time a candidate earned this many votes either through first preferences or a combination of first preferences and transfers, she or he became elected.

After the polls close, returning officers sort the ballots into parcels based on first preferences and count them. Any candidate who achieves the quota or more on the first count is immediately elected. Starting with the candidate who received the most votes, any surplus ballots above the quota go to the second choice candidates indicated on the

⁷ *Statutes of Manitoba*, 1920, c. 33, Regulation 6; *Statutes of Manitoba*, 1931, c. 10, Regulation 3; *Statutes of Alberta*, 1924, c. 34, Regulation 3.

ballots. Once all the surpluses have been transferred according to the subsequent preferences indicated on the ballots, the lowest candidate drops from contention and other candidates receive his or her ballots based on the next preferences indicated on the ballots of the eliminated candidate. When any candidate achieves the quota because of the transfer of other candidates' ballots, he or she is elected and the surplus votes of that candidate go to other candidates. After this, the elimination of the candidates with the fewest votes continues. This process of transferring surpluses and dropping the lowest candidate until either the correct number of candidates has reached the quota (i.e., ten candidates in Winnipeg from 1920-1945) or until there is only the requisite number of candidates remaining, whether or not these candidates have achieved the quota.

There are a few details about the transfer of ballots which are important to understand the way in which STV works. Ballots that are being transferred always go to the next "continuing candidate," which both the Alberta and Manitoba legislation defined as any candidate "not elected and not excluded from the poll."⁸ This means that if, in a ballot that is being transferred, a voter's next preference is for a candidate who is either elected or eliminated, the ballot transfers instead to the next preference they indicated. For example, if a voter's ballot is transferring from that voter's first choice candidate and their second and third choice candidates have both already been elected or eliminated, the ballot would go to the voter's fourth choice candidate.

Furthermore, ballots can become non-transferable one of two ways. The first way is if voters do not indicate any subsequent preferences on their ballots. If, for example, a voter indicates preferences for only three candidates, after his or her ballot has passed through all three candidates and the third candidate is about to be eliminated, their ballot becomes non-transferable because it does not indicate a fourth preference. Such ballots

⁸ *Statutes of Manitoba*, 1920, c. 33, Regulation 1(6); *Statutes of Alberta*, 1924, c. 34, Regulation 1(6).

are also known as “exhausted ballots.” The second way a ballot can become non-transferable is through voter error. Alberta and Manitoba had identical regulations governing voter error.⁹ If a voter gives the same preference ranking to two or more candidates (i.e. ranking four candidates 1, 2, 3, 3), gives a candidate a preference that does not follow in numerical order (i.e. 1, 3, 4, 5), or marks more than one figure by the name of one candidate, the ballot will become non-transferable. It is important to note that the ballot only becomes non-transferable at the point where the error occurred: these types of errors do not spoil the ballot and make the previous preferences invalid.

The final important detail about the transfer process is which particular ballots move from one candidate to another. This problem only arises in the case of a surplus because in the case of the elimination of a candidate, all of that candidate’s ballots are transferred according to subsequent preferences. In a surplus, however, the returning officers need rules to determine *which* ballots they should transfer to subsequent candidates as the surplus. The procedure worked slightly differently depending on whether the candidate just elected won on first preference votes alone or whether they used any transferred ballots. If the candidate just elected and from whom votes are about to be transferred won on first preference votes alone, then returning officers divide all of the ballots in his or her parcel into sub-parcels according to the next preference. If the candidate from whom votes are about to be transferred received some of his or her votes as part of a transfer, only the ballots received in the last transfer go into sub-parcels based on the next preferences indicated on the ballots. In either case, the returning officers count the ballots in each sub-parcel as well as the ballots that are non-transferable. If the number of transferable ballots is equal to or less than the surplus, the returning officers transfer all of the ballots to according to the next preferences. If the number of

⁹ *Statutes of Manitoba*, 1920, c. 33, Regulations 8 and 9; *Statutes of Alberta*, 1924, c. 34, Regulations 8 and 9.

transferable papers is greater than the surplus, however, it is necessary to choose which particular ballots to transfer. The idea is to transfer ballots in proportion to the next preferences indicated on the ballot. The number of papers from each sub-parcel is determined by multiplying the number of ballots in the sub-parcel by the surplus and then dividing that total by the total number of transferable ballots. For example, if on a first count, a candidate earned 6,000 votes and the quota was 4,000, returning officers would examine all 6,000 ballots to determine what proportions to transfer according to subsequent preferences. If 4,500 of the people who indicated that candidate A was their first preference indicated that candidate B was their second preference, then those 4,500 votes would be multiplied by 2,000 (the size of the surplus) and that number would be divided by 6,000 (the total number of transferable ballots) to yield 1,500. If 1,200 people indicated that C was their second choice, returning officers would perform the same calculation to determine that 400 of those 1,200 ballots would go to candidate C. If the remaining 300 voters indicated that candidate D was their second choice, then 100 of those ballots would go to candidate D. Returning officers choose the particular ballots to transfer randomly from the sub-parcels. In this way, the transfer of surpluses is always in proportion to the next preferences indicated on the ballot. There remains a tiny random element, however, in the choice of which particular ballots are transferred.

The general practice of the Hare system is to distribute surpluses before eliminating candidates from contention and to distribute each candidate's surplus ballots. There were situations in which the legislation permitted returning officers in both Alberta and Manitoba to deviate from this rule. If a candidate's surplus along with any other untransferred surplus was less than the difference in votes between the two lowest continuing candidates, the returning officer could choose not to transfer the ballots. The returning officers could also combine the votes of eliminated candidates and transfer them

together if the vote total of any one of them was less than the difference between the two lowest continuing candidates.¹⁰

Through these complicated transfers of surpluses and the ballots of eliminated candidates, the Hare system tries to guarantee that each candidate elected will have the support of a segment of the electorate. One way to understand the principle behind the Hare system is to see an election as taking place in a building with a large hallway and a room for each candidate. The Hare system tries to fill one room for each elected candidate. As voters enter the building, they pass through a turnstile while counts them. Each voter then enters the room to indicate their support for the candidate they would most like to see elected. Each room contains a number of chairs equal to the quota needed for that candidate to become elected. Once all the chairs are full, the candidate is elected and election officials place a "full" sign on the door to the room. After the initial movement of voters to rooms, there will be some rooms which will have more voters than chairs. Starting with the most full room, the extra voters go back into the hallway and enter the room of their second most preferred candidate. Once all the rooms contain only sitting voters (i.e., no room contains more voters than chairs), we begin to shut down rooms. We empty the room with the fewest voters, place a "closed" sign on the door, and ask those voters to choose a new room. They may not enter any room which has a "full" or a "closed" sign on the door. We continue to close rooms down until we are left with a number of full rooms equal to the number of candidates we wish to elect.

While the Hare system and the alternative vote differ in outcomes, with the Hare system functioning like a system of proportional representation and AV functioning as a majoritarian electoral system, clearly both are variants of a single principle: the single transferable vote. As Johnston points out, both systems use ordinal rankings of candidates

¹⁰ *Statutes of Manitoba*, 1920, c. 33, Regulation 8(5)(c), Regulation 9(2); *Statutes of Alberta*, 1924, c. 34, Regulation 5(5)(d), Regulation 6(2).

and transfer ballots between candidates according to the results of previous counts.¹¹ Indeed, the only difference between AV and the Hare system from a process point of view is the district magnitude. Under AV, the district magnitude is equal to one: the quota is equal to the number of valid votes divided by two (one seat plus one), discarding the decimal remainder and adding one. This is the formula for majority support (50% plus one) which is what AV tries to achieve. Since only one candidate is elected under AV, distributing surpluses is unnecessary. Thus STV and AV are mechanically identical, although they differ in their outcomes and political implications.

Quotas: The Threshold of Representation

Having laid out the procedures by which STV determines electoral winners, we can now turn to some of the mechanics involved in an STV election. The first, and in a sense primary, consideration is the size of the quota. Quotas are important because they determine the threshold of votes that a candidate has to achieve in order to become elected. Tables 2 and 3 show the quotas used in each election in Edmonton, Calgary, and Winnipeg during the period in which STV was in effect. As can be seen from Tables 2 and 3, the populations of Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Calgary grew steadily during this period as demonstrated by the increase in the total number of valid votes. The quotas, too, increased steadily as the number of seats per district either remained constant or increased at a level less than the growth in population.

An important consideration in studying the quotas in use in an STV election is the number of candidates elected with a partial quota. As discussed above, ballots can become non-transferable if voters indicated no further preferences or if they number their ballots incorrectly. As a result of these ballots dropping out of the count, candidates can easily be elected with partial quotas. Tables 2 and 3 show that this phenomenon was quite

¹¹ Johnston, 4.

Table 2

Quotas in Edmonton and Calgary, 1926-1955

year	constituency	total valid votes	district magnitude	quota	# elected by partial quota
1926	Calgary	19737	5	3290	2
	Edmonton	18154	5	3026	2
1930	Calgary	24417	6	3489	1
	Edmonton	21189	6	3027	3
1935	Calgary	41193	6	5885	1
	Edmonton	37267	6	5324	3
1940	Calgary	45914	5	7653	1
	Edmonton	43743	5	7291	3
1944	Calgary	39309	5	6552	1
	Edmonton	37834	5	6306	2
1948	Calgary	39101	5	6517	3
	Edmonton	46150	5	7692	1
1952	Calgary	41673	6	5954	1
	Edmonton	52039	7	6505	3
1955	Calgary	62494	6	8928	2
	Edmonton	76544	7	9269	3

Source: Adapted from Johnston, 24.

common in both Alberta and Manitoba. Except in the constituency of Winnipeg South in both the 1949 and 1953 elections, all constituencies elected at least one member with a partial quota. It was not uncommon for up to 50% of the candidates to win in this fashion. As Johnston notes, the partial quota is significant from an electoral perspective because it represents a lowering of the threshold of representation.¹² In a significant number of cases, candidates who receive fewer votes than the quota can become elected, thus making it easier for candidates from smaller parties to earn representation in the legislature.

¹² Johnston, 28.

Table 3

Quotas in Winnipeg constituencies, 1920-1953

year	constituency	total valid votes	district magnitude	quota	# elected by partial quota
1920	Winnipeg	47427	10	4312	3
1922	Winnipeg	44328	10	4030	3
1927	Winnipeg	50706	10	4610	2*
1932	Winnipeg	76991	10	7000	4
1936	Winnipeg	79344	10	7214	3*
1941	Winnipeg	58682	10	5335	5*
1945	Winnipeg	79433	10	7222	1
1949	Winnipeg Centre	20555	4	4112	1
	Winnipeg North	24580	4	4917	2
	Winnipeg South	27607	4	5522	0
1953	Winnipeg Centre	20573	4	4115	1
	Winnipeg North	21613	4	4323	2
	Winnipeg South	29128	4	5826	0

* - adjusted from official count sheet to eliminate excess counts.

Candidacies

The next question to be considered is the number of candidates attracted to the contests held under STV in Alberta and Manitoba. Did the adoption STV lead to a multiplication of the number of candidates contesting elections? It is possible that the lowered thresholds of representation afforded by the Hare system would provide an incentive for more candidates to contest elections because of the increased likelihood of a successful outcome. The evidence from the three cities in which the Hare system was used does not support this expectation, however, as Tables 4 through 6 reveal. In Winnipeg (Table 4), the adoption of STV in 1920 did seem to lead to a dramatic increase in the number of candidates contesting elections. In 1915, an average of 2.5 candidates contested each seat, a result typical of the pre-STV period. In 1920, the number of

candidates contesting each seat jumped to 4.1. This increase in the number of candidates is a temporary aberration, however, as by the time the 1927 election came along, the average number of candidates had returned to the pre-STV norms.

Table 4
Number of candidates in Winnipeg, 1899-1966

Year	Seats	# of candidates						Total	# cands /seat	# inds	# inds /seat	# inds/ # cands
		Acc	2	3	4	5	6+					
1899	3		3					6	2	0	0	0
1903	3		1	2				8	2.67	2	0.67	0.25
1907	4		3	1				9	2.25	0	0	0
1910	4		1	3				11	2.75	0	0	0
1914	6		2	4				16	2.67	1	0.17	0.06
1915	6		3	3				15	2.5	2	0.33	0.13
1920	10						1	41	4.1	12	1.2	0.29
1922	10						1	43	4.3	5	0.5	0.12
1927	10						1	25	2.5	3	0.3	0.12
1932	10						1	29	2.9	3	0.3	0.10
1936	10						1	21	2.1	1	0.1	0.05
1941	10						1	27	2.7	3	0.3	0.11
1945	10						1	20	2	1	0.1	0.05
1949	12						3	28	2.33	5	0.42	0.18
1953	12						3	33	2.75	5	0.42	0.15
1958	12		1	8	2	1		39	3.25	3	0.25	0.08
1959	12			9	3			39	3.25	0	0	0
1962	12		1	9	1		1	39	3.25	2	0.17	0.05
1966	12			9	3			39	3.25	0	0	0

The evidence from Edmonton (Table 5) and Calgary (Table 6) lends further credence to the assertion that STV did not have a significant impact on the number of candidates contesting elections. There was considerable fluctuation in the average number of candidates contesting each seat throughout the STV period, but for most elections,

each seat in Edmonton and Calgary was contested by between three and four candidates. The elimination of STV after the 1955 election did not result in any decrease in the average number of candidates contesting each seat — the number of candidates in each city remained about four. There is thus little evidence that the Hare system had any independent effect on the number of candidates contesting elections in the major cities of Alberta and Manitoba.

Table 5
Number of Candidates, Edmonton, 1905-1967

Year	Seats	# of candidates						Total	# cands /seat	# inds	# inds /seat	# inds/ # cands
		Acc	2	3	4	5	6+					
1905	1		1					2	2	0	0	0
1909	2				1			4	2	1	0.5	0.25
1913	3		1			1		7	2.33	1	0.33	0.14
1921	5						1	26	5.2	11	2.2	0.42
1926	5						1	18	3.6	3	0.6	0.17
1930	6						1	17	2.83	2	0.33	0.12
1935	6						1	27	4.5	0	0	0
1940	5						1	19	3.8	2	0.4	0.11
1944	5						1	20	4	0	0	0
1948	5						1	16	3.2	1	0.2	0.06
1952	7						1	29	4.14	0	0	0
1955	7						1	30	4.29	1	0.14	0.03
1959	8			1	5	2		33	4.13	0	0	0
1963	10			2	7	1		39	3.9	0	0	0
1967	11			1	7	3		46	4.18	3	0.27	0.07

Source. See Appendix A.

In the rural areas, which used the single-member variant of STV, alternative voting, there is also little evidence of an electoral system effect on the number of

candidates. Tables 7 and 8 show the number of candidates contesting elections in Manitoba and Alberta, respectively. Manitoba shows a slight jump in the elections

Table 6
Number of Candidates, Calgary, 1905-1967

Year	Seats	# of candidates						Total	# cands /seat	# inds	# inds /seat	# inds/ # cands
		Acc	2	3	4	5	6+					
1905	1			1				3	3	1	1	0.33
1909	2					1		5	2.5	0	0	0
1913	3		2	1				7	2.33	0	0	0
1921	5						1	20	4	6	1.2	0.3
1926	5						1	11	2.2	2	0.4	0.18
1930	6						1	13	2.17	3	0.5	0.23
1935	6						1	20	3.33	2	0.33	0.1
1940	5						1	14	2.8	1	0.2	0.07
1944	5						1	19	3.8	0	0	0
1948	5						1	22	4.4	5	1	0.23
1952	6						1	25	4.17	1	0.17	0.04
1955	6						1	23	3.83	2	0.33	0.09
1959	7			1	6			27	3.86	0	0	0
1963	8			1	6		1	33	4.13	2	0.25	0.06
1967	9				9			36	4.0	0	0	0

conducted under AV rules (1927-1953). In the pre-AV elections, an average of 2.14 candidates contested each of Manitoba's rural seats. In the AV period, 2.46 candidates contested each seat on average. That number would likely be somewhat higher if it were not for the large number of acclamations in the 1941 and 1945 provincial elections. While it is tempting to conclude that AV increased the number of candidates, it is important to note that the average number of candidates continued to increase in the period after the use of AV. An average of 3.02 candidates contested each seat in the period from 1958 to

1966. The increase in the number of candidacies under AV in Manitoba thus appears to be part of a general trend towards increased competitiveness in Manitoba's party system.

Table 7
Number of Candidates in Rural Manitoba, 1899-1966

Year	Seats	# of candidates						Total	# cand /seat	# inds	# inds /seat	# inds/ # cand
		Acc	2	3	4	5	6+					
1899	37		34	3				77	2.08	8	0.22	0.10
1903	37	1	29	7				80	2.16	9	0.24	0.11
1907	37	1	36					73	1.97	0	0	0
1910	37	1	34	2				75	2.03	2	0.05	0.03
1914	43	3	36	4				87	2.02	1	0.02	0.01
1915	41	1	36	4				85	2.07	3	0.07	0.04
1920	45	3	27	12	1	2		107	2.38	15	0.33	0.14
1922	45	2	25	16	2			108	2.4	13	0.29	0.12
1927	45	2	12	24	4	2	1	130	2.89	12	0.27	0.09
1932	45		26	12	5	2		118	2.62	11	0.24	0.09
1936	45	1	23	17	4			114	2.53	5	0.11	0.04
1941	45	16	22	5	2			83	1.84	12	0.27	0.14
1945	45	7	21	13	3	1		105	2.33	14	0.31	0.03
1949	45	16	18	9		1*		84	1.87	10	0.22	0.12
1953	45	1	8	21	13		1*	140	3.11	12	0.27	0.09
1958	45		5	31	8	1		140	3.11	4	0.09	0.03
1959	45		11	32	2			126	2.8	3	0.07	0.02
1962	45		8	33	4			131	2.91	1	0.02	0.01
1966	45		4	25	16			147	3.27	0	0	0

* - includes St. Boniface, which was a two-member constituency in 1949 and 1953

Source: See Appendix A.

The situation in rural Alberta confirms the experience of Manitoba with alternative voting. In the pre-AV period, an average of 2.18 candidates contested each rural seat. In the period in which AV was in use, an average of 2.92 candidates ran in each seat. This

increase seems to be part of a trend throughout these early years of Alberta's history as the post AV period saw an average of 3.31 candidates per seat. There is therefore little evidence in either province for an electoral system effect on the number of candidates contesting elections.

Table 8
Number of Candidates in Rural Alberta, 1905-1967

Year	Seats	# of candidates						Total	# cands /seat	# inds	# inds /seat	# inds/ # cands
		Acc	2	3	4	5	6+					
1905	23	1	16	6				51	2.22	6	0.26	0.12
1909	37	9	21	6	1			73	1.97	7	0.19	0.10
1913	50		34	14	2			118	2.36	14	0.28	0.12
1921	51	2	39	5	4*			111	2.18	9	0.18	0.08
1926	51		5	38*	5	2		154	3.02	9	0.18	0.06
1930	51	3	36	11	1			112	2.20	24	0.47	0.21
1935	51			17	28	6		193	3.78	8	0.16	0.04
1940	47		13	30	4			132	2.81	49	1.04	0.37
1944	47		3	37	7			145	3.09	28	0.60	0.19
1948	47		8	37	2			135	2.87	6	0.13	0.04
1952	48	1	20	20	7			129	2.69	7	0.15	0.05
1955	48		11	21	10	3		140	2.92	8	0.17	0.06
1959	49		9	25	15			153	3.12	4	0.08	0.03
1963	45	1	3	24	12	4	1	153	3.4	7	0.16	0.05
1967	45		3	21	21			153	3.4	8	0.18	0.05

* - includes Medicine Hat, which was a two-member constituency in 1921 and 1926.

Source: See Appendix A.

One of the attractions of STV for its supporters is its strong focus on candidates. Voters have extraordinary flexibility in whether they want to support candidates in one party or whether they wish to split their preferences among candidates in different parties. Voters can also choose to support independent candidates without fear of wasting their votes. If voters support an independent candidate and that candidate is no longer in

contention, they can transfer their ballots to their next preferences. Voters have little need to engage in strategic or “insincere” voting. With the disincentives for voting for independent candidates removed, it is possible that STV might encourage more independent candidates to seek election.

The evidence from Winnipeg (Table 4) seems to provide some evidence for this phenomenon. The first election using the Hare system, 1920, saw the highest number of independent candidates in Winnipeg for the period under consideration. An average of 1.2 independent candidates contested each seat in Winnipeg and almost 30% of all the candidates in that election were independents. The numbers of independent candidates dropped significantly after that election, however, and fluctuated considerably until the 1949 and 1953 elections which also saw relatively large number of independents. A look at Edmonton (Table 5) and Calgary (Table 6) quickly dispels any idea that STV might be the reason for the increase, however. The adoption of the Hare system in the 1926 election did not result in increased numbers of independents for either city. In fact, the biggest jump in the number of independent candidates came in the 1921 election results where both cities saw dramatic increases in the number of independent candidacies. This raises the possibility that there is an electoral system effect on the number of candidates, but that it is associated with the district magnitude, rather than the electoral formula. The 1921 election in Alberta and the 1920 election in Manitoba saw the first use of large multi-member districts in the major cities. Winnipeg used the Hare system, while Edmonton and Calgary used the plurality formula. It is possible that the initial use of multi-member constituencies creates an initial wave of enthusiasm on the part of independent candidates who perceive that their chances will be better under the new electoral regime. An alternative explanation, however, is that the increase in the number of independent candidacies in the 1921 and 1920 elections in Alberta and Manitoba may have more to do with the changes in the party systems of both provinces. The 1921

provincial election in Alberta marked the beginning of the second of Alberta's four party systems and the emergence of the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA). Despite the Liberal victory in Manitoba in 1920, that election marked the beginning of the end of the traditional Conservative-Liberal two-party system.¹³ Furthermore, both provincial elections in 1920 and 1921 were the first provincial elections after the Winnipeg General Strike and the considerable labour unrest in this period in western Canada appears to have spilled over into the electoral arena. Most of the independent candidates in Edmonton and Calgary in 1921 described themselves as "Independent Labour" candidates.

The experience of Alberta and Manitoba with STV does not seem to lend support to the idea that STV has a dramatic impact on the number of candidates running. The Hare system in the major cities did not attract significantly large numbers of candidates, despite the prospect of lowered thresholds of representation. The alternative vote system used in the rural areas also did not appreciably increase the number of candidates. Any fluctuations in the number of candidates seemed to have more to do with changes in the party system and issues that rose and fell.

In the rural areas, the number of candidates was always at workable levels. Only rarely did more than four candidates contest a seat. Asking voters to rank a small number of candidates such as that is not a significant problem. In the larger urban areas, there are only a few cases where the ballot may have been prohibitively large. For the most part, Edmonton and Calgary's ballots only listed around twenty candidates. Edmonton's ballot was generally larger than Calgary's and the number of candidates grew to 29 and 30 in the 1952 and 1955 elections. In Winnipeg, with its very large district magnitude of ten, the number of candidates twice reached very high levels. In 1920 and 1922, the ballot listed over forty candidates which is a very large number for voters to consider. Voters,

¹³ See Appendices B and C.

however, did not have to list preferences for all of the candidates. Furthermore, the returning officers were able to print candidates' names on the ballot in colour according to their party affiliations to help voters sort out which candidates they wished to support, a provision used in the 1920 election.¹⁴ While the number of candidates in Winnipeg thus approached levels which might be unworkable, there are other provisions of electoral law which could make the process feasible and understandable for Winnipeg voters.

Number of counts

One of the considerations in STV elections is the number of counts needed to determine the successful candidates in the election. The amount of time and effort needed to determine a victor is a frequent criticism of STV procedures. Although this point is somewhat moot in an age of computers, it is worth considering the number of counts required to determine election winners in Manitoba and Alberta.

Tables 9 and 10 contain information about the number of counts required to determine the election outcomes in the three major cities as well as the number of candidates elected on the first count. There is considerable variation in the number of counts required to determine a victor. It is quite clear that the district magnitude is not the factor in determining the number of counts. Over the seven elections where Winnipeg was a single, ten-member district, the number of counts ranged from 15 to 37. There is, however, a strong relationship between the number of candidates contesting the seats in a district and the number of counts required to determine the winners. The relationship is quite linear as can be seen in Figure 1. The best-fit line for Figure 1 intercepts the x-axis (the number of candidates) at 1.45 and the slope is 0.909. This is very close to a one-to-one relationship. Edmonton and Calgary display a particularly strong linear pattern, while the results from Winnipeg show considerably more variability. There may be more

¹⁴ *Winnipeg Free Press*, 24 June 1920, 7.

Table 9

Number of counts required, Alberta cities, 1926-1955

Year	Calgary			Edmonton		
	# of candidates	# of counts	candidates elected on first count	# of candidates	# of counts	candidates elected on first count
1926	11	9	1	18	16	0
1930	13	10	2	17	14	1
1935	20	18	1	27	23	1
1940	14	12	2	19	15	1
1944	19	17	2	20	16	1
1948	22	19	1	16	14	1
1952	25	22	1	29	27	3
1955	23	21	1	30	27	2

Source: Adapted from Johnston, p. 24.

Table 10

Number of counts required, Winnipeg, 1920-1953


Year	Constituency	number of candidates	number of counts	elected on first count
1920	Winnipeg	41	37	2
1922	Winnipeg	43	37	2
1927	Winnipeg	25	21*	2
1932	Winnipeg	29	24	2
1936	Winnipeg	21	16*	1
1941	Winnipeg	27	20*	2
1945	Winnipeg	20	15	4
1949	Winnipeg Centre	9	8	2
	Winnipeg North	12	8	1
	Winnipeg South	7	5	3
1953	Winnipeg Centre	14	10	0
	Winnipeg North	11	8	1
	Winnipeg South	9	7	2

* - adjusted from official count sheet to remove excess counts.

volatility in the relationship between the number of candidates and the number of counts in a district with a large district magnitude such as was found in Winnipeg.

Figure 1

Relationship between number of counts and number of candidates



It is not surprising that this strong relationship between the number of counts and the number of candidates exists as each count represents the transfer of surplus votes or the votes of eliminated candidates. This close relationship is partly a function of the fact that only very few candidates win on the first count. As Tables 9 and 10 show, only rarely did a significant proportion of the candidates win on the first count in these elections. On average, 1.55 candidates were elected on the first count, a number very close to the x-intercept of the best-fit line for Figure 1.

In the rural areas, in most cases, multiple counts were not necessary to elect candidates. Table 11 reports the number of constituencies requiring multiple counts. In Alberta, only 26% of the rural seats needed multiple counts to determine a winner. In Manitoba, 30% of the seats required multiple counts. In most cases, then, the alternative vote system functioned as a plurality system with only one count in single member districts. In the majority of cases in Alberta and Manitoba, one candidate won a majority of the vote on the first count, making further counts unnecessary.

Table 11

Multiple counts in rural constituencies, Alberta and Manitoba

Alberta				Manitoba			
Year	Seats	Second Counts Needed	2nd Cnts as % of Seats	Year	Seats	Second Counts Needed	2nd Cnts as % of Seats
1926	51	16	31.4%	1927	45	21	46.6%
1930	51	7	13.7%	1932	45	15	33.3%
1935	51	10	19.6%	1936	45	17	37.7%
1940	47	26	55.3%	1941	45	4	8.9%
1944	47	8	17.0%	1945	45	11	24.4%
1948	47	8	17.0%	1949	43*	3	7.0%
1952	48	11	22.9%	1953	43*	23	53.5%
1955	48	16	33.3%				

*-excludes St. Boniface

Source: Alberta data adapted and calculated from Johnston, p. 25; For Manitoba data, see Appendix A.

In the large urban centres, then, the Hare system frequently resulted in a large number of counts. The first two elections in Winnipeg saw 37 counts each and three other elections required over 20 counts to determine the victors. Two elections in Calgary and three in Edmonton required over 20 counts, culminating in a high of 27 counts in the last

two elections in Edmonton. The number of counts is directly a function of the number of candidates in these systems. In the rural areas, multiple counts were not necessary most of the time and the AV system usually functioned like the single member plurality system.

Voter turnout

Voter turnout is an important concern of students of electoral systems.

Comparative studies of electoral system effects show that nations that use proportional representation typically have higher rates of voter turnout than polities using the single member plurality system. Blais and Carty suggest three reasons why this might be the case. First, the better correspondence of seats and votes is supposed to make voters feel their votes matter, encouraging them to turn out and vote. Second, PR's multi-member districts lead to more competitive elections and will lead parties to campaign more widely, thus encouraging greater turnout. Third, PR is associated with larger numbers of parties, increasing the likelihood that voters will find parties with which they can agree.¹⁵ These effects all suggest that PR should lead to higher voter turnout.

This effect is offset by the tendency of voters in Alberta and Manitoba to stay home. Alberta has had low turnout rates in both federal and provincial elections, reflecting both the lack of competition in the province's party system and basic tenets of the province's political culture which accept authoritarian, one-party government.¹⁶ Manitoba also has had medium to low voter turnout,¹⁷ although not as low as Alberta which ranks at the bottom of provincial election turnout.


¹⁵ Andre Blais and R.K. Carty, "Does proportional representation foster voter turnout?" *European Journal of Political Research* 18 (1990): 167.

¹⁶ Rand Dyck, *Provincial Politics in Canada*, 3rd. ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1996), 510.

¹⁷ Dyck, 382.

Figure 2 shows the trend of voter turnout in Alberta over time from 1926 to 1967. Unfortunately, there are only spotty records of voter turnout for the 1921 election and no consistent records for the period before that, so we are unable to compare the period before the adoption of PR to the period in which STV was in use. Interestingly, rural turnout is higher than urban turnout in every election except for 1940 and Edmonton

Figure 2
Voter Turnout in Alberta, 1926-1967



and Calgary have very similar turnout patterns. It does not appear that STV increased voter turnout, as it fluctuates within the same range in the period in which Alberta went back to the plurality rule (1959-1967). Turnout does not seem appreciably higher in either rural or urban Alberta during the STV period. The fluctuations in voter turnout seem to have more to do with the logic of party competition and changes in the party system. The


higher turnout in 1935 and 1940 is associated with the transition from the UFA to the Social Credit dominated party system and the increase in 1967 marks the beginning of the shift away from Social Credit to the Progressive Conservative dominated party system. The increase in 1955 is associated with a breakthrough for the opposition Liberals who saw their share of the vote jump to 31% from 22% in 1952. It is interesting that the increases in voter turnout were more pronounced in the urban areas than in the rural areas, representing the urban roots of the shift away from Social Credit.

Because of better data for the period before STV was adopted, Manitoba represents a better test of the hypothesis that more proportional electoral systems lead to higher voter turnout. Figure 3 shows the historical trend in voter turnout in Manitoba from 1899-1966. In rural Manitoba, the elections conducted under AV rules do not show much of an electoral system effect. The 1927 election's voter turnout was very close to that of the previous two elections. There is a brief jump in voter turnout in 1932, but this may reflect a brief surge of interest in new parties arising because of the Depression rather than the electoral system. By the 1940 election, voter turnout had returned to a level slightly below its previous levels. It stayed at that level, increasing slightly for the 1953 election. In Winnipeg, the period prior to the adoption of STV (1899-1915) had very high voter turnout. In the period in which the Hare system was in use (1922-1953), turnout remained relatively high for a few elections and then began a steep decline. In the post-STV period in Winnipeg (1958-1966), voter turnout slowly increased. If anything, the evidence from Manitoba would lead us to conclude that STV leads to *lower* voter turnout, not higher turnout as hypothesized. It is more likely, however, that, as in Alberta, the trends in voter turnout are due more to the character of Manitoba's party system and politics in the province rather than electoral system effects. The decline in voter turnout after 1927 likely reflects voter response to the rise of coalition politics in Manitoba and the lack of genuine party competition in this period. For voters, the sheer dominance of

the Liberal-Progressive coalition meant that it made little difference to voters who they picked or whether they even voted. The fact that turnout bottoms out in both Winnipeg and rural areas in 1941, the election in which the Conservatives, Social Credit, and CCF all joined in the coalition, provides further evidence for this explanation. The large number of acclamations in that election and in 1949 (see Table 7) is also evidence of the lack of competitiveness in the Manitoba party system in the Progressive era.

Figure 3

Voter Turnout in Manitoba, 1899-1966



The evidence on voter turnout suggests that the adoption of STV did not usher in a new era of improved political participation in either Manitoba or Alberta. Indeed, the overwhelming evidence in both cases is that the change in electoral system did not have any significant effect on voter turnout. There is no evidence that the better correspondence of seats and votes encouraged more people to show up and vote. The

experience of Alberta and Manitoba does not invalidate the argument that PR leads to higher turnout. Two of the three reasons cited above as to why voters are more likely to vote in PR elections focus on the increased competitiveness of the party systems. If the adoption of STV did not lead to substantially more competitive party systems, we should not expect it to increase voter turnout either. The evidence from Alberta and Manitoba strongly suggests that the most important factor in voter turnout is the shape of the party system and the shifts in the competitive positions of the various parties. To the extent that PR might play a role in the nature of party competition and those shifts, it can be a factor in encouraging greater voter participation in elections.

Spoiled ballots

The question of spoiled ballots is of special importance. While there is always some level of ballot spoilage, either as a deliberate act of protest or through voter error, a high number of spoiled ballots can signify a problem in electoral law. If an electoral system proves to be too complex and unworkable for voters, it may result in large numbers of spoiled ballots. As discussed above, STV places greater demands on voters than does the single-member plurality system. It is reasonable to expect that STV may have resulted in a higher level of ballot spoilage than was the case under the plurality system.

When examining the rate of ballot spoilage in Alberta (Table 12), it is clear that STV resulted in higher levels of spoiled ballots than was the case under the plurality system. In the period in which STV was in use, an average of 3.7% voters in Calgary spoiled their ballots. Edmontonians had even greater difficulty with STV as almost one in twenty (4.8%) of voters spoiled their ballots. Rural voters also seemed to have difficulty with preferential balloting, as they averaged a ballot spoilage rate of 4.6%. The difference between Calgary and the rest of the province may be due to the fact that Calgary also used STV at the municipal level. Voters in Calgary may have been more familiar with the

requirements of the system and less apt to be confused by the different requirements of elections at different levels of government. Nevertheless, the number of spoiled ballots was quite high across the province in the period in which STV was in effect.

Table 12

Rate of Ballot Spoilage in Alberta (%), 1926 - 1967

Year	Calgary	Edmonton	Rural
1926	3.7%	4.0%	5.5%
1930	3.7%	4.1%	4.3%
1935	3.1%	3.2%	3.0%
1940	1.7%	2.7%	3.8%
1944	3.7%	5.5%	2.1%
1948	6.2%	2.4%	5.8%
1952	3.9%	9.1%	6.3%
1955	3.4%	7.6%	5.7%
1959	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%
1963	0.2%	0.5%	0.3%
1967	0.6%	0.6%	0.5%

Source: Johnston, pp. 24-25; see Appendix A.

The contrast with the period when Alberta reverted to the plurality rule is striking. In Calgary, an average of 0.4% spoiled their ballots in each of three plurality elections considered here. In Edmonton, 0.5% spoiled their ballots, while 0.4% of rural voters did so. The dramatic drop in the rate of ballot spoilage after the province moved back to the plurality rule is clear evidence that STV proved to cause difficulties for voters in the province of Alberta. Johnston argues, however, that it would be wrong to attribute the entire ballot spoilage to STV procedures as there is considerable variation in the rate of spoilage in different elections. He argues that we would expect high turnout to be associated with higher rates of ballot spoilage because of increased participation by people who did not usually vote and thus were unfamiliar with STV voting procedures. The two elections with the highest voter turnout, 1935 and 1940, both had lower than

average rates of ballot spoilage.¹⁸ It would be wrong, then, to blame STV for all of the ballot spoilage found in this period.

Manitoba (Table 13) provides an interesting contrast with Alberta because it does not have the same high rates of ballot spoilage. There are limitations to the ballot spoilage data from Manitoba, as the figures are only available from 1936. In Winnipeg, voters spoiled an average of 1.6% of ballots while the Hare system was in use and an average of 1% of the ballots after Manitoba went back to the plurality system. The ironic thing about the Manitoba rates is that Winnipeg, which used the Hare system, often had lower rates of ballot spoilage than did the rural areas which used alternative voting and had fewer candidates. After the return to the plurality system, the rural areas had lower levels of rejected ballots. The differences between STV and the plurality system are relatively modest, but there is still some evidence that STV led to higher rates of spoiled ballots.

Table 13

Rate of Ballot Spoilage in Manitoba (%), 1936-1966

Year	Winnipeg	Rural
1936	1.8%	2.3%
1941	1.7%	1.6%
1945	n.a.	1.3%
1949	1.0%	1.5%
1953	1.7%	2.1%
1958	0.9%	0.6%
1959	1.1%	0.7%
1962	1.3%	0.8%
1966	0.8%	0.5%

Note: The data for Winnipeg, 1945 are unavailable

¹⁸ Johnston, 27.

The interesting thing about the comparative experience of these two provinces is how much more pronounced the effect of STV on the rate of ballot spoilage is in Alberta than in Manitoba. This is especially interesting as elections in Calgary and Edmonton tended to have fewer candidates than did elections in Winnipeg with its larger district magnitude. One would expect that Winnipeg would have higher levels of ballot spoilage. The difference between the two provinces is not due to the fact the data for Winnipeg do not extend back to the period in which STV was first used and when voters were learning to use the system and presumably were more prone to error. In fact, the highest incidences of ballot spoilage in Alberta came in the last three elections using STV. Calgary recorded 6.2% ballot spoilage in 1948; Edmontonians spoiled 7.6% of their ballots in 1955 and a whopping 9.2% in 1952. Clearly, Albertans had more of a problem with spoiled ballots than did Manitobans.

The source of the difference in the experience of the two provinces seems to lie in the more restrictive ballot marking provisions of Alberta's election legislation. As discussed above, Alberta required voters to mark their ballots with a "1." even if they intended to vote for only one candidate. Returning officers considered any ballot marked with an "X" as spoiled. Manitoba's election law was considerably more lenient and instructed returning officers to count ballots if they clearly indicated a desire to vote for only one candidate (plumping), even if they did so with a mark other than "1." This is an instructive case of how more subtle aspects of electoral law such as ballot marking provisions can have a greater impact on significant aspects of electoral practice than more studied factors such as electoral formulae or district magnitude.

There is one other way in which STV ballots might have been "spoiled." If a voter mistakenly gives the same preference order to more than one candidate or gives a candidate a preference that does not follow in numerical order, their ballot would be non-transferable and would not pass on to the appropriate candidate. These are both easy

mistakes to make, especially in cases where ballots typically have lists of candidates over 20 names long and as high as 43 in Winnipeg in 1922. If a voter had a preference for a candidate and due to the ballot marking provisions of the electoral law, this preference could not be taken into account, this does represent a form of ballot spoilage.

Unfortunately, we have no way to determine how many voters fell victim to this particular problem as the election records combine these ballots with other non-transferable votes.

The most common source of non-transferable ballots would be those voters who declined to list a full set of preferences and whose ballots were not needed or could not be used by any of the candidates remaining. While this would represent a problem for STV voting procedures, it is a relatively minor one as at least some of that voter's preferences would be recorded and play a role in the election outcome. This phenomenon does, however, represent a potential imperfection in the operation of STV.

The use of STV in these two provinces did have an effect on spoiled ballots. There does seem to be some justification for the criticism that STV is too complicated for voters to use. The Alberta case in particular shows how STV can disenfranchise almost 10% of the voters in some elections because of its complexity. The Manitoba example, however, shows that more lenient ballot marking provisions can counteract some of the problems associated with STV's complexity. Even with these provisions, the use of STV seems to be associated with a 0.5% increase in the rate of ballot spoilage. While this may be an acceptable trade-off for a more proportional electoral outcome, it is a reminder that all electoral system choices involve trade-offs; losses in some aspects of electoral practice may offset the improvements in others.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the effects of STV on some of the more mechanical aspects of electoral practice in Manitoba and Alberta. After explaining the way in which STV operated in both jurisdictions and considering the size of the quotas, it looked at how

STV affected the number of candidates. The STV elections in both provinces were associated with widely varying numbers of candidates. There is little evidence, however, to suggest that the prospect of a lower threshold of representation multiplied the number of candidates contesting elections. The number of candidates continued to fluctuate within the same levels in the period before STV, while STV was in use, and afterwards. This is true in both urban and rural areas in both provinces. There is also no persuasive evidence that STV led to a higher number of independent candidates contesting elections.

The elections in all three major cities frequently required significant numbers of counts to determine the winners. The number of candidates is the most important determinant of the number of counts required to choose the successful candidates. In Alberta and Manitoba, there is a strong linear relationship between the number of candidates and the number of counts necessary. In the rural areas using alternative voting, a majority vote decided most seats on the first count, making further counts unnecessary. AV functioned very much like the plurality system in most constituencies.

Although comparative studies of electoral systems find that polities with more proportional electoral systems tend to have higher voter turnout, there is little evidence of this in either Alberta or Manitoba. The more proportional Hare system did not seem to have any direct effect on voter turnout in the three major cities. The AV system is not a more proportional electoral system than the plurality system and there is little evidence that it had much effect on voter turnout, either.

The one area where STV had a clear and identifiable effect was in ballot spoilage. The use of STV had a dramatic effect in Alberta and a noticeable effect in Manitoba. The extremely high levels of ballot spoilage in Alberta seem to be directly due to the use of STV and the comparatively harsh restrictions on marking the ballots used in that province. Manitoba's relatively lenient treatment of "X" voting led to only a small

increase in the rate of ballot spoilage. It is clear, however, that STV does prove to be more complicated for voters to use and does result in greater potential for voter error.

STV did seem to be a workable electoral system for both provinces. The large district magnitudes used in the three cities did occasionally lead to large numbers of candidates and to a corresponding long counting process, but the adoption of STV did not seem to lead either province's electoral process to degenerate into anything approximating chaos. One of the most interesting conclusions to be drawn from this chapter is the relatively minor role which the electoral system seemed to play in these variables. The number of candidates, either independent or on party slates, seem to be more of a function of changes in the electoral fortunes of various parties and social conditions. The significant labour unrest experienced in the Canadian prairies and especially Winnipeg accounts for the multiplication of the number of candidates in the early 1920s. Both provinces also experienced shifts in party systems in the early 1920s, with farmers coming to dominate politics in both provinces. These changes in social structure and in the party system appear to be more significant determinants of the number of candidates running for office than are electoral system variables.

Turnout, too, seems to depend on the partisan situation. Alberta's highest voter turnout is associated with changes of government. In the period under consideration in this study, the highest voter turnouts were in 1935 and 1940, the period of transition from a UFA party system to a Social Credit party system. We find other increases in voter turnout in the 1955 election where the opposition Liberals experienced a breakthrough and the 1967 election, the beginning of the shift to the Progressive Conservative party. In Manitoba, the steady erosion in voter participation seems to be related to the rise of coalition politics and the collapse of partisanship in the Liberal-Progressive era. Changes in the party system seem to be more significant in determining voter turnout.

Except for ballot spoilage, then, the electoral system takes a back seat to social structure and party system features in determining the operation of many of these features of electoral practice. The electoral system can still have an indirect effect on the number of candidates and voter turnout if it plays a role in helping to structure party competition. If the electoral system increases the number of parties or improves the chances of smaller parties, this may increase the number of candidates and voter turnout. It is to the effect of the electoral system on these party system features that we now turn in the next few chapters.

Chapter Four

Proportionality in STV Elections

The central concern in studies of electoral systems is how closely the results of an election correspond to the preferences of voters. There are a couple of reasons for this. First, this question is intrinsically important. Elections are the primary mechanisms that translate voter preferences into political representation in representative democracies. The question is thus important from the standpoint of assessing the quality of representative democracy. Second, the question of the correspondence between voter preferences and election results is important because it is the primary mechanical effect of an electoral system. In a sense, other electoral system effects are secondary to the translation of votes into seats. Parties (actual and potential) respond to the incentives given by this mechanical translation of votes into seats and this shapes other important variables like the number of parties competing in an electoral system.

The primary way of approaching this question is through studying proportionality: that is, whether a party's seat share is proportional to its share of the votes. Perfect proportionality, where each party's share of the seats is equal to its share of the votes, is a theoretical possibility, but it is virtually impossible to achieve, since the reduction of the choices of thousands or millions of voters to a few hundred representatives necessarily introduces some distortion, except in very rare circumstances. Still, some electoral systems do a much better job than others of minimizing the distortion introduced in the translation of votes into seats. Some approximate this ideal quite well, while others have a much poorer record. We can compare electoral systems by how faithfully they translate proportions of votes into proportions of seats.

This chapter will examine the impact of the adoption of STV on proportionality in Alberta and Manitoba. We will begin by considering the question of the applicability of established measures of proportionality to STV elections. We will then consider the impact of the Hare system on the proportionality of election outcomes in Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Calgary. Finally, we will examine how alternative voting affected proportionality in the rural areas of both provinces.

Measuring disproportionality in a candidate-centred electoral system

While the basic concept of proportionality is quite simple to understand, measuring it precisely can be difficult.¹ Most measures of proportionality begin with the differences between seat shares and vote shares. Large differences between seat and vote shares mean increased disproportionality. As such, these measures are actually measures of disproportionality where higher numbers represent increased deviation from a perfectly proportional outcome while lower numbers represent a closer correspondence between seat and vote shares. Since disproportionality essentially represents the other side of the proportionality coin, this does not pose a significant problem.

There are many approaches to the measurement of disproportionality as described in Appendix D. In this study, we will use Loosemore and Hanby's *D*, the most common measure of disproportionality in electoral systems. *D* is measured by halving the sum of the absolute values of the differences between seat shares and vote shares:

$$D = (1 / 2) \sum |s_i - v_i|$$

D will be equal to 0 in cases of perfect proportionality and 1 in cases of perfect disproportionality. Appendix D discusses the relative advantages and limitations of *D* as a measurement of proportionality.

¹ Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 57.

While any attempt to measure disproportionality has its peculiar shortcomings and advantages, there are some problems with measuring disproportionality that are particular to the single transferable vote. Measures of disproportionality are based on the correspondence between votes and seats for parties. This assumes, however, that parties are the focus of the electoral system. For STV elections, this assumption is not necessarily correct. STV functions even with the absence of parties. It is a candidate-centred system, the goal of which is to elect a set of candidates so that each voter feels a personal connection with at least one of the candidates.² This candidate focus means that party-based measures of disproportionality may have a problem measuring the distortion that STV introduces in the electoral system. As Mair and Laver put it: "It is therefore, on the face of it, somewhat surprising that it [STV] should ever produce a result which provides proportional representation of *parties* in any given situation."³ Comparative studies, however, indicate that STV does return relatively proportional electoral outcomes. Cross-national studies, such as that conducted by Taagepera and Shugart, indicate that STV electoral systems are relatively good at minimizing deviation from proportionality.⁴ Of course, such cross-national studies rely on only two cases of (Malta and Ireland), a significant limitation considering the wide variation within PR and plurality electoral systems.

² Vernon Bogdanor, "Introduction," in Vernon Bogdanor and David Butler, eds., *Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and their Political Consequences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 7-10.

³ Peter Mair and Michael Laver, "Proportionality, P.R. and S.T.V. in Ireland." *Political Studies* 23 (1975): 491. Emphasis in original.

⁴ Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, *Seats & Votes: The Effects & Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 106-107. find that Ireland's value for D is 3.2% while Malta's is 2.6%. Both countries score in the lower range for proportional representation systems.

The essence of the problem is that STV allows voters to cast multiple votes for multiple candidates, choosing from within and between party slates. One difficulty is deciding which count is indicative of the voters' preference. The usual approach in measuring disproportionality in an STV election is to use the first count as the indication of the voters' true preferences. This is a reasonable approach as the power STV gives to voters reduces much of the incentive for them to engage in strategic or "insincere" voting.⁵ STV will tend to elect legislators in ratios proportionate to their relative shares of first preference votes if a number of conditions are met.

First, the constituency system can play a significant role in the proportionality of STV elections. There are two significant elements to the constituency system. The first is the average district magnitude. Larger district magnitudes are associated with the more proportionate electoral outcomes. The logic of the relationship between district magnitude and proportionality is quite simple. An increased number of seats leads to a lower quota which makes it increasingly likely that smaller parties will earn representation in the legislature. Lower quotas are also more sensitive to the relative vote shares of larger parties and thus will likely return more proportionate electoral outcomes.⁶ The second important element of the constituency system is the question of electoral boundaries, specifically, the apportionment of voters per seat. A perfectly proportional electoral formula will still produce disproportionate aggregate election results if there is significant inequality of voters in the apportionment formula.⁷

⁵ George H. Hallett, "Proportional representation with the single transferable vote: a basic requirement for legislative elections," in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, eds., *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 119-120.

⁶ Mair and Laver, 493-496; Michael Gallagher, "Disproportionality in a proportional representation system: the Irish experience," *Political Studies* 23 (1975), 504-508.

⁷ Gallagher, 509-511; Mair and Laver, 496-497.

In the Manitoba and Alberta cases, these concerns are of negligible importance because the district magnitudes were relatively high by STV standards. Except for the 1949 and 1953 elections in Manitoba, all of the STV districts had district magnitudes of larger than 5, the minimum needed for proportionate electoral results.⁸ Furthermore, since we are primarily looking at the district-level operation of STV and are not relying on aggregate voting data, the question of electoral boundaries does not affect this examination of proportionality, except in the last two STV elections in Manitoba. The 1949 and 1953 Manitoba election saw Winnipeg divided into three 4-seat districts. While two elections is a sparse sample upon which to base conclusions, this switch does provide some opportunity to gauge the impact of district magnitude on proportionality in Manitoba. The question of electoral boundaries in these two elections is also a relevant concern. The disparities between the three districts were not large, however. In the 1949 election, there was an average of 12,561 voters per seat; the constituencies ranged from 13,436 voters per seat in Winnipeg South (7.0% over the average) to 11,662 in Winnipeg North (7.2% under the average). Because of voter mobility, these disparities increased for the 1953 election. There were 12,340 voters per seat for all of Winnipeg, ranging from 14,016 in Winnipeg South (13.6% over the average) to 11,222 (9.1% under the average) in Winnipeg North. In all, these are not excessive variations in voter population.

The second set of conditions necessary for proportional outcomes in STV elections is for parties to be significant entities for voters. Proportionality will be maximized if voters rank the parties first and restrict themselves to ordering candidates within each party.⁹ Indeed, if voters restrict their choices to one party, STV is equivalent to the largest remainders form of list proportional representation, regarded as the most

⁸ Taagepera and Shugart, 113-114.

⁹ Mair and Laver, 492.

proportional of PR formulas.¹⁰ This only happens in theory, however, as in real STV elections, voters do not always restrict themselves to one party, but exercise the power that STV gives them. This can introduce some disproportionality into the system, but such an effect is minimal if the parties lose votes through transfers to other parties at equivalent rates. Parties whose supporters are more disciplined than others in voting the party slate will generally receive more than their share of the seats, all other things being equal.¹¹

Disproportionality can also result from non-transferable ballots. When voters only fill out a subset of the total number of preferences available to them, their ballots may become non-transferable. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3, ballots can become non-transferable if voters make errors in completing their ballots. Non-transferable ballots can introduce disproportionality because it may mean that a party does not make use of all the votes potentially available to it. In addition, if party A's voters rank all of A's candidates and then do not indicate preferences for any other parties while party B's voters rank all of B's candidates and then transfer their preferences to candidates from party A, party A will be at an advantage.¹² In other words, if non-transferable ballots are not spread evenly among the different parties, disproportionality can result.

If these conditions are not met, the translation of first preference votes into seats can be distorted by the transfer process in STV. As a result, the reliance on first preference votes can occasionally give a misleading impression of the disproportionality introduced by the STV electoral system. It is important to understand how proportionality

¹⁰ Arend Lijphart, "Degrees of proportionality of proportional representation formulas," in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds., *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences* (New York: Agathon, 1986), 175, 178.


¹¹ Mair and Laver, 492.

¹² Mair and Laver, 492.

changes over the counts of an STV election. In general, the deviation between votes and seats will diminish with each successive count.

Figure 4 shows the measure of D for each count in the Winnipeg constituency in 1932. The party shares at each count are determined by adding the votes credited to each candidate from that party still in a position to receive votes as well as one quota worth of votes for each candidate from that party declared elected. For example, on the third count in 1932, the Conservative party had elected one candidate and thus had 7,000 votes (the quota) credited to them. They also had six other candidates still in a position to receive votes; those six candidates had a total of 18,975 votes between them. On the third count, then, the Conservatives had 25,975 votes or 33.7% of the total transferable vote at that point in the counting. When ballots become non-transferable, they are no longer part of the calculation. The rationale for this is that we have to assume that if voters had to choose from the list of available candidates at that count, they would have chosen not to vote.

Figure 4
Value of D based on vote shares for each count, Winnipeg 1932




The value for D slowly decreases over the course of counting. The highest point is on the first count where value for D is just over 22%, a relatively high number. D remains at this relatively high level for about half the counts and then begins to decrease slowly to a disparity of about 10% for the 24th and final count. The very small slope through the 2nd through 13th counts is due to the very few votes being transferred in each of these transfers. These small numbers mean that any discrepancies in transfers do not have a significant impact on the proportionality of the outcome. The larger drops towards the end result from the transfer of votes from parties that are unlikely to win any more seats to parties that do win more seats. For example, the largest single drop in D came between the 23rd and 24th count. The 24th and final count eliminated the final Conservative candidate remaining and his 4,780 votes were transferred to other candidates or were declared non-transferable. Since there were no more Conservative candidates in a position to receive transfers, 3,410 Conservative voters did not indicate any subsequent preferences and their ballots were non-transferable. These non-transferable votes are no longer part of the calculations of D in the 24th count, thus improving the conversion of vote shares into seat shares by the Conservatives and decreasing D . Furthermore, those 1,370 votes that remained went to candidates who used the votes to get elected, also reducing D . Only 63 votes went to a candidate who did not become elected. All of these factors reduced disproportionality.

Most of the elections under consideration in this study show a pattern similar to that seen in the 1932 Winnipeg election, but most show more steep drops in D towards the end. Another common situation is a relatively flat profile. Figure 5 shows the values of D for the 1926 election in Calgary. In this election, the transfers from count to count did not affect the values of D significantly. This is because the rate of vote leakage was similar for each party which meant that D does not change much from transfer to transfer.

Figure 5

Value of D based on vote shares for each count, Calgary 1926




There are a few profiles that show unexpected patterns. These result from candidates with extraordinary personal popularity that cuts across party lines. One of the most dramatic examples comes in the 1936 election in Winnipeg (Figure 6). The value for D based on first preference vote is almost 27%, a very high value. This high value only lasts for the one count, however. After that, the value of D stays at a relatively low plateau of about 10% for most of the counts, eventually declining to less than 5% on the final count. This high value of D based on first preferences is due largely to Lewis St. George Stubbs, an independent candidate who polled a remarkable 24,805 or 31.3% of the 79,344 votes cast. Since Stubbs was an independent candidate, his votes did not transfer to other independent candidates. As a result, the vote share for the independent candidates is high relative to their share of the seats. Furthermore, although Stubbs was an independent, he had a definite ideological position. Stubbs was a well-known judge who was removed from the bench for such actions as declaring that there were separate laws for the rich and poor. He identified himself as a socialist and being left of the centre

of the political spectrum.¹³ As a result, the CCF received a large share of Stubbs' transfers. The CCF only received 12.9% of first preferences, but ended up electing three of the ten MLAs from Winnipeg because they attracted such a large share of transfers. In fact, the CCF received almost as many votes in transfers as did the other five parties combined while losing relatively few transfers to other parties. It seems clear that a number of CCF supporters supported Stubbs with their first preferences and then quite faithfully voted the CCF slate.

Figure 6

Value of D based on vote shares for each count, Winnipeg 1936



It is tempting to dismiss the Winnipeg 1936 case as a unique set of circumstances involving an independent candidate, but a similar effect can be seen in other elections involving candidates who are personally popular, even when they are members of a party. The most popular single candidate in Alberta elections was premier Ernest Manning. The

¹³ K.W. Taylor and Nelson Wiseman, "Class and ethnic voting in Winnipeg: the case of 1941," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 14 (1977): 178; Nelson Wiseman and K.W. Taylor, "Voting in Winnipeg during the Depression," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 19 (1982): 220.


effects of his candidacy is apparent especially in the 1944, 1948, and 1952 elections. In 1944, D dropped from just over 12% on the first count to under 10% on the second count. In 1952, D dropped from about 9% on the first count to 7% on the second count. In both of these elections, Manning's personal popularity inflated D on the first count, although less dramatically than Stubbs did in Winnipeg. Figure 7 shows a more interesting effect of Manning's candidacy. In the 1948 election, Manning received almost half of the first preference votes in Edmonton and very nearly three quotas worth of votes. As shown in the graph, Manning's candidacy had a dramatic effect, but it is the opposite of Stubbs' candidacy. Between the first and second counts, D almost doubles and stays at that point for the rest of the counts. Manning's personal popularity clearly played a role in this outcome as he attracted votes from supporters of other parties. While the Social Credit party had 54% of the vote on the first count, their share of the popular vote dipped to 49% on the second. Besides Social Credit, the chief beneficiaries of transfers from Manning were the Liberals and Harper Prowse's Independent Citizens' Association. Neither Prowse nor the Liberals were able to gain enough votes to earn any additional seats. This, combined with the relatively low district magnitude of five in 1948 meant that disproportionality increased from the first count. It is paradoxical that transfers away from a party can actually lead to greater rewards from by the electoral system.

The conclusion to be drawn from this is that calculating D based on first preferences can present a misleading picture of the election in cases where there is a popular single candidate. The 1936 Winnipeg election demonstrates this very well when many CCF supporters apparently used the freedom granted by the STV ballot to support a high profile independent candidate with a similar ideological perspective. Since many of their votes were surplus ballots, they went back to the CCF on the second count and the election proceeded with predominantly intraparty transfers and relatively low levels of disproportionality. It would be misleading to report a value of D of over 25% which is

what would result from a calculation based on first preference votes. The case of Ernest Manning is another example of how basing D on first preference votes create a false impression of the character of the election. Although the effect of Manning's candidacy is not nearly as pronounced as the Stubbs candidacy, it still served to create a high level of D on the first count in two elections and an artificially low level of D in 1948. About 10% of the Social Credit vote in Edmonton seems to be due to Manning's personal popularity. Manning seemed to attract first preference votes from supporters of other parties who used their subsequent preferences to support their own parties. Calculating D based on first preference votes can thus be misleading in these situations.

Figure 7

Value of D based on vote shares for each count, Edmonton 1948



Is there an alternative? Taking the average of the values of D for all counts would produce a value for D that better reflects the nature of STV. Although STV stands for *single* transferable vote, we can conceive of STV as a series of votes, each weighted differently. Using the average value for D , a measure we will designate as D_{avg} , would better take into account the fact that people express a range of preferences in STV elections. It would help to compensate for situations like Winnipeg in 1936 and

Edmonton during the Manning years where a popular candidate can distort the values of D . In the case of Winnipeg in 1932 (Figure 4), a typical profile where D declines slowly over the counting process, the value for D_{avg} across the counts is 18.0%, compared to a value of 22.2% based on first preference votes. The value for D_{avg} is still relatively high, reflecting the fact that there is a significant level of disproportionality for most of the counts. In the case of a flat profile such as is found in Calgary in 1926 (Figure 5), D_{avg} is equal to 12.3%, only slightly less than the 12.8% calculated from first preference votes. This reflects the relatively unchanging value for D throughout the counting process in a flat profile election.

D_{avg} differs most significantly from the first preference value in cases where a popular candidate affects the measures of disproportionality. The most dramatic example of this is Winnipeg in 1936 (Figure 6). In that election, the value for D based on first preferences was a very high 26.7%, a value more similar to those of plurality electoral systems than those found in proportional representation systems.¹⁴ When we take the average value of D for all counts, D_{avg} is 8.4%, a value that better reflects the dynamics of the election in Winnipeg in 1936. In the elections in Edmonton where Ernest Manning's personal popularity was a factor, D_{avg} also seems to reflect the dynamics of the electoral process better. In 1944, a calculation of D based on first preference votes in Edmonton would return a value of 12.4%. The value of D_{avg} for Edmonton in that election is 9.4%, which seems to compensate for the Manning effect. In 1952, the value for D is 9.5% while D_{avg} is 8.0%. Finally, value for D_{avg} in Edmonton's unusual 1948 election (Figure 7) is 10.7%, a much higher and more accurate reflection than the value of 5.9% based on first preferences.

¹⁴ Taagepera and Shugart, 106-107.

Table 14 lists the values for D based on first preferences and D_{avg} for each constituency in Alberta. Table 15 contains the same information for Winnipeg. Generally, the value for D_{avg} is lower than the value of D based on first preferences, but in a significant number of cases, D_{avg} is higher than the value for first preferences. In only about a third of the cases is there a dramatic difference (greater than 2%) between D_{avg} and D .

Table 14
Disproportionality in Alberta

Year	Edmonton		Calgary	
	D	D_{avg}	D	D_{avg}
1926	0.156	0.150	0.128	0.123
1930	0.180	0.164	0.123	0.112
1935	0.161	0.155	0.104	0.079
1940	0.131	0.114	0.096	0.100
1944	0.124	0.094	0.048	0.052
1948	0.059	0.107	0.157	0.153
1952	0.095	0.076	0.174	0.168
1955	0.106	0.107	0.152	0.127

Despite the benefits of measuring D this way, there are some weaknesses as well. D_{avg} is more cumbersome and more difficult to apply than D . A more serious weakness is that we can only use it at a district level and not at an aggregate level. This limits its usefulness and causes problems in this study when faced with the situation of the three constituencies that made up Winnipeg in Manitoba's 1949 and 1953 elections. One approach would be to take the average value of D_{avg} for all three constituencies and report that as the value. This is a fundamentally different methodology from that used in measuring D in single-member plurality systems, however. In plurality systems, we do not measure D in each constituency and then take the average of all the values as the measure

of disproportionality. Rather, the vote and seat shares are calculated at the aggregate level. Taking the average of district-level disproportionality is not comparable to other measures. This is a serious limitation in this measure and restricts its applicability. In the end, we will have to use D_{avg} as a supplemental measure to the more established first preference based way of measuring D .

Table 15
Disproportionality in Manitoba


Year	Constituency	D	D_{avg}
1920	Winnipeg	0.181	0.216
1922	Winnipeg	0.133	0.131
1927	Winnipeg	0.137	0.103
1932	Winnipeg	0.223	0.180
1936	Winnipeg	0.267	0.084
1941	Winnipeg	0.081	0.078
1945	Winnipeg	0.044	0.065
1949	Winnipeg Centre	0.222	0.208
	Winnipeg North	0.203	0.203
	Winnipeg South	0.148	0.152
1953	Winnipeg Centre	0.125	0.130
	Winnipeg North	0.209	0.155
	Winnipeg South	0.127	0.098

The effects of STV on proportionality in the cities

With the adoption of the single transferable vote, Alberta and Manitoba were making a conscious shift to an electoral system with a better correspondence between vote shares and seat shares than the plurality system. We expect, then, that the adoption of STV should have led to markedly lower levels of D than were experienced in the period in which the provinces used plurality. Similarly, the switch back to plurality should be accompanied by a rise in the value of D .

Figure 8 graphs D over 14 of the 15 elections held in Alberta between 1909 and 1967. The 1917 election has been excluded because of the way in which Alberta's election law circumvented the electoral system for members of Canada's armed forces. The adoption of STV in the 1926 election led to a dramatic drop in D in both Edmonton and Calgary. Furthermore, as expected, the value of D jumped again in 1959 with the return to the plurality system. In the period from 1909 to 1921, before STV was adopted in Alberta, the average value for D in Calgary was 0.254 while in Edmonton it was 0.342. While STV was in use from 1926 to 1955, D dropped to an average value of 0.123 and 0.126 in Calgary and Edmonton, respectively. When the province returned to plurality in 1959, the average value of D jumped back up to 0.287 in Calgary and 0.484 in Edmonton. If we use the values of D_{avg} for the period in STV was in use, the basic pattern


Figure 8
Disproportionality in Alberta, 1909-1967



does not change dramatically. There are slight variations in the values for some of the elections, but, generally, the situation is similar. The average values of D_{avg} for 1926 to 1955 were 0.114 in Calgary and 0.121 in Edmonton.

STV seems to have had the expected effect on D in Alberta, lowering it to about half of the value found in the plurality elections. Was the situation in Manitoba any different? Figure 9 shows the values of D for Manitoba between 1899 and 1966. On average, the period in Winnipeg before STV (1899-1915) saw an average disproportionality value of 0.269. While STV was in use in Winnipeg, the average value of D was 0.147. When the province returned to the plurality rule in 1958, D jumped back up to 0.264. Winnipeg's use of STV in provincial elections resulted in more proportional election results overall. The effect in Manitoba, however, is not nearly as unambiguous as the effect in Alberta. There is much greater variation in the values of D found in Winnipeg. The highest value of D in 1936 exceeds the average values of D in both

Figure 9
Disproportionality in Manitoba, 1899-1966



plurality periods. Furthermore, the average value of D under STV in Winnipeg is greater than the average values of D in both Edmonton and Calgary.

Another interesting feature of the Manitoba case is the effect of the shift in district magnitude that occurred in the 1949 and 1953 elections. For the seven elections between 1920 and 1945, Winnipeg was a single district with ten MLAs. For the 1949 and 1953 elections, Winnipeg was divided into three districts, each with a magnitude of four. As discussed earlier, one of the time-honoured generalizations about electoral systems is that larger district magnitudes allow for more proportional electoral outcomes. The shift to a smaller district magnitude in those two elections should have resulted in higher levels of disproportionality. Contrary to our expectations, however, the shift to four-member districts actually decreased disproportionality. The average value for D when $M=4$ is 0.128 while the average value of D when $M=10$ is 0.162. It would be foolish to make generalizations about the effects of the shift to district magnitude based on only two elections, however.

STV seems to have resulted in more proportional election outcomes in the three major cities as expected. If anything, the question is why D did not drop more than it did. This is particularly puzzling, especially given the fact that both provinces used STV with relatively large district magnitudes which should have resulted in a relatively high degree of proportionality. In comparison, Taagepera and Shugart find values of D for Ireland and Malta to be 3.2% and 2.6%, respectively.¹⁵ The values of D for Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Calgary are closer to those of a plurality system.

One reason for this apparent discrepancy is that measuring D at the district level does not allow for the trade-offs that can lower D for aggregate election results. A party that is penalized slightly by the electoral system in one district might benefit slightly in

¹⁵ Taagepera and Shugart, 106.


another district, thus reducing the overall level of disproportionality. A good example of this can be seen in the three smaller Winnipeg districts in 1953. At the district level, the three districts recorded levels of D at 12.5%, 20.9%, and 12.7%. Yet, if we aggregate the vote totals and seat totals for all three districts, the disproportionality is only 10.5%, lower than any single constituency. This may help to explain the surprising finding that the drop in Winnipeg's average district magnitude from ten to four resulted in more proportional election results.

Related to this problem is the fact that we are dealing with small numbers of seats in the districts, especially in the Alberta cases. This necessarily introduces disproportionality. In cases where there are only five seats in the district, vote shares come in 20% steps. This necessarily introduces a certain amount of disproportionality. For example, in Edmonton in 1948, the Liberals and the CCF each received about 20% of the vote and the electoral system rewarded them each with one of the district's five seats. Social Credit earned 54% of the vote and won three seats while the Independent Citizens' Association earned 6% of the vote and no seats. Had there been ten seats in the district, the ICA would likely have won one seat and Social Credit would have won five, reducing D from 6% to 4%.

While this explanation certainly accounts for some of the disproportionality in both provinces, it fails to account for the differences between Alberta and Manitoba. For most of the period, Winnipeg had a district magnitude of ten seats while the cities in Alberta had anywhere from five to seven seats. The larger district magnitude should have resulted in lower levels of D in Winnipeg. Instead, Winnipeg had noticeably higher levels of D than did Edmonton and Calgary. Part of the higher D is due to the effects of popular candidates on D as discussed above. Figure 10 is a graph that uses D_{avg} for the STV period in Winnipeg. This graph shows a more pronounced STV effect on D in Winnipeg, mainly because it eliminates the 1936 peak in Figure 9 which is due to the Stubbs

candidacy discussed earlier. D_{avg} is still higher than the similar value for Edmonton and Calgary, however.

Figure 10
Disproportionality (D_{avg}) in Winnipeg, 1899-1966



Winnipeg's higher level of disproportionality seems to be the result of a couple of phenomena. The first is what Taagepera and Shugart tentatively refer to as the "law of conservation of D." In short, their argument is that the proportionality gains that can be realized from a more proportional electoral system are offset to some extent by the attraction of the new electoral arrangements to smaller parties which might not otherwise have run. Taagepera and Shugart suggest that a shift to a higher district magnitude or, to extend their argument, to a more proportional electoral formula, will cause new parties to form in anticipation of improved electoral prospects. These smaller, newer parties attract votes, but not enough to win seats, thus contributing to disproportionality. They suggest

that this effect will limit the positive effects of changes to improve the proportionality of an electoral system, thus sustaining disproportionality at moderate levels.¹⁶

As will be discussed in Chapter 5, Alberta did not experience a proliferation in the number of parties contesting elections under STV. Although the composition of the legislative representation of Edmonton and Calgary more closely reflected the partisan composition of those cities' electorates, new parties did not form in anticipation of electoral success.¹⁷ The situation is quite different in Winnipeg where the adoption of STV was accompanied by an increase in the number of smaller parties contesting elections.¹⁸ Whether this is entirely due to the electoral system or is due to social developments is a separate question and will be discussed in Chapter 5. Manitoba did see more parties contesting elections under STV than under the plurality rule. This increase in smaller parties explains some of the increase in disproportionality. For example, in the 1922 provincial election, two small labour parties contested the seats in Winnipeg. The Union Labour Party and the Workers' Party of Canada together attracted almost 4% of the vote, but were rewarded with no seats, adding to the disproportionality found in Winnipeg. Combining the votes of the small labour parties with the votes for the Independent Labour Party (ILP) or the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) reduces the average degree of disproportionality to about 10%. Clearly, the electoral fragmentation that Winnipeg experienced and Alberta did not accounts for some of the increased disproportionality in Manitoba.

¹⁶ Taagepera and Shugart, 120-125.

¹⁷ See J. Paul Johnston, "The single transferable vote in Alberta provincial elections," paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1992, 21-23.

¹⁸ See Appendix B.

The second phenomenon explaining the different rates of disproportionality is the vote transfer pattern in both provinces. As discussed earlier, if parties are very disciplined in their transfers, that is, if they do not “leak” transfers to other parties, STV will produce highly proportional results. Disproportionality can result partly from different rates of party solidarity. If one party’s voters are very disciplined or if one party does a better job of attracting transfers than the others, the electoral system will display decreased proportionality. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, Alberta’s political parties were more disciplined in vote transfers than were the parties in Manitoba. While transfer retention rates around 90% were not uncommon in Alberta, Manitoba’s political parties usually retained only about 60% of their transfers. This increases the incidence of vote leakage and the resulting disproportionality.

Effects of alternative voting on proportionality in rural Manitoba and Alberta

Thus far, we have restricted our attention to the major cities and the impact of the Hare system. What effects did the adoption of alternative voting have on the proportionality of election outcomes in the rural areas? The intention of alternative voting is not to produce proportional electoral outcomes; rather, its goal is to ensure that every representative elected has the support of a majority of his or her constituents.¹⁹ While the mechanics are essentially similar to those of STV, the logic is different, with alternative voting leading to majoritarian rather than proportional outcomes.

Figure 8 graphs disproportionality for Alberta’s rural areas from 1909 to 1967. The period in which AV was in use (1926-1955) does not seem to differ significantly from the periods in which the plurality system was in use. The elections using AV show wide swings in the values of D , reaching a high of over 0.45 in 1944. On average, the pre-

¹⁹ R.M. Punnett, “The alternative vote re-visited,” *Electoral Studies* 10 (1991): 281-283.

AV period in Alberta saw an average value of 0.248 for *D*. While AV was in use, the disproportionality measured 0.326. In the three elections after AV was abandoned for the plurality rule, *D* measured 0.391. Alternative voting appears not to have improved the proportionality of electoral outcomes in Alberta.

An examination of the situation in Manitoba when AV was in use (1927-1953) supports this conclusion. Again, in the rural areas of Manitoba, alternative voting appears to have done little to enhance proportionality. On the contrary, alternative voting in Manitoba is associated with higher levels of disproportionality, although this likely reflects the Progressive dominance of rural Manitoba. The average value for *D* in the pre-AV period (1899-1922) was 0.154. In the elections using AV (1927-1953), the average value of *D* was 0.203, while in the post-AV period (1958-1966), *D* averaged 0.143. The large difference between Alberta and Manitoba in values for *D* in the rural areas reflects the differences in party systems in the two provinces. Manitoba's party system was more competitive than Alberta's and this is reflected in the rural disproportionality values. While the Progressives never won over 70% of the seats in the provincial legislature in Manitoba, the Social Credit party routinely won over 90% of the seats in Alberta.²⁰ The operation of alternative voting did not in any way restrain single-party dominance in Alberta

Conclusion

Electoral reform in Manitoba and Alberta appears to have had mixed results in the proportionality of electoral outcomes in the two provinces. In the rural areas, alternative voting had little impact on proportionality. This is not surprising, considering that

²⁰ See Rand Dyck, *Provincial Politics in Canada*, 3rd. ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1996), 382-384, 422, 512-515, 558 and Peter McCormick, "Provincial party systems, 1945-1993," in A. Brian Tanguay and Alain-G. Gagnon, eds., *Canadian Parties in Transition*, 2nd. ed. (Scarborough: Nelson, 1996), 349-371.

proportionality is not one of the goals of alternative voting. AV continued to allow for significant disproportionality in rural Alberta and Manitoba.

In the cities, the use of single transferable vote had a noticeable effect on the proportionality of the election results. The adoption of STV led to significant decreases in the value of D . If we take into account the peculiarities involved in the use of the Loosemore-Hanby measure with a candidate-focused electoral system such as STV, the effect of STV on D may have been even more profound, as the values of D_{avg} reveal. Clearly, STV resulted in fairer electoral results in both provinces than did the plurality system used before and after STV. There were significant differences between the two provinces, however, in how much D fell. Manitoba generally reported higher levels of D despite its higher district magnitude which should have resulted in more proportional electoral outcomes than in Alberta. This was due to the behaviour of parties and voters under STV in Winnipeg. A proliferation of parties accompanied the adoption of STV in that city, fragmenting the vote and increasing disproportionality. Furthermore, Alberta's voters were more disciplined in their ordering of transfers, tending to stick with one party rather than crossing partisan lines, thus minimizing vote leakage and improving proportionality. Manitoba's voters were more likely to ignore partisan lines which increased disproportionality.

Despite the improved performance in producing fairer electoral outcomes, the effect of STV on the party systems of the two provinces was limited by the restricted application of proportional representation. The use of majoritarian electoral systems in the overrepresented rural areas meant that the overall proportionality of the electoral system was not affected significantly by the electoral reforms of the two provinces. Elections in were essentially won or lost in the rural areas which controlled about 80% of the seats in the two provinces. Since rural areas used the plurality formula and the equally majoritarian alternative voting formula, Alberta's governing parties continued to enjoy

sweeping majorities while the Progressives in Manitoba consistently translated a plurality of voter support into a majority of the seats in the legislature. The use of the more proportional STV formula in the three cities may have reduced the extent of these victories slightly, but ultimately it did not change the logic of electoral calculation in either province.

Chapter Five

STV and the Number of Parties

The relationship between electoral systems and the number of political parties is one that has intrigued both analysts of electoral systems and those who argue for or against electoral reform. Opponents of proportional representation systems raise the possibility of dozens of small, ideologically extreme political parties suddenly springing up with the adoption of PR. Proponents of PR systems deny this will be the case or suggest that any multiplication in the number of parties that results from the adoption of electoral reform will simply better reflect the diversity of political opinion in that jurisdiction.¹

The relationship between a country's electoral system and its party system is of central importance in understanding how and why electoral systems help to shape political conflict. Studies of the relationship usually focus on the number of parties operating in the party system. This is with good reason as the number of parties is a fundamental characteristic of a nation's party politics. As Taagepera and Shugart argue, if we could choose only one number to characterize the politics of a nation that has competitive elections, we would likely choose the number of political parties because it is so closely linked to so many other important variables in politics.²

¹ See Douglas Amy, *Real Choices / New Voices: The Case for Proportional Representation in the United States* (New York: Columbia, 1993), 76-98 and 170-177 for a discussion of this question.

² Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Predicting the number of parties: A quantitative model of Duverger's mechanical effect," *American Political Science Review* 87 (1993): 455.

This chapter will examine the impact of the adoption of STV on the numbers of parties in Alberta and Manitoba. We will begin by discussing the academic debate surrounding Maurice Duverger's approach to the relationship between electoral systems and the number of parties. We will then turn to the problem of measuring the number of parties in a party system. Finally, we will consider the impact of the Hare system on the number of parties in Edmonton, Calgary, and Winnipeg. This chapter will conclude with an examination of the impact of the alternative voting system on parties in the rural areas of both provinces.

Theory and Controversy

Most discussions of the relationship between electoral systems and the number of political parties grow from the work of Maurice Duverger. In a 1951 article, Duverger advanced three propositions for consideration. He suggested that a proportional representation system tends to produce a party system with "many rigid, independent parties," that a plurality system with run-off elections will likely produce a party system with "many independent but flexible parties," while the plurality electoral system with one ballot "tends towards a two-party system."³ Duverger later refined the latter proposition more firmly in his book *Political Parties*, first published in French in 1951. Duverger wrote in that work: "*the simple-majority [plurality] single-ballot system favours the two-party system. Of all the hypotheses that have been defined in this book, this approaches the most nearly perhaps to a true sociological law.*"⁴ This connection between the

³ Maurice Duverger, "The influence of the electoral system on political life," *International Social Science Journal* 3 (1951): 315.

⁴ Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, 3rd. ed., trans. Barbara and Robert North (London: Methuen, 1964), 217. Emphasis in original.

plurality electoral system and the two-party system has come to be known as Duverger's law, despite the fact that many observers before Duverger noted this relationship.⁵

The partner to Duverger's law is his development of the relationship between proportional representation systems and the number of political parties, commonly known as Duverger's hypothesis. Duverger wrote: "It is certain that proportional representation always coincides with a multi-party system: in no country in the world has proportional representation given rise to a two-party system or kept one in existence."⁶ William Riker, one of the leading students of Duverger's law, reads much significance into the distinction between the law and the hypothesis.⁷ It is not clear from reading Duverger, however, that this distinction between the law and the hypothesis is as stark as Riker makes it out to be. The language used to describe the relationship between PR and multiple parties is every bit as deterministic as that outlining Duverger's law. The main difference seems to be that Duverger explicitly described the relationship between plurality and the two party system as a law, something he did not do for the hypothesis. Duverger himself says that he saw all three propositions outlined in his 1951 article and in his writings elsewhere as sociological laws.⁸

Duverger's contribution to the debate on the relationship between electoral systems and the number of parties is not simply a description of an empirical regularity.

⁵ William H. Riker, "The two-party system and Duverger's law: An essay on the history of political science," *American Political Science Review* 76 (1982): 754-756, traces early formulations of Duverger's law to John Stuart Mill in 1867 and to Henry Droop in 1881, suggesting that by 1901, it was "commonplace."

⁶ Duverger, *Political Parties*, 245.

⁷ Riker, 758.

⁸ Maurice Duverger, "Duverger's law: Forty years later," in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds., *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences* (New York: Agathon, 1986), 69-70.

He also attempted to advance an explanation for why two-party systems seem to result from the use of the plurality formula by nations. Duverger suggested that smaller parties operating in a plurality electoral system were subject to both a “mechanical effect” and a “psychological effect.” The mechanical effect is relatively straightforward. Third parties receive fewer seats than they deserve. In many cases, they do not receive any seats at all.⁹ As Taagepera and Shugart note, this effect is a mechanical one because once a nation chooses electoral rules, there is no deliberate strategy on behalf of human actors to penalize smaller parties.¹⁰ Douglas Rae persuasively demonstrated the existence of the mechanical effect in real-world electoral systems. He found that, while all electoral systems tend to award parties with a large share of the votes a disproportionately large share of the seats, plurality systems award a greater seat bonus to strong and first-place parties than do PR systems.¹¹

The psychological effect is more controversial, partly because it is more difficult to formulate, describe, and measure. Duverger described the psychological effect as resulting from voters’ attempts to make their votes count as much as possible. He succinctly described the situation as follows: “In cases where there are three parties operating under the simple-majority [plurality] single-ballot system the electors soon realize that their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to the third party: whence their natural tendency to transfer their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries in order to prevent the success of the greater evil.”¹² Duverger conceived of the psychological

⁹ Duverger, “The influence of electoral systems,” 315; Duverger, *Political Parties*, 224-225.

¹⁰ Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, *Seats & Votes: The Effects & Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 65.

¹¹ Douglas W. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 70, 88-92.

¹² Duverger, *Political Parties*, 225.

effect as a long-term process that takes time to manifest itself fully as voters increasingly desert third parties and concentrate their support on the larger parties.¹³ Riker argues that the voter-based theory of the psychological effect is essentially rooted in rational choice theory which sees voters as trying to maximize the utility of their vote and have the greatest desired impact on the outcome of the election.¹⁴ Duverger's law, however, is not apparent only in voters; it also extends to party elites as they decide whether to contest elections. Anticipating that voters might engage in strategic voting, small parties may choose not to contest certain constituencies, thus reducing the number of parties.¹⁵

Duverger's law is the best example of an approach that emphasizes the electoral system determinants of the number of parties. According to this approach, voters and parties respond to the incentives and punishments the electoral system provides. There is another approach, however, which stresses the socio-economic determinants of party formation. According to this approach, parties are rooted in social and economic cleavages. The main lines of division in society become the main lines of division in partisan politics. It is important to recognize that Duverger did not describe his law as a deterministic truth that holds true in all contexts and despite all other effects. He argues, in effect, that his law is true if all other things are equal: "The electoral system works in the direction of bipartism; it does not necessarily and absolutely lead to it in spite of all

¹³ Duverger, *Political Parties*, 225.

¹⁴ Riker, 762-764; See Gary W. Cox, *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) for an extended treatment of this point.

¹⁵ Riker, 764-765, argues that further research into the behaviour of party elites is the direction further research into Duverger's psychological effect must go. For attempts to proceed along these lines, see Andre Blais and R.K. Carty, "The psychological impact of electoral laws: Measuring Duverger's elusive factor," *British Journal of Political Science* 21 (1991): 79-93.

obstacles. The basic tendency combines with many others which attenuate it, check it, or arrest it."¹⁶

The cleavages approach, with its emphasis on the social determinants of party system formation, is best typified by an influential article written by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. In it, they trace the development of party systems to the various cleavage structures in society.¹⁷ In their study of the relationship between issue dimensions and the number of parties in parliament, Taagepera and Grofman apply this approach to the question of the number of parties more directly.¹⁸ They expand the work of Lijphart who attempted to describe the issue dimensions that divide developed democracies.¹⁹ Taagepera and Grofman argue that the number of parties in a nation's parliament is equal to the number of issue dimensions which divide a nation, plus one. Thus, a nation with one dimension spawns two parties, each of which is on one side of the issue. They conclude that the number of issue dimensions alone can account for the number of parties present, irrespective of the electoral system in use. They do note, however, that the electoral system seems to be related to the issue dimensions somehow.

¹⁶ Duverger, *Political Parties*, 228.

¹⁷ Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: An introduction," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York: Free Press, 1967), 1-64.

¹⁸ Rein Taagepera and Bernard Grofman, "Rethinking Duverger's law: Predicting the effective number of parties in plurality and PR systems -- Parties minus issues equals one," *European Journal of Political Research* 13 (1985): 341-352.

¹⁹ Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 127-149.

in that every country with more than two and a half issue dimensions uses multi-member districts.²⁰

This relationship between issue dimensions and the number of parties that Taagepera and Grofman explore provides an important challenge to the idea that electoral systems are central determinants of the number of parties present in a political system. This socio-economic argument, however, may ignore the role that parties themselves play in structuring political conflict in a political system, in as much as it portrays parties as responding to societal influences. Parties can draw attention to certain issues and highlight certain lines of division in a nation while downplaying other potentially relevant cleavages.²¹ Put another way, issue dimensions may not be independent of the number of parties. A large number of parties may emphasize an even larger number of dimensions of conflict in an attempt to distinguish themselves from each other. Thus, the number of issue dimensions may be high in a nation, but this may be the result rather than the cause of having a high number of parties.

Giovanni Sartori suggests a distinction that may provide a way to combine the two approaches. He distinguishes between electoral systems that are relatively strong and those that are relatively feeble. Proportional representation systems, argues Sartori, have less effect on the translation of votes into seats. Indeed, the more proportional an electoral system is, the less its effect on the number of parties will be. In other words, PR systems are relatively feeble. Single-member plurality systems, on the other hand, have a

²⁰ Taagepera and Grofman, 350.

²¹ Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, *Crisis, Challenge, and Change*, rev. ed. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988), chapter 1 make this argument to explain the absence of class politics in Canada, suggesting that a class party may be an essential prerequisite for the emergence of class politics in Canada, rather than the other way around.

very strong effect on the number of parties, thereby putting a brake on the emergence and flourishing of multiple parties.²²

Building on this, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that a proportional representation electoral system will not stand in the way of more parties forming if there is a suitable issue basis for parties to emerge. Plurality systems, on the other hand, are likely to have an effect on the number of parties by limiting their numbers, even if there are issue bases for more parties to emerge. In a plurality system, third parties are likely to remain relatively small and have trouble establishing themselves as alternatives to the more established parties. Electoral systems thus serve as important gate-keeping institutions in the translation of issue dimensions into partisan conflict. Grofman and Taagepera hypothesize that a combination of multiple issue dimensions and a plurality electoral system will result in the emergence of two or three effective parties, while multiple issue dimensions in a proportional representation system will result in three or more parties.²³

While much of Duverger's evidence was anecdotal and impressionistic, more systematic examinations of the relationship between the number of parties and electoral systems conform to the expectation that proportional representation systems are associated with larger numbers of parties. Rae found that the electorate and parliamentary representation were more fractionalized in countries with PR than in countries using plurality or majoritarian formulae and he concluded that "multipartism is more common and more extreme under proportional representation than under first-past-the-post

²² Giovanni Sartori, "Political development and political engineering," in J.D. Montgomery and A.O. Hirschmann, eds., *Public Policy*, vol. 17 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 278-284; Giovanni Sartori, "The influence of electoral systems: Faulty laws or faulty method?" in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds., *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences* (New York: Agathon, 1986), 57-63.

²³ Taagepera and Grofman, 344.

systems."²⁴ Taagepera and Shugart confirmed this conclusion, finding that plurality systems have lower numbers of parties than do systems of proportional representation.²⁵

One of the most debated questions in the literature over electoral systems is whether proportional representation multiplies the number of parties present in an electoral system. Early critics, such as F.A. Hermens, suggested that PR would multiply the number of parties dramatically, thus fragmenting the political system and reducing its stability.²⁶ What is surprising in this literature is the relative absence of systematic studies of transitions between electoral systems. Taagepera and Shugart consider the case of Denmark which adopted PR nationwide in 1920 to see if the switch in electoral systems resulted in a multiplication of parties. The evidence from Denmark suggests that the adoption of PR did not result in appreciably more parties than were already present. The greatest increase in the number of parties came under the plurality rule just prior to the adoption of PR. The evidence from Sweden seems to suggest that the number of parties increases with the adoption of PR, since the number of parties rose steadily after Sweden's electoral reform in 1908. Taagepera and Shugart argue, however, that this increase in the number of parties was the result of the emergence of a new urban-rural issue dimension and a split of parties on the Left after the Russian Revolution, rather than the adoption of proportional representation. Their point is buttressed by the fact that the number of parties in Sweden had declined by 1940 to a level very close to what it was prior to the adoption of PR.²⁷ Shamir's more systematic statistical study of the effects of

²⁴ Rae, 98. See Arend Lijphart, "The political consequences of electoral laws, 1945-85," *American Political Science Review* 84 (1990): 488-491 for an updated discussion of Rae's findings.

²⁵ Taagepera and Shugart, *Seats & Votes*, 81-85.

²⁶ F.A. Hermens, *Democracy or Anarchy? A Study of Proportional Representation* (South Bend, Ill.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1941).

²⁷ Taagepera and Shugart, *Seats & Votes*, 148-153.

changes in electoral systems in six European countries confirms Taagepera and Shugart's analysis. He concluded that while, on balance, the adoption of PR resulted in more parties, these parties were so small as to have very little effect on the overall fractionalization of the electoral system.²⁸

Measuring the number of parties

Shamir's argument raises the methodological question of how best to measure the number of parties, their size, and relevance in the political system. Determining the number of parties can be a difficult thing to do in any party system. Answering the question "How many parties are there?" requires us to make some very fine distinctions between what is and is not a relevant party.²⁹ One approach is to include all parties that contest an election, regardless of their size. While this seems to be the most complete determination of the number of parties in a party system, it can also serve to obscure the way the party system actually works. This approach would consider a party that contested every seat and which controls a majority of the seats in the legislature to be equivalent to one that may have contested only one or two seats and earned a tiny fraction of the popular vote. This does not seem to give an intuitive or fair reflection of the way in which the party system actually operates. Alternatively, we could limit ourselves to only those parties that have earned seats in the legislature. This seems more reasonable, but again gives parties with a majority of seats the same weight as small parties with only a handful of seats. This only transfers the measurement problem from the electorate to the legislature.

²⁸ Michal Shamir, "Changes in electoral systems as 'interventions:' Another test of Duverger's hypothesis," *European Journal of International Research* 13 (1985): 1-10.

²⁹ See Lijphart, *Democracies*, 115-123 for a discussion of this problem.

A second approach is to establish a cut-off point that sets the minimum level of support a party needs to be considered relevant. This technique might lead us to exclude all parties that do not receive at least ten or fifteen percent of the vote, for example.³⁰ This has the obvious benefit of removing from consideration those parties that are so small that they are largely irrelevant to the operation of the party system. While this approach is intuitive, it is essentially arbitrary. If we use a fifteen percent threshold, why is a party with fifteen percent of the vote necessarily more relevant to the party system than a party that receives fourteen percent of the vote? Furthermore, the determination of the number of parties can vary dramatically, depending on the threshold adopted.

A third approach is to weigh each party's size according to its strength in the electorate or in the legislature. Parties with a large share of the votes or seats will count for more than relatively small parties. Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera developed this approach into a measure called the effective number of parties. The effective number of parties is the reciprocal of the sum of the squares of the vote or seat fractions held by each party. Expressed as an equation, the effective number of parties is measured as follows:

$$N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2}$$

In this formula, "p_i" is the proportion of seats and votes for a party.³¹ In any situation where a number of parties win equal shares of the vote, the value of N will be equal to the actual number of parties. For example, in a situation of perfect two-party competition,

³⁰ The 10% threshold was used by Terence H. Qualter, "Seats and votes: An application of the cube law to the Canadian electoral system," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 1 (1968): 340 in his analysis of the Canadian electoral system.

³¹ Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, "'Effective number of parties: A measure with application to West Europe,'" *Comparative Political Studies* 12 (1979): 3-27.

that is, where there are only two parties and each party has 50% of the vote, N will yield a result of 2 as:

$$N = \frac{1}{(0.5 \times 0.5) + (0.5 \times 0.5)} = 2$$

The effective number of parties measure returns values that are remarkably intuitive. N is superior to measures that set an arbitrary cut-off point because the number of parties decreases gradually as support for smaller parties diminishes, rather than the dramatic drop in number of parties that results when the cut-off point is reached.³² Another advantage of N is that it is related to other measures of concentration, most notably Rae's measure of fractionalization, " F ," which he used in his influential cross-national study of electoral systems. That measure is based on the probability of randomly selecting two individuals who voted for different parties and is calculated as follows:³³

$$F = 1 - \left(\sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2 \right)$$

Since both F and N rely on the sum of the squares of the vote or seat shares won by the various parties, it is quite clear that the two measures are related mathematically. The relationship is:³⁴

$$N = \frac{1}{(1 - F)}$$

While Rae's fractionalization index conveys the same information as the effective number of parties and provides an index that ranges from 0 to 1, N is preferable because it is more intuitive. It is easier to envision a value of two effective parties as opposed to the fractionalization index of 0.5.

³² Taagepera and Shugart, *Seats & Votes*, 79.

³³ Rae, 53-58.

³⁴ Taagepera and Shugart, *Seats & Votes*, 80.

The measure “ N ” is not without its problems. It does result in a loss of detail and can give a misleading impression of the partisan situation. For example, a situation in which there are three parties with equal levels of support will return the same effective number of parties (3.0) as a situation in which there is one large party with 57% of the support, a small party with one percent of the vote, and 21 other small parties, each with two percent of the vote. It is obvious that the two situations are quite different, but the “effective number of parties” measure equates them. However, as Taagepera and Shugart argue, such a loss of detail is inevitable in any attempt to reduce a complex set of information into one number.³⁵ Hence, it is important to supplement N with other descriptions of the number of parties and not rely exclusively on the “effective number of parties” reasoning.

One final important step in measuring the effective number of parties is to distinguish between the number of electoral parties and the number of parliamentary parties. The effective number of electoral parties (N_v) is determined through calculations based on the proportions of the vote that each party receives. The effective number of parliamentary parties (N_p) is determined through calculations from the parties’ legislative representation. It is important to consider both when trying to understand the impact of electoral reform as a switch in electoral system may affect the number of electoral parties but not the number of parliamentary parties, or vice versa.

Alberta and Manitoba as Test Cases

The Manitoba and Alberta cases provide an excellent opportunity to test hypotheses about the relationship between electoral formulae and the number of parties. Not only do they represent cases of a shift from a relatively disproportional plurality electoral system to a more proportional STV system, but they also allow for an

³⁵ Taagepera and Shugart, *Seats & Votes*, 259-260.


examination of the effects of a shift back to the plurality system. Furthermore, the use of STV was over a period of time long enough to allow any change in the number of parties to manifest itself. Since the Alberta and Manitoba cases happened simultaneously, we also have the opportunity to test the effects of a shift in electoral formula in two different social contexts.

The Impact of the Hare System

As discussed earlier, there is reason to expect that the adoption of the Hare form of STV in the major cities of Alberta and Manitoba would have resulted in an increase in the effective number of parties. Figure 11 shows the effective number of electoral (N_v) and parliamentary (N_s) parties in Winnipeg over time. As the graph indicates, a dramatic increase in the number of electoral parties accompanied the adoption of STV in Winnipeg. The effective number of electoral parties shot up from around three in 1915, the last plurality election to about four and a half in 1920 and around five and a half in 1922.

Figure 11

The Effective Number of Parties in Winnipeg, 1899-1966



While the number of electoral parties fluctuated while the city used STV, the number of parties remained quite high until the return to the plurality system after 1953. On average, there were about two and a half effective electoral parties in Winnipeg prior to 1920; after the adoption of STV, the number jumped to about four and a half effective electoral parties in Winnipeg. After the return to the plurality system in 1958, roughly three electoral parties contested seats in Winnipeg. The evidence from Winnipeg seems to support the contention of those who argue that the adoption of more proportional electoral systems multiplies the number of parties present.

While STV and a larger number of electoral parties coincided, it would be a mistake to attribute all of this increase in the competitiveness of the party system in Winnipeg to the adoption of STV. As discussed above, there are many things that shape party systems. There were many factors besides STV which may have influenced the number of parties in Winnipeg at this time. Most significantly, the 1920 election was the first provincial election after the Winnipeg General Strike. This increased the salience of class-based cleavages in Manitoba, as the dramatic surge in support for labour candidates in the 1920 election indicates. For the province as a whole, 3.3% of voters cast ballots for labour candidates in the 1915 election. In 1920, 17.7% of voters supported labour candidates. In Winnipeg, this pattern is even stronger. In 1915, labour candidates received 6.6% of the vote while in 1920, they polled 33.1% of the vote. More evidence for the increased salience of class divisions is the increase in the number of candidates who declared a labour affiliation on the ballot. In 1915, only three candidates (two of those in Winnipeg) ran under the labour banner; in 1920, eighteen candidates (including ten in Winnipeg) ran as labour candidates. Class politics remained salient throughout the period

using STV, as the work of Nelson Wiseman and Wayne Taylor on the relative salience of class and ethnic voting in the city demonstrates.³⁶

The long-term trend in the effective number of electoral parties in Figure 11 supports this interpretation of the evolution of Winnipeg's party system. The effective number of parties spikes upward in 1920, peaks in 1922, after which the secular trend is toward a decreased number of parties. This trend reflects the evolution of labour politics in Manitoba. Wormsbecker describes the emergence of labour politics in 1920, the fragmentation of the labour movement in 1922, and the decline in labour's political fortunes after 1927.³⁷ The dramatic emergence of labour's political power in 1920 increased the number of parties. The rivalries between different factions in the labour movement fragmented the labour vote further in 1922, elevating the effective number of parties even higher in that election. After 1922, labour's support consolidated around the Independent Labour Party, and later the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, which decreased the effective number of electoral parties. Further evidence of a social rather than an institutional basis for the increase in the number of electoral parties is the increase in the number of parties in rural Manitoba in 1920, despite its continued use of the plurality rule (See Figure 16, below). It is impossible to conclude, then, that the shift to a more proportional electoral system had any direct multiplicative effect on the number of

³⁶ Nelson Wiseman and K.W. Taylor, "Voting in Winnipeg during the Depression," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 19 (1982): 215-236; K.W. Taylor and Nelson Wiseman, "Class and ethnic voting in Winnipeg: the case of 1941," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 14 (1977): 174-187; Nelson Wiseman and K.W. Taylor, "Ethnic vs class voting: The case of Winnipeg, 1945," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 7 (1974): 314-328; Nelson Wiseman and K. Wayne Taylor, "Class and ethnic voting in Winnipeg during the Cold War," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 16 (1979): 60-76.


³⁷ Kathleen O'Gorman Wormsbecker, "The rise and fall of the labour political movement in Manitoba, 1919-1927" (M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1977).

electoral parties. If STV had any effect on the number of electoral parties, it was likely limited to exacerbating the increase in the number of parties rather than being the sole cause.

The number of parliamentary parties (N_p) in Winnipeg shows more evidence of the effect of STV than does the number of electoral parties. Obviously, the number of parliamentary parties is related closely to the number of electoral parties; representation in parliament is not possible without electoral support. The improved proportionality of the Hare system meant that the number of parliamentary parties reflected the higher number of parliamentary parties more faithfully than would have been the case under the plurality system. There were, on average, 1.8 parliamentary parties in Winnipeg before the adoption of STV. While the Hare system was in place, there were almost four parliamentary parties.

Figure 12

The Relative Reduction in the Number of Parties in Winnipeg, 1899-1966




After the return to the plurality system, there were just over two effective parties representing Winnipeg in the Manitoba legislature. While STV was in use, there was a fairly close correspondence between the number of parliamentary and electoral parties. Figure 12 graphs the relative reduction in the effective number of parties in Winnipeg from 1899 to 1966. It shows the percentage of effective parties eliminated by the working of the electoral system.³⁸ While there are significant fluctuations from election to election within both plurality and the Hare system, the average values for the relative reduction of the number of parties while the Hare system was in use are about half of those from when the plurality rule was in effect. On average, the plurality system eliminated about 29% of the effective parties from 1899 to 1915 and 31% from 1958 to 1966. The Hare system in Winnipeg eliminated an average of 14% of the effective parties.

Turning to Calgary (Figure 13) and Edmonton (Figure 14), we see an interesting contrast that confirms the earlier analysis of the Winnipeg results. In both cities, the use of the Hare system did not, on average, lead to a dramatic increase in the number of electoral parties. Calgary averaged 2.9 electoral parties in the periods it used plurality, both before and after the use of STV. During the period in which the Hare system was in use, an average of 3.0 effective electoral parties contested elections, a negligible increase. Edmonton provides a little more evidence of an increase in the number of parties after the adoption of the Hare system. From 1905 to 1921, an average of 2.5 effective parties contested elections in Edmonton. While STV was in use, an average of 3.4 effective electoral parties were present. When the city returned to the plurality rule in 1959, the number of effective electoral parties averaged 3.1. In neither place did the Hare increase the number of electoral parties in any dramatic way.

³⁸ The relative reduction of the number of effective parties is calculated as follows: $(N_v - N_s)/N_v$.

Figure 13


The Effective Number of Parties in Calgary, 1905-1967



The experience of Edmonton and Calgary in comparison with Winnipeg suggests that STV does not necessarily increase in the number of parties. To the contrary, the large increase in the number of electoral parties in Alberta's major cities came in 1921, one election before the adoption of the Hare system. This increase was likely due to the re-aligning character of the 1921 election in Alberta politics, as it marked the transition from the first Liberal-dominated party system to the second party system, dominated by the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA). Although the UFA did not contest any of Calgary's five seats in 1921 and ran only one candidate in Edmonton in that election, the 1921 election was still one of those rare elections in Alberta that resulted in a change in government. This likely increased the number of electoral parties in both major cities.

Figure 14

The Effective Number of Parties in Edmonton, 1905-1967



Furthermore, Manitoba was not the only province to feel the effects of labour militancy, as Alberta also saw an increase in the number of labour candidates and support in 1921. Table 16 demonstrates the increase in the political strength of labour candidates leading up to the 1921 election. This suggests that the salience of class divisions in electoral politics also increased in Alberta and likely contributed to the increase in the effective number of electoral parties.

One possible explanation is that the increase in district magnitude in all three cities may have increased the effective number of electoral parties. In 1921, Edmonton and Calgary both elected five members, switching from single-member districts. The 1920 election in Winnipeg also marked the emergence of a larger district magnitude of ten, a

Table 16

Labour* candidacies and support in Edmonton and Calgary, 1913-1921

Year	Edmonton		Calgary	
	% of cand	% of votes	% of cand	% of votes
1913	0	0	14.3%	2.6%
1917	12.5%	1.9%	28.5%	24.9%
1921	34.6%	20.5%	30.0%	32.4%

* - includes Labour, Independent Labour, and Socialist Labour candidates

shift from the six single-member districts of 1915. It is possible that the increase in district magnitude may be the factor that increases the number of electoral parties. The evidence in this study cannot definitively rule out this possibility. It does, however, appear unlikely as in the two Alberta cities, the effective number of electoral parties quickly dropped off in Calgary and varied around values close to those seen in the period when the city returned to the single-member plurality system. In Edmonton as well, the number of effective electoral parties declined, albeit much more slowly than in Calgary. By 1935, it was at the levels close to those seen after 1955. If the larger district magnitude was the factor leading to large numbers of parties, we would expect the number of electoral parties to have remained high throughout the period in which the Hare system was in use.

The pattern of the number of effective parliamentary parties in Edmonton and Calgary also seems to confirm the conclusions drawn from the situation in Winnipeg. The more proportional Hare system affected N_e in both cities as it translated voter preferences more faithfully than did the plurality system. In both Calgary and Edmonton, the number of parliamentary parties increased with the adoption of the Hare system and stayed at relatively high levels throughout the period of its use. In Edmonton, every election using the Hare system returned a higher number of effective parliamentary parties than any of the plurality elections in the time periods under consideration. In Calgary, the difference is

less stark, but still significant. Table 17 indicates the average number of effective parliamentary parties in both cities. In Calgary, there was an average of one more parliamentary party during the period using the Hare system than was the case in the plurality period. In Edmonton, the use of STV increased the number of parliamentary parties by two and a half times, a very dramatic effect.

Table 17


Average Number of Parliamentary Parties in Edmonton and Calgary

Period	System	Calgary	Edmonton
1905-1921	Plurality	1.7	1.2
1926-1955	Hare	2.6	2.8
1959-1967	Plurality	1.6	1.1

The number of parliamentary parties increased much more dramatically than the number of electoral parties. In Edmonton and Calgary, the plurality system had a brutal impact on the number of parliamentary parties in both relative and absolute terms. In the 1905-1921 period, the number of electoral parties was on average 1.2 and 1.3 effective parties higher than the number of parliamentary parties in Calgary and Edmonton, respectively. In the 1959-1967 period, the number of electoral parties was 1.2 and 2.0 effective parties higher in the two cities. During the 1926-1955 period, the Hare system reduced the number of effective parties by an average of only 0.4 parties in Calgary and 0.5 parties in Edmonton. Figure 15 shows the relative reduction in the number of parties for both cities. In Calgary, the plurality electoral system reduced the effective number of parties by 41% and 43%, from 1905-1921 and 1959-1967, respectively. In Edmonton, the number of parties was reduced by 43% and 64% in the periods before and after the Hare system was in use. In contrast, while the Hare system was in use, the relative reduction of

Figure 15

The Relative Reduction in the Number of Parties,
Edmonton and Calgary, 1905-1967



the effective number of parties was 14% in both cities. The Hare system was much more faithful in translating the diversity of partisan choices into legislative representation than was the plurality system.

The effect on the effective number of parliamentary parties was more pronounced in Edmonton and Calgary than in Winnipeg. The combination of Alberta's tendency towards overwhelming legislative majorities and the single-member plurality system led to many extreme reductions in the number of parties. Manitoba's more competitive party system seems to have produced less electoral distortion than in Alberta and thus the effects of the adoption of STV, while still noticeable, are less striking. The gap between N_e and N_p is less severe in Winnipeg (Figure 11) in the plurality periods than was found in the plurality periods in Calgary (Figure 13) and Edmonton (Figure 14). This accounts in

turn for the lower reductions in the effective number of parties in Winnipeg (Figure 12) than in Edmonton and Calgary (Figure 15).

The increase in the number of parliamentary parties in the three major cities meant that Edmonton, Calgary, and Winnipeg's representatives in the legislatures were more diverse than would have been the case had the plurality rule been in use. This not only meant that Liberals or Conservatives did not exclusively represent these cities, but also that candidates from smaller parties won periodically and further increased the diversity of perspectives. While Alberta's less competitive party system limited the opportunities for smaller parties, it was still possible for Labour and Independent Labour candidates to become elected under the more proportional Hare system. That would not have been the case without the Hare system. Winnipeg was even more diverse, with representatives from a variety of labour groups earning representation. Winnipeg routinely elected Communist and Labour-Progressive MLAs from 1936 on; the success of these candidates was likely due to the Hare system, since after Winnipeg returned to plurality in 1958, Communist and Labour Progressive candidates never won another seat.


The Impact of the Alternative Vote

While the Hare system seems to have played a role in structuring the character of party competition in the three major cities, what effect did the use of alternative voting have on party competition in the rural areas of Manitoba and Alberta? The effective numbers of electoral and parliamentary parties in rural Manitoba are graphed over time in Figure 16. There were wide fluctuations in these measures in the period under study. The use of AV does not seem to have significantly affected either the numbers of electoral or parliamentary parties in rural Manitoba. As noted earlier, one of the largest increases occurred in 1920, two elections before the first use of AV. This suggests a societal, rather than an institutional cause. The increase likely reflects the emergence of a farmers' movement and the political activism of labour. The 1920 election shattered the two-party

system; from this election on, there were around three effective electoral parties in competition in rural Manitoba. There is significant fluctuation in the number of electoral parties while the rural areas used AV. It is difficult to attribute this to the alternative voting system, as this period also saw significant political realignments with parties joining and leaving the Progressive-led coalition. The peak in the number of parties in 1949 represents the fragmentation of the coalition government as increasing number of Conservatives ran as independents in opposition to the coalition, increasing the effective number of electoral parties. (See Appendix B). While AV is associated with a slightly higher number of electoral parties, Manitoba's competitive and fluid party system accounts for much of the fluctuation.

The number of parliamentary parties shows a similar trend. After a surge in 1920, N_p dropped dramatically and fluctuated around two and a half to three parties. One

Figure 16
The Effective Number of Parties in Rural Manitoba, 1899-1966




interesting feature of Figure 16 is the discrepancy between the number of electoral and parliamentary parties. Up to and including the 1920 election, the numbers of electoral and parliamentary parties were very similar. From 1922 on, parliamentary and electoral parties diverged significantly. Alternative voting does not appear to have affected the correspondence between these two measures. Indeed, the performance of the system under AV differs little from the results under the plurality rule after the 1953 election.

In short, the alternative vote system in Manitoba appears to have had a negligible impact on the number of parties in rural Manitoba. The increased and fluctuating numbers of electoral and parliamentary parties in the province seem to reflect the impact of the UFM/Progressive movement and the character of coalition politics in Manitoba. AV does not appear to have been determinative in rural Manitoba.

Figure 17

The Effective Number of Parties in Rural Alberta, 1905-1967



The evidence from rural Alberta corroborates the conclusions from Manitoba. The effects of AV on party competition in rural Alberta are evident in Figure 17. As in Manitoba, the use of AV appears to have had virtually no impact on the effective number of parliamentary or electoral parties. It is interesting to note the relatively less competitive party system in Alberta in Figure 17 when compared to Figure 16. The effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties is consistently lower in Alberta than in Manitoba and the gap between N_e and N_p is particularly pronounced. For several of the elections, the number of effective parliamentary parties is one or slightly over one which indicates that one party (Social Credit) won every or almost every seat in rural Alberta. Figure 17 portrays a slight long-term increase in the effective number of electoral parties. Over time, Alberta's party system was becoming more competitive. The majoritarian AV and

Figure 18

The Relative Reduction in the Number of Parties in Rural Manitoba, 1899-1966





Figure 19

The Relative Reduction in the Number of Parties in Rural Alberta, 1905-1967



plurality systems generally masked this trend, however, since the number of parliamentary parties does not display a similar secular trend. The only election that reflects the increased competitiveness of the party system was the 1955 election, which was also the only election in which AV had a discernable effect, as we will see in Chapter 6.

Alternative voting appears, then, to have had almost no impact on the character of party competition in the rural areas. The effective number of parties appears to have been unaffected by the adoption of STV. Table 18 shows the average number of electoral and parliamentary parties for Alberta and Manitoba in all three periods. As can be seen, any changes in the number of parties are part of a secular trend toward greater numbers of parties. Furthermore, in neither Alberta nor Manitoba was AV an effective electoral system for more accurately translating voter preferences into diverse parliamentary

representation. The relative reduction in the effective number of parties for rural Manitoba and rural Alberta is graphed in Figures 18 and 19, respectively. Manitoba displays wild fluctuations in this measure. Alternative voting does not differ from the plurality system in any systematic way. Alternative voting was capable both of dramatically reducing the number of parties (1932) and of more fairly reflecting the diversity of opinion in the electorate (1936). Alberta also displays significant fluctuations, but not nearly as wild as those in Manitoba. Alberta's reduction levels are much higher than Manitoba's, reflecting Social Credit's dominance of the party system. Figure 19 also reveals a long-term dampening effect in Alberta. Both AV and the plurality system prevented the increasing diversity at the electoral level from carrying through to the legislature. The evidence from both provinces indicates that the adoption of AV did not result in a lower reduction of the number of parties. Indeed, as Table 18 reveals, the average reduction in the number of parties under AV is indistinguishable from the record under plurality. Any differences are part of long-term trends in the evolution of the party system.

Table 18

Average Effective Number of Parties and Average Relative Reduction of the Number of Parties in Rural Manitoba and Alberta

Period	Manitoba			Alberta		
	Electoral parties	Parliamentary parties	Relative Reduction	Electoral parties	Parliamentary parties	Relative reduction
Pre AV	2.6	2.2	14%	2.2	1.4	34%
AV	3.6	2.7	24%	2.7	1.4	47%
Post AV	3.4	2.6	22%	2.7	1.1	57%

Conclusion

In some respects, electoral reform in Alberta and Manitoba appears to have had a significant impact on the character of party competition in those two provinces. The

adoption of the Hare system in Winnipeg was accompanied by a multiplication of electoral parties that seems to support Duverger's hypothesis that proportional representation causes multipartism. The evidence from Edmonton and Calgary, however, seems to support arguments against such a contention, as the number of electoral parties did not increase with the adoption of a more proportional electoral system. In fact, it is difficult to claim that the electoral formula is the decisive factor in determining the number of electoral parties. It is more accurate to say that choosing a more proportional electoral system will allow the emergence of new electoral parties if there is a sufficient social basis for them. In the case of Winnipeg in 1920, the aftermath of the General Strike led to an increase in the salience of class politics which sparked an increase in the voting support of labour candidates. This fragmented the party system and shattered the domination of the Liberal and Conservative parties. In Alberta, however, the adoption of the Hare system was not accompanied by the emergence of new social bases for party formation, thus a multiplication of parties did not occur.

The number of parliamentary parties seems to be more closely linked to the change in electoral systems. In all three cities, the adoption of the Hare system increased the number of parliamentary parties, in some cases quite substantially. The cities' parliamentary representation became more diverse and corresponded more closely to the electoral support of the various parties. This is evident in the drop that occurs in the relative reduction in the number of parties. While all electoral systems have a tendency to reduce the fragmentation in the legislature and hence the effective number of parliamentary parties, the Hare system seems to eliminate a much smaller proportion of the electoral parties. Typically, the Hare system eliminated only about 14% of the effective number of electoral parties in these instances while the plurality system eliminated at least twice that amount, on average. Still, the use of the Hare system did seem to have had a significant impact on the parliamentary representation of those cities.

These conclusions support the existence of Duverger's mechanical effect. The plurality system seems to have dampened the effective number of parties in the legislatures and limited the full expression of voter choice in their parliamentary representation. This effect is a mechanical result of the operation of the plurality rule. The evidence pertinent to Duverger's psychological effect is much less conclusive. If the psychological effect were determinative, we would expect that the adoption of a more proportional electoral system, such as the Hare system, would result in an increase in the effective number of electoral parties. This does not appear to have happened. At the same time, it is not clear that we can conclusively rule out the existence of the psychological effect, as the adoption of multi-member constituencies in all three cities seems to have resulted in a multiplication of the effective number of electoral parties.

While the Hare system seems to have made a difference in the operation of the party systems in both provinces, the same is not true about the alternative voting procedure. The use of AV in the rural constituencies appears to have had no impact on the number of electoral or parliamentary parties. Mirroring our conclusions about the effect of AV on proportionality, alternative voting does not seem to have any better a record at faithfully translating the concerns of the electorate than does the plurality system. Moreover, AV was equally effective at reducing the number of parties as the plurality system was.

The case studies of Alberta and Manitoba confirm the observations that have been made that electoral systems are only one of many influences on party systems. In most cases, their influence may not be decisive. The number of parties that are viable seems to be more of a function of society than the institutional arrangements of elections. More proportional electoral systems allow the emergence of more parties, but do not in themselves *cause* new parties to emerge. They also appear to allow new parties to be more faithfully represented in a polity's legislature, but their influence in that regard is

primarily mechanical. On this evidence, it seems clear that more proportional electoral systems do not necessarily multiply the number of parties in a political system. The threat of PR resulting in a multitude of very small, ideological parties fragmenting the political system does not seem to be borne out. Even the effective number of parliamentary parties, the party system variable that most clearly showed the effects of the electoral formula increased only very modestly and certainly within manageable levels. Hence, the fear that PR results in some form of political party anarchy is not supported by the evidence from the experiences of Manitoba and Alberta.

Chapter Six

The Endurance of Partisanship: Party Solidarity and Exclusivity

While the single transferable vote is often lumped together with proportional representation systems because of its propensity to return proportional election outcomes, it differs from other PR systems in that voters cast their ballots for candidates, not for parties. Thus, while STV is similar to other PR systems in outcomes, it differs substantially in process. Most PR systems rely on party lists; while some list systems allow some choice of candidates within party lists and even from the lists of other parties (*panachage* systems),¹ the primary choice facing a voter is which party to support. STV is qualitatively different in that voters do not have to indicate a preference for a particular party. Instead, they choose from among candidates and may cast their preferences for any combination of candidates from any combination of parties in any order they wish. For many proponents of STV, this is one of the most attractive features of the system. They see STV as a way to minimize party control over the electoral process as it gives voters the freedom to choose which candidates they will or will not support, maximizing voter control and choice.² A frequently unanswered question, however, is the extent to which

¹ Douglas J. Amy, *Real Choices / New Voices: The Case for Proportional Representation in the United States* (New York: Columbia, 1993), 227-228 provides a good overview of the different options available for list systems; See Gary W. Cox, *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Chapter 3 and Appendix A for a more detailed description.

² Nick Loenen, *Citizenship and Democracy: A Case for Proportional Representation* (Toronto: Dundurn, 1997), 125; Amy, 181; George H. Hallett, "Proportional representation with the single transferable vote: A basic requirement for

voters actually take advantage of this freedom. This chapter will examine the pattern on transfers in Alberta and Manitoba in order to determine the role of partisanship in STV elections.

The non-partisan traditions in Alberta and Manitoba

This feature of preferential voting is especially relevant in the context of Alberta and Manitoba politics in the period under consideration, since populism and non-partisanship were particularly popular ideas in the two provinces. The non-partisan climate was particularly pronounced in Manitoba after the 1922 election when the United Farmers of Manitoba (UFM) won a majority in the legislature. Despite all being elected as farmers, the UFM candidates were poorly organized and did not even have a leader in 1922. John Bracken became leader of this disparate group and the party ran as the Progressives from 1927 onwards. Throughout the 1930s, Bracken repeatedly invited the opposition parties to join the Progressives in a broad-based, non-partisan coalition government. The Liberals were the first to accept Bracken's offer and three Liberals joined the cabinet in 1931. In the election in 1932, Liberals and Progressives ran under a combined "Liberal-Progressive" label. After the 1936 election, the five Social Credit MLAs agreed to support the governing coalition. World War II increased pressure on the opposition parties to join the coalition, and in 1940, the Conservatives, CCF, and Social Credit all joined. The vast majority of candidates in the 1941 provincial election ran in support of this coalition, although there were several who ran against the coalition, including a few Conservatives and Social Credit candidates. Because of the collapse of

democratic elections," in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, eds., *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 119-120; Richard S. Katz, "The single transferable vote and proportional representation," in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman, eds., *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 141-142.

partisanship in the 1941 election, there were many acclamations. When Bracken left to become leader of the federal Conservative party in 1943, the CCF decided to withdraw from the coalition and was its primary opponent. The coalition splintered further in the 1949 election when a number of anti-coalition Conservatives were elected. In 1950, the Conservatives officially withdrew from the coalition, although not before several of their members crossed the floor of the legislature to join the Liberal-Progressive government. The 1953 election was fought more or less along party lines, although this non-partisan spirit in Manitoba did not really end until the defeat of the Liberal-Progressives in 1958.³

In his study of populist movements on the Canadian prairies, David Laycock identifies the Bracken-led coalition government as an example of “crypto-liberal” populist thought. The government’s goal was to provide fiscally sound, non-partisan government. The government would operate like a municipality, emphasizing administration, not politics. Laycock notes that this form of populism emphasizes technocratic decision-making rather than real popular participation.⁴

While Alberta did not display the utter collapse of partisanship that characterized Manitoba in this period, there was still a significant anti-party tradition that was at its peak during this time period. In his classic analysis of Alberta politics, C.B. Macpherson referred to Alberta’s party system as a “quasi-party” system to distinguish it from one-

³ On this period, see Rand Dyck, *Provincial Politics in Canada*, 3rd. ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1996), 401-404; Roger Gibbins, *Prairie Politics & Society: Regionalism in Decline* (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980), 124-126; T. Peterson, “Ethnic and class politics in Manitoba,” in Martin Robin, ed., *Canadian Provincial Politics: The Party Systems of the Ten Provinces* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 92-98; Nelson Wiseman, *Social Democracy in Manitoba: A History of the CCF-NDP* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1983), Chapter 2.

⁴ David Laycock, *Populism and Democratic Thought on the Canadian Prairies, 1910 to 1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 53-55.

party government and a situation where there are no parties.⁵ The United Farmers of Alberta, the party that implemented STV in Alberta, developed the first and most complete critique of partisanship. The theory of representation espoused by the UFA was explicitly against parties and proposed a system of functional representation to replace it.⁶ The UFA's "radical democratic populism"⁷ was hostile to partisan politics in principle and any role for parties. While Social Credit was not as radically populist as the UFA, its form of populism also stressed the irrelevance of parties. For Alberta, Social Credit functioned as *the* party — the way to express political preferences. After people had expressed their preferences, Social Credit would deliver the desired policies through the machinations of experts. While Social Credit's version of populism is essentially technocratic,⁸ partisan politics is still irrelevant in this situation. Policies are not delivered through political conflict between parties, but by one party listening to the people and delivering results, as typified by the Social Credit slogan: "Vote for results not schemes."⁹

As in the two provinces, Ireland, the most prominent country to use STV, also has an anomalous party system. While partisan conflict is fairly well developed in Ireland, it is essentially partisan conflict over nothing. The two dominant parties in Irish political life, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, trace their origins to a division over the treaty signed with the United Kingdom in the 1920s, a cleavage that is irrelevant today. Political conflict centres on the ability of local politicians to act as brokers, and patron-client relationships between

⁵ C.B. Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System*, 2nd. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 237-241.

⁶ Macpherson, 40-54; Gibbins, 133-134.

⁷ Laycock, Chapter 3.

⁸ Laycock, Chapter 5.

⁹ Cited in Macpherson, 152.

elected officials and voters.¹⁰ Politics in Ireland resemble municipal politics more than the national politics of other countries. STV complements such a party system because of its emphasis on candidates rather than cohesive parties.

In both provinces, then, STV operated in an atmosphere that was substantially different from the more established party systems found in the central and eastern parts of Canada. STV was very much in keeping with this atmosphere as it emphasized candidates, not parties. Given the freedom that STV gives to voters and the non-partisan predispositions in Alberta and Manitoba's political culture in this time period, we might expect voters in the two provinces to be relatively unconstrained by party lines in marking their ballots.

Party solidarity

One of the easiest ways to measure the strength of partisan attachment in the use of the STV ballot is to measure the extent of party solidarity. Party solidarity in an STV system is measured by the proportion of transfers that go to candidates of the same party if there are any that can receive transfers. For example, if a Liberal candidate drops out and has 2,000 ballots to transfer, and other Liberal candidates receive 1,500 of those ballots, the solidarity ratio would be 0.75. As Michael Gallagher points out, high levels of party solidarity are indicative of healthy and vital parties, while low levels of party solidarity indicate parties with weak organizations. In a case of low solidarity, candidates likely rely on their own merits as much as or more than the party for their electoral

¹⁰ R.K. Carty, "Politicians and electoral laws: An anthropology of party competition in Ireland," *Political Studies* 4 (1980): 550-566.

appeal.¹¹ Solidarity, then, measures the extent to which parties are “real” for voters and the extent to which party considerations guide the decisions of voters.

Table 19 shows the combined solidarity ratios for all parties in Alberta and Manitoba. The transfers of the ballots of independent candidates have been excluded from these tables as there is no reason to expect a partisan basis for the transfer patterns in those cases. Furthermore, in a few cases, the returning officers took advantage of provisions of the electoral law (see Chapter 3) to combine the transfer of votes from candidates when they received relatively few votes. In those situations, it is impossible to determine which votes came from which candidates. The number of ballots in those situations is relatively small and thus has very little effect on the analysis.

Table 19
Solidarity ratios for Alberta and Manitoba cities, 1920-1955

Manitoba		Alberta			
Year	Winnipeg	Year	Calgary	Edmonton	Cities combined
1920	0.575	1926	0.831	0.788	0.806
1922	0.592	1930	0.683	0.678	0.681
1927	0.625	1935	0.847	0.805	0.824
1932	0.723	1940	0.867	0.839	0.852
1936	0.676	1944	0.871	0.819	0.839
1941	0.474	1948	0.805	0.825	0.821
1945	0.626	1952	0.778	0.759	0.765
1949	0.568	1955	0.809	0.835	0.811
1953	0.619				
Total	0.611	Total	0.816	0.809	0.811
Avg.	0.609	Avg.	0.811	0.794	0.802

¹¹ Michael Gallagher, “Party solidarity, exclusivity and inter-party relationships in Ireland, 1922-1977: The evidence of transfers,” *Economic and Social Review* 10 (1978): 2-3.

Table 19 shows that, in both provinces, partisanship was an important predictor for the destination of transferred ballots. The majority of ballots transferred from eliminated or elected candidates go to candidates of the same party. While this is a broad similarity, there are contrasts between Alberta and Manitoba. In Manitoba, partisanship was not nearly as important in determining the destination of transfers. Just over 60% of transfers went to candidates from the same party. In comparison, Alberta's voters were considerably more consistent in their voting, choosing to transfer their ballots to candidates of the same party over 80% of the time. As Table 1 shows, this pattern holds in both Edmonton and Calgary; there is only about a half a percentage point difference between the two cities in their solidarity ratios.

The strength of partisanship in Alberta is somewhat surprising, given the non-partisan elements in the province's political culture.¹² In fact, the solidarity ratios of Alberta exceed those found in Ireland.¹³ They come closer to resembling the solidarity ratios of Malta, which uses STV in a situation with two strong and disciplined parties.¹⁴ As discussed earlier, however, there are important differences in the way populism manifested itself in the two provinces. In Alberta, partisanship never collapsed to the point where differences between parties ceased to be meaningful. Instead, Alberta's form of populism was, as Macpherson argued, "quasi-partisan." One party could accommodate political differences and would deliver the desired results.

¹² See Nelson Wiseman, "The pattern of prairie politics." in Hugh G. Thorburn, ed., *Party Politics in Canada*, 7th. ed. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1996), 440-443; Dyck, 509-510.

¹³ On Ireland, see Gallagher, 4.

¹⁴ See Wolfgang Hirczy de Miño, "Malta: STV in a two-party system." Paper presented to the Conference on Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine. 14-15 December 1996, 11.

The situation in Manitoba was much different. The Progressives were profoundly anti-partisan and wanted to see the province governed through a non-partisan cooperative coalition. The low solidarity ratios found in Manitoba in this period indicate that these ideas resonated with the voters of Manitoba and partisanship was less important in providing cues for voter behaviour. Not surprisingly, party solidarity was at its lowest point in 1941 when partisanship collapsed in the province and all of Manitoba's major parties joined the coalition. Solidarity dropped 20% from the preceding election and less than half of the transfers in that election went to candidates of the same partisan label. Coalition politics rendered partisan distinctions meaningless in that election. In 1945, the withdrawal of the CCF from the coalition seems to have returned some vigour to the party system in Manitoba as solidarity ratios rose to pre-coalition levels.

The differences between Alberta and Manitoba are also useful in helping to explain the differences in proportionality discovered in Chapter 4. Despite the fact that Winnipeg elected a relatively large number of MLAs in one district — ten — and we could thus expect that city to return more proportional electoral results, Chapter 4 showed that Alberta's elections were usually more proportional. The strong party solidarity shown by Alberta voters helps to explain this apparent contradiction. As discussed in Chapter 4, STV is mathematically equivalent to the highly proportional largest remainders party list form of proportional representation when all transfers remain within parties. The more that preferences are dispersed between parties on each count, the more the weight of ballots deviates from those expressed in first preferences. This introduces a degree of disproportionality. The relative weakness of party solidarity in Manitoba meant that a first preference vote cast for a candidate could not necessarily be considered a vote for that party. In Alberta, it is generally easier to make that assumption, given the high degree of solidarity. The result of this is a more proportional electoral outcome in Alberta than in Manitoba.

Not surprisingly, parties in each province differed in how disciplined their supporters were in marking their ballots. Supporters of some parties displayed remarkable solidarity and voted party lines quite consistently while supporters of other parties did not seem to be bound by party ties. Table 20 shows the party solidarity ratios for parties in Manitoba while Table 21 reports the same information for Alberta. Consistent with the aggregate findings reported above, party solidarity levels for Manitoba's political parties are consistently lower than those in Alberta. The ILP/CCF¹⁵ stands out with the highest

Table 20
Solidarity Ratios in Winnipeg, by party

Year	Liberal	Conservative	ILP/CCF	Progressive	Social Credit	Independent	Others *
1920	0.743	0.633				0.260	0.456
1922	0.564	0.703	0.591	0.487		0.228	0.547
1927	0.564	0.599	0.820	0.540		0.286	
1932	0.512	0.702	0.830	0.731		0.343	0.741
1936		0.777	0.807	0.537	0.611		
1941		0.357	0.651	0.429	0.312	0.033	0.236
1945		0.562	0.787	0.468			0.614
1949			0.658	0.504			
1953		0.540	0.588	0.665	0.677	0.183	
Avg.	0.596	0.609	0.717	0.545	0.533	0.171	0.514

* includes all parties for which solidarity ratios are available for only one election: Dominion Labour and Socialist Party of Canada in 1920, Union Labour and Workers' Party in 1922 (figures reported are average values), United Workers in 1932, Smart Money Economics in 1941, and Labour Progressive in 1945.

¹⁵ The Independent Labour Party and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Manitoba have been combined. The CCF largely grew out of the ILP in Manitoba. In fact, in the 1936 election, CCF candidates ran as ILP/CCF candidates to ease the transition to the new party and to minimize confusion for voters. Wiseman, *Social Democracy*, Chapter 1, discusses the formation of the CCF out of the ILP and the early tensions between the two groups.

level of solidarity of any Manitoba party; if they were competing in Alberta, their performance in retaining transfers would be unremarkable. This reinforces the conclusions reached above: Manitoba was considerably less partisan than Alberta. Table 20 also reveals the toll that the coalition years took on partisan identity in Manitoba. In 1941, the election featuring the coalition that included all major parties in the province, solidarity ratios for all parties dropped. The Manitoba Conservatives retained just over 35% of their transfers and Social Credit retained just over 31%. Even the normally consistent ILP/CCF retained fewer of its transfers.

Table 21
Solidarity Ratios in Edmonton and Calgary, by party

Year	Libe- ral	Conserv ative	Social Credit	CCF	Labour	Indepen dent	Labour Progres- sive	Ind. Social Credit
1926	0.752	0.789			0.849			
1930	0.597	0.761			0.654	0.154		
1935	0.847	0.675	0.957		0.681			
1940			0.877	0.737		0.921		
1944			0.845	0.873		0.850	0.689	
1948	0.700		0.849	0.817		0.621		0.143
1952	0.635	0.664	0.859	0.764				
1955	0.815	0.649	0.880	0.767				
Avg.	0.724	0.708	0.878	0.792	0.728	0.637	0.689	0.143

By contrast, Alberta parties were highly disciplined. One of the most striking features of Table 21 is the exceptionally high solidarity ratios of Social Credit supporters. On average, over 87% of the transfers of eliminated or elected Social Credit candidates went to other party candidates. In their first election, Social Credit retained almost 96% of all their transfers. Social Credit's solidarity ratios are considerably higher than other parties in Alberta. This finding is consistent with Gallagher's observation that Fianna Fail,

the dominant Irish party, retains the most transfers in Ireland's STV elections.¹⁶ This would seem to support a general conclusion that dominant parties do a better job of retaining transfers. The Liberal-Progressives in Manitoba, however, do not seem to be part of that general trend. Although they were the dominant party in Manitoba politics, Table 20 reveals that they retained just over half of their transfers. The difference between the Progressive movement in Manitoba and the Social Credit movement in Alberta seems to account for the willingness of the two parties' supporters to restrict their support for one party. As noted earlier, the Manitoba Progressives were more consistently non-partisan, holding that party labels should not matter. In Alberta, Social Credit's position can be characterized as saying that other parties do not matter. The result of these differences is that the Progressives in Manitoba retained fewer transfers than did the Social Credit party. A party's position in a party system does not seem to be sufficient to explain its solidarity ratios; organizational and ideological factors are also significant.¹⁷

In looking at Ireland, Gallagher concluded that minor parties perform more poorly than do major parties in retaining transfers. Furthermore, he found that minor parties tend to weaken as they get older.¹⁸ It is difficult to reach decisive conclusions on this point in Alberta and Manitoba, given the unique partisan situations of both provinces in this era. The Manitoba Liberal party and the Alberta Conservative party show tendencies that support Gallagher's conclusions, but other minor parties, such as the Alberta CCF, show no signs of weakening. It is difficult to reach comparable generalizations from the Canadian provinces for a couple of reasons. First, these results represent the behaviour of only a part of each province's voters, since the Hare system was limited to the major

¹⁶ Gallagher, 5.

¹⁷ Gallagher, 5, credits Fianna Fáil's "organisational superiority" for its solidarity.

¹⁸ Gallagher, 7.

cities. Second, provincial party systems are less “closed systems” than are national party systems such as that found in Ireland. Examples from neighbouring provinces or from national party organizations can sustain the solidarity of minor parties.

Finally, the solidarity ratio of independent candidates is interesting. There is no reason to expect any consistent pattern of transfer from independent candidates to other independent candidates. As Gallagher notes, the “solidarity” of independent candidates represents a benchmark of how we could expect STV to perform if party labels meant nothing.¹⁹ The Manitoba evidence in Table 20 is fairly typical and consistent with the experience in Ireland. Again, the Alberta experience is anomalous and shows high levels of solidarity even among independent candidates. In 1940, over 92% of the transfers from independent candidates went to other independent candidates, the highest solidarity ratio for that election! It is important to bear in mind, however, the relative scarcity of solidarity ratios from independent candidates from which we can draw conclusions. Furthermore, the high levels of solidarity in Alberta came during the two elections during World War II and the election immediately following the war. This likely disrupted normal voting patterns. The only non-wartime solidarity ratio among independent candidates came in 1930; its value of 15% is consistent with the experiences of Manitoba and other countries.

In summary, the solidarity ratios of both provinces show that the majority of transfers from eliminated and elected candidates was retained by those candidates' parties. There are some significant differences between political parties in Alberta and Manitoba that reflect the differences in the partisan situations of the two provinces. Despite the freedom afforded by the Hare system and the fact that non-partisanship was a significant element of Prairie political culture, most transfers stayed within parties. Even in

¹⁹ Gallagher, 8.

Manitoba, which saw the complete collapse of partisan differences in its legislature at one point, parties still retained 60% of transfers. The evidence from solidarity ratios leads to a conclusion that partisanship played a very important role in marking ballots.

Exclusivity

A second way to gauge the role of partisanship in elections using the Hare system is to measure exclusivity. Exclusivity refers to the extent that voters restrict their preferences to candidates from one party. It is measured by the proportion of ballots that become non-transferable upon the elimination of a party's last candidate. For example, if the final candidate from a party is eliminated and she has 1000 ballots available to transfer and 350 of those are non-transferable, this indicates that 35% of the voters chose not to indicate any preferences beyond those for that party, giving an exclusivity ratio of 0.35. While a small proportion of ballots might have become non-transferable in any case, there are usually much larger numbers of non-transferable ballots when there are no more candidates from that party eligible to receive transfers.

Gallagher's study of Ireland found relatively high levels of exclusivity among Irish voters, particularly among supporters of the largest parties. He suggests that such high levels of exclusivity might be due to voters who are indifferent as to which candidates win besides those of their favorite party, or because voters demonstrate their general contempt for all other parties and candidates. While Gallagher argues that these explanations have some merit, he concludes that the primary reason for exclusivity is that Irish voters do not fully understand the workings of the Hare system. He notes that the Hare system does not reward or necessitate strategic voting and argues that, in many cases, it is worthwhile for voters to award their lower preferences in the way most supportive of their party.²⁰ Gallagher does not, however, provide any evidence for

²⁰ Gallagher, 9-12.

ignorance as the motivation behind voter tendencies to restrict their preferences to one party.

Table 22 reports exclusivity ratios from Winnipeg while Table 23 reports those measures for Edmonton and Calgary. For each party, the tables report the total exclusivity (the percentage of all votes cast in all elections that became non-transferable) and the average exclusivity (the average exclusivity in each election). The aggregate totals for each city and province are broken down by total exclusivity (the total number of votes that became non-transferable upon elimination of a party) and the average exclusivity (the

Table 22

Exclusivity ratios in Winnipeg

Party	Total Exclusivity	Average Exclusivity
Social Credit	0.473	0.433
Conservative	0.468	0.468
Progressives	0.410	0.408
Labour Progressive	0.392	0.392
Communist	0.368	0.287
Independent Liberal	0.355	0.355
Liberal	0.297	0.369
ILP/CCF	0.291	0.174
Smart Money	0.271	0.271
Economics		
Independent Labour	0.254	0.254
Workers' Party	0.128	0.128
Labour	0.116	0.116
Socialist Party of Canada	0.106	0.106
Socialist	0.091	0.091
Union Labour	0.048	0.048
Ex-Soldiers and Sailors	0.037	0.037
Dominion Labour Party	0.024	0.024
Social Democrats	0	0
Winnipeg Total	0.345	0.288

average value of each election). It is important to treat these tables with some caution as they are based on a limited number of cases. In several elections, parties did not have any candidates eliminated from contention and thus exclusivity ratios were unavailable. This is especially true of the larger parties.

Table 23

Exclusivity ratios in Edmonton and Calgary

Party	Edmonton		Calgary		Cities combined	
	Total	Average	Total	Average	Total	Average
Social Credit	n/a	n/a	0.644	0.584	0.644	0.584
Conservative	n/a	n/a	0.614	0.340	0.614	0.340
Liberal	0.458	0.369	0.696	0.696	0.567	0.478
CCF	0.542	0.439	n/a	n/a	0.542	0.439
Labour- Progressive	0.479	0.445	0.364	0.296	0.433	0.359
Labour	0.419	0.432	0.294	0.226	0.335	0.381
Communist	0.294	0.272	0.2	0.2	0.271	0.229
Ind. Liberal	0.246	0.246	n/a	n/a	0.246	0.246
Ind. Labour	n/a	n/a	0.184	0.101	0.184	0.101
UFA	0.099	0.035	n/a	n/a	0.099	0.035
Ind. Social Credit	n/a	n/a	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072
Ind. Progressive	0.058	0.058	n/a	n/a	0.058	0.058
Economic Restoration	0.010	0.010	n/a	n/a	0.010	0.010
Total	0.403	0.411	0.417	0.372	0.408	0.416

The data from Alberta and Manitoba cast doubt on Gallagher's conclusion that ignorance lies behind the high levels of exclusivity among voters in Hare system elections. The cities in Alberta had higher levels of exclusivity than did the city of Winnipeg. This is consistent with the higher levels of solidarity found in Alberta. In the province in which partisanship seemed to have played a larger role, exclusivity ratios are similarly high. This suggests that partisan motivations play a strong role in influencing voter exclusivity. Unless Alberta

voters understood the operation of the STV system significantly less well than their counterparts in Manitoba, it would be incorrect to attribute high exclusivity ratios to ignorance about the electoral system.

There are some interesting differences between the parties as well, particularly in the case of Manitoba. Winnipeg frequently featured large numbers of labour parties contesting elections (See Appendix B). The dominant ILP/CCF party was joined on occasion by Communist and other labour affiliations. Interestingly, while the ILP/CCF had the highest solidarity ratio of the four major parties in Manitoba, it had the lowest exclusivity ratio. When no ILP/CCF candidates were eligible to receive transfers, the ballots of the last eliminated candidate could be transferred to candidates of other labour parties. The reciprocal situation also held; the ILP/CCF was a tempting target for the transfers of other eliminated parties. In Alberta, the high exclusivity ratio of the Social Credit party reinforces the conclusion that Social Credit was a highly disciplined party and that voters in the province strongly felt the partisan lines between it and other parties.

A significant proportion of voters in both provinces, then, were relatively exclusive, despite the fact that the Hare system does not reward exclusivity. Alberta's higher exclusivity ratios are consistent with the higher solidarity ratios in that province. The exclusivity ratios in Alberta and Manitoba support the conclusion that partisanship played an important role in the voters' behaviour in this period, despite the non-partisan elements in the provinces' political cultures.

Partisanship and alternative voting in rural Alberta and Manitoba

Thus far, the analysis has concentrated on the role of partisanship in the Hare system. What role did partisanship play in the use of AV in rural Manitoba and Alberta? There are fewer opportunities for analysis because of the limitations of AV and the limitations in the available data. Alternative voting does not permit us to analyze solidarity which is an important indicator of the strength of partisan attachment. Since there was a

district magnitude of one and each party usually ran only one candidate, there is no opportunity to observe what proportion of the vote transferred from one candidate to another of the same party. However, we are able to measure exclusivity and the partisan relationships by observing which parties voters indicated upon the elimination of their preferred party or candidate. The second limitation is the quality of the data. In Alberta, we are limited to records which record only the first and last count. In situations where more than one candidate was eliminated, we are unable to determine how many of each candidate's votes became non-transferable and where they went. The Manitoba data are more complete, but there are situations where the records are of poor quality and unreliable. Furthermore, the transfer sheets for the 1941 election are unavailable.

Table 24 shows the aggregate exclusivity ratios for rural Alberta and Manitoba. Overall, these exclusivity ratios are quite high. Around half of the voters in the rural areas seem to have engaged in "plumping," the practice of indicating only one preference on their ballots. Another interesting finding is that, over time, both provinces saw increases in the incidence of plumping. This also casts doubt on Gallagher's assertion discussed earlier that high exclusivity ratios are the result of ignorance on the part of the electorate. It seems that voters, as they gained experience with AV, concluded that their later preferences made little difference in electoral outcomes.²¹ The 1953 election in Manitoba saw a slight reversal of that trend, perhaps reflecting the increased partisanship that the end of the coalition era brought about. Even in 1953, however, almost half of the voters plumped their ballots. The primary exception appears to be Alberta in 1955, when the

²¹ Ben Reilly and Michael Maley report similar results for Australia that allow voters to express less than a full set of preferences on their ballots. In both New South Wales and Queensland, the incidence of plumping has increased over time. See Ben Reilly and Michael Malley, "Single transferable vote and the alternative vote compared," Paper presented to the Conference on Australia, Ireland and Malta Under the Single Transferable Vote, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine, 14-15 December 1996, 14.

exclusivity ratio dropped to its lowest level for either province in any election. The 1955 election was significant because it was one of the few times opposition parties were able to break Social Credit's stranglehold on the province. The exclusivity ratio for the 1955 election is composed entirely of parties other than Social Credit; the low value reflects attempts by the opposition parties to use the alternative vote to improve their chances of defeating Social Credit candidates. In the four elections from 1940 to 1952, the CCF averaged an exclusivity ratio of 0.565; in 1955, their exclusivity ratio dropped to 0.232. In 1952, the Liberals' exclusivity ratio was 0.520; in 1955, it dropped to 0.346. In the 1955 election, opposition supporters seemed very conscious of the ways they could use alternative voting.

Table 24

Exclusivity ratios, rural Alberta and rural Manitoba

Manitoba		Alberta	
Year	Exclusivity	Year	Exclusivity
1927	0.429	1926	0.428
1932	0.564	1930	0.435
1936	0.592	1935	0.470
1941	n.a.	1940	0.380
1945	0.652	1944	0.637
1949	0.658	1948	0.637
1953	0.499	1952	0.523
		1955	0.298

The relationships between the parties in Alberta in 1955 reinforce these conclusions. On average, over 80% of transfers from CCF candidates went to Liberal candidates in 1955, a dramatic increase from the 38% that went to the Liberals in 1948 and the 58% that the Liberals received in 1952. The Liberals in turn transferred two-thirds of their transfers to CCF candidates in 1955. This continued a pattern established in 1952

when the CCF received about 60% of Liberal transfers. Usually, Social Credit was a popular destination for transfers from both the Liberals and the CCF. In 1944 and 1948, Social Credit received, on average, over 60% of CCF transfers; in 1948, the Liberals sent an average of over 80% of their transfers to Social Credit candidates. The 1955 election in Alberta stands out quite dramatically. Clearly, the Liberals and CCF were cooperating on their ballots in an attempt to defeat Social Credit candidates.

The Manitoba data does not display any such dramatic developments. Party supporters tended to transfer their votes in no clear pattern. There were only a few occasions where transfers followed any particular pattern. In 1927, the Conservatives were the predominant transfer destination for all parties except the Progressives who favoured the Liberals. In 1936, ILP/CCF voters transferred significant proportions of their ballots to Social Credit candidates when they were available, reflecting the party's attempted cooperation with Social Credit. In 1945, the Labour Progressives gave a disproportionate share of their transfers to CCF candidates. These cases of identifiable transfer patterns were relatively few, however, and electorally insignificant.

Did transfers make a difference in electoral outcomes in Manitoba and Alberta? As was discussed in Chapter 3, in the majority of cases in both provinces, multiple counts were not required to determine a winner. In most cases, the candidates ahead after the first count won the election. Table 25 lists the Manitoba cases where a candidate ahead on the first ballot lost in the end while Table 26 lists the same situations for Alberta. In Manitoba, the Progressives had the biggest problems retaining seats in 1927; this reflects the fact that the Conservatives seem to have been the Progressives' primary opposition in rural Manitoba and were a favorite destination for transfers from other parties, as discussed earlier.

Table 25**Rural Manitoba, victories through transfers, 1927-1953**

Election	Constituency	Seat gain	Seat loss
1927	Minnedosa Norden Springfield	Conservative Conservative Liberals	Progressive Progressive Progressive
1932	St. Boniface	Labour	Conservative
1936	none		
1941	none		
1945	none		
1949	none		
1953	Minnedosa	Social Credit	Progressive

Table 26**Rural Alberta, victories through transfers, 1926-1955**

Election	Constituency	Seat gain	Seat loss
1926	Bow Valley Pincher Creek	Liberal UFA	UFA Liberal
1930	Beaver River*	Liberal	UFA
1935	none		
1940	Olds St. Albert	Social Credit Independent	Independent Social Credit
1944	Banff-Cochrane	Social Credit	Independent
1948	none		
1952	none		
1955	Acadia-Coronation Athabasca Lac Ste. Anne Vermillion	Liberal Liberal Liberal Liberal	Social Credit Social Credit Social Credit Social Credit

*-decided by judicial recount

In Alberta, the situation was quite unremarkable until 1955. Prior to that election, the Liberals and UFA would occasionally manage to steal a seat from each other through transfers as did Social Credit and Independent candidates. In the 1955 election, however,

a clear pattern emerged as the Liberals managed to claim four seats which Social Credit would have won if the election had used the plurality formula. This is clearly the result of the combination of decreased exclusivity on the part of CCF voters as well as an increased emphasis on voting Liberal with second preferences. Alternative voting cost Social Credit four seats in the 1955 Alberta election.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the role of partisanship in the way STV operated in Manitoba and Alberta. Given the non-partisan atmosphere of both provinces, it is perhaps somewhat surprising to find that partisanship guided voters in the two provinces to a significant extent. In both provinces, the majority of the transfers from a candidate went to candidates from the same party. The solidarity ratios show that this is true of all of the major parties in both provinces.

There are some significant differences between the two provinces in their partisan behaviour while using STV. Parties in Alberta displayed much higher levels of solidarity than did parties in Manitoba. This seems to reflect the different non-partisan experiences of the two provinces. In Manitoba, non-partisanship was more extreme, with the party system essentially collapsing in 1941. Not surprisingly, the 1941 election saw a dramatic drop in the solidarity ratios of the parties in Manitoba politics. Party differences appear to have become less significant in this period and the behaviour of voters seems to reflect this.

In Alberta, the situation was different. The populism advanced by Social Credit and the dominance of that party in Alberta meant that party differences were not necessarily irrelevant, but that *other* parties were essentially irrelevant. Social Credit voters proved to be remarkably loyal and consistent in their preference ordering, consistently favouring Social Credit candidates. In fact, the levels of solidarity expressed by Social Credit are unmatched by any party in Alberta, Manitoba, or even in Ireland. The

differences between Alberta and Manitoba in terms of party solidarity also help to explain the fact that Alberta's cities reported lower levels of deviation from proportionality than did the city of Winnipeg.

This chapter also casts doubt on Michael Gallagher's suggestion that the fact that voters under the Hare system tend only to order preferences for one party indicates that voters do not really understand the way the electoral system works. In Alberta, where partisanship appears to have been a more significant factor, voters were more likely to display exclusive behaviour in preference ordering, limiting their choices to one party. While Manitoba voters were also somewhat likely to do so, the tendency is much less strong, suggesting that partisan perceptions play a role. This conclusion is enhanced by the finding that under AV in the rural areas of both provinces, voters were increasingly likely over time to only indicate one preference.

In rural Manitoba and Alberta, the overwhelming conclusion is that only a minority of voters took advantage of the freedom provided them by alternative voting. Most voters appeared to have "plumped." As a result, alternative voting had very little impact on electoral outcomes. As discussed in Chapter 3, only a minority of seats required more than one count and only a fraction of those altered the outcome from what would have happened under plurality. The only election where there is some evidence of AV's impact was the 1955 Alberta election where the CCF and the Liberals appeared to have cooperated in marking later preferences on their ballots and in choosing each other as second choices. The net result was that four seats that would have been won by Social Credit were won instead by the Liberals. This brief opposition breakthrough was the most dramatic example of the potential of AV to change electoral impacts.

While the 1955 Alberta election is an example of the possibilities provided by the STV ballot, it is clearly an exception. Most voters did not take advantage of those possibilities. While some STV advocates favour the system for the way it frees voters

from partisan labels, the evidence from Alberta and Manitoba indicates that partisanship continued to guide voters in their electoral decisions. In these two provinces, these potential advantages of the single transferable vote remained largely theoretical for the majority of either province's voters.

Chapter Seven

Analysis of the used vote in Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Calgary

Electoral systems play an important role in shaping the character of electoral competition. They reward certain kinds of behaviour and punish others. In this way, electoral systems are not neutral in their effects. Parties that can take advantage of the incentives provided by an electoral system will be more successful than those which cannot. This chapter will try to determine which of Alberta and Manitoba's political parties were most effective at using STV and the reasons for their success or failure. Through this analysis, we should better understand the characters of parties in this era and the relationships between them. In addition, we hope to improve our understanding of the incentives provided by the Hare electoral system.

The concept of the used vote

One way of analyzing how well each party used the Hare system is to look at the used vote for each party in each election. Cohan, McKinlay, and Mughan developed the concept of the used vote to analyze Irish elections. They note that parties either use the votes they receive to elect candidates or waste them. The votes a party actually uses are part of the "used vote."¹ In a plurality system, the used vote for a successful party in a constituency is equal to the number of votes of its closest competitor plus one. Any votes earned by parties that did not win the election as well as surplus votes are "wasted" votes.

¹ A.S. Cohan, R.D. McKinlay, and Anthony Mughan, "The used vote and electoral outcomes: The Irish general election of 1973," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975): 364-365.

If a party “uses.” a greater proportion of its received vote, it will be more efficient in converting votes into seats. The analysis of the used vote is more useful in analyzing STV elections than plurality elections. The Hare system provides a method for distributing surplus votes as well as redistributing the votes cast for candidates who did not become elected. Parties have much greater opportunity to maximize the used vote under STV than under plurality.

Under the Hare system, there are two sources of votes: parties can either earn votes through first preferences (FP) cast for that party’s candidates or they can receive transfers (T) from other parties. Any votes allocated to a party’s elected candidates are used votes. There are three ways a party can waste votes under the Hare system. First, votes can be transferred away from the party to other parties (W1). Second, votes can be wasted if they become non-transferable (W2). If a ballot becomes exhausted, it is not passed on to other candidates and the votes are wasted from the standpoint of a party and for the voter. Third, votes can be wasted if a candidate is still in contention at the end of the counting, but has not received enough votes to win a seat (W3).²

As discussed in Chapter 3, the counting rules used in Manitoba and Alberta allowed returning officers to combine the votes of two eliminated candidates in specific situations. This happened in several elections in both provinces. In situations where the votes of different parties were combined, it is impossible to determine what proportions of each party were used or wasted. This introduces a small amount of error into the used vote analysis; however, the number of votes involved in these situations were relatively small and the error introduced is correspondingly small.

A certain amount of vote wastage is pretty much inevitable for a party under an STV system. While parties with consistent voter support can minimize the leakage of

² Cohan, McKinlay, and Mughan, 367.

votes to other parties (W1), a small proportion of votes will almost certainly leak to other parties. Furthermore, one party will usually be left with an unelected candidate after the final count; this wastes a certain proportion of the quota (W3). Larger parties are more likely to use a higher proportion of the vote than smaller parties. Candidates from smaller parties are usually eliminated earlier, increasing the opportunities for vote leakage. Candidates from larger parties will usually have an opportunity to earn transfers from earlier eliminated candidates, increasing their chances of election. A very small party that does not elect anyone by definition wastes all of its vote.

Analysis of the used vote in Alberta

Table 27 shows the used vote components for Calgary while Table 28 does the same for Edmonton. The used vote is expressed as proportions of the quota, the number of votes needed to elect one member, in order to make the numbers more intuitive and meaningful. Because of the fluctuating district magnitudes in both cities over the years, it is important to bear in mind that the proportion of quotas will vary in significance from election to election. For example, winning 1.2 quotas worth of first preferences when the district magnitude is seven is not as impressive as winning 1.1 quotas when the district magnitude is five. To improve the comparability of the data between elections, the number in parentheses behind the first preference calculation is the number of quotas earned in first preferences divided by the district magnitude. This number is proportional to the popular vote based on first preferences, but not equivalent to it as the quota is determined by dividing the popular vote by $M+1$. Thus, the sum of this adjusted index for all parties in an election will be greater than one.

Tables 27 and 28 reveal that Alberta's political parties were relatively efficient in using the votes they received. The wasted proportions are relatively small, particularly for the large parties. Table 29 shows the average proportion of used vote for each party, as measured by dividing the used vote by the total received vote. A score of 100% indicates

Table 27

Analysis of the used vote in Calgary

Party	Year	FP	T	W1	W2	W3
Liberals	1926	1.67 (0.33)	0.18	0.07	0.01	0.80
	1930	2.13 (0.36)	0.16	0.14	0.12	0
	1935	1.36 (0.23)	0.28	0.25	0.39	0
	1948	1.14 (0.23)	0.15	0.27	0.07	0
	1952	0.89 (0.15)	0.24	0.12	0.02	0
	1955	1.94 (0.32)	0.21	0.13	0.08	0
Conservatives	1926	2.68 (0.54)	0.03	0.30	0.40	0
	1930	2.99 (0.50)	0.22	0.16	0.04	0
	1935	1.01 (0.17)	0.17	0.16	0.01	0
	1952	1.05 (0.18)	0.20	0.17	0.03	0
	1955	1.82 (0.30)	0.20	0.07	0.01	0.85
Social Credit	1935	4.09 (0.68)	0.36	0.01	0.01	0.68
	1940	2.23 (0.45)	0.06	0.20	0.09	0
	1944	2.30 (0.46)	0.08	0.10	0.28	0
	1948	2.51 (0.50)	0.42	0.05	0.03	0.85
	1952	3.84 (0.64)	0.30	0.18	0.06	0
	1955	2.82 (0.47)	0.19	0.17	0.08	0
CCF	1940	0.54 (0.11)	0.19	0.05	0.005	0.68
	1944	1.41 (0.28)	0.13	0.03	0.03	0.55
	1948	0.65 (0.13)	0.31	0.05	0.03	0
	1952	0.64 (0.11)	0.26	0.05	0.02	0.79
	1955	0.29 (0.05)	0.05	0.18	0.16	0
Labour	1926	0.88 (0.18)	0.12	0.08	0.04	0
	1930	1.01 (0.17)	0.10	0.06	0.02	0
	1935	0.28 (0.05)	0.12	0.27	0.12	0
	1948	0.55 (0.11)	0.09	0.46	0.18	0
	1952	0.09 (0.02)	0.004	0.08	0.01	0
Labour Progressive	1944	0.19 (0.04)	0.002	0.09	0.10	0
	1948	0.08 (0.02)	0.001	0.08	0.004	0
	1955	0.06 (0.01)	0.01	0.05	0.02	0
Communist	1935	0.14 (0.02)	0.01	0.12	0.03	0
Independent Labour	1926	0.75 (0.15)	0.12	0	0	0
	1935	0.04 (0.01)	0.001	0.04	0.001	0
	1940	0.03 (0.01)	0.01	0.04	0.003	0
	1952	0.49 (0.08)	0.11	0.48	0.12	0
Ind. Social Credit	1948	0.20 (0.04)	0.02	0.16	0.01	0
Independent	1926	0.02 (0.003)	0.001	0.02	0.001	0
	1930	0.86 (0.14)	0.17	0.26	0.11	0.66
	1935	0.08 (0.01)	0.005	0.08	0.001	0
	1940	3.20 (0.64)	0.12	0.09	0.04	0
	1944	2.10 (0.42)	0.06	0.04	0.06	0
	1948	0.87 (0.17)	0.23	0.11	0.01	0
	1955	0.05 (0.01)	0.001	0.05	0.004	0

Table 28

Analysis of the used vote in Edmonton

Party	Year	FP	T	W1	W2	W3
Liberals	1926	1.35 (0.27)	0.50	0.11	0.04	0.73
	1930	1.54 (0.26)	0.35	0.11	0.05	0.75
	1935	2.64 (0.44)	0.51	0.15	0.04	0
	1948	1.20 (0.24)	0.18	0.21	0.18	0
	1952	1.95 (0.28)	0.31	0.34	0.16	0
	1955	3.26 (0.47)	0.28	0.47	0.07	0
Conservatives	1926	1.68 (0.34)	0.30	0.18	0.04	0
	1930	2.34 (0.26)	0.50	0.09	0.01	0
	1935	0.91 (0.15)	0.43	0.34	0.04	0
	1952	0.72 (0.10)	0.35	0.19	0.04	0
	1955	0.76 (0.11)	0.37	0.15	0.02	0
Social Credit	1935	2.57 (0.43)	0.30	0.03	0.02	0.89
	1940	1.96 (0.39)	0.21	0.13	0.06	0
	1944	2.83 (0.57)	0.18	0.27	0.07	0.82
	1948	3.27 (0.65)	0.15	0.38	0.04	0
	1952	3.69 (0.53)	0.37	0.36	0.06	0.74
	1955	3.03 (0.45)	0.16	0.26	0.08	0
CCF	1940	0.59 (0.12)	0.16	0.48	0.26	0
	1944	1.24 (0.25)	0.08	0.16	0.17	0
	1948	1.18 (0.24)	0.05	0.07	0.03	0
	1952	1.51 (0.22)	0.13	0.18	0.46	0
	1955	0.73 (0.10)	0.21	0.06	0.02	0.86
Labour	1926	1.18 (0.24)	0.36	0.24	0.29	0
	1930	1.54 (0.26)	0.27	0.42	0.38	0
	1935	0.26 (0.04)	0.02	0.25	0.02	0
Labour Progressive	1944	0.27 (0.05)	0.02	0.12	0.17	0
	1952	0.13 (0.02)	0.01	0.09	0.04	0
	1955	0.10 (0.01)	0.004	0.07	0.03	0
UFA	1926	1.01 (0.20)	0	0.01	0	0
	1930	1.07 (0.18)	0	0.07	0	0
	1935	0.39 (0.07)	0.23	0.56	0.07	0
Communist	1935	0.21 (0.03)	0.07	0.16	0.12	0
	1940	0.15 (0.03)	0.01	0.14	0.02	0
Economic Restoration	1935	0.04 (0.01)	0.002	0.04	0.0003	0
V & AF	1944	0.56 (0.11)	0.32	0	0	0
Independent Citizens' Association	1948	0.35 (0.07)	0.28	0	0	0.63
Ind. Progressive	1940	0.05 (0.01)	0.003	0.05	0.003	0
Ind. Liberal	1926	0.39 (0.08)	0.14	0.40	0.13	0
Independent	1926	0.40 (0.08)	0.06	0.41	0.05	0
	1930	0.52 (0.09)	0.02	0.44	0.10	0
	1940	3.25 (0.65)	0.49	0.07	0.02	0.83
	1944	1.09 (0.22)	0.17	0.22	0.03	0
	1955	0.01 (0.002)	0.004	0.01	0.002	0

perfect usage of all received votes, a highly efficient result that is attainable only under very specific circumstances. The two perfect 100% scores in Table 29 were situations in which there was one candidate who managed to earn enough votes to win, but did so with less than a full quota. These candidates never transfer votes, either through elimination or surplus. Any party that did not elect any candidates and thus had a used vote proportion of 0% is not included on the table. It is clear from Table 29 that the largest three parties — Social Credit, the Liberals, and the Conservatives — were by far the most efficient in using their votes. Most of the wastage for these three parties comes from the W3 component of their used vote.

Table 29

Used vote proportions, Alberta

Party	Edmonton	Calgary
Liberal	71.9	75.8
Conservative	84.2	78.1
Social Credit	78.1	85.0
UFA	64.3	
CCF	45.7	30.4
Labour	40.2	35.7
Ind. Labour		100.0
V & AF	100.0	

From the overall picture, we will now turn to specific components of the used vote.

First preferences

First preferences were by far the most important component of the used vote in Alberta. This is not surprising given the high levels of party solidarity displayed by Alberta's political parties. In Edmonton, on average, 84.9% of a party's received vote in an election came from first preferences; in Calgary, 88.9% came from first preferences. Social Credit, in particular, relied heavily on first preferences. In both cities, around 93%

of its received vote was first preference votes. Given Social Credit's commanding position in Alberta's party system, as seen in the large number of first preference votes the party received from 1935 to 1955, this is perhaps not surprising. Some of the other major parties were less reliant on first preference votes than Social Credit. The CCF in Calgary only earned 78.2% of its votes on first preferences while 74% of Conservative votes in Edmonton came from first preferences.

Transfers

Transfers did not figure prominently as a source of votes for most parties in Alberta. At most, parties earned about a half quota's worth of transfer votes. The smaller parties earned relatively few transfer votes, but this is due primarily to the fact that their candidates were typically eliminated early and were thus a source of transfers rather than a destination for transfers. Edmonton's party system appears to have been a little more volatile than that of Calgary as parties earned more votes from transfers. The Liberals and Conservatives in Edmonton were particularly reliant on transfers.

Table 30 shows the sources of transfer votes for each party in Calgary while Table 31 does the same thing for Edmonton. The percentages expressed in these tables are the percentage of votes received from other parties. The figures are thus a percentage of T in the used vote analysis. The totals for each party are based on total votes received in transfers throughout the entire period. These tables should be interpreted in conjunction with the used vote analysis of Tables 27 and 28. The number of votes in many cases is quite small and certainly not decisive in most of the elections. Furthermore, these figures can be misleading because a voter's preferred party may have no candidates left to receive transfers. For example, a supporter of the CCF might prefer to cast his later preferences for the Labour Progressive party, but because of the limited electoral support for the Labour Progressives, it is likely that all the candidates from that party would have been

eliminated by the time CCF candidates were eliminated. Thus, the transfer might go to a party such as the Liberal party, even though this was the voter's third choice.

Table 30
Sources of transfers by party, Calgary (%)

Liberal

Year	Social Credit	Conser vative	CCF	Labour	Ind. Labour	Comm	Labour Prog.	Ind. Social Credit	Ind.
1926		78.2		18.7					3.1
1930		45.7		9.1					45.2
1935	2.9	46.2		34.8	1.5	5.3			9.4
1948	9.5		7.2	34.5			1.5	10.9	36.4
1952	35.4	23.9	4.8	3.7	32.2				
1955	32.3	22.6	34.5				4.4		6.2
Total	17.7	31.7	11.1	15.8	6.9	1.2	1.4	1.5	12.6

Social Credit

Year	Liberal	Conser vative	CCF	Labour	Ind. Labour	Comm.	Labour Prog.	Ind. Social Credit	Ind.
1935	53.8	7.9		25.5	1.5	7.7			3.6
1940			47.8		11.8				40.4
1944			35.1				44.9		20.0
1948	19.2		3.9	35.3			7.4	33.5	7.8
1952	17.2	22.0	9.8	4.5	46.5				
1955	42.1	11.3	32.9				6.5		7.2
Total	28.9	8.1	13.3	17.0	9.7	1.8	3.9	9.8	7.5

CCF

Year	Social Credit	Liberal	Conser vative	Labour	Ind. Labour	Labour Progressive	Ind. Social Credit	Indepen dent
1940	62.3				6.7			31.0
1944	44.8					33.8		21.4
1948	1.7	8.3		65.4		19.8	2.7	2.2
1952	9.8	3.0	8.6	12.3	66.2			
1955	4.2	10.0	8.5			62.7		14.7
Total	23.9	4.1	2.6	24.2	17.7	14.9	0.9	11.8

Conservative

Year	Social Credit	Liberal	CCF	Labour	Ind. Labour	Communist	Labour Progressive	Indepen dent
1926		52.2		36.7				11.1
1930		36.7		8.1				55.2
1935	0.2	29.5		45.9	2.2	1.9		20.2
1952	18.7	23.1	11.6	0.8	45.8			0.0
1955	46.6	23.7	21.6				1.8	6.3
Total	22.1	27.3	11.0	11.5	11.6	0.4	0.7	15.4

Table 30, continued

Labour

Year	Social Credit	Liberal	Conser vative	CCF	Ind. Labour	Comm unist	Labour Prog.	Ind. Social Credit	Indepen dent
1926		17.1	77.8						5.2
1930		4.8	29.0						66.3
1935	0.1	8.6	3.2		17.7	63.2			7.2
1948	17.0	34.0		14.8			8.7	13.8	11.9
1952	4.2	37.5		58.3					
Total	5.0	17.3	20.7	5.0	6.1	21.7	2.5	4.0	17.8

Independent Labour

Year	Social Credit	Liberal	Conservative	CCF	Labour	Independent
1926		10.4	59.1		28.4	2.1
1935					100.0	
1940	35.9					64.1
1952	33.0	12.4	22.2	11.2	21.2	
Total	20.9	11.2	34.7	6.6	23.5	3.1

Communist

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Labour	Ind. Labour	Independent
1935	7.7	3.1	56.9	20.0	12.3
Total	7.7	3.1	56.9	20.0	12.3

Labour Progressive

Year	Social Credit	CCF	Independent
1944	14.3	14.3	71.4
1948		100.0	
1955	2.2	32.6	65.2
Total	4.6	33.8	61.5

Independent Social Credit

Year	Social Credit	CCF	Labour Progressive	Independent
1948	44.6	30.4	10.7	14.3
Total	44.6	30.4	10.7	14.3

Independent

Year	Social Credit	Liberal	Conser vative	CCF	Labour	Ind. Labour	Labour Progressive	Ind. Social Credit
1926			100.0					
1930		34.3	33.5		32.1			
1935	3.4		48.3		10.3	37.9		
1940	64.4			22.3		13.3		
1944	67.6			11.1			21.4	
1948	3.9	61.4		2.5	23.9		0.7	7.6
1955	87.5			12.5	0.0			
Total	26.3	32.9	6.5	8.2	16.2	3.8	2.7	3.3

Table 31

Sources of transfers by party, Edmonton (%)

Liberals

Year	Conser vative	Social Credit	CCF	Labour Prog	Labour	UFA	Comm unist	Econ. Rest.	Ind. Liberal	Ind
1926	12.9				25.6	0.5			29.8	31.2
1930	15.6				25.7	5.3				26.4
1935	32.6	2.7			12.6	40.8	10.4	0.9		
1948		90.6	9.4							
1952	24.1	49.9	21.7	4.3						
1955	37.8	46.1	10.3	3.9						1.9
Total	24.1	31.5	7.4	1.7	11.3	10.3	2.5	0.2	4.0	7.0

Conservatives

Year	Liberal	Social Credit	CCF	Labour Prog	Labour	UFA	Comm unist	Econ. Rest.	Ind. Liberal	Ind.
1926	15.0				25.9	0.3			20.6	38.2
1930	13.5				48.6	4.6				33.3
1935	19.1	1.5			8.4	67.1	3.3	0.6		
1952	34.9	49.5	14.2	1.4						
1955	70.1	23.3	4.7	1.1						0.8
Total	38.4	18.9	4.7	0.7	11.1	15.3	0.7	0.1	1.8	8.3

Social Credit

Year	Liberal	Conse rvative	CCF	Labour Prog	Labour	UFA	Comm unist	Econ. Rest.	Ind. Prog.	Indepe ndent
1935	17.2	25.7			16.9	20.2	18.3	1.8		
1940			56.5				25.9		3.3	14.4
1944			37.2	19.0						43.8
1948	77.9		22.1							
1952	52.5	28.5	16.3	2.7						
1955	67.7	16.7	9.2	5.0						1.4
Total	36.9	14.4	22.3	3.9	2.9	3.5	7.4	0.3	0.5	8.0

CCF

Year	Liberal	Conse rvative	Social Credit	Labour Progressive	Communist	Independent Progressive	Independent
1940			31.1		41.2	6.8	21.0
1944			54.1	36.6			9.3
1948	28.1		71.9				
1952	18.9	9.0	22.8	49.2			
1955	47.3	8.1	21.4	21.3			
Total	24.8	4.8	31.4	20.9	9.7	1.6	6.7

Labour Progressive

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Social Credit	CCF	Independent
1944			66.4	28.2	5.4
1952	3.5		31.6	52.6	
1955	10.3		25.6	35.9	5.1
Total	2.4	11.4	46.9	35.1	4.1

Table 31, continued

Labour

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Social Credit	UFA	Economic Restoration	Independent Liberal	Independent
1926	8.1	13.7		0.6		52.6	25.0
1930	15.2	5.8		7.8			68.5
1935	23.1	19.0	0.8		57.0		
Total	11.9	12.0	0.0	3.4	3.4	28.3	41.0

UFA

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Social Credit	Labour	Communist	Economic Restoration
1935	17.5	37.0	4.0	22.1	16.3	3.1
Total	17.5	37.0	4.0	22.1	16.3	3.1

Communist

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Social Credit	CCF	Labour	Economic Restoration	Ind. Prog.	Independent
1935	6.6	10.7	2.6		71.9	8.2		
1940			30.4	21.7			29.0	18.8
Total	5.7	9.1	6.7	3.3	61.1	7.0	4.3	2.8

Economic Restoration

Year	Liberal	Labour
1935	44.4	55.6
Total	44.4	55.6

V & AF

Year	Social Credit	CCF	Labour Progressive	Independent
1944	34.0	13.7	9.9	42.5
Total	34.0	13.7	9.9	42.5

Independent Citizens' Association

Year	Liberal	Social Credit	CCF
1948	27.2	64.6	8.2
Total	27.2	64.6	8.2

Independent Liberal

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Labour	UFA	Independent
1926	17.0	31.4	14.9	0.7	36.0
Total	17.0	31.4	14.9	0.7	36.0

Independent

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Social Credit	CCF	Labour Prog.	Labour	UFA	Comm.	Ind. Liberal
1926	20.8	48.6				30.6			
1930	20.0	58.5					21.5		
1940			15.3	74.4				3.6	6.6
1944			62.3	22.2	15.5				
1955	62.9		37.1						
Total	1.4	2.5	25.0	58.9	3.4	1.1	0.3	2.6	4.8

Despite their limitations, Tables 30 and 31 reveal a lot about the relationships between different parties in Alberta politics from 1926 to 1955. Not surprisingly, Social Credit was an important source of transfer votes for all parties. Even though Social Credit voters were remarkably disciplined, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, the sheer number of Social Credit votes made them an important source of transfers for the other parties.

As befitting a brokerage party, the Liberals' transfers came from a number of sources. The Conservatives were more important to the Liberals in Calgary than in Edmonton. Social Credit was an important source of transfers for the Liberals in Edmonton largely because of the presence of Ernest Manning who attracted a huge proportion of first preference votes due to his personal popularity. His surplus ballots would "leak" into other parties, including the Liberals.

While the Conservatives were generally the most important source of Liberal transfers, the Liberals reciprocated and were an important source of Conservative transfers. This suggests that supporters of the two "old-line" parties were somewhat united against Social Credit. It is important not to overstate this, however, as the proportions involved are quite modest.

Social Credit drew its support from across the board, reflecting the fact that its candidates generally remained on the ballot through several counts, allowing them to pick up transfers from eliminated candidates from a variety of parties. Liberal candidates appear to have been the most important source of transfers for Social Credit, although the party shows a surprising level of support from CCF voters as well, possibly reflecting the similar populist roots of the two parties.

Not surprisingly, the CCF received a significant proportion of its support from other labour candidates and parties. Over 30% of the transfers they received in Edmonton and almost 60% in Calgary came from parties such as the Labour Progressive party. Mirroring the results above, Social Credit was an important source of transfers for the

CCF as well. In Edmonton, the Liberals were another important source of transfers. This reflects the greater strength of the Liberal party in Edmonton, particularly in 1955 where there were a significant number of first preferences cast for Liberal candidates.

The smaller parties received their transfers from a variety of sources. The numbers are relatively small, however, making it difficult to reach firm conclusions on the partisan relationships between the small parties and between small parties and larger ones.

Wasted votes: Vote Leakage (W1)

As is to be expected in a party system where voters seemed very conscious of partisan differences in their preference ordering, the numbers for W1 are relatively small. Most voters seem to have confined themselves to voting within their preferred parties. Smaller parties were far more likely to leak votes than larger parties. This is primarily because smaller parties run fewer candidates and are far more likely to be in a position where there are no further candidates under that party's banner eligible to receive transfers.

Of course, votes that are wasted from a party's perspective may not necessarily be wasted from a voter's perspective or from the standpoint of the ideological balance in the provincial legislature. Voters can cast their first preferences for a smaller party and then indicate their later preferences for parties and candidates who share similar policy goals. In a sense, then, these votes are not necessarily wasted for voters, even if their preferred party was unable to make use of them.

Table 32 shows the percentage of votes transferred to other parties from each of the parties that contested elections in Calgary while Table 33 contains the same information for Edmonton. Even more than Tables 30 and 31, these tables reveal some of the partisan relationships in the minds of voters in Alberta's two largest cities. The same limitations present in Tables 30 and 31 are also present here; these tables need to be interpreted with the same caution.

The Liberal party transferred a significant proportion of its ballots to Social Credit in both Edmonton and Calgary. The Conservatives were also popular targets for Liberal transfers. The Conservatives displayed a strong preference for transferring their ballots to the Liberals. In both Edmonton and Calgary, the Liberals received more of their transfers than all of the other parties combined. In Edmonton in 1955, over 70% of the Conservative transfers went to the Liberals, reflecting the popularity of Liberal leader J. Harper Prowse and the unpopularity of the then scandal-ridden Social Credit party. Social Credit supporters favoured the Liberals in Edmonton and the CCF in Calgary, although the party tended to disperse its transfers quite widely. CCF supporters seemed to have favoured Social Credit among all of the major parties, particularly in Calgary. In Edmonton, independent candidates were a popular choice for CCF supporters.

Table 32

Destination of transfers (W1) in Calgary, by party (%)

Liberal

Year	Social Credit	Conservative	CCF	Labour	Ind. Labour	Communist	Independent
1926		30.7		43.1	26.1		
1930		56.2		3.2			40.6
1935	76.3	19.3		4.0		0.3	0.0
1948	29.1		9.4	11.2			50.4
1952	42.7	38.5	6.5	1.3	11.0		
1955	60.3	36.3	3.4				
Total	45.9	22.6	4.4	6.0	2.0	0.1	19.0

Social Credit

Year	Liberal	Conser vative	CCF	Labour	Ind. Labour	Labour Prog	Ind. Social Credit	Independent
1935	92.3	3.8		1.9				1.9
1940			61.3		0.9			37.8
1944			59.6			0.3		40.1
1948	30.1		11.0	32.4			8.1	18.4
1952	47.0	20.2	13.8	0.1	19.0			
1955	41.1	57.2	1.1			0.1		0.5
Total	24.9	21.1	29.5	2.0	4.4	0.1	0.5	17.5

Table 32, continued

CCF

Year	Social Credit	Liberal	Conservative	Labour	Ind. Labour	Labour Prog	Ind. Social Credit	Independent
1940	52.1				0.0			47.9
1944	81.0					0.9		18.1
1948	32.8	21.9		27.2		1.6	5.3	11.3
1952	37.4	14.9	29.6	3.0	15.1			
1955	34.5	40.2	24.3			0.9		0.1
Total	40.6	26.0	17.4	3.3	2.3	0.7	0.6	9.1

Conservatives

Year	Social Credit	Liberal	CCF	Labour	Ind. Labour	Communist	Independent
1926		46.3		30.3	22.8		0.6
1930		46.4		17.6			36.0
1935	17.2	78.8		2.3		0.2	1.4
1952	38.6	34.5	13.1		13.9		
1955	29.4	65.4	5.2				
Total	17.9	54.0	4.0	10.1	8.8	0.0	5.2

Labour

Year	Social Credit	Liberal	Conserv.	CCF	Ind. Labour	Communist	Ind.
1926		43.7	13.1		43.3		
1930		16.8	20.5				62.7
1935	33.5	35.8	27.9		0.4	2.3	0.2
1948	32.2	11.3		44.7			11.8
1952	17.1	11.4	2.2	40.6			
Total	28.1	20.1	9.9	27.1	4.4	0.7	9.7

Independent Labour

Year	Social Credit	Liberal	Conservative	CCF	Labour	Communist	Independent
1935	13.9	10.8	9.4		55.2	5.8	4.9
1940	19.6			36.7			43.7
1952	28.8	16.5	19.0	35.7			
Total	27.1	14.7	16.8	33.4	3.7	0.4	3.9

Communist

Year	Social Credit	Liberal	Conservative	Labour
1935	22.9	12.3	2.7	62.1
Total	22.9	12.3	2.7	62.1

Labour Progressive

Year	Social Credit	Liberal	Conserv.	CCF	Labour	Ind. Social Credit	Ind.
1944	39.5			47.2			13.3
1948	2.2	3.0		81.0	10.3	1.2	2.2
1955	23.2	17.4	6.7	52.7			
Total	22.7	6.3	2.0	59.6	3.3	0.4	5.7

Independent Social Credit

Year	Social Credit	Liberal	CCF	Labour	Independent
1948	72.1	8.4	4.3	6.4	8.8
Total	72.1	8.4	4.3	6.4	8.8

Table 33

Destination of transfers (W1) in Edmonton, by party (%)

Liberal

Year	Con-serva-tive	Social Credit	CCF	Lab. Prog	Lab.	UFA	Com-mu-nist	Econ. Rest.	Ind. Cit. Assoc	Ind. Liberal	Ind.
1926	40.9				26.7					21.5	10.9
1930	59.9				36.3						3.8
1935	44.5	27.9			2.9	21.7	2.7	0.4			
1948		55.9	7.1						3.7		
1952	36.1	56.5	7.3	0.1							
1955	55.0	22.6	21.8	0.1							0.5
Total	40.6	34.5	12.6	0.1	2.4	2.1	0.3	0.04	5.9	0.7	0.7

Conservative

Year	Liberal	Social Credit	CCF	Labour Prog.	Labour	UFA	Communi-st	Ind. Liberal	Indepen-dent
1926	34.8				26.7			23.5	15.1
1930	60.5				25.5				14.0
1935	49.1	22.5			1.3	24.8	2.3		
1952	38.3	54.1	6.2	1.4					
1955	70.5	17.2	11.5	0.7					
Total	51.5	25.0	4.6	0.5	4.5	8.4	0.8	2.5	2.3

Social Credit

Year	Lib.	Cons-erva-tive	CCF	Lab. Prog.	Lab.	UFA	Com-mu-nist	V & AF	Ind. Cit. Assoc	Ind. Prog.	Ind.
1935	44.3	19.8			0.6	29.3	6.0				
1940			38.5				2.2			2.2	57.2
1944			16.7	5.7				39.2			38.4
1948	43.0		9.8						47.2		
1952	42.7	48.6	8.4	0.3							
1955	49.3	32.4	17.5	0.4							0.5
Total	33.6	18.6	14.8	1.1	0.01	0.5	0.3	6.4	13.1	0.2	11.5

CCF

Year	Liberal	Conser-vative	Social Credit	Labour Progressive	Comm-unist	V & AF	Indep. Citizens' Association	Indepen-ent
1940			24.3		0.4			75.3
1944			43.7	4.3		27.9		24.2
1948	23.5		44.9				31.6	
1952	36.7	27.7	33.0	2.6				
1955	46.8	27.7	23.1	2.4				
Total	12.3	7.2	30.2	1.3	0.2	4.0	2.6	42.3

Table 33, continued

Labour Progressive

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Social Credit	CCF	V & AF	Independent
1944			28.1	25.2	25.3	21.3
1952	14.2	5.5	10.7	69.6		
1955	16.1	5.9	11.4	66.5		
Total	9.4	3.5	17.6	51.7	9.7	8.1

Labour

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Social Credit	UFA	Communist	Economic Restoration	Ind. Liberal	Independent
1926	52.6	31.7					8.4	7.2
1930	43.1	56.9						
1935	25.2	14.2	19.7	19.8	20.7	0.4		
Total	38.0	34.3	7.9	7.9	8.3	0.1	1.8	1.6

UFA

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Social Credit	Labour	Ind. Liberal	Independent
1926	40.0	15.0		30.0	15.0	
1930	27.7	34.2				
1935	37.6	51.6	10.8			
Total	36.9	50.3	10.1	2.2	0.1	0.4

Communist

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Social Credit	CCF	UFA	Independent
1935	33.4	9.0	34.2		23.4	
1940			38.9	48.3		12.8
Total	1.2	4.1	36.8	26.3	10.7	7.0

Economic Restoration

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Social Credit	Labour	UFA	Communist
1935	11.8	6.4	13.8	34.0	18.2	15.8
Total	11.8	6.4	13.8	34.0	18.2	15.8

Independent Liberal

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Labour
1926	37.3	15.4	47.3
Total	37.3	15.4	47.3

Independent Progressive

Year	Social Credit	CCF	Communist	Independent
1940	12.9	20.7	5.2	61.2
Total	12.9	20.7	5.2	61.2

Independent

Year	Liberal	Conservative	Social Credit	CCF	Labour Prog.	Labour	Communist	V & AF	Ind. Liberal
1926	38.1	27.8				21.9			12.1
1930	20.9	37.6				41.6			
1940			45.5	51.8			2.7		
1944			35.7	3.5	0.6			60.2	
1955	35.9	20.4	14.8	27.5	1.4				
Total	17.4	19.0	16.2	7.3	0.2	17.9	0.3	18.5	3.3

The minor parties reveal the most significant patterns as W1 tended to be the most significant proportion of the wasted vote for them. The smaller labour parties overwhelmingly favoured the CCF, as is to be expected. Labour Progressive supporters were particularly likely to support the CCF in their later transfers. When Communist, independent Labour, and Labour candidates ran in the same election as CCF candidates, the CCF was a favorite destination for transfers. This is a way in which STV can encourage the proliferation of parties. Voters can support small parties without fear of their votes being wasted. The independent Social Credit candidate in Calgary in 1948 indicates another way in which STV can encourage the proliferation of candidates and parties. Social Credit supporters could safely vote for the independent Social Credit candidate, knowing that if he were eliminated, they could vote for Social Credit candidates with their later preferences. The fact that 72% of the Independent Social Credit supporters chose Social Credit for their subsequent transfers indicates that this was a popular choice for many voters. Interestingly, however, the same is not true of the Independent Liberal candidate in Edmonton in 1926. In that situation, a plurality of the transfers went to Labour candidates.

The Hare system thus allows voters to express a complex set of preferences. These tendencies are most pronounced among smaller parties and independent candidacies. The Hare system allows voters to use their higher preferences to support the parties of their choice and their lower preferences to support larger parties that are closer to them ideologically.

Wasted votes: Non-transferable ballots (W2)

A second way in which parties can waste ballots is when a candidate is eliminated and a certain proportion of ballots fails to transfer to other candidates from the party, either because they are ineligible to receive transfers or because voters failed to indicate

subsequent preferences. There are some interesting contrasts in the ways parties in different competitive positions wasted votes in this manner. The largest parties (Liberal, Conservative, Social Credit, and CCF) generally wasted larger numbers of ballots this way than did the smaller parties. This is mirrored in the exclusivity ratios discussed in Chapter 6. Supporters of smaller parties expect that candidates from their favoured party may very well not be elected. Consequently, they are more likely to indicate preferences beyond their most favoured party. Smaller parties are thus more likely to waste their votes by transferring them to other parties (W1) rather than seeing them become non-transferable. While vote leakage (W1) remained a problem for larger parties, the proportion wasted by becoming non-transferable (W2) is higher.

Wasted votes: Unelected candidates at the final count (W3)

In absolute terms, W3 is the largest component of wasted votes, since the unelected candidate at the final count has close to a full quota of votes. For example, in 1935 in Edmonton, the Social Credit party had 89% of a full quota wasted by having a candidate still in contention at the final count, but unelected. This proportion of wasted votes is, in a sense, unavoidable, as some candidate has to lose on the final count. In many cases, however, W3 is the result of wasted votes by vote leakage or non-transferable ballots (W1 and W2). In Edmonton in 1926, Liberal candidate J.C. Bowen was eliminated on the last count with 2,212 votes. D.M. Duggan, a Conservative candidate, had 2,265 votes. The Liberals wasted 439 votes through W1 and W2; had they retained a small proportion of those, Duggan would have been eliminated on the last count rather than Bowen. This type of situation happened relatively frequently in both Edmonton and Calgary; in Edmonton, the Liberals lost a seat this way in 1926, while Social Credit lost seats this way in 1935, 1944, and 1952. In Calgary, Social Credit lost a seat in 1948, the CCF lost one in 1952, while the Conservatives lost a seat in 1955. The fact that Social Credit was the greatest victim of seat losses this way despite their remarkable solidarity

ratios indicates that a certain proportion of wasted vote due to W3 is, in the end, unavoidable.

Analysis of the used vote in Manitoba

Table 34 reports the used vote in the Winnipeg constituency from 1920-1953. As was the case in Alberta, the used vote is expressed as a proportion of the quota. In 1949 and 1953, Winnipeg was divided into three four-member constituencies; the used vote figures for those elections are the average used vote. To assist in comparing the figures across elections, the number in parentheses after the first preferences figure is the first preference number divided by the average district magnitude — ten from 1920 through 1945 and four in the 1949 and 1953 elections.

The Winnipeg used vote shows a party system characterized by more fluid party attachments. As we saw in Chapter 6, voters were more willing to jump across party lines in their preference ordering in Manitoba than in Alberta. This is seen in the higher values for T and W1 in Manitoba. A more significant proportion of the received vote for each party was earned through transfers in Manitoba. The reverse side of this situation is that Manitoba parties lost a larger proportion of their votes to other parties. The situation in Winnipeg also reflects a more competitive party system than was the case in Edmonton and Calgary. No party dominated Winnipeg to the same extent that Social Credit dominated in Alberta. The used vote reflects this more dynamic party system.

As was the case in Alberta, Manitoba's political parties were relatively efficient at using the votes they received. Table 35 shows the proportions of received votes which the various parties used in Manitoba. Any parties that did not elect any candidates are excluded from this analysis. The ILP/CCF were particularly efficient at using the votes they received, reflecting their comparatively high party solidarity ratios. The relatively high proportion of the used vote shown by the Labour Progressive party is due to the fact that the party tended to be very careful in its nomination process, only nominating one

Table 34

Analysis of the used vote in Winnipeg

Party	Year	FP	T	W1	W2	W3
Liberals	1920	3.34 (0.33)	1.00	0.34	0.08	0
	1922	2.75 (0.28)	0.48	0.51	0.10	0.75
	1927	2.39 (0.24)	0.28	0.38	0.21	0
	1932	0.26 (0.03)	0.03	0.23	0.06	0
Conservatives	1920	1.50 (0.15)	0.69	0.33	0.03	0
	1922	1.87 (0.19)	0.48	0.25	0.10	0
	1927	2.90 (0.29)	0.27	0.26	0.16	0
	1932	3.90 (0.39)	0.35	0.64	0.61	0
	1936	2.54 (0.25)	0.79	0.14	0.11	0
	1941	2.77 (0.28)	0.45	0.80	0.33	0
	1945	1.42 (0.14)	0.67	0.12	0.14	0.78
	1949	0.37 (0.09)	0.11	0.18	0.04	0.27
	1953	1.04 (0.26)	0.16	0.16	0.11	0
ILP/CCF	1922	2.72 (0.27)	0.66	0.48	0.004	0
	1927	2.49 (0.25)	0.53	0.13	0.03	0
	1932	3.13 (0.31)	0.70	0.10	0.02	0
	1936	1.41 (0.14)	1.53	0.10	0.03	0
	1941	2.03 (0.20)	0.69	0.15	0.07	0.73
	1945	4.14 (0.41)	0.24	0.27	0.16	0
	1949	1.69 (0.42)	0.14	0.17	0.04	0
	1953	1.46 (0.36)	0.11	0.11	0.12	0
	Progressive	1922	1.26 (0.13)	0.36	0.47	0.31
1927		1.91 (0.19)	0.26	0.30	0.07	0
1932		2.12 (0.21)	0.62	0.08	0.03	0
1936		2.31 (0.23)	0.51	0.17	0.04	0.69
1941		2.96 (0.30)	0.38	0.37	0.06	0
1945		3.21 (0.32)	0.25	0.64	0.09	0
1949		1.97 (0.49)	0.27	0.21	0.15	0.19
1953		1.38 (0.34)	0.20	0.16	0.07	0.46
Social Credit		1936	0.49 (0.05)	0.25	0.42	0.32
	1941	0.16 (0.02)	0.01	0.13	0.04	0
	1953	0.25 (0.06)	0.02	0.09	0.09	0
Labour Progressive	1945	0.96 (0.10)	0.15	0.14	0.03	0
	1949	0.56 (0.14)	0.09	0.10	0.07	0
	1953	0.88 (0.22)	0.10	0	0	0
Socialist Party of Canada	1920	1.11 (0.11)	0.87	0.171	0.002	0.816
	1922	0.32 (0.03)	0.21	0.32	0.06	0
Socialist	1932	0.12 (0.01)	0.004	0.11	0.01	0
Social Democrats	1920	0.291 (0.03)	0.714	0.005	0	0
	1922	0.545 (0.05)	0.394	0	0	0
Dominion Labour Party	1920	3.17 (0.32)	0.02	1.18	0.005	0
Labour	1932	0.23 (0.02)	0.07	0.26	0.03	0
Communist	1927	0.44 (0.04)	0.05	0.25	0.24	0
	1936	0.81 (0.08)	0.29	0.10	0	0

Table 34, continued

Party	Year	FP	T	W1	W2	W3
Ex-Soldiers and Sailors Labour	1920	0.11 (0.01)	0.22	0.31	0.01	0
Union Labour	1922	0.16 (0.02)	0.03	0.18	0.01	0
Workers' Party of Canada	1922	0.27 (0.03)	0.02	0.26	0.04	0
United Workers	1932	0.65 (0.07)	0.10	0.04	0.01	0.71
Sound Money Economics Workers	1941	0.16 (0.02)	0.01	0.13	0.04	0
Independent	1941	0.92 (0.09)	0.07	0	0	0
Progressive	1949	0.34 (0.09)	0.07	0.33	0.09	0
Independent Labour	1953	0.39 (0.10)	0.07	0.30	0.17	0
Independent Conservative	1949	0.13 (0.03)	0.02	0.10	0.04	0
Independent	1949	0.62 (0.16)	0.38	0	0	0
	1920	1.48 (0.15)	0.49	7.66	0.31	0
	1922	1.06 (0.11)	0.02	0.15	0.01	0
	1927	0.88 (0.09)	0.22	0.29	0.05	0.74
	1932	0.59 (0.06)	0.05	0.46	0.18	0
	1936	3.44 (0.34)	0	2.44	0	0
	1941	2.00 (0.20)	0.10	0.12	0.003	0
	1945	1.15 (0.12)	0	0.15	0	0
	1949	0.28 (0.07)	0.15	0.05	0.02	0.36
	1953	0.67 (0.17)	0.16	0.03	0.004	0.31

candidate and running that candidate in the most promising constituency (working class Winnipeg North) to maximize the party's electoral chances. As can be seen from Table 34, the Labour Progressives tended to win just enough votes to elect a single candidate, with relatively few surplus votes to distribute. The same is true of the Social Democrats who, in 1920 and 1922, only nominated John Queen, who managed to earn just enough votes in each election to win a seat.

First preferences

As noted earlier, Winnipeg's party system differed substantially from those operating in Edmonton and Calgary because it was less dominated by a single party. Thus, no party dominated first preferences. Overall, first preferences were the most important component of the received vote for Manitoba's political parties; on average, 81.6% of the received votes came from first preferences. All four of the major parties in Winnipeg (the Liberals, ILP/CCF, Conservatives, and Progressives) received, on average, between 80

and 86% of their received votes as first preferences. This reliance on first preferences is slightly less than in Alberta, reflecting the lower levels of solidarity and greater fluidity in partisan attachment seen in Manitoba.

Table 35
Used Vote Proportions in Winnipeg

Party	Proportion
Workers	100.0%
Social Democrats	99.8%
ILP/CCF	87.8%
Labour Progressive	86.3%
Progressive	74.7%
Conservative	67.9%
Dominion Labour Party	62.8%
Liberal	56.5%
Communist	45.2%
Socialist Party of Canada	25.0%

Transfers (T)

As might be expected in Manitoba's political climate, transfers were often an important part of the province's parties' received votes. This is due to a number of factors. First, as discussed in Chapter 6, Manitoba's parties displayed relatively low solidarity ratios and ballots were thus more likely to change parties while transferring. Second, the proliferation of parties that accompanied the adoption of the Hare system in 1920, particularly class-based parties, meant that there were more small parties to be eliminated and more possibility for alliances between these parties or between them and the larger ILP/CCF. Third, the large district magnitude in Winnipeg meant a lower threshold of representation, making it more likely that transfers would make a difference. In a few cases, parties received entire quota's worth of transfers. Finally, the coalition politics that dominated Manitoba essentially eradicated partisan differences and made transfers more viable. In 1920, the Liberals, Socialists, and Labour candidates all received

one or more quotas worth of votes from other parties. In 1936, the ILP received more votes in transfers than they received in first preferences, largely due to the candidacy of the very popular independent candidate, Lewis. St. George Stubbs, as discussed in Chapter 4. In many other cases, parties received significant proportions of transfers which allowed them to elect other candidates.

Table 36 breaks down the sources of transfer votes (T) for each party, helping to map out the relationships between the different parties in Manitoba. As in the Alberta cases, these data are limited by the availability of candidates to receive transfers and thus have to be read somewhat cautiously. In order to condense the results somewhat, the minor labour parties were combined into one category.

The lack of a dominant party in Winnipeg means that the partisan relationships are more clearly delineated in the transfer patterns than is the case in Alberta. The Liberals appear to have relied most heavily on Independent candidates and the Conservatives as sources of transfer votes. The 1920 election saw large numbers of Independent candidates (see Chapter 3) and these candidates were an extremely important source of transfers for the Liberals. The Conservatives were also a significant source of transfers to the Liberal party. Although 69.5% of the transfers Liberal candidates received in 1932 came from the Conservatives, it is important to bear in mind that this was the first election after the Liberal party had joined forces with the Progressives. Those remaining Liberal candidates in 1932 were the fragments of the Liberal party that did not join the coalition. The Liberals only received 3% of a quota in transfers, a negligible amount.

The Conservatives drew their support from across the board, receiving some support from a variety of parties. As was the case for the Liberals, independent candidates were an important source of Conservative support, particularly in the first several elections. After the Conservatives joined the Progressive led coalition in 1941, the party was rewarded with significant proportions of transfers from the Progressive party.

Table 36

Sources of transfers by party, Winnipeg (%)

Liberals

Year	Progressives	Conservatives	ILP/CCF	Minor Labour	Independent
1920		13.3		9.5	77.2
1922	46.7	20.9	12.0	15.0	5.4
1927	26.2	39.5	7.1	4.6	22.6
1932	8.9	69.5	10.5	3.7	7.4
Total	16.3	20.9	4.4	10.0	48.4

Conservatives

Year	Progressive	Liberals	ILP/CCF	Minor Labour	Ind. Liberal	Social Credit	Sound Money Economics	Independent
1920		19.4		10.5				70.1
1922	22.6	43.2	17.4	8.9				7.9
1927	52.7	20.8	8.8	4.9				12.9
1932	14.2	15.6	6.4	12.0				51.8
1936	11.3		4.6	0.7		12.9		70.5
1941	55.9		14.4			8.9	10.7	10.1
1945	81.7		12.2	0.9				5.2
1949	34.1		32.6	21.4				11.9
1953			14.4		16.1	68.4		1.1
Total	31.7	8.3	10.1	4.9	1.2	8.9	1.0	33.8

ILP/CCF

Year	Progressive	Liberal	Conservative	Minor Labour	Ind. Progressive	Ind. Lib.	Social Credit	Sound Money Economics	Independent
1922	14.3	11.3	5.3	64.6					4.5
1927	9.2	20.1	8.2	36.6					25.8
1932	3.0	6.3	43.5	34.5					12.7
1936	4.4		2.2	5.3			15.5		72.7
1941	13.9		66.9				7.4	5.2	6.0
1945	27.6			48.3					24.1
1949	20.9		14.9	13.4	45.2				5.7
1953			55.1			21.8	21.2		1.8
Total	8.6	3.8	20.7	20.5	2.1	0.8	7.6	0.7	35.0

Progressives

Year	Liberal	Conservative	ILP/CCF	Minor Labour	Ind. Progressive	Ind. Lib.	Social Credit	Sound Money Economics	Independent
1922	48.3	20.0	11.5	14.1					6.2
1927	49.1	26.2	7.7	2.2					14.7
1932	17.1	42.4	4.6	10.8					25.1
1936		18.9	7.3	1.8			15.4		56.6
1941		59.2	28.9				5.2	4.0	2.7
1945		44.1	32.5	7.0					16.4
1949		31.8	30.9	7.6	25.1				4.6
1953		19.0	7.8			9.3	63.0		0.8
Total	8.0	31.0	14.6	4.7	3.7	2.4	19.2	0.4	15.9

Table 36, continued

Combined minor labour parties

Year	Progre ssive	Liberal	Conser vative	ILP/ CCF	Minor Labour	Ind. Lib.	Social Credit	Sound Money Econ	Independ ent
1920		2.6	1.8		79.6				16.1
1922	5.3	7.7	5.5	25.9	51.2				4.3
1927	11.2	25.2		31.8					31.8
1932	1.7	6.9	14.3	21.6	25.3				30.2
1936									100.0
1941	6.6		24.7	39.8			14.1	7.4	7.8
1945	16.8		5.5	68.5					9.3
1949	87.6			12.4					
1953			29.6	20.8		41. 2	8.4		
Total	2.8	3.4	4.3	11.2	53.5	0.8	0.5	0.2	23.4

Social Credit

Year	Progressives	Conservatives	ILP/CCF	Minor Labour	Sound Money Econ.	Ind.
1936	4.7	2.9	10.5	3.9		78.0
1941	12.1	3.0	4.5		50.0	30.3
1945	12.3		42.1			45.6
1953		5.2	13.4			81.4
Total	4.7	3.0	11.4	3.3	1.6	75.9

Sound Money Economics

Year	Progressives	Social Credit	Independent
1941	32.4	27.0	40.5
Total	32.4	27.0	40.5

Independent Conservative

Year	Progressive	Conservative	ILP/CCF
1949	51.3	39.5	9.2
Total	51.3	39.5	9.2

Independent Progressive

Year	Conservative	ILP/CCF	Independent
1949	64.0	9.1	26.9
Total	64.0	9.1	26.9

Independent Liberal

Year	ILP/CCF	Social Credit
1953	45.2	54.8
Total	45.2	54.8

Independents

Year	Progre ssives	Liberal	Conser vative	ILP/ CCF	Minor Labour	Social Credit	Smart Money Economics
1920		29.1	32.0		39.0		
1922	1.0	0.2	0.7	92.2	5.9		
1927	12.2	36.2	18.9	24.4	8.3		
1932	2.5	17.0	37.5	18.1	24.9		
1941	12.3		38.7	30.5		4.8	13.7
1949	55.9		19.7	24.4			
1953			13.0	41.4		45.6	
Total	15.4	14.5	23.6	23.9	14.1	7.3	1.2

The ILP/CCF drew its support from three places. Independent candidates were a source of support, but this is largely due to the Stubbs candidacy in 1936. As a labour candidate running as an independent, it is not surprising that a healthy proportion of his transfers would go to the ILP/CCF. Not surprisingly, minor labour parties were an important source of strength for the ILP and the CCF. When those smaller labour parties were eliminated, a large proportion of their transfers would end up with the ILP or the CCF. While there were significant tensions with the more extreme socialist elements in Manitoba politics, the CCF was ideally situated to receive transfers from these parties. The importance of the Conservative vote to the ILP/CCF is somewhat surprising, but it is likely rooted in the two parties' common opposition to the Progressive government.

The Progressives managed to attract support from several parties. In the first few elections, the Liberals were the most important source of support for the Progressive party. As the Progressives absorbed the Liberal party, the Conservatives became their most significant source of transfers. Conservative membership in the coalition government enhanced the ties between the Conservatives and the Progressives. In those three coalition elections, the Conservatives were an extremely important source of transfers for the Progressives. Thus, while the coalition allowed the Conservatives to attract some support from the Progressives, the reverse also happened.

The small labour parties primarily drew support from each other — over half of their transfers came from other labour parties. The ILP/CCF was relatively insignificant for these parties in terms of transfers. This situation is not surprising. The smaller labour parties tended to be eliminated rather quickly. By the time ILP/CCF candidates were eliminated or elected, there would be relatively few candidates from those smaller parties in a position to receive transfers.

Wasted votes: Vote leakage (W1)

Manitoba's political parties wasted significant proportions of their used votes through vote leakage due to transfers. Parties routinely gave up a third or more of a quota in transfers to other parties.

Table 37 shows the destination of transfers in Winnipeg by proportions. The Progressives overwhelmingly favoured the Conservatives in their transfers. Over half of all of their transfers went to Conservative candidates. This relationship was particularly strong during the early years of Conservative membership in the coalition government: in 1945, over 85% of all Progressive transfers to other parties went to Conservative candidates. The 1949 election is somewhat anomalous, but this is largely due to the availability of Conservative candidates eligible to receive transfers. If the Independent Conservative (future premier Duff Roblin) totals from 1949 are added to the Conservative totals, the Conservative figure for 1949 is part of the broader trend of transfers from the Progressives to the Conservatives. The ILP/CCF was a distant second favorite for Progressive voters, although in some elections, such as in 1936, the ILP/CCF was a relatively popular choice for Progressive voters. Interestingly, the CCF's short-lived participation in the coalition did not result in an increase in transfers from Progressive to CCF candidates.

In Manitoba in this time period, the Liberals transferred their votes quite evenly between the Progressives and the Conservatives. The Conservatives were a popular initial destination for Liberal transfers, but as the Liberals and Progressives forged closer links, the Progressives became more important to the Liberals.

The Manitoba Conservatives transferred their ballots primarily to two parties: the Progressives and the ILP/CCF. The Progressives were quite overwhelmingly the favorite destination for transfers from the Conservative party; in 1945 over 90% of the transfers from Conservative candidates went to Progressive candidates, reciprocating the transfers

Table 37

Destination of transfers (W1) in Winnipeg, by party

Progressives

Year	Liberal	Conser vative	ILP/ CCF	Minor Labour	Ind. Con- servative	Social Credit	Sound Money Economics	Ind. Liberal	Inde pend- ent
1922	48.0	23.0	20.1	8.7					0.2
1927	24.5	47.8	16.6	1.8					9.3
1932	3.1	64.2	27.2	3.9					1.7
1936		53.3	39.8			6.9			
1941		68.0	25.6	1.5		0.4	0.6		3.9
1945		85.5	10.4	4.0		0.2			
1949		15.9	10.0	4.5	38.1				31.7
1953		56.9	10.7	1.4		2.6		5.9	22.5
Total	7.6	54.5	16.5	3.5	6.5	0.9	0.1	0.8	9.7

Liberals

Year	Progressive	Conservative	ILP/CCF	Minor Labour	Independent
1920		39.5		18.7	41.8
1922	33.6	40.2	14.6	11.6	
1927	33.3	14.5	27.9	3.1	21.2
1932	47.7	23.9	19.3	5.2	3.9
Total	29.7	29.7	16.0	9.4	15.2

Conservatives

Year	Progres sives	Liberals	ILP/ CCF	Minor Labour	Ind. Con- servative	Ind. Progressive	Social Credit	Independent
1920		39.9		13.4				46.7
1922	28.5	40.2	14.0	17.0				0.3
1927	35.9	41.4	16.6					16.1
1932	42.2	2.9	47.9	3.9				3.0
1936	70.7		24.2				5.2	
1941	34.3		57.3	2.7			0.0	5.7
1945	92.9			7.1				
1949	43.4		7.3	5.1	30.0	7.9		11.4
1953	59.1		28.7	5.1			0.5	6.7
Total	41.3	8.4	31.3	4.3	4.3	1.1	0.3	8.9

ILP/CCF

Year	Progre ssives	Liberals	Conser vative	Minor Labour	Ind. Con- servative	Ind. Pro- gressive	Ind. Lib.	Social Credit	Ind.
1922	8.7	12.1	17.5	42.0					19.7
1927	15.2	14.7	17.8	11.1					41.3
1932	28.9	2.8	22.1	36.9					9.3
1936	37.3	36.6						26.1	
1941	49.6		24.1	12.8				0.2	13.3
1945	29.7		30.3	38.8				1.2	
1949	52.3		19.3	0.8	8.7	1.4			17.6
1953	35.9		18.3	5.3			7.4	1.8	31.2
Total	33.7	3.1	22.6	19.6	1.8	0.3	1.0	2.2	15.7

Table 37, continued

Combined minor labour parties

Year	Progressive	Liberal	Conservative	ILP/CCF	Minor Labour	Independent
1920		4.1	3.1		84.6	8.2
1922	4.8	2.5	5.0	41.2	46.1	0.4
1927	11.8	18.2	16.3	25.5	25.4	2.7
1932	5.0	10.2		84.8		
1936	6.6	9.5	5.6	55.9	21.6	0.8
1945	2.4	5.2	5.3	79.5		7.6
1949	22.3		12.2	59.2	4.4	1.8
Total	5.0	0.5	4.5	62.0	26.0	2.0

Sound Money Economics

Year	Progressives	Conservatives	ILP/CCF	Minor Labour	Social Credit	Independent
1941	14.2	36.9	27.1	4.8	4.7	12.3
Total	14.2	36.9	27.1	4.8	4.7	12.3

Social Credit

Year	Progressives	Conservative	ILP/CCF	Minor Labour	Ind. Liberal	Sound Money Economics	Independent
1936	18.9	24.4	56.8				
1941	18.0	29.8	37.5	9.1		1.4	4.2
1953	17.7	28.0	28.4	2.2	9.2		14.6
Total	18.4	26.1	46.2	1.9	2.5	0.2	4.6

Independent Progressive

Year	Progressives	ILP/CCF
1949	60.8	39.2
Total	60.8	39.2

Independent Liberal

Year	Progressives	Conservatives	ILP/CCF	Minor Labour
1953	47.3	22.6	18.5	11.6
Total	47.3	22.6	18.5	11.6

Independents

Year	Progressives	Liberals	Conservatives	ILP/CCF	Minor Labour	Ind. Progressive	Social Credit	Sound Money Economics
1920		46.8	29.2		24.0			
1922	14.8	17.4	25.4	19.9	22.4			
1927	13.3	21.8	12.0	47.8	5.1			
1932	33.0	0.4	37.3	18.5	10.8			
1936	11.9		22.7	45.5	12.0		7.9	
1941	10.6		39.1	38.9	5.8		3.2	2.4
1945	26.8		23.0	38.5	9.4		2.4	
1949	34.7		31.5	15.4		18.4		
1953	21.4		7.9	7.9			62.7	
Total	12.5	11.5	25.7	31.2	13.9	0.3	4.9	0.0

from Progressive candidates to Conservatives as discussed above. The ILP/CCF earned a surprising number of Conservative transfers in Winnipeg. The high point came during the

coalition election of 1941. The coalition probably diminished the perceived differences between the Conservative and CCF candidates in that election. For the other elections, it is likely that the opposition position of the Conservatives and the ILP/CCF created a sense of commonality and facilitated transfers between the two parties.

The ILP/CCF transfer pattern displays some interesting partisan relationships. One surprising finding is that less than one-fifth of ILP/CCF transfers went to minor labour candidates. This partially reflects the fact that there were usually relatively few candidates from minor labour parties still eligible to receive transfers when the ILP or CCF candidates were eliminated. This also reflects some of the animosity between the CCF and their more extreme counterparts.³ The Progressives were the most popular recipients of transfers from supporters of the ILP/CCF. This is somewhat surprising. This partially reflects the strength of both the ILP/CCF and the Progressives. Transfers between the ILP/CCF and the Progressives would have taken place late in the counting when relatively large numbers of votes were involved, thus making the relationship appear stronger than it may have been in the minds of voters. To some extent, this relationship also reflects the ambivalence felt by ILP/CCF supporters towards the Progressives. Some CCF supporters and officials saw the Progressives as kindred "progressive" spirits, despite the government's actions to the contrary.⁴ The Conservatives were another consistent destination for transfers of ILP/CCF candidates, again possibly reflecting a common position encouraged by the two parties' common opposition status.

The small labour parties were very consistent in their transfer behaviour, favouring the ILP/CCF by a significant margin. Interestingly enough, only a small proportion went

³ See Nelson Wiseman, *Social Democracy in Manitoba: A History of the CCF-NDP* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1983), Chapter 3.

⁴ Wiseman, *Social Democracy*, Chapter 2.

to other minor labour parties when a candidate from one of these small parties was eliminated. Although the fragmentation on the left did rob the ILP/CCF of first preference votes, it is quite clear that their candidates received the bulk of the later preferences. In the end, this fragmentation did not harm the party too significantly. In fact, the Labour Progressives, the CCF's primary alternative on the left, encouraged their supporters to vote CCF with their second preferences despite the CCF's campaign to encourage its supporters to avoid cooperation with the LPP.⁵

Social Credit was not an electorally powerful force in Winnipeg in this time period, so their transfers were not always electorally significant. In 1936, however, Social Credit candidates received three-quarters of a quota in first preferences and transfers (see Table 34). In that election, the ILP/CCF candidates received the majority of the Social Credit transfers to other parties. This reflects some of the early discussions of cooperation between the CCF and Social Credit and the possibility of a coalition between the two parties.⁶ The talk of cooperation died down quickly and the CCF became a less favoured destination of transfers for the party. From the CCF's point of view, this was not a significant problem as it coincided with Social Credit's declining electoral significance.

Little is known about the Sound Money Economics candidates: their vote totals were comparatively small and were shared primarily by Conservative and CCF candidates in 1941. The Independent Progressive and Independent Liberal candidates in 1949 and 1953 mirror the experiences of the Independent Social Credit candidate in Calgary: preferential balloting allows voters to support an independent candidate loosely affiliated with a party without fear of jeopardizing the success of their preferred option. Supporters of independent candidates in Winnipeg tended to prefer the ILP/CCF, but a significant

⁵ Wiseman, *Social Democracy*, 40-41.

⁶ Wiseman, *Social Democracy*, 19.

proportion also supported the Conservatives. Interestingly, the Progressives attracted relatively little of the vote of independent candidates.

Wasted votes: Non-transferable ballots (W2)

The parties all wasted a proportion of their received vote through non-transferable ballots. As was the case in Alberta, the larger parties generally wasted more votes this way than did the smaller parties. The primary exception is the ILP/CCF which had relatively few votes become non-transferable, reflecting their comparatively low exclusivity ratios and the availability in some cases of ideologically compatible alternatives, such as the Labour Progressives.

Wasted votes: Unelected candidates (W3)

As noted in the discussion of Alberta, all electoral systems necessitate that there be winners and losers. The Hare system is no exception: someone has to be eliminated in the final count. While some losses are unavoidable, as seen in Edmonton and Calgary, there were a number of situations where parties lost seats that could have been retained through maximizing the used vote by minimizing W1 and W2 losses. In 1920, Robert Russell, a candidate for the Socialist Party of Canada lost on the final count by 63 votes. The Socialist Party lost 739 votes in transfers to other parties (W1). Given the multiplication of labour parties in the 1920 election and the fact that 85% of transfers from labour parties went to other labour parties, these losses likely contributed to the election of other candidates with similar ideological positions. However, 98 votes were also lost to Liberal, Conservative, and Independent candidates. This would have been enough to elect Russell instead of the Conservative candidate who took the final spot.

A similar situation occurred in 1922 where the Liberal candidate, Duncan Cameron, lost the final spot in Winnipeg to a UFM candidate by a 371 vote margin. The Liberals wasted 406 votes through non-transferable ballots (W2) and a staggering 2,075

votes through transfers to other parties. In 1936, Mary Dyma, a Progressive candidate lost the final Winnipeg seat by 927 votes; in that election the Progressives gave up 1,209 votes in transfers to other parties and 276 votes through non-transferable ballots. In the 1945 election, the Conservatives lost the final seat to the Liberals by a slim 93 vote margin. What must have made this loss difficult was the large number of ballots (1030) that were non-transferable (W2) and the fact that these ballots became non-transferable on the final transfer. If a tenth of those Conservative supporters had indicated one more preference, the party would have earned an additional seat.

As was also the case in Alberta, however, these losses are probably unavoidable in most situations, despite the best efforts of parties to maximize their used votes. In Manitoba, at least, all parties were hit by this problem fairly equally; in the long run, the losses due to unelected candidates likely even out.

Winners and losers under the Hare system

The evidence presented thus far shows that Social Credit in Alberta and the ILP/CCF in Manitoba were the most cohesive and efficient parties in their respective provinces. The used vote analysis shows that Social Credit was a dominant force in Edmonton and Calgary because of its ability to attract large numbers of first preferences and retain those votes through very disciplined transfers to other Social Credit candidates. The ILP/CCF in Winnipeg was also a dominant party in first preferences, but not nearly to the extent of Social Credit in Alberta. Chapter 6 also revealed the ILP/CCF to be relatively disciplined in its transfers, compared to other parties in Manitoba. The ILP/CCF also managed to attract a significant number of transfers from other parties in Winnipeg, particularly the small labour parties.

The question remains whether any of this made a difference in electoral outcomes. Were some parties better able to use the Hare system to elect candidates than others? Terence Qualter argues that results under the Hare system in Alberta and Manitoba did

not differ appreciably from what they would have been under the plurality system. He bases this claim on the argument that in many cases, the ten top people who were leading on the first count end up becoming elected in the end.⁷ If Qualter is correct, the Hare system added a lot of complication to the electoral process with very little effect: hence, differences between the parties' supporters in terms of transfer behaviour are insignificant.

There are two problems with Qualter's argument. The first is that the first preference results are not the same as what would have happened under the plurality system. Under the plurality rule, voters would have had as many votes as the district magnitude (i.e., ten in Winnipeg). A multi-member plurality system tends to return results in which all of the elected candidates are from the same party (see Chapter 1). What Qualter is comparing is the results under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) as was used in Japan until 1995. Like STV and unlike the plurality system, SNTV tends to return relatively proportional electoral outcomes.⁸

The second problem is that the evidence does not support Qualter's argument. When Winnipeg was a ten-member district between 1920 and 1945, every election featured at least one candidate who finished in the top ten on the first count and who failed to become elected. Qualter's claim is more accurate about Winnipeg when it was divided into three four-member districts. Only twice in six cases (Winnipeg Centre in 1949 and Winnipeg North in 1953) did candidates become elected through transfers, but

⁷ Terence H. Qualter, *The Election Process in Canada* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 134.

⁸ Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, *Seats & Votes: The Effects & Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 106, report a value of 6.9% for D for Japan, in the same group as PR countries and Ireland. See also Arend Lijphart, Rafael Lopez Pintor, and Yasunori Sone, "The limited vote and the single nontransferable vote: Lessons from the Japanese and Spanish examples." in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds., *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences* (New York: Agathon, 1986), 154-169.

one of those cases was a situation where a Progressive candidate in seventh place after the first count beat out the Progressive candidate in fourth place. The lower district magnitude resulted in fewer transfers and, thus, less of an opportunity to gain or lose seats through transfer votes. In Edmonton, only one election (1930) failed to result in a different outcome than would have been the case under SNTV. In fact, Edmonton featured some dramatic climbs by certain candidates. In 1952, Social Credit candidate Edgar Gerhart became an MLA despite the fact that he was in sixteenth place after the first count, a remarkable showing made possible by the disciplined transfers of Social Credit supporters and the overwhelming popularity of Ernest Manning. In Calgary, only two of the eight elections (1930 and 1944) saw no changes in the election outcome. Clearly, the experience of Alberta and Manitoba does not fit Qualter's portrayal.

Table 38 shows which parties gained and lost seats through transfers in the Hare system. If a party's candidate wins a seat because of transfers, i.e., he or she would not have been elected under an SNTV system, we will consider that to be a gain. We will consider a party to have lost a seat if one of its losing candidates would have won had the result been decided on first preferences alone. Table 38 shows that the ILP/CCF were clearly the party that made the best use of transfers in the Hare system. The ILP/CCF managed to gain five seats through transfers and, perhaps more importantly, did not lose a single seat. This reflects both the disciplined voting of the party's supporters as well as the party's attractiveness as a transfer destination. The Progressives also did relatively well, with a net gain of two seats over the STV period. This is somewhat surprising, as the Progressives did not display high levels of solidarity; in fact, in one of the elections in which they gained a seat (1941), their solidarity ratio was at its lowest level.⁹ In the 1941 election, however, the Conservative solidarity ratio was even lower and the Progressives

⁹ Their solidarity ratio was 0.429 in that election; See Table 20 in Chapter 6.

earned a significant proportion of Conservative transfers, allowing their candidate to become elected. The smaller parties and independents generally fared quite poorly under the Hare system, not gaining any seats through transfers and occasionally losing seats. This is to be expected, since smaller parties run fewer candidates and have fewer opportunities to earn transfers from their own eliminated candidates. In addition, as we saw in our analysis of the transfer patterns, small labour parties were more likely to transfer their ballots to the ILP/CCF than to other small labour parties.

Table 38

Seats gained and lost through transfers, Winnipeg

Party	Gains	Losses	Net
ILP/CCF	5	0	+5
Progressives	3	1	+2
Liberals	1	1	0
Socialists	1	1	0
Communists	0	1	-1
Independents	0	1	-1
Labour	0	1	-1
United Workers	0	1	-1
Conservatives	0	3	-3

From this analysis, the Conservatives emerge as the biggest losers of the Hare system in Winnipeg. This is despite the fact that the Conservatives had the second-best overall record in party solidarity. What accounts for this comparatively dismal performance? The problem appears to have been the Conservatives' participation in the coalition; they lost a seat in each of the three elections they contested as part of that arrangement. The Conservatives' solidarity dipped in this period, resulting in transfer leaks to other parties, most notably the Liberal-Progressives. The end result of this lack of discipline was fewer Conservative MLAs.

Table 39 shows the situation in Alberta. As is to be expected, Social Credit clearly did the best in terms of transfers. It should be noted that all three of the party's seat losses in Edmonton and Calgary came in 1935, the first election Social Credit contested. After that, they managed to exploit their commanding position in terms of first preferences, transferring the ballots of eliminated Social Credit candidates to other Social Credit candidates still in contention. In this way, their candidates quickly moved into a position where they could earn their seats. It should also be noted that most of the Social Credit seat gains took place in Edmonton where Ernest Manning ran from 1940 on. His personal popularity meant that he earned an overwhelming proportion of first preferences; after his election, his surplus votes would go to other Social Credit candidates whose first count totals were probably artificially low because of the presence of Manning. This "Manning bonus" accounts for many of the Social Credit gains.

Table 39

Seats gained and lost through transfers, Edmonton and Calgary

Party	Edmonton			Calgary			Cities Net
	Gained	Lost	Net	Gained	Lost	Net	
Social Credit	6	2	+4	1	1	0	-4
Conservatives	2	0	+2	1	1	0	-2
Liberals	2	3	-1	3	1	+2	-1
Labour	1	0	+1	1	1	0	+1
UFA	0	1	-1				-1
Ind. Liberals	0	1	-1				-1
Ind. Labour				0	1	-1	-1
CCF	0	1	-1	0	-1	-1	-2
Independents	0	2	-2				-2

The other parties in Alberta experienced various degrees of success and failure in electing or losing candidates. The patterns are not as clear as in Manitoba, reflecting the more static character of the party system in Alberta. Since all parties were relatively

disciplined, there is little opportunity to draw conclusions based on these results. For example, other than Social Credit, the CCF was the most disciplined party in Alberta, keeping close to 80% of its transfers; despite this, the party still lost a seat in Edmonton and a seat in Calgary. This simply reflects that there were fewer votes available to be transferred to CCF candidates from eliminated CCF candidates or others sympathetic to the CCF.

Another way of examining the way parties used the Hare system is to compare the initial first preference ordering with the order of elimination. It is advantageous for parties to have their candidates hang on for as many counts as possible. This allows them the opportunity to earn more transfers and keeps them in contention for winning a seat. Successful parties should be able to keep their candidates around for a longer period. Moving up will usually require that parties retain their own transfers and attract transfers from other parties. If a party's candidate is eliminated earlier than his or her first preference ordering indicates it should, this is registered as a loss of rankings. For example, if a candidate for a party finishes third out of ten candidates, but is the fourth candidate eliminated (a finish of seventh place), it would receive a score of -4 for having dropped four places from third to seventh. Conversely, if a candidate gains rankings, by finishing higher than the first preference order, this is registered as a gain of a certain number of rankings.

In all three cities, Independent candidates fared relatively poorly in moving up in the finish order. In Edmonton, independent candidates lost fourteen ordinal positions, while they lost seven in Calgary, and fifteen in Winnipeg. Independent candidates do not have the partisan connections with other candidates which would enable them to earn transfers and move up in the ordinal rankings. This casts doubt on whether STV is especially effective in rewarding the candidacies of independents. It seems clear that candidates who compete as part of a party slate have an advantage in earning transfers.

In Alberta, the Conservatives did relatively poorly in Edmonton, losing thirteen ordinal rankings. This likely reflects the fact that, of the major parties, the Conservatives had the lowest solidarity ratios. The CCF did quite well in Calgary, gaining ten ordinal rankings, reflecting their high solidarity ratio. The party that gained the most through the transfer process was Social Credit in Edmonton. Social Credit candidates experienced a net gain of thirty-seven positions in Edmonton. This obviously reflects the Manning factor; the fact that Manning was the overwhelming first choice for Social Credit supporters meant that a number of candidates finished in artificially low positions after the first count. The transfer of Manning's large surplus meant that Social Credit candidates had a tremendous opportunity to move up in the count. Interestingly, some Social Credit candidates in Edmonton actually went down in the rankings, suggesting that the Manning surplus did not distribute proportionally to the other Social Credit candidates.

In Winnipeg, the Progressives were definitely the party that did the poorest in ordinal rankings. Progressive candidates lost a total of twenty-three ordinal positions. This reflects the very low solidarity ratio of the Progressive party. Interestingly, the coalition strategy appears to have been an effective way to deal with this poor performance. From 1922 to 1936, the Progressives' net loss was thirty ordinal positions; from 1941 to 1949, they gained six. This gain appears to have been partly at the expense of the Conservatives who lost a total of eight ordinal rankings over the same three elections. Overall, the Conservatives were the other poor performer in preference order, losing thirteen positions over the course of the years the Hare system was in use in Winnipeg.

By far the best performing party was the ILP/CCF. Their significantly better solidarity than their competition combined with the party's ability to attract transfers from other parties, gaining the ILP/CCF a significant number of ordinal rankings. The party's net gain from 1922 to 1953 was 49 ordinal positions, a very impressive performance.

Conclusion

The analysis of the used vote showed a contrast of the two provinces. Alberta's party system was more static and election outcomes depended on first preferences and transfers within parties, rather than transfers between parties. Social Credit was able to translate its commanding first preference position into electoral success through careful and disciplined transfers between their candidates.

In Winnipeg, the used vote analysis reveals a party system that was more complex and fluid, depending much more on transfers between parties. The ILP/CCF was a dominant force in Winnipeg politics in this period, attracting a significant proportion of first preference votes. The situation was somewhat complicated by the regular emergence of more militant labour groups. The Hare system allowed for the emergence and management of this conflict on the left. Voters were able to vote for parties like the Labour Progressives, knowing that they could choose to support the CCF with their later preferences. The analysis of the destination of transfers reveals that a significant proportion of voters did so.

The used vote analysis also indicates something of the complex relationship between the various parties in the two provinces. In Alberta, there is some evidence to suggest that, in the large cities, the Liberals and the Conservatives seemed to prefer to transfer to each other rather than to Social Credit; there thus appears to be a modest cleavage between the establishment parties and the new party in Alberta politics in this era. This is reinforced by the fact that CCF supporters often supported Social Credit with their later transfers, possibly reflecting the common populist roots and the rejection of the established party system that the two parties shared.

In Manitoba, the transfer patterns revealed some aspects of the way coalition politics worked in that province and the toll it took on the Conservative party. Coalition politics increased the mutual dependence of the Progressives and the Conservatives in

Winnipeg. The main cleavage lines in Winnipeg appear to have pitted the Conservatives and the Progressives against the ILP/CCF and the smaller labour parties.

In the end, STV appears to have been used most successfully by Social Credit in Alberta and by the ILP/CCF in Manitoba. These two parties were most successful at using transfers to elect candidates and improve their ordinal rankings. This suggests that disciplined party behaviour is an important determinant of a party's success in electing candidates under STV. Both Social Credit and the ILP/CCF were disciplined parties with committed voters. They seemed to be most rewarded by the workings of the STV system. This bolsters the conclusion of Chapter 6 and suggests that much of the vaunted freedom given by STV to voters is somewhat illusory. The electoral system rewards those parties that use their partisan identities to retain transfers; it also encourages parties to form alliances to attract the support of other parties' voters. One needs only look at the fate of independent candidates under the Hare system to see that these candidates dropped in ordinal rankings and lost seats because they lacked the partisan connections that would have enabled them to earn transfers which in turn would help them earn seats. The single transferable vote thus provides voters with more freedom in theory, but the practice is rather different. Even in the populist context of prairie politics in this period, partisanship appears to have played an extremely important role in guiding the voting behaviour of the electorate and in determining party success.

Chapter Eight

With a bang or whimper? The abolition of STV

In the mid-1950s, after over thirty years of experience with STV, both Alberta and Manitoba abandoned it. Within a year of each other, both provinces adopted the plurality system used in the rest of Canada. Although the outcome in both provinces was similar, the path back to the plurality system was decidedly different in both provinces. Manitoba abandoned the STV system with little more than a whimper of protest. In Alberta, the abolition of STV by the Social Credit government was accompanied by loud and angry denunciations by the opposition parties and the newspapers of the province. This chapter will compare the politics of the abolition of STV in both provinces, focusing on the contexts that shaped the debates.

Manitoba

In Manitoba, the context was the continuing malapportionment that plagued representation in the provincial legislature. The city of Winnipeg was severely underrepresented. Table 40 reports the extent of this underrepresentation during the first half of the 20th century. Because the Progressives' support was stronger in rural Manitoba, this malapportionment was not politically neutral. Moreover, the primary opposition to the Liberal-Progressive government came from Winnipeg. Thus, the underrepresentation of Winnipeg also meant the underrepresentation of opposition voices in Manitoba's legislature. This was the most pressing problem in Manitoba politics at the time.

Table 40

Representation of Winnipeg in the Manitoba legislature

Year	Winnipeg population as proportion of Manitoba's population (%)	Winnipeg seats as percentage of legislature seats (%)
1901	16.60	7.8
1911	29.48	12.24
1921	29.35	18.18
1931	30.53	18.18
1941	30.42	18.18
1951	30.35	21.05

Source: Adapted from M.S. Donnelly, *The Government of Manitoba* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 60. Corrected for 1951.

The Manitoba legislature dismantled the proportional representation system in two steps and in both stages, the underrepresentation of Winnipeg overshadowed the debate. In an editorial at the start of the legislature's 1949 session, the *Winnipeg Free Press* wrote that the redistribution of seats in the legislature was the most important issue facing the legislature and called on the provincial government to establish an independent commission to handle the issue.¹ An editorial in the *Winnipeg Tribune* also emphasized the importance of the redistribution issue for the legislature.² Thus, it is not surprising that one of the first items of business for the new session of the legislature was the report of the legislature's redistribution committee. The committee had recommended the elimination of two rural seats and that Winnipeg's representation be increased to twelve seats from the current ten. The committee also recommended converting St. Boniface from a single-member to a dual-member district plus the addition of one more suburban seat. The net result of all of this would have been to increase the size of Manitoba's

¹ *Winnipeg Free Press*, 7 February 1949.

² *Winnipeg Tribune*, 12 February 1949.

legislature from fifty-five to fifty-seven members.³ This would lessen the underrepresentation of Winnipeg only slightly. As seen in Table 1, Winnipeg would still have only two-thirds of the representation to which it was entitled by population.

With regard to the operation of the Hare system in Winnipeg, the most significant proposal was to divide Winnipeg into three four-member constituencies, applying the Hare system in each constituency. These new provincial districts in Winnipeg would largely follow the three wards used in Winnipeg's municipal elections. This was significant because of the potential impact on the proportionality of electoral results. One of the time-honoured findings of electoral systems research is that larger district magnitudes produce more proportional electoral results. Generally, a district should have at least five seats to produce proportional outcomes.⁴ The likely negative impact of the change on proportionality was readily apparent to the *Free Press* which immediately complained about the committee's plan in an editorial: "Nor will it be easily understood why Winnipeg is to be divided into . . . constituencies except that such a division is a partial reversal of the principle of proportional representation and seems at first glance to work to the advantage of the Government and the disadvantage of the Opposition. The Government will have some explaining to do."⁵

After some early procedural wrangling over some technical aspects of the redistribution committee's work, the legislature voted to accept its report. However, for most of the rest of the session of the legislature, the government did not act to implement the report. Opposition MLAs and newspaper editorials repeatedly called for the

³ *Winnipeg Tribune*, 7 February 1949; *Winnipeg Free Press*, 10 February 1949.

⁴ Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, *Seats & Votes: The Effects & Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 117.

⁵ *Winnipeg Free Press*, 11 February 1949.

government to act. As one MLA pointed out, it had been four years since the last provincial election and there were abundant rumours about an upcoming election. He urged the government to rectify the redistribution situation before any election.⁶

On April 5, the Liberal-Progressives finally introduced the necessary legislation to implement the report's recommendations. The debate over this bill revealed not only the differences between the CCF and the Liberal-Progressive led Coalition government, but also the differences between CCF MLAs and more extreme independent and labour representatives. A key figure in the debate was Lewis St. George Stubbs, the former judge who had been a fixture in the Manitoba legislature as an independent MLA from Winnipeg since 1936.

In the debate over second reading, Stubbs declared the redistribution a gerrymander and called for an independent boundary commission to draw electoral boundaries for the province. He was highly critical of the division of Winnipeg into three districts, calling it a "complete departure from the P.R. system." He argued that the new system would make it harder for smaller parties and independents to win representation in the legislature and accused the government of deliberately raising the threshold of representation. In one of his typically withering attacks on the government, he said he would rather have had no redistribution than this "iniquitous measure."⁷ Stubbs alleged that the government had proposed the reforms simply to save its political future. He said that the government should have entitled the bill "An act for the relief of the coalition government and to perpetuate it in office." Stubbs also claimed that the bill was directed against him personally. He lived in affluent Winnipeg South, but much of his electoral

⁶ *Winnipeg Free Press*, 15 March 1949; an editorial in the *Tribune* echoed this concern: *Winnipeg Tribune*, 17 March 1949.

⁷ *Winnipeg Free Press*, 19 April 1949.

support came from working-class Winnipeg North. The division of Winnipeg into three districts would cut him off from his electoral base. Stubbs said the plan would make him consider not running for reelection.⁸ Though clearly on the left, Stubbs was nevertheless also often highly critical of the positions of the CCF. In the debate over redistribution, Stubbs was specifically critical of Hansford, the CCF leader, for agreeing to the report. He accused the CCF of ineptitude because proportional representation does not work in small constituencies.⁹

The CCF, however, did criticize the proposal to divide Winnipeg into three constituencies. Lloyd Stinson, a CCF MLA who sat on the redistribution committee, claimed that he had tried to increase the representation of Winnipeg further and had tried to prevent the division of Winnipeg, but was outvoted by government members on the committee. He accused the Liberal-Progressives of attempting to divide CCF support in Winnipeg, and charged the government with attempting an "iniquitous gerrymander." Other CCF members such as Donovan Swales and Morris Gray echoed Stinson's criticisms. The Labour Progressive leader, William Kardash, also joined the CCF and Stubbs in their critique of the measure, describing the subdivision of Winnipeg as "political butchery." Premier Douglas Campbell responded to these criticisms by saying that the government did not want to lengthen an already long Winnipeg ballot by increasing the district magnitude which is why they divided Winnipeg into smaller districts. He said it was "nonsense" that this change undermined proportional representation, but did not provide any evidence or arguments to support his claims.¹⁰ The Coalition government's dominance of Manitoba's legislature guaranteed the passage

⁸ *Winnipeg Free Press*, 22 April 1949.

⁹ *Winnipeg Tribune*, 30 March 1949.

¹⁰ *Winnipeg Free Press*, 19 April 1949.

of the redistribution bill, and it passed third reading in a late night session on April 21. The bill was opposed by the CCF members and the Independent Conservatives. The first stage of the demise of PR in Manitoba had ended.

Editorial reaction to the move was somewhat mixed. Fred Johnson, the legislature reporter for the *Tribune*, wrote in a column that the bill did seem to favour the Coalition government: "Members who shouted 'gerrymandering' can scarcely be blamed."¹¹ The *Free Press* toned down its earlier criticism of the redistribution process and argued that the bill dealt with the worst excesses of Winnipeg's underrepresentation in the Manitoba legislature. They were also critical — although only mildly so — of the plan to divide Winnipeg into three constituencies: "Nor can the plan to divide Winnipeg into three four-member constituencies be regarded as anything but a departure — it may well be a reasonable one — from the principle of proportional representation which has governed this city for nearly 30 years."¹²

The 1955 amendments to the elections act dwarfed the impact of the 1949 change, completely removing preferential balloting from use in Manitoba. A select committee of the legislature, established in 1953, spent two years studying the best way to improve the redistribution process. When the committee reported to the legislature in 1955, it recommended a ratio of seven urban voters to four rural voters. It further recommended a mandatory decennial redistribution, carried out by an independent boundary

¹¹ Fred Johnson, "Legislature in Session," *Winnipeg Tribune*, 22 April 1949.

¹² *Winnipeg Free Press*, 23 April 1949.

commission.¹³ Finally, the committee also recommended that Manitoba revert to single member districts for all of the legislature's seats and abolish the single transferable vote.¹⁴

The main focus of the debate was the redistribution element of the bill. While there was little opposition to the independent boundary commission, there was some debate over the 7:4 urban-rural ratio contained in the bill. Lloyd Stinson, who was by then the CCF leader, and who had also been part of the select legislature committee, argued for a more equitable urban-rural ratio. Conservative leader Duff Roblin saw the new ratio as an improvement, but argued that it did not go far enough in correcting rural overrepresentation.¹⁵

The provisions to scrap multi-member districts and alternative voting were more controversial. A Conservative MLA, Errick Willis, advanced one of the strongest arguments against PR in Winnipeg, arguing that the Hare system made Winnipeg politically unimportant. He suggested that because of PR, the election outcome in Winnipeg was usually a "saw-off," with little change from one election to the next. Willis contended that if Winnipeg's seats were elected under plurality, parties would do more to try to win Winnipeg votes, hoping to earn enough of a swing vote to sweep the city's seats. This, he claimed, would make Winnipeg politically stronger and more influential.¹⁶ This was an interesting reversal of the argument advanced by the Progressives when they advocated the adoption of PR in the early part of the century. As noted in Chapter 2, the

¹³ M.S. Donnelley, *The Government of Manitoba* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 79-80; Rand Dyck, *Provincial Politics in Canada*, 3rd. ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1996), 388; W.L. Morton, *Manitoba: A History*, 2nd. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 481.

¹⁴ *Winnipeg Tribune*, 1 March 1955.

¹⁵ *Winnipeg Tribune*, 1 March 1955.

¹⁶ *Winnipeg Tribune*, 3 March 1955; *Winnipeg Free Press*, 3 March 1955.

propensity of parties to try to buy the swing vote was one of the arguments advanced in favour of PR. Other MLAs also spoke up against the PR system. Jack McDowell, a Conservative MLA, claimed that STV had caused “more ill-feeling and trouble than any other factor.”¹⁷ The specifics of McDowell’s complaints have not been recorded.

STV was not without its supporters, however. The Conservative opposition leader, and future premier, Duff Roblin, supported the STV system because it gave voters more choice and control in marking their ballots. William Kardash, the Labour Progressive leader, was not concerned about the abolition of STV, but strongly opposed the end of multi-member districts.¹⁸ Kardash likely saw that, in a single-member district, the electoral prospects of the Labour Progressives would be quite grim. This prediction proved to be accurate as the Labour Progressives were never able to elect a member under the single-member plurality system adopted in 1955. The CCF’s position on the 1955 bill was ambivalent. Some MLAs, like Morris Gray, fought quite hard to preserve both STV and multi-member districts.¹⁹ Others, like Lloyd Stinson, did not appear to have been as concerned with the PR elements of the bill as with other parts of the legislation, such as the establishment of an independent boundary commission.²⁰ In his memoirs, Stinson claims he did what he could to preserve the PR system, but felt it necessary to sacrifice the PR system in order to gain the independent boundary commission.²¹

¹⁷ *Winnipeg Free Press*, 3 March 1955.

¹⁸ *Winnipeg Free Press*, 1 March 1955; *Winnipeg Free Press*, 29 March 1955.

¹⁹ *Winnipeg Tribune*, 3 March 1955.

²⁰ *Winnipeg Tribune*, 1 March 1955; *Winnipeg Free Press*, 1 March 1955.

²¹ Lloyd Stinson, *Political Warriors: Recollections of a Social Democrat* (Winnipeg: Queenston House, 1975), 160.

Editorial reaction to the 1955 legislation was generally positive. The editorial writers with the *Tribune* lauded the independent boundary commission and argued that the end of multi-member districts in Winnipeg would strengthen the city's importance in Manitoba politics. They did not support the end of STV, however, and wanted to see the entire province use alternative voting.²² The *Free Press* took an almost identical editorial stance, praising the independent commission, the improved urban-rural ratio, and the move to single member districts. The abolition of alternative voting, however, was of "doubtful value." The newspaper argued that Manitoba should have one uniform electoral system: "Differences between country and city have been heightened by different electoral systems, and the city's voice has been dissipated in a hodge podge of representation."²³

Manitoba's proportional representation system faded into memory in 1955. The most pressing representational concern in Manitoba at the time was the under-representation of the city of Winnipeg. The 1955 legislation appears to have rectified that situation and the Liberal Progressive government chose that occasion to end the use of STV in Manitoba, as well. For its part, the CCF supported the abolition of STV in return for the establishment of an independent boundary commission. With relatively little debate or argument, STV became a part of Manitoba's history.

Alberta

If Manitoba's STV system ended with a whimper, the debate over the abolition of PR in Alberta was more like a bang. The 1955 provincial election provided the immediate context for the changes to Alberta's electoral law. Scandals over the government's rental of a building owned by two Social Credit MLAs and suspicious dealings between MLAs and Alberta Treasury Branches had rocked the Social Credit government. That election

²² *Winnipeg Tribune*, 2 March 1955.

²³ *Winnipeg Free Press*, 1 April 1955.

saw Social Credit drop to its lowest level of popular support (46%) since the 1940 election. Its majority was reduced from fifty-two to thirty-seven seats in a sixty-one seat legislature. In contrast, the opposition Liberals, led by the popular Harper Prowse earned fifteen seats with 31% of the vote.²⁴

Most significant in all of this was the opposition's use of the alternative voting system in rural Alberta. As reported in Chapter 6, in the 1955 election, Alberta's opposition parties used the AV system with a new level of sophistication. Opposition supporters were less likely to "plump" their ballots; that is, they were more likely to indicate more than one choice on their ballots. Moreover, their supporters were more likely to indicate other opposition parties with their second choices. CCF supporters were more likely to vote Liberal with their later choices and Liberal supporters were more likely to indicate CCF candidates with their second choices. The result was a dramatic increase in the number of seats where Social Credit led after the first count, but ultimately lost because of transfers. In all, Social Credit lost four seats to the Liberals because of vote transfers, the most they or any party lost in one election during the STV era. In addition, there had been some close calls for some government MLAs, victorious by narrow margins because of transfers. Although Social Credit's commanding position in rural Alberta remained more or less intact, the opposition parties' newfound adeptness with alternative voting was costing the party seats. The decline in the Social Credit share of the popular vote also meant an increase in the number of constituencies requiring multiple counts to determine a victor. In 1948, only eight seats required multiple counts; eleven seats in 1952 and sixteen seats (a full third of the rural seats) needed multiple counts. If this trend were to continue, there would be even further opportunity for opposition parties to use AV to their advantage.

²⁴ Dyck, 538; Meir Sefarty, "Harper Prowse and the Alberta Liberals." *Alberta History* 29, no. 1 (1981): 7.

This trend did not escape the notice of Social Credit supporters or leaders. Bob Hesketh cites letters from Social Credit notables to Premier Ernest Manning urging him to consider eliminating preferential balloting and returning to the plurality system. Hesketh argues that the Social Credit leadership decided to eliminate STV because of the cost to the party's electoral fortunes. Because of Social Credit's ideology of grassroots direction, Hesketh contends that the leadership had to manipulate the annual convention of the Social Credit League to request the change in order to prevent the appearance of political opportunism. To do this, the leaders highlighted the opposition's collusion in using the alternative voting system to defeat government candidates in order to create a siege mentality among Social Credit supporters. After a panel discussion on the Election Act and a number of suggestions by Social Credit cabinet ministers, the delegates at the 1955 Social Credit convention passed two resolutions, one calling for the division of Edmonton and Calgary into single-member districts and the other calling for an end to preferential balloting.²⁵

Hesketh argues that, as the 1956 session of the legislature drew near, Social Credit leadership downplayed its earlier emphasis on opposition collusion against Social Credit in order to take the moral high ground in the session.²⁶ The government gave three reasons for the proposed change. The primary argument advanced by the government was the high rate of ballot spoilage under STV. Fred Colborne, the cabinet minister responsible for shepherding the new Elections Act through the legislature, cited this problem while introducing the bill for first reading. Colborne argued that the complicated nature of the STV system effectively disenfranchised voters.²⁷ Colborne and Manning

²⁵ Bob Hesketh, "The abolition of preferential voting in Alberta," *Prairie Forum* 12 (1987): 131-134.

²⁶ Hesketh, 135.

²⁷ *Calgary Herald*, 8 March 1956.

repeatedly came back to this central argument throughout the debates on the bill.²⁸ Second, during the debate over the abolition of STV, the Social Credit government claimed that the general public had called for the change.

The final argument from the government benches was that Alberta should conform to the dominant practice in Canada. Manitoba had abolished its STV system the previous year and British Columbia had done the same a few years earlier, leaving Alberta as the only province that continued to use preferential voting. Colborne and Manning repeatedly came back to the argument that Alberta should use the same electoral system employed in federal elections and those held in other provinces in order to prevent confusion. In his longest speech of the debate, Manning expressed his fondness for STV, saying that he expected that one day all of Canada would use it — but, until then, he felt Alberta should conform to the practices of the federal government.²⁹

The opposition responded to the government's proposal by focusing on the government's assertion that the STV system was responsible for spoiled ballots. Although the Social Credit cabinet had tried to cast itself as the defender of democratic participation, data presented in Chapter 3 clearly disputes this claim. It was shown that while the 1955 election featured relatively high numbers of spoiled ballots, the rate of spoilage had actually decreased from 1952 in both Edmonton and Calgary. Liberal MLA Abe Miller raised this point in the debate, questioning the government's commitment to voter participation since Social Credit seemed suddenly to become concerned about ballot spoilage only after an election that produced a minor reversal for the party.³⁰

²⁸ *Calgary Herald*, 17 March 1956; *Calgary Herald*, 20 March 1956; *Calgary Herald*, 24 March 1956; *Calgary Herald*, 27 March 1956; *Edmonton Journal*, 17 March 1956; *Edmonton Journal*, 20 March 1956.

²⁹ *Edmonton Journal*, 20 March 1956.

³⁰ *Calgary Herald*, 20 March 1956; *Edmonton Journal*, 20 March 1956.

While there is evidence that Colborne's arguments on spoiled ballots had significant problems, the opposition was unable to press its critique.³¹ Some opposition MLAs denied there was a problem and, with an air of elitism, expressed little sympathy for voters who were unable to mark a ballot with the figures "1,2,3." Grant McEwan declared STV to be no more complicated than completing a tax form.³² Liberal leader Prowse concentrated on the stringent ballot marking rules. The main reason for the high number of spoiled ballots in Edmonton and Calgary, he argued, was that some people continued to mark their ballots with an "X," instead of with the figure "1" when plumping, thus spoiling their ballots. Prowse argued that a ballot should be acceptable if the voter's intention was clear.³³ A comparison of rates of ballot spoilage in Calgary and Edmonton with that in Winnipeg as reported earlier in Chapter 3, supports Prowse's argument.

While the opposition paid scant attention to the government's argument that Alberta should use the same electoral system as the federal government and the other provinces, some opposition members did challenge the government's assertion that the public was calling for an end to STV. In particular, W.J.C. Kirby, a Conservative MLA from Red Deer, vigorously pursued this line of criticism. He challenged Colborne to name a single organization besides the Social Credit League which had called for the restoration of the plurality system.³⁴ Bryce Stringham, an independent MLA representing Bow Valley-Empress, reported that there was no public demand for electoral reform in his

³¹ Hesketh, 135-138.

³² *Edmonton Journal*, 27 March 1956; *Calgary Herald*, 20 March 1956; *Edmonton Journal*, 20 March 1956.

³³ *Calgary Herald*, 17 March 1956.

³⁴ *Calgary Herald*, 27 March 1956; *Edmonton Journal*, 27 March 1956.

constituency.³⁵ There was, in fact, little evidence of widespread dissatisfaction with the STV system. Hesketh notes that, after the 1955 election, there were no letters to editors of Alberta's major daily newspapers complaining about the electoral system and no evidence of letters to the premier from the general public.³⁶ In an editorial, the *Edmonton Journal* argued that, in the absence of a poll, the only evidence of public support for or against STV was the position of organizations. The *Journal* noted that most organizations in the province actually favoured the retention of STV.³⁷

The opposition generally was ineffective in attacking the government's rationale for the reforms. Speaking for the official opposition, Prowse initially challenged the government to go ahead and make the desired changes, expressing confidence that Social Credit would not fare any better under the plurality system than it had under STV.³⁸ At other times, he and his colleagues called for a one-year delay to allow for a more full public debate on the changes.³⁹ One member of the Liberal caucus called for the government to resign and challenged Social Credit to an election over the proposed changes.⁴⁰ Kirby, the most vocal of the Conservative opposition members, challenged the government's motivations for the proposal: "If you can't win the game under the existing rules then change them." Kirby denounced the Social Credit action as "cynical" and "sheer political opportunism." He compared the government's claim of knowing what

³⁵ *Edmonton Journal*, 20 March 1956.

³⁶ Hesketh, 142, note 24.

³⁷ *Edmonton Journal*, 21 March 1956.

³⁸ *Calgary Herald*, 17 March 1956.

³⁹ *Calgary Herald*, 20 March 1956; *Calgary Herald*, 27 March 1956; *Edmonton Journal*, 20 March 1956; *Edmonton Journal*, 27 March 1956.

⁴⁰ Hesketh, 136.

was best for the people to the strategies of Adolph Hitler, the Soviet government, and Juan Peron.⁴¹ Like the Liberals, the two CCF MLAs did not follow a consistent strategy in their opposition to the bill. They simultaneously called for a wider use of the Hare system in Alberta and for a delay in implementing the proposed bill.⁴² A few other independent MLAs opposed the government as well. Rose Wilkinson, a member of the Social Credit caucus, broke ranks with her party and voted against the proposal, citing William Aberhart's preference for STV and the support of her constituents.⁴³

While the opposition parties had some trouble honing their critique of the Social Credit proposals, the editorial boards of the province's newspapers let loose with a series of indignant editorials denouncing the government's move. Editorials with titles like "Keep our voting system!," "No Sound Reason Given," "If You're Losing, Change the Rules" and "Ignore Reason! Press Forward!" graced the pages of Alberta's major newspapers.⁴⁴ Editorial writers at the *Edmonton Journal* denounced Social Credit's motivation as narrowly partisan, noting that the government had used the system for twenty years without any complaints until it cost them some seats. They contended that the spoiled ballot problem in the major cities could be dealt with by dividing Edmonton and Calgary into smaller districts with a magnitude of 2 or 3.⁴⁵ They also claimed that PR made the legislature more competitive and hence more responsive to the concerns of the

⁴¹ *Calgary Herald*, 17 March 1956; *Calgary Herald*, 27 March 1956; *Edmonton Journal*, 27 March 1956.

⁴² *Calgary Herald*, 20 March 1956; *Edmonton Journal*, 20 March 1956.

⁴³ *Calgary Herald*, 20 March 1956; *Edmonton Journal*, 20 March 1956.

⁴⁴ From the *Edmonton Journal*, 10 March 1956; *Edmonton Journal*, 21 March 1956; *Calgary Herald*, 9 March 1956; *Calgary Albertan*, 23 March 1956, respectively.

⁴⁵ *Edmonton Journal*, 10 March 1956; *Edmonton Journal*, 21 March 1956.

electorate, denouncing the abolition of STV as “one of the most unpopular pieces of legislation ever introduced in the assembly.”⁴⁶

The Calgary newspapers were even more indignant. The *Calgary Herald* sharply attacked the move as “cold-blooded, cynical, purely political cheap-jackery which can fool no-one” and argued that, along with STV, Social Credit would probably like to abolish the secret ballot and the opposition. Like the *Journal*, the *Herald* suggested that the province could largely solve the spoiled ballot problem by reducing district magnitudes. The *Herald* suggested dividing Edmonton and Calgary into single-member districts and using alternative voting.⁴⁷ The *Herald* writers agreed with those at the *Journal* that the government’s motivation was partisan advantage and had no basis in public opinion: “Loyalty to its leaders and contempt for public opinion has always marked Social Credit.”⁴⁸ They argued that STV had worked well in Alberta and rejected the government’s arguments for uniformity with the rest of Canada as constituting a “feeble excuse.” The same editorial closed with a call to defeat the government because of this move: “With only one vote which will count, the voters in future can only make it effective by voting to beat Social Credit. They have been robbed of a democratic privilege that gave them a chance given to no other voters in Canada.”⁴⁹

Still, the *Calgary Herald* and the *Edmonton Journal* were quite willing to give up on the Hare system in the major cities in order to preserve alternative voting, but the *Calgary Albertan* proved to be a more consistent defender of the principle of proportional representation. The *Albertan*’s editorial writers defended Edmonton and Calgary’s multi-

⁴⁶ *Edmonton Journal*, 31 March 1956.

⁴⁷ *Calgary Herald*, 9 March 1956.

⁴⁸ *Calgary Herald*, 21 March 1956.

⁴⁹ *Calgary Herald*, 21 March 1956.

member districts in numerous editorials on the proposed reforms. They joined their counterparts in questioning the motives of the Social Credit government, calling the move “the biggest blunder the Social Credit government has made in many years.” They argued that voting systems should not be judged on whether they preserve parties in power but on the accuracy of their representation. The editorial writers contended that the plurality system was inadequate any time there were more than two parties competing. They claimed that the spoiled ballot argument was spurious and that any voter unable to figure out how to mark their ballot under STV was “not worth worrying about.”⁵⁰ While they opposed the move to scrap alternative voting in rural Alberta, the writers were even more concerned about changes to the voting system in the major cities. The newspaper argued that the plurality system was majoritarian and disenfranchised voters who supported minority parties. Any small party representation under plurality was “purely an accident of geography.” If Social Credit was really concerned with protecting the franchise as it claimed, the *Albertan* said, it should retain the STV system. The editorial writers argued that from 1944 to 1955, there would not have been even a token opposition without the Hare system in Edmonton and Calgary.⁵¹ The *Albertan* denounced the government’s move as “foolishness that the Social Credit party will have to answer for.”⁵²

The *Lethbridge Herald* was also highly critical of Social Credit’s motives for the change to the electoral system. The newspaper argued that alternative voting was well suited to the “hodge-podge of parties now cluttering up the ballot,” while the plurality system worked better with two parties. The *Herald* writers questioned why STV was suddenly a problem after all of these years and agreed with the newspapers in the two

⁵⁰ *Calgary Albertan*, 9 March 1956; *Calgary Albertan*, 15 March 1956.

⁵¹ *Calgary Albertan*, 20 March 1956; *Calgary Albertan*, 26 March 1956.

⁵² *Calgary Albertan*, 23 March 1956.

large cities that Social Credit was attempting to preserve itself politically. One editorial warned Manning he would pay a political price for his actions: "he may find that he has over-estimated his own prestige and power once too often."⁵³

The *Red Deer Advocate* was also critical of the move, arguing that STV was "unquestionably the fairest and soundest system now in use in any province in Canada." The *Advocate* disputed the claim that the people of Alberta had called for a return to the plurality system. The paper argued that when Social Credit was finally defeated, "one of the first duties of the new government must be the restoration of the transferable ballot and the return of Alberta to her rightful position as the leader in better voting methods."⁵⁴

Despite the efforts of the opposition parties and the sharp criticism of the province's newspapers, Social Credit pushed through with its proposed changes to the electoral system. The 1959 provincial election was conducted by the plurality system used elsewhere in Canada. Contrary to the newspaper predictions that Alberta's voters would make the government pay for its disregard of the electorate, STV did not figure as a prominent campaign issue in the 1959 provincial election. The changes to the electoral system were a distant memory, having happened early in the life of the legislature.

The results of the 1959 election seemed to indicate that Social Credit knew what it was doing when it altered the electoral system. Social Credit's popular vote increased to its pre-1955 levels as the party earned the support of 56% of the province's voters, an increase of 10% from 1955. The single member plurality electoral system played a significant role in the outcome, as Social Credit almost swept the legislature, winning sixty-one of the sixty-five seats, the largest majority in the party's history. In rural

⁵³ *Lethbridge Herald*, 9 March 1956; *Lethbridge Herald*, 22 March 1956; *Lethbridge Herald*, 24 March 1956; *Lethbridge Herald*, 29 March 1956; *Lethbridge Herald*, 2 April 1956.

⁵⁴ *Red Deer Advocate*, 14 March 1956; *Red Deer Advocate*, 4 April 1956.

Alberta. Social Credit won 58% of the vote and forty-seven of the fifty seats. Edmonton and Calgary showed the effects of the change in electoral system most dramatically. In Edmonton, Social Credit won 49% of the popular vote and swept all eight of the city's seats. In Calgary, the government took just under 55% of the vote and won six of the seven seats in that city. The switch in electoral systems contributed to the evisceration of the opposition in Alberta, a situation that continued until the 1967 breakthrough of the Conservatives.

Conclusion

While Alberta and Manitoba followed broadly similar paths when adopting STV, they pursued quite different courses when abolishing it. In Manitoba, the severe underrepresentation of Winnipeg overshadowed the workings of the electoral system. The priority for opposition parties and for Winnipeg's MLAs was improved representation for the city in the Manitoba legislature. The Liberal-Progressives dismantled STV in Manitoba gradually. First, they reduced the average district magnitude in Winnipeg from ten to four, reducing the proportionality of electoral outcomes, then later completely reformed the electoral process. For their part, the opposition parties were quick to sacrifice STV in their desire to win an independent redistricting process. The debate in the legislature over the new legislature showed relatively few people willing to defend STV. Editorial reaction was equally muted. While newspapers were somewhat critical of the government's abandonment of preferential balloting, they let the abolition of STV pass without much comment.

In Alberta, by contrast, the situation was much more explosive. Opposition parties soundly criticized the Social Credit government's abolition of STV. The legislature elected in 1955 featured the largest opposition in years in Alberta and the STV issue was one of the first they tackled. While their criticisms often lacked focus, the opposition parties loudly denounced Social Credit's proposed changes to the electoral system. The

province's major newspapers echoed and amplified these criticisms in an almost unanimous condemnation of the government's plan.

The difference between the reactions in the two provinces seems to rest in the motivation of the government. The changes in Alberta were closely tied to government losses in the previous election. Social Credit was quite clearly trying to enhance its electoral chances through changing the electoral system. Although the Alberta government tried to drape its electoral system reform in the guise of ensuring the full participation of all voters by reducing the number of spoiled ballots, the government's sudden concern about spoiled ballots coincided suspiciously with increased opposition adroitness in using the alternative voting system to defeat Social Credit candidates. Social Credit's claims about spoiled ballots and a supposed public outcry against the STV system do not stand up to serious scrutiny. The close call of the 1955 election appeared to have scared the government and prompted them to change the electoral system to improve their chances. Partisan advantage clearly motivated the Social Credit government in 1956.

In Manitoba, the situation was less clear. The decision to eliminate STV grew out of a select legislative committee which, although it examined the entire electoral process, focused on the question of electoral redistribution. The legislative committee was made up of representatives from all of the major parties,⁵⁵ and thus the decision seemed to be less motivated by partisan advantage. Indeed, the legislative debates on the 1955 reforms to the electoral system indicate that both support for and opposition to STV crossed party lines to some extent. Some Conservatives, such as Duff Roblin, favoured the STV system, while others opposed it. Some Liberal-Progressive members appeared to be supportive of STV, while others were opposed. The CCF was the most supportive of STV, but even

⁵⁵ Stinson, 160.

within that party, there was some difference of opinion. Some members, such as Morris Gray, were strongly committed to proportional representation, while others, such as leader Lloyd Stinson, thought protecting PR was less important than improving the representation of the city of Winnipeg. Furthermore, in Manitoba, it was not as apparent that STV was working strongly in the favour of or against one of the parties, as was the case in Alberta. The argument that the government was making the change for political advantage was harder to substantiate in Manitoba. As a result, the debate was more muted in Manitoba and STV faded from the province with less fanfare than was the case in Alberta.

The experiences of these provinces demonstrate the importance of considering past or prospective electoral reforms in their contexts. In Manitoba, the context for the discussion of electoral reform was the relative lack of representation for Winnipeg. This shaped the character of the debate in Manitoba. In Alberta, the immediate context was Social Credit's losses in the 1955 provincial election which created a sharp division between government and opposition in the ensuing debate. The contrast between the two provinces is a reminder that electoral systems do not exist in vacuums, but rather within broader institutional and socio-economic contexts that mediate the incentive for reforms and the forms they take.

Chapter Nine

Conclusion: The impact of electoral systems

The actions of the Manitoba and Alberta legislatures in 1955 and 1956 put an end to a remarkable period of electoral experimentation in the Canadian provinces. Other than British Columbia's brief experiment with alternative voting in 1952 and 1953, no other provinces have deviated from the plurality formula. For a period of thirty-five years, Alberta and Manitoba used an electoral system that ran decidedly against Canadian electoral precedent.

These experiments with the single transferable vote are significant not only in the Canadian context, but also for their comparative value, because few countries use STV. Most European countries use list systems of proportional representation and the current trend in electoral system reform seems to be towards hybrid systems that combine elements of the plurality system with features of list systems of proportional representation.¹ While a number of American and Canadian cities use or have used STV for municipal elections,² the local nature of urban politics means that parties do not typically play a strong role in such elections. STV, with its emphasis on candidates, not parties, is ideally suited to such contexts. There are only a few cases where STV operates in conjunction with competitive party systems — Ireland, Malta, and Australia. Alberta

¹ Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts, "Understanding the dynamics of electoral reform," *International Political Science Review* 16 (1995): 9-29.

² Douglas J. Amy, *Real Choices/New Voices: The Case for Proportional Representation Elections in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 10-11.

and Manitoba's experiences with STV are significant because they join this short list of cases. Studying the use of STV in these two Canadian provinces contributes not only to our knowledge of Canadian provincial politics, but also to our understanding of the operation of STV.

The impetus for the adoption of this little-used electoral system was the Progressive movement with its emphasis on institutional reform designed to undermine partisan politics. Along with such mechanisms as recall, referenda, and initiative, the Progressive movement advocated STV as a way to improve the operation of representative democracy. They argued that STV would produce more representative legislatures, help to eliminate electoral corruption, and improve the prospects of the independent candidate and voter. The Progressives were drawn to the degree of choice that STV provided to voters and the ability to cross party lines in ballot ordering. While it experienced only limited success in federal politics, the Progressive movement was influential in the prairies, taking power in Manitoba and Alberta. The ideas of the farmers' movement compelled the Liberals in Manitoba and the UFA in Alberta to adopt the Hare system for use in the major cities. In both provinces, the adoption of proportional representation was not a controversial measure; electoral reform was a widely supported reform. It would have been possible to extend the Hare system in a limited way to some of the more densely populated rural areas, but the UFM and the UFA both chose to use alternative voting, the single member version of STV, in the rural areas of Alberta and Manitoba. To some extent, this reflected concern over the ability of MLAs to represent geographically dispersed constituencies effectively, but also seems to reflect an element of political self-preservation, given the rural base of both parties. Thus, an element of political opportunism clouded the electoral reform projects of both provinces.

Once implemented, the STV system did not live up to all of the hopes of its proponents. STV appears to have had a negligible impact on voter turnout, casting doubt

on the claim that more proportional electoral outcomes foster interest in politics and higher turnout. If anything, voter turnout in Winnipeg actually declined under the Hare system. This likely reflects the collapse of partisan differences associated with the coalition politics of the Liberal-Progressive era in Manitoba politics, rather than any influence of the electoral system. In Alberta, turnout was essentially the same under the Hare system as under plurality. Finally, alternative voting appears to have had no impact on voter turnout in the rural areas of either province.

While STV did not usher in a participatory utopia in Alberta or Manitoba, it did prove to be a workable electoral system in both provinces for the most part. The relatively large district magnitudes in Edmonton, Calgary, and particularly Winnipeg meant lengthy ballots, at times containing dozens of names. As a result, the counting process could take some time. Despite this, voters managed to use the system effectively. This is an important point, because critics often question the complexity of STV procedures for voters, arguing that voters will spoil their ballots at higher rates than under simpler electoral systems. This argument figured prominently in Social Credit arguments to eliminate STV in Alberta. This study found that Calgary and Edmonton experienced high rates of ballot spoilage. A comparison with Manitoba, however, reveals that the high rates of ballot spoilage were not due to the mechanics of the Hare system, but rather were due to the comparatively strict ballot marking provisions of Alberta's election legislation.

The use of proportional representation in the three major cities did accomplish one of the Progressives' primary objectives: the reduction in the distortion of election results. The results of elections conducted under the Hare system produced much more proportional outcomes than did elections under the plurality system both before and after the use of STV. One of the curious discoveries of this study is that despite the large district magnitude of Winnipeg ($M=10$), the Manitoba capitol experienced higher levels of disproportionality than did Edmonton and Calgary, contrary to the expectations of

electoral system research. The different partisan situations of the two provinces account for these differences. Manitoba's adoption of the Hare system was accompanied by a proliferation in the number of parties. An increase in the number of small parties meant an increase in the number of parties that did not earn seats, contributing to disproportionality. Moreover, voters in Alberta limited their preference orderings to one party in a more disciplined way, meaning that first preferences were a more accurate indicator that a ballot marked for one party would actually help elect candidates from that party. This reduced disproportionality. The combination of these two factors led to lower levels of disproportionality in the Alberta cities, although in both provinces the Hare system was clearly an improvement over the plurality system in providing more proportional election results. The same cannot be said for the use of alternative voting in rural Alberta and Manitoba. In both provinces, AV did not produce more proportional electoral results than did the plurality system.

Some of the Progressives had hoped that STV would increase the number of parties competing in elections and would break the two party monopoly in Canadian politics. STV influenced the number of parties competing in starkly different ways in Alberta and Manitoba. In the cities of Alberta, the adoption of the more proportional Hare system had no appreciable impact on the number of electoral parties contesting elections. In Winnipeg, however, a dramatic increase in the number of electoral parties accompanied the adoption of the Hare system. This suggests that the change in electoral system was not the decisive factor in determining the number of parties, but rather that changes in social structure and lines of partisan conflict account for these basic changes in party systems. Winnipeg first used proportional representation in 1920, the first election after the Winnipeg General Strike; the increase in the number of parties reflects the increased salience of class politics in Manitoba. Further evidence for this is provided in

the fact that the effective number of electoral parties also increased in rural Manitoba in 1920, despite the fact that the plurality system remained in effect there.

The Hare system appears to have had a more significant impact on the number of parliamentary parties. Under the Hare system, Edmonton, Calgary, and Winnipeg all had more effective parties representing them in the legislature than was the case under the plurality system. The Hare system thus appears to have fulfilled one of the Progressives' goals: the more faithful representation of the views of the electorate in the legislature. All three cities were represented by a much more diverse group of legislators than would likely have been the case under the plurality system. Nothing reflects this better than the 1959 Alberta election, the first that used the single member plurality system after Alberta's lengthy experience with the Hare system. In Edmonton in 1959, Social Credit translated its 49% of the vote into a sweep of all eight of the city's seats. Under the Hare system, Social Credit would likely have earned only four seats and Alberta would have had a larger opposition than the plurality system returned in 1959.

The Hare system used in the large cities thus appears to have a strong impact on the effective number of parliamentary parties, but only a limited impact on the effective number of electoral parties. The AV system in use in the rural areas of both provinces did not have a noticeable impact on number. In fact, the results under AV were scarcely different than they would have been under the plurality system, reflecting the propensity of both systems to return majoritarian outcomes.

One of the Progressives' primary goals was the destruction of the party system. The Progressives saw political parties as inherently flawed and morally compromised. STV fit very nicely with that philosophy as it allows voters to choose candidates on any basis they wish and is designed to function without parties. One of the surprising findings of this study is the extent to which, even in the non-partisan atmosphere of the Canadian prairies, voters restricted their preference orderings to one party. This tendency was

particularly pronounced in Alberta where party supporters of parties generally, and Social Credit in particular, limited themselves to one party with unprecedented discipline. In Manitoba, voters were more likely to cross party lines in their preference orderings, particularly during the coalition period. Even with the collapse of partisanship in that province, however, a sizable majority of voters displayed high levels of solidarity and exclusivity. Furthermore, the Hare system appears to have worked better for parties whose supporters were able to vote in a disciplined manner. This was particularly the case in Manitoba where the Independent Labour Party and later the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation were significantly more disciplined than other parties. The ILP/CCF managed to move its candidates up several preference rankings while less disciplined parties like the Conservatives dropped from the top ten positions in Winnipeg. Contrary to the expectations of the Progressives, the Hare system rewarded disciplined parties.

While the Hare system had some impact on aspects of political life in the three cities, the alternative voting system in use in rural Alberta and Manitoba does not appear to have been particularly effective. In the vast majority of cases, multiple counts were not necessary as one candidate usually won a majority of the vote on the first count. When multiple counts were required, the candidate leading after the first count won in all but a handful of cases in either province. Voters in both provinces appeared to have disregarded the opportunities provided by the alternative ballot for the most part. The evidence suggests that a large proportion of voters in both provinces engaged in "plumping," restricting themselves to indicating only one choice on the ballot. Although AV provided voters with the potential of greater choice, many voters in both provinces neglected to make use of those possibilities. The one exception to these generalizations was the 1955 election in Alberta. Opposition voters in that election plumped less frequently and were much more likely to choose one of the other opposition parties with their second

preference. The result of this was that Social Credit lost four seats it would have won had the plurality rule been in place. Other than that one election, alternative voting was surprisingly ineffective.

This opposition usage of the alternative voting mechanism in 1955 appears to have scared the Social Credit government and contributed to the government's decision to abandon preferential balloting in Alberta. The decision to eliminate STV was highly controversial and opposed strongly by opposition parties and the province's newspapers. The reason for the strong opposition to the move was the naked political motivation behind the decision to return to the plurality rule. Coming on the heels of the minor opposition breakthrough in 1955, it seemed quite clear that the government was attempting to preserve its political life by changing the electoral system. The response in Manitoba to the decision to eliminate STV was comparatively more quiet as any controversy over the abolition of the Hare system and alternative voting was overshadowed by the underrepresentation of Winnipeg and the demands for an independent boundary commission. In Manitoba, support for and opposition to STV crossed party lines; it was less clear that the repeal of STV was done for political purposes.

One of the central theoretical concerns of the literature on electoral systems is the relative impact of institutional rules such as electoral systems and societal developments such as cleavage lines. This is expressed most directly in the debate over Duverger's law, discussed in Chapter 5. This study contributes to the conclusion that electoral systems do not necessarily determine party systems. Most of the effects of STV in Alberta and Manitoba were quite modest. Much of this is due, of course, to the limited application of the Hare system. The dominant electoral system in the period was alternative voting, since most of the seats were found in rural areas. The majoritarian character of alternative voting meant that it did not lead to results that were appreciably different from the results

under plurality. If the Hare system had been more widely used in Alberta and Manitoba, we might expect the electoral system effects to be more significant.

Even bearing this limitation in mind, however, one has to be struck by how social structure attenuates the impact of electoral systems. In this study, this was most dramatically demonstrated by the different impacts of the Hare system on the number of electoral parties. In Alberta, the Hare system had no apparent impact on the number of parties, while in Manitoba, the adoption of PR was accompanied by a multiplication of the effective number of electoral parties. The different impact of the Hare system means that we have to be careful in concluding that a more proportional electoral system necessarily leads to more parties. Social structure appears to have been far more important in determining the character of party competition. At best, the Hare system enhanced the trend towards multiple parties in Winnipeg. It is a historical guessing game of "what if" to try to determine whether the increase in the number of electoral parties in Winnipeg would have been as dramatic in the absence of proportional representation. The effects of the Hare system on the character of the party system thus appear to be less dramatic than might be expected.

This conclusion is consistent with the research of people such as Arend Lijphart who conclude that the proximal (direct) effects of electoral systems on proportionality are far more pronounced than the distal (indirect) effects on things such as multipartism.³ An interesting conclusion of this study, however, is the way in which social structure can affect even proximal effects. The fact that Winnipeg had higher levels of disproportionality despite the higher district magnitude is partly attributable to the increased tendency of Manitoba voters to cross party lines in their preference orderings.

³ Arend Lijphart, "The political consequences of electoral laws, 1945-85." *American Political Science Review* 84 (1990): 481-496.

The way in which the two provinces expressed partisanship differently thus influenced the proportionality of the electoral system, one of the most predictable proximal effects.

The way in which electoral systems can function differently in different social contexts should provide a note of caution to any would-be electoral engineers. Electoral systems do not have deterministic mechanical effects; they interact strongly with social structure to unfold in sometimes unexpected ways. Plugging a particular electoral system into a particular social context will not necessarily produce a specific outcome. The Progressives expected that giving voters the option to cross party lines in their ballot marking would allow them to cast off the shackles of party politics. Alberta and Manitoba voters generally chose not to take advantage of those opportunities and followed party lines quite closely. The effects of electoral systems on a country or province's politics cannot be predicted simply or mechanistically.

While the use of STV in general and the Hare system in particular in Alberta and Manitoba was somewhat limited, this study does suggest some possible avenues for further research. One possibility is to extend the study of alternative voting to British Columbia, the only other province to use STV. As noted in Chapter 1, the British Columbia uses of alternative voting are the most widely studied, but the emphasis has been on the role AV played in the rise of Social Credit to power in that province, not on the impact of AV on proportionality, multipartism, voter turnout, and ballot spoilage. BC's use of STV was even more limited than in Alberta or Manitoba, but further study along such lines would provide a more complete picture of the use of alternative voting in Canada.

The present study also raises another interesting question about the politics of electoral reform. The Progressive movement strongly influenced Alberta and Manitoba and the ideas of the farmers' platform provided the spark for the adoption of STV. An interesting question is why Saskatchewan did not follow the example of its neighbours

and adopt STV for use in its provincial elections. There were similar political conditions in all three provinces in that farmers wielded significant political clout. Moreover, the Saskatchewan Liberal party was very responsive to the demands of the agricultural sector, just as the Liberals in Manitoba and Alberta had been. In Saskatchewan, however, the provincial wing of the Liberal party was more successful at disassociating itself from the federal party and in fending off the foray of the farmers into organized provincial politics.⁴ As noted in Chapter 1, like Edmonton, Calgary, and Winnipeg, the three largest cities in Saskatchewan were multi-member districts. If the farmers were influential in Saskatchewan politics, why did their influence not extend to institutional reform such as STV? Why did Saskatchewan not adopt the Hare system in the cities and AV in rural areas?

Another related question about the politics of adoption of STV centres on the failure of the Ontario farmers to successfully undertake electoral reform. The United Farmers of Ontario governed that province from 1919 to 1923 and, during their term in office, there were plans for electoral reform along the lines of what happened in Manitoba and Alberta.⁵ In Ontario, however, the farmers were unsuccessful in passing the necessary legislation. Further research into why the farmers failed in Ontario while their counterparts in Alberta and Manitoba succeeded would help to shed light on the politics of electoral reform.

As discussed in Chapter 1, Canadian provinces have been relatively innovative in their electoral practices, particularly when compared to the federal government. Still, there has been a decided lack of research into these different ways of implementing

⁴ Rand Dyck, *Provincial Politics in Canada*, 3rd. ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1996), 461; Roger Gibbins, *Prairie Politics & Society: Regionalism in Decline* (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980), 128.

⁵ *Grain Growers' Guide*, 1 December 1920.

representation at the provincial level.⁶ Further research on these innovations would help to illuminate the diversity of political cultures in Canada's provinces, increase our understanding of the politics of electoral reform, and contribute to a better appreciation of the way in which federalism allows for varied approaches to the institutional expression of representation. Furthermore, a number of Canadian cities also experimented with alternatives to the plurality system, including STV and these, too, have yet to be studied in any depth.⁷ Shedding a narrow focus on national institutions in political science can provide a richer understanding of the diversity of political practice in Canada.

With a recent resurgence of interest in electoral reform as a result of some anomalous results in recent federal elections,⁸ we could benefit from increased attention to the experiments of Alberta and Manitoba. The experience of these two provinces reveal the limitations of what we can expect from electoral reform. While Alberta and Manitoba's move to proportional representation was incomplete, their thirty-five years of experience with STV stands as the most elaborate deviation from the dominant single-member plurality electoral system in Canada's history. Yet, apart from this study and a

⁶ Among the only serious treatments of provincial approaches to electoral reform are J. Paul Johnston, "The single transferable vote in Alberta provincial elections," paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1992; Harold Jansen, "The single transferable vote in Manitoba," paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, St. Catharines, 1996; Dennis Pilon, "Proportional representation in Canada: An historical sketch," paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, St. John's, 1997.

⁷ See J. Paul Johnston, "Learning history's lessons anew: The use of STV in Canadian municipal elections," paper presented to the conference on Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote, Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine, 1996, for a rare study of municipal uses of STV in Canada.

⁸ See Stephen Harper and Tom Flanagan, "Our benign dictatorship," *The Next City*, Winter 1996/97, 34-57.

few sources cited in it, they remain an untapped resource in dealing with contemporary problems of representation in Canada. That situation should not be allowed to continue.

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Appendix A

Data Sources

In this study, I have used official election results as the basis for calculations wherever possible. Because of the poor condition of some of the electoral records in both provinces, however, this was not always feasible. In those cases, I had to supplement or correct the official records with newspaper and academic accounts.

In every general election report, Elections Manitoba publishes a historical synopsis and a summary of past election results. These provided basic information about the number of candidates and their partisan affiliations, particularly for the periods which used the plurality system. The data for Winnipeg's vote transfers in the 1920-1953 period came primarily from microfilm of the records of the Chief Electoral Officer of Manitoba, housed in Manitoba's Legislature Library. The microfilm of the 1927 election results was of damaged pages and was incomplete. The 1927 data used in this study come from a copy of the vote transfer sheet stored in the Provincial Archives of Manitoba (accession number P2547 f.20). The microfilm of the 1932 results was also incomplete. I could find no alternative official source of records for that election, so data for the 1932 election came from newspaper accounts.¹ The newspaper's transfer sheet contained a number of obvious mathematical errors which I corrected.

¹ *Winnipeg Evening Tribune*, 20 June 1932.

The microfilmed records also contain the alternative voting records for rural Manitoba. For most of the constituencies in these elections, these records include complete transfer sheets of each count. All of the transfer sheets for the 1941 election are missing, however. Furthermore, the microfilmed records for a few constituencies include transfer sheets with irreconcilable mathematical errors. I have excluded these from this analysis.

It was difficult in some cases to determine the partisan affiliations of candidates in Manitoba, particularly those running for smaller labour parties. The primary source for partisan affiliations was the *Index to Elections*, produced by Elections Manitoba,² and housed in the Legislature Library. While these records were reliable for most of Manitoba's elections, they combine labour candidates in the 1922 election under one generic partisan affiliation, overlooking the differences between different labour parties. The Manitoba elections index lists thirteen "Labour" candidates for the 1922 election, despite the fact that there were only ten seats in Winnipeg. The 1920 labour affiliations in the *Index* also do not agree with other accounts of labour politics in this era. For those elections, I relied on Kathleen O'Gorman Wormsbecker's account of the battles between rival labour parties. Her excellent work lists the labour parties and their candidates for the

² Manitoba, Elections Manitoba, *Index to Elections* (Winnipeg: Elections Manitoba, 1990).

1920, 1922, and 1927 elections.³ The affiliations she describes are consistent with those reported in the *Manitoba Free Press*.

Alberta's election results are in much better shape than those in Manitoba, thanks largely to the Chief Electoral Office's publication, *A Guide to Alberta Elections*, as well as the Documentary Heritage Society's publication, *Alberta Election Results*.⁴ These books contain reliable election results and partisan affiliations of the candidates. The *Guide* discusses the STV era, but neither publication reproduces the transfer sheets. Fortunately, the transfer sheets for Edmonton and Calgary are preserved in the Provincial Archives of Alberta (accession number 71.138). Those records contain a few typographical and transcription errors which I have corrected. More seriously, the transfer sheet for Edmonton in 1955 is missing from the collection. I used reports in the *Edmonton Journal* for that election.⁵

Alberta's provincial archives do not hold the transfer sheets for rural Alberta. For those elections, we are left with the records in the *Guide to Alberta Elections*. Those records list only the results after the first and last counts. This enables us to determine

³ Kathleen O'Gorman Wormsbecker, "The rise and fall of the labour political movement in Manitoba, 1919-1927" (M.A. thesis: Queen's University, 1977). 53-55, 125-130.

⁴ Alberta, Chief Electoral Officer, *A Guide to Alberta Elections 1905-1982* (Edmonton: Chief Electoral Officer, 1983); Ernest Mardon and Austin Mardon, eds., *Alberta Election Results 1882-1992* (n.p.: Documentary Heritage Society of Alberta, 1993).

⁵ *Edmonton Journal*, 2 July 1955.

which constituencies required multiple counts, but not the number of counts required or the patterns of transfers, except in the case where there are only three candidates.

Appendix B

Manitoba Election Results, 1899-1966

Note: Rural Manitoba results include all constituencies outside Winnipeg with the exception of St. Boniface in 1949 and 1953. In 1914 and 1915, Winnipeg voters could cast two votes on their ballots, one on each of two lists of candidates. The vote totals for those elections thus do not equal the number of ballots cast. From 1941 through 1949, candidates are grouped by partisan affiliation, irrespective of whether they supported or opposed the government coalition.

1899

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal	23302	49.5%	17	42.5%
Conservative	20474	43.5%	18	45.0%
Ind. Conservative	2957	6.3%	5	12.5%
Independent	343	0.7%	0	0%

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal	19697	49.6%	16	43.2%
Conservative	16695	42.1%	16	43.2%
Ind. Conservative	2957	7.4%	5	13.5%
Independent	343	0.9%	0	0%

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservative	3779	51.2%	2	66.7%
Liberal	3605	48.8%	1	33.3%

1903

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservative	25333	47.6%	29*	72.5%
Liberal	23740	44.6%	9	22.5%
Independent	2563	4.8%	0	0%
Other Conservative	1596	3.0%	2	5.0%

* - includes one acclamation

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservative	21144	47.8%	26*	70.3%
Liberal	19927	45.1%	9	24.3%
Other Conservative	1596	3.6%	2	5.4%
Independent	1550	3.5%	0	0%

* - includes one acclamation

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservative	4189	46.5%	3	100%
Liberal	3813	42.3%	0	0%
Independent	1013	11.2%	0	0%

1907

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservative	31066	50.6%	28*	68.3%
Liberal	29426	47.9%	13	31.7%
Independent	939	1.5%	0	0%

* - includes one acclamation

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservative	22601	51.2%	25*	27.6%
Liberal	21506	48.8%	12	32.4%

* - includes one acclamation

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservative	8465	48.9%	3	75.0%
Liberal	7920	45.7%	1	25.0%
Independent	939	5.4%	0	0%

1910

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservative	38117	50.8%	28*	68.3%
Liberal	33157	44.2%	13	31.7%
Labour	1939	2.6%	0	0%
Socialist	1237	1.6%	0	0%
Independent	609	0.8%	0	0%

* - includes one acclamation

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservative	29467	52.6%	26*	70.3%
Liberal	25908	46.3%	11	29.7%
Independent	609	1.1%	0	0%

* - includes one acclamation

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservative	8650	45.3%	2	50.0%
Liberal	7249	38.0%	2	50.0%
Labour	1939	10.2%	0	0%
Socialist	1237	6.5%	0	0%

1914

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservative	68532	46.6%	28*	57.1%
Liberal	62798	42.8%	20	40.8%
Independent	8511	5.8%	1	2.0%
Labour	7143	4.9%	0	0%

* - includes three acclamations

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservative	38544	49.5%	26*	60.5%
Liberal	37666	48.4%	17	39.5%
Labour	1273	1.6%	0	0%
Independent	306	0.4%	0	0%

* - includes three acclamations

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservative	29808	43.2%	2	33.3%
Liberal	25132	36.4%	3	50.0%
Independent	8205	11.9%	1	16.7%
Labour	5870	8.5%	0	0%

1915

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal	64363	55.1%	40*	85.1%
Conservative	38623	33.0%	5	10.6%
Independent	10076	8.6%	2	4.3%
Labour	3825	3.3%	0	0%

* - includes one acclamation

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal	41273	58.7%	36*	87.8%
Conservative	27177	38.6%	5	12.2%
Independent	1139	1.1%	0	0%
Labour	773	1.6%	0	0%

* - includes one acclamation

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal	23090	49.6%	4	66.7%
Conservative	11446	24.6%	0	0%
Independent	8937	19.2%	2	33.3%
Labour	3052	6.6%	0	0%

1920

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal	49970	34.8%	21*	38.2%
Conservative	26517	18.5%	8	14.5%
Farmer	20299	14.1%	9*	16.4%
Independent	17008	11.8%	5*	9.1%
Dominion Labour	13665	9.5%	3	5.5%
Labour	9702	6.8%	7	12.7%
Socialist Party of Canada	4797	3.3%	1	1.8%
Social Democrat	1253	0.9%	1	1.8%
Ex-Soldiers and Sailors Labour	452	0.3%	0	0%

* - includes one acclamation

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal	35547	36.9%	17*	37.8%
Conservative	20042	20.8%	7	15.6%
Farmer	20299	21.1%	9*	20.0%
Independent	10646	11.1%	5*	11.1%
Labour	9702	10.1%	7	15.6%

* - includes one acclamation

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal	14423	30.4%	4	40.0%
Dominion Labour	13665	28.8%	3	30.0%
Conservative	6475	13.7%	1	10.0%
Independent	6362	13.4%	0	0%
Socialist Party of Canada	4797	10.1%	1	10.0%
Social Democrat	1253	2.6%	1	10.0%
Ex-Soldiers and Sailors Labour	452	1.0%	0	0%

1922

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
United Farmers of Manitoba	49767	32.8%	28*	50.9%
Liberal	35123	23.1%	8	14.5%
Conservative	23539	15.5%	7	12.7%
Independent	19055	12.6%	6	10.9%
Independent Labour Party	10979	7.2%	3	5.5%
Labour	7962	5.2%	2	3.6%
Social Democrat	2348	1.5%	1	1.8%
Socialist Party of Canada	1273	0.8%	0	0%
Workers' Party of Canada	1084	0.7%	0	0%
Union Labour	644	0.4%	0	0%

* - includes two acclamations

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
United Farmers of Manitoba	44673	41.6%	27*	60.0%
Liberal	24035	22.4%	6	13.3%
Conservative	16000	14.9%	5	11.1%
Independent	14776	13.8%	5	11.1%
Labour	7962	7.4%	2	4.4%

* - includes two acclamations

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal	11088	25.0%	2	20.0%
Independent Labour Party	10979	24.8%	3	30.0%
Conservative	7539	17.0%	2	20.0%
United Farmers of Manitoba	5094	11.5%	1	10.0%
Independent	4279	9.7%	1	10.0%
Social Democrat	2348	5.3%	1	10.0%
Socialist Party of Canada	1273	2.9%	0	0%
Workers' Party of Canada	1084	2.4%	0	0%
Union Labour	644	1.5%	0	0%

1927

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Progressive	53939	33.0%	29*	52.7%
Conservative	44320	27.2%	15	27.3%
Liberal	33852	20.7%	7	12.7%
Independent Labour Party	15559	9.5%	3	5.5%
Independent	13087	8.0%	1	1.8%
Communist	2015	1.2%	0	0%
Farm Labour	440	0.3%	0	0%

* - includes two acclamations

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Progressive	45145	39.1%	27*	60.0%
Conservative	30958	27.5%	12	26.7%
Liberal	22823	20.3%	5	11.1%
Independent	9051	8.0%	1	2.2%
Independent Labour Party	4089	3.6%	0	0%
Farmer Labour	440	0.4%	0	0%

* - includes two acclamations

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservative	13362	26.4%	3	30.0%
Independent Labour Party	11470	22.6%	3	30.0%
Liberal	11029	21.8%	2	20.0%
Progressive	8794	17.3%	2	20.0%
Independent	4036	8.0%	0	0%
Communist	2015	4.0%	0	0%

1932

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal-Progressive	100721	39.6%	38	69.1%
Conservative	90135	35.4%	10	18.2%
Independent Labour Party	34655	13.6%	5	9.1%
Independent	12510	4.9%	1	1.8%
Liberal	5198	2.0%	0	0
United Worker	4561	1.8%	0	0
Farm Labour	4334	1.7%	1	1.8%
Labour	1600	0.6%	0	0%
Socialist	848	0.3%	0	0%

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal-Progressive	85903	48.4%	35	77.8%
Conservative	62861	35.4%	7	15.6%
Independent Labour Party	12717	7.2%	1	2.2%
Independent	8382	4.7%	1	2.2%
Farm Labour	4334	2.4%	1	2.2%
Liberal	3374	1.9%	0	0%

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservative	27274	35.4%	3	30.0%
Independent Labour Party	21938	28.5%	4	40.0%
Liberal-Progressive	14818	19.2%	3	30.0%
United Worker	4561	5.9%	0	0%
Independent	4128	5.4%	0	0%
Liberal	1824	2.4%	0	0%
Labour	1600	2.1%	0	0%
Socialist	848	1.1%	0	0%

1936

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal-Progressive	91357	36.0%	23*	41.8%
Conservative	71927	28.4%	16	29.1%
ILP/CCF	30983	12.2%	7	12.7%
Independent	29892	11.8%	3	5.5%
Social Credit	23413	9.2%	5	9.1%
Communist	5864	2.3%	1	1.8%

* - includes one acclamation

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal-Progressive	74723	42.9%	21*	46.7%
Conservative	53616	30.8%	13	28.9%
ILP/CCF	20785	11.9%	4	8.9%
Social Credit	19881	11.4%	5	11.1%
Independent	5087	2.9%	2	4.4%

* - includes one acclamation

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Independent	24805	31.3%	1	10.0%
Conservative	18311	23.1%	3	30.0%
Liberal-Progressive	16634	21.0%	2	20.0%
ILP/CCF	10198	12.9%	3	30.0%
Communist	5864	7.4%	1	10.0%
Social Credit	3532	4.5%	0	0%

1941

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal-Progressive	59038	36.1%	27*	49.1%
Conservative	34954	21.4%	15**	27.3%
CCF	28301	17.3%	3	5.5%
Independent	23683	14.5%	6	10.9%
Social Credit	11879	7.3%	3***	5.5%
Workers	4889	3.0%	1	1.8%
Sound Money Economics	864	0.5%	0	0%

* - includes ten acclamations

** - includes five acclamations

*** - includes one acclamation

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal-Progressive	43233	41.2%	24*	53.3%
Conservative	20191	19.2%	13**	28.9%
CCF	17475	16.7%	1	2.2%
Independent	13017	12.4%	4	8.9%
Social Credit	11010	10.5%	3***	6.7%

* - includes ten acclamations

** - includes five acclamations

*** - includes one acclamation

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal-Progressive	15805	26.9%	3	30.0%
Conservative	14763	25.2%	2	20.0%
CCF	10826	18.4%	2	20.0%
Independent	10666	18.2%	2	20.0%
Workers	4889	8.3%	1	10.0%
Social Credit	869	1.5%	0	0%
Sound Money Economics	864	1.5%	0	0%

1945

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
CCF	73988	33.8%	9	16.4%
Liberal-Progressive	70475	32.2%	25*	45.5%
Conservative	34819	15.9%	13*	23.6%
Independent	24270	11.1%	5**	9.1%
Labour Progressive	10566	4.8%	1	1.8%
Social Credit	4501	2.1%	2	3.6%
Socialist	222	0.1%	0	0%

* - includes three acclamations

** - includes one acclamation

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal-Progressive	47259	33.9%	22*	48.9%
Progressive Conservative	24593	17.6%	12*	26.7%
CCF	44116	31.6%	5	11.1%
Independent	15961	11.4%	4**	8.9%
Social Credit	3866	2.8%	2	4.4%
Labour Progressive	3613	2.6%	0	0%

* - includes three acclamations

* - includes one acclamation

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
CCF	29872	37.6%	4	40.0%
Liberal-Progressive	23216	29.2%	3	30.0%
Conservative	10226	12.9%	1	10.0%
Independent	8309	10.5%	1	10.0%
Labour Progressive	6953	8.8%	1	10.0%
Social Credit	635	0.8%	0	0%
Socialist	222	0.3%	0	0%

1949

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal-Progressive	77335	39.2%	31*	54.4%
CCF	49933	25.3%	7	12.3%
Progressive Conservative	23410	11.9%	9**	15.8%
Independent PC	14740	7.5%	4	7.0%
Independent	12300	6.2%	3	5.3%
Ind. Liberal-Progressive	11890	6.0%	2	3.5%
Labour Progressive	5243	2.7%	1	1.8%
Independent Labour	1114	0.6%	0	0%
Ind. CCF	1171	0.6%	0	0%

* - includes twelve acclamations

** - includes four acclamations

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal-Progressive	41740	38.1%	25*	55.6%
CCF	20485	36.2%	1	2.2%
Progressive Conservative	18208	16.6%	9**	20.0%
Ind. Liberal- Progressive	10217	9.3%	2	4.4%
Independent	9305	8.5%	3	6.7%
Ind. PC	8567	7.8%	3	6.7%
Ind. CCF	1171	1.1%	0	0%

* - includes twelve acclamations

** - includes four acclamations

St. Boniface	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal-Progressive	6583	44.8%	1	50.0%
CCF	5388	36.7%	1	50.0%
Ind. PC	2730	18.6%	0	0%

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal-Progressive	29012	39.9%	5	41.7%
CCF	24060	33.1%	5	41.7%
Labour Progressive	5243	7.2%	1	8.3%
Progressive Conservative	5202	7.2%	0	0%
Independent PC	3443	4.7%	1	8.3%
Independent	2995	4.1%	0	0%
Ind. Liberal-Progressive	1673	2.3%	0	0%
Independent Labour	1114	1.5%	0	0%

1953

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal-Progressive	105958	39.6%	32*	56.1%
Progressive Conservative	56278	21.0%	12	21.1%
CCF	44332	16.6%	5	8.8%
Social Credit	35750	13.4%	2	3.5%
Ind. Liberal Progressive	11929	4.5%	3	5.3%
Independent	9577	3.6%	2	3.5%
Labour Progressive	3812	1.4%	1	1.8%

* - includes one acclamation

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal-Progressive	77724	44.0%	27*	53.5%
Progressive Conservative	36996	20.9%	9	20.9%
Social Credit	30832	17.4%	2	4.7%
CCF	20129	11.4%	1	2.3%
Ind. Liberal Progressive	7068	4.0%	3	7.0%
Independent	4016	2.3%	1	2.3%

* - includes one acclamation

St. Boniface	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal-Progressive	8110	41.5%	2	100.0%
CCF	4000	20.5%	0	0%
Ind. Liberal-Progressive	3189	16.3%	0	0%
Progressive Conservative	2838	14.5%	0	0%
Social Credit	1420	7.3%	0	0%

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
CCF	20203	28.3%	4	33.3%
Liberal-Progressive	20124	28.2%	3	25.0%
Progressive Conservative	16444	23.1%	3	25.0%
Independent	5561	7.8%	1	8.3%
Labour Progressive	3812	5.3%	1	8.3%
Social Credit	3498	4.9%	0	0%
Independent Liberal	1672	2.3%	0	0%

1958

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Progressive Conservative	117822	40.5%	26	45.6%
CCF	58671	20.2%	11	19.3%
Liberal-Progressive	101763	35.0%	19	33.3%
Independent	5041	1.7%	1	1.8%
Labour Progressive	1207	0.4%	0	0%
Independent PC	1223	0.4%	0	0%
Social Credit	5174	1.8%	0	0%

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Progressive Conservative	89586	41.5%	20	44.4%
Liberal-Progressive	83148	38.5%	19	42.2%
CCF	35905	16.6%	6	13.3%
Social Credit	5174	2.4%	0	0%
Independent	1855	0.9%	0	0%
Ind. PC	274	0.1%	0	0%

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Progressive Conservative	28236	37.7%	6	50.0%
CCF	22766	30.4%	5	41.7%
Liberal-Progressive	18615	24.8%	0	0%
Independent	3186	4.3%	1	8.3%
Labour Progressive	1207	1.6%	0	0%
Independent PC	949	1.3%	0	0%

1959

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Progressive Conservative	147140	46.7%	36	63.1%
CCF	69594	22.1%	10	17.5%
Liberal-Progressive	95452	30.3%	11	19.3%
Labour Progressive	1731	0.5%	0	0%
Independent	1171	0.4%	0	0%

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Progressive Conservative	109381	47.3%	29	64.4%
Liberal-Progressive	77235	33.3%	11	24.4%
CCF	43649	18.9%	5	11.1%
Independent	1171	0.5%	0	0%

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Progressive Conservative	37759	45.1%	7	58.3%
CCF	25945	31.0%	5	41.7%
Liberal-Progressive	18217	21.8%	0	0%
Labour Progressive	1731	2.1%	0	0%

1962

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Progressive Conservative	134147	45.2%	36	63.2%
Liberal	108261	36.4%	13	22.8%
NDP	45430	15.3%	7	12.3%
Social Credit	7495	2.5%	1	1.8%
Independent	849	0.3%	0	0%
Communist	816	0.3%	0	0%
Liberal Labour	111	0.04%	0	0%

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Progressive Conservative	105313	46.3%	29	64.4%
Liberal	85986	37.8%	12	26.7%
NDP	28068	12.3%	3	6.7%
Social Credit	7495	3.3%	1	2.2%
Independent	795	0.3%	0	0%

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Progressive Conservative	28834	41.5%	7	58.3%
Liberal	22275	32.1%	1	8.3%
NDP	24986	25.0%	4	33.3%
Communist	816	1.2%	0	0%
Liberal Labour	111	0.2%	0	0%
Independent	54	0.1%	0	0%

1966

Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Progressive Conservative	130102	40.0%	31	54.4%
Liberal	107841	33.1%	14	24.6%
NDP	75333	23.1%	11	19.3%
Social Credit	11635	3.6%	1	1.8%
Communist	638	0.2%	0	0%

Rural Manitoba	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Progressive Conservative	98443	40.3%	25	55.6%
Liberal	85939	35.2%	14	31.1%
NDP	49215	20.1%	5	11.1%
Social Credit	10891	4.5%	1	2.2%

Winnipeg	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Progressive Conservative	31659	39.1%	6	50.0%
NDP	26118	32.2%	6	50.0%
Liberal	21902	27.0%	0	0%
Social Credit	744	0.9%	0	0%
Communist	638	0.8%	0	0%

Appendix C

Alberta Election Results, 1905-1967

Note: Rural Alberta includes all constituencies outside Edmonton and Calgary. In the 1921 provincial election in Edmonton and Calgary, voters could vote for five candidates; the vote totals in those cities for that election exceed the number of ballots cast.

1905

Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	14485	57.6%	23*	92.0%
Conservatives	9342	37.1%	2	8.0%
Independents	1336	5.3%	0	

* - includes one acclamation

Rural Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	11822	58.3%	21*	91.3%
Conservatives	7833	37.3%	2	8.7%
Independent	929	4.4%	0	0%

* - includes one acclamation

Calgary	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	1030	42.4%	1	100.0%
Conservatives	993	40.9%	0	0%
Independents	407	16.7%	0	0%

Edmonton	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	1209	70.1%	1	100.0%
Conservatives	516	29.9%	0	0%

1909

Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	29634	59.3%	36*	87.8%
Conservatives	15848	31.7%	2	4.9%
Independents	1695	3.4%	1	2.4%
Ind. Liberals	1311	2.6%	1	2.4%
Socialist	1302	2.6%	1	2.4%
Labour	214	0.4%	0	0%

* - includes nine acclamations

Rural Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	18863	60.2%	33*	89.2%
Conservatives	9923	30.8%	1	2.7%
Independents	1347	5.1%	1	2.7%
Ind. Liberals	1311	4.1%	1	2.7%
Socialist	555	1.7%	1	2.7%
Labour	214	0.7%	0	0%

* - includes nine acclamations

Calgary	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	4512	47.1%	1	50.0%
Conservatives	4330	45.2%	1	50.0%
Socialist	747	7.8%	0	0%

Edmonton	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	6259	76.3%	2	100.0%
Conservatives	1595	19.4%	0	0%
Independents	348	4.2%	0	0%

1913

Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	47748	49.2%	39	69.6%
Conservatives	43737	45.1%	17	30.4%
Independents	3639	3.8%	0	0%
Socialists	1814	1.9%	0	0%
Ind. Liberals	47	0.05%	0	0%

Rural Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	32986	51.8%	37	74.0%
Conservatives	26102	41.0%	13	26.0%
Independents	2996	4.7%	0	0%
Socialists	1558	2.4%	0	0%
Ind. Liberals	47	0.1%	0	0%

Calgary	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservatives	6700	67.5%	3	100.0%
Liberals	2973	29.9%	0	0%
Socialists	256	2.6%	0	0%

Edmonton	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	11789	50.5%	2	66.7%
Conservatives	10935	46.8%	1	33.3%
Independents	643	2.8%	0	0%

1917

Alberta districts	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	54212	48.1%	34*	60.7%
Conservatives	47055	41.8%	19**	33.9%
Independents	6569	5.8%	2	3.6%
Labour	3576	3.2%	1	1.8%
Socialists	784	0.7%	0	0%
Non-Partisan	416	0.4%	0	0%

* - includes six automatically elected as members of armed forces

** - includes five automatically elected as members of armed forces

Rural Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	43896	54.9%	33*	66.0%
Conservatives	30702	38.4%	15**	30.0%
Independents	4462	5.6%	2	4.0%
Socialists	439	0.5%	0	0%
Non-Partisan	416	0.5%	0	0%

* - includes six automatically elected as members of armed forces

** - includes five automatically elected as members of armed forces

Calgary	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservatives	6781	47.2%	1	33.3%
Labour	3576	24.9%	1	33.3%
Liberals	2701	18.8%	1	33.3%
Independents	1296	9.0%	0	0%

Edmonton	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservatives	9572	52.2%	3	100.0%
Liberals	7615	41.5%	0	0%
Independent	811	4.4%	0	0%
Socialists	345	1.9%	0	0%

1921

Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	101584	34.1%	15*	24.6%
United Farmers of Alberta	86250	28.9%	38	62.3%
Labour	33987	11.0%	4	6.6%
Conservatives	32734	11.0%	0	0%
Independents	28794	9.7%	4	6.6%
Independent Labour	10733	3.1%	0	0%
Labour Socialist	2628	0.9%	0	0%
Independent Liberal	1467	0.5%	0	0%

* - includes two acclamations

Rural Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
UFA	81272	55.5%	38	74.5%
Liberals	52947	36.1%	9*	17.6%
Independents	3882	2.6%	2	3.9%
Labour	7239	4.9%	2	3.9%
Conservatives	1203	0.8%	0	0%

* - includes two acclamations

Calgary	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	20298	26.8%	1	20.0%
Labour	17566	23.2%	2	40.0%
Independents	15842	20.9%	2	40.0%
Conservatives	15175	20.0%	0	0%
Independent Labour	5250	6.9%	0	0%
Labour Socialist	1745	2.3%	0	0%

Edmonton	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	28339	37.4%	5	100.0%
Conservatives	16356	21.6%	0	0%
Labour	9182	12.1%	0	0%
Independents	9070	12.0%	0	0%
Independent Labour	5483	7.2%	0	0%
UFA	4978	6.6%	0	0%
Independent Liberal	1467	1.9%	0	0%
Labour Socialist	883	1.2%	0	0%

1926

Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
UFA	71967	39.7%	43	70.5%
Liberals	47450	26.2%	7	11.5%
Conservatives	40091	22.1%	5	8.2%
Labour	14123	7.8%	5	8.2%
Independent Liberal	2728	1.5%	0	0%
Independent Labour	2467	1.4%	1	1.6%
Independents	1254	0.7%	0	0%
Independent UFA	999	0.6%	0	0%
Liberal Progressive	252	0.2%	0	0%

Rural Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
UFA	67922	49.5%	42	82.4%
Liberals	35144	25.6%	5	9.8%
Conservatives	26197	19.1%	1	2.0%
Labour	5183	3.8%	3	5.9%
Independent Liberal	1549	1.1%	0	0%
Independent UFA	999	0.7%	0	0%
Liberal Progressive	252	0.2%	0	0%

Calgary	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservatives	8811	44.6%	2	40.0%
Liberals	5495	27.8%	1	20.0%
Labour	2910	14.7%	1	20.0%
Independent Labour	2467	12.5%	1	20.0%
Independent	54	0.3%	0	0%

Edmonton	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservatives	5083	28.0%	2	40.0%
Liberals	4083	22.5%	1	20.0%
Labour	3563	19.6%	1	20.0%
UFA	3046	16.8%	1	20.0%
Independent	1200	6.6%	0	0%
Independent Liberal	1179	6.5%	0	0%

1930

Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
UFA	74187	39.4%	39*	61.9%
Liberals	46275	24.6%	11	17.5%
Conservatives	27954	14.9%	6	9.5%
Independents	25449	13.5%	3	4.8%
Labour	14354	7.6%	4	6.3%

* - includes four acclamations

Rural Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
UFA	71076	49.9%	38*	74.5%
Liberals	34456	24.2%	8	15.7%
Independents	23832	16.7%	3	5.9%
Conservatives	6877	4.8%	0	0%
Labour	6156	4.3%	2	3.9%

* - includes four acclamations

Calgary	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservatives	10440	42.8%	3	50.0%
Liberals	7440	30.5%	2	33.3%
Labour	3541	14.5%	1	16.7%
Independent	2996	12.3%	0	0%

Edmonton	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Conservatives	7077	33.4%	3	50.0%
Labour	4657	22.0%	1	16.7%
Liberals	4648	21.9%	1	16.7%
UFA	3230	15.2%	1	16.7%
Independents	1577	7.4%	0	0%

1935

Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	163700	54.3%	56	88.9%
Liberal	69845	23.1%	5	7.9%
UFA	33063	11.0%	0	0%
Conservatives	19358	6.4%	2	3.2%
Communist	5771	1.9%	0	0%
Labour	5086	1.7%	0	0%
Independent	2740	0.9%	0	0%
Independent Liberal	955	0.3%	0	0%
United Front	560	0.2%	0	0%
Ind. Conservative	258	0.1%	0	0%
Independent Labour	224	0.1%	0	0%
Economic Reconstruction	192	0.1%	0	0%

Rural Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	125960	56.4%	50	98.0%
Liberals	47812	21.4%	1	2.0%
UFA	30971	13.9%	0	0%
Conservatives	8582	3.8%	0	0%
Communist	3855	1.7%	0	0%
Independent	2271	1.0%	0	0%
Labour	2068	0.9%	0	0%
Independent Liberal	955	0.4%	0	0%
United Front	560	0.3%	0	0%
Ind. Conservative	258	0.1%	0	0%

Calgary	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	24079	58.5%	4	66.7%
Liberals	8000	19.4%	1	16.7%
Conservatives	5956	14.5%	1	16.7%
Labour	1645	4.0%	0	0%
Communist	820	2.0%	0	0%
Independent	469	1.1%	0	0%
Independent Labour	224	0.5%	0	0%

Edmonton	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberals	14033	37.7%	3	50.0%
Social Credit	13661	36.7%	2	33.3%
Conservative	4820	12.9%	1	16.7%
UFA	2092	5.6%	0	0%
Labour	1373	3.7%	0	0%
Communist	1096	2.9%	0	0%
Economic Reconstruction	192	0.5%	0	0%

1940

Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	132507	42.9%	36	63.2%
Independent	131172	42.5%	19	33.3%
CCF	34316	11.1%	0	0%
Labour	3258	1.1%	1	1.8%
Liberal	2755	0.9%	1	1.8%
Ind. Progressive	1726	0.6%	0	0%
Independent Liberal	1136	0.4%	0	0%
Communist	1067	0.4%	0	0%
Ind. Social Credit	362	0.1%	0	0%
Independent Farmer	314	0.1%	0	0%
Independent Labour	251	0.1%	0	0%

Rural Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	101165	46.3%	32	68.1%
Independent	81320	37.2%	13	27.7%
CCF	27843	12.8%	0	0%
Labour	3258	1.5%	1	2.1%
Liberal	2755	1.3%	1	2.1%
Ind. Progressive	1336	0.6%	0	0%
Ind. Social Credit	362	0.2%	0	0%
Independent Farmer	314	0.1%	0	0%

Calgary	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Independent	24467	53.3%	3	60.0%
Social Credit	17052	37.1%	2	40.0%
CCF	4144	9.0%	0	0%
Independent Labour	251	0.5%	0	0%

Edmonton	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Independent	23730	54.2%	3	60.0%
Social Credit	14290	32.7%	2	40.0%
CCF	4266	9.8%	0	0%
Communist	1067	2.4%	0	0%
Ind. Progressive	390	0.9%	0	0%

1944

Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	146367	51.9%	51	89.5%
CCF	70307	24.9%	2	3.5%
Independent	47239	16.8%	3	5.3%
Labour Progressive	12003	4.3%	0	0%
Veterans & Active Force	3532	1.3%	1	1.8%
Labour United	1788	0.6%	0	0%
Single Tax	480	0.2%	0	0%
Farmer's Labour	390	0.1%	0	0%

Rural Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	113452	53.8%	47	100.0%
CCF	59188	28.1%	0	0%
Independent	26594	12.6%	0	0%
Labour Progressive	9071	4.3%	0	0%
Labour United	1788	0.8%	0	0%
Single Tax	390	0.2%	0	0%
Farmer's Labour	390	0.2%	0	0%

Calgary	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	15044	38.3%	2	40.0%
Independent	13744	35.0%	2	40.0%
CCF	9269	23.6%	1	20.0%
Labour Progressive	1252	3.2%	0	0%

Edmonton	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	17871	47.2%	2	40.0%
CCF	7850	20.7%	1	20.0%
Independent	6901	18.2%	1	20.0%
Veterans & Active Force	3532	9.3%	1	20.0%
Labour Progressive	1680	4.4%	0	0%

1948

Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	164003	55.6%	51	89.5%
CCF	56387	19.1%	2	3.5%
Liberal	52655	17.9%	2	3.5%
Independent	9014	3.1%	1	1.8%
Ind. Citizen's Association	3969	1.4%	0	0%
Labour	3579	1.2%	0	0%
Ind. Social Credit	2958	1.0%	1	1.8%
Labour Progressive	1372	0.5%	0	0%
United Labour	856	0.3%	0	0%

Rural Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	122476	58.4%	46	97.9%
CCF	43127	20.6%	0	0%
Liberal	35960	17.2%	0	0%
Independent	3363	1.6%	0	0%
Ind. Social Credit	1658	0.8%	1	2.1%
Ind. Citizen's Association	1246	0.6%	0	0%
Labour Progressive	856	0.4%	0	0%
United Labour	856	0.4%	0	0%

Calgary	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	16382	41.9%	2	40.0%
Liberal	7456	19.1%	1	20.0%
Independent	5651	14.5%	1	20.0%
CCF	4217	10.8%	1	20.0%
Labour	3579	9.2%	0	0%
Ind. Social Credit	1300	3.3%	0	0%
Labour Progressive	516	1.3%	0	0%

Edmonton	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	25145	54.5%	3	60.0%
Liberal	9239	20.0%	1	20.0%
CCF	9043	19.6%	1	20.0%
Ind. Citizen's Association	2723	5.9%	0	0%

1952

Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	167789	56.2%	52*	85.2%
Liberal	66738	22.4%	4	6.6%
CCF	41929	14.1%	2	3.3%
Conservative	6271	2.1%	1	1.6%
Progressive Conservative	4700	1.6%	1	1.6%
Ind. Social Credit	4203	1.4%	1	1.6%
Independent Labour	2927	1.0%	0	0%
Labour Progressive	1132	0.4%	0	0%
Independent	705	0.2%	0	0%
Farmer's Candidate	655	0.2%	0	0%
Labour	527	0.2%	0	0%
Non-Partisan Farmer	463	0.2%	0	0%
People's Candidate	296	0.1%	0	0%

* - includes one acclamation

Rural Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	120594	59.1%	45*	93.4%
Liberal	48778	23.9%	1	2.1%
CCF	28021	13.7%	1	2.1%
Ind. Social Credit	4203	2.1%	1	2.1%
Independent	705	0.3%	0	0%
Farmer's Candidate	655	0.3%	0	0%
Non-Partisan Farmer	463	0.2%	0	0%
Labour Progressive	308	0.2%	0	0%
People's Candidate	296	0.1%	0	0%

* - includes one acclamation

Calgary	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	22871	54.9%	4	66.7%
Conservative	6271	15.0%	1	16.7%
Liberal	5286	12.7%	1	16.7%
CCF	3791	9.1%	0	0%
Independent Labour	2927	7.0%	0	0%
Labour	527	1.3%	0	0%

Edmonton	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	24024	46.2%	3	42.9%
Liberal	12674	24.4%	2	28.6%
CCF	9817	18.9%	1	14.3%
Progressive Conservative	4700	9.0%	1	14.3%
Labour Progressive	824	1.6%	0	0%

1955

Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	175553	46.4%	37	60.7%
Liberal	117741	31.1%	15	24.6%
Conservative	34757	9.2%	3	4.9%
CCF	31180	8.2%	2	3.3%
Coalition	4581	1.2%	1	1.6%
Independent	4225	1.1%	1	1.6%
Liberal Conservative	4001	1.1%	1	1.6%
Labour Progressive	3420	0.9%	0	0%
Ind. Social Credit	2721	0.7%	1	1.6%

Rural Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	120422	50.4%	31	64.6%
Liberal	69172	28.9%	10	20.8%
CCF	21528	9.0%	2	4.2%
Conservative	11159	4.7%	1	2.1%
Coalition	4581	1.9%	1	2.1%
Liberal Conservative	4001	1.7%	1	2.1%
Independent	3627	1.5%	1	2.1%
Ind. Social Credit	2721	1.1%	1	2.1%
Labour Progressive	1894	0.8%	0	0%

Calgary	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	25182	40.3%	3	50.0%
Liberal	17347	27.8%	2	33.3%
Conservative	16283	26.1%	1	16.7%
CCF	2632	4.2%	0	0%
Labour Progressive	579	0.9%	0	0%
Independent	471	0.8%	0	0%

Edmonton	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Liberal	31186	40.7%	3	42.9%
Social Credit	29949	39.1%	3	42.9%
Conservative	7315	9.6%	1	14.3%
CCF	7020	9.2%	0	0%
Labour Progressive	947	1.2%	0	0%
Independent	127	0.2%	0	0%

1959

Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	230283	55.7%	61	93.8%
Progressive Conservative	98730	23.9%	1	1.5%
Liberal	57408	13.9%	1	1.5%
CCF	17899	4.3%	0	0%
Independent	3640	0.9%	0	0%
Ind. Social Credit	2393	0.6%	1	1.5%
Coalition	2279	0.6%	1	1.5%
Labour Progressive	884	0.2%	0	0%

Rural Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	151657	58.0%	47	94.0%
Progressive Conservative	56476	21.6%	0	0%
Liberal	35233	13.5%	1	2.0%
CCF	9243	3.5%	0	0%
Independent	3640	1.4%	0	0%
Ind. Social Credit	2392	0.9%	1	2.0%
Coalition	2279	0.9%	1	2.0%
Labour Progressive	415	0.2%	0	0%

Calgary	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	39489	54.6%	6	85.7%
Progressive Conservative	20872	28.9%	1	14.3%
Liberal	9766	13.5%	0	0%
CCF	2201	3.0%	0	0%

Edmonton	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	39137	49.0%	8	100.0%
Progressive Conservative	21382	26.8%	0	0%
Liberal	12409	15.5%	0	0%
CCF	6455	8.0%	0	0%
Labour Progressive	469	0.6%	0	0%

1963

Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	221107	54.8%	60	95.2%
Liberal	79709	19.8%	2	3.2%
Progressive Conservative	51278	12.7%	0	0%
New Democratic Party	38133	9.5%	0	0%
Independent	3966	1.0%	0	0%
Ind. Social Credit	3178	0.8%	0	0%
Alberta Unity Movement	2233	0.6%	0	0%
Coalition	2179	0.5%	1	1.6%
Prog. Conservative-Liberal	1134	0.3%	0	0%
Communist	527	0.1%	0	0%

Rural Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	137601	58.9%	42	95.5%
Liberal	41971	18.0%	1	2.3%
Progressive Conservative	23726	10.1%	0	0%
New Democratic Party	19053	8.2%	0	0%
Ind. Social Credit	3052	1.3%	0	0%
Independent	2497	1.1%	0	0%
Alberta Unity Movement	2233	1.0%	0	0%
Coalition	2179	0.9%	1	2.3%
Prog. Conservative-Liberal	1134	0.5%	0	0%
Communist	333	0.1%	0	0%

Calgary	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	38701	49.9%	7	87.5%
Liberal	17582	22.7%	1	12.5%
Progressive Conservative	13936	18.0%	0	0%
New Democratic Party	5666	7.3%	0	0%
Independent	1469	1.9%	0	0%
Ind. Social Credit	126	0.2%	0	0%
Communist	101	0.1%	0	0%

Edmonton	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	44805	48.7%	10	100.0%
Liberal	20156	21.9%	0	0%
Progressive Conservative	13616	14.8%	0	0%
New Democratic Party	13414	14.6%	0	0%
Communist	93	0.1%	0	0%

1967

Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	222270	44.6%	55	84.6%
Progressive Conservative	129544	26.0%	6	9.2%
New Democratic Party	79610	16.0%	0	0%
Liberal	53847	10.8%	3	4.6%
Independent	6916	1.4%	1	1.5%
Coalition	3654	0.7%	0	0%
Ind. Prog. Conservative	1118	0.2%	0	0%
Lib/PC Coalition	699	0.1%	0	0%
Ind. Social Credit	693	0.1%	0	0%

Rural Alberta	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	131202	50.1%	41	91.1%
Progressive Conservative	48876	18.6%	1	2.2%
New Democratic Party	44278	16.9%	0	0%
Liberal	25256	9.6%	2	4.4%
Independent	6534	2.5%	1	2.2%
Coalition	3654	1.4%	0	0%
Ind. Prog. Conservative	1118	0.4%	0	0%
Lib/PC Coalition	699	0.3%	0	0%
Ind. Social Credit	517	0.2%	0	0%

Calgary	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	42373	38.2%	5	55.6%
Progressive Conservative	42225	38.1%	3	33.3%
Liberal	14673	13.2%	1	11.1%
New Democratic Party	11645	10.5%	0	0%

Edmonton	votes	% of votes	seats	% of seats
Social Credit	48695	38.9%	9	81.8%
Progressive Conservative	38443	30.7%	2	18.2%
New Democratic Party	23687	18.9%	0	0%
Liberal	13918	11.1%	0	0%
Independent	382	0.3%	0	0%
Ind. Social Credit	176	0.1%	0	0%

Appendix D

Measures of Disproportionality

There are two basic approaches to measuring disproportionality. The first is to look at the amount of disproportionality per party. Douglas Rae pioneered this approach in his classic study of electoral systems. Rae's measure, I , reflects the average discrepancy between seats and votes. It is calculated by adding together the absolute values of the differences between seat shares and vote shares, then dividing by the number of parties. In equation form, this is expressed as follows:¹

$$I = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n |v_i - s_i|}{N}$$

While I is an attractive measure in that it is reasonably intuitive, its main problem is that the number of parties present in an electoral system strongly influences the outcome, especially if those parties are small. In a situation where many small parties compete, I will tend to be quite low.² To deal with this problem, Rae introduces a "cut-off" value, not counting parties that receive less than 0.5% of the vote. This cut-off is still quite low and arbitrary, however, and does not completely alleviate the problem of sensitivity to

¹ Douglas W. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 84-86.

² Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 58; Michael Gallagher, "Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems," *Electoral Studies* 10 (1991): 40.

large numbers of small parties. Consequently, the Rae index does not correlate as strongly with other measures of disproportionality as do some other measures.³

There have been other attempts to apply this basic logic of a party-based measure of disproportionality. Lijphart has suggested overcoming the shortcomings of the Rae index by using a fixed number of parties. One index he developed calculates the average vote-seat share discrepancies for the two largest parties.⁴ While this type of index eliminates some of the Rae index's worst problems, the choice of the number of is still arbitrary. The choice of two parties makes intuitive sense in two-party systems, but in multi-party systems, Lijphart's index would in some cases return inaccurately low levels of disproportionality. For example, the single member plurality electoral system played a significant role in the outcome of the 1993 Canadian federal election as Table 41 shows.

Table 41
Election Results, Canada 1993

Party	Votes	Seats	 Vi-Si
Liberals	41%	60%	19%
Reform	19%	18%	1%
Conservatives	16%	1%	15%
Bloc Quebecois	14%	18%	4%
New Democrats	7%	3%	4%

Lijphart's two-party index would take the average of the seat-vote discrepancies of the two largest parties (the Liberals and Reform), giving a result of 10%. By only including two parties, Lijphart's index misses the most significant electoral distortion in

³ Gallagher, 46-47; Lijphart, *Electoral Systems*, 66-67.

⁴ Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 163.

the 1993 election, the lack of reward for the regionally diffuse Conservative vote. Interestingly, Lijphart's two-party index returns a value of 9% for the 1988 federal election, an election in which the single member plurality system played a much less dramatic role than in 1993. Lijphart's two-party index avoids some of the problems associated with Rae's index and is quite suitable for comparative purposes as most party systems have at least two parties, but it can misrepresent the effects of the electoral system in situations of multipartism. As the elections in Winnipeg and many of those in Edmonton and Calgary featured relatively large numbers of parties, Lijphart's two-party index is not appropriate for this study.

More recently, Lijphart has suggested the intuitive and elegant solution of only measuring the single largest deviation from proportionality.⁵ This index is simple to calculate and easy to understand. Its simplicity, however, is also its biggest liability. It only shows one part of the picture of disproportionality. Again, the cut-off point of one party is still arbitrary. Lijphart himself uses this measure as only a supplementary measure to other preferred measures.⁶

All three party-based measures fall into the difficult position of having to choose a cut-off point that is reasonable and not essentially arbitrary. For this reason, the second method of measuring disproportionality is preferable. This class of measures determines the total amount of disproportionality for the entire electoral system, not just for each party. There are two versions of this type of measure which are currently widely used. The first is the Loosemore-Hanby Index, D , determined by adding the absolute values of

⁵ Lijphart, *Electoral Systems*, 62.

⁶ Lijphart, *Electoral Systems*, 62.

the differences between vote and seat share, then dividing by two. In formulaic form, D is calculated as follows:⁷

$$D = (1 / 2) \sum |s_i - v_i|$$

D will be equal to zero in a case where all parties receive exactly the share of seats to which their vote share entitles them (perfect proportionality) and will be equal to one in a situation where a party (or parties) with no votes receives all the seats while a party (or parties) with all of the votes receives no seats (a theoretical example of perfect disproportionality). D is the most widely used measure of disproportionality, but it has some weaknesses. The main complaint is that D weighs all deviations between vote and seat shares equally. A situation where four parties each experience a 5% deviation from proportionality would return a similar value to a situation where one party experienced a 10% deviation. D thus tends to overstate the disproportionality of PR systems that have a number of parties with small deviations from proportionality.⁸ Monroe extends this argument further and argues that D suffers from insensitivity to transfers. D registers transfers of votes from parties which receive a greater share of the seats than their share of the votes entitles them to (advantaged parties where $s_i > v_i$) to a party which receives fewer seats than they are entitled to (disadvantaged parties where $v_i > s_i$), but fails to register transfers from one party to another if both are either advantaged or disadvantaged by the electoral system.⁹ Taagepera and Shugart admit that D can be somewhat of a blunt instrument and that it cannot tell us where the distortion is occurring. They argue,

⁷ Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, *Seats & Votes: The Effects & Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 105.

⁸ Lijphart, *Electoral Systems*, 60.

⁹ Burt L. Monroe, "Disproportionality and malapportionment: measuring electoral inequality," *Electoral Studies* 13 (1994): 139.

however, that any attempt to reduce a situation to one number will inevitably lead to some simplification and loss of information.¹⁰

Michael Gallagher has developed an alternative measure of deviation from proportionality that tries to address some of the shortcomings of the Loosemore-Hanby index used by people like Taagepera and Shugart. Gallagher's goal is to combine some of the features of the Rae index, *I*, with the system-based approach of measuring disproportionality. He wants to preserve Rae's idea that it is important know where disproportionality is coming from in our measures. Gallagher suggests a least-squares index which would entail adding the squares of the vote-seat differences for each party, dividing by two, then taking the square root.¹¹ In formulaic form, the Least Squares Index is calculated as follows:

$$LSq = \sqrt{((1 / 2) \sum (v_i - s_i)^2)}$$

What this does in practice is weigh the disproportionality by itself so that large discrepancies between seats and votes contribute more to the index than small discrepancies. The result is a measure that is less sensitive to small deviations from proportionality, correcting one of the possible shortcomings of *D*. This comes at the price of a loss of sensitivity, however.







In this study, *D* will be the primary measure of disproportionality because it is intuitive and thus simple to understand and to calculate. It is also the most widely used measure of disproportionality,¹² thus facilitating comparison of the results of this study with other studies. It is important, however, to remember the limitations of *D* described above, notably its sensitivity to small deviations and its insensitivity to transfers.

¹⁰ Taagepera and Shugart, 261.

¹¹ Gallagher, 40-41.

¹² Monroe, 141-142.

IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



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