THE INTENTIONALITY OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE QUESTIONING ACT

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of Graduate Studies

of

The University of Guelph

by

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In partial fulfilment of requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

December 1997

Your file Votre reference

Our file Notre référence

0-612-27446-2

Canada

ABSTRACT

THE INTENTIONALITY OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE QUESTIONING ACT

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A good deal of work has already been done on the topic of questions, most of it in recent years, and most of it on the "logic" of questions. Yet in spite of all the attention paid to the topic, what has not received sufficient treatment is the *phenomenology* of question and answer, in the Husserlian sense of that word, "phenomenology". The present work has two aims: to fill in this gap in the phenomenological literature and to examine the *intentionality* of a question, and this in order to elucidate the "question-structure" of intentionality. The argument is basically this: Intentionality or conscious "aboutness" is a *rivetting*. The act does not "stare" at its referent, courtesy of its "sense". As an act, it rivets on it, and it does so to the extent that either the object is *interesting* or the act is being *informed*. What's "interesting" holds out different possibilities (maybe A, or B, or C); what's informative is the reduction of those possibilities (A--not B or C). What is "interesting" elicits that response called "questioning". In the answering--in the actualization of the question--the act itself becomes "informative". Thus, the act rivets on its object--the act *is* an act—in so far as it is structurally that of either a questioning or an answering, or somewhere in between. Thus, the "question-notions" of interestedness and informativeness must figure centrally in a theory of intentionality. This being so, there are some other key notions that will have to be

revised, or introduced, accordingly. Not least of them are the notions of "emptiness" and

fulfilment, of truth and evidence, and the problem of how reality is disclosed to us.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank my "colleague students" for being around me during my days as a doctoral candidate: Catherine Canary, Greg Eliot, Dr. Keith Culver, Andy Berry, and Paul Strong. Most thanks goes to Walter Strong (for being my fellow phenomenologist) and David Castle (for being a fellow philosopher and for being the only person I know who likes Beethoven's Seventh as much as I do). All of them are *Übermenschen*, which means I will not forget them.

I thank Prof. Karl Schuhmann, of the Department of Philosophy, State University of Utrecht, for sending me some unpublished work by Johannes Daubert in October 1996.

I thank Dr. Clement Reeves, recently retired from the Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph, who planted in me the idea that, maybe, intentionality and interrogation are next to "convertible terms"; and Prof. Kenneth Dorter, from the same Department, who commented on an early proposal of my work.

I thank Dr. José Huertas-Jourda, recently retired from the Department of Philosophy, Wilfrid Laurier University, for serving so graciously as my external examiner, and for having earlier provided me access to the Daubert archives that were held at Wilfrid Laurier University until quite recently. Some gratitude has to go to Prof. Jay Newman, of the Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph, not only for his service as a member of my examining committee but also, and primarily, for his outstanding performance as a proofreader. I express gratitude to my "fellow hermeneut", Dr. Gary Madison, of the Department of Philosophy, McMaster University, who served as a member of my advisory

committee and whom I have known since my days as an undergraduate student

Many thanks to Prof. Jay Lampert for having done such a meticulous and thorough job as a reader of an earlier draft of this work

I am especially grateful to Prof. Jeff Mitscherling, my supervisor and friend, who was there at the start of the project and trusted me in what I was trying to do. (It was Jeff who originally got me into Guelph. Assuming that that's a good thing, I thank him for that too.)

Many thanks to Barbara-Ann Borland and Natasha, who cheered me on.

Thanks to my siblings. And special thanks to my mother and father, to whom I affectionately dedicate this work.

And for sending my roots rain, I thank God.

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Introduction

A good deal of work has already been written on the topic of questions, most of it in recent years, and most of it on the "logic" of questions.[1] Yet in spite of the volume of literature on the topic, what remains missing in all this is a systematic study on the phenomenology of questioning, in the Husserlian sense of that adaptable word, "phenomenology". The aim of the present work is twofold: (1) It is to fill in this missing blank in the phenomenological literature. (2) And it is to examine the intentionality of a question--with an eye to elucidating the "question-structure" of intentionality. In a few lines: Intentionality or

conscious "aboutness" is a rivetting. The act does not "stare" at its referent, courtesy of its "sense". So far as it is an act, it rivets on it, and it does to the extent that the either the object is interesting or the act is being informed. What's "interesting" holds out different possibilities (maybe A, or B, or C); what's informative is the reduction of those possibilities (A--not B or C). What is "interesting" elicits that response called "questioning". In the answering--in the actualization of the question--the act itself becomes "informative". Thus, the act rivets on its object--the act is an act--so far as it is structurally that of either a questioning or an answering, or somewhere in between. Thus, the "question-notions" of interestedness and informativeness must figure centrally in a theory of intentionality. This being so, there are some other key notions that will have to be revised, or introduced, accordingly--not least, the notions of "emptiness" and fulfilment, of truth and evidence, and the problem of how reality is disclosed to us.

This introductory chapter falls into three parts: (A) In the first, I draw up a list of the basic claims of this study. (B) In the second part, I write about some different approaches to the problem of Qs and explain how our approach differs from these. (C) And in the last, I provide an outline of the work, chapter by chapter.

A. A List of Assertions

Before drawing up a list of the key claims, it is expedient that I say a sketchy word or two about the operative term, "intentionality". The term means quite different things for different philosophers.[2] I shall take as my starting point Husserl's notion of it. (What other philosophers have said about it will not enter into the argument.) And to narrow things down even more, I shall stick fairly closely to Husserl's formulation of it as found in the

Logical Investigations (hereinafter usually referred to as *LI*.) The later Husserl does

introduce notions of intentionality not to be found in the *LI*, for example, operational

intentionality, anonymous intentionality, horizon intentionality, and unconscious

intentionality [see Mohanty (1970)]. However, these notions will have no part to play in the

present work. Now that the parameters of the notion have been narrowed down, somewhat

arbitrarily I admit, let us consider the basics of the notion.

The term "intentionality" derives from the Latin intendere, meaning "to point at" or

"extend toward". According to standard current usage, the term "intentionality" simply

stands for "aboutness"; it does not refer exclusively to a psychological property. On this

view, a sentence, an instruction, or a road-sign is intentional in that it is a thing about some

other thing, just as a promise, a wish, or a Q is about some other thing. By contrast, for

Brentano (certainly), for Husserl (I take it), and so also for us, the term refers only to mental

phenomena. Intentionality is phenomenological "aboutness"; it is a relation that holds

between the subject and the object of which that subject is conscious (see *LI* V, §§10-13).

On this point we are also following Husserl. Intentionality is not the defining feature

of any and all mental phenomena. (Husserl parts company with his teacher, Brentano, who

would have intentionality imposed on all mental phenomena.) One's taking delight in an

object may persist long after that object is out of view; but in that case the lingering mood

itself has presumably ceased to be intentional. To be intentional, then, is to be "directed", to

have a "target", to "mean" an object, to be actively locked into this or that thing. What is

intentional is an act of consciousness, or, less redundantly, an "act".[3] With this minimal

description of "intentionality", I shall now list the key claims of the present work. They are

not the only key claims; but they are the claims from which the overall argument basically

hangs.

(1) Husserl partitions the intentional act into two moments: "matter" (Materie), or

"meaning" (or "propositional content", as other philosophers have sometimes called it); and

"quality" (Qualität) (or, as it has been called by others, "force", or "mood") (*LI* V, §§20-22).

(The terms are subsequently replaced--speaking roughly here--with "noematic Sinn [sense]"

and "thetic character" respectively [*Ideas* I (1913), §§117, 133].) This is how the distinction

works. Take, for example, these three utterances: "The rose is red", "Oh that the rose were

red!", and "Is the rose red?" They all share one and the same meaning, the rose is red. Yet

they differ, obviously, in what they are; the first is a statement, the second a wish, the third a

question.

I disagree with this account, at least so far as what it says about questioning. It is a

distortion to say, to this effect, that a Q is what you get when you add a certain "quality" to

an act already equipped with the meaning. Add this quality, stir, and--poof!--the act has

more the "feel" of a Q than an optative, or an assertive, etc. Admittedly, that's a caricature

of Husserl's view; but it is not too far off the mark. On our view: It would be better not to

construe a Q as being just one more type or "quality" of intentional act, to be merely ranged

alongside, say, promising, stating, requesting, predicting, doubting, hypothesizing, desiring,

seeing, and whatever other "quality" may exist. In fact, it might even be better not to

construe a Q as an act-quality at all. Why is that? Because this way of talking about a Q has

a way of covering over the fact that questioning instantiates a basic structure of

intentionality.

(2) By a "basic structure", I am referring to one of the two intentional categories, "empty" and "fulfilled". For Husserl, and for us, these categories are absolutely basic to the notion of intentionality. To illustrate what the terms are about: A person says, "There's a black bird". Another person, understanding what would count as evidence for the truth for this assertion, looks up to see if it is so, and so it has turned out. The evidentially empty act "becomes fulfilled. What, then, makes a Q and an answer together a "basic structure"? I propose that questioning be identified with the "empty" phase of an act, and answering with the "fulfilled" phase. Given this, the notions of intentionality and questioning are radically brought into relation with each other. The relation can no longer be viewed as incidental, a Q can no longer be regarded as "just another" quality-type. This, I think, is a bold claim, and I had best moderate it by pointing out the following.

(3) Intentional acts may be separated out according to their "direction of fulfilment", of which there appear to be basically two kinds.[4] (Never mind here that there these two domains in some cases overlap. For example, in uttering a promise, one both makes it and states it at once.) The one "direction" is thing-to-thought, let's call it. The aim of an act operating with this direction of fulfilment is that it bring about a state of affairs, make a cake, keep a promise, build a house, etc., according to a plan, idea, recipe, or whatnot. Here, the standard is the "thought" to which the "thing" must measure up. The second "direction of fulfilment" is thought-to-thing. The aim of a thought-to-thing act is to match up one's "thinking" to how "things" are, which it must do either truly or falsely. Describing what the

cook is doing in the kitchen, seeing that the plan has been carried through, stating the time of day, etc., are examples of thought-to-thing acts.

Now, backing up a step: The categories of "empty" and "fulfilled" in the domain of thing-to-thought acts are (if you will) "making" and "finishing off", respectively. The one is "empty", the other is "fulfilled". By contrast, the categories of empty and fulfilled in the thought-to-thing domain are (once again) questioning and answering. The one act, or phase of the act, is "empty", and the other phase of it is "fulfilled". It should be noted here that a developed distinction to this effect is not to be found in Husserl's theory of intentionality. In our nomenclature, his theory deals with thought-to-thing intentions only. In any case, we, too, shall be investigating only the one of two domains of intentionality--namely, what we are calling the "thought-to-thing" domain. Having just divided things into two, let us do it once more.

(4) In reference to the category of fulfilment, there are two types of Q that we ask: the "predicative" (or "signifying") and the "hermeneutical" (or "symbolizing"). With the predicative Q, the meaning materials are already in place; its job is simply to check out how things are in the world in reference to the already established meanings. Here are two examples of a predicative Q: "Is this a rose?" has the meanings this is a rose, this is not a rose. "What colour is this?" has the meanings, this is blue, is green, is yellow, etc. However, it is evident that the predicative Q is only one of two types of Q. Whereas the predicative Q provides the meaning-materials ("Is this mirror taller than that one?", the hermeneutical Q, on the basis of some "clues", has to find the meaning! A good example of the hermeneutical

Q is the riddle, which, providing the "parts" (as it were), asks for an identification of the "whole" in which they belong. "Be good to me, I am everybody. Scratch my back I am nobody. Who am I?" Answer: "A mirror".

Now, on Husserl's view, the empty act is, paradigmatically, the signifying act. By implication, the sort of Q that would prove to be paradigmatic in his scheme of things is what we are calling the "predicative Q". In our scheme of things, a thought-to-thing act may prove to be empty not only predicatively, but also interpretively. Our division of Qs (and answers) into "predicatives" and "interpretives" is nothing less than a division of: "empty" acts into predicatively and interpretively empty; and "fulfilled" acts into predicatively and interpretively fulfilled. Of course, there is a criticism in all this: Had Husserl noticed how crucial is this very distinction with Qs, and, what's more, had he thought of correlating questioning with intentionality, such a distinction would have almost certainly shown up at the centre of his theory of intentionality. So what if it did? Among other things, he would have had to modify his concept of the noema in such a way that it could account for both types of Q.

According to Husserl, it is the "noematic Sinn", the "matter", or "meaning", or "logical content", immanent in the act that is responsible for the intentionality of that act, for making that act an act. The content provides, so to speak, the vectorial co-ordinates of the act. If the act has the content, then, automatically, it also has an object in front of it. In fact, it is the content alone which guarantees that the mental event is intentional. That, at any rate, seems to Husserl's view. Anyway, it is one of the way in which his concept of the noema has come to be interpreted. (Dagfinn Føllesdal [1969], Hubert Dreyfus [1982],

Ronald McIntyre and David Smith [1982], and Izchak Miller [1984] have variously

interpreted the concept of the noema along the lines of Frege's theory of linguistic referring.

Just as Frege says that reference is effected via sense, so Husserl says that the intended

object is effected via the noematic Sinn.)

So what is the problem? Granted, the theory works well enough for the predicative

Q. In asking, "Where is the book?", I already know enough about the book to be able to

identify it should I come across it. Indeed, I know enough to be able to ask all sorts of things

about it. To oversimplify: It is "predicatively" that reference is effected via sense. When it

comes to asking a hermeneutical Q, on the other hand, what I start out with is the enigmatic

object and a few riddle-clues to go by; and what I set out to find is the "meaning" of that

object. "What is this that I plainly see in front of me?" Hermeneutically, things work in the

reverse: Sense is effected via reference.

(5) There are various ways in which information has come to be technically defined.[5]

According to one definition, and this is what we shall mean by it, information--

informativeness, call it instead--is a measure of the reduction of alternative or contending

messages. The greater the degree of the contentiousness of those messages, the greater the

"noise", or uncertainty, or--this is our technical term--interestedness. And the greater the

degree of the filtering-out or reduction of the contentiousness, the greater is the

informativeness of the remaining message. To illustrate the point: What does it take to

"know" that, for example, moving the knight from this square to that square on the chess

board is the most expedient move? According to the idea that information is a reduction of

uncertainty, knowing this fully would require seeing how any one of the rival options is less expedient. Putting the point in pedagogical terms: To know something well is to be able to deal with the opposing point of view. This basic idea of what makes for information is neither original nor exceptionable.

To be sure, "information theory", in practice, might have more to do with talk about the molecular organization of a fluid or the design of telephone circuits, than with a "phenomenology of questioning". But this hardly restricts the basic principle of information theory to things mathematical. Nor does it prevent us from appropriating for phenomenological purposes a principle that has an experiential basis in the work-a-day activity of questioning and answering. If there is any phenomenon that best fits the description of reducing the contending messages, it is in the act of answering. How so? Questioning "takes note" of the noise, maybe x, or y, or z; and aiming to eliminate it, it asks, "Is it x, or y, or z?" Answering this Q would be an acquisition of "information" in the technical sense that it involves, among other things, a filtering-out of rival messages.

(6) Our notion of informativeness, and interestedness, are phenomenological. Unless I am already "interested", unless I already WANT TO KNOW your telling me about something, or--a little problematically--unless I retrospectively WOULD WANT TO HAVE KNOWN, then what you have to tell me, however trustworthy I take it be, is NOT informative. In order to be informative, there has to be a questioning behind it. All this is another way of saying that interestedness and informativeness are not essentially quantifiable. To be sure, they admit of "more" and "less". But this depends upon the circumstance in which it is

being asked, who is asking it, when it's being asked, and a thousand other factors. However, it is not numbers that these notions ride on--for example, a reduction of 99 of a 100 possibilities is more informative than a reduction of 1 of 2. The Q, "Is it a boy or a girl?", which deals with two possibilities, may prove far more interesting than, the Q, "Which one of these hundred items is it?", which deals with a hundred. And correspondingly, the answer to the first Q would prove to be the more informative.

(7) What is the philosophical advantage in saying, "An empty act is a questioning act", or "A fulfilling act is an answering act"? What changes here besides the terms? Once we start to construe the intentionality of an act in terms of questioning and answering, we then find ourselves obliged to re-evaluate Husserl's concept of intentionality in a way which is more substantive than nominal. How is that? We have to renovate his concept in such a way as to bring into it the "question-notions" of interestedness and informativeness--notions that are simply not there to be found in his phenomenology. One of the consequences of doing this is that the ideas of "truth" and "evidence", obviously central to Husserl's phenomenology, have to be modified accordingly.

For Husserl (roughly speaking), truth is an adaequatio rei et intellectus, a correspondence between thought and thing, word and world (*LI* VI,§39). Where does evidence (Evidenz) fit into this? For Husserl, evidence is not, as psychologism would have it, a "feeling" of conviction. (If evidence were a matter of feeling, then logic, which deals with truth, would be a branch of psychology!) Evidence is, rather, the experience of truth from which "conviction" follows. In the experience of evidence, one "sees" the agreement

or coincidence of rei and intellectus. To illustrate: A says, "There's a black bird!"

Hearing this, B has an "empty", or "signifying", idea of a state of affairs; B then looks up, only to see the perceptual intuition of a flying black bird, an intuition which "fulfils" the signifying act. In this evidential re-identification of the meaning in the fulfilling intuition, B experiences the truth.

On our account, truth is, as it is for Husserl, adaequatio rei et intellectus. Where we differ with Husserl is mainly on the question of evidence. What makes an act "empty", and what "fills it up", is not so much the intuition. Rather, the "emptiness" of an act is correlated to how noisy or interesting its target is; My not seeing the black-bird doesn't make the act empty; and seeing it doesn't fulfil it up. What makes it empty--and interested in its object-- is my thinking it might be otherwise, my not taking your word for it; etc. And what fulfils it is not the perceptual intuition, but the reduction of contending possibilities--a reduction of which, it so happens, is sometimes carried out by way of perceiving, and sometimes by taking your word for it.

Evidence, then, is not so much a "filling up" as a crowding- out of so many contending possibilities "as false". The experience of a truth lies in the "acknowledging" that the rose is red and, at the same time, the "denying" that it is not any other colour. Where we find this double structure of "acknowledge and deny" is, precisely, in the answering act. To answer is both to acknowledge and deny. I do not mean to suggest that the focus of an answering act is on the denying; to be sure, its primary business is to acknowledge the truth of the matter. However, although the "filtering-out" is not the defining characteristic of an answer, it is not merely a logical "byproduct" of grasping the

truth either. An answering act both acknowledges and denies, even though the focus is admittedly on the "truth".

(8) A theme of this work, closely connected to our "information theory" of intentionality, is the problem of realism. The "metaphysics" of a questioning, in its very performance, is realistic. To ask a Q is to presuppose, in the very asking, that the answer is already "out there". (One can't ask, knowing that France is a republic, "Is the king of France wise?": one can't ask the Q simply because it admits of no answer. The most one can do is reply that it that "the Q does not arise".) So what if questioning is "realistic"? So far as we can line up the notion of questioning and answering with that of intentionality, then we have some right to say that, by extension, the intentionality or "aboutness" of acts must be realistic. When is the act really intentional? When its object is either interesting or informative, or somewhere in between.

In the present work, the problem of realism is not about whether the world exists (which it does, you know). Nor is it about non-veridical experiences (yes, we sometimes do hallucinate). Nor is it about whether there are real causal relations between the act and its object. The problem is about how to explain our experience of the real or Innesein (literally, "in the midst of being").[6] Reality is something that I cannot actually see, no matter how much perceptual intuition "fills" the act. Perception no more adds existential weight to a thing's "looking real" than the thought of a hundred dollars in my pocket makes me any richer. Perception might be a predicate, but existence is not. What, then, is in the structure of Innesein that allows me to "feel" a reality that I cannot see? In our informational sense of

the term, evidence is precisely something that I do not see. Evidence is a denying that what I see as being thus-and-so is otherwise.

But here's an objection: "Isn't Husserl's talk about fulfilment also a kind of argument for realism? Isn't 'fulfilment' all about seeing whether the intended object exists?" The answer to this depends upon which Husserl one is reading and how one is reading him. Behind the "phenomenological reduction", which Husserl puts forward in *Ideas* I, is Husserl's recognition that perceptual fulfilment cannot, after all, "legitimate its own contents and is thus not proof against skeptical doubt" (Schuhmann and Smith [1985, 767]). "For this reason Husserl regards the natural attitude, which accepts the claims of perception at face value, as no more than 'the conception of the naive human being'" (ibid., 767).

To continue: Yes, "fulfilment" is about seeing whether the intended object exists. However, "fulfilment", as Husserl himself understands it, cannot quite do the trick--a fact which he himself recognizes. Husserl's mistake was to have stopped at the point of making this correct assessment. Stopping at this point, he effectively declared that the question of existence is fundamentally irrelevant for purposes of doing phenomenology. Granted, perceptual acquaintance does not legitimate its own contents. Granted, no matter how good the lighting and how accurate the sets, a perceptual intuition is, by itself, merely cinematic. But this being true does not warrant the reduction? There is something that does give the object its "look" of being real. In order to find this something, we need a different notion of fulfilment, i.e., the informational fulfilment of a Q. What gives the object its look of being real is that "halo" around it 'that ain't otherwise'.

B. Their Approaches, Our Approach

It should prove useful to take due note, at the outset, of the different approaches to the study of Qs. In this way, we can better see where our own approach fits on the philosophical map; we can ward off any misunderstanding about what we are, and are not, setting out to do: and we can show what makes our approach different from the others. I have sorted out the approaches, somewhat arbitrarily, into two groups: (1) the "logical" and (2) the "intentional". Our own approach, it turns out, fits somewhere in the second group. But again, this is somewhat arbitrary—or misleading—not least because the act of a Q cannot be examined apart from its "logic" or semantics.

1. On the Logic of a "Q"

Rather than try to define the "logic of Qs", I shall give some examples of the different things that different philosophers have in mind when they talk about this "logic". I shall break this discussion into two sections. (a) The first is about a logic of Qs in the sense of a calculus. Although I shall not be dealing with Qs in this "mathematical", and admittedly legitimate way, it is well that I still say a perfunctory word or two about this sense of a logic of Qs, if only for the record. (b) The second section, the more relevant, is about a logic of Qs in the semantic sense. There seems to be four semantic notions of a Q. Except for the "make-me-know" reduction of a Q, I have no major qualms with these different approaches. We shall see about this when we get there.

(a) A Logic of Qs, a Calculus of Qs

It may have been a certain Richard Whately, a 19th century logician, who was the first to have hinted at the idea of developing a logic of Qs (and imperatives) that would run parallel to a logic of propositions. In his Elements of Logic (1826), Whately suggests that Kant's tripartite division of judgment of relations might also apply to Qs (and imperatives). (This is pointed out in Prior and Prior [1955, 43].) Thus, there are categorical Qs ("Is this a rose?), just as there are categorical judgments ("The rose is red"). There are conditional Qs ("If the rose is red, then--?"), just as there are conditional judgments ("If the rose is red, I'll buy it"). And there are disjunctive Qs ("Is the rose red or white?"), just as there are disjunctive judgments ("The rose is either red or white"). A few philosophers have since tried to formalize a logic of Qs into a calculus, what with its own "erotetic" quantifiers, variables, and the like. Prior and Prior (1955), in their classic paper, have argued against any such attempt to formalize what they dubbed an "erotetic logic" (after the Greek word *erotema*, "question"):

> . . . the things it seems proper to say about questions are exactly the things
> which logicians of a conservative and antisymbolic bent (like Cook Wilson)-
> -or of a radical and antisymbolic bent (like Mr. Peter Strawson); it is the
> same thing anyway--have said about propositions. Erotetic logic would seem
> to be antisymbolic; and we hazard the suggestion that, conversely,
> antisymbolic logic is erotetic.[1955, 59]

This, at any rate, is one sense of a "logic of Qs"--namely, a calculus of Qs. Why develop it? To what end?

> One motivation for such an approach is that of the "pure" logician: to
> study certain logical properties of answer sets (e.g., completeness with
> respect to possible state descriptions or whatever) and relation between
> answer sets (inclusion, implication, and the like).[Harrah, 1987, 200-201]

The other motivation is to develop a logic of retrieval--the "librarian's logic", we might say-

-that formalizes the how-to of retrieving and managing information. Belnap's work (1976)

is representative of such a logic. The aim of this sort of logic is to mechanize the retrieving

and managing of information.

> Probably the strongest motivation for the abstract interrogative approach is
> that it leads to the construction of systems that work very well in situations
> of a certain kind . . . . Example: The questioner is a scientist, the respondent
> is a research assistant, and the information source is a library; the scientist
> says to the assistant "What book in the library has the best discussion of
> nematodes?" For other examples we can let either questioner or respondent
> or both be a machine. In cases like this, the argument for the abstract
> interrogative approach is very impressive. [Harrah, 1987, 202]

Again, although a calculus of Qs will not figure in the present work, I have no disagreement

with the idea itself. What I do disagree with, as regards the "logic of Qs", are a few views as

what this logic is "semantically". Let us go over this.

(b) A Logic of Qs, a Semantics of Qs

I begin with a note that is more about a clarification of terms than about any sort of

"approach".

The act of a Q is what we shall be principally examining. In order to give some idea of what a Q-act means, we have only to distinguish it from its counterpart, the logical formation of a Q, sometimes called the "proposition", or the "content", or the "sense", or "matter". Imagine a single Q put to, say, ten of us. If each one of us is asking it, there are ten different Qs (or eleven, if we include the person putting it to us), qua Q-acts. Yet there is only one Q here qua Q-meaning. This notion of the "meaning" as something which is logically distinct from the concrete act goes some way toward explaining how it is possible for me to communicate "the same Q", or "the same" anything else for that matter, to someone else. It goes some way toward explaining how I can communicate "the same thing" to myself--how I can go back the next day to "the same Q" that I had asked myself the night before; how I "know" that the just-arrived answer is the answer to "the same Q" I had asked myself five seconds ago.

It is essential that we not confound the logical formation of a Q with its grammatical formation--the interrogative--"in" which the meaning of the Q gets expressed. One and the same interrogative may represent, after all, what are in fact different questions. The Q-act behind the interrogative, for example, "When was Karl in Berlin?", may involve the idea that Karl's visit to Berlin was unique. Logically, correlated to this Q-act is one Q-meaning. Or the Q-act behind that interrogative may involve the idea that Karl was there many times, and require a list of the dates of Karl's visits to the city. Logically, correlated to this Q-act is quite another Q-meaning. Take another example: Where the contrastive stress occurs in certain of our questions does not, it seems, modify its core meaning. The utterances "Is the rose red?" and "Is the rose red?" seem to be semantically equivalent. Yet in other cases,

notably in the why-Q, a shift in stress can substantially alter the logical formation. The

utterances, "Why was Karl in Berlin?", "Why was Karl in Berlin?", mean different things,

in that they each have to point toward different things, they expect logically different,

indeed, grammatically different, answers. They are not just pragmatically different, which is

obvious enough; they are semantically or "logically" different. Suffice it to say that there

can be a whole lot more to the logical formation of a Q than grammatically meets the ear.

Of course, I am not suggesting that a Q is unique in this respect. Very much the same is to

be said of statements, warnings, retractions, and so forth.

There exist as many as three basic interpretations as to what logical formation of a Q

"means". (i) On the first view (in fact, this would seem to be Husserl's view), it is simply

the meaning that inhabits the act, irrespective of what kind of act that is. In a stating act, the

meaning is a statement-meaning (S is p); in a wishing act it is a wish-meaning (Oh that S

were p!); and in a Q-act, it is a Q-meaning (Is S p?). I have already formally expressed my

disagreement with this view. (ii) On the second view (Åqvist's [1975] and Hintikka's

[1974]), the meaning of a Q is construed as an "epistemic imperative". Accordingly, to ask,

"Is S p?" means the same as, "Make it the case that either I know that S is p or I know that S

is not p". I shall explain what is with wrong with the second view in the next chapter (where

I criticize the view that a Q is a request of some sort). (iii) On the third view, the meaning of

a Q is identified with its "set of answers". Accordingly, to ask, "Is S p?" is to present as

alternative answers the statements, "S is p" and "S is not p". Among the chief

representatives of this approach are Hamblin (1958), Stahl (1969), and Belnap (1963,

1976). We do not quite go along with this view either; however, it does fare better than the

first, and fares much better than the second. (iv) Not to get too far ahead of ourselves, we propose a fourth view. Although it comes close to the third, it is still slightly different. The meaning of a Q is not the set of possible statement-answers; it is a set of possible ways that one statement can go. Putting it differently, a Q is, predicatively, a "name" in need of "predication". Or hermeneutically, it is a predication in search of a name.

I shall not make heavy weather of the above classification of a logic of Qs. which means quite different things to different philosophers. What we do need to note carefully is the distinction between the logic of a "calculus" and the logic of "semantics" (it's the second logic that is the more relevant) and that it is the fourth of the semantic notions which we happen to hold.

2. On the "Intentional" Approaches

The so-called intentional approaches to the study of Qs are more taken up with the problem of the experience of the activity than with its "logic". (But again, the distinction is fuzzy.) I shall single out three approaches: (a) the hermeneutic-Collingwood approach; (b) the speech act approach: (c) and Daubert's approach; and (d) Husserl's approaches. I shall explain our own "phenomenological" model by way of contrasting it with these three, as I go through each one of them.

(a) A Hermeneutic Model, Our Model

Doubtless, few philosophers have ever denied that asking Qs is important when it comes to trying to make sense of things. But there are only a very few who have gone out of their way

to make something of this fact; the names R.G. Collingwood and H.-G. Gadamer come immediately to mind.[8] I have accorded neither of them a prominent place in this work. A partial explanation is called for as to why I am not giving our close allies more say in this work (besides the one about not being able to invite everyone to the party). One reason is that hermeneutics, although obviously very much in the business of questioning, does not cover the whole domain of questioning. The task of interpreting, in the usual sense of that term, is but one type of Q; the task of asking the predicative is yet another type. Accordingly, hermeneutics is a specialization of a "phenomenology of questioning".

(To be sure, it might be that Gadamer, for one, uses a different definition of "interpret", and so I suspect he does. But this hardly takes away from my point. Gadamer works with a different definition if only because he does not appreciate, let alone see, that there is a difference between what we are calling the predicative Q and the hermeneutical Q. That is our distinction, not his. And if he does recognize it (which he doesn't), I have not found him fighting for it. It also might be that Collingwood uses a different definition of "interpret" as well, and so I think he does. Whereas for Gadamer questioning is "interpretive", for Collingwood it is "predicative". (Read: Collingwood's talk about Qs is at times not that "hermeneutic" after all!) As if he were trying to persuade the positivists of the day that he, too, is "scientific", Collingwood stresses the "definite question" (1939, 124) at expense of Qs--hermeneutical Qs--such as "What is knowledge?", "What is duty?", "What is art?", and other what Qs, which he next to denounces as "pseudo-questions" (ibid., 122). In any case, Collingwood seems to have forgotten, at least for a moment, that one sometimes has to look for and find the "definite question" before asking it, and this one

does by asking the "pseudo-question", the hermeneutical Q, "What is the Q here?")

Yet another reason for not giving Collingwood and Gadamer a prominent place in the present work has to do with the fact that our problem is not "their" problem. True, we are asking, as they are, "How does one come to understand this or that?" But in addition to this, we asking a question that they do not ask, certainly not systematically ask, namely: "What is this intention called a Q?" Not surprisingly, our problem requires that we arrange things somewhat differently. The hermeneutic model effectively has it that the questioning act is on the one side of the world, and everything else, which is to be interpreted, is on the other side. On the other side are to be found such things as tables, electrons, triangles, but also promises, requests, statements, invitations, thank you's, greetings, along with Qs and answers, and whatever other target there may be for the interpreting act.

Our model, on the other hand, requires that things be arranged in this way: On the one side of the world, lined up side-by-side, are any number of kinds of act, such as making promises, issuing requests, thanking, . . . not to mention also asking Qs. And on the other side of it are things such as tables, trees, chairs, electrons, but also, you might say, "promise-objects", "request-objects", "statement-objects", "question-objects", and other "spiritual objects". Our model would have us view the questioning act as one act ranged alongside so many other kinds of act. Looking at it in this way, we can pose the problem accordingly: What is it that differentiates this one intentional act from other acts? That's how start to figure out what a Q is--paradoxically, not so much by examining anything and everything about Qs, but about what seeing what marks it off from its next of intentional kin.

(b) A Speech-Act Model, Our Model

When examining the Q within the framework of speech act theory (so-called), one sees it as but one more kind of "illocutionary force". A thanking, a stating, a warning, a predicting, a guaranteeing, a praying, and a promise are some ways of "doing things with words". Questioning is still another way. Is our own approach something like this speech-act approach? A small "Yes"; it, too, takes note of the fact that a Q, just like a warning, a thanking, etc., is one of any number of types of act. But a much bigger "No"; a Q is not, as mainstream speech-act theory might democratically have it, just one more act among many others. Such a theory cannot in principle do justice to the hermeneutics of a Q without going outside speech-act theory. Questioning is primarily taken up with the elucidation of the "third thing"--the object in question--not with the interlocutor, who may or may not be present to help in this business of elucidation.

I am not saying that speech-act theory does not, or cannot, recognize the target-fixing feature of acts, i.e., acts of uttering. Searle's discussion about word-to-world and world-to-word "directions of fit" of utterances is clearly meant to do justice to the fact that utterances deal with "third things". I am saying, rather, that speech-act theory (the mainstream theories of Austin and Searle at any rate) cannot say very much about the object without "going outside" its own apparent territory. Searle's own view on this to the contrary (and we'll see about this in due course), the defining mark of a Q is not its "pragmatic", or "communicative", or "illocutionary" force. In or out of speech, a Q is what it is by virtue of that thing which it aims at and tries to elucidate. If one wishes to examine the structures of this object, one ought not rely too much on a speech-act analysis. To sum up: Even if a

speech-act theorist would make the concession, "Well, agreed, questioning is very, very

'important'", and then write a book about it, entitled, "A Most Important Speech-act", that

still wouldn't take care of our objection.

(c) Daubert's Model, Our Model

The most ambitious work on the subject of the Q in the phenomenological literature, of

which I am aware, is that undertaken by Johannes Daubert, the "unknown

phenomenologist" (1877-1947).[9] I have already explained a little about how our approach to

the problem of questioning contrasts with the hermeneutic and the speech act approaches. It

is Daubert's approach that I shall now briefly consider. I quote Karl Schuhmann and Barry

Smith, who provide this historical background:

> [The] *Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phänomenologie Forschung*, to give it
> its full title, was a joint undertaking sponsored by Husserl and the Munich
> group, and Daubert took a major part in the preparation for its launching.
> Like the other prospective co-editors--Reinach, Pfänder, Geiger, and Scheler
> (representing Munich), and Husserl (representing the rest of the world)--
> Daubert, too, was expected to contribute a major work to the first volume of
> the series. He had been working since March 1911 on a "phenomenology of
> questions" and had accordingly planned to submit a piece on this topic. And
> while he failed, as on earlier occasions, to produce a final version of his
> ideas in published form, the drafts of his work have survived and been
> collected in a convolute consisting of 87 full folio shorthand pages ["it
> carries the sigil Daubertiana AI2, bearing the title "Frage"] . . . [1987, 357].

What, then, does Daubert say about the questioning act? Not enough for our purposes.

Daubert does not so much as define a Q as single out (right at the beginning) three different moments of a Q. There is, first of all, the act of questioning (das Fragen). There is the meaning of the Q (die Frage); its inhabiting your Q-act and my Q-act allows us to ask the "same Q". And there is also the addressed or communicated Q (die Anfrage), which on his view is the Q-act in its original form. Now, while Daubert says in effect that a Q is a many-sided thing (which is true enough), he fails to provide a definition of what makes the Q-act (das Fragen), the Q-meaning (die Frage), and the Q-communique (die Anfrage) a Q. It may be that Daubert's failure to define this common thing, a Q, poses only a slight problem for his work, which could be easily fixed up by just supplying in a definition of our own. But in any case, he does not appear to recognize what is (so it seems to me) the main phenomenological significance of questioning.

Daubert entitles the Introduction to his "Frage", "Die Frage im Vergleich zum Urteil". (Read: The question compared to the judgment.) He states the aim of the work as follows: "Die Analogie zum Urteil. Ziel: Phänomenologie der Frage als eigentümlicher Denkakt selber" (AI2, 1r). (Read: A Q ought to be investigated in the same way that a judgment is investigated, namely, as an act of thinking in its own right.) Behind Daubert's stated aim is a rejection of reductionist view, one formulation of which Husserl happens to defend at the end of the Sixth Investigation.[10] According to this reductionist view, a Q, "Is A b?" is reducible to the statement, "I ask whether A is b", or "My current question is whether A is b". Ditto for any other non-stating utterance. A promise, a thanking, a warning are also so many abbreviations of stating acts. It is this reductionist theory, almost certainly Husserl's version of it, that Daubert calls into question. All well and good. But if it is a

matter of having to criticize the reductionist thesis, an analysis of promising could just as easily do the trick. So why, then, does Daubert single out Qs for analysis?

What else is notable in Daubert's approach is that he accords no hermeneutic privilege to questioning. In fact, Daubert expressly dismisses Heinrich Rickert's assertion to the effect that there is something inherently answer-like about a judgment. ("Am besten werden wir die Struktur dieses Sinnes verstehen, wenn wir das Urteilen als Antwort auf eine Frage betrachten" [Rickert, 1904, ch.3, §6, 153].) An answer is not, Daubert declares, the original form of a judgment (AI2, 78v). All of which leaves the reader asking yet again: Then why does Daubert single out Qs? Why not, instead, write about commands or promises? Why not a work beginning with: "Phänomenologie des Wunsch als eigentumlicher Denkakt selber"? Should we expect some forthcoming works on each kind? A hundred-volume set, maybe?

I am not saying that there'd be anything wrong with writing a hundred-volume set. My point is that it is best to get the first volume right. And my point is that the problem of the Q ought not be treated as merely incidental to phenomenology, as Husserl treats it (as we'll see in a moment). Nor should it even be treated as only very, very interesting, as Daubert seems to have treated it. What makes the phenomenon of questioning "especially special" for phenomenology is that the terms "intentionality" and "questioning" are--not quite, but almost--convertible terms. Consequently, doing a phenomenology of the Q doesn't boil down to just one more "topic of choice", alongside so many other topics--the social world, making promises, the law, and mailboxes. Failure to note all this was Daubert's missed opportunity.

Certain factors led me to decide that it would be best not to bring Daubert into the thick of the thesis.[11] Not least of them has to do with the incongruity between his aim and ours, and the fact that many of the topics broached in this work simply do not come up in Daubert. Nothing would be worse than to force a philosopher to say what he's not really saying. With this in mind, I decided that it would be best, for both parties, to keep Daubert mostly in the wings of this work. I ask the reader to watch out for the "Daubert subtext" that shadows the whole work, although mainly only in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.

(d) Husserl's Model, Our Model

The researcher is hard pressed to find anything in the phenomenological literature dedicated specifically to the problem of questioning. Edmund Husserl, prolific writer that we was, has next to nothing to say about the subject.[12] It is only here and there in his published works that he gets around to examining the subject of Qs. It is in even fewer places that he writes about the subject at length. His most extensive treatment of it is be found somewhere in *Experience and Judgment* (hereinafter usually referred to as *EJ*). But that discussion adds up to a mere seven pages (§§78, 79). Husserl also examines the subject at length in his Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis (§15). But then what is stated here is, almost word for word, the same as what is stated in *EJ*.

In the *Logical Investigations* (1900/1901) and *Ideas* I (1913), arguably his most important works, there are no analyses of Qs to speak of. Whenever the topic of Qs comes up in these works, the purpose is invariably to illustrate some bigger point. In the Sixth Investigation, for example, the bigger point is about "disputed utterances" in general, of

which the expression of a Q is but one among many, many types. There is the wish-expression, the command-expression, the promise-expression. And to throw in just one other example, there's also the question-expression. In a word, Husserl has very little to say about the subject. More to the point, it does not seem to have occurred to him that the connection between questioning and intentionality is not so incidental after all.

It is Husserl who will prove to be our main philosopher. But to this, one might object: Why Husserl, who never wrote a treatise on Qs? The objection misses the point. For one thing, Husserl never officially wrote a treatise on intentionality either; yet what he says about it is everywhere in his writings. And second, what Husserl explicitly says about Qs will not even figure all that heavily in the overall argument anyway. I shall be interested in it mainly to the extent that I read it as a consequence of a "prior" theory of intentionality. What I propose, then, is that we work in somewhat the reverse direction: Examine the "what" of a Q, and then, working backwards, see what all this says about the nature of intentionality.

There are at least four theories of Qs (if they can be called that) that may be culled from of Husserl's writings--theories "A", "B", "C", and "D", I shall call them. It should prove helpful that I identify these four early on. According to theory A, a Q is next to identified with doubting. We find this view in *EJ*, §§77-78. Theory B, which is to be found at the end of the Sixth Investigation, is less a "theory about questions" than a theory about non-stating expressions. The expression of a Q just happens to be but one among any number of kinds of nonstating acts. To the extent that theory B can even be called a theory about Qs, it is more a theory about the act of expressing a Q, than a theory about the thing

that actually gets expressed. Such is the way that Husserl talks about--and marginalizes--

the phenomenon of questioning in the Sixth Investigation. According to theory C, a Q calls

for taking up an attitude--affirm it or deny it--toward a proposition. An answer is defined,

accordingly, as a "judgmental decision". Theory C is also to be found in *EJ*, §§77-78 (and

in *LI* V, §29, 616). Finally, there is theory D, which is to be found Ideas I. (There is a touch

of theory A in it, but the two theories are still quite different for all that.) According to this

theory, a Q is to be classified as one more "doxic modality". There exist the doxic or belief-

modalities of certainty, of doubting, of conjecturing, of deeming possible. And then, to add

one more item to the list, there exists also modality of questioning (*Ideas* I, §§94, 103).

My different readings of Husserl are intended to be no more than rough-and-ready. I

do not pretend to do justice to all nuances of this moving target, Edmund Husserl. And that

is not the point of the present study anyhow. This work is emphatically not on Husserl. It is

a work whose starting-point, bearings, and spirit is fundamentally Husserlian. And it is a

work that may even be read, at one level, in certain parts, as a critique of Husserl en route.

But that said, my business with Husserl is mainly to lean on him, as on a lamppost, partly

for light, partly for support. I turn now to an overview of the next five chapters.

C. The Argument, Chapter by Chapter

In Chapter 2, I work through a number of traditional accounts of the questioning act.

Philosophers have variously defined questioning as a request, as a desiring, as a proposition

in doubt, to take only a few examples. None of these accounts, it turns out, quite hits the

mark. Once these accounts have been examined, and gotten out of our way, we shall be

equipped to devise our own definition. To put it down to a slogan: A Q is a multi-directed act; and its aim is to reduce this "multiplicity". I shall not explain at this point what this is supposed to mean, except to note its philosophical novelty. Operative in the definition is the very notion of intentionality--"directedness". This definition is, I think, a philosophical first.

In Chapter 3, I explicate our definition in terms of how a questioning act relates to its object. I argue that the phenomenological object of a Q--a predicative Q--is an "eclipsed" state of affairs, or a "state of affairs in question". The state of affairs (usually referred to as SAs) is taken as being "all there"; what makes this intended object questionable is that one part of it remains hidden from view of the questioner. With the answer to the Q, the object-in-Q is *unveiled* as a "SAs as answered". But so what if this is the "object of a question"? And how can we be so sure about this? I go on to argue that the questioning act requires that its answer performs two things at once: It has to recognizes as "true" the "thus-and-so" of the SAs; and, what's more, it has to rule out as "false" the contending possibilities. ("The rose is *red*--not any other colour". "This is a *rose*--not any other flower".) Call this the logic of answering the logic of "acknowledge and deny". What follows from all this is that the questionability of a SAs--its being "eclipsed"--is not "just" an obstacle, which I have only to get around in order for me to see the SAs in its entirety. It is a *helpful* obstacle, so to speak; it is *through overcoming* it that the that SAs can be exposed as a SAs. In answering the Q, I not only recognize the thus-and-so of the "state of affairs"; in denying the contrary, the SAs is given to me as real, as being, indeed, a SAs. The implications of the present analysis, then, are both "realist" and "epistemological". *Ontologically*, the "SAs as answered" is prior

to the "SAs as questioned". (Unless the former is already assumed to be there, the latter isn't there.) And *epistemologically*, questioning is "prior" in that this act is required in order to see the SAs as an existing SAs. (Much of what I shall say in the third chapter applies also to the hermeneutical Q; but all of it is meant to apply to the predicative Q. Chapter 3 represents the first part of our analysis of the predicative Q. Chapter 4 is the second of the two parts on the predicative Q.)

In Chapter 4, I push the discussion on the predicative Q a step further. I propose. and argue for, the idea that the signifying act and the fulfilling act, as Husserl calls them, be redescribed, respectively, as "questioning" and "answering". And I re-propose the idea. which I already float in the third chapter--namely, the idea that conceptions of truth and evidence, which Husserl lines up with the notion of intentional fulfilment, be renovated accordingly. On our view, a fulfilling act is an answering act. And on our view, answering involves both moments "acknowledging" and "denying". Putting two and two together: Truth involves essentially an acknowledgement of "what is the case". And evidence, should it go with it, involves the reduction or denying of the contenders. Hence, the relation between truth and evidence is already, and manifestly, built into the logic of question and answer. In Chapter 4, then, I confirm our intuition that the notions of intentionality and questioning are in fact intertwined. More than that, I link up the notion of "noise", in reference to which a Q arises, with interestedness; I link up our notion of evidence with informativeness; and I end up maintaining that how real one's relation to the thing "feels" is predicated on how interesting or informative that thing is for the subject. So far as the object "bores" us, it takes on the "Potemkin look".

In **Chapter 5**, I examine the hermeneutical Q, which paradigmatically reads as. "What is this?" The aim of the hermeneutical Q is, like that of its predicative counterpart. to filter out those contending messages called "noise". But there are some differences between the two. I already pointed this out, but I must reiterate it here. The fact that there might be-- would have to be--traces of the interpretive element in the predicative Q does not render the distinction between the predicative and the hermeneutical pointless. Far from it; to make light of that distinction, because "everything's interpretive", is like talking about a night in which all cows are black. To try to answer. "How many nails are in this box?" is predicative; the interpreting (the formulation of the Q) is already over and done with. In order to answer it, one has to "go into the world" and get the information that would "fill in the blank" of the Q. By contrast, to try to answer. "What is this?", or answer a riddle, is *hermeneutical*. The materials are already in hand; now it is a matter of seeing how they fit together "syncategorematically". Finding the book is the predicative Q; interpreting what is on the page is the hermeneutical Q.

I shall argue for this difference as I go along; but in any case. the differences are profound enough that the *hermeneutic* notion of "noise", along with the notions of "truth". "evidence", "fulfilment". "informativeness". and suchlike, will warrant a separate treatment. Such will be the general aim of the fifth chapter. The specific aim will be to answer: What prompts the hermeneutical Q? What does it want, besides, of course, an interpretation? Or. what is it that an interpretation provides? Roughly, these are the claims I shall argue for.

(i) The hermeneutical problem begins with one's seeing a coincidence or conjunction of events or appearances, the actual connection of which is not determined.

("Every time there is [A] sunspot activity, there is [B] a surge in monetary inflation.) (ii) The hermeneutical Q, not satisfied with finding a coincidental conjunctions, or "predictabilities", sets out to establish whether and how A and B are in fact connected. Indeed, it is precisely when the Q comes across a coincidental conjunction that the hermeneutical Q arises—not in spite of its discovery, but *because* of it. In our terminology, a coincidence might prove "interesting", but not "informative"; it has a way of posing a problem, but not offering a "solution" or explanation. (iii) Hermeneutical noise consists not of possibilities that, "predicatively", may or may not actually obtain (e.g., "Are we, or aren't we, in a period of inflation?"). The hermeneutical possibilities have more to do with the question of *belonging* and *not belonging* (e.g., "What, if anything, do these sunspots and this inflation have to do with each other, besides their 'interesting' positions in time?") and, if they belong to each other, the question of *how* they belong to each other.

To illustrate: What is *far outside* the ontological perimeter of this thing called "inflation" does not belong (e.g., of what relevance could there possibly be between inflation and the beat of a butterfly's wing on the other side of the world or the penny that went down the drain?!) What is far outside the perimeter is too uninteresting to ask about. On the other hand, what is *well within* the ontological perimeters of inflation (for example, the factor of not enough people being out of work) does "belong" or is "relevant". However, for someone in the know, *this* connection, might also be uninteresting, for the same reason that it is also "too obvious". *Where*, then, is hermeneutical noise to be found? Where do Qs of interpretation arise? It is neither far outside nor well within the ontological perimeter of a given thing. It is *at*, or *near*, or *around*, the fuzzy, vague perimeter of the thing. To re-phrase

Spinoza's dictum for our purposes: All *informative* determination is the negation of what is at the fuzzy, *interesting* border of thing.

In **Chapter 6**, the conclusion, I redefine, first of all, what a Q is: A Q may be thought of as a "potential" intentionality or relation to the world, requiring an "actual" intentionality. It is actualized, becomes "real", only so far as it comes into contact with what it sees as actual or real. The realist moral is that intentionality--thought-to-thing intentionality--gets its reality from the "outside". I expand on this moral a little by considering it in light of the sort of intentionality which I do not discuss in the argument proper: "cooking", as opposed to "cognition", thing-to-thought intentionality, as opposed to thought-to-thing intentionality. Second, I reconsider the distinction between the hermeneutical and the predicative in light of the problem of what makes one Q "profound" and another "shallow", one Q asked for its own sake and another for the sake of something else.

In order to ward off any false expectation toward the present work as a whole, I must emphasize the following: "Being", "temporality", or whatever it is, makes things "interesting"; we make them "informative". Questioning arises within an "interesting "field of noise"; answering tries to narrow down this field informatively. Note well, our account does not explain what generates this field in the first place. How it is actually set up would be the next thing to investigate--but not in the present work. In any event, our main purpose here does not require that we plough back that far. Our business is restricted to an "ontic" examination of what goes on *within* the field that is already in place.

Notes to Chapter 1

1. Since around the mid-1950's, a number of "analytic" philosophers have attempted to develop a logic of interrogatives. To name a few: Gerold Stahl (1956), C.L. Hamblin (1958), and Nuel D. Belnap and Thomas B. Steel (1976); Lennart Åqvist (1965, 1975) and Jaakko Hintikka (1974); David Harrah (1961); and M.L. Prior and A.N. Prior (1955). I have included in the bibliography only some of these references. For further reading and an extensive, although slightly outdated, bibliography, see David Harrah, "The Logic of Questions" (1984). More on the "logic of interrogatives" in B.1 of this chapter.

2. Consider the very different things "intentionality" might mean for these different philosophers, for starters: Franz Brentano; Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty; the "phenomenological" philosopher of mind, John Searle; and the possible-worlds semanticists, for whom intentionality is to be defined in terms of the information that a given act carries (Jaakko Hintikka, and, I suppose, Saul Kripke). And then consider what intentionality actually means for: the behaviourist (Gilbert Ryle and Carl Hempel); the functionalist (Daniel Dennett); for the "property dualist", (Thomas Nagel); the "substance dualist" (Descartes, John Eccles); the functionalist who still wants to be a property dualist (David Chalmers). It is simply beyond the scope of the present undertaking to give coverage to every one of these theories of intentionality, and then, at the end of it all, try to negotiate these theories.

3. "Act" sounds a lot like "activity", and we may suppose that for some philosophers it means just that. But as a phenomenologist's term of art, "intentional act", or "act" for short, is not synonymous with "activity". The minimal defining feature of an act is its "directedness". My actively looking for this or that about a particular thing is an "act" only so far as it is directed and has something before it. But then so, too, is my just inactively seeing this thing as this or that; in this case, also, my directedness at the thing, although not active in the busy sense of "active", is still an "act" all the same. Apart from this difference

between the two experiences, they are both of them, equally, acts. We may make a distinction, then, between, the "active act" in the sense of busy act (the "task" of looking for something, say) and the "inactive act" in the sense of an unbusy act (of just having found it, say).

Doubtless, some would disagree with the terminology. Searle, for example, notes that "Some authors describe beliefs, fears, hopes, and desires as 'mental acts', but this is at best false and at worst hopelessly confused. Drinking beer and writing books can be described as acts or actions or even activities, . . . ; but believing, hoping, fearing, and desiring are not acts nor mental acts at all. Acts are things one does, but there is no answer to the question, 'What are you now doing?' which goes, 'I am now believing it will rain'. . . . or 'desiring to go to the movies'" (1983, 3). His point, of course, is that we should carefully distinguish an activity from a state, and of course we agree with this. But if by "some authors" he is alluding to people like Husserl, it is in fact Searle who is "hopelessly confused" about the history. See, e.g., Husserl, *LI* V, §13, 563n2. See also J.N. Findlay's "Translator's Introduction" to Husserl's *Logical Investigations*: "The use of a language of acts, of things done, is in this context traditional, but Husserl makes clear, like Brentano and Meinong, that his use of the term has no special connection with activity. The mere presence of something to mind, its entry into consciousness in whatever unheralded manner, its mere turning up or appearance or *Erscheinung*, constitutes an 'act' . . . " (*ibid.*, 8; also 25-26).

4. I am appropriating the terminology from Searle (1977). Searle calls the two "directions of fit" "word-to-world" and "world-to-word". In order to counter any association of his motive of using the terms with our motive, his baggage with our baggage, I am playing it safe and am labelling the two "directions" thought-to-thing and thing-to-thought instead. To be sure, the distinction itself doesn't originate with Searle, as he admits:

> The best illustration of this distinction I know of is provided by Elizabeth
> Anscombe (1957) [in *Intentions*]. Suppose a man goes to the supermarket
> with a shopping list given him by his wife on which are written the words

"beans, butter, bacon, and bread". Suppose as he goes around with his shopping cart selecting these items, he is followed by a detective who writes down everything he takes. As they emerge from the store both shopper and detective will have identical lists. But the function of the two lists will be quite different. In the case of the shopper's list, the purpose of the list is, so to speak, to get the world to match the words; the man is supposed to make his actions fit the list. [Thus a world-to-word fit.] In the case of the detective, the purpose of the list is to make the words match the world . . . .[Thus a word-to-world fit.] [1979, 3; see also Searle's *Intentionality* (1983, 7f., 171f.).]

What I am calling a thought-to-thing act is in Husserl's scheme of things (I am speaking very roughly) an "objectifying act", i.e., an act of a cognitive and "looking" character. As for what I am calling a thing-to-thought act, Husserl scarcely recognizes its phenomenological importance. These "emotional acts", the acts of "volition", are not the primary bearers of meaning, but are, rather, at best founded on the primary bearers called "objectifying acts". I shall be saying more about this matter, and Husserl's attitude toward it, in the closing chapter. (See Mohanty [1971, 107] and Mohanty [1964, 80-86]).

5. The word "information" stands for any number of things: "It may mean a measure of physical organization (or decrease in entropy), a pattern of communication between sources and receivers, a form of control and feedback, the probability of a message being transmitted over a communication channel, . . . or the reduction of some uncertainty . . . .There is no unique notion of information upon which the above senses converge and hence no proprietary theory of information" (R.J. Bogdan [1991, 394]; also Philip Hanson [1990]; Dretske [1986]). What we mean by it is specifically the reduction of uncertainty. "Where there is uncertainty, there is usually the possibility of reducing it by the acquisition of information. Indeed, information is merely the negative measure of uncertainty . . . " (Kenneth Arrow, *The Economics of Information* [1984, 138]). Now, there are mathematical ways of talking about information, which evidently prove useful in communications

engineering. (To get an idea of what I mean, see, or glance at, Claude Shannon (1951) "Prediction and Entropy of Printed English", *Bell System Technical Journal*; J.R. Pierce (1961) *Symbols, Signals and Noise*, ch. 3. Both works cited in Fred Dretske (1981) *Knowledge and the Flow of Information*, 242n13.) In having to ask, "Which of these three is it?", the informational quantity is three "bits". So much for the quantitative notion of "reducing uncertainty". What we mean by information, by contrast, is a phenomenological notion of it. Unless I am already "interested", unless I already WANT TO KNOW your telling me about something, what you have to tell me, however true it is, is NOT informative. In other words: Information—informativeness is the preferred term—is correlated to questioning. The idea of correlating a theory of questions with a theory of information is not new. For example, at the end of his article, "Questions", Hamblin (1958) suggests that some such connection ought to be made. For what saying this is worth, I reached the idea independently.

6. I borrow the term "Innesein" from the Munich phenomenologist, Johannes Daubert. For Daubert, it means that mode of consciousness in which reality is disclosed. I quote Schuhmann and Smith's excellent article, "Against Idealism: Johannes Daubert vs. Husserl's *Ideas I*". According to Daubert

> The "immediate access" to reality granted by Innesein gives "immediate evidence" of the world (11v) and produces "immediate certainty" (1r). It contains "an absolutely certain awareness" not only of my own real existence (121v) but also of "externally perceived reality in its being (its reality)" (1r). [1985, 784]

I shall be saying more about Daubert as I go along.

7. According to Collingwood, it is a mistaken view that the sciences can be constructed by arguing from the mere observation of things. Against his "realist" contemporaries—G.E. Moore, Ernst Mach, Bertrand Russell, and others—he contends that the mere staring at a

thing cannot reveal what is already there. What is required to apprehend the phenomenon is a questioning activity. "The kind of science which Bacon describes and all 'modern scientists' have practised," Collingwood notes, "is the kind of science in which the first stage is to ask a question and the second stage is to get it answered" (1940, 278). Doubtless, this is hardly a contentious thing to say. Who, nowadays, would want to be caught denying that asking questions is crucial when it comes to thinking well? If this is the only thing that Collingwood has to say about Qs--his logic of inquiry--it does not amount to very much. In fact, if one compares it with some of the things which have been written about the logic of interrogation since, Collingwood's "logic" looks at least fifty years old.

9. Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith explain: "Daubert's near-total eclipse is no accident. Although we have no hesitation calling him, and not Husserl, the true architect of the phenomenological movement, it nonetheless remains true that he 'never published a line'" (1985, 763). Husserl, who held Daubert in the highest esteem since they first met in 1902, put the latter's unwillingness to publish down to being too self-critical. Making his work even less accessible to the philosophical public, Daubert wrote his manuscripts, dating from 1902 to 1914 and 1930 to 1931 in a nearly undecipherable shorthand (Schuhmann, 1991, 196). It was Schuhmann who finally cracked the code in the 1970s. The manuscript, carrying the sigil Daubertiana AI2, and bearing the title "Frage", was transcribed into German in 1981, under Schuhmann's supervision, by Reinhold Smid.

10. Daubert's criticism of Husserl's theory of non-stating expressions goes at least as far back as 1904, in a correspondence with a certain Dr. Fritz Weinmann (Daubertiana AI 5/83). The question concerning nonstating expressions comes up yet again in 1906 (AI 5/153). (See Smid [1985, 282-283]. Also Schuhmann [1996, 19, concerning 5/83]: "Brief an Dr. Weinmann über seine Frage betreffend Husserl, VI, Kap. 9 über Frageakte und objektivierende Akte". Also Schuhmann [1996, 37, concerning 5/153]: "Die Gespräche mit Husserl während meines Besuches: . . . Einfühlungsfrage; über . . . Wunsch- und Fragesätze usw., objektivierende Akte und Sachverhalt; . . . " (i.e., during his visit he discussed with Husserl such topics as the question of empathy, wishing and question sentences, the

objectifying act and the state of affairs). I cannot say to what extent Daubert's disagreement with the "Husserl VI, Kap. 9" of the *Logical Investigations* led him to the decision to attempt to do a phenomenology of questions sometime in 1911. But certainly the disagreement was instrumental; and certainly also, the Husserl text in particular provides the backdrop for the work. (See also Barry Smith, on the AI 5/83 text [1988]). Of course, this is not to say that Daubert disagreed with the *Logical Investigations* as a whole. Far from it; Daubert played a major role in propagating the newly published *Logical Investigations*—the founding book of the Phenomenological Movement as it is known today (see Schuhmann 1989, 53; Mitscherling 1997, 13).

11. Still another reason: I judge myself as still lacking sufficient familiarity with Daubert, whose ideas I came across rather late in the writings of the present work. My reading of Daubert is at this stage still too dependent on the secondary literature and the good authority of Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith. The primarily literature on Daubert is, currently, pretty well only the secondary literature. Only a few of the original texts have been published (in Kevin Mulligan (1987), ed., *Speech Act and Sachverhalt*; in Schuhmann (1985, 7-8); and in Smith [1988, 132-34]). The original texts are currently available in the Bavarian State Library and at the Centre for Advanced Research in Phenomenology at Wilfrid Laurier University, in Waterloo (Ontario). Karl Schuhmann, with whom I have corresponded, was kind enough to have sent some of the Daubert texts my way (in the fall of 1996). I also express gratitude to Dr. José Huertas-Jourda, who provided me access to the Daubert archives that were until quite recently maintained at Wilfrid Laurier University.

12. I stress "published". It remains to be seen what Husserl has to say in the documents that have yet to be transcribed. Among them, in the Husserl Archives in Louvain, are the MSS on "*Frage- und Wunschverhalt*" (As noted by Barry Smith, "Toward a History of Speech Act Theory" [1985, 148n18].)

Chapter 2:

Towards a Definition of a Question

Introduction

A. A Q is a Special Case of a Request

B. Answers have to be Statements

C. A Q is a Wishing

D. Questioning is a Desiring

      1. The Two Orders of Desire

      2. On How Lucid is a Questioning Desire

E. A Q is an Asking

F. A Q has to be Asked

G. A Q has to be in Words

H. Questioning and Doubting (Husserl's "Theory A")

      1. Doubting with Yes-No Qs, Not with Words Qs

      2. The Doubting- and the Question-Targets are Identical

      3. First-Order and Second-Order Doubt

      4. Passive Doubt, Active Question

      5. Doubting and Its Cousins--Suspicion, Wonder, Et Al.

      6. Questioning and "Being Questioned"

I. Conclusion

Notes to Chapter 2

Introduction

In this chapter, I examine some of the key ways that the questioning act has come to be interpreted by philosophers.[1] Some of these interpretations have been put forward as definitions of a questioning act; and some of them are have been intended as only partial

descriptions of it. But in any case, no one of these accounts, I shall argue, quite hits

the mark. The aim of the present chapter is twofold: It is to show how this or that account

goes wrong and how to improve upon it. ("'A Q is a request'? Not true; however. . . .";

"'A Q is a doubting'? Not true; however . . ."; and so forth.) I shall be examining only a

few of the accounts, just enough to allow us to mark off this one act from other acts with

which it is easily confounded.[2] This brings us to the second aim: Once the ground is

cleared, I shall be able to put forward a definition that works better (for our purposes,

anyway) than the ones already available to us. I shall end up defining a Q as follows: A Q

is a multi-directed act, the aim of which is to reduce this "multiplicity" of its directedness.

The chapter reads somewhat like a "syllabus of errors", in which these different

accounts are critically examined one by one, in this order: (A) A Q is a request. (B)

Answers take the form of statements. (C) A Q is a wishing. (D) A Q is a desire. (E) A Q

is an asking. (F) A Q has to be asked. (G) A Q has to be in words. (H) A Q is a doubting.

This part of the chapter represents Husserl's official entry into the overall argument. And

for purposes of our trying to define a Q, it also represents the turning point of the chapter.

Agreed, questioning is not the same as doubting. However, when we look at why these

two forms of experience are so easily identified with each other, we hit upon the

definition we are looking for. It is to an examination of these eight accounts that I now

turn.

A. A Q ia a Special Case of a Request

Perhaps the most common interpretation of a Q nowadays is the one according to which a Q is a request of some sort.[3] This definition has two drawbacks. The first is that it is limited to covering only those Qs asked in conversational interchange. After all, a request is a social act, and anything described as a "case of requesting" would have to be, by extension, social as well--as, for example, when I ask you, visible to me; or ask the anonymous addressee ("Who goes there?"); or ask the person who might not be there ("Is anyone there?"); or ask the gnome in the garden; or ask God who lives inside me; etc. Of course, *some* Qs are "public". It may even be that a Q is truly in its element when it goes public. But the fact remains that not every Q is inherently public.[4] Unless a Q is actually addressed to someone else, that Q doesn't work like a "request", in the ordinary sense of that word. Under ordinary circumstances anyway, I no more "request" myself to answer the Q that I ask myself than I "request" myself to get up and close the door.

There is a second drawback to this definition, and it is the more serious one. Even those Qs which do go public ought not be called "requests". Agreed, there is a *pragmatic* similarity between the communicated Q and the standard request. Both of them may be counted as attempts to get the other person to do something. But whatever they share in common "pragmatically", the two kinds of act are "metaphysically" in different lines of business altogether. The "direction of fit" of a request is "thing-to-thought". The primary aim of a request is to "modify" something in the world. The aim of a Q, public or private, moves in the opposite direction. Its primary direction of fit is thought-to-thing.

What's wrong with saying that a Q is a Q is a "special case of requesting" (Searle, 1969, 69)? Nothing at all, if it is just the pragmatic force that is being singled out. Still, the description does more to misguide than elucidate.[5] It amounts to saying that *the act of answering* is something rather like, say, the delivering a piece of mail. In asking you a Q, for example, "What's the time?", I am putting in a *request* for information. You comply, and send me the appropriate "file" or "box", i.e., the answer in which there happens to be contained the statement, for example, "Twelve o'clock". Looking at this another way: When I ask, "Please, answer the phone", I issue a "telephone-request". When I ask, "Please, close the window", I issue a "window-request" . . . . But when I ask. "What time is it?", I issue an "information-request". And when I ask. "Could you please get me that file which contains the information, I also issue an information-request. Now for some mysterious reason, our dictionaries lack such entries as "telephone-request", "window-request". "door-request", "dig-that-hole-request", etc. But it does happen to include, thanks to some weird, historical accident, a special word for "information-request", and this is what everybody calls a "question". Call this the "answer-is-a-box" theory.

When it comes to determining the direction of fit of a type of act, the important thing to ask is: What is its *primary* direction of fit? What is the thing that primarily "fulfils" this given act? A promise is fulfilled when the world matches up to the requirements of the word. The same goes for requests, invitations, and many other acts. When it comes to a Q, on the other hand, the act is *primarily* fulfilled when the words

match up to the world. A Q belongs, if anywhere, in the company of statements, descriptions, and those other utterances which work in the "department of truth".[6]

But the plot thickens; primarily and essentially, a Q "looks both ways" in its direction of fit. Never mind the "pragmatic" and secondary sense in which a Q may be thing-to-thought. At the *primary* level, a Q, any Q at all, is thing-to-thought as well as thought-to-thing. Consider, for example, the Q, "Where is my book?" The Q calls for a thought-to-thing reply. But, what's more, it sets down a thing-to-thought directive or "plan"--not the pragmatic plan of "getting someone else to answer", but the "semantic" plan, which is to secure, in this case, a where-is-the-book answer. Any other kind of answer, a who-answer, a why-answer, a what-colour-is-the-book answer, etc., would miss the mark. A Q, then, calls not just for any old "true reply". It calls for a reply which is, in addition to being true, also in some sense "appropriate", or "right", or in compliance with the kind of answer that the given Q is calling for. "Primarily" then, a Q has a double direction of fit: It has an "obligatory" thing-to-thought plan, which is to reach a thought-to-thing report. It requires an answer that is both "right" and "true".[7]

B. Answers have to be Statements

To the contrary, not all answers take the form of a statement. Nor do all of them even have to take the form of any one of those acts that might be thought to be closely related to the stating act (e.g., reporting, testifying, revealing, announcing, notifying, classifying, identifying). Consider, for instance, the Q, "Which one of the doors should I close?", or "Should I close the door, yes or no?" This Q calls for a request, not for a statement, or for

any one of the close allies of a statement. More to the point, the given Q doesn't

call for an answer which is supposed to be "about" a request. (For in that case the answer

might be better described as a "statement".) Rather, the Q calls for a "request-answers".

In my saying, "Close the door", or "Yes, close the door", it is not as if I am doing two

things separately--answering your Q and then, switching intentional gears, requesting that

you to do it. Nor does my utterance sound to me, or you, as if I am doing these two things

separately. Thus the reason for hyphenating the expression "request-answer"; it is in order

to indicate that the "acts" of answering and requesting are integrated moments of one and

the same act.

(A parenthetical note on "hyphenation" of *Qs* with other acts--parenthetical

because the present discussion is mainly about the "hyphenation" of *answers*. To be sure,

a Q can *also* "hyphenate", not least with that very family of acts with which it is easily

confounded: requests, invitations, or any other sort of utterance that "asks" something of

the hearer. A invites B over. But genuinely wanting to know B's answer to this--inviting

B is not a mere formality here--A also *questions* B at the same time. Thus, the utterance is

a fusion of two act-moments: an invitation and a question. This, it seems to me, suggests

an explanation for why invitations, requests, and other "asking utterances" can be so

readily phrased in the interrogative form. The reason has to do with the fact that,

whatever else these utterances are up to, they can *also* be [or *have to be* also?], asking Qs.

Perhaps this also explains why one cannot "naturally" phrase a command in the

interrogative. If one phrases it so, the utterance is liable to come across in a mocking tone.

["Soldier boy, do you think you can do fifty push-ups?"] Or if it sounds sincere, it might

comes across as if the person who is "supposed to" be doing the commanding were *uncertain* about whether the other person will comply. Coming across in this way, the "command" has the illocutionary force that feels more like a request. After all, to command, or order, or boss about is to "tell"; but to request is to "ask". [In fact, it might be that nested in this *de facto* request, or any request, is the trace of a question, i.e., "Will you do it?"] Summing up: A Q is not to be reduced to a request. But nor is a request, or any of its thing-to-thought cousins, to be reduced to a Q, even though they all "ask". True, a fused utterance, e.g., a request-question, might be more a request than a question, or the other way about. But this doesn't mean that the Q-moment is more like a request, or the request-moment more like a Q. My point is that Qs, just like answers, do not have to be found in their pure form. Let us resume our discussion about the "hyphenated *answer*" and about their telling the truth.)

There is nothing particularly new in my pointing out that an answer doesn't have to be a statement. "Commands, requests, advice, recipes, suggestions, imprecations, or any other of the various kinds of imperatives," as philosophers have already pointed out, "may also be given in answer to questions" (Hamblin; 1967, 50). But (maybe this is new), I propose that we don't stop with a small list of imperatives, but go all the way, adding the entries: warning-answers, guarantee-answers, promise-answers, thanking-answers, vow-answers, declaration-answers, . . . and, yes, even question-answers (e.g., "If you must know, my question is, 'Where is my book?'"). Any kind of "illocutionary" act can be given in answer to a Q.

But let us be careful here. We are saying that request, promises, warnings, and the like, may constitute instances of answers, every bit as much as statements. But then how are we to reconcile this broad conception of answerhood with our other view-- namely, that a Q seeks for its fulfilment a thought-to-thing answer? After all, isn't a request, to take only one example of a non-stating act, basically thing-to-thought? So wouldn't a request-answer also be thing-to-thought? And if so, doesn't this expose a contradiction in our previous assertion that a Q's direction of fit has to be thought-to-thing? There is no contradiction here. I shall relegate the details of my argument to the endnotes. My *claim* is this: A request *qua* answer is, indeed, thought-to-thing. Or to use a more generic term: A *reply* to, "Which door should I close?" has, or might have, not one but two "act-moments". The reply is, *qua* thing-to-thought, a request; and the same reply is, *qua* thought-to-thing, an answer.

The true/false dimension of assessment applies not only to the stating act. Even advising, requesting, promising, confessing, and the like, are "answerable" to telling the truth. (Whether they are issued just "by themselves" or as answers to Qs that antedated them, this would seem to be besides the point.) Admittedly, the job of "telling the truth" is more *conspicuous* in the stating act. But this is probably because a stating act has this one outstanding peculiarity--telling the truth (or failing to) is about the only right thing (or wrong thing) it can do. To sum up: An answer doesn't have to be "pure". Or a safer way to put it: A *reply* doesn't have to be pure. If there is a Q behind it, the reply has to be an answer. And even if it is doing other things besides answering, one of its "moments" is still an answer. This reply, *qua* answer, is thought-to-thing in its direction of fit.

I shall try to clarify our position by contrasting it with Aristotle's view that truth is the preserve of the statement. At the same time, I can show what bearing our position has on problem basic to the philosophical tradition.

The problem of truth--What is it? What can be truly said?--has been near the centre of philosophy right from the start. It was only a matter of course, then, that philosophers early on came to attach priority to the statement. The policy of a statement is, after all, to state a fact or describe a state of affairs, which it has to do "truly" or "falsely". Yet the moment philosophy endowed the statement with special significance, it took on a dismissive attitude toward non-stating sentences. The remark that Aristotle makes early on in his *De Interpretatione* was to remain representative of this view for a long time to come. "There is not truth or falsity in all sentences," he concedes; "a prayer is a sentence but is neither true nor false". A mere concession, because to this he immediately adds: "The present investigation deals with the statement-making sentence; the others we can dismiss, since consideration of them belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or poetry" (*De Int.*, 17a3-5). Now, from the perspective of our "phenomenology of questions", what position should we take concerning the traditional view that has accorded primacy to the statement?

The temptation might be to say something "daring": "Well, promises, guarantees, warnings, . . . and questions, too, are equally important for the needs of civilized living, and philosophy shouldn't be so dismissive towards them. Statement are not quite as their cracked up to be!" Or: "Since all these things are so important, then 'the study of rhetoric

or poetry', to which they have been relegated, is 'where it is at'. Down with pretensions to 'truth'. Long live rhetoric!'". I suggest that this would be the more sensible line to take:

"It may be that prayers, requests, guarantees, and warnings belong to the study of rhetoric or poetry. But you just can't relegate *questions* in the same way. They belong, with statements, in the 'serious business' of philosophy. There is no 'truth or falsity' in Q-sentences. But Qs still looks for the truth. What's more, they have a noticeable way of hanging around in the company statements. We have to do explanatory justice to this fact that you seem to pass over". We might even say that our analysis of the Q-act points in the direction of *explaining* Aristotle's devotion, and ours, to the stating act. Perhaps, after all, the statement is nothing other than the 'purest' of answers. And then we might add to all this: "Maybe praying, promising, warning, and other non-stating utterances cannot be wholly relegated to the study of rhetoric or poetry either. After all, it is not just the statement that can be made in answer to a Q. Any and every type of utterance besides can also be construed as an answer to a Q. This means, going by *our* account: To the extent that a non-stating utterance can be so construed, it would have to have 'truth' in it".[8]

C. A Q is a Wishing

The logician Bernhard Bolzano defines a Q as an "assertion" about "our desire, in fact, to be informed".[9] Husserl says almost the same thing, defining a Q as a "definite wishing [*bestimmt Wunsch*]", and still in another place as a "striving". A "wish" is a "definite", or articulate desire, or "intentional" desire, clear as to its target. The same is true of a Q; so

far as it is admissible to talk about it in terms of a desiring, it is an intentional, as opposed to a "dark", desire. This, I take it, is the argument for linking up questioning and wishing. I disagree with it. Admittedly, wishing and questioning have both to do with desiring. And for argument's sake, they are both articulate. ("For argument's sake". Not every Q, it turns out, is clear as to its target. More on this below.) But there is a qualitative difference between the two. A wish, unlike a Q, is not so much an articulate desire as an articulation *about* a desire. A wish, e.g., "Oh I wish I knew all that!" or "I wish I had all that!" is typically idle--it doesn't really do anything--in that its job is more a matter of reporting a desire "at a remove".[10]

To push the argument a step further: Whereas there exist indirect Qs ("I ask whether x is y", instead of "Is x y?"), there exist no indirect wishes.[11] Indirect wishes do not exist because they are already as indirect as desire can get. (There is the desiring of X. The desire "goes through" the act of my reaching out for X. There is, in talking about it, an indirect desire--a report about that desire--and this we call a "wish", e.g., "I wish I could have that "desirable X". Since a wish is already an indirect desire, expressing the indirect wish would be to make a report about a report of one's desire! Accordingly, we may coordinate questioning, as well as, say, the desire to close the door, with "lucid desiring", which "runs through" and animates these acts. And we may coordinate "indirect questioning", as well as wishing (e.g., talk about questioning; talk about wanting to close the door) with "indirect desiring", which is less a desiring than a report about it at a remove.[12]

D. A Questioning is a Desiring

I shall now examine the very different idea according to which a Q, not a wish, but a kind

of *desiring*. Alexius Meinong seems to have held some such view.[13] Heidegger also

connects questioning with desiring. Almost certainly alluding to Cicero's formulation.

"*Qaestio est appetitio cognitionis*", he describes a Q as a "cognizant seeking". And R.G.

Collingwood, in a telling metaphor, says that the "ranging of the mind in search of its

prey is called asking questions". Indeed, this view that a Q is a desiring is reflected also in

our everyday speech. When we "question", we "ask" for an answer. Whatever else

"asking" means, it includes the idea of a seeking after something. It seems to be the

consensus, then, that a Q is a desiring thing. What should we say about this view?

Although it isn't all that informative as it stands, it is worth talking about. I shall have

two things to say about it: (1) Contrary to Daubert's view. desiring does seem to be an

essential part of a Q. (2) A questioning desire need not be "clear as to its target" after all.

1. The Two Orders of Desire

Daubert's first argument takes as its starting point the acceptance of the Brentanian

doctrine of the "phenomena of interest". According to this doctrine, our "interests"

characteristically admit of opposites--"an opposition between love and hate. . . . between

inclination and disinclination, between being pleased and being displeased" (Brentano

[1969,§21,17]). Now, what Daubert attempts to show is that questioning belongs to a

domain entirely different from the "interests" that go with striving, desiring, and the like.

(Daubert [AI2, 1r; 14r; 30v]; Schuhmann and Smith [1987, 362-63]). The act of a Q,

according to Daubert, has no qualitative counterpart (*qualitativen Gegenstücke*).

One can hope or fear the prospective answer, be afraid of, or not afraid of, it, and so forth;

but none of this enters into the question itself. What about this argument?

Daubert may be right in saying that a Q does not admit of qualitative opposites.

But he is mistaken in thinking that for this reason it cannot be a desiring act. When

Brentano speaks of the phenomena of interest, he means "not an opposition of objects",

but "rather, an opposition between references to an *object*" (1973 [chap.7, §9, 223]; my

italics). For Brentano the "phenomena of interest" admit, so to speak, of 1 and +1. One

loves this, one hates that. On the other hand, the phenomena of *act*-desire--and this is

very different--admit of 0 and 1, "empty" and "fulfilled". The questioning act can hate its

object, or love it, or be indifferent to it. But the act itself still stands in a desiring relation

to its own future and actualization. It can love or hate its object, but still desires, or

"loves", to know about its object. (Indeed, the more the Q hates it, or loves it, the more

the "emotional investment" it puts into the object, maybe the more the Q would desire to

know something about it.)

2. On How Lucid is a Questioning Desire

One might be willing to concede that a Q does involve a desiring, but with this

qualification: The desiring of a Q has to be "lucid" as opposed to "dark", and this is

because a Q is clear as to its target. But is this true? Does it have to be lucid? What is the

difference between these two desires? And then how does the difference bear on the

subject of Qs? Let us briefly go over this difficult matters. In the following text, which is

not about questions *per se*, Husserl tries to capture something about the difference

between what we are calling lucid and dark desires:

. . . desiring does not always seem to require conscious reference to what is desired, that we are often moved by obscure drives or pressures towards unrepresented goals, and if one points especially to the wide sphere of natural instinct, where goal-consciousness is at least absent at the start, one may say: This is a case of mere sensations . . . i.e. of experiences really lacking intentional reference, and so also remote in kind from the essential character of intentional desire. [*LI* V, §15b, 575]

Now, so far as questioning involves "desire" (not that Husserl says anything about this), this desiring would have to be articulate rather than dark. And this is because a Q is always specific as to its target. So the argument might conceivably go. In fact, Husserl almost seems to say as much when, a little later, he calls a question a "definite" [*gewissen*] wish" (*LI* V, §29, 616). By this I take him to mean:

Here we are dealing with intentional experiences, but with such as are characterized by indeterminateness of objective direction, an "indeterminateness" which does not amount to privation, but which stands for a descriptive character of one's presentation. The idea that when "something" stirs, when there is a rustling, a ring at the door, etc., an idea had before we give it verbal expression, has indeterminateness of direction, and this indeterminateness is of the intention's essence, it is determined as presenting an indeterminate "something". [*LI* V, §15b, 575]

These so-called indeterminate acts are what we are calling "dark". On our view, to the extent that such indeterminate experiences *do* amount to "privation"--to the extent that

they *are* "desirings"--they are questioning intentions. "Something stirs"--What stirs? "Someone's at the door?"--Who's at the door? "The box is some colour"--What colour?

My point is: So far as desiring is involved in a Q, it is, in some cases, "lucid". In these cases, the Q is clear as to its target. Sure, the Q is "in the dark" in that it does not yet know what is on the other side of the target; but the Q, and the very desiring that animates it, is, although "in the dark", still "definite" so far as the Q itself is *formulated*. However, it is not always the case that Qs are clear as to their targets. Indeed, what makes a hermeneutical Q "hermeneutical" is that it seeks the formulation of the very Q which is to be asked. (Or for that matter, it seeks the formulation of the right thing to say, etc.) In the case of hermeneutical questioning, as opposed to its "predicative" counterpart, the Q has to grope about for words that, should they arrive, will *as a consequence* clarify the target. So far as we may talk about desiring as involved in the *hermeneutical* Q, this desiring is even "darker" still.

E. Q is an Asking

Nobody actually says this, but everybody seems to assume it. I include a discussion of this everyday definition in our "syllabus of errors", partly because I shall have to state at some point how I mean to use, loosely, the term "ask". And I include it partly because an examination of it will bring to light what ought to be taken note of early on in the present study. The act of a Q has a "career", which is not to say that it is always a happy one. The

act passes through different phases--a beginning, a middle, and an end. The beginning phase is what I call "asking". Let us go over this methodically.

In the ordinary usage of that verb, one can "ask" in the form of a Q or an imperative. One can "ask oneself" or "ask another". One can ask publicly or solitarily. But in any one of these cases, "asking" comes to the same as "seeking to obtain something". More, asking is a seeking by way of words or gestures. When using the word *ask*, I shall be referring to a formulated seeking. And I shall be referring, usually, to the act of *specifying in words* what is in Q. To "ask a question" involves bringing that act into words. To ask a Q is to have formulated it. What, then, about the relation between asking and questioning?

"Asking" is not one and the same as questioning. Asking is, rather, something more like the beginning phase of a Q. (Never mind here that there is also *thing-to-thought* asking, such as requesting, inviting, etc.) In addition to a beginning, a Q also has a middle and an end--in addition to an asking phase, also an *askwering phase* and an *answering phase*. In the middle phase, the Q, which is still somehow being asked, works toward its answer. Whence, of course, our hybrid name for this middle phase: "askwering". (But in fact, we already have words for this at our disposal, e.g., "calculate", "appraise", "assess", "figure", "reckon", "puzzle out", "unravel", "disentangle", "decipher".) In the end phase, assuming that the Q even reaches that stage, the question-*act* is "answered". The act *turns into* an answer. The question-*act*, then, has three phases, the first two of which mark it out as a *question*-act: *asking, askwering,* and *answering.*[14]

Moreover, answering is not (or needn't be) a numerically separate act. It is best to think of it as, rather, a "phase". I may do the asking, and you do the answering; but your answer becomes "my" answer, the fulfilling phase of my Q-act, and my question becomes "your" Q, the lead-up to your answer. What we find in conversation is often a division of labour between questioner and answerer. But a "division of labour" implies that there is one and the same job to do. So, then, when I ask you a Q, there is, as pointed out already, one Q-meaning, two Q-acts. We share the same Q (*qua* its logical formation); but we each ask it alone (*qua* the act itself).

F. A Q has to be Asked

In order to counter a misunderstanding, I emphasize that our threefold distinction does not always correspond to how real Qs actually work. Not every Q has to have a definite beginning, middle, and end. Some Qs don't end happily ever after either. What's more, some Qs can actually get around the job of even having to do any asking and go straight to the job of answering. Without having to waste words, "What is the time?", one simply looks at the time on the watch. One is so accustomed to having ask*ed* the Q a thousand times before that the need to put it into words all but drops out. If you like, "asking" is replaced by a "know-how asking".

To take another example, consider how the questioning activity works in your trying to follow a lecturer (or trying to read a text). Knowing too well what follows, you can't ask, because you already know. Knowing absolutely nothing about it, you can't ask either, but this time because you don't know what to ask. It is in the fuzzy territory of

knowing neither too much, nor too little, that following it becomes informative. It is in this middle zone that questioning and answering take place. Moreover (getting to my the point), the structure of the experience of following a lecture, or reading a text, is such as to allow for *degrees* of questioning and answering. The utterance doesn't have to have to intonation of a Q to become a Q for the hearer. Nor does the given sentence have to end with a question mark in order that the reading of it points me to a "questioned target". It is in the very hearing of the utterance, or the reading of the sentence, that one can be effectively engaged *more or less* in a questioning act, and *more or less* in an answering act. "More or less", "matter of degree", "quasi-questioning", and "quasi-answering", are the operative expressions here.

In *asking* a Q, one freezes the movement between the intentional act and the intended target. But consider how the target is presented in the *flow* of a lecture, or the *flow* of a reading. The lecturer holds up this "object"--it's called, say, "medieval history"--and slowly turns the object around in such a way that different aspects of it are revealed. Flowingly, the present message is at once a quasi-answering (answering the prior quasi-Q), and a quasi-Q (anticipating the next message). However, this flux might suddenly freeze up, for one of any number of reasons. For example, the lecturer might just stop, deliberately delaying the answering. And this would give just enough time for the questioning, *already operative*, to cross the *asking threshold* and formulate itself into words. But whatever it is that stops this "flowing", the movement of the disclosing of the object comes to a sudden standstill, at which point an *asked* Q suddenly arises, "Well, what's on the other side?"; "Well, what did happen?"; or, "And . . . ?!"

G. A Q has to be in Words

Not only can there be a questioning apart from asking. Evidently, there can also be questioning apart from words altogether. With little or no ceremony of words, we pick up all sorts of information simply by way of touching, seeing, hearing and the like. The activity is still a *questioning* for all that, even when it does not always cross the "asking threshold". What seems to fill in for the job of "asking" in this case is *my moving around it* or *moving it around me*. I "quasi-question", say, the vase on the table, by looking at it, turning it around, walking around it. I see how it reflects, first things close up, then further away; feel how much it weighs, by lifting it, then letting it down; determine its colour, under a dim light, then bright, then next to the red drapes; feel its surface, moving my finger this way, then that, hear the sound it makes when I tap it, first a soft tap, then a hard tap. These different *experiments*, or "strategies of seeing", represent so many different Qs seeking different answers, e.g., Is it a solid? Made of what material? Is its density continuous throughout?[15]

In the present work, I have steered clear from examining "unlinguistic" questioning; the model Q in this work is linguistic. To this extent, by the way, the later discussion on the "object in question" is somewhat rigged and specialized; it is about the "object in question" of a linguistic Q. In any event, I rather doubt, or would to like to think, that saying more about the specifics of the unlinguistic Q would matter all that much in the end for purposes of this analysis. All that we would have to do, I suspect, is make the necessary accommodations. "This is how a "predicative" Q works; a "hermeneutical" Q works; predicative truth works . . . ; transposing our findings to the

'quasi' region, this is how a predicative quasi-Q works, a hermeneutical quasi-Q works; and so forth.

H. Questioning and Doubting (Husserl's "Theory A")

The idea of defining a Q in terms of doubting goes as far back as Boethius, according to whom, "A question is a proposition in doubt". I shall argue that, contrary to this traditional interpretation, the two are not the same. (That's the easy part. Obviously, they are different. What is less obvious is how this definition ever came to prevail.) Next, in the attempt to do justice to our intuition that the two acts are closely related, I shall determine what is the structural similarity that holds between these two admittedly different acts. And then, having identified their similarity--both acts are "multi-directional"--I shall try to determine what, precisely, it is that differentiates these two obviously different acts. In so doing, we shall have arrived at a definition.

I pointed out in the opening chapter that there are, arguably, four theories of a Q that may be culled from Husserl's writings--theories "A", "B", and "C". The present discussion takes as its starting-point Husserl's *theory A*. According to this theory, a Q is all but identified with doubting. I shall begin with a statement of Husserl's articulation of this traditional account, and then, without staying too close to the text, go from there. The following passage is taken from the beginning of a section in his *Experience and Judgement*, in which the author spends the first paragraph or two on explaining the relation between questioning and doubting.

The phenomenon of *questioning* . . . is found in close association with doubt. Like doubt, it is originally motivated by events in the passive sphere. In this sphere a disjunctive fluctuation of apprehensions corresponds to the intuitions which are split in an intentional conflict; in the unity of the conflict, A, B, and C are present to consciousness as united in their reciprocal opposition. We cannot express this otherwise than by the words: for consciousness there is whether A, or B, or C *is*, and we find this precisely in the expression of the question and the doubt as acts . . . .We say, for example, I question, I doubt, whether A *is*. Therefore, what precedes the questioning, as, similarly, what precedes [active] doubting in the passive sphere. is a unified field of problematic possibilities . . . .

The passive, disjunctive tension of the problematic possibilities (doubt in the passive sense), to begin with motivates an active doubting, a mode of behaviour which puts the ego into an act-cleavage. This cleavage brings with it . . . an original impulse to get out of this condition . . . .Thus arises the striving for a firm [judicative] decision . . . .Taken in a completely general sense, *questioning* is *the striving, . . . to come to a firm judicative decision.* [*EJ*, §78, 307-08]

I shall now comment on this. The comments proceed in the following six steps: (1) Doubting and questioning are not the same after all. All well and good. (2) But it still remains to be explained why is it that these two forms of experience are so easily identified with each other, even though it is "obvious" that they are not the same. The reason is that they are both of them multi-directional. Whether in *asking* or *doubting*, the act deals with a plurality of competing possibilities. ("Is it A or B?"; "Maybe it is A instead, in which case it is doubtful that it is B".) Now that we know what these two acts have in common, our next question is: How are they in fact different from each other? (3)

Before answering this, I shall first have to distinguish between first-order and second-order doubting. (4) After that, I shall go on to explain that *part* of the difference between the doubting and questioning lies in this: Doubting is "passive" and questioning is "active". (5) The next move consists in seeing whether there is anything else that is multi-directional, and so it turns out that there is--for example, surprise, wondering, and suspicion, supposition, Our problem, then, turns out to be bigger than we had thought; it is about the difference not just between questioning and *doubting*, but also between questioning and the many multi-directional cousins of doubting. By the time we get to the end of the section, we shall have arrived at the definition: *A Q is a multi-directional act, the aim of which is to reduce this multiplicity.* (6) In the final section, I take up the problem about what to do with very fair objection that, our claim to the contrary, certain of our Qs seem to be passive.

1. Doubting with Yes-No Qs, Not with Word Qs

The idea of defining a Q in terms of doubting goes as far back as antiquity. In his *De topicis differentiis*, Boethius writes: "a proposition is an expression signifying what is true or false, either simply stated or for the sake of proving something else; a question. on the other hand, though it is an expression, is a proposition in doubt." [*De top. diff.* 1176d34-38] Of course, it is true that doubting does accompany certain of our Qs. But clearly this is not always the case and, it may be suspected, it is not even usually the case.[16] What best exposes the limitation of this traditional definition is the **word Q**. These are Qs which, unlike *yes-no Qs*, work with an interrogative word--"who", "what",

"where", "how", etc. Typically, word Qs do not carry doubt and for good reason. In asking, for example, "Where is x?", it is simply too early to doubt. The materials for potential doubting are not in yet. Only once they are in--the answer is, "It is upstairs"--can one then go on to enter into a doubting question, if one so chooses: "But is x *really* upstairs, as you say it is--yes or no?" (I stress the word "typically". To be sure, it is possible that there might be doubt in my asking, "Where is X?" But in that case, surely, the "grammar" of the Q does not quite reflect--and this is what counts here--the underlying *logic* or *meaning* of that Q. For if I am doubting, then what I am logically asking is, "Is x really upstairs?", even though grammatically I ask it in another way, "Where is x?", It is as if I were trying to conceal my doubt; as if I were not quite aware of my doubting, and then ask it in an undoubtful way; etc.)

The definition that a Q is a "proposition in doubt" does not work when it comes to word Qs. The sort of Q that more readily fits the description of a "proposition in doubt" is yes-no Q (or a Q to which a "yes" or a "no" would count as an appropriate answer). But even restricting the definition to the yes-no Q, there is still a problem. Not all yes-no Qs, maybe not even the majority of them, have doubting in them. In asking the yes-no Q, "Is it *lightning*?" one doesn't have to be doubting anything; more likely, one is asking for a specification of a state of affairs, "Well, is it lightning--or is that fire?" Or in asking, "*Is* it lightning?", one doesn't have to doubt anything either; one might be asking, rather, "Well, is it, or was it--?" Doubting works, rather, something more like this: "They say it is lightning. I myself thought it was lightning. But *IS it the case that* it is lightning?" Or, "They say it was lightning. But *IS it the case that* it **was** lightning?"

If it is so "obvious" that these two forms of experience are not the same, then how is it that they are so easily identified with each other?

2. The Doubting- and the Question-Targets are Identical

Husserl points out (in the above quote) that the expressions "I question whether" and "I doubt whether" ordinary mean the same (*EJ*, 307). This is true enough; but this is not to say that questioning and doubting are themselves the same. What makes the *expressions* the same, I suggest, has to do with the fact that, as Husserl himself recognizes, the *intended targets* of questioning and doubting are structurally one and the same. Both questioning and doubting aim at the same "whether A, or B, or C" or "whether A or not-A". Moreover, the expressions themselves are not, respectively, the expressions of a questioning and a doubting. Saying "I question whether--" comes across as less a Q and more a "second-order" *description* of the "field of problematic possibilities". Nor is the expression, "I doubt whether--", quite a doubting act either. It is, just like its counterpart, "I question whether", more like a second-order doubting, a *description* of the same thing, namely, a field of problematic possibilities. It is no wonder that doubting is sometimes thought to be the same as questioning. It is no wonder that doubting is sometimes thought to be the same as questioning. However they happen to be different, their targets are structurally identical. (This is our view, and Husserl's. This is not to say that we are in agreement with Husserl as to what this target is "made of". But more on this in the next chapter.)

We see how questioning and doubting are structurally so alike. Our next question is about how these two "multi-directional" acts actually differ from each other. In order to answer this, we shall have to distinguish between "first-order" and "second-order" doubt. The distinction is not that novel, but for purposes of the discussion, it is crucial.[17] It turns out that the sort of doubting that is, structurally, so "question-like" is *first-order* doubting. This is the reason for our having to draw the following distinction.

3. First-Order and Second-Order Doubt

An instance of second-order doubt would be my entertaining the idea that, say, my two hands in front of me might not actually be there. Or it would be my pointing out, with Descartes, that anything and everything is logically doubtable. Or it would be my refusing to countenance the existence of tooth fairies, because their existence is "highly doubtful" (in which case, what I really mean is that I am *highly certain* of their nonexistence). So much for some examples of second-order doubt. What about first-order doubt? To take Husserl's own example (*EJ*, §21b, 92): The thing in the shop-window looks to me like a mannequin. But then suddenly I see that it might be, to the contrary, a truly animate thing. First-order doubting is the very *conflict* of readings of one and the same core phenomenon: *This is a mannequin. No, this is a man. No, this is a mannequin, etc.*

First-order doubting, then, might well be defined as the *partial* loss of the "authority" of the original apprehension *alongside* with the entry of a rival apprehension. "I believed for many years, or for a few seconds, that this thing in the shop-window was a mannequin. But now it looks like a man, although I'm not 'wholly' sure". "I once

believed for half a minute that this was a man. Now I see it is a coat rack, although I can't yet say this for sure". Up to this point anyway, we agree with Husserl as to what doubting involves in the original, first-order sense.

We already know why doubting and questioning are such close cousins; they are both "multi-directional". And when we talk about doubt being a close cousin of questioning, it is first-order doubting that we are referring to. Our next question will involve asking how doubting and questioning actually *differ* from each other. As a first approximation, doubting is "passive" and questioning is "active". But in fact, this is only partially true. Let us proceed carefully.

4. Passive Doubt, Active Question

Husserl distinguishes between "passive" and "active" doubting (*EJ*, 307-308). In **passively doubting**, the phenomenon just appears as *maybe A*, or *maybe B*, or *maybe C*, and all this happens without one's "doing" anything. "Passive doubt" for Husserl is, I take it, "first-order doubt". I am less certain about what he means by **active doubting**. However, whatever it is, it is not quite like "second-order doubt". In fact, if Husserl were to use our terminology, he would probably want to call this active doubting a case of "first-order" doubting. Why not, indeed? Passive doubt is doubt based on "givens"; one just comes across something as "doubtful". Active doubt, on the other hand, is a seeking-out of reasons to doubt. If this is, in fact, what Husserl would say, or is saying, I do not wholly disagree with it. However, I suggest that this would be the better way of looking at the matter:

Among the other features of first-order doubt is that it is characteristically passive. (Of course, there is more to it than that. Doubting involves a "*loss* of authority".) Granted, one can actively doubt in the *authentic* sense of "doubting". But this is not to admit that first-order doubting is, after all, sometimes active. Rather, it is to say that first-order doubting, which is passive, can be *weaved into* the activity of, say, pronouncing (as if reaching an answer on this point), "This is doubtful!" It is also to say that first-order doubting can be *weaved into* activity of questioning--for example, "What might be the reasons to doubt what already 'feels' authentically doubtful?"

To elaborate: One can actively "respond" to first-order doubt in one of two ways. One may shift perspectival gears, so to speak; that is, one may "step out" of first-order doubting and enter into a second-order doubting (should we even care to call it "doubting"). In that case one actively switches from the multiple-target of first-order doubt to the "*de dicto*" relation toward the first-order doubt. I then question whether such-and-such is doubtful; or, maybe in answer to that Q, I "state" or "report" that such-and-such is given as being doubtful. In effect, I nominalize and "disarm" the original doubt by taking a distance from it. Still another way that I may actively respond to first-order doubt is by switching the act into a Q. In this case, I don't shift perspectival gears. I continue to "live in" the doubting; I stay with the same "*de re*" multiple-target; I actively set out to resolve the ambiguous target, asking not, "Is this doubtful?", "How is it doubtful?", but, "doubtfully", "Is this so?". In the adequate answering of the Q, "It is so", first-order doubt goes away.

Should we say, then, that the difference between these two "multi-directional" acts, doubting and questioning, is a difference between one of them being passive, and the other being active? I suggest that this is *part* of the difference.[18] (But can't questioning be passive, too? I shall say something about this problem at the end of this section.) The *other part* of the difference (to repeat) is that whereas doubting points in the direction of "losing" a belief, a Q points in the direction of *gaining* something. (In answer to an objection: Yes, even if the Q finds a reason to *doubt*, it is still a gaining. What is gained is the reason itself.)

5. Doubting and Its Cousins--Suspicion, Wonder, Et Al.

Questioning and doubting are not identical, but they are closely related. Doubting is multi-directional, as is also questioning. And not surprisingly, doubting also *gives way* to questioning. With first-order doubt (A or B or C), the target of a potential Q is *set up*. The "target materials" for the "formulation" of a Q (Is A or B or C?), should that Q come about, are already right there for the taking. But having just said all this, what should we say about those *other* Qs in which there was no doubting leading up them, or no doubting accompanying them? Are they just "pure" Qs that just came to be Qs entirely on their own, so to speak? Or might it not be, instead, that they, too, got prior help, that they, too, were provided with their "target materials" by some preceding experience, albeit not the experience of doubting? Are there other forms of experience that, like doubting, contribute to the origin of a Q? We should think so; and when we look carefully, it is not hard to find "question instigators" other than doubting. Doubting sets up a target for a

potential Q. But evidently, the same goes for, say *distrust, suspicion*, and, maybe, *ambivalence, hesitancy*, and *caution* ("Is it A? Or is it only an appearance of A? Might it not be B?"). Although in a way different from doubting, distrust, and the like, *being surprised* and *wonder* also, presumably, set up targets for potential Qs, or (another way of saying it) they provide the materials for their "formulation". In my being surprised, or in my wonder, I see *that* it is A. But I also see *that* it might been otherwise. I ask, then, not "Whether A?", "Is it A?", which I know about already, but "Why A?"

First-order doubting is multi-directed; so, too, are the acts of suspecting, distrusting, and the like, in the first-order sense "multi-directed". Doubting provides the materials for a Q; so also, do suspecting, distrusting, and the like provide the materials. Doubting can accompany certain of our Qs; so, too, can suspecting, distrusting, and like accompany them. To be sure, a suspicion may involve an asserting of a possibility; or it may fall under what philosophers call, "entertaining a possibility". But suspicion, like doubting, conjecturing, supposing, and so forth, needn't remain at the level of "asserting".[19] A first-order suspicion opens up a "suspicion target", and predisposes me to Q, "suspectingly", e.g., "Is my spouse being unfaithful?" Or, moving up to a more detached level, it might get me to Q whether the suspicion itself is actually correct.

I can best explain my point by summing up: I have differentiated doubt from questioning. At the same time I have set out to explain the common intuition that the two are still closely related. (They are both multi-direction acts, as Husserl himself recognised.) Along the way, I introduced into the analysis *other* "Q-instigating" acts. In so doing, I reformulated, and extended, the original problem. Now that we have

discovered that doubting is but one member of a family of multi-directional acts,

we see that the problem is not really only about the idea that a Q is a "proposition in

doubt", or only about how to differentiate questioning from doubting. It is also about the

idea that a Q is a "proposition in suspicion, in surprise, in wonder, etc." I have tried to

give at least the hint of an explanation for our common intuition that wonder, surprise,

etc., as well as doubting, are in close company with questioning and how it is that they

predispose us to ask. I have at least found for these "instigators" a conceptual home in the

analysis. But more importantly, it is through an examination of these multi-directional

acts (notably, the doubting act) that we have reached our definition of a Q: *A Q is actively

multi-directional, the aim of which is to reduce--this is what's "active" about it--the

multiplicity.*

Doubting and suspicion "open up" the target: "A or B", "A or not-A".

Questioning, proceeding in the opposite direction, sets out to close or "reduce" it: "It is

B", or "It is A". Not to put too fine a point on it, but it should be pointed out here that not

all "question instigating" acts are quite "multi-directional" in the way that doubting or

suspecting is. In one's being surprised or started, against all expectation, that "IT IS A!",

a target for questioning might also be "opened up". (Maybe wonder works this way

sometimes, too.) But notice, what the target elicits is not, "A or not A?", or "A or B?".

The fact that it is A is not in question here. What the surprise target is more likely to elicit

is, "*Why* A?" (or "*How* A?"). Still, the surprise intention is multi-directed for all that. It

"sees" *that A*, but, seeing no reason why it could not have been not-A or B instead, it

asks, "Why?" or "How so?" In other words, even when it comes to being surprised or

startled, the aim of the sometimes ensuing Q, "Why?" is still to reduce the multiplicity of possibilities. ("It is A, as we already plainly know. But don't be too astonished, for this is why it can't be otherwise".)

6. Questioning and "Being Questioned"

A Q is *actively* multi-directional. Just in what sense is it "active"? To recall our threefold distinction, a Q **asks** with an eye to answering. The Q, in the working-out toward the answer, **askers**. And the Q also **answers**, if all goes well. But there is a problem, which may be stated as follows. The distinction between a Q and its "multi-directional" cousins (notably, doubting) cannot be made in terms of "active" and "passive".[20] Never mind the problem that it might that certain multi-directional acts besides Qs can be active. It seems that in certain cases questioning itself can be passive! Doesn't all this put the definition in jeopardy? Or rather: Can't certain of our Qs be "passive" in some sense--in the sense, perhaps, of "being asked" and "being answered"?

A Q "finds itself", "arises", "shoots up", within a field of possibilities. Note well, a Q is *not* what generates this field. Rather, a Q "takes note" of it (this is asking); it sets out to narrow down the field (this is "askwering"); and if all goes well, it ends up narrowing it down to a single possibility (this is "answering"). As to whether the field has been set up actively, or passively, or even whether it has been set up by a prior Q (which would itself require a prior target!), is a somewhat separate issue. By implication, we might well say that first-order doubting, suspecting, wondering, and its "instigating" cousins are, in a sense, prior to the activity of questioning. We might even say that these

are so modes of "*being questioned*". In any event, the question about *how* that field

is actually set up is *prior* to the question that we are trying to answer in the present study:

"What is a Q, which arises within this field? What does a Q try to do in this setting? &c."

In answer to this "prior question", I shall hazard only a guess or two in the concluding

chapter. However, it is not our main purpose here that we plough back that far.

I. Conclusion

A Q can be public, but then again it doesn't have to be. A Q works like a request, but then

again it doesn't. Its direction of fit is deemed to be thing-to-thought; but then, no, the

direction is thought-to-thing. So, then, on this view, an answer, a thought-to-thing act,

would have to take the form of a statement. Not really; any kind of utterance can come

back as an answer. And so it would seem that, therefore, a Q's direction of fit is also, in

some cases, thing-to-thought! Yes, it is, but not for that reason . . . . A Q has to come in

words? Not always. A Q is active, as opposed to passive? Maybe not. Its temporal

structure is episodic as opposed to enduring? Not always. A Q is a desiring? Well, yes

and no, but then again . . . . Enough examples. Pretending for a moment that we don't

have the definition at this point, let us ask: "How, then, ought this chameleonic thing be

defined?" The thing to do, I suggest, is consider whether there might be something wrong

in the *way* that philosophers have tried to define this thing.

Why the persistent failure on the part of those who have tried to define it? One

might try to explain this "failure" by insisting that there is no failure to begin with. What

is needed is an eclectic approach. A Q is "all these things taken together". This is how one writer optimistically sees it:

> . . . the divergence in opinions about the notion of question is only apparent. It arises partly from the fact that the term *question* is differently understood; partly because some authors, when analyzing questions, emphasize syntactic properties, while others stress the semantic ones, and still others are interested in the pragmatic aspect, the latter being sometimes included in the semantic one and appearing as semantic. [Jerzy Pelc, 747]

According to this explanation, the way to correct the "failure", lies in simply taking up a pluralistic approach. It consists in settling for the conclusion that, "At any rate, a Q is a highly intricate thing". The explanation proposes that all we have to do is piece all the various things of a Q together--its syntactic, its semantic, and its pragmatic moments--and try to look at these aspects all at once.

It is already apparent why *this* approach will not work. A Q may be described, pragmatically, as a request, another as a doubting, another as linguistic. But, here's the objection, not every Q is a "request", not every Q is a "doubting", not every Q, evidently, is linguistic, and much less is it likely that a Q could be all of these things put together. What is required, I suggest, is not eclecticism, but a willingness to dig deeper. And when we do this, it becomes less a wonder why these various attempts to define a Q have more or less failed. The terms which have gone into the these definitions of a Q--"request", "statement", and so forth--are too dinky to capture the phenomenon. What all this

indicates, surely, is that there has to be something *very basic* about a Q--at any rate, too basic for such seemingly regional notions as "request", "desiring", and the suchlike. Maybe what is "very basic" about it has something to do with intentionality itself. Maybe the "what" of a Q is linked up with the ABC's of intentionality. In fact, this is precisely the case, as we have already found out. Tentatively stated: *A Q is a multi-directed act; and its aim is to reduce the "multiplicity" of its directedness.*

One might offer the following objection. "Before 'provisionally' declaring what a Q is, wouldn't you first have to do this scientific thing first--namely, sift through a thousand types of act (or a hundred thousand, depending on how you count them), just to make sure there's nothing else like it?" The objection misses the point. We are not ruling out the possibility that there might be instances of other types of act that have the structure that defines a Q. What we are saying is that if this structure is embedded in some "other act", an act that typically goes by another name, then, whatever else it is, it is also *questions*.

To take a messy example: I look at a photograph of you, in which case the act is a seeing. But then, in my "seeing the past", the act is also a remembering act. I ask, in looking at it, "Where was the picture taken?". The act is a seeing-remembering-questioning. The act may also be amenable to such partial descriptions as "presupposing". "reminiscing", "waiting" or "hoping" (for the answer). A few other examples: I question seeingly, or question hearingly (We have common names for these acts; they are called "looking for" and "listening for".) I question "doubtingly", "predictingly", "conjecturingly", "suspectingly". But enough examples.

The general point is that there are any number of "act-qualities" that can go into a single intentional act to give that act its "final feel"--just as so many notes go into making a single tone. As Husserl puts it, "There is, in this plurality, . . . necessarily a positing which is *archontic*, so to speak, which unifies and governs all others" (*Ideas*, §117, 279). The specific point is that a Q, although logically set apart in a radical way, doesn't have to operate all by its lonely self. Quite the contrary. In fact, we may rather doubt whether a Q-act could operate in a rarefied form, without at the same time being something else "in addition". In fact, for purposes of this inquiry, it had better not operate alone! The key aim of the present study is to disclose a thing or two about *intentionality as such* **on the basis** of an examination of the inner workings of a Q. The strategy largely hinges on the assumption that a Q enters into, and pervades, these other intentional acts.

1. My opening strategy is much like Daubert's. In the first stage of his "AI2 Frage" analysis, he isolates the act of questioning from those forms of other experience with which it is easily misidentified. ("*A. Die Absonderung des Fragens von anderen Erlebnissen*" [AI2, 1r].) Daubert rejects, as I also do, the interpretations according to which a Q is a doubting, a wishing, and a desiring. My own list of interpretations includes more entries than does Daubert's; and unless indicated otherwise, the criticisms which I raise are my own.

2. In case this doesn't go without saying, it would take a very big book indeed to cover everything said about the subject, from Aristotle to Adam of Balsham, from Cook Wilson to R.G. Collingwood. That book has yet to be written. And whatever the "historical" details there may be in this chapter, they should be taken as rough approximations only. I shall be discussing the "basic themes" only, not every variation on every theme, and discussing only *some* of the themes at that. I should add that a few of these accounts have not actually been put forward by anyone, at least not in the way that I shall articulate them. ("A Q's direction of fit is primarily thought-to-thing only"? Whoever said that?!) I should add, also, that at least one of these accounts has never really been "officially" put forward by anyone at all. But I include these "unofficial" accounts in the list all the same. if only because either they are, or seem to be, commonly presupposed; or, if that's not the case, they have some plausibility in them, even though they turn out to be "importantly wrong", so to speak. Although nobody actually says, for example, that a Q requires in every case a statement for its answer, or that a Q is an asking, the idea is still very much out there.

3. The request-definition of a Q has been around for at least a good century. See Felix Cohen (1929, 351n2): " . . . the names of Bolzano, Natorp, Jerusalem, Wundt, and many others are adduced in factor of this position [that a question is a kind of request]". We might be able to add Frege to the list: "An interrogative sentence [*Satzfrage*] and an

assertoric one contain the same thought; but the assertoric sentence contains something else as well, namely, assertion. The interrogative sentence contains something more too, namely, a request [*Aufforderung*]" (1977, 7). See also the Otto Jespersen's *The Philosophy of Grammar*, (1963, 302): "A question also is a kind of request, viz., a request to tell the original speaker something, to give him a piece of information that he wants". Also see Dwight Bolinger's *Interrogative Structures of American English* (1957, 4): A question , he says, " . . . is an utterance that "craves" a verbal or other semiotic (e.g., a nod) response. The attitude is characterized by the speaker's subordinating himself to his hearer". Also Searle (1969, 69) and (1979, 14). Also Lennart Åqvist (1975), for whom a Q is an "epistemic imperative" which says, in effect, "Bring it about that I know that--".

4. I should explain here what it means for an utterance to be "inherently public". There are certain kinds of utterance which do *not* require for their "success" that they go out to someone else. To this extent, they are not inherently public. A wish, for example, is, typically, not in need of being heard by someone else. Should it go public, we might describe it as being only "accidentally public", "merely shared", "overheard". Not so with certain other types of act. Obviously, a thanking needs a thankee, an apology needs an apologee, promising, a promisee, etc. One might argue that the same is true also of *questions*: A Q is one more type of an inherently public act, or *social action* (*soziale Akte*), as Adolf Reinach has called it. (Reinach [1883-1917], along with Johannes Daubert, was a member of the circle of so-called "Munich phenomenologists", and then later a student and colleague of Husserl.) The following passage is taken from Reinach's work on the phenomenology of legal obligations, the *A Priori Foundations of Civil Law* (1913). This is what he says this about "social acts".

> Commanding is rather an experience all its own, a doing of the subject
> which according to its nature has . . . the *need of being heard*. What has
> been shown for commanding also holds for requesting, warning,
> questioning [*Fragen*], informing, answering and for still many other acts.
> They are all social acts, which, by the one who performs them and *in the*

performance itself, are as it were cast towards another person in
order to fasten themselves in his soul. [1913,§3,19-20]

To comment: Reinach is right in saying that informing, commanding, requesting, and warning are all of them, in every instance, social acts. But can the same be said of a *question*? Are Qs *in every case* inherently public? Reinach doesn't really offer an explanation as to why he thinks questioning in particular is social. (But the reader must not be too hard on him for that. He mentions "questioning" only for the purpose of providing just one more example of a "social act". His treatise is on obligations, not on questions.) Anyway, the closest thing to an explanation that Reinach does offer is to be found in one of the few passing remarks he makes about the act of a Q:

> Questioning [*Fragen*] too is a social act; it calls for some doing by way of
> response, but not an external action but rather another social act, the
> "response" in the strict sense. We have in responding a social act which
> does not call for any doing but rather presupposes some such--and always
> in the form of a social act. So we distinguish simple social acts, social acts
> which presuppose other social acts, and finally social acts which aim at
> social acts or other activities as following upon them. [1913, §3, 21]

But this doesn't quite add up to an explanation for why a Q is, supposedly, "social". The passage reads more like a convincing account of how a particular Q operates *if it already happens to be social.*

Reinach ought to have distinguished between those acts which are "social" *in every case* (e.g., thanking and apologizing) and those acts which are "social" only *sometimes* (e.g., questioning and asserting). Take, for instance, the act of asserting. Reinach does not include this act in his sample list of social acts. Nor should he include it. On the other hand, he does classify the act of *informing* as a social act, and he is right to do so. By definition, to inform means to inform *someone else*. But, a point that Reinach overlooks, an act of informing is also, by definition, a *social* asserting. Asserting, in other

words, can lead two different lives. The one is solitary, the other is public. And when asserting goes public, we give it a special name and call it "informing". My point is that the same logic applies to the domain of questioning, even if there happens to be no special name in the English language for that sort of Q which is specifically social (*die Anfrage*).

5. In a paper entitled "A Taxonomy of Speech Acts", Searle attempts to develop, as he puts it, "a reasoned classification of illocutionary acts into certain basic categories or types" (1979, 1). Along the way, he comes up with five types of act, only the first two of which need concern us here: the "assertive" and the "directive". "The point of the members of the assertive class," Searle notes, "is to commit the speaker . . . to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition" (1979, 12). Some examples of assertives, which he provides, are: *suggesting, putting forward a hypothesis, swearing, stating, insisting*. Not surprisingly, he describes the "direction" of an assertive as "word-to-world". The "directive act", on the other hand, Searle notes, may be counted as a "world-to-word" "attempt . . . by the speaker to get the hearer to do something" (1979, 13). Some examples, also provided by Searle, are: *asking, ordering, commanding, requesting, begging, pleading, praying, entreating, inviting, permitting, advising*. So far, so good. But then tagging on to the end of his short analysis of directives--it adds up to a paragraph--Searle makes the blunder of adding this one remark about Qs. "Questions," he notes in passing, "are a subclass of directives, since they are attempts by S to get H to answer, i.e. to perform a speech act" (1979, 14). This remark almost comes to the same as what Searle says about Qs in an earlier work, also made in passing: "Asking questions is really a special case of requesting" (1969, 69).

6. Precisely in that group which Searle calls the "assertive" class (1979, 12).
7. This talk about an act's having to be "right and true" has a great deal to do with Husserl's doctrine of the signitive act, as we shall see in a later chapter. To oversimplify Husserl's doctrine: In order to get at the TRUTH of something, the signitive act has to be

fulfilled in the RIGHT way. We find a slightly similar idea expressed in Collingwood's doctrine of the "bipolarity of thought". From his *Principles of Art*:

> The distinctions between right and wrong, good and bad, true and false,
> are special cases of this bipolarity . . . . There is nothing in the case of
> feeling to correspond with what, in the case of thinking, may be called
> mis-thinking or thinking wrong. The most general name for this thing is
> failure. Failure and its opposite, success, imply that the activity which fails
> or succeeds is not only a 'doing something' but a 'trying to do something',
> where the word 'trying' refers not to what is called 'conation', but to an
> activity which sets itself definite tasks, and judges itself as having
> succeeded or failed by reference to the standards or criteria which it
> thereby imposes on itself. [1938, 157; also 216, 277]

Collingwood's point is that thought may be evaluated in some cases in terms of "truth" and "falsity"--this is one bipolarity--and in other cases in terms of "well done" and "ill done"--this is another bipolarity. Collingwood has it that some acts have a true/false dimension of assessment, and others have a right/wrong dimension. We, on the other hand, have it that, at least as far as Qs go, one and the same given act has to have "both bipolarities" operative in it. A Q calls for an answer that is both truly "thought-to-thing" and rightly "thing-to-thought". Evidently, Collingwood's doctrine of bipolarity seems designed, among other things, to allow him "to reconcile his Cook Wilsonian point that questioning is thinking too . . . ; it isn't necessarily a bipolarity of truth and falsity; it can be one of 'in virtue of which an act of thought may be well done or ill done'" (Somerville [1989, 583]).

8. It is helpful to compare our analysis of the stating act with Austin's. (I am referring mainly to the discussion in the second last chapter of Austin's *How to Do Things with Words*, entitled, "Statements, Performatives, and Illocutionary Force", *passim*.) Austin argues, persuasively, that "truth" (and "falsity") is only one "dimension of assessment" of

the satisfactoriness of how we use words in relation to things. His other point, as near as I can make out, is that philosophers ought to recognize that this one dimension of assessment extends beyond the domain of the statement, description, and the like. The categories of "truth" and "falsity" apply also to other kinds of utterance. His overall argument proceeds as follows:

Austin begins by dividing utterances into constatives (e.g., statements, descriptions) and performatives (e.g., promises, requests, invitations, and other "non-stating" acts). But this distinction with which Austin starts out eventually breaks down. To utter a statement, as Austin points out, is also to do something "performatively". Conversely, to warn is also to report something "constatively". Austin then goes on to replace his initial distinction with the terminology of "locutionary act" and the "illocutionary act". The locutionary act corresponds, very roughly, to the constative act. It is the locutionary side of an utterance which does the conveying of a fact--for example, *that there is a fire*. And the illocutionary act corresponds, roughly, to the performative act. The illocutionary side actually brings something about--for example, *warning us* that there is a fire. But of course, there are important differences between Austin's early and later distinctions. The point of the later distinction, among other things, is that every utterance has built into it these two act-moments, both the locutionary and the illocutionary rolled into one.

How, then, does our view compare with Austin's? It speaks well for both Austin's analysis and our own that a similar conclusion has been reached by both parties, and yet by entirely different roads. On our view, a Q is "after the truth". Also on our view (not as if anyone would want to dispute it), promises, requests, and the like can just as easily count as answers as can statements. In order to put these two views together, we are forced to reject, as Austin himself does, the distinction (let's call it) between constatives and performatives--between acts which only constatively "say" something and acts which only performatively "do" something. Moreover, our own conception of answerhood requires an analysis of utterances something very like Austin's later distinction--namely, that between the "locutionary saying" and "illocutionary doing". It would not be going

too far to say that, in the case of responding to a Q, it is the *locutionary* moment of that utterance--the "fact-side" of it--which gets "filtered out" as the answer.

To illustrate: In your answering, "Yes" to my Q, "Do you promise--?", two things happen all at once. An obligatory state of affairs comes into the world by virtue of your incantatory "word", which "makes something truth". But at the very same time, in your saying "Yes", you are also reporting, in a thing-to-thought way, that you are hereby entering into the obligation of a promise, that you "see" this obligatory state of affairs that is currently being brought into existence. That particular aspect of your utterance which does direct commerce with my Q is the side of it which "reports what is". You utterance *qua* answer is (maybe not quite, but almost) the "locutionary" moment of the act. (Notice, by the way, that it is not just the words, "Yes, I promise" that the Q takes in. It is *through these reporting words* that I am directed to the "disclosure" of an entire, complex state of affairs, which comes into being *by virtue those incantatory words*.)

9. From Bolzano's *Theory of Science* (1837, §22), quoted by Husserl in the *Logical Investigations* (VI, §68, 840). Husserl, *Logical Investigations* (V, §29,616) and *Experience and Judgment* (§78, 308).

10. Daubert argues, rightly, against the idea that a Q is a wishing. Whereas there exist indirect Qs, there exist no indirect wishes. Whereas a wish can be "idle" or "pious", can rest in itself, a Q "tends toward a decision" (AI2, 28r; 21r, 28v. See Schuhmann and Smith [1987, 361-62].)

11. An easy example of an indirect Q is, "I ask whether x is y", which is indirect for "Is x y?". But what about those "fuzzier" cases? What, for example, should we say about: "Would you ask the doctor for an explanation?"? This might be a combination of being an indirect Q (Doctor, "I" am asking you for an explanation) and a proxy request (Being my messenger, will you ask the doctor on my behalf?). What about: "I want to ask a Q"? If it is no more than "idle", it is simply a wish. If uttered in a public forum, it might be received a request to speak (I want to ask a Q, make this recommendation, etc.). Or it

could be, in a moment of trying to formulate a Q, an articulation of what one is actually trying to do "questioninlgy". But that is not an "indirect Q". What about: "How can I ask about God?"? This, it seems, could be a direct Q, which in this case happens to be *about* a "Q". Or, this is another possibility, it could be the beginnings of one and the same Q. It is not as if the formulation of a Q (the "pre-asked" phase) and the asking of need necessarily be distinct. The formulating "grows into" the asking.

12. Admittedly, there is a sense of "wishing" (if one wants to call it that), in which one attempts to get someone else to do something by deliberately not directly asking for it. But maybe the better thing to call this act is, not a "wish", or an "indirect wish", but an *indirect request*. To back up a step: An indirect Q can be expressed as a statement about one's asking such-and-such, and this is what we mean by the term in the above discussion. There, we co-ordinated this sense of "indirect Q" with wishing, and placed it outside the domain of desiring. But the term, an "indirect Q" can also denote not a reporting about a Q, but, indeed, a questioning itself. An indirect Q in *this* sense is a Q that makes a point of deliberately not directly asking what one wants to know. Yet it is still very much a Q for all that. It still sets out to get hold of an answer. The indirect Q in *this* sense--an "'indirect Q' question", as opposed to an "'indirect Q' statement"--is to be co-ordinated, not with wishing, but with indirect requesting.

13. Alexius Meinong, *On Assumptions*, (1983, §18, 89). The Cicero quote is taken from Schuhmann and Smith, (1987, 360n19). The authors refer to *Academica Priora* II, VIII, 26. Of course, there is also the famous opening line to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, (980a20-25), "All men by nature desire to know". Also Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (H5, 24) and R.G. Collingwood's *Essay on Metaphysics* (1940, 37).

14. Our discussion about the three phases of a Q may be reminiscent of what Heidegger calls the three "structural items" of a Q. The two "three's" are not the same. We are talking about the act-phases of a question; Heidegger, on the other hand, is talking about what might be called the "object moments" of Q. In given "inquiry", there is, he says,

"that which is asked about" [*sein Gegrafies*]", "that which is interrogated [*ein Befragtes*]", and "that which is to be found out by the asking [*das Erfragte*]" (*Being and Time*, H5, 24). To illustrate what Heidegger is saying, take, for example, the Q, "Where is the rose?". There is the "asked about" of the question, which is the rose. There is the "that which is interrogated", which is the whereabouts of the rose. And then there is the "that which is to be found out", which in this case turns out to be, surprise, "in the vase".

15. According to J.J. Gibson, the perceptual intuition--the ray of light, a sound--is, or may be, already loaded, or overloaded, with an array of information. "[T]he variables of an optic array may carry information about the environment from which the light comes" (from his "Ecological Optics" (267-278), in Jay Garfield (1990) ed., *Foundations of Cognitive Science*, 274). What the "act" of perceiving ("act" is our term, not Gibson's) tries to track down are the invariants and higher-order variables in the flux of appearances. (To illustrate: If you change the key of a melody, all the notes have changed their positions; in their relation to themselves, however, they remain in that same *higher-order variable* called a "melody".) The means by which these invariants are hermeneutically tracked down ("hermeneutic" is our term, not Gibson's) is precisely by moving around or over the object, or by being attentive to the *object's* moving about. (Here's a sample of Gibson making this point: "The optic array at one position will, in general, be different from that in any other position. That is, its pattern will be different. It will be so by virtue of the laws of parallax and perspective", etc. [*ibid.*, 271].) If I were to do a phenomenology of "bodily questions" specifically, I would make use of these two things: Merleau-Ponty's theory of bodily intentionality and Gibson's theory of perceptual information. I shall be saying more about Gibson in a few other places.

16. How could Boethius, or anybody else, have failed to see what is so obvious to us? There are a few good reasons for this. Each one of them has to do with the tradition.

    A. Doubting what the "wise" or the "many" say: Once the very object of a Q, its very target, is identified with the "tradition", the "already given", then the specific task of a Q has been set accordingly. A Q's task is to doubt the *already* given--the only thing

that can be doubted. This nicely explains why Boethius defines a Q as a doubting.

The aim of the particular work in which we find this definition--the *Topics*--is nothing less than a treatise on the "places" (*topoi*) from which arguments for or against this or that received opinion could be drawn (Nuchelmans [1980, 155-56]). In this context, the model Q reads, more or less: "Are they, the wise or the many, right or wrong, yes or no?" It is not so surprising to find, in this context, a definition of a Q which identifies it with doubting. But of course, this does not change the fact that the definition is still wrong.

B. Doubting as the origin of inquiry: C.S. Peirce all but says that questioning and doubting come to the same. From his essay, "Fixation of Belief" (1955, 5-22): "We generally know when we wish to ask a question and when we wish to pronounce a judgement, for there is a dissimilarity between the sensation of doubting and that of believing" (p.9). "The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term this struggle *Inquiry*, . . . " (p.10). And in his "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1955, 23-41), he writes: " . . . the action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief is attained . . . . But here I use [the words "doubt" and "belief"] to designate the starting of any question, no matter how small or how great, and the resolution of it" (pp.26-27). For Peirce, then, doubting is, if not the same as questioning, *the* origin of a Q. Inquiry, then, lies with a deviation from the normal course of events. In "Critical Common-Sensism" (1955, 290-301), he notes: "Doubt, usually, perhaps always, takes its rise from surprise, which supposes previous belief; and surprises come with novel environment" (p.297). (See also Sintonen [1984, 41-42, 211n16], who lists a number of philosophers of science who have also held the view that the function of an explanation is to resolve a conflict between the background and the surprise.)

C. The hermeneutical priority of the "already-given" to the doubting act: Peirce repudiates the Cartesian ideal of "beginning with complete doubt" ("Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" [1955, 228-250], p.228). We find similarities in Heidegger's critique, notably in *Being and Time*. Peirce also holds the now-common view according to which reflection goes into gear at the moment of "cognitive conflict". (The conflict lies between the background belief--"the tradition", "the expectation", or what-not--and the deviant phenomenon that pulls one up short.) Again, we find a similarities in

Heidegger. (He talks about the shift from equipment-like or "absorbed intentionality" to "representational intentionality". See Dreyfus [1993, ch.4]). There is an argument, stated or otherwise, in Peirce, and in Heidegger, and Gadamer, according to which, roughly: Doubting, and questioning, are logically posterior to the already-given. Moreover, it is with a disturbance in the already-given that they arise. Gadamer speaks of the "hermeneutical priority of the question" (that is, prior *to* the judgement). (See *Truth and Method*, Second Part, II, 3c.) But he should also have spoken of the "priority of the tradition"--prior to questioning, prior to doubting. It would not be criticising Gadamer, or Heidegger, to suggest--as if Gadamer even makes a secret of it--that his insistence on the need for "openness" (presumably, one must wait for the disturbances, which give rise to Qs) and his playing-down of the agency of the subject is very much tied to an anti-Cartesian critique.

17. Our distinction between first- and second-doubt implies a critique of Cartesian doubt. To be sure, the critique is hardly original. We find it in Peirce's writings, for example. In his "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities", Peirce writes, "We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy" (1955, 228). From the "Essentials of Pragmatism": "But in truth, there is but one state of mind from which you can 'set out', namely, the very state of mind in which you actually find yourself at the time you do 'set out' . . . ; and who knows whether, if you could [doubt everything], you would not have made all knowledge impossible for yourself?" (1955, 256). See also Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, *passim.*, (e.g., §354, "Doubting and non-doubting behaviour. There is the first only if there is the second".) This view that we are already "in the truth", that doubt only comes after the fact, is everywhere in evidence in Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Gadamer, to name a few phenomenological names. Husserl also makes a point of this "priority" of the already-given. One of the writings in which he makes this point is in *Ideas I* (§§103-104). Husserl is fairly explicit about insisting on the priority of *being actual* over against *being possible, being doubtful*, etc., and about the view that doubting, deeming likely, deeming possible, etc. are so many "doxic *modalities*" of "belief-certainty".

18. We may put our explanation to a small test by comparing it with Daubert's, who also dismisses as mistaken the view that a questioning can be defined as a doubting. On Daubert's view, the difference between doubting and questioning resides (this is how Schuhmann and Smith put it) in "the radical difference of temporal structure as between doubt and presumption on the one hand--which are *enduring states*--and the acts [activity] of judging and questioning on the other--which are *occurrent episodes*" (1987, 360). Now, Daubert is on the right track to the extent that he coordinates, presumably, the enduring state with the passive act (="state"), and the occurrent episode with the active act (="act") (see *ibid.*, 360n18). In that case, what he is saying, in effect, is that doubting is a passive act and questioning is an active act. So far, so good. My only misgiving with Daubert's account is that it coordinates the passive and the active too tightly with the temporal structures of the enduring state and the occurrent episode respectively. Why is that a problem? For one thing, a Q can, like a doubting, drag out over time; it, too, can be an enduring state. And conversely, there are certain passive acts which have, or may have, the temporal characteristic not of an enduring state, but of a snappy, transitional episode. The experience of a surprise is a case in point; it is at once both episodic and passive. It can be no accident that a surprise, like a doubting, also tends to give rise to our questions.

19. This may be taken as a criticism of Somerville, and Collingwood. Somerville, commenting on Collingwood's "logic of question and answer", points out:

> Conjectures and suspicions, like supposals, also come under what
> philosophers in their technical jargon call "entertaining a proposition."
> That is, they involve the asserting of possibilities. To have the suspicion
> that one's spouse is unfaithful is distinct from going on to ask whether
> one's suspicion is in fact correct . . . [1989, 529].

20. My reason for wavering on this point is not that I have to declare that a Q is "active" at any cost, and that if I do not do this then I shall not be able to say, for example, what separates doubting and questioning. The categories of "active" and "passive" are crucial, I

insist, in explaining what *doubting* is; however, one does not really need to refer to such categories in order to explain what differentiates doubting from questioning. It would be enough just to say that to doubt is to point in the direction of a "losing" something and to question is to point in the direction of a "gaining" something.

Chapter 3

The State of Affairs in Question

(On the "Predicative Question", Part I)

Introduction

A. What do Questions Aim at?

    1. Husserl, the Sixth Investigation, and His "Theory B"

    2. This is not a Speech-Act Critique

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D. Conclusion (with An Addendum on Supposing)

Notes to Chapter 3

Introduction

What should we say about the intended target of a Q? Structurally, what sort of "thing" does

it characteristically aim at? These are the questions I shall try to answer in the present

chapter. Before elaborating on the theme of this chapter, it is expedient that I draw

attention to a few distinctions.

(i) The first is the now familiar distinction between "seeing" and "seeing that". As

Husserl notes, "we do not merely say 'I see this paper, an inkpot, several books', and so on,

but also 'I see that the paper has been written on, that there is a bronze inkpot standing here

. . .'" (*LI* VI, §40, 773). I call the first type of seeing a "simple seeing" and the second type a

"categorial seeing". A simple seeing sees the particular (this paper); a categorial seeing sees

the state of affairs (seeing that this paper has two sides).[1] (ii) I take this distinction between

"simple seeing" and "categorial seeing" as being *roughly* equivalent to that between "seeing

as" and "seeing that". In seeing something simply "as" this or that, prior to any explication

of the object, what one sees is a presentation. A presentation (this is how *I* am defining it) is

whatever is "there for me" or "present to me"--a piece of paper, a building, a work of art,

the dark side of the moon, the place where I was yesterday, the number 3. Of course, not

only can I presentationally see *A as b*; I can also, in a judging of that presentation, see *that A

is b*. In the second case, I set my "categorial" sights on a *state of affairs*.

Working with these distinctions, what should we say about *questioning* and *its*

target? Is its object a presentation or a SAs? Or something else? Or is it, rather, "founded"

on one of them?

What I propose is that we add yet a third type to this list of phenomenological

objects. This object is "grammatically" more than a presentation, but less than a SAs. This

denotatum of a Q is the "object-in-question". (By this hyphenated expression I mean not the

"object in question", this object here (a person, a factory, an artwork, etc.), this object that

the Q is "about". The object-in-Q is *not* the actual object "in itself", but the object so far

as it actually appears questionable.) This object-in-Q, I shall claim, is so structured as to be

located somewhere between a *presentation* and a *SAs*. And, not to overload our list with

other entries, we may as well provisionally include in this "middle zone" of

phenomenological objects the correlates of other multi-directed acts (the doubt-object, the

suspicion-object, the wonder-object, and the like.)

In saying that the object-in-Q is a "third type", I mean this only in the

epistemologically sense. We can think of this object-in-Q as being, structurally, a cognitive

intermediary between a presentation and a state of affairs. Between one's seeing *A as b* and

one's seeing *that A is b*, one sees, i.e., questions, *whether A is b*. However, ontologically

speaking, this object-in-Q is not a "third type" after all; it is, indeed, a *SAs*. What makes it

"questionable" is that one part of it still hidden from view of the questioner. In fact, it is this

second term--the *state of affairs in question*--that I shall prefer to use over "object-in-Q". I

shall now say a few words about the logistics of the present chapter.

The type of Q that I shall be examining in this chapter, and in the next, is the

predicative Q. I have already indicated the difference between this type and the

hermeneutical type. To oversimplify, the predicative Q starts with the "name" and then

proceeds to determine the "predicate" (*A--is ?*). Typically, the choices open to a predicative

Q are clear: "What kind of flower is it--rose or poppy?" "What colour is it--red or blue?"

"What is the modality--possible or necessary?" "Did it or will it happen?" The

hermeneutical Q, by contrast, proceeds the other way about. Starting with the predicate-

clues (*--is x, --is y, --is z*), it then looks for the "name", or the answer, to the "riddle", "What

is it?" (*? is x, y, and z*). In any case, in this chapter, and in the fourth, I shall mean by a "Q" a *predicative Q*.

I divide the present chapter into three parts. In Part A, I sort through a few theories of what a Q aims at. I end up claiming that the intended object of a Q is an "eclipsed" SAs--a "SAs in Q". In the rest of the chapter, I try to work out the implications of this idea. In Part B, I argue in detail for my claim that questioning calls for, and answering provides. a "double semantics": The questioning act requires that its answer perform two things at once: that the answer recognizes as "true" the "thus-and-so" of *a* SAs; and, at the same time, that the answer rules out as "false" the contending possibilities of *that* SAs. ("The rose is *red*--not any other colour"; "This is a *rose*--not any other sort of flower".)

With the basics of this "logic" of questioning and answering worked out, I shall go on to argue in Part C for the following claim. Namely, the questionability of a SAs--its being "eclipsed"--is not "just" an obstacle, which I have only to get around in order for me to see the SAs in its entirety. It is a *helpful* obstacle; it is *through overcoming* it that the SAs can be exposed as a SAs. In answering the Q, I not only recognize the thus-and-so of the "state of affairs"; in denying the contrary, the SAs is given to me as real, as being, indeed. a SAs. The implications of the present analysis, then, are both "realist" and "epistemological". *Ontologically*, the "SAs as answered" is prior to the "SAs in Q". (Unless the former is already taken to be "all there", it cannot be called into question.) And *epistemologically*, questioning is "prior" to answering in that this act is required in order to see the SAs as an existing SAs.

A. What do Questions Aim at?

What does a Q "aim at"? Here is a sample of some different approaches to this problem that different philosophers have taken: "If a Q is meaningful, it must be true". "But how can a Q be true? If it is true, then true about what? Is it an elliptical statement for, say, 'I want to know whether—?' Does its truth coincide with the sincerity of saying it?" "Seeing that it is not true, how could it be still meaningful? Do we have to revise the view that 'what's meaningful has to be true?'" "Is it meaningful 'pragmatically'? Is it a request, or an attempt to get someone else to do something, viz., answer a question?" The point I am trying to convey is that the solution problem of just what a Q *aims at* has been anything but obvious. When Cook Wilson goes out of his way to say that when "'putting Qs to ourselves, we should be said to be *thinking*", it is as if other philosophers, against this "ordinary view", would beg to differ. And when Collingwood decides to include questioning among the activities of thought, it is as if he thought himself to be saying something that did not go without saying.[2] In Chapter 2, we came across a few variations on this problem; in this first part of the chapter, we shall come across a few more.

(1) In the first section, I briefly examine *one* of Husserl's theories ("theory B") of a Q. According to this view, the objectual correlate of asking a Q is the underlying *experience* of wanting to know. (2) In the second section, I examine what may be called the "speech-act critique" of referentialist theories of language, of which Husserl's is but one formulation. According to this critique, a Q, or for that matter a promise, or warning, etc., is a "language game". A Q is what you get when you comply with a given set of so many rules. I shall discuss this critique, the better to distance my own position from it. Whatever my

disagreement with Husserl's "theory B", my own position is still a "referentialist", at least as far as what having to explain questioning goes. (3) In the third section, I examine Daubert's theory. According to Daubert, a Husserlian who disagrees with Husserl, the object of a Q is a "SAs as questioned" (*Frageverhalt*). This, I take it, is the correct view, and I shall be adding my own details to it.

1. Husserl, the Sixth Investigation, and His "Theory B"

I have called Husserl's account of questions in the closing chapter of the Sixth Investigation his "theory B" of Qs (*LI* VI, 9, §§67-70). But I should qualify this; Husserl no more expressly provides a "theory" of Qs *in particular* than he provides a theory of wishes or commands in particular. The topic of discussion happens to be about any and every kind of non-stating expression; in this discussion, a Q is treated as just one other kind. Anyway, what I single out for consideration here is what his general theory has to say about interrogatives specifically.[3] I emphasize that my reading of Husserl is heavily simplified, which should do for our purposes. I should also emphasize the point, in fairness to Husserl, that he did not regard the analysis at the end of the Sixth Investigation as his last word on the problem.[4]

Before examining his account, it is crucial that I say a prefatory word about the background theory of language on which this account is based. This theory, which is generally worked out in the First Investigation, is predicated on the view that an intentional act has in every case a target-fixing or objectifying function. According to this theory, moreover, language has no meaning apart from the subject's bestowing meaning upon it,

right then and there, in the concrete act of "expression". Since the act that bestows this

meaning upon the expression is objectifying, the primary function of an expression is that it

refers or points to something. This is not to say that referring is the *only* function of an

expression, or even its *original* function. On this point, Husserl goes so far as to concede

that "Expressions were originally framed to fulfil a communicative function" (*LI* I, §7, 276).

A mere concession, because to this he immediately adds the point that an expression,

whether in or out of communication, publicly uttered or not, still has an objectifying

function to fulfil.

Now, such a theory seems to work well when it comes to accounting for expressions

of *naming* and *stating*. Agreed, they are both objectifying acts. When I express the

presenting act ("This rose"), I "name" a presentation; when I express the judging act ("This

rose is red"), I "assert" something about a given SAs. Agreed, also, these acts of both

naming and *stating* have their underlying, nonlinguistic counterparts of *presenting* and

judging, which are also "objectifying" acts. So far, so good. However, it is when this theory

has to account for non-stating or "controversial" expressions that it runs up against some

potential difficulties. We know what the stating (and naming) act point at. But what are we

to say about the correlate of a *non*-stating expression, such as the question-expression

("interrogative"), or the wish-expression ("optative"), or the command-expression

("imperative")? Since they are expressions, they, too, have to point. But at what? Such is

the problem that Husserl tries to resolve at the end of the Sixth Investigation. Let us

consider how Husserl attempts to resolve it.

Bolzano, whom Husserl quotes in the discussion, remarks that "'A question...

asserts nothing about what it enquires into, but it asserts something nonetheless: our desire,

in fact, to be informed concerning the object asked about'" (*LI* VI, §68, 840). According to

this reductionist view, a Q of the direct form, "Is S p?" is reducible to the indirect form,

which says in effect, "I am currently asking whether S is p". Now, although Husserl appears

to reject this reductionist view at first, in the end what he puts forward is a highly

sophisticated formulation of it. Husserl's argument comes down to this:

A controversial expression, no less than an assertive expression, has to point at

something. However, there still remains a "*fundamental difference* between names and

statements, on the one hand, and the expressions of our controversial group, on the other"

(*LI* VI, §70, 849). When I state, "S is p", what is "meant" as the object of predication is not

the underlying judging, but rather the *state of affairs*. On the other hand, when I express, for

example, an interrogative or an imperative, the objectual correlate of this act--what is

"meant"--is, precisely, the underlying *experience* of questioning, commanding, etc.

> It is not the wishes, commands, etc., *themselves* [that is to say, the
> underlying, non-linguistic experiences] that are expressed by these
> grammatical patterns and their significations; it is rather the intuitions of
> these acts that serve as fulfilments [of the optative, imperative,
> interrogative,...acts of expression]. When we compare indicative with [say]
> optative sentences, we must not coordinate judgements with wishes, but
> *states of affairs* with wishes" [*ibid.*,850].

For Husserl, as for Bolzano, the interrogative is really a registering of the underlying experience. However, Husserl does reject, correctly, the view that Bolzano evidently puts forward—namely, the view that in saying, "Is it A?" is short for "I currently wish to be informed whether it is A". Ordinarily, one does not take such a self-reflective distance in asking, "Is it A?" Of course, one *can* take a self-reflective distance on one's own experience of questioning. But *ordinarily*, there is, as Husserl puts it, simply an "interweaving" of the "controversial" expression and the underlying experience (*LI* VI, §69, 848; also 850-51).

> Since the [non-stating or "disputed"] expression becomes one with the intuited inner experience as a knowing of the latter, an interweaving of factors arises having the character of a self-enclosed phenomenon. To the extent that, in such interweaving, we live principally in an interrogative act, with which our expression merely fits in, and to which it gives articulate voice, the whole interweaving is called a question. [*ibid.*, 848]

If all this is true, then, it is to be asked, what function could the "disputed" types of utterance possibly fulfil? In answer to this, Husserl accords non-stating utterances an "*immense practical and communicative importance*" (*ibid.*, 850). They have, he tells us, "the role of telling the hearer (like essentially occasional expressions) that the speaker is performing certain intimated acts (of request, congratulation, condolence, etc.) with an intentional regard to his auditor" (*ibid.*, 848).

What is wrong with this account? For one thing, when Husserl says that a Q has an "immense practical and communicative importance" (which is true enough), it very much sounds as if it is bestowed this honour by default. After all, what else is there left for a Q to

do? On Husserl's own account, talking to oneself in interrogatives would be a waste of words. One would be giving redundant "voice" to what one's experience has "already said", as it were.

> Shall one say that in soliloquy one speaks to oneself, and employs words as signs, i.e. as indications of one's own inner experience? I cannot think such a view acceptable. [*LI* I, §8, 279]

> In a monologue words can perform no function of indicating the existence of mental acts, since such indication would be quite purposeless. For the acts in question are themselves experienced by us at that very moment. [*LI* I, §8, 280]

> In a monologue a question is either of the form 'I ask myself whether . . .', or relation to the subject vanishes entirely: the interrogative expression becomes a mere name, or not really even that. [*LI* VI, §69, 848]

The fact of our occasionally having to *try* to put a Q into words, of having to clarify what that Q is, does not find its way into his analysis. The fact that we sometimes do have to try tells against the view that an interrogative merely "gives voice" to the experience that is already "heard" or "understood". The point of expressing a Q, it seems to me, is to *ask* the Q. In so doing, one "gives voice" not to an underlying experience, but to a *third thing*. And in asking about it—in or out of communication—one brings into the open the "questionability" of the thing itself. Small wonder, then, that one does not ordinarily take a

self-reflective distance in asking a Q. The "self" is not the main business of the Q to begin with. In questioning, all eyes are on the thing called into question.

2. This is not a Speech-Act Critique

Of course, much has happened in the "philosophy of language" in the hundred intervening years since Husserl wrote the Sixth Investigation. Accordingly, the significance of the problem that Husserl was up against might be that much harder for us to appreciate nowadays.[5] It is the speech-act theory of Austin and Co. that has served to discredit referential theories of language, of which Husserl's is one formulation, and by extension the problem of "controversial expressions", which arises within a referential theory. In his essay, "Materials towards a History of Speech Act Theory", Barry Smith points out, succinctly, that the "position in fact adopted by Husserl...may indeed be considered to be the most sophisticated formulation of the classical representationalist theory [of language] which Austin and Co. so vehemently attacked" (1988, 129).

What should we say about this speech-act critique in light of the above discussion on Husserl? Of course, Austin and others are right in rejecting the view according to which the non-stating utterance is no more than an abbreviated statement about an underlying experience. (Never mind the tiny detail that Husserl *also* rejects this view.) However, their being right on this count does not mean that they are right in down-playing the referentialist theory of language as much as they do. Consider, for example, how a speech-act theory would typically deal with the phenomenon of Qs. In its placing undue emphasis on the communicative function of a Q--the same thing happens in Husserl's analysis, by the way--

the issue concerning the "third thing" of a Q all but drops out. In fact, for Austin and Searle, talk about the "third thing" of a Q does not even remotely come up.[6]

No sooner does a speech-act theory reject one reductionist account than it replaces it with yet another reductionist account. Instead of being reduced to an abbreviation, "I am asking whether A is b", a Q now gets reduced to the following of so many rules. Searle expressly puts forward the idea that a Q (and other types of speech) is reducible to a conjunction of "constitutive rules" specific to that one type of illocutionary act (1969, 66).[7] Still another, and earlier, attempt at reducing a Q to the meeting of so many rules is put forward by Harold Jeffreys (1948, 378). According to Jeffreys, the meaning of a Q can be translated into the following triad of statements: "I do not know whether", "I want to know whether", "I believe you know whether" (Hamblin, 1967, 52). What it means to ask a Q is that all three statements are true (i.e., all three conditions are truly met). What are we to say about *this* reductionist approach?

In one sense, it is simply uninformative; in another sense, it is just wrong. What, it is to be asked, does the "I do not know whether" mean if not, "I do not know the answer to the *question*"? What does the "I want to know whether" really mean if not, "I want to know the answer to the *question*"? As one critic of this view aptly puts it, "It is simply as if we were told that the question Q means 'I do not know the answer to Q'; where the definiendum appears as part of the definiens" (Hamblin, 1958, 161). But the problem is not just about the fact that this way of defining a Q is circular; it is also downright wrong. Where this "behaviourist" explanation, and others like it, go critically wrong is that they *identify* what are at best only the background conditions of the thing with the very thing itself. What

explanations like these leave out, at the very last moment, is any mention of the crucial thing that makes a Q what it is--namely, its *intended object*.

The speech-act theories of Austin and others to the contrary, a theory of Qs based on an "objectifying" theory of language, such as Husserl's, is still the right way to go. In fact, *our* position here is not at variance with Husserl's idea that an interrogative has to point: it is at variance with his view that does not strictly follow from a referential theory of language. Husserl says that the interrogative has an object, which is true enough. Our disagreement is with his claim about *what* this object is. Husserl says that it is the questioning experience; we are saying that it is the thing called into question.

A brief historical note should help set the record straight, as well as provide a context for the following section. The fact that speech can be deployed in any number of illocutionary ways was not first noticed by Austin, Searle, and their pragmatic followers, contrary to what is sometimes presumed to be the case. The early "Munich" phenomenologists--Johannes Daubert, not least among them--had already recognized as a problem the fact that speech can be deployed in many different ways. Daubert recognized this partly thanks to his critique of Husserl's theory of non-stating utterances. But in so doing, he ended up not repudiating the sort of "referential" theory of language on which Husserl's theory of non-stating utterances is predicated. Rather, he reaffirmed it; he took the "Meinongian" route of admitting into his ontology types of objects that have no place in Husserl's ontology. The object of a wish is not a wish-experience, but a SAs as wished (a *Wunschverhalt*), which is "out there"; of a command is the *Befehlverhalt*, which is "out there"; of a question is the *Frageverhalt*, which is "out there"; and so forth. Each act has its

own, defining correlate.

3. Daubert's "*Frageverhalt*", Our "State of Affairs in Q"

A Q, according to Daubert, has its own intended object. This object is not the entity itself, but the structure which is opened up around it, which is "about" the entity. The intended object of a judgment, say, "The rose is red", is not the rose itself; it is the SAs of the rose's being red. So in the same way, the intended object of a Q, "Is the rose red?" is not the rose itself either; it is, rather, the SAs of the rose's being red as questioned. To be sure, this "Frageverhalt" does not wholly depend upon what is already given. After all, the very point of a Q is to work out what still remains indeterminate.

Such is Daubert's theory of what a Q targets. I take his view to be basically correct, what I understand of it at any rate. If there is any disagreement between our position and his, it is that he failed to push his own position just one step further. That is, he failed to notice that the intended object of a Q has an intermediary function to fulfil. And perhaps the reason for this failure lay with his too generously extending his analysis so as to include other types of SAs--the SsAs as wished (*Wunschverhalt*), as commanded (*Befehlverhalt*) and so forth. In so doing, he confounded two dimensions of the intended object that ought to be kept distinct: the phenomenological and the ontological.

To explain: The act-quality, not just its propositional "matter", is somehow reflected in the object. For example, corresponding to a wish-act is a "wished" SAs, a warning-act, a "warned" SAs, an X-act, an X-SAs. But then what of it? It may be doubted whether Daubert's point, thus stated, necessarily represents a disagreement with Husserl. Husserl

might reply to Daubert as follows: "Granted, when one, say, wishes for something, one points at a SAs as wished. It is not that one necessarily reflects on this wish-for-ness of the object; but in some sense one does 'know' about it in some pre-reflective sense". It is unclear, then, what Daubert is saying over and above what Husserl is either already saying or already allows. This, at any rate, is what we want to say:

When talking about how the act-quality and the "quality" of the SAs are correlated, it is crucial that we distinguish between "ontological qualities" and "phenomenological qualities". Certain act-qualities are reflected in the object ontologically. In my fearing it, it is given as objectively dangerous; in predicting it, as objectively futuristic; in wishing it, as objectively "good"; etc. These "qualities", along with the object's being blue and thirty feet tall, are given as belonging to the very fabric of the object "out there". We distinguish these ontological act-qualities from those qualities that are reflected in the object phenomenologically. I may "present" or "judge" the dangerous object, the future object, the good object. The object may be ontologically dangerous and futuristic; phenomenologically, however, this dangerous futuristic object may be given as a presentation or as a SAs. Danger and the future may be written all over the object. But there are no names or indicative sentences inscribed all over the thing "out there". Nor are there any question marks or interrogatives. Presentations and SAs are phenomenological structures, whatever the "ontology" of this or that instantiation of it may be. The same is to be said of the object-in-Q.

Once we recognize this very point, namely, that the object-in-Q is "phenomenological", the crucial idea naturally presents itself: The object-in-Q has an

intermediary function to fulfil. Daubert, I think, failed to distinguish sharply the ontological from the phenomenological. And failing to do so, he overlooked just this very point, as did Husserl--the point, namely, that among the basic structures of an object, there are not two but three: in addition to the objects corresponding to a name and a judgment, the third is that corresponding to a Q. Not only does the act "see as" and "see that"; it also, sometimes, sees "whether".

Anything that is simply "there before me", before any explication, is a presentation. A book, the object of a memory, the beauty of this thing, a frictionless surface, an x-ray tube, the number three, a star--any one of these may be given as a presentation. I presentationally see something as this or that. I see this as a bridge, as a book, as beautiful. Not only can I see, in a "naming", something as this or that presentation. I can also, in a judging, see that this something is this or that. In the second case, I set my sights on a state of affairs. But in addition to being able to "see as" and "see that", I can also, in a questioning, see whether, see who, see what, see when, etc. Our point is that there is one way to talk about naming, another about judging, and still quite another about questioning. Appeal here to ordinary speech is no proof by itself; but it is a good indication that characterizing the question as a "state of affairs" is a mistake. It goes against our linguistic instincts to talk about "questioning that", or indeed, "questioning as".

One way of thinking about what a Q is, in grammatical terms, is to located somewhere between "seeing as" and "seeing that". For what this is worth, yet another of explaining it "grammatically" is to place somewhere between naming and judging. How is that? To name something is, in a way, to invite predication. To name is, almost, to question.

Imagine just saying to someone: "Socrates" (What do you want? What about him?); "London bridge" (What about it?); "the selection of the jury" (Did it include me?); "your cooking" (What about my cooking?); "the best things in life" (Are not the worst things in life also free?). Just to name something is to leave the situation incomplete. Without pressing the point too hard, just to name something is to make the object "questionable". (Just to say, "Tom" sounds very like a Q, "Tom?"; and Tom's response, "Yes" sounds very like an answer to it.) In any case, we can think of questioning, in grammatical terms, as straddling somewhere between naming and predication. ("'Socrates'?" "*Socrates was a philosopher*"; "'London bridge'?" "*London bridge is falling down*"; "'The selection of the jury'?" "*The selection of the jury took up the morning*".)

Summing up: We have worked our way through two "theories" of what a Q points at. According to Husserl, the interrogative points at the underlying experience. According to Daubert, a Husserlian who disagrees with Husserl on this point, a Q does, in fact, aim at something "out there". And according to our view: Next to the two phenomenological objects--a presentation and a SAs, we propose to place a third intermediary object, to be called the "object-in-Q". But it gets more complicated: The object-in-Q is *founded* on the SAs; if all goes well, it is eventually revealed as a *SAs as answered*. Our own starting position, then, turns out to be not so very different from Daubert's. True. the "object-in-Q" is an intermediary object *epistemologically*. However--a concession to Daubert--this object, in that it is already "all there" waiting to be discovered, *is*, indeed, a SAs.

By way of closing, I should comment on our notion of the "SAs in Q" in light of the following remark. "Each intentional experience," according to Husserl, "is either an

objectifying act or has its basis in such an act" (*LI* V, §41, 648). In other words: The objectifying act (one's seeing that tiger, say) fixes upon the object. To be contrasted with this objectifying act is the act of feeling, or an emotional act, which *has its basis* in the objectifying act (one's fearing, or hating, or loving, the tiger that one "objectifying" sees). Where, then, should we fit the notion of a Q in this scheme of things? On our view, a *Q* is, like fearing, or any other emotional act, a "founded act"; it does *not* have its very own objectual correlate, as does the act of judging. Moreover, what makes a *Q* "founded" is not so much that it "has its basis" in an objectifying act. After all, the objectifying act is not "there" yet. This act, being a Q, isn't quite yet pointing at the object; the act is still *looking in order to identify* what is still hidden behind the bushes. Nevertheless, the Q act *is* still founded in the sense in that it takes the object, hidden though it is, as being already "all there". In a manner of speaking, a Q does "have its basis" in an objectifying act in the sense that, ontologically, the answer is prior to the Q, even though epistemologically it is obviously the other way about.

B. On the Logic of Questions

This part of the chapter is devoted to a partial defense and explication of the fourth view. It goes in four steps, and it is only in the last step that I shall actually have something explicit to say about the "SAs in Q". In section (1), I argue against the idea according to which answering is simply a matter of affirming or denying; (2) for the idea that the function of "negation" is to deny, but also to recognize; (3) for the idea that answering involves not only a "recognizing", but, at the same time, a "denying". In section (4), I try to verify this logic of

"recognize-and-deny" by showing how it can explain the "phenomenon of emphasis"

(e.g., *A* is b, A is *b*).

1. Husserl's "Theory C" and the Logic of "Affirm or Deny"

We described a Q as a "multi-directed" act. But to this one might offer the objection: In

asking, say, "Where is X?", one looks under a, over b, behind c, etc. Granted, *this* Q is

"multi-directional". But what about when it comes to the yes-no Q? Doesn't a yes-no Q

really involve no more than an affirmation or denial of a singular proposition? And if so,

then isn't it the case that there do exist certain Qs--yes-no Qs--that are not multi-directional

at all? So much, then, for the idea that a Q is multi-directed. This objection warrants a

careful response. The way I propose to deal with it is by way of a critical analysis of

Husserl's "theory C" of questioning (as I call it). Husserl doesn't actually state the above

objection. But going by his "theory C" of questioning, he can be made to state it in effect.

The overriding aim of this section is to dispose of the idea on which "theory C", and the

objection, are predicated, and this is the idea that a Q calls for a "quality of judging". As for

the reason for wanting to dispose of it, this will emerge in due course.

According to Husserl (his "theory C"), a Q has for its objectual correlate either a

"problematic disjunction" (e.g., "whether A or B is") or a "problematic singularity" (e.g.,

"whether A is") (*EJ*, §78, 307). The first type of Q is, in fact, a word Q (although this is not

what Husserl calls it), and the second type of Q is, more obviously, a yes-no Q (although,

again, this is not what he calls it). The "singular" or yes-no Q has, for Husserl, but a single

proposition, a single "theme", with which to work. The only disjunction for the yes-no Q,

e.g., "Is this a mannequin?", is "extrathematic", as he calls it. For neither the "yes" nor

the "no" enters into the theme or proposition, "This is a mannequin". The yes-no Q merely

calls for an assertion or a denial of that single theme:

> Every possible judgment is thinkable as the content of a question. In the
> [yes/no or "singular"] question, it is naturally not yet actual content; rather, it
> is in the question only as contemplated, a merely represented (neutralized)
> judgment and is, as the content of the question, oriented equally toward the
> yes and the no. If [by contrast] the question has several parts [if it is a
> "disjunctive" Q] put in the form of a complete disjunction, then it may read,
> for example, "Is this A or B?" [*EJ*, §78, 309; also *Ideas* I, §94.]

According to Husserl, then, a Q may be classified according to whether it is "singular" or

"disjunctive". Presumably, the singular and the disjunctive types are meant to correspond to

what might be called the "yes-no Q" and the "word Q" respectively. But if this is Husserl's

view, and evidently it is, then he is mistaken. His view to the contrary, every full-fledged Q,

a yes-no Q no less than a word Q, is problematically disjunctive. Moreover, how a

problematically disjunctive Q works is not quite as Husserl describes it.

Husserl takes the object of a problematically singular Q ("Is S p?") to be the

proposition itself. The objective of this yes-no Q is to reach a "judgmental decision".

Answering it involves either affirming or denying the given proposition (S is p). Now, the

problem with all this is that Husserl, consistent philosopher that he is, also takes the object

of a problematically disjunctive Q (say, "Where is S?") to be propositional as well. In this

case, the object happens to be a "field" of propositions. But other than that, the same logic is

supposed to apply. Namely, the objective of this Q, just like that of an explicit yes-no Q, is to reach a judgmental decision.[9] Again, answering this involves simply the affirmation (or denial) of a proposition (e.g., S is under the stairs; S is on the mat; S is behind the door). For Husserl, then, the target of a Q, be it "disjunctive" or "singular" (as he understands the terms) is in either case a proposition. And this means that the questioning act must somehow be external to the meaning with which it is implicated. Indeed, Husserl insists on as much: a Q is "a practical mode of behaviour *relative to* judgments" (emphasis mine). An answer, on the other hand, is a judicative decision", i.e., a decision "about" a proposition (*EJ*, §78, 308, 309).[10]

Husserl's account of questioning has at least this much going for it: It is consistent. Some Qs are singular, others are disjunctive. But any one of them involves, in answering it--here's the consistency--the act of affirming or denying. We, too, have a consistent account. Obviously, some Qs are yes-no Qs, others are word Qs. But any and every Q--here's our consistency--is problematically disjunctive, or "multi-directional". But then, it might be asked, "How, on your account, could a yes-no Q possibly be 'disjunctive'? Isn't it just an affirmation or denial of a given proposition?"

An approximate answer to this: A yes-no Q works with not one, but *two* propositions. What this Q discloses are two *objective* possibilities (*p* and *not-p*), *not* two possible subjective attitudes toward a single proposition (I affirm *p* or I deny *p*). But I stress that this is an approximate answer. In fact, this account, in the "propositionalist" way that it is stated, risks losing sight of the fact that correlated to the yes-no Q are not two, but only *one* SAs. In order to do justice to this fact, I shall have to substitute for this propositional

talk of "p" the terminological talk of "A is b". I shall expound on this point momentarily.

Summing up: The yes-no Q, as well as, obviously, the word Q, is multi-directional. The object of a yes-no Q is, indeed, "objective", rather than "propositional". With a yes-no Q, one aims at two objective possibilities "through" the two propositions (p and not-p), rather than at two possible "judgmental decisions" (of affirming p or denying p). It is in this sense that a Q is "multi-directional": The act is directed at a multiplicity of possibilities-- two at least--which are given as being "out there". That said, we have not quite yet disposed of the idea that an answering is a matter of affirming or denying. (Call this "logic I"). Nor have we provided an unambiguous statement of the position which is meant to replace it. (In fact, there are two possible replacements: "logic II" or "logic III", as we shall call them.) It is to these unfinished matters that we now turn.

2. Taking "No" for an Answer

Why does Husserl hold the view to the effect that answering takes up a "quality of judging"? And what are we philosophically getting ourselves into by adopting a contrary view? This, I suspect, is one of his reasons, unstated though it may be. Husserl happens to hold the usual view according to which negative facts are not to be regarded as constituents of the world.[11] What is it that is being referred to when one says, for example, "This rose is not red"? A standard reply to this question is that the negative judgment is no more than a positive act of denying that that rose is red.[12] Husserl seems to adopt some such explanation: A is not b comes to the same as I deny "A is b".[13] The suggestion would not be

far-fetched that perhaps one of the factors that pressures Husserl into taking up this view--a Q calls for an "affirming" or "denying"--is bound up with the fact that his ontology fails to make allowance for "negative SsAs".[14]

Where do we stand on this? It is obvious by now that we are rejecting his view to the effect that a Q calls for an affirming or denying of a judgment. But rejecting this, note well, doesn't automatically commit us to the "embarrassing" view that there exist such things as negative facts. There is, after all, the "Fregean" option that we might want to take instead. (More on that option shortly.) In fact, it turns out that our account of questioning does bring with it an ontology that allows for the existence of negative facts, for the following reason. The point of a Q is to "get the truth" of something; the point of an answer is to tell it. (Or so I think that this is how it works.) An answer takes the form of "acknowledging" or recognizing "what is" the case. So far as I can tell, this is always the "point" of an answer. And it is not as if only some answers--"positive answers"--recognize "what is", and other answers--"negative answers"--have to go into a different gear and "deny".

This very much seems to be the general rule, if not the strict rule: A negative answer, as well as positive answer, being what it is, is supposed to recognize the truth of the matter. But none of this should be so hard to believe. The performative metaphysics of a yes-no Q is such that it is open to an answer that might point in the direction of a negative fact. We can actually catch this "performative metaphysics" at work by considering what makes certain negative replies to Qs inappropriate, and others appropriate. Interestingly, the inappropriate ones happen to be denials rather than recognitions. Consider the following.

(i) Take the Q, "What colour is this rose?" The answer, "It is not red", would be inappropriate relative to the Q. This is because the Q, like any other Q, calls for a recognition (e.g., "It is white"), not a denial (e.g., "It is not red"). (ii) Take the Q, "Is the rose red?" The answer to this Q, "It is not red", is, by contrast, appropriate so far as it does acknowledge "what is the case". Notice, the answer to the first Q, "It is not red" (read: "A is not b") and the answer to the second Q, "It is not red" (read: "A is-not b") are very different answers. The first says to the effect, "It is false"; the second says to the effect, "It is true". Whereas the first fails to deliver what the Q called for, the second succeeds. (iii) Take the Q, "Which of these roses is not red?" The answer, "This rose is not red" is appropriate. Although this answer (read: "A is-not b") has a negation sign in it, it nonetheless recognizes "what is the case". On the other hand, answering, "Well, this one's white" is, in reference to this Q, inappropriate. Although it has no negation sign in it, it nonetheless denies rather than recognizes. Relative to the Q, which is looking for a *negative* fact, it effectively says, in the way of a retraction, something like, "Well, among the ones that aren't red, it sure isn't this one".

Our thesis is that the business of an answer is to "recognize" the truth of what is the case. To be sure, the thesis has to be refined, and qualified, when it comes to Qs which expressly ask, "Is it false?", "Is it true?", "True or false?". If I say, "It is false that A is b", where is the "recognition of a truth" in saying it? That I am speaking truly? Well, I had better be. But surely, that is not what I am "recognizing" when I say, "It is false that--", or even, "It is true that--". What, then, about these Qs which move to a higher order, and which ask, instead of "Is A b?", "Is it true that A is b?"? I shall postpone a discussion of this

matter until the end of Chapter 4. In the meantime, suffice it to say that the business of an answer is to recognize a truth, and this is the case whether the Q behind it is, "Is *A* b?", "Is A *b*?", "Does A exist?", or, "Is it true that A is b?"

Summing up the first two sections: Husserl's "theory C" effectively reduces a Q to a call for a "judgmental decision". The answering provides a judgment with a quality of judgment, a positioning or negating, an approval or rejection. We argued against this view, maintaining that it is not able to do justice to the way questioning actually works, which is such that it calls for a "recognition" of a "truth". According to our position, even a no-answer would have to point to a fact, albeit a negative fact, just as much as a yes-answer would have to point to a positive fact. For what a "proof by performance" is worth, questioning is open to the existence of negative facts, or at least behaves as if they did exist, by virtue of the fact that it can take "No" for an answer. And so I think they do; their manifest existence may be taken as an argument for our rejection of theory C, not an "embarrassing" consequence of that rejection. Anyway, a rejection of theory C does not logically commit us to the belief in negative facts. There is another route we could take instead--namely, the Fregean. But as we shall see in a moment, this too proves unable to capture the "logic of a question". We are now in a position in which to outline the ABC's of this logic. Call it "logic III", and contrast it with (Husserl's) "logic I" and (Frege's) "logic II".

3. The Logic of Recognize and Deny

Logic I: For Husserl, a "Yes" answer is a matter of affirming a proposition, a "No" answer

is a matter of denying it:

> one affirms [p] (true)

> one denies [p] (false)

Logic II: For Frege, as for Husserl, a yes-no Q operates with one proposition only. However, on Frege's view, as opposed to Husserl's, "Yes" and "No" do not correspond to modes of judgments. Position and negation belong to the content of the judgment itself, not to the attitude towards it. Hence, in answering a Q, one does not affirm or deny a judgment; rather, one asserts the affirmative judgment ([p]), or asserts the denying judgment ([not-p]). So, for example, an answer to a yes-no Q, or a propositional Q (Satzfrage), as Frege calls it, is "an assertion based upon a judgement; this is so equally whether the answer is affirmative or negative" ("Negation", 1977, 31). This is the Fregean alternative to Husserl's view:

> one asserts [p] (true)

> one asserts [not-p] (false)

Logic III breaks down like this:

> one recognizes ["p"] (true)

> one recognizes ["not-p"] (true)

> one denies ["p"] (false)

> one denies ["not-p"] (false)

According to logic I, negation is matter of denying, and that is that. According to logic II, negation is a matter of asserting a falsehood. On this view, one asserts that [p], in which case, p is supposed to be true; or one asserts that [not-p], in which case p is supposed to be false. According to logic III, on the other hand, negation plays two qualitatively different

roles: it plays the role of denying as false (a qualified concession to logic I) and the role of telling the true (a concession to logic II only to the extent that it places negation on the side of logical content). Logic III can capture ontological nuances that logics I and II cannot: The rose is not-red "recognizes" that the rose is some colour other than red; the rose is-not red "recognizes" the negative state of affairs that the rose is not red; the rose is not red "denies" as false that the rose is not red; (it is not the case) that the rose is red (or not-[A is b]) denies that the positive SAs that the rose is red obtains); it is not the case that the rose is-not red (not-[A is-not b]) denies that the negative SAs obtains; etc.

Why opt for "logic III"? Logic I does not capture the "recognizing" function of a Q. Nor can it do justice to the fact that our answers now and then do come into contact with negative facts. Neither, for that matter, is logic II quite equipped to deal with negative facts. Negation can mean only "it isn't true", or "it's false"; but it can't mean (heaven forbid the negative fact!), "(it is true that) A is-not b, or A is not-b, etc." It is logic III, by contrast, which is best suited to describe how we actually do cognitive commerce with things in the world.

Logic III is the logic of questioning and answering, which is immanently deployed in these very activities. So far as "questioning" and "intentionality" are correlated notions, we can put it somewhat differently and say instead that it is the logic of intentionality. A final point: In accommodating for two types of negation, logic III has an advantage over logics I and II in the way of explanatory power on this very point that will prove central to this work. Namely, operative in any and every answering act--and this is apart from whether it "recognizes" any positive or negative facts--is the denying of the contending possibilities

"as false", e.g., "This rose is red, which is to say, not any other colour". The plot has

now thickened. In the next section, I shall introduce the basics of this idea that the

achievement of an answering act is both to recognize and to deny.

(A cautionary note is in order: Again, I shall discuss what I think it means to say,

expressly, "It is true that—" and "It is false that—" near the end of Chapter 4. Here, by "[it is

true that] A is b", I mean simply that the SAs, <A's being b> is recognized as true, not that

the act has moved into the second-order and is prefaced with an express, "It is true". And I

mean that this "recognizing" is a *moment* of an act, of which denying is the other moment.

This second-order act, by the way, is still comprised of the two moments of recognize and

deny. A similar point applies to "[it is false that] A is other than b", which is a moment of

an act: This is not equivalent to one's expressly saying, "It is false that A is other than b",

which is still comprised of the two moments of recognize and deny. On this view, the

"truth" and "falsity" of recognize and deny, respectively, is "existentially" deeper than talk

about, "It is true" and "It is false", in which, anyway, the two moments of recognize and

deny remain operative. But again, more will be said about something's being true or false

late in Chapter 4.)

4. The Phenomenon of Emphasis

Such at any rate is our claim: An answering act consists of both an "upfront" recognizing of

what is true and a "background" denying of what is false. I shall provide a provisional

argument for this by way of examining the phenomenon of the "allomorph" (as I shall call

it, following Stephen Boër [1979, 264]).[15] To illustrate what I mean, here are only six

allomorphic ways to say "Caesar invaded Britain in 55 B.C.".

1. *Caesar* invaded Britain in 55 B.C.

2. Caesar *invaded* Britain in 55 B.C.

3. Caesar invaded *Britain* in 55 B.C.

4. Caesar invaded Britain *in* 55 B.C.

5. Caesar invaded Britain in *55 B.C.*

6. Caesar invaded Britain in 55 B.C.

Now, the obvious thing about the five stressed allomorphs is how easily they may be construed as answers to fairly specific Qs. The first Q is, "Who--?", the second, "Did what?", "To what?", "Before, after, or in?", "What year?" Stating the point differently, an answer is a "stressed" or emphasized act. As for the sixth allomorph, which is unstressed, it is anybody's guess what Q it is meant to answer, or even if it is supposed to answer to begin with. (I shall postpone further discussion about the "unstressed allomorph" until Part C.)

What bearing does all this have on our idea that answering involves a "denying" moment? What examples 1-5 are meant to show, among other things, is that there is more to an answer than just its surface content. As "sentences", they are identical, of course. But as answers, they are markedly different. What makes each answer different? It is not enough to say that they are differently stressed, which would be only to point out the phenomenon, but not yet to explain it. The question is, What is the logic of this stressing? What does the stressing do? What is constitutive of it? The answer to this, I maintain--this is the less obvious part--is that it has to do with the act of denying. A different denying, a different allomorph. Here is how I propose to "demonstrate" our thesis that answering is a dual act of

"recognize and deny": by showing that our thesis does a very good job at explaining what differentiates one allomorph from another. Consider these two answers, say, "The *rose* is red" and "The rose is *red*". Are they semantically different? Here are three possible answers to this: Yes; No; and Both yes and no. I shall argue for the third.

YES: The first answer would be Collingwood's, who might want to say that the allomorphs are actually semantically different. (I mean "semantically different" in the sense that they would have different truth-conditions.) This would be premised on his apparent view to the effect that the meaning of a statement is actually a function of the Q behind it.[16] (More about his view in a moment.)

NO: The second answer would be Daubert's; it may also be the answer that most philosophers would be prepared to give. (More on Daubert's position specifically in C.1. below.) According to this view, the different Qs behind these different allomorphs do not affect their semantic cores. However differently stressed they may be, they are semantically identical. Collingwood's mistake consists in having conflated the pragmatics of an utterance with its semantics. Take, for example, his assertion that "Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question" (1940, 21). In the context in which he says this, it might first sound like a semantical claim. But on a closer reading, his claim is not nearly so bold as that, for it has to do with the "pragmatics", not the "semantics", of an answer.

The first answer says, "Yes, the semantics of the two answers, 'The *rose* is red' and 'The rose is *red*' are different". The second answer says, "No, they are identical. Their meanings are not a function of the Qs behind them. The Qs behind them, the stressing, what makes these answers, etc.--these are matters having to do only with the circumstances in

which the utterance is made. However important these matters may be, they do not enter into the 'logical formation' of the utterance itself". The third answer, which is ours, attempts to do justice to both sides, and it goes as follows:

BOTH YES AND NO: Obviously, there is a "pragmatic difference" between the two allomorphic answers, "The *rose* is red" and "The rose is *red*". Almost as obviously, this difference is, loosely speaking, correlated to the different Qs behind the answers. (Collingwood is at least right about this much.) Up to this point, we wholly agree with the second position. However, in criticism of it, we hasten to add the point that this "pragmatic difference" is still a semantic difference for all that. An answer denies as well as recognizes. The answer, "The *rose* is red--not the daffodil, not the daisy", is, indeed, semantically different from this answer, "The rose is *red*--not blue, not white". The two allomorphs point to the same thing "out there"; they acknowledge the same thing. But they are each denying as "false" something different.

To conclude: An answer has, then, two "meaning moments". The one concerns a truth, pointing at what is out there, the other concerns what "did not make it as the truth", so to speak.[17]

C. So Much Questioning, So Much Realism

We have now come full circle. We started out with a discussion of how the objectual correlate of Q might be structured. We then worked out the "double semantics" of questioning and answering, and concluded that to answer is both to acknowledge X and to deny its logical contrary. At this final stage, with our logic worked out, we may return to the

discussion of the "SAs in Q" (section 2). In preparation for this, however, we shall first

present a brief analysis of the intended object of an answer (section 1). The aim of this part

of the chapter is to bring out the realist implications of our analysis up to this point. The

claim, part of it, is that one has access to the factuality of a SAs in proportion that it is, at

least structurally, a state of affairs as answered. The business of questioning, then—or

intentionality, to put it more radically—is to get at the reality of things, not just know about

them. Consequently, the experience of reality is as phenomenologically relevant as the "act"

and the "content". All this will make better sense momentarily.

1. The State of Affairs as Answered

I am going to argue, to a point, for a claim that goes roughly as follows. (I expect to

strengthen the case more fully, again, toward the end of the next Chapter.) Correlated to the

"stressing" of an answer is the "embossment" of the related SAs. For a SAs to be embossed,

for it to have "depth", is for it to appear to me as real as opposed to merely "photographic".

Better yet, it is for the "SAs" to appear to me as a SAs, no inverted commas necessary. In

other words: No embossment, no "ontological" access to the factuality of that SAs. Sure, we

all "know" that 2 and 2 is 4; but unless that SAs is embossed, we can't "see into" its

factuality, we can't experience its reality. What allows us to see into its factuality, what

gives it the appearance of depth is the denying function, "not 5, not 6, not 3, not 2". What is

recognized is the remainder, which is 4.

In order to articulate our position on what makes for the intended object of an

answer, I shall bring Daubert into the discussion once again, contrasting his position with

ours. According to Daubert, the difference between an objective state of affairs

(*Sachverhalt*) and the same state of affairs as cognized (*Erkenntnisverhalt*) principally turns

on the element of emphasis. A state of affairs "out there" does not unfold itself to me apart

from my "interest-guided emphases" that I bring to bear on it (AI2, 37v). When I look with

a certain interest at some object in order to gain knowledge thereof, then the object does not

fall into my gaze as something which exists on its own accord; the object rather develops in

reflection of my consideration of it" ([AI2, 18v; also AI2, 17v, 63r]; trans., Schuhmann and

Smith [1987, 377]). Objectually correlated to the allomorphic acts, "The *rose* is red" and

"The rose is *red*" are, in Daubertian terminology, different *Erkenntnisverhalte*. Now to a

few comments on our agreement, and disagreement, with Daubert.

    The first comment reiterates a point made in the above section. Daubert maintains,

in effect, that there is no semantic difference between "*S* is p" and "S is *p*". His view is that

the "animated sense of the sentence [i.e., the allomorphic sentence] is made up of the

interest guided emphases which, however, do not disturb the sentence-meaning and its

structure" [(AI2, 37v); ibid., 378].) The emphasis (*Betonung*) in a sentence is strictly

pragmatic. Emphasis provides the hearer's clue as to the speaker's purpose (AI2, 20r, 17r;

ibid., 378). Our view on this, to recall, is: In terms of "truth", there is, indeed, no semantic

difference between the allomorphs, "*S* is p" and "S is *p*". However, in terms of what each is

denying, there is a semantic difference. The "practical" difference concerning the speaker's

purpose, and the like, on our view, is a function of this difference in what is being denied as

false.

    Second, Daubert evidently holds the view that one can see that <*S* is p> or that <S is

p>, but not, purely and simply, that <S is p>. One cognizes a state of affairs not purely

and simply, but with this or that feature of it thrown into relief. We may put his view, and

also ours, down to a slogan: "No emphasis, no embossment of that state of affairs". And:

"No embossment, no access to it". Differences of detail notwithstanding, I agree with this

part of Daubert's position. Now, seeing that this was his own position--"No emphasis, no

access"--one would think that Daubert had all but made a good argument for the view that

questioning is "prior" to the judging. Accordingly, he might have argued something along

these lines: "Interpret the *'Erkenntnisverhalt'*--the state of affairs as judged with emphasis--

as the *'Antwortverhalt'*. And then reformulate the thesis to read, 'No question, no access'".

In writing a work on the "phenomenology of questioning", the idea of ascribing

some kind of priority to the questioning act must have occurred to Daubert, and so it did.

Daubert does consider at one stage Heinrich Rickert's point that the act of judging carries

the attitude of an answer, but only in order to reject Rickert's point. Daubert writes that "the

peculiar attitude which lies in answering a question" is not, in fact, an essential part of "the

original type of judgment" (A2, 78v; Schuhmann and Smith, [1987, 364]). After all, a

judgment, he argues, does not normally follow a Q as a sequel, and anyhow it need not do

so. All that may very well be true. Yet is still seems that Daubert, given his insistence on the

sensible distinction between the *Sachverhalt* and the *Erkenntnisverhalt*, could have--and

should have--still capitalized on the point that there is a profound connection between the

Erkenntnisverhalt and the *Antwortverhalt* all the same.

On our view, a SAs is accessible only in so far as the act is "stressed", only in so far

as one part of its object is thrown into relief. And on our view, also--which Daubert does

not seem to have entertained as a possibility--a SAs as cognized has to have the structure of a SAs as answered: No answer-structure, no access to that SAs. And on our view, the "priority" of the Q, at least in the sense that we are talking about questioning here, is not so much a "hermeneutical priority" ("No question behind it, no making sense of it") as an *existential* priority. The point is not so much that the "meaning" of a SAs isn't accessible unless it is a SAs as answered (which may be a doubtful assertion). Rather, unless a SAs is structurally given "as answered", it can't take on the "look" of being real--in which case it can't be given as a SAs.

What gives this intended object its "look" of being real? In order to answer this, it is necessary that we first consider more carefully the difference, and the similarity, between logic II and logic III (so-called).

In the Fregean scheme of things, although negation belongs to the content of the proposition, it is still external to the structure of the proposition. And when placed next to the proposition, it means that "this is false". Hence, the "atomic" unit of meaning is the proposition. Not so according to an "Aristotelian" logic of terms. Here, the basic unit isn't sentential but terminological; it is the terms, the subject and predicate, out of which the proposition is constructed. (Contrasting this Aristotelian logic of terms with his own, Frege says that "A distinction of subject and predicate finds no place in my way of representing a judgment".[18]) Maybe up to a point, then, our "logic III" may be described as a "logic of terms". The argument might go roughly as follows:

As opposed to logic II, logic III can 'break into' the proposition, just like a logic of terms. Logic II can make sense of the logical formation, 'not-{A is b}', which means, 'it is

false that A is b'. However, it is unable to break into what is inside the parentheses. And hence, any talk about negative facts is ruled out in advance. Not so with logic III". What about such an interpretation? There is a risk in associating logic III with a logic of terms.

For one thing, Aristotelian logic (I take this to mean roughly the same as a logic of terms) fails, or is unable, to account for negative facts.[19] To say, "A is not b" represents something like a separation of subject and predicate. And second, with a logic of terms, one doesn't "break into" a proposition. Rather, a proposition is either put together (A is b) or, in a sense, not put together (A is not b) by the cognizing subject, precisely by keeping the terms separate. Arguably, herein lies a key difference between, on the one hand, a logic of terms, and, on the other, logic III, as well as logic II (and, maybe also, logic I). According to a logic of terms, the unity of a judgment is founded on the synthesizing subject, who juxtaposes the "A" and "B" and provides the cementing "is".

This explanation, the "propositionalist" might argue, rightly, is a piece of psychologism. The term logician cannot account for the persistence of the unity in the negative judgment "A is not B", when making such a judgment is supposed an act of separating! The point of the criticism is that there is no subjective separation here, nor, conversely, any subjective synthesizing. There is only the unity of the judgment, whether it is asserted as true or false, whether "positive" or "negative"; and this unity lies with the proposition itself, the "whole", not with the aggregate of two pieces placed side by side, or kept apart from each other.[20]

On our view, the source of the unity of the "A is b" lies not with the synthesizing subject, nor with the proposition either, but with the state of affairs, which is "out there". I

see that A is b precisely in its being "thus--and not otherwise". The "thus" relates to the what the answer recognizes as "true", and the "not otherwise" relates to those possibilities which the answer has effectively closed off as being "false". I "see" the reality of the thus-and-so of the intended SAs in proportion to my seeing it as being "not otherwise".[21] There is a distinctively "realist" point to the above argument. I shall try to firm up the realist case in the next section, in which I shall round out this discussion with a complementary analysis of the SAs in Q.

2. The "State of Affairs in Question", Revisited

Asking, "Where is the cat?", I would not, ordinarily, go through a string of separate Qs, each time aiming at a separate SAs, e.g., "Is the cat on the mat? Then is the cat in the tree? Then is it under the stairs? &c." Ordinarily, there would be only one overarching questioning act, with one intended object, even though the act itself "runs through" different possibilities concerning that same object. "Is the cat--on the mat, in the tree, under the stairs?" Going by this, we would have to say that what the act runs through are not different propositions, but different "predicate-expressions" (--is on the mat, --is in the tree, --is under the stairs). Very well, I might get detained with one of the possibilities, with whether, say, the cat is under the stairs. But in that case, I shift gears into another Q, "Is it under the stairs?" And in this case, as with the word Q, "Where is it?", I aim not through different propositions and at correspondingly different possible SsAs. Rather, I aim through a single Q at an object-in-Q, which is but one "eclipsed" SAs. And what I have to work with are two terms, "is under the stairs" and "is-not under the stairs". To continue with our appeal to

experience: I'm already intentionally fastened on to the cat. Now all I have to do is find out where it is.

The point is: The "multi-directionality" of a questioning act--a predicative Q, at any rate--is not multi-propositional. (In that case, the mode of operation of a Q would be to "run through" a series of propositions--p, q, and r. Aiming through each proposition, it would correspondingly point at different SsAs--SAs-p, SAs-q, and SAs-r.) No, the multi-directionality of a Q is, for lack of a better term, multi-predicative. But so what if it is multi-predicative? At the risk of identifying the one with the other, let us say that the object-in-Q is an "eclipsed SAs", that one part of it is blocked from one's intentional vision. The aim of the Q is to "uncover" this hidden or eclipsed part of a SAs. The moment the occluded part is uncovered, the Q is "answered" and the object-in-Q "re-emerges" as a "SAs as answered". Why make a big deal about this?

The aim of a Q is not to scan the fact-x or SAs-x, that it is possible that "SAs-a"; the SAs-y that it is possible that "SAs-b"; and so forth. In a way, these facts, these SsAs, these that-it-is-possible-that's are already known and, hence, they are not in question. Rather, the aim of a Q is to catch sight of a hidden determination of a SAs. The "Q" is not about, "Which one of these possible SsAs obtains?"; it is about, "Which one of the possibilities of this SAs is actual? What is the precise determination of this SAs?" Putting this another way: On the view that a Q scans different SsAs, the logical formation of a Q comes down to a random set of propositions, e.g., "Which is it? 'Columbus discovered America in 1492'. 'The rose is blue'. 'The time is five o'clock'". But this is utter nonsense. Without a lot of stage-setting, we don't ask such "questions". Nor, by implication, is the sort of Q that we

would ask, e.g., "What colour is this rose?" asked in a propositional way: "Which is it? 'The rose is red'. 'The rose is blue'; etc." Rather, the Q aims at a single object-in-Q, behind which there is one SAs, which has yet to be revealed: <The rose--(what colour)>.

The SAs correlated to, or "behind", the object-in-Q is, in a way, ontologically prior to the object-in-Q. Once the questioning act catches sight of the SAs, the meaning materials "S" and "p" are suddenly pulled together and unified as "S is p". Again, this happens not so much by the work of the judging subject, but by the objectivity of the SAs, which the judging subject happens to recognize as being "thus-and-so, not otherwise". But there is more: It is not as if the object-in-Q is, alas, just an obstacle which stands in my way, and which I have to get around in order to see the SAs in its entirety. Rather, it is through overcoming this obstacle that the SAs--this object-in-Q--can be exposed as a SAs in its "factuality". In answering the Q, I not only recognize the thus-and-so of the "state of affairs"; in denying the contending possibilities, the SAs is given to me as being just that, namely, a SAs. The implications of our analysis of the SAs in Q are both ontological and epistemological. *Ontologically*, the "SAs as answered" is prior to the "SAs in Q". (Unless the former is already assumed to be there, the latter can't be there either.) And *epistemologically*, questioning is "prior" in that this act is required in order to see the SAs as an existing SAs.

D. Conclusion

Roughly, the point of Part A of this Chapter was to elucidate the structure of the intended target of a predicative Q (the "object-in-Q" or, alternatively, the "SAs in Q"), and, by

implication, a predicative answer (the SAs as answered). The point of Part B was to show that a Q elicits it, and an answer provides it--namely, the "double semantics" of recognizing what is true and denying what is false. And, putting these findings together, the point of Part C was to put forward a realist thesis, which we have just gone over. I expect to strengthen our case in the following Chapter. I shall be examining, mainly among other things, the notions of evidence and, which turns out to be the same thing, informativeness. Keep in mind, the next chapter is the second of two parts; both Chapters, this one and the next, concern specifically the predicative Q, as opposed to the hermeneutical Q--that quite different sort of Q, which will receive a separate treatment in the Chapter 5.

An Addendum on Supposing: Up to this point, I have been dealing with "actual" states of affairs, which are correlated to judgments such as, "This snow is white", "The chair needs fixing", or, moving toward more "spiritual" concreta--"This factory is being sold", "This is the constitution the Athenians lived by", "This bank notice is null and void", "The number expressing the value of pi goes on forever", "This frictionless plane", etc. The question at this point is how we are to fit "abstracta" into our account, be it material abstracta (about snow, tables, trees) or spiritual abstracta (bank notices, torts, wars). By "abstracta", I have in mind specifically those objects which serve as targets of supposing acts. These objects are "abstract" in the sense that no claim is being made as to whether or not they exist. I shall start with (a-b) some general remarks about what a "supposing act" is, and then (c) bring the discussion to bear on the notion of the object-in-Q. Of course, a complete analysis would require a lot more dissecting than I am able to provide here. I hasten to add that a supposing Q does not have to be predicative. Predicative: "Supposing

that this is snow, what colour would it be?" Hermeneutical: "Supposing it is cold, white, and comes in six-pointed crystals, what is it?")

(a) One might be tempted to place the notions of "assuming", "hypothesizing", "presume", "suppose", and the like, in with the group of "doxic" or epistemological acts, such as certainty and doubting. However, they are not essentially "epistemological" notions. (More on doxic modalities in Chapter 4.) These acts belong in a class of their own. (See Husserl's *Ideas* I [§110, 259].) Sure, in supposing X, I may be predisposed to ask, "But does X really obtain?", "How can I be sure about X, anyway?", etc. Still, supposing isn't essentially tied specifically to doubting, or to questioning, or to some other doxic mode. In supposing X, I postulate it "for argument's sake"; or I assume it until further notice; etc. But the moment I ask about the supposed X, "How certain is it that X obtains?", "Does it obtain?", I am no longer quite in the supposing mode. To question a supposition, to doubt it, to assess it, or what-not, is no longer to suppose, but to point at a supposition with a Q, with a doubting, etc.

However, having just said all that, we hasten to add that one doesn't just suppose, and then leave it at that. To suppose is to start out with something, and then go somewhere with it. Supposing X, one asserts y; supposing X, one questions whether y; etc.

(b) Husserl, in his *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, calls a supposed state of affairs a "proposition" (*Satz*). "Judgments, in the sense proper to apophantic logic, are supposed predicatively formed affair-complexes as supposed" (*ibid.*, §45). Commenting on this, J.N. Mohanty notes: "Since apophantic logic as a pure logic of consequence deals with senses alone, its domain consists of supposed objectivities qua supposed" (1982A, 98). A

different way of putting Husserl's, and Mohanty's, point might be as follows. In making an extensional claim ("This snow is white"), one points at some actual SAs, and does so either truly or falsely. On the other hand, in making an "intensional" claim, in saying, e.g., "Snow is white", or, in defining it, "Snow is frozen water vapour in the form of white feathery flakes or crystals", it is neither here nor there whether there is any snow in the world right now, or even whether there ever was or will be any snow. The "point" of an intensional utterance, such as "Snow is white" is, without being "iffy" about it: If there is any snow, then that snow is white. "Snow is white" has an implicit if-then, or "suppositional" structure. This, I take it, is the standard, and reasonable, way of explaining the "truth" of an intensional utterance, notably a definition. And I also take it that it is also Husserl's explanation.

(c) Husserl still holds the Brentanist thesis that an intentional act has to have an object. How, then, does he explain the non-extensionality of, say, a definition (or certain definitions)? Even the intensional act is, in a way, extensional, at least in that it still points at a state of affairs as supposed. All well and good. But perhaps it might be better not to speak of a SAs "as supposed", and this for two reasons. If I say, "If x, then y", then what is supposed is not a SAs, but only a part of a SAs, <(if) x (then) is y>. And if I say, which is quite different, "If (x is y)", then what is supposed is, admittedly, a SAs; however, this SAs itself is "nominalized". The act then requires completion; or, alternatively, the higher-order state of affairs requires disclosing, e.g., <(if) {x is y} (then) is z>. You don't just say "The Eiffel Tower" unless you're pointing at it, in which case the phenomenon "completes the sentence", or, better still, "completes" the object-in-Q. By the same token, one just wouldn't

say, "Supposing the Eiffel Tower were falling down". If that is all that one were to say,

we would do him the courtesy of adding a question mark to the end of it. "'Supposing it to

be so'? Well, what then?"

1. I am using the term "see" quite loosely. One can see what is called to mind, what is envisaged, as well as what is visually "perceived". In a manner of speaking, one can also see facts or SAs, in the way that one sees *that this gold is yellow* precisely *through* the visible constituents gold and yellow [*LI* VI, §44].) However, strictly speaking, "I can see colour. but not *being*-coloured. . . . I can hear a sound, but not that something *is* sounding" (*LI* VI. §43,780). Finally, and this is according to Husserl, there is also a non-sensory type of perception that allows us to see ideal entities, such as numbers (*LI* VI, §47). For further reading on "simple seeing" and "propositional seeing", see Kevin Mulligan's (1995) paper on Husserl, simply entitled, "Perception".

2. See n5 below.

3. My criticisms of the closing discussion of the Sixth Investigation do not necessarily apply to what Husserl also says about wishing, commanding, etc. (Indeed, I agree with Husserl's contention about the *optative* sentence specifically--namely, that it points at the underlying wish-experience.) Anyway, the idea of subjecting any and all kinds of "controversial" utterances to the same analysis merely on the basis that they are non-stating acts is itself dubious.

4. Husserl explains, at the end of this 1920 foreword, that he had "changed [his] position on the problem of the phenomenological interpretation of interrogative and optative sentences shortly after the first edition of the work. . ." (*LI*, 664). Since there was "no place for small revisions, which were all that could be undertaken at the time", Husserl decided to leave the original argument "unaltered" (*ibid.*). We may compare this with the "author's footnote" in §127 of *Ideas I* (1913), in which Husserl says: "Cf. with this...the final chapter of the Sixth

Investigation of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, Vol. II. One sees that since then the author has not stood still. . ." (303n99).

I have not been able to ascertain what those "revisions" were, or would have been. In his paper, "Husserl and the Logic of Questions", C. Struyker Boudier refers to the foreword to the Second Edition of the *LI* with this remark: "Which changes [Husserl] made we can see in *Ideen I* of 1913" (1983, 387). "It is apparent . . . that Husserl's position with regard to the problem of questions has undergone drastic change" (*ibid.*, 399). I see no indication of such a drastic change. When we move from the *LI* to *Ideas I*, the only apparent change as far as Husserl's talk about Qs is concerned is a change from one topic to another topic. When Husserl talks about the subject of Qs in the Sixth Investigation, he does so in the context of a speech act analysis of sorts. And when he talks about Qs in a few places in the *Ideas*, he does so in terms of its "doxicality". Of course, the topics themselves are drastically different. But from this it hardly follows that Husserl's *position* on the subject of Qs had "drastically changed". (More on his "theory D" of Qs in Chapter 4.) Admittedly, this represents a "change of subject", but it hardly constitutes what Husserl would have us understand by "change" in the foreword--evidently, the very sort of change that Boudier is convinced has taken place in the Husserl texts.

Whatever Husserl's final view was concerning the questioning act, the last word on this matter "would need to take account of the still un-transcribed MSS on `Frage- und Wunschverhalt'* in the Husserl Archives in Louvain" (Barry Smith [1986], 148n18). However, going just by the texts that we have right in front of us, it does not appear that Husserl had in any way "drastically" changed his mind concerning the Sixth Investigation.

5. In any case, it was not just *Husserl's* problem. Cook Wilson felt it necessary to point out that when "'putting questions to ourselves, we should be said to be *thinking*. This certainly is the ordinary view. . .'" (Somerville [1989, 527)]. To which nowadays one might want to respond, as if the point were already philosophically obvious: "Really?!" When Collingwood decided to include questioning among the activities of thought, it is as if he were taking a bold step (*Essay on Metaphysics* [1940, 106]). It may be that Cook Wilson

and Collingwood were belabouring a point that is not so obvious after all. See also Somerville [1989, 527]), "Collingwood's Logic of Question and Answer":

> Questions also present a challenge to the easy assumption that all thought is either true or false. . . . If thoughts are true or false, they...cannot be interrogative in form. Yet posing questions to oneself is thinking too. as Cook Wilson recognized. . . ." [526-27]

6. If we could get them to answer *our* question--"Then just what is being *referred to* in asking a Q, if Husserl and other referentialists are wrong?"--"their" answer to it would be less convincing than Husserl's. Here is the sort of answer that they would give. This is a caricature, but it is not far off the mark: "The issue isn't really about what a Q 'refers to'. It is about where a Q *comes from*. On our view, an utterance-type is a type of 'language game'. What constitutes, say, a Q is no more than the compliance with a set of rules or 'conditions' which happen to be specific to that act". And, if we may finish off *their* reply to us (it is not as if they would want us to put their case in this way): "A Q is an epiphenomenon, a magical 'force'. Comply by the transcendental rules for the possibility of a Q, and--poof!--a Q comes out of the hat. Call this--blush--linguistic behavioursim".

I am not the first of accusing certain speech-act theorists of practising magic. See Hermanns's article (1985) "*Zu einem Fall von Sprachmagie in der Sprachwissenschaft*" ("A Case of Language Magic in Linguistics"), which is referred to in Amin Burkhardt (1991, 855). The speech act theory of Austin, Searle, and their followers, he writes, "has described the 'illocutionary force' of an utterance as a hidden entity somehow added to the utterance by the speaker. . . . This conception has been called [by Burkhardt himself] the 'ontological fallacy' of speech act theory". I am unsure whether Hermanns and Burckhardt actually take Searle, and others, to task for what might be called "transcendental behavioursim"--i.e., the conditions for the possibility that this illocutionary "force" emerge is that one complies to these external rules. A Gricean might say--I hedge on this--"No, compliance with the rules just won't cut it. What's needed is the 'speaker's intention', the

'sincerity', etc." (see Searle [1969, 44-49]). We're saying: "Compliance with the rules isn't enough. What's needed is an object-in-Q". As for "sincerity", this comes from whether the range of contending possibilities is such as to be "interesting" and whether the answer would be accordingly "informative". But more on these two categories in the fourth chapter.

7. See Searle's *Speech-acts* (1969), on "constitutive rules" (33-42). See also John Crosby's (1983, 143-94) and James DuBois's (1995, 139-49) "Reinachian" critique of Searle's analysis (1969, 57-61) of the promising act. Both authors disagree with the reduction of a promise to a set of specific rules. Part of Crosby's concern is about what this reductionism all but implies: namely, that promising, not to say any other sort of speech-act, is fundamentally an "invented" thing, much in the same way that chess or football are invented things. I cannot comment on Crosby's concern over the phenomenon of promising, or whether it should be a concern at all. What I am fairly well-placed to say, however, is that questioning itself is not an invented thing.

8. On Daubert's doctrine of the Frageverhalt, see Daubertiana AI2:17r/v; 38r. References also cited in Schuhmann and Smith's commentary on Daubert's phenomenology of questioning (1987, 367-69). See also Smid (1985, 282-84) and Smith (1988, 130-33).

9. For a recent, and strong, version of the reductionist thesis, see Andrzej Wisniewski (1994). According to Wisniewski, any "normal question" is reducible to a finite set of yes-no Qs, or "binary" Qs, as he prefers to put it.

10. All of which recalls the "answer-is-a-box" theory discussed in Chapter 2, and the theory that a Q is a wishing of some kind, also discussed in Chapter 2. We find a hint of theory C also in Husserl's *LI* V, §29). In the following passage, he seems to be saying, in effect, that the object of a Q is nothing less than its desired or wished objective. This objective is to reach a judgmental decision about a proposition.

It would seem that the 'question' has two senses. In one sense it stands for a

definite wish, in another for a peculiar act presupposed by each such wish. Our wish aims at 'judgmental decision', i.e., it aims at a judgement which will decide a question. . . . The wish, in brief, strives for an answering of the question: this last is not therefore itself the wish. [*LI* V, §29, 616]

To put this in our own words: The first sense of "question"--the Q-act--is a "wishing for". The second sense of "question" is the intentional object itself. The Q-object is the prospect of the "act of making a decision about a judgment". And this act is called the "answering of the question". What Husserl later says about questioning in this "Additional Note" in the *Investigations* sounds very like what he later says in *EJ*: "[Q]uestioning is the striving . . . to come to a firm judicative decision" (*EJ*, §77, 308). What this "practical" account maintains, in effect, is that the "direction of fit" of Q is "world-to-word".

11. "Negation": In order to give a rough idea of how we shall use the word "negation", let us see how it contrasts with the other members of the "not family". There is "notness" in the sense, first of all, of non-being. Tables, trees, and chairs, the laws we currently live by, the factory still in operation, a "real threat", etc., are all of them "real". On the other hand, ghosts, unicorns, square circles present cases of "non-being". Another sense of notness is privation--for example, a ship's failure to be seaworthy, one's being deaf, mute, or blind. There is also notness in the sense of nothing (along with "nobody" and "never"), as opposed to "something" (along with "somebody" and "sometime"). . . . And then, at the end of a long list, there is notness in the sense of negative facts, which are acknowledged as true (The earth is not flat).

12. Kant, for example, speaks about the "task" of a negative judgment as being the "rejection of error" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, A709/B737). Gale also mentions in this regard "Sigwart and the idealist logicians [Bradley and Bosanquet], who claimed that a negative judgment consists in setting aside a possible affirmation" (1976, 58; also 43n70)]. Bergson states that a negative judgment gives "a lesson to others, or it may be to ourselves .

. . . Negation aims at someone. . . ." (*Creative Evolution* [1944, 313-14]. The text is also cited by Gale [*ibid.*, 58.)

13. At one point, Husserl holds the view that the asserting act is logically prior to the denying act. (This is not to say that the priority of the one entails the reductionist view that negation is a matter of denying.) In a section entitled "The problem of the 'quality' of judgment. The negative judgment is not a basic form", he writes: "There is only one basic form [or quality of judgment], which is the simple . . . categorical judgment: 'S is p'" (EJ,§72). But then again, Husserl also holds the view that the denying act is, nonetheless, somehow on an equal footing with the asserting act. Asserting is as much a "doxic position-taking" as is denying. "Just as negation, metaphorically speaking, strikes out," he says, "so affirmation 'underscores,' it 'confirms' a position by 'assenting' instead of 'annulling' it as in negation" (*Ideas* I, §106).

14. For further literature on the difficult subject of negative facts see: Reinhardt Grossmann (1984) *Phenomenology and Existentialism*; Adolf Reinach's 1911 work, "On the Theory of Negative Judgments" (trans. 1982). And also James Dubois (1995) *Judgment and Sachverhalt: An Introduction to Adolf Reinach's Phenomenological Realism*. Dubois writes about Reinach's theory of negative judgments, and about Roman Ingarden's guarded acceptance of the view that, yes, negative facts do have some sort of "objectivity". For Ingarden, a negative fact isn't "autonomous" (this entails a rejection of Reinach's view, according to which a negative SAs obtains precisely as does a positive SAs). Nonetheless, for Ingarden, a negative SA may still be described as "constituted". For discussion of Ingarden's notion of "autonomous", see Jeff Mitscherling (1997) *Roman Ingarden's Ontology and Aesthetics*, esp. chapter three, section B.2.

15. Stephen Boër (1979) describes the differently stressed token sentences, and the unstressed or "neutral" token sentence, of one and the same sentence-type as so many "allomorphs". A few observations: (1) I do not mean to imply that stressing has to be, or

usually is, as mechanical as simply dropping weight on a certain word or phrase. Stressing or "figuring" is also (and more often?) achieved by where one positions the subject in question in the sentence ("It was in 55 B.C. that . . .", "Britain, being invaded by Caesar in the year 55 B.C. . . .", "It was Caesar who . . .", "The person to have . . . was Caesar", etc.). I am assuming that my analysis, which deals with simple allomorphs, extends to these more complex ways of stressing. And I realize that a fuller analysis would require that I eventually sort through these other strategies of stressing. (See Wallace's "Figure and Ground: The Interrelationships of Linguistic Categories" (1982), a highly technical analysis of the different ways that a sentence is "grounded" and "figured".)

(2) Nor am I suggesting that it is only thanks to questioning that stressing is possible. Consider these two allomorphs of one and the same "*Q*": Why did *he* do it?", "Why did he do *this*?" At the very least, I am giving an explanation for what differentiates two answering allomorphs, *A* is b and A is *b*. I am claiming, safely, that stressing, be it of an answer, or just a statement without a Q leading up to it, is to differentiate the ground from the figure. And I am suggesting that the logic of stressing is to "recognize and deny". That is what is going on when we answer a Q, or italicize a word, or drop emphasis on a particular phrase, etc.

(3) There is a distinction between two types of emphasis that we ought to watch out for. For lack of better terms, I shall call the one type the "topic of concern" and the other type the "subject-matter". In laying stress on, say, "Caesar", one indicates that it is not so much the invading, nor Britain, nor the year 55 B.C., but the man himself, *Julius Caesar*, which is the *topic of concern* here. In laying stress on, say, "Britain", I exclude not the rival possibilities of topics, but the rival possibilities of the *subject-matter* itself, i.e., Caesar invaded *Britain*--not anywhere else. The emphasizing act, then, may accomplish one of two things. It may locate the topic of interest, or it may exclude the rival possibilities of the subject-matter itself. The question is: Is one "exclusionary" more basic than the other? Then which one is it? I suggest that it is the latter which is the primary. The singling-out of the one topic from the other is (almost) the outcome or "function" of the singling-out of one of contending possibilities of the subject-matter. One's singling out the topic regarding Britain,

not so much regarding Caesar, the invasion, 55 B.C., "comes after" the emphasis on "*Britain*--not Gaul, not Alexandria". One knows the topic--it's about *where*, not about *who*, or *did what*, or *when*--either by virtue of *questioning* the contending where-possibilities or, in determining which of the "where's" it is, by virtue of *answering* the question. And one is *interested* in the topic, selects it out from others, precisely inasmuch as one wants to know which of the "where's" it is. To conclude: What is primarily behind the phenomenon of emphasis has primarily to do with the "rival possibilities" of the subject-matter. First comes the subject-matter; then the topic of interest follows alongside, or develops as a consequence of trying to sort out the first.

16. The most his argument warrants is not that the meaning of a statement is a function of the Q behind it, but only that an understanding of the "pragmatic why" of the utterance--the Q behind that utterance--is indispensable to the recovery of its "semantic what". See how Collingwood conflates "I mean to" or "I intend to" with meaning:

> I began by observing that you cannot find out what a man means by simply
> studying his spoken or written statements, even though he has spoken or
> written with perfect command of language and perfectly truthful intention.
> In order to find out his meaning you must also know what the question was
> (a question in his own mind, and presumed by him to be in yours) to which
> the thing he has said or written was meant as an answer [1939, 31].

17. A helpful way of summing up the main points of this part of the chapter, and of refining them without repeating what was already said, would be to bring our "logic" of questioning into contrast with Hermann Lotze's "Kantian" logic. According to Lotze, "the sentences 'S is P' and 'S is not P', so long as they are supposed to be logically opposed to one another, must express precisely the same connexion between S and P, only that the truth of that connexion is affirmed by the one and denied by the other" (*Logic* [1874] §40. p 63). Lotze represents yet another philosopher to have espoused an idealist theory of negation (not to

say also of "position"). Accordingly, a judgment is a proposition in need of an affirmation or a denial. I assume that this places him in good company with Husserl and, maybe, Daubert as well. A few words about what Daubert makes of one part of Lotze's theory of judgments should help bring our own related position into sharper focus.

Lotze modifies Kant's schema of "qualities of judgments"--affirmation, negation, and infinity--into the triad of affirmation, negation, and question:

> This content [S is P] itself can be expressed in a form as yet neither
> affirmative nor negative in the interrogative sentence, and this indeed would
> take the third place amongst the three qualities of judgment more
> appropriately than the limitative or infinite judgment, which is supposed to
> attribute a negative predicate to the subject by a positive copula, and is
> usually expressed in the formula "S is not-P" (§40, 63-4).

According to Lotze, then, a Q is a judgment of sorts, lacking only in the taking of a position, be it in the affirmative or the negative. This is what Daubert says--or what his expositors say on his behalf--in response to Lotze:

> Sigwart saw the difference [between judgment and question] as lying in the
> opposition between intention and realization, conceiving the question as "the
> draft of a judgment,". . . . Here, too, Daubert is willing to concede that
> questions tend toward completion. . . . Lotze gets closer to a correct account
> of the relation between question and judgment when he conceives both as
> expressing an identical logical content. . . . And now, as Lotze would have it,
> the identical logical content that is here affirmed and there denied can be
> seen to have been expressed already in the question sentence "in a form that
> is still free of affirmation and negation". When, however, Lotze goes on to
> affirm a tripartite division of sentential phenomena into position, negation
> and questions, then his view becomes untenable, if only for the reason that

"negations can occur also in the question itself" (AI2, 7r). A question of

the type, ["Is the rose not red?"] is surely as legitimate as one of the type ["Is

the rose red?"]. [Schuhmann and Smith, 1987, 364-65].

To comment on this: (1) The apparent criticism to the effect that Lotze had overlooked the fact that negation can enter into a (yes-no) Q does not undermine Lotze's contention in the least--namely, that a Q is still, in a sense, "positionally" neutral. (Of course, this is not to say that Lotze had anticipated such an objection.) The rhetorical element in, say, "He did it, didn't he?" almost expects a "Yes"; and, "He didn't do it, did he?" almost expects a "No". Nonetheless, so far as it remains a de facto Q, it remains equally open to a Yes or a No, and is in this sense genuinely "neutral".

(2) It looks as if neither Sigwart, nor Lotze, nor Daubert, nor even Daubert's commentators, have taken seriously, philosophically, the fact that the word Q is also a question. How else except through not taking the word Q sufficiently seriously could Lotze have ended up devising his tripartite division in the way that he did? And how else could Daubert have missed a crucial objection against this division? The objection, e.g., "A question of the type, 'Is the rose not red?'" (which I take to be Daubert's objection) isn't decisive. As just pointed out, rhetorical negation doesn't take from the neutrality of the Q. What is decisive is the fact that some Qs are not positionally neutral, that "semantically" they take a side. Lotze's tripartite division to the contrary, certain Qs, namely, word Qs, have to take a side in their very formulation. The Q, "Where is it?", is not neutral. It calls for positive answer. And the Q, "How many did not make it?", is not neutral either; it calls for negative answer.

(3) But having just said all this, I hasten to add that existentially a Q calls for only one position: the recognition of what is positively the case--be it about a positive SAs or a negative SAs. The yes-no Q, "Is A b?" admits of an answer concerning either a positive or a negative SAs, but it calls for a positive recognition of the one or the other: "(It is so) that A is b", or "(It is so) that A is-not b". The Q, "How many made it?" admits of an answer concerning only a positive SAs: "(It is so) that five made it". And the Q, "How many did

not make it?" admits of an answer concerning only a negative SAs: "(It is so) that twenty did-not make it". According to our logic, then, there is not a tripartite division, but a twofold division: There are questions, and there are answers. An answer is a "positioning", but not in the sense of a quality of judgment called an "affirming"; and it implicitly involves a denying moment, which might be regarded as a quality of judgment.

(4) Lotze replaces the last of the three qualities of judgment--the so-called "limitative judgment"--with the interrogative sentence. The only reason he gives for evicting this form of judgment--"S is not-p"--from the original triad is:

> Much acumen has been expended even in recent times in vindicating this
> form of judgment, but I can only see in it an unmeaning product of pedantic
> ingenuity. Aristotle himself saw clearly enough that such expressions as
> 'not-man' means all that it ought logically to mean, that is, everything that is
> not man, triangle, melancholy, sulphuric acid, . . . it is an utterly impossible
> feat to hold together this chaotic mass of the most different things in any one
> idea, such as could be applied as a predicate to a subject [ibid., §40, 64].

To comment on this passage: (1) True enough, Aristotle does not recognize the "limitative" judgment (sometimes also called the "infinite judgment") as something to be placed alongside the affirmation and the negation. "'A is not-b' is in his view an affirmation with an odd and unimportant kind of predicate", as Ross puts it (1985, 29; Ross refers to *De Int.* 19b24-35, 20a23-26; *An. Pr.* 25b22f, 51b31-35, 52a24-26). That said, it seems that Aristotle suggests a contrary view elsewhere. Englebretsen points out that:

> Aristotle says that "contraries belong to those things within the same class
> which differ most" [*De Int.*, 23b23-24]. Examples are justice-injustice,
> black-white, ill-well. . . . Sight is not possessed by a stone; but neither is
> sight possessed or privative to a stone [*Categories*, 12a26-12b5]. If a quality,
> P, is privative to a thing, then it is correct to affirm 'not-P' of it [e.g., One

can say, "This man is not-seeing"; but one ought not say, "This stone is not-seeing"]. . . . We can say that while both 'not-red' and 'yellow' are contrary to 'red', only 'not-red' is the logical contrary of 'red'. . . . The logical contrary of a term [e.g., not-red] amounts to the disjunction of all of its nonlogical contraries [green, yellow, black, white, blue, etc.]. [1981, 5, 6]

I am suggesting that Lotze's reading of Aristotle is off the mark. If the limitative judgment, e.g., "not-man", means, as Lotze interprets it, no more than everything else which a man is not--a triangle, melancholy, sulphuric acid, a neutrino, Quasar 3C 273--then, to be sure, it would be an odd, an unimportant, not to say also a very, very long, and useless kind of judgment. But in fact, Aristotle's notion of the "infinite" judgment is more "finite" than that. Which brings us to the second comment (2): In Lotze's tripartite schema, the Q replaces the limitative judgment by default. Evidently, it does occur to him that there might be an intimate connection between the Q and the limitative judgment. The connection, I suggest, is basically this: What an answering act "denies" is not everything under the sun, except this; it denies the logical contrary. In the order of questioning and answering, to deny is to deny selectively. It is to deny the logical contrary. "The rose is red--which is to say, not any other colour". "This is a rose--which is to say, not any other flower".

(5) In anticipation of a few things I shall be saying in the following section: If there is such a thing as a "neutral", it is not the Q, but the "unstressed statement". It has an intended object; but looking at it, we have no access to its factuality. Second, a Q is not neutral, in this respect: It operates on the understanding, is "askable", only to the extent that there is a reality behind this target, and this reality has only to be revealed.

18. See P. Geach and M. Black (1960, 2). Also cited in Englebresten's commendable defense of a term logic in *Logical Negation* (1981, 17).

19. For *Aristotle*, "Negation is a rejection of a suggested connexion, but it is equally true that affirmation is the acceptance of a suggestion connexion; the two attitudes are put on the

same level just as are pursuit and avoidance" (David Ross 1985, 28; Ross refers to Aristotle's *Met.* 996b14-16 and *N.E.* 1139a21f). But what about the *Aristotelians*? My identifying "Aristotelian logic" with the "logic of terms" should be qualified in light of the fact that the certain medieval Aristotelians, most notably William of Ockham, had developed the idea of *syncategorematica*. By definition, the categorematica (such as "man". "dog", "best", "friend") have independent signification; in contrast, the syncategorematica (such as "is", "not", and "always") have only dependent signification. That is, they signify only in conjunction with the categorematic terms, e.g., "Man is not always a dog's best friend". Now, one could point out, in objection, that since an Aristotelian logic of terms can include syncategorematic terms, such as negation, this logic of terms can account for negative propositions after all, and can do so without having to posit "negative facts". This objection warrants a much longer reply than I am able to offer at this stage. Tentatively, however, I suggest: If the negation is not just a terminological matter of "rejecting a connection", if negation is *inside* this unity called a "proposition", then this proposition must correspond to that other unity, which I call a "negative fact".

20. For a fuller discussion of the issues surrounding the problem of what unifies "S is P". see Mohanty's *Husserl and Frege* (1982, 100-107).

21. Daubert himself maintains that the necessity of a judgment, my seeing that such-and-such is thus-and-so, is located within the orbit of the object. I take over Daubert's idea, but provide my explanation for it in terms of question and answer, the logic of recognize and deny, etc. In any event, commenting on "Brentano und seine Schule" (AI, 19), i.e., Marty's appropriation of Brentano's "reism", Daubert writes:

> This [judgment that S is P] is not up to my discretion; one cannot change it.
> It is this character of objectivity, no matter whether the object is real or
> merely appears subjectively so, and whether it can be presented intuitively or
> not, which necessitates me to adjoin the P to the S. [From Karl Schuhmann,

"Contents of Consciousness and States and Affairs: Daubert and Marty",
(1990, 205); Schuhmann's translation.]

"Reism", by the way, is an ontology (notably Brentano's, but also Marty's) according to which the thing (res) is the basic category of existence. On this view, for example, "The rose is red" would mean "The red rose exists"; "Snow is white" would mean, "There exists no non-white snow". Obviously, our position is not reistic, not least because reism does not measure up to the luxuriant ontology of questioning itself. What would a reist do, for example, with triangularity, or events, happenings of the past, negative facts? And what on earth does a reist think he is doing when he confounds "exemplification" (The rose is red) with "existence" ("The rose exists", "The red rose exists")?!

Chapter 4:

A Theory of Answering, a Theory of Informativeness

(On the "Predicative Q", Part II)

Introduction

A. Sign, Fulfilment; Question, Answer

    1. Not "Apodictic", Not "Good Enough"

    2. "But is it Really So?" is Not the Only Thing We Ask

    3. The Openness of a Signifying Act

    4. Does the Intuition Have Nothing to Add?

     (a) The Confirming Intuition

     (b) The Disconfirming Intuition

B. A Theory of Truth, a Theory of Evidence

C. Questioning and "Doxicality" (Husserl's "Theory D")

    1. Deeming Possible

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    3. Deeming Likely, Deeming Unlikely

     (a) Second-Order Uncertainty

     (b) First-Order "Degrees of Uncertainty"

    4. On Certainty

D. Conclusion: On the Idea of Informativeness

    1. Auditory Evidence

    2. "It is True", "It is False"

Notes to Chapter 4

Introduction

Clarifying what makes for a "piece of knowledge" is the central aim of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, if not also his other works as well. The Sixth Investigation, with which the work ends, is entitled, appropriately enough, "Elements of a Phenomenological Elucidation of Knowledge".[1] What about his theory of knowledge, which figures so largely in his work? And how might his theory bear on our theory of questioning and our theory bear on his?

The sort of knowledge that Husserl sets out to analyze is "knowledge" in the active sense of knowing as opposed to the dispositional sense of "having knowledge". Husserl's question, to oversimplify, is about what makes for the experience of knowing this or that. For Husserl, to know is to find something to be just as it was "signifyingly" thought to be. If you say to me, "There's a blackbird!", I start out with a "sign"; I look up and see that, indeed, this is so. At that moment, there is an "intuitive illustration" of the sign and I enter into a "knowing" of something (*LI* VI, §16, 720). To put the same point in a few different ways: Knowing consists in one's having "fulfillingly" re-identified the thing for which one originally had only a "sign". To know X is to have found X, the thing one was looking for all along. Or, to know X is to "re-identify" X, or to recognize X. "Knowledge", as Husserl understands the term, has "reference to a relationship between acts of thought and fulfilling intuitions" (*LI* 837).

Now, a judgment, which is in fact true, does not by itself constitute a case of knowing. In order to "know" it, what is required, in addition to a judgment's being true in fact, is one's being able to see the truth of it--to have *evidence* (*Evidenz*) for it. Evidence, for Husserl, is not a conjunction of a judgment and a "feeling" that guarantees its truth (*LI* 187,

194*ff*, 772). Evidence is the experience of the "adequating", or "corresponding", or "re-identifying", between what is meant and what is given.

> if it is to be called 'knowledge' in the narrowest, strictest sense, it requires to
> be evident, to have the luminous certainty that what we have acknowledged
> *is*, that what we have rejected *is not*, a certainty distinguished in familiar
> fashion from blind belief, from vague opining, however firm and decided . . .
> . [*LI* 60-61]

I shall provide more details of Husserl's theory of knowledge as I go along. At this point, I shall state the problem and theme of the present chapter. In a word, what theory of knowledge is, or ought to be, built into our "phenomenology of questioning"? How does our analysis of questioning bear on the Husserlian notions of "truth" and "evidence"?

There do exist, I shall argue, some noteworthy parallels between how, on the one hand, a signifying act and a fulfilling act are related, and how, on the other, a question and an answer are related. A signifying act calls for a fulfilment; so too does a Q. It anticipates a coming-to-know about something; so does a Q. And like a Q, it also recognizes what was originally given only as a "sign". Oddly enough, these parallels between the signifying act and the questioning act, which seem to us so conspicuous, are all but overlooked by Husserl.[2] And Daubert, a good Husserlian who paid specific attention to the phenomenon of questioning, does not appear to have taken notice of the parallels either. But in any case, there do exist these parallels. The implication of this is that our analysis of questioning can be brought to bear on a theme--the problem of knowledge--that is so central to phenomenology.

I divide this chapter into four parts. **Part A:** In the first part, I redescribe the transition from the signifying to the fulfilling phases of an act as a transition from the (predicative) question to the (predicative) answer. (I stress, "predicative". In this chapter, which is the "second of two parts", it is only the *predicative* Q that is under consideration.) And I provide a few arguments for why there is good reason to think that "to signify is to question".

Part B: The point of this chapter is not just to replace the terms--"signifying" with "questioning", "fulfilling" with "answering--but otherwise innocuously leave everything just as it originally was. (Nothing would be gained in doing that.) The point is to "fix up" the notion of the signifying (and fulfilling) act in such a way that it lines up with *our* notion of the questioning (and answering) act. By implication, the point is also to "fix up" the companion notions of "signifying" and "fulfilling"--the notions of "truth" and "evidence". In the second part, I shall have to "renovate" the notion of *evidence* in light of our analysis of questioning (= signifying) and answering (= fulfilling). (Husserl's notion of truth remains pretty well intact.) I shall correlate the notion of *evidence* with the "denying" side of the answering act. An answer consists of both the moments of recognizing a truth (A is x: A is x) and denying that it is otherwise (not B or C; not y or z).

Part C: Here I examine our proposed theory in light of Husserl's view to the effect that questioning is one among several "doxic modalities" or "belief-attitudes". The point of the discussion will be twofold: (i) It will be to elucidate these *other* doxic modes in terms of where they fit into our "information theory" of truth and evidence, as well as to defend our

theory of questioning by demonstrating how well it can account for these other doxic

modes. (ii) And the point will be to prepare the way for the concluding part.

Part D: Here I shall introduce and examine the "informational categories" of

interestedness and informativeness.

Evidence is correlated to the degree that contending possibilities have just been

eradicated. So much eradicating, so much evidence. What about those truths that "go

without saying"? They cease to require evidence. But it is not as if this is because they

already have evidence. They cease to require it because they cease to be amenable to it. If a

"truth" is so obvious as to go without saying, then the denying operation drops out. When

this drops out, so does the possibility for evidence! Paradoxically, the truths at which these

"neutral certainties" (I call them) point begin to "look" less real, or in any event they begin

to "feel" less real to me. Talk about their "reality" is one thing; existential access to their

"factuality" is quite another. It is this loss of access that is the issue here.

What has all this to do with the informational categories? The greater the weight or

rivalry of possibilities, the greater *interest* I take toward the object at issue. A Q arises

within this "field", and calls for the reduction of the contending possibilities. Second, the

greater the reducing of the possibilities, the greater the evidence--that is to say, the greater

the *informativeness*. Roughly speaking, interestedness is the need for evidence and

informativeness is the "evidence" that goes with answering a Q.

A final remark: It should be carefully noted at the outset that my intention in the

present chapter is not to do a close exegesis of Husserl's writings. (Why no references, the

reader might otherwise ask, to what Husserl has to say about, for example, possibility in

Formal and Transcendental Logic? And why not more references to what he has to say about the same thing in *Ideas I*?) I shall reiterate, then, the general disclaimer, which I stated in the introductory chapter: The present work, not just this one chapter, takes Husserl as its "foil" and starting-point; but the work is emphatically *not* "on" Husserl and its purpose is *not* exegetical.

A. Sign, Fulfilment; Question, Answer

The act of answering is, if anything, a "fulfilment" of a questioning act. The very idea of questioning and answering brings with it the idea of two things related as "signifying" and "fulfilling", or something like that. All of which raises the question: How, then, does Husserl *avoid* making the connection between "signification" and "question", "fulfilment" and "answer"? I think he does so by way of his "theory C" of Qs. A brief statement of it bears repeating here. Husserl notes that

> . . . the word 'question' has two senses. In one sense it stands for a definite wish, in another for a peculiar act presupposed by each such wish. Our wish aims at 'judgemental decision', i.e., it aims at a judgement which will decide a *question* . . . . The wish, in brief, strives for *an answering of the question*: this last is not therefore itself the wish. [*LI* V, §29, 616]

In other words: A Q in the **first sense** aims toward a "decision" concerning this judgment. As Husserl puts it in another place, a Q is a "*practical mode of behaviour relative to judgments*" (*EJ* §78). Accordingly, the object of a Q is not the thing "out there", as we would have it. Its *object* is the judgment, and it is the judgment, not the question, which

does the pointing or "signifying". To bring our terminology to bear critically on

Husserl's account: No, the primary direction of fit of a Q is *not* thing-to-thought, but

thought-to-thing. No, the "objective" of a Q is not to reach a decision of "affirm" or "deny",

"yes" or "no", a decision concerning a "quality of judging"; it is to see or recognize what

reality itself has already affirmed or authorized. I have already examined, in Chapter 2, this

"pragmatic" reduction of a Q and what would motivate a philosopher to adopt this view. In

any case, I shall now offer a few good reasons (in sections 1-3) for thinking that, to the

contrary, the "signifying act" *is* a questioning, or conversely, for thinking that questioning is

not qualitatively different from signifying. I suspect that, in the following three sections, my

reader will keep coming up with the good objection, or question: "All this implies that the

fulfilling intuition--the seeing itself--does not add anything to the act and has nothing to do

with 'fulfilment'. Are you saying that the role of intuition is irrelevant as far as evidence

goes?" I shall briefly answer this in section 4.

1. Not "Apodictic", Not "Good Enough"

It would not be stretching it to interpret Husserl as having characterized the notion of the

signifying act too "epistemologically". His treatment of the signifying act is one-sidedly

taken up with the problem of knowing so far as it might be "grounded" in "apodictic

knowing": When can one be sure that this cannot be doubted? What makes for "justified

belief"? When is the signifying act apodictically fulfilled? The *phenomenological* issue, by

contrast, is: When is a "signifying act" *really* a signifying act? When is what I "know"

"good enough"?

According to Husserl, we lack evidence, in the strict sense, concerning most of the things in which we believe--that the earth isn't flat, that the pyramids were built long ago, that this is the trace of an atomic particle. True, we still carry these "pieces of opinion" around with us as if no further "proof" of them were needed. But in fact, what we presume to "know" is only through hearsay, photographs, and other indirect sources. And if we ourselves are the practitioners of a given science, what we "know" still falls short of having evidence in the strict sense; we do our research only by "art and method", still lacking insight into why our methods actually work and why these things are as we say they are (*LI* 201). Husserl may be granted this epistemological point: We *could* insist on getting fuller evidence for these things. But from the phenomenological standpoint, what of it? The issue is whether we actually *do* insist on it in this or that instance. How does this bear on what *we* take the signifying act to be?

Take the following example. I might find your telling me that the "The clock says it's ten" perfectly satisfactory, enough that I lack any cognitive motive to double-check the time. In fact, my turning around to look at the clock myself might not add anything to my already knowing it. Seeing the clock for myself might not make me know "better" what I already know perfectly well. Seeing it doesn't add any additional certitude that my believing it does not already provide. On the other hand, *if* I find your telling me the time less than satisfactory, I could go on to check the time for myself, in the event that what you told me isn't true. In that case, my having this idea that the clock says it's ten, without the confirming intuition of seeing it for myself, would be, indeed, a signifying act. It is only in this sense, it seems, that talk about a "signifying act" is phenomenologically relevant--

precisely to the degree that it is a questioning. Otherwise, it is as "full" as need be, or "good enough", until further notice. And if it is genuinely signifying, if it "requires" fulfilment, then it is not to be described as a signifying "judgment". A genuinely signifying act is a *questioning* act. It is as a "questioning", not as a "judging", that is genuinely signifying or *"empty"*, that it genuinely *requires* "fulfilment" and is genuinely *not* "good enough".

2. "But is It Really So?" is Not the Only Thing We Ask

In construing the signifying act as the same as questioning, there is the philosophical advantage of having at least the beginnings of an explanation for what seems to be all but missing in Husserl's phenomenology. And this is the explanation for the *motive* behind, so to speak, craning my intentional neck, knitting my intentional eyebrows. I turn toward this X and rivet on it because I am questioning it, because I want to know more about X. Not only does construing the signifying act as a questioning go some way toward identifying the motive of looking this way rather than that, of fastening on to the object rather than turning away from it; it also allows us to recognize that the signifying act does more than just look for a determination of, "But is it so?" As a questioning, it can "ask" any and all manner of Qs.

Consider, for example, being told, "There's a blackbird!" You look up to see for yourself. But why do you do that? So far as Husserl would be willing to identify the signifying act with the questioning, he would say, I suspect, that you look in order to answer the just-to-make-sure Q, "But is it so?" But this, surely, is hardly the only reason that could

get you to look up. In fact, when it comes to one person saying something to someone else, there is, under ordinary circumstances, in place something like a juridical presumption of innocence as regards the speaker. You don't doubt his words, nor does he want you to. And yet you look up, just as he wants you to look up! Some explanatory justice, then, has to be done to the fact that, ordinarily, you look up for some reason other than the one which would ask about the just-to-make-sure truth of the utterance. In one case, you might be asking, "But is it so?". But in other cases, you might be asking something else. Here are a few possibilities: *How does it fly like that? Anything in its mouth? When did it arrive here? Where did it come from? Is it here to stay? Where is its nest? Where is it going? Did I see it before?* The signifying act is a "questioning act". But as such, it only sometimes to this effect asks the sort of yes-no Q, "But is it so?". But then at other times it might "ask", instead, the yes-no Q, "Is it *black*?", or some word Q, such as *where?*, *when?*, *what-colour?*

3. The "Openness" of a Signifying Act

According to Husserl, roughly, the "experience of truth" consists in the fulfilment of a signifying act. A signifying act prescribes X; turning around, I see that X is the case. The signifying act--a sort of expectation--is fulfilled. And with that, I experience the truth. If, on the other hand, the signifying act is, instead of fulfilled, frustrated, if things turn out to be other than X, then what I experience is not the "truth", but a "falsehood" (*LI* VI, §39, 769).[3] There is a problem with this account, and one way to get around it, and to justice to how we actually deal with frustration and fulfilment, is to think of the signifying act as a questioning.

For one thing, it reads like an account of the experience of my finding out that I was wrong about something; the "moral" of the frustration is that I *was* wrong. Second, by coordinating "frustration" with the experience of falsehood, Husserl might be but a short step away from inadvertently allowing into his theory of truth a theory of *revisionism*. To illustrate the point: I anticipate X. The situation *appears* to be Y, even though, unbeknownst to me, it is, in fact, X. I suffer "frustration", or "cognitive dissonance" (as it might be called nowadays). In order to approach the situation "happily", I might revise my anticipation, changing it from X to Y. "Truth", then, is a function of anticipatory happiness. "Falsehood" is a function of being a bad predictor. Now, one might maintain the somewhat different view. According to this argument, which Gadamer seems to advance, it is in the "Hegelian" moment of frustration that I experience a truth.[4] Indeed, this idea accords well with conventional wisdom. "The truth," as they say, "is hard" and "to suffer is to learn".

The first two views are not incompatible; indeed, they are complementary. They represent two "time-experiences" *in* learning. (A third time-experience may be added to the list: the experience is to be located somewhere between a frustration and a fulfilment. Not taking an anticipatory side for, or against, A or B, the answer to the question, "Is it A or B?" neither "frustrates" nor "fulfils".) That said, I suggest that neither view quite hits the mark, in that they account for "frustration" and "fulfilment" only in the secondary senses. Primarily, frustration involves the failure of answering a Q. And primarily, fulfilment involves the re-identification of one of a multiplicity of possibilities, i.e., it involves answering a Q. The answer to a Q might be secondarily frustrated or fulfilled. (I didn't expect this, even though I still asked about it; I expected as much, even though I still asked

about it.) However, once a Q goes into gear, the act has preempted not only secondary

frustration (sure, I might be disappointed, but that won't make the answer wrong), but also

secondary fulfilment (just because it turns out to be as I expected doesn't make it true).

Putting this another way: Primarily, there are two types of fulfilment: "*happy* fulfilment"

and "unhappy *fulfilment*". What is important about the fulfilling act is not whether it is

happy (fulfilled in the secondary sense) or unhappy (frustrated in a secondary sense), but

whether it is (indeed) fulfilled. And the reason that its being happy or unhappy is not so

important is that the signifying act leading up to it is a questioning act. The *openness* that

goes with a Q makes a preemptive strike against "frustration" or, for that matter, against

"happiness".

These, then, are a few *prima facie* reasons for our wanting to correlate "signifying"

with "questioning", and "fulfilling" with "answering". Aligning these terms together has the

advantage of keeping the phenomenological analysis of the "signifying act"

phenomenological. (What makes it signifying is not about whether better evidence is

logically possible, but whether the evidence currently available is "good enough".) The

difference between "signifying" and "fulfilling" is a difference not between believing and

seeing (so to speak), but between wanting to know and knowing, between questioning and

answering. "Hearsay" is one way one might know, "seeing" is still another. I am *not* saying

that perception has nothing to do with fulfilment. The point is that one given act (e.g.,

"There's a blackbird!") might be fulfilled on the basis of hearsay, but that another given act

(e.g., "There's a blackbird!"), more sniffy when it comes to evidential standards, might

require nothing less than a perceptual intuition instead. And the point is that perception,

although far from having an irrelevant role in the fulfilment of certain acts--it has a very distinctive role--is not the essential category when it comes to the problem of evidence. Evidence comes with the crowding out of rival possibilities. Perception happens to be *a* way, a very effective way, in which this is carried out.

Aligning the terms "signifying" and "questioning" also has the advantage of being able to provide, in principle, an explanation as to the *motive* for why we look at those things that we do and in the way that we do. The motive is questioning. Finally, aligning these terms also has the distinctive advantage of being able to account for the "openness" of the way that we move about in the world. Having enumerated a few reasons that speak in favour of the view that to signify is to question, I now turn to an examination of perhaps the key objection to the above analyses.

4. Does the Intuition Have Nothing to Add?

Seeing that the connection between the signifying act and the questioning act is so "obvious" to us, it is to be asked why Husserl never thought as much and why we never came to recognize the structural similarities between the two. One reason, as already mentioned, might be that he tends to characterize the problem of knowledge in terms of "could" rather than "does", in terms of what "could" be evidentially improved upon rather than what "does" questioningly require evidential improvement. That is the epistemological reason; the other reason is, quite simply, the phenomenological one. Although Husserl does not expressly put it in this way, we may well imagine him saying it, specifically in response to our position: "Even if the 'fulfilling intuition' does not add anything to one's hearsay

belief 'in', say, there being a blackbird flying overhead, the fact remains that this intuition still changes the 'act-quality'. The intuition *does* 'fulfil' the intention, even one just looked up by *accident*, even if there was no 'questioning' that motivated one's looking-up". And to this, we may imagine Husserl adding an objection to our attempt to "renovate" his concepts "signifying" and "fulfilling": "All this counts against your idea of correlating 'signifying' with 'questioning', and 'fulfilling' with 'answering'. With or without a Q leading up to it, the intuition still 'fulfils' the act. And this means that the act, with or without being a Q, was still 'signifying'".

How should we respond to this objection? I agree that the intuition *does* add something, that it is a "fulfilling" intuition. The problem, then, is how our account can have it both ways: On the one hand, we want to insist that to signify is to question; but on the other hand, we still want to allow for the fact that an intuition can still fulfil what, by definition, would have to be "signifying", even if there was no Q "leading up" to that intuition. I shall answer this objection with reference to: (a) when the intuition proves the act to have been right and (b) when it proves it to have been wrong.

(a) The Confirming Intuition:

In our first cognitive scenario, I start out already fully believing that (say) there's a blackbird overhead. Then, by some accident, I look up and see that, indeed, this is the case after all. Originally, I had the "idea"; now I have the *confirming* intuition. What is happening here? The event can be divided into two phases. In phase one, the original act, since it was obviously not a questioning, could not have been--going by our definition--a signifying act.

The original act was as full as it "needed" to be; it was as if the act already had the

blackbird already fully in view. In the second phase, a moment later, along comes the

intuition of seeing the blackbird. The intuition *does* change the quality of the original act; it

changes it in such a way that the act becomes fulfilled. But since it is fulfilled, the act must

have been originally, by definition, signifying! How does this analysis of the second phase

square with the analysis of the first phase? How are we to put these contradictory analyses

together?

In phase one, the act *was* already fulfilled. It was not signifying, it was not a Q; it

was a judgment. In phase two, the act is "de-judged"; the act *becomes*, retrodictively,

signifying. In a manner of speaking, it becomes a "retrodictive Q". I do not quite mean to

say that the act *is* a questioning; I mean that the structure of the intuitionally fulfilled act is

that of an answer. The original act is not, of course, frustrated; but neither is it merely

"fulfilled". To reiterate the point, it was *already* full. With the intuition elbowing its big

way in, as it were, the original act, which wasn't expecting the "surprise visit", must now

make accommodations for the intuition. The original act becomes signifying in the sense

that it must "become bigger" for the intuition. (To switch the metaphor: It is not that the

well was empty and needed water to fill it up; it was already full. Rather, it is that a bigger

well is now needed for this unexpected flood of water.) With the *standard* of evidence

having gone up, the intuition can be said to "fulfil" the act retrodictively; and the act can be

said to be a *retrodictively* "signifying" or "questioning" act.

"'Retrodictive signifying'?" "'A "Q" that arises after the answer is already in

place'?" A *full* analysis would require that I look at the intricacies of the temporal structure

of a Q, *viz.*, that I look at how there could be a *retentional* signifying or questioning and at how questioning could be retentionally built up, in a "revisionist" way, after the "answer" has already arrived. Dealing with these details is outside the reach of the present work. Thus, I shall have to present the above, and the following, remarks more as *claims* than arguments. To continue:

(b) The Disconfirming Intuition:

As in the first scenario, I already fully believe that there is a blackbird overhead and I look up quite by accident. What I see this time, however, is a *dis*confirming intuition (e.g., there is no bird to be seen, or the bird is not a blackbird). My original belief is now proven to have been false. Now the objection to our position--to signify is to question--might go as follows:

"The original act was not a Q. This is because what is experienced as false cannot have been a Q. Recall your distinction between 'primary' fulfilment and frustration, on the one hand, and 'secondary' fulfilment and frustration, on the other. An answer may or may not turn out quite as one had expected; it may or may not fulfil one's original hunch. 'Fulfilment' in this secondary sense is to be distinguished from the primary fulfilment of a Q. A Q is 'open' to whatever answer may come about (A, or B, or C). Even though the Q may be betting on A's outcome, the Q is still a 'good sport' in that it is prepared for an answer which might turn out to be otherwise. In any case, to return to your scenario, the original act, in that it was falsified, could not have been a Q. And yet this *non*-Q was a signifying act. The act of signifying believed--it *judged* it to be the case--that there was a

blackbird overhead. And then, by accidentally 'looking up', it got proven wrong by the disconfirming intuition".

It is with the last part of the objection that I disagree. The original act, which was not a Q, was *not* a signifying act either. When the act happens on an intuition, this "full" judgment gets de-judged; it *becomes* a retrodictively signifying in such a way that it can make room for this intuition. In its final phase, the act has the structure of an answer, even though no Q actually led up to it, even though (in other words) there was no prior openness to preempt the possibility of "being wrong". Of course, there is this important difference: In the case of an answer to a Q, in the familiar sense of that term, secondary frustration and fulfilment are secondary by virtue of the openness of the Q. I was betting on A, but it turned out to be B; I am "frustrated", but only secondarily. For what is at issue is the primary fulfilment, my seeing what is the case. Yet a similar, although not identical, logic applies to the act "becoming" signifying "in retrospect". "I *was* wrong; but that is incidental or 'secondary' to my seeing the truth of what *is* the case". Or, in the first scenario: "I *was* right; but that is also 'secondary' to my seeing the truth of what *is* the case". I shall say more on matters directly relating to perception in the second part, which is about to follow.

To sum up: In Part A, I have put forward several arguments as to why "signifying" should be redefined as "questioning" and "fulfilling" as "answering". Having made this case, I shall now bring Husserl's notion of evidence into the story. According to Husserl, evidence comes with the fulfilling of an act. I shall have to modify this notion of evidence in such a way as to coordinate it with our own analysis of questioning (= signifying) and answering (= fulfilling).

B. A Theory of Truth, a Theory of Evidence

For Husserl the notions of "truth", and "evidence" for it, are intimately bound up in reference to his analysis of the relation between a signifying act of thought and its fulfilling intuition. "Fulfilment" is a "re-identification" of the subject matter in the "intuitive illustration" of it (*LI* VI, §16, 720). And this re-identification of it is a piece of knowledge. What is our position on Husserl's theory of evidence?

(i) We agree with the *basic idea* that there exists a tight link between the fulfilment of a signifying act and the "experience of truth". However, we want to modify this basic idea accordingly: To signify is to question, to fulfil is to answer. From this it would almost have to follow that the structure of the fulfilling experience--evidence--has the structure of an answer.

(ii) We also agree with the idea that the experience of truth involves *re-identifying* that which was merely meant with that which is immediately given. However, we want to modify this point as well, in such a way that it reads: "To re-identify is to re-identify *one* of the signs". (A signifying act doesn't contain one "sign"; it is a questioning, which points at a multiplicity of possible directions.)

(iii) We also agree with Husserl's thesis to the effect that the requirements of truth and evidence are already built into the structure of intentional existence. But we reformulate this idea to read: Thought-to-thing intentionality shuttles back and forth between *questioning* and *answering*. What the questioning phase calls for, and what the answering act provides, are these two: "truth" and "evidence". The answering act does these two things

at once (a point already made in Chapter 3): It recognizes "what is", and it denies its logical contrary. Stated in yet another way: Questioning "goes after" the truth; but it also "turns away" from the false; it is directed *toward* the "thus-and-so" of something and *away from* the "being otherwise". It is this "away from" or *crowding out* of rival possibilities that is the characteristic mark of evidence.

How different is our view of evidence from Husserl's? The differences are not so radical as to make the two views incommensurable. I should like to stress at this point the *similarity* between his view and ours: Even for Husserl, the notion of evidence brings with it the idea of "it cannot be otherwise". I shall discuss this point specifically with reference to his concept of perceptual intuition. But first, I shall have to back up a step and restate our position:

Loosely speaking, evidence is acquired not so much by opening one's eyes and seeing what is there, but by taking note of the mistake that one would make in thinking that the contrary is there. Evidence is not so much a "filling up" as a *crowding-out* of so many contending possibilities "as false". The experience of a truth lies in "acknowledging" that the rose is red *and*, at the same time, in "denying" that it is any other colour. In a manner of speaking, I do the denying and reality does the rest. Where we find this double structure of "acknowledge and deny" is, precisely, in the answering act. To answer is to both acknowledge and deny. But again, this is to speak only very loosely. For it is not as if the *focus* of an answering act is on the denying; its primary business is to acknowledge the truth of the matter. Nor is it as if reality, what gets acknowledged, is the "remainder" that is left

standing after its contenders have been taken out. In fact, when it comes to a fulfilling perceptual intuition--this is a concession to Husserl--it is rather the other way around.

According to Husserl, a seeing act consists of a "noetic phase", which "animates" the "hyletic" or sensory phase; the hyletic phase, in turn, fills up the noetic (or "signifying") phase. Perception carries evidence for what it posits (*LI* VI, §§21-29; *Ideas* §135). This view of perceptual evidence is compatible, I think, with our own account of evidence. True, it is not as if, when it comes to a perceptual fulfilment, there is first a denying and then a recognizing, in that order. (Husserl does *not* say this and we *should not* say it either.) Nonetheless, there is in Husserl's account of perceptual fulfilment the idea of a *crowding-out*, an idea that is not so far removed from our own idea of how an answering act is supposed to work. For Husserl, the fulfilling perception--the hyletic data of "green", let's say--crowds out the contenders *by virtue* of its actual perceptual content. Putting this point in our own terminology: The act "recognizes" the truth of what is; with reality overwhelming the contenders, "denying" follows as a consequence.

How different, then, is our view from Husserl's on the idea of evidence? To be sure, it is different in the way of emphasis; Husserl does not correlate truth and evidence to the two structural moments of "recognize" and "deny". But perhaps he *should* have correlated them, on his own grounds. In order to back up my point, I shall quote a few passages from Henry Pietersma's essay, "Husserl's Views on the Evident and the True". (The passage in question is about "eidetic" objects, as opposed to "perceptual" objects, objects such as the state of affairs that 2 is less than 3. But for our purposes, this is a minor detail.)

> [For Husserl] The optimal epistemic situation is typically "defended" by
> reference to one's inability to think otherwise about the matter in hand.
>
> In *Logical Investigations* Husserl emphatically rejects this
> description in a purely *psychological* manner [my italics] . . . . An
> epistemically optimal situation would thus be characterized in terms of a
> subjective necessity which is only a fact about our thinking . . . . According
> to our author, the awareness of not being able to think otherwise is to be
> taken as a presentation to the subject of "objective-ideal necessity." It shows
> that this or that cannot *be* otherwise; hence if a subject thinks about it
> otherwise, he will be wrong. In other words, Husserl insists on describing
> the situation as one of seeing an objective necessity, as an insight into the
> pure essence of things. [1977, 47]

According to Husserl, rightly, to see the necessity of the object's being thus-and-so is to see

that the object cannot be otherwise (*LI* III, §7, 446). However--and this is where our view

comes in--in order to be able to see into this necessity, it must be that the subject also

"denies" the rival possibilities. Or, not to put too fine a point on the difference, the subject

must be able to see the object itself as "denying", i.e., as "closing off", those rival

possibilities.[5] In the sense that the subject marginally sees that he would be wrong if he

thought about it otherwise, he also marginally denies that any of those possibilities in fact

obtains. Hence, it is in pointing at the objectual correlate that has the structure of a *state of*

affairs as answered--thus-and-so, and not otherwise--that the act "experiences the truth".[6]

Again, I quote Pietersma at length:

> One form of skepticism [psychologism] he considers treats *Evidenz* as
> nothing more than the factual conjunction of a judgment and a certain
> feeling. Such a view, according to Husserl, amounts to complete skepticism.

To appreciate the full force of this skepticism, we have to remember that what is at stake is the epistemic worth of a situation which is genuinely optimal in terms of the scale that measures epistemic distance. We have to suppose that the subject has done all he could to obtain a good grasp of what he intends. This implies that he not merely thinks he has but that no critical evaluation has been able to show that he has powers he did not fully exercise, or that the nature of the case requires exploration he has not undertaken. In short, the subject cannot conceive of anything he could still do. In more Husserlian language, there are no 'intentions' still calling for 'fulfilment'. This disposes of the argument that a feeling of certainty is a sign of truth, since this situation clearly presupposes a situation in which such a correlation first became known to us. [*ibid.*, 47]

Husserl's position, as just stated by Pietersma, can be redescribed without too much straining in "our" language of questioning and answering. After all, it is his own view, as well as ours, that evidence is a matter of *argumentation*—"thus and not otherwise"--not a matter of feeling. Evidence comes about by way of seeing that the other possibilities are *logically* closed off.

There is one other point in the above passage that I should comment on, if only for the record. Pietersma mentions in the above passage something about "epistemic distance", and by this he is referring to the general idea that Husserl puts forward in the Sixth Investigation, and mainly in the third chapter, "The Phenomenology of the Levels of Knowledge" (*LI* VI, §§16-29). Husserl points out, rightly, that knowledge comes in "levels", "degrees", or "grades" of evidence. The optimal epistemic situation is one in which there can be no more fulfilling. For Husserl, the *"epistemologically pregnant sense* of self-evidence is exclusively concerned with this last unsurpassable goal, *the act of this most*

perfect synthesis of fulfilment" (*LI* VI, §38, 765). This evidence is reached when, as Pietersma puts it, "the subject cannot conceive of anything he could still do" and "there are no 'intentions' still calling for 'fulfilment'".

We may transpose all this into the "key" of questioning and answering. First, the optimal situation of evidence has been reached when there are no more intentions calling for fulfilment, i.e., when all the Qs have been answered. Second, "evidence" pertains not just to the single questioning act; it can also pertain to a complex of Qs and answers. ("Traversing an epistemic distance may involve a lengthy process of thinking", as Pietersma puts it [*ibid.*, 40].) Third, the entire complex itself, not just the individual parts of it, can be spoken of, as a whole, in terms of "signifying" and "fulfilling", "truth" and "evidence", "question" and "answer". Questioning, then, need not necessarily be just as a single-step act, but a *complex* of questioning and answering. And fourth, the criterion of optimal evidence of a given inquiry, whatever the criterion might mysteriously be, does not quite turn on whether more Qs could still be asked. (One could always ask more Qs.) Optimal evidence is reached when "enough is enough"; is reached when the details become immaterial and uninformative; is reached when answering more little Qs no longer adds anything to this big, signifying Q that is called an "inquiry"; and is reached when this big Q has already been answered and already has enough evidence for its own good, until further notice. I shall say more about this "big Q"--the *hermeneutical* Q--in Chapter 5.

Let us retrace the steps so far taken in this chapter. In Part A, we redescribed the transition from the signifying to the fulfilling phases of an act as a transition from the (predicative) question to the (predicative) answer. In Part B, we have "renovated" the notion

of *evidence* in light of our analysis of questioning (= signifying) and answering (= fulfilling). (Husserl's notion of truth pretty well stays the same.) We have correlated the notion of *evidence* with the "denying" side of the answering act. We shall now examine how our findings bear on, and how our "question-theory" of evidence can account for, the doxic cousins of a Q--for example, the modes of deeming likely and unlikely, deeming doubtful, and deeming certain.

C. Questioning and "Doxicality" (Husserl's "Theory D")

On Husserl's view, rightly, an intentional act has to take up some one or other "belief-attitude" as regards its intended object (*Ideas* §§103-104). The act may variously "posit" the object's existence as *being certain, being possible, being likely, being unlikely, being doubtful,* . . . and, in some cases, *being questionable*. But however the act "posits" its object, it has to do so in one "doxic" way or another. Moreover, according to Husserl, these belief-attitudes are to be separated out into two groups. In the first group is included, all by itself, "deeming certain". In the second are included the doxic modes of deeming possible, deeming likely or unlikely, deeming doubtful, and deeming questionable. These doxic modalities are modalities *of* deeming certain. "Belief-certainty", as Husserl also calls it, is the "*'unmodalized' primal form of the mode of believing*" (*Ideas* §104). In other words, deeming probable, deeming likely, deeming questionable, and other "modal deemings" logically presuppose the background of deeming certain. Not only is "deeming certain" our doxic starting point. It is also the point to which we continually try to return:

> Thus, even intuitive certainty, transformed into a habitual possession, leads again to uncertainty, to doubt, to a question. Everything becomes questionable again. Nevertheless, we still strive for incontestable knowledge, for convictions not subject to question. [*EJ* §79, 313].

It is in this philosophical context that we find Husserl's "theory D" of questions. Admittedly, my calling it a theory of *questions* is stretching it a bit. It reads more like a theory about a select group of act-qualities, of which "questioning" is but a member among other members. I disagree with Husserl on certain details of just where questioning is supposed to fit in this doxic family (which is hard to do, since he says so little about it). However, I do agree with him on this much: If "questioning" belongs anywhere in a taxonomy of acts, it would have to be somewhere here, under the category of doxic modalities.

In the following, I shall examine how this one doxic modality, questioning, actually relates to the other basic "belief-attitudes". I shall carry out the discussion in light of our theory of how the requirements of "truth" and "evidence" are built into a questioning act. The point of the discussion is partly to elucidate these *other* doxic modes in terms of where they fit into our theory. And it is partly to elucidate, and defend, this theory by showing how well it can account for these other doxic modes. The present discussion falls into four sections: (1) I argue that "deeming possible" is not so much a doxic modality as it is the defining feature of doxic modality. (2) I propose that we speak of specific doxic modalities, such as doubting, in terms of "deeming uncertain", and that we also allow for *degrees* of deeming uncertain.

With these preliminaries in place, I then proceed to sections 3 and 4: (3) I make a negative claim to the effect that "deeming likely" and "deeming unlikely", are *not* to be counted among the doxic modalities after all, Husserl notwithstanding. The varying "weight" of contending possibilities is *not* a function of "likelihood" after all. (4) Finally, I argue that deeming certain is *also* a doxic modality, Husserl notwithstanding. This discussion, and the third, should bring home how differently we need to construe the notion of certainty once we think of it along the lines of how questioning and answering work. According to the closing argument:

Evidence is correlated to the degree that contending possibilities have been eradicated. So much eradicating, so much evidence. As for those truths that "go without saying"—"wheels are round", say--these *lose* their evidence precisely in proportion that they go without saying. They become "neutral certainties", and what they point at don't look as real to us as they once did. This argument will also furnish us with the materials with which to argue for the claim in Part D: Namely, informativeness--not a category in Husserl's phenomenology--turns out to be identical with evidence. The more informative the message, the more real the thing at which it points appears to be.

1. Deeming Possible

Two points of clarification are in order: (a) the first point, by way of getting to the second, is that the notion of a "doxic modality" is to be understood in a first-order sense; and (b) the second point is that "deeming possible" is not so much a doxic modality, but is a defining feature of a doxic modality. I am fairly sure that Husserl would endorse the first point (if he

does not already hold it), and I am almost as sure that the same would go for the second point.

(a) Maybe this is not quite as Husserl conceives it. On our view anyway, the doxic modalities of "deeming likely", "deeming doubtful", "deeming unlikely", as well as "deeming certain", are not so much acts in themselves as *"epistemic" qualities* of acts, whatever else they might happen to be. (One remembers "with doubt", "with certainty", etc.; one sees "with doubt", "with certainty", etc.) Or better yet, they are not so much "qualities" as vector-like *structures*. (Doubting, for example, is multi-directed, as is questioning). Finally, they are not activities, in spite of this way of talking about *deeming* likely, *deeming* unlikely, *deeming* doubtful, and the rest. First-order doubt, to recall, is the type of doubting that animates the act itself. (One sees this doubtingly, remembers this doubtingly). Second-order doubt, on the other hand, is an act that "talks" about doubt (e.g., "I certainly find this doubtful", "This is unlikely to be doubtful"). What I propose is that we also apply this first-order/second-order distinction to "deeming likely", "deeming unlikely", and "deeming certain". (Take, for example, "deeming certain". Second-order certainty is one thing, e.g., "I judge it to be certain that X is y". First-order certainty is quite another, e.g., with conviction, "X is y".)

(b) Here is an example of what "deeming possible" might involve, which is Husserl's own:

> The thing "suggests itself" as possibly a man. Then a contrary deeming
> possible occurs; it could be a tree which, in the darkness of the forest, looks
> like a man who is moving. Now, however, the "weight" of the one

"possibility" becomes considerably greater; we decide in its favour . . .

that "it was a tree after all". [*Ideas I* <215>, 250]

We may extend Husserl's point, and say that whether it is specifically in doubting, in questioning, in deeming likely, or whatnot, the doxic act is a "deeming possible" *at bottom.* Although I doubt that he would have a problem with this point, Husserl *might* object: "These other modalities involve 'deeming possible'. But I include 'deeming possible' as a separate entry for the reason that I mean by it deeming *purely* possible". But to this we would reply: "Deeming possible" in the *first-order* would have to be "presumptive", "motivated", "open", or "weighted", to use Husserl's own terminology. A deeming *purely* possible, on the other hand, whether by freely postulating a hypothesis, by supposing for argument's sake, by conjecturing, by "let's pretend", is to involve an "as-if transformation". But then this would be "deeming possible" only in a second-order sense. Summing up: It is somewhat misleading to talk about "deeming possible" as a "doxic modality". Minimally defined, a doxic modality *is* a "deeming possible". And it is misleading in that it might imply that first-order deeming doubtful, deeming unlikely, and the rest, are something other than deeming possible.

2. Doubting and Questioning

Up to this point in this chapter, our claim has been that a signifying act is a questioning act. Now stating our case with more precision, a signifying act is either a questioning act, or it tends towards it. First-order doubting is *also* signifying for the simple reason that it holds open different *contending* possibilities. (Doubting might well be described as an answering

that can't make up its mind. In these cases, the logic of "recognize and deny", operative in an answer, takes place *fluctuatingly*. At one moment: one recognizes, this is a ship, denying it to be a lighthouse. At another moment, one recognizes this is a lighthouse, denying it to be a ship.) For good measure, we can add to the list of other "signifying" candidates, along with doubting and questioning: disappointment, wonder, suspicion, and other acts that are, or might also be, "multi-directed". But having just said that, I should stress that if a signifying act is not a questioning, then it *tends towards it*. When doubting is a "strong" doubting, when other possibilities stand up and "announce" themselves as serious contenders--when the act becomes genuinely "signifying"--it "turns into" a questioning. And just as the target of doubting predisposes one to question, so also do the targets of disappointment, surprise, and the like.

Implied in the above remark is the idea that there are *degrees* of doubting (and degrees of disappointment, surprise, etc.). We may correlate this idea with our "information theory". Doubting involves the *incursion* of competing possibilities over against a "traditionally" held possibility. The more "competitive" or "weighty" these newly arrived possibilities are, the greater the degree of the doubting. However, since doubting is almost by definition a "historical" act (one doubts what *was* held), since it is a specific kind of uncertainty, it would be better to talk in the "ahistorical" terms of *"uncertainty"*. This allows for the fact (so I think) that there are any number of other sorts of doxic modalities besides just the few that Husserl mentions. We may add to the doxic list, among others: deeming disappointing, deeming suspicious, deeming surprising. These, like doubting, also involve the "incursion" of possibilities.

I have said enough about doubting in particular and about other particular types of modalities. I shall use the generic description, "deeming uncertain", which is meant to cover them all. In the next section, I shall explore more carefully the idea that there are *degrees* of uncertainty or certainty.

3. Deeming Likely, Deeming Unlikely

The degree of uncertainty, or certainty, that goes with deeming likely, or a deeming unlikely, is to be accounted for by the fact that in such cases not all the contending possibilities have been eliminated. With the contending possibilities still "in the air", the given act falls short of being certain about what it aims at. The degree to which it is uncertain is correlated to the degree of the "contentiousness" or "weight" of possibilities. And the degree to which this uncertainty is reduced is correlated to the level of the reduction of possibilities. Hence, eliminating the uncertainty involves eliminating all contending possibilities.

In order to counter a potential misunderstanding, I must stress once again the disclaimer that *our* "information theory" is to be conceived along "mathematical" lines. It is not as if deeming likely, or deeming unlikely, and by extension, the act of answering, were no more than an implicit reckoning of probabilities (e.g., "likely", "unlikely", "certainly") or that the measure of a possibility's "weight" is amenable to a calculus. The idea of *first-order* uncertainty is an *existential matter*.

To illustrate the point: I know that the likelihood of this airplane stalling in flight and taking me down with it, is very slim indeed. But a statistic does not have the final say

on whether or not, and how much, the possibility of this happening is experienced as a *contending* possibility. If I begin to fear the fate of this flight, *first-order* uncertainty may increase accordingly. What, then, is this thing that brings a measure of uncertainty into the act? (a) With an eye to answering this, I shall start with a brief statement of what I take to be a "second-order" or "abstract" sense of uncertainty. (b) And then, working backwards, I shall proceed to the analysis of "first-order" certainty or uncertainty. My negative claim will be: Whatever else makes for a "contending possibility", it is not, fundamentally, a reckoning of a probability.

(a) Second-Order Uncertainty

In asking the sort of Q that is up front about "evidence", "But is it so?", or "But will it be so?", I have moved into the second-order sense of "certainty". (Contrast this second-order certainty, "I deem it certain that X is y" to first-order certainty of deeming with certainty "X is y".) When I ask about the *probability* about such-and-such happening, having happened, etc., I also move into the second order. In the second order, "I am certain that X is y"; in the second order, "89 per cent that X is y". A second-order certainty statement is, in a way, a statement *about* the Q behind it ("The Q has **eliminated** all the contenders"). Similarly, a probability statement is, in a way, also *about* the Q behind it ("The Q has **reduced** the contenders--").

What gets a Q going are the contending possibilities set before it. The answering of a Q involves the elimination of them. However, if the full elimination itself cannot be brought off, the *reduction* of them will do as a second-best. The answer that settles for a

reduction, and gives a verbal measure of it with a "maybe", an "unlikely", a "highly probable", or a *quantitative* measure of it with, say, an "89 %", is called a *probability statement*. (I pass over the ontological problem of whether utterances concerning the future can be statements, or can refer "truly" or "falsely".) Our "information theory" of probability is *not* claiming that probability is "objective". Sure, one can talk about the "propensity" of a thing; but this hardly means that "1/2" is built into, say, this coin. Nor is it "subjective" either, at least not in the sense that claiming, for example, "X's happening is an 89 per cent chance" is primarily a measure of my "commitment" to believing what I am saying.[7] Rather, a probability statement is a measure of *missing information*.

This point is not philosophically novel. However, what is novel, I think, is our idea that "probability" is integrally connected to this thing called a "question". A Q, "What is the probability?" is not just another Q alongside so many others. In a way, a probability Q is a Q that *asks about itself.* A Q, any Q, calls for the reduction, if not the elimination, of the contending possibilities. Accordingly, every answer comes at least implicitly prefaced with a probability index. If the contenders have been eliminated whole and entire, if the evidence is total, then "100%" implicitly prefaces the answer. If the contenders can be only reduced at best, not wholly eliminated, then--this is an option--the questioner can go into the second-order, so to speak, and ask for a measure of the missing information.

(b) First-Order "Degrees of Uncertainty"

But all this takes place at the second-order level. At the first-order, talk about "It is likely that", "It is unlikely that", "It is doubtful that", and the like, does not essentially come up. "Likely" and "unlikely" are second-order assessments. These assessments, along with the

observations, "The rose is red", "The sky is blue", are to be distinguished from the first-order "doxic modalities" of being *likely, unlikely, doubtful, certain*—modalities that are operative in these assessments. What is this first-order "doxic feel"? When does a range of possibilities become "*contender-worthy*"? When do they become sufficiently contentious as to give rise to a Q? At the first-order level, "probability" is somewhat incidental to whether or not a possibility is contentious. The degree of the contentiousness of a possibility--the degree of first-order "uncertainty"--is correlated to the existential point of what is at stake should that possibility turn out to be true.

In order to be a "contender", a possibility has to be more than just a "pure possibility". Consider how things works for the Q, say, "Where is the book?" Now, to be sure, in terms of pure possibilities, the book might be on the planet Mars, or in a galaxy far, far away. But the Q concerning its whereabouts does not, of course, take up any and all where-possibilities as "fair game". The where-possibilities are "motivated", as Husserl might put it. They have been narrowed down to, say, a range of "where's" in this house, or in this room. (Notice, it is not as if the Q itself, which deals with this motivated or narrowed-down range, did the *narrowing down*. The where-possibilities already "show" themselves to be contenders, and to this extent the range has already been narrowed down as "worthy" for the subject matter of a Q. The Q "takes over" what has already begun, and tries to narrow down the contenders even more--if all goes well, right down to the last possibility, which then turns out to be true, as if by "default".)

To repeat our question: What is it that makes these possibilities "contenders"? One answer to this would have it that these possibilities are taken as "probabilities", and that this

is what distinguishes a motivated possibility from a "pure" possibility. So the argument might go. This, I think, is a mistake. Let us go over this in two steps.

According to *our* "epistemology of questioning", a spectrum of belief does not stretch from "0" to "100", from "uncertainty" to "certainty". Rather, "certainty of x" is on one side, "certainty of not-x" is on the other. (Remember, we countenance the existence of negative states of affairs.) What is to be found *between* these two extremes are "uncertainty". "doubt", not to say also "deeming likely", "deeming unlikely". It is somewhere in this *middle zone*, if anywhere, that a Q may be counted as "worthy". The possibility is not weighted so heavily against the others that the answer "Yes" is already obvious. Nor is it weighted so lightly that the answer "No" is already obvious.

However (the second step), being in the "middle zone" is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for turning a possibility into a contending possibility. One can be very, very sure about X, and yet ask in earnest, "Is X so?", for the reason that a great deal rides on whether or not X is actually so. One can be very, very unsure about Y, and yet not give a hang about determining, "Is Y so?" Being very sure, in the second-order, is not enough to pre-empt a Q. Being very unsure, in the second-order, is not enough to get it off the ground.

Or rather: "Being sure", or "being unsure", "deeming likely", or "deeming unlikely". in the usual sense has nothing fundamentally to do with its "doxical" counterpart at the level at which it may prompt a Q. (It should become clearer in a moment what is meant by "the usual sense".) The information about, "Is it a boy or a girl?", involves an elimination of only one possibility; the information about, "Where is it?", involves the elimination of maybe thirty thousand possibilities. But the "worth" of the information riding on the one might be

existentially far greater than that riding on the second. And hence, the first Q might likely be a far more pressing Q than the second.

Indeed, there are cases in which talk about "likely" and "unlikely", in the usual senses, does not even technically enter a Q, for example, "Does God exist?" For a Pascal, or a gambler, a great deal can ride on what the answer to that Q is, even though there is no way to attach a probability to it. Reading the statistics on the safety of flying may not help allay my fear for flying. (Conversely, reading the statistics on the danger of it may do nothing to diminish my confidence that the plane will land safely.) The statistics may tell me that the probability of the plane going down in flames is highly remote. I may even put my whole "rational" trust in those statistics. But the statistics themselves do not necessarily add, or take away from, the weight of these *possibilities*. To crash or not to crash? That is the Q that may still weigh heavily on me, even if I remain convinced that the chance is one in a million. What is the point? Whatever makes for the weight of a contending possibility, it is *not* fundamentally tied to a statistical reckoning of "not likely", "likely", "very likely", etc.

A parenthetical note: I am not making a point about fear *per se*, confidence *per se*, or this or that emotion *per se*. The purpose of the example about one's fear of flying is simply to bring out that the fact that "rationality"—"Calm down! There's no reason to be afraid", "The probability is very, very low"--is not the "deciding factor" when it comes to the varying "weights" of possibilities put before the subject. To be sure, the point about fear does suggest the larger issue: What might be the connection between, on the one hand, the intentionality of types of emotion in general, or only certain types of emotion, and, on the other hand, doxicality, noise, interestedness, informativeness, questioning and answering,

truth and evidence? I cannot answer these questions here; the most I can do is note them and relegate these questions to a larger problem that I am not taking up in the present work: Namely, What sets up a "field of noise", or a field of rival possibilities, *within* which a Q is liable to arise in response?

Finally, we said that basic to a doxic modality, be it a questioning, doubting, deeming likely or unlikely, is that it is, minimally, a deeming possible. We may refine this point as follows: Basic to a doxic modality at the primitive level is the "existential weight" of the relative possibilities--or what we have elsewhere called their "contentiousness" or "rivalry". The weightier a possibility, the more pressing it is, so the more urgent is the related questioning. The weightier, the greater the worth of the prospective information concerning it. The weightier, the greater may be the elimination of the "noise" or uncertainty. Hence, *certainty*, at the primitive level, is not about the epistemic matter of "not so likely, more likely, very, very likely . . . and finally certain". "Deeming likely" and "deeming unlikely" are not, after all, primitive doxic categories (Husserl to the contrary). Rather, it is an existential matter of "the more at stake for me as regards these possibilities and "the greater the gain of 'certainty' in the reduction of the contenders". Of course, a phrase, such as "existential weight", doesn't add up to an explanation. Rather, it requires an explanation, which I shall try to sketch out in the closing chapter.

We have said quite enough about how questioning relates to doubting, deeming likely, and deeming unlikely. The category that we have yet to examine, explicitly anyway, is that of certainty.

4. On Certainty

According to Husserl, "certainty" is not a doxic *modality*. As pointed out already, it is "unmodalized". Doxic modalities--doubting, questioning, and the rest--are modalities *of* "belief-certainty". But this is only a first approximation of Husserl's position. For in point of fact, he distinguishes between, on the one hand, "unmodalized" or "primary" certainty, the certainty of *believing*, and, on the other hand, the **modalized** certainty of *assent* (*EJ*, §§71-72; also *LI* V, §29; also Mohanty [1982]). This difference corresponds, roughly, to the difference between one's saying, believingly, "The rose is red", and the other's saying, approvingly or with assent, "What you say about the rose being red is true". Or again, just as there is first-order and second-order doubt, there is also first-order (unmodalized) and second-order (modalized) certainty. Having just given a slightly more precise reading of Husserl's position on the idea of "certainty", I shall now roughly contrast our own position with his. Keep in mind that this follows from our "question theory" of evidence, just as do the above discussions on doxic modalities.

Whereas for Husserl first-order certainty is unmodalized, on our view it is modalized. Obviously, with evidence comes certainty. But evidence involves not just the simple "belief" or recognizing what is; it involves also the denying of its contending *possibilities*. Certainty at this level is already "modalized" in the sense that the judging act is already dealing with possibilities. Also on Husserl's view, certainty in the second-order is modalized. We agree, but with the proviso that modalization at this level be regarded as, indeed, a second-order modalization, which has more to do with what the judgment is talking about than with the "inner conviction" of the judgment itself. First-order doxicality

is no less operative in a second-order judgment. When I say, in the second-order, "It is certain that", "It is 99 per cent certain that", etc., I might say it with first-order certainty, or I might even say it with first-order hesitation, doubt, etc.

But it gets more complicated. We allow that there is something *un*modalized at the first-order after all, although it isn't quite what Husserl has in mind. We shall call this "unmodalized something" *pre-certainty*. In answer to a Q, "The rose is *red*", I acknowledge the entire state of affairs, and deny the rivals of "red". The *modalized* certainty of this answer, and the evidence of the answer, assembles around "red--not these other colours". However, although in the answer, "The rose is *red*", the focus is on the "red" of the rose, there is still, of course, a marginal noticing of everything else besides. The rose itself is, if you like, the *presupposed part* of the state of affairs correlated to the answer, "The rose is *red*". The "certainty" of my relation to it in this case is *pre-certain* in the sense that I simply take it "as a given, without any questions asked". The "debate" is around the "red" of the rose, not the rose itself. Hence, *this* "part" or "moment" of certainty in the utterance, the part concerning the rose itself, is unmodalized.

The doxicality of an act even survives the effects of the so-called "phenomenological reduction", according to Husserl. Even if all presuppositions concerning the existence of the world are "put out of action", or "neutralized", there would still remain, on his view, a believing, even though "no longer serious believing", a questioning, even though "no longer serious questioning", and so forth (*ibid.*, §§109, 110). I have only a few comments to make on this. One *cannot* "neutralize" all presuppositions concerning the existence of the world. This isn't so much because, practically speaking, it's too hard to pull

off. Nor is it because, ontologically speaking, "Dasein" is already "being-in-the-world", we are "already in the truth", and so forth. Rather, it is that presuppositions, and suppositions, are the things we "de-neutralize". Ordinarily at any rate, it is when we say such things as "The rose is *red*" that the existential presupposition *becomes* a presupposition.

To sum up the distinctions thus far: There is certainty in the first-order and second-order. There is both modalized and unmodalized certainty in the first-order. I shall now introduce yet another category. I am unsure how to classify it, since it seems to be neither first- nor second-order. Call it "neutralized certainty".

To illustrate: This is modalized certainty that, say, "the tree is *green*", comes to be "neutralized". First, there were contending possibilities, along with a Q, "What colour is the tree?" Second, there was the answer, "The tree is *green*", and with it an afterglow of the contending possibilities and their denial. Third, the answer to the Q was to *become* so "obviously true" that asking, "What colour is this tree?", or answering, "The tree is green", became sillier and sillier. (Of course, not forever; information that two and two is four doesn't grow old; but information about a tree does.) And fourth, the "answer" eventually turns into an "unstressed allomorph". The corresponding SAs *as cognized* flattens out. Accordingly, I lose access to its factuality. It is then that the certainty of this SAs has been "neutralized".

This point is fairly well in keeping with what was said near the end of Chapter 3, where it was pointed out that "embossment" is a precondition of having access to a SAs. No embossment, no access to it. Unless I see such-and-such as being thus-and-so *and not*

otherwise, I gain no ontological access to the *factuality* of the SAs--which is to say, I

can't "see" it. With the SAs "de-embossed" from my perspective, what I "see" instead is a

presentation, the-tree-is-green. My saying, "The tree is green", doesn't necessarily mean

that, phenomenologically, I am therefore pointing at a SAs. No, unless I can see the "thus-

and-so and not otherwise"--unless the "SAs" is structured as a *SAs as answered*--the

objectual correlate cannot be given as a SAs. In the meantime, it is neutralized into a

presentation. Or the presentation, whatever its history, is *de-neutralized* into an object-in-Q

("What colour is the tree?"; "Is the tree green?") or into a SAs ("The tree is green").

What is the point? First of all, in light of our theory of truth and evidence, one might

raise the problem: "What happens when what we know 'goes without saying', when we get

used to it, and give it no second thought? 'The sum of the internal angles of a triangle add

up to two right angles'. Why go through the proof that allows us to see it as 'thus and not

otherwise' again and again?" In answer: Yes, these things "go without saying". However,

things are not as they might seem; it is not as if, having become so used to the idea that 2

and 2 is 4, we now have the truth of the matter and the evidence for it. No, truth is

something I have in my pointing at a reality; and my experience of it presupposes evidence

for it; and evidence requires the denying of the contrary; and this denying involves the

embossment of a SAs, in which case it is revealed in its factuality. No embossment, no

access to this. Sure, I know that "2 and 2 is 4", however uninteresting, is real; I know that

the ground beneath my feet, however uninteresting the fact may be, is real. However,

without evidence, or the need for it, the reality of this state of affairs is, *for me*, neither here

nor there. What gets neutralized is not so much the look of the object's being real but the

experience of this thing's being real. And what does the neutralizing is *my getting used to it*. This experience lies somewhere between finding the thing "interesting" and finding it "informative".

D. Conclusion: On the Idea of Informativeness

In Part C, I examined our theory of evidence in light of Husserl's view to the effect that questioning is one among several "doxic modalities" or "belief-attitudes". The point of the discussion was partly to figure out where these *other* doxic modes should fit in our "information theory" of truth and evidence. And it was partly to elucidate, and defend, our theory of evidence--or "certainty"--by showing how well it can account for these other doxic modes. I argued that evidence is correlated to the measure that contending possibilities are reduced. So much reducing, so much evidence. As for those truths that eventually "go without saying", they cease to require evidence. But here's the catch: They cease to require evidence not because they already have it, but because they are no longer so amenable to it. Now that these truths are so "obvious", the denying operation drops out. No denying, no evidence; no evidence, no access to the "factuality" of these "obviously true" SsAs.

By way of closing, I shall introduce a category that is not to be found in Husserl's phenomenology, certainly not by the name I am giving it, and this I call "informativeness". This notion is no more, or less, in Husserl's phenomenology than is the notion of evidence as *we* understand that term. By "evidence" we mean, roughly, the "but not otherwise" of cognizing something's being "thus-and-so, but not otherwise". And by evidence, we also

mean informativeness. "Informativeness" and "evidence" mean the same thing. In other words, it is not as if it is only in the last few paragraphs of the chapter that the topic of informativeness has come up; we have been talking about it all along, except in name. Why, then, introduce the term so late in the chapter on evidence, i.e., informativeness? And if they mean the same technically, why multiply the terms?

In answer to the first question, the two terms do not mean the same in good English usage of the words. It was necessary, then, to work out the notion of evidence by initially staying close to the ordinary meaning. Now that this has been worked out, the next step is to show that "evidence", in our technical sense of the notion, is the same as informativeness. It is the notion of "informativeness"--I prefer this over "evidence"--and its counterpart, "interestedness", that will prove fundamental from this point on in the present work.

To inform me is to tell me something that is supposed to be more than just true. If I already know full well that 2 and 2 is 4, to tell me as much is *not* to "inform" me. Moreover, even if I don't know something (e.g., I don't know what 365 x 24 equals), telling me is not to inform me unless I first of all *want* to know, in some wide sense of the word, "want". To be informed, then, is not necessarily to have one's Q answered; but it is to provide something that, even if it is not, technically speaking, an answer, still has to have the structure of an answer. How is that?

Not knowing is not enough a precondition to informing me. Knowing that I don't know X is not enough a precondition to informing me either. Nor is being told the "truth" enough. What informing requires, in addition to all these, and primarily, is that the "message" *interests* me in the first place. Informing, then, is correlated to the

"interestedness". What makes for this interest is the range of contending possibilities which is, mysteriously no doubt, put before me. Logically, first comes interestedness, then information. These possibilities have varying "existential" weights; they contend in varying ways and degrees. Within this range or field a Q arises, or anyway it tends to arise. Questioning is a response to, a function and manifestation of, this "interest". In turn, a message is informative to the extent that it narrows down the very range of contending possibilities that makes the subject-matter interesting and "question-worthy". Informativeness, then, is correlated to the degree of this eradication. The paradigmatic bearer of informing is the answering act, whose chief business it is to recognize and deny.

In other words: To inform is primarily to deny contending possibilities. So much providing of evidence, so much informativeness. If the possibilities are not in place as contenders, so much the worse for informativeness. "2+2 is 4"? I don't seriously entertain the idea that it might be greater or less than 4. For me, being told that 2 and 2 is 4 is, therefore, wholly uninformative, not to say also wholly uninteresting. The statement. "2 and 2 is 4" can never, ever again "sound" like an answer to me. And even were I to preface the statement with, "What is 2 and 2?", in order to help make it sound like an answer, I would be only faking the Q, however much I might knit my eyebrows and try to ask it sincerely. The Q is not real, for there are no contending possibilities, no interestedness (*inter-esse*) "between" me and the SAs that 2 and 2 is 4. Nor is the "answer" real; or it is real only in proportion that contending possibilities have been wiped out. The desideratum of a Q is not, "Tell me what I don't know". It is, "Tell me what I think might be the case, but isn't so".

So much evidence, so much informativeness. I should like to bring our thesis to bear on the problem of statements about negative facts, the better to refine it and put it to a test.

A no-answer to a yes-no Q is a recognition of a "truth" of a negative state of affairs. Technically, this answer, relative to its Q, is every bit as appropriate as a yes-answer. But that said, the fact remains that we find negative answers less than satisfying. Scientists tend not to value too highly the negative answer. They don't make careers out of saying, E does not equal mc³, or "There is no life on the sun". The same goes for everyone else. Why is that? First things first, it should be pointed out that, given *our* philosophical view that there do exist such things as negative facts, we are not in the position to say: The reason that taking note of negative facts is less satisfactory is that they are less than true. Not so; "2 and 2 is not 5" is every bit as true as "2 and 2 is 4".

The reason why we tend not to value negative facts is that they tend to be not so very informative. If I ask, "Is the rose red?", and you answer, "Yes", it has *full evidence.* Knowing that it is red nullifies the other possibilities. Red--not any other colour. But the same cannot be said if the answer to the Q is, instead, a "No". The answer is true, but it falls short of evidence. Very well, it's not red; that gets rid of one possibility. But where does that leave the others? If anything, the negative answer incites another Q, or reopens the questioning that had already begun: "Well, then, excluding red, what colour is it?"

Since we are doing the philosophically "eccentric" thing of positing the existence of negative facts, the onus is on us to meet the objection: "If they do exist, if they are 'true', then why is it that we still tend to think of them as less real than positive facts?" I am

suggesting that the reason for this (or part of it) has to do with their uninformativeness. I am also suggesting that this correlation between informativeness (or lack of it) and the "experience of reality" (or lack of this experience) is not confined just to our commerce with negative facts. It also applies to those positive facts that eventually "go without saying". With these facts, as with negative facts, it is hard to get access to, and to "feel", their factuality.

I emphasize this "existential" dimension of interestedness (roughly, the "need" for evidence) and informativeness (roughly, the evidence itself). Showing how such-and-such can't be otherwise is not to provide an ounce of evidence for the hearer unless there is an "interesting" field of possibilities already in place for him. The "sincerity" of the Q, the degree to which that questioning act is genuinely a Q; the degree to which an answer is informative, or, better yet, the degree to which the answer is really an answer--these categories are measured against whether there is actually in place a range of contending possibilities and the degree to which those possibilities are, in fact, contentious. The degree of my experience of the real is a function of the degree to which I have before me a field of contending possibilities, or the degree to which these "noisy" possibilities have been "filtered out" by my answers. Questioning and answering are therefore central to one's *experiencing* things as real.

Finally, my reader will have noted, perhaps with some misgivings, that almost all my examples of Qs have been about those that deal with *finite* ranges of possibilities. My reason for sticking to such examples has been partly strategic. I am assuming that what applies to these simple cases applies also to those more complex and messier cases.

Consider the example of a Q which calls not for one simple possibility against other simple possibilities ("Which one is prime--2,4, or 5?" A: "{5}--{not 2 or 4}"), but for one potentially complex possibility against another potentially complex possibility ("Which of the numbers between 2 and 20 are prime?" A: "{3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19}, not {2, 4, 6, 8, 9. . . . 20}). Consider the example of the Q, "What are the three countries in Europe that have the highest standard of living?" The possibilities can be enumerated and the range is finite. However, each possibility (Denmark, Spain, etc.) represents a *vague* target for the Q, "What is this country's standard of living?" or, before that, "*What* is a 'standard of living'?" This brings me to my second reason for using examples of Qs that deal with finite ranges. Those ranges that are vague, that have to be rendered *de-finite* or determinate, pertain to hermeneutical Qs, as opposed to predicative Qs. In short, I have not attempted to provide a theory of the "criterion of relevance" for Qs. My point is that with the predicative Q, the criterion is already in place. And my point is that if it is the criterion itself that remains to be determined, then that is precisely the job which is cut out for the hermeneutical Q. I shall be examining this sort of Q in the following chapter.

In closing, there are two additional points that I should like to comment on briefly. They are connected to the problem of interestedness (the first more obviously so than the second); however, since neither topic could be quite fitted into the main discussion, I have opted to place them at the very end of the chapter. The one problem has to do with authority in speaking, and the other with what it means to say, "It is true" and "It is false".

1. Auditory Evidence

An underlying and Husserlian thesis of this chapter is that truth and evidence are the things intentional consciousness starts to look for at ground level. Talk about "scientific truth" and "scientific evidence" comes later, if at all. But if this is so, how are we to do justice to the fact that much, or most, of what we believe in is based on hearsay, "no further questions asked"? Doesn't all this somewhat discredit the assertion that the requirements of truth and evidence are built into us? Not entirely. Here is a sketch of how I think the "authority" of hearsay works. My reason for bringing up this issue at this point is to put our theory of evidence to a small test. To an extent, our "information theory" of evidence can account for the phenomenon of authority. Let us examine the following.

Denying the logical contrary makes for the evidence. Yet if most of what we believe is true is by hearsay, then this suggests that "authority", which, it appears, normally goes with the act of communicating, is somehow *linked up* with the denying function. Denying makes for evidence. Authority makes for evidence. To complete the sequence: Presumably, there must be some connection between the one and the other. What would that connection be? On the one hand, the "Cartesian" might want to declare that authority is a "second-best", a stand-in for evidence maybe, but in no way equivalent to it. On the other, the "Romantic" might declare that there's more to "proof" than evidence, that authority carries its own conviction. Both views miss the mark.

Authority is already built into the communicative act, more or less. Typically, one communicates on the understanding that the other wants to know, or would want to know (a case of retrodictive questioning?), or because the other is already asking a Q, or will hear what the other is saying as an "answer" to a Q he would want to have asked in retrospect.

And typically, one communicates in order to inform, or be informed. What makes a message informative is not simply that it is true, or even that the "sense" is different, even though the denoted object is the same (to take Frege's celebrated example of "the evening star is the morning star"). What makes a message informative is that there is (or was, up to a moment ago) around it contending messages. Consider a few familiar examples.

(a) *The evening star is the morning star.* We astronomers don't tell each other such things as "the evening star is the morning star", simply because we know it already, or should know it. (b) *My hand has six fingers.* What would make this informative is not just its truth, but that it would prove interesting. A hand usually has five fingers. For a hand to have six would be a sight to behold. (c) *My hand has five fingers.* Well, assuming that you say only informative things, I try to guess as to the contenders, as to why it could have been otherwise, and so forth. ("So, you've been using the meat cleaver again, have you!")

An obvious rule of communication is: Say informative things, in the very wide sense of that word. Failing that, the utterance, a sort of doing, lacks a "because". What is my point? The degree to which what is said is informative is correlated to the reduction of "noise" or contending messages. Hence, a "moment" of communicating, at least when it is up and running, is to "deny the contrary". How, then, does one speak with "authority"? On our view, this comes to the same as asking: How does one communicate well? Discern the Q the hearer is asking, or prompt the hearer into asking it, etc. But whatever the strategy, find the "rhetorical Q" that the hearer is already asking, or should be asking, and then answer it for the hearer. Only then will the speaker's message come across as informative. Only then will the speaker be in a position in which to deny the contrary and, hence, speak

with "authority". According to our view, then, rhetoric--the art of persuading--is the science of how to deny well.

I return to a point made early on about the Daubertian, and Reinachian, thesis that questioning (*die Anfrage*) is an inherently public act, much in the way that promising, commanding, and thanking are also, although more strictly so, inherently public. To recall, I rejected this thesis, with the explanation that Qs take place as much in private as in public. But the original point may now be modified, and radicalized, as follows: It is not that a Q is inherently public and that only in communication is it in its element. Rather, it is the "public"--the communicative realm--which is inherently "questionable". Communication comes into its own when question and answer pass back and forth between speaker and hearer. This is not to say that in a communicative exchange, lots of individual Qs and individual answers have to pass back and forth. Rather, the very structure of communicating involves the introducing and eradicating of contending "messages". Its very structure is that of questioning and answering. Those things that the average speaker would be prepared to call "questions" and "answers" simply make manifest what is already going on beneath the surface.

2. "It is True", "It is False"

A key claim in the present work is that it is the business of an answer is to "recognize" the truth of what is the case. To be sure, the thesis has to be refined, and qualified, when it comes to Qs which expressly ask, "Is it true?" or "True or false?". If I say, "It is false that A is b", where is the "recognition of a truth" in saying it? That I am speaking truly? Surely,

this not what I am "recognizing" when I say, "It is false that--", or even, "It is true that--

". What, then, about these Qs that move to a higher order, and that ask, instead of "Is A b?",

"Is it true (or false) that A is b?"? We are not toning down the original thesis: The higher-

order Q is not exempt from the rule that it too must reach an answer that "recognizes the

truth". Admittedly, it might be "higher order" semantically. But *qua* questioning, it is still a

Q, neither more nor less nor other; and the business of an answer to it is still to recognize a

truth, and this is so, whether the Q behind it is, "Is A b?", "Does A exist?", or, for that

matter, "Is it true that A is b?" or, "Is it false that A is b?"

But the question remains: What is it that one is saying *in addition* when prefacing

"A is b" with "It is true that--" or "It is false that--"? The cautious view to take on this is that

it could mean different things in different circumstances. In one case, it might be a way of

personally warranting a claim, standing behind it, guaranteeing it. In another case, it might

mean no more than what it says, namely, *it is true that--*, in which case it adds pretty well

nothing to what "A is b" already says. I propose a third possibility, which goes as follows:

Ordinarily, you would say, "It is true that A", not so much because you're

warranting something "personally", but because there is, "in the air", the view to the

contrary, according to which, "It is false that A". (Indeed, the very point of committing

oneself to the proposition A, to warranting A, standing by it, etc., presupposes that A does

not go without saying, that it is not generally agreed that A, etc. Why on earth would one

effectively give one's guarantee that "Wheels are round" or that "2 and 2 is 4"?) Or

ordinarily, you would say, "It is true that . . .; however. . . .", as a way of saying that,

admittedly, you're not taking the contrary view, "Even though, however--". In short:

Ordinarily, you would say "It is true that", or "It is false that", for the same reason you'd say anything else, and this *in order to say something informative*. What would make this informative for us is that we, your hearers, thought otherwise, or might have thought otherwise, or suspected otherwise. "'Black'? We thought it might be white". "'True'? We thought it might be false".

The rule applying to "Is A b?" applies, then, also to "Is it true that A is b?". The point of asking and answering it is to be informative. Of course, this is not to say that there is lacking any crucial difference between the two types of Q. There *is* a difference, and it lies with the respective messages themselves. Ordinarily, with the Q, "True or false?", or the answer, "It is true--", "It is false--", talk about the status of one's belief is in the air. Presumably, "It is true that X" says to the effect, "Recognize this truth: this belief is right. Deny the contrary: this belief is wrong". And presumably, "It is false that X" says to the effect, "Recognize this truth: this belief is wrong. Deny the contrary: this belief is right".

Notice carefully, there is "true" and "false", as in "It is true" and "It is false"; and then there is, so to speak, an existential "true" and "false". The one pair is not to be confounded with the other. In the answer, "A is b", there is both a recognition and a denying, an existential "truth-moment" and an existential "false-moment". The same goes for, and no less so, the answer, "It is true that A is b" or "It is false that A is b". What they "say" is one thing; one says, "true", the other says, "false". However, in the saying itself, there is, in either case, the existential recognizing of a truth--that this is true, that this is false. And in the saying itself, there is also, in either case, the existential denying of a falsehood--this is true, not false; this is false, not true.

I shall postpone until the concluding chapter any speculation on the precise natures of interestedness and informativeness. At this point, I end our two-part discussion of the predicative Q and turn to the analysis of the hermeneutical Q. Not all the principles that apply to the predicative Q apply also to the hermeneutical Q, as we shall see. Among other things, obviously, the aim of a hermeneutical Q is also to come up with something informative. The next question I shall try to answer is: What exactly is a hermeneutical Q? And how is it that it is felt to be a profounder thing to ask than its predicative cousin? Part of the answer to that is that they are more informative.

1. As Dallas Willard puts it, rightly, the "Clarification of the nature of knowledge (*Erkenntnis*) is the primary aim of Husserl's philosophical work, at least up to 1913, when he completed Section Four of *Ideas I* . . . . Thus, his first major work, the *Logical Investigations* (1900-1901) became an analysis of the nature of knowledge in general and of the conditions of its possibility. Volume II is titled "Investigations in the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge" and culminates in the "Sixth Investigation," which is an elaborate statement on what, exactly, knowledge is . . . . The Sixth Investigation is the counterpart of Section Four in the later *Ideas I* (1913). . ." (1995, 138).

2. A case could be made that Husserl, in *Experience and Judgment*, does come close to correlating the signifying act and the questioning act, even though at the last moment he backs out from doing so. C. Struyker Boudier, commenting on the Husserl of *EJ* (and the *Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis*), notes that:

> Every experience of a particular thing has an internal horizon. Experience is
> a form of intentional behaviour; "in search of" fulfilment, it is "asking" for
> knowledge which is completely satisfying. Starting from this observation, it
> would be possible to develop a theory of cognitive development in terms of
> questions and answers, but Husserl refrained from this. [1983, 400]

3. "But, turning to the correlated case of conflict, we encounter *absurdity*, the ["frustrated"] experience of the total conflict between intention and quasi-fulfilment. To the concepts of truth and being the correlated concepts of *falsehood* and *non-being* then correspond" (*LI* VI, §39, 769; see also §11, "Frustration and Conflict").

4. Gadamer makes a similar point. Taking his point somewhat out of context, this is what he says:

> The truly experienced man is one . . . who knows that he is master
> neither of time nor the future. The experienced man knows the limitedness
> of all prediction and the uncertainty of all plans . . . . Experience
> [frustrational experience or "negativity"] teaches us to recognize reality.
> What is properly gained from all experience, then, is to know what is. But
> 'what is', here, is not this or that thing, but 'what cannot be done away with'.
> [*TM*, 320]

5. Perhaps what makes seeing so evidential—"Seeing *is* believing"--is the *degree* to which the "denying" moment becomes more and more "being denied". The (answering) act has evidence by virtue of the data itself, which itself does the denying, or the cutting-off, of what were other possible fulfilments of that (questioning) act. Whatever it is that makes seeing so evidential, equal emphasis should be put on the fact that seeing is also intrinsically one-sided. (See Pietersma 1977, 44; *LI* VI, § 712).

6. What Husserl says about "scientific reason" he could just as well have said about the logic of evidence in general. In his *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, he notes that the particular stamp" of scientific reason is:

> . . . that it actualizes "*genuine*" cognition *by an unremitting concomitant
> criticism of cognition.* Accordingly the systematic product of scientific
> reason . . . has the particular sense of being a system of judgments that,
> while undergoing incessant criticism, are consciously made adequate to an
> evidential giving of the categorial objects [SsAs] themselves and that are, in
> this sense, truths . . . . [§46, 128]

7. Using an "ordinary language" argument, S.E. Toulmin (1950) argues that a probability statement, referring to neither a thing nor a frequency, or anything else out there, involves a degree of commitment. To say "probably" is characteristically used in a way to guard an assertion, so as to not to commit oneself to a statement unreservedly. Toulmin's account is

perhaps an extreme case of a subjective theory of probability. A less subjective theory is that put forward by J.N. Keynes. In his *A Treatise on Probability*, the author argues that probability is the measure of belief that a rational person, using all the evidence at his disposal, would attach to a proposition. Probability is a measure not of a "commitment", but of *credibility*. I am insufficiently familiar with the intricacies of such a theory to say this for sure, but my hunch is that such a theory might not be all that incompatible with our *phenomenological* appropriation of the idea that probability is a measure of "missing information".

Chapter 5:

What Does It Mean? What Is Its Cause?

(On the What Question)

Introduction

A. What Does "What is It?" Want?, and How Does It Get It?

    1. On What is a "What?"

    2. The What Q, the Experimental Q

      (a) A Parenthetical Note on Single-Rayed and Many-Rayed Intentions, and Part-Intentions

B. On the Reduction of Hermeneutical Noise

    1. On the Logic of Part and Whole

    2. Reducing the Noise Around the "Fringes" of a Thing

    3. Predictability isn't Everything

C. "Truth", "Evidence", and "Informativeness"

    1. Hermeneutical Truth

      (a) What's True is not the Interpretation

      (b) Arriving at Truth by a Different Road

      (c) "No Truth-Conditions--What Then?"

          (i) Something Like Trying to Remember

          (ii) Still, There are Truth-Conditions of Sorts

    2. Hermeneutical Evidence

D. Conclusion

    1. Why, How, and Because

    2. A Logic of Questions and Parts

Notes to Chapter 5

Introduction

There are any number of ways by which to categorize Qs. There are "yes-no questions" and "word questions"; there are "unique-alternative" Qs, "complete-list" Qs, and "nonexclusive" Qs. This is to name only a few ways that Qs have come to be categorized. Surprisingly, a distinction that is *not* to be found in the technical literature is that between what I have been calling the "predicative Q" and the "hermeneutical Q". I say "surprisingly" because it is precisely *this* distinction that, even if it does not override every other category in importance, should be somewhere at the top of the list. In fact, for purposes of the present analysis, this distinction is so important that the analysis is structured around it: In Chapters 3 and 4, it was the predicative Q that was examined, and in this fifth chapter, it is the hermeneutical Q. What is the *reason* for our according this distinction so much significance? It is expedient that I say a few words about this at the outset, the better to explain the objective of the present chapter.

One of the underlying claims of this work is that the structure of intentionality runs parallel to (or is identical with) the structure of questioning and answering. Hence, an analysis of the latter would have to pretty well come to the same as an analysis of the former--if, that is, one would know what to look for in the first place. A Q is amenable to a thousand different descriptions. But surely not every one of them would be equally relevant, or even relevant at all, in an argument which attempts to line up the notions of intentionality and questioning. What is relevant, centrally relevant, are the *empty* and *fulfilling* features of a Q. How so? Two categories very basic to the intentional act are "empty" and "fulfilled". It is these two categories that are also, obviously, very basic to questioning and answering. At

one moment, a Q is "empty"; it is a "Q" ordinarily so-called. At another moment, it is "fulfilled"; it is "answered", or "becomes" an answer. Thus my explanation for making the distinction between the predicative Q and the interpretive Q figure so centrally in the attempt to correlate the notions of intentionality and questioning.

Besides importing the *terms* "question" and "answer" into Husserl's theory of intentionality and making so much use of the words "question" and "answer", what are we saying that Husserl is not already saying? So far as predicative Qs go, I have already answered the first part of the question in Chapter 4. I shall now answer the other part of the question, which has to do with the hermeneutical Q: I said that the difference between the predicative Q and the hermeneutical Q has not been duly noted in the technical literature on the subject of "Qs". *Almost* the same thing could be said regarding the literature on intentionality. Take, for example, *Husserl's* analyses of the fulfilling act. The counter-term for "fulfilment" is, for Husserl, either "signifying" or "empty". The terms, it seems, are virtually interchangeable. What this suggests is that, for Husserl, an act requiring fulfilment works in this one way. Namely, the act starts out emptily--signifyingly--with a "meaning" or proposition already "in hand", and then, if all goes well, it gets verified by a perceptual, or a categorial, intuition. What I am claiming is that the "empty" act can operate also in the reverse direction. In a manner of speaking, the aim of such an act would be to *"find the sign"*, as opposed to finding the thing, or something about the thing, at which the sign is already pointing. When such is the aim of the act, when it is "empty" in *this* way, I call it a "hermeneutical Q".

The fact that there is a qualitative difference between the predicative and the hermeneutical does not seem to have been sufficiently noticed, or brought home, by Husserl. I shall qualify, or tone down, my point in the second of the "two prefatory words" below. I turn now to a word about the purpose and structure of the present chapter.

The aim of a hermeneutical Q--"What is this?"--is, like that of the predicative Q, to filter out those contending messages called "noise" and arrive at an answer that has truth and evidence for it. But there are differences, as well as similarities, between the two types of Q. And these differences are profound enough that the *hermeneutic* notion of "noise", along with the notions of "truth", "evidence", "fulfilment", "informativeness", and suchlike, will together require a separate examination. Such will be the general aim of the fifth chapter. The specific aim will be to examine what *motivates* the interpretive activity. Basically, what is "noisy" consists of a predictable conjunction (e.g., when X arises, so does Y); the hermeneutical Q, dissatisfied with coincidences of phenomena, statistical correlations, etc., sets out to establish whether X and Y are intrinsically connected, and if so, how so. The central portion of this chapter falls into three parts.

(A) In the first part, I argue that the aim (or anyway the result of answering) of the what Q, is to fix its object, is to "noun-ify" or "atemporalize" it. The interpretive Q picks out what remains invariant in the "flowing", independent of this or that instantiation of it.

(B) In the second part, I examine what makes for *hermeneutical* noise. Such noise consists of those possibilities which the hermeneutical Q sets out to reduce. It is with the reduction of these possibilities that an "interpretation" emerges as a consequence. First

comes noise; then the comes the Q's aim to reduce it; then, out of the reduction, comes the answer called an "interpretation". The reduction is the aim; the interpretation is the spin-off.

What, then, is gained in this reduction, besides, of course, an "interpretation", besides getting an "atemporal" view of the object? Why should the reduction matter? There are two answers to this. First, to understand is to be able to recognize this one object under different manifestations. (Move it over there, turn it upside down, throw it, change its colour--it is the same individuated thing.) Call this being able to recognize future appearances, which goes with the territory of understanding, "predictability". Noise is the *loss* of this "predictability". The aim of the hermeneutical Q is to restore it; the fruit of its labour is called an "interpretation"--a renewed and altered "predictability". But to the question, "Why should the reduction matter?", this is only part of the answer, and not even the main part. If it were the only part, then hermeneutics would be a matter of merely drawing attention to coincidences--for example, every time Saturn lines up with Jupiter, inflation is sure to follow!

The main driving motive in asking, "What is it?" is just irreducibly this: the Q wants to know what the given thing is. What it means to "know it" is to have, in addition to predictability, insight into the structure of that thing. *Why* it wants to know has to do, indeed, with predictability--but not so much the lack of predictability itself, but of not being able to grasp the logic of a conjunction that has become noticeably predictable. It is when I see the conjunction between sunspots and inflation, when the relation becomes predictable,

that the hermeneutical Q arises--not in spite of this but *because* of it. "What is the connection? Is there a connection?"

(C) In Chapter 4, I explained how truth, and evidence for it, works on the predicative side of the answering act. A predicative truth is the recognizing of "what is". The evidence for it--predicative evidence--is the denying of its logical contrary as false. ("The rose is *red*--which means to say, not any other colour".) With this, I put forward the idea that where this sort of truth and evidence are brought together, there lies a predicative answer. In the third part of the present chapter, I shall re-examine these categories of truth and evidence, and the related categories of interestedness and informativeness, so far as they have to do with *hermeneutical* questioning and answering.

In order to ward off any false expectation of *how much* I intend to accomplish in the present chapter, it is expedient that I make this clear to the reader at the outset:

(i) The first point concerns our perhaps unconventional use of the word "hermeneutic". Ordinarily, the word has been associated with, almost restricted to, the business of having to decipher texts--sacred texts, legal documents, historical artifacts, in short, any and all forms of "expression". What we are taking to be the model Q here is not, "What is the meaning of this passage, this line, this text?", but, "What is this thing 'essentially'?" Given the choice of examples, our discussion turns out to be more a "hermeneutic of things" than a "hermeneutic of texts". Moreover, the word "hermeneutics" is associated not just with the problem of the deciphering of texts, but also with a constellation of names of people who have said important things about the problem of interpretation--notably, Friederich Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey, Martin Heidegger, and

Hans-Georg Gadamer. My own use of the term is not to be taken to imply that I have a philosophical allegiance to any one of these thinkers, or that I mean to discuss their positions at length (which I shall not be doing). As I have already indicated in Chapter 1, I am not attempting to do "hermeneutics" in the usual sense of the term. I am looking into the intentionality of a questioning act--or the questioning of intentionality. One type of question I identify as "hermeneutical", i.e., interpretive.

(ii) The second point is about Husserl. I do not mean to *exaggerate* the point that Husserl failed to notice "our" distinction, or something like it, between the "predicative" and the "hermeneutical". My only claim is that he does not make enough of a distinction that he himself effectively draws. Robert Sokolowski points out, on Husserl's behalf, two types of fulfilment. There is, first of all, the "empty and filled intention based on the presence and absence of the material ingredients of a categorial object" (Sokolowski 1974 37). "If I am behind the house and say, because someone told me. 'The front door is open.' I emptily intend the fact . . . . If I go to the front and look, and execute the judgment again in the presence of the front door, I register the fact intuitively" (*ibid.*, 34). This sense of "empty" and "filled" is, roughly, what we are calling "predicative". Second, there is the "empty" and "filled" in syncategorematical terms. In this case, what I do have is the material ingredients; but what I lack is insight into their logical connections--connections such as implications, possessions, conjunctions, disjunctives, buts, therefores, indeeds, perhapses.

> Consider the case of a difficult mathematical proof. In step fifteen I am told
> to combine A and B. If I have been confused by the argument so far, . . . I

can [only] emptily assert, "Yes, now 'A and B'," but the "and" is not really at work here. But if I learn the first fourteen steps, it will be possible for me to register the new categorial object, "A and B," in step fifteen. [*ibid.*, 38; also Husserl's *Ideas I*, §136]

At this point, when one can say, "Aha!", or after fourteen piecemeal aha's!, "intention 15" is *syncategorematically* fulfilled. "Now I see why this is so!" This second type of fulfilling, as described by Sokolowski, is either very close to, or identical with, what we mean by an act that is "hermeneutically" empty or filled. Thus, it would appear that there is a profound connection between, on the one hand, the problem of the "syncategorematica"--and along with it, the related notions of "eidetic seeing", the logic of parts and wholes, and the "variation"--and, on the other hand, the problem of interpretation. I shall be saying more about how these various notions link up with the hermeneutical Q. However, it should be noted at the outset that I shall *not* be focusing on Husserl exegetically. The strategy here is much in keeping with that of the other chapters. Instead, what I shall do is *point out* the overlooked "connections" and discuss how these concepts figure in hermeneutical questioning--much in the way that someone would write up a detailed proposal for further research.

A. What Does "What is it?" Want?, and How Does It Get It?

A model example of the hermeneutical Q is the riddle.[1] The trick to answering a riddle is to proceed from the "predicate-clues", which are provided, to the "name" ("Clues: It has a, b, and c. Q: *What* do you 'call' it?"). Whereas a predicative Q already has all the meaning-materials in hand, the hermeneutical Q has to find them. It has the clues, or the

"phenomena", to go by; but the aim is to piece them together with a "what". In the ordinary sense of the word, to "interpret" is to look for, or come up with, a determination of the defining what or "essence" of something. It is to ask, "What is it?" That is the hermeneutical Q.

To be sure, this description of the hermeneutical Q is limited. Not all such Qs are riddles. The riddle Q is, to repeat, only a *model* of hermeneutical interrogation--just as trying to crack a code, or to "unpack" an argument, or to translate are so many other models. Second, not every hermeneutical Q is a "what Q". The why Q and the how-come Q are also hermeneutical (for reasons to be discussed at the end of this chapter). And then there is the also who Q, which seems to be a what Q "gone animate" and which certainly is a Q that calls for interpretation. (These similarities notwithstanding, I am very wary of treating, "Who is it?", as merely a special case of asking, "What is it?", or treating "who" as an "animate what".) Narrowing down the scope of this part, and the whole of this chapter. I shall concentrate specifically on that hermeneutical Q which asks, "What is it?"

I shall consider these preliminary matters in two sections. In section (1) I consider: What does a what Q ask for? What does it get for all its work? I argue that the end result of the Q is to have fixed or "a-pluralized" its object in the sense that the interpretive Q picks out what remains *invariant* in the plurality of its instantiations. In section (2) I argue that the method or strategy by which the "what" is worked out is "experimental" or "hypothetical" (or *something like* that which Husserl calls the "variation").

1. On What is a "What?"

Now that we have narrowed down the hermeneutical Q to the what Q, we are still left with this one problem: Not all what Qs are hermeneutical. In fact, any and every Q can be reworded in such a way as to be prefaced with, "What is it?" "Where?" can be turned into, "In what place?"; "When?" into, "At what time?"; "Who?" into, "What person?"; "Why?" into, "For what reason?" However, a Q's being prefaced with the word "what" does not automatically render it hermeneutical. Hence, the very idea of a what Q is problematic to say the least. One possible solution to the problem would be to say: "This only goes to show that any and every Q is already a what Q, even if disguised as something else. And in that case, the distinction between the interpretive and the predicative proves to be unfounded. Accordingly, every Q is interpretive. Or, since it makes no difference, every Q is predicative. But one way or the other, there is no real difference".

But of course there *is* a difference. The question to be asked is: What is it, then, that makes certain of our what Qs *interpretive*. Alternatively, what is it that makes certain of our what Qs, i.e., any and all manner of predicative Qs, *non-interpretive*? Briefly, to understand something that you see is to have "individuated" it, to have gotten a "fix" on the *what* of something that would otherwise be no more than just an un-individuated flow of disparate appearances. So much understanding, so much individuating. The individuated "what" in this "flowing" is . . . a river, a fire, planetary movement, a suspension bridge, a mountain, a triangle, an atom, an event.

Consider the Q, "Should I describe this as a 'vermilion' or a 'crimson'?" Or the Q, "Should I describe this as 'windy', 'breezy', 'gusty', 'airy', 'stormy'?" In either case, the Q

aims through a "thesaurus" of different possible meanings or signs, trying all the while

to determine which one of them most decisively locks into the object. "'Vermilion'? No.

'Crimson'? Now, that's more like it". "'Windy', 'Breezy'? 'Gusty'? 'Airy'? No, no, no.

'Stormy'? That word is right on the button!" Such Qs are predicative, not hermeneutical, in

that the "meaning-materials" are already more or less provided. The policy of the

predicative Q is: Aim through these options, and see which one of these meanings hits the

target.

Consider the Q, "What is it? A rose or a poppy?" At first blush, the Q looks

hermeneutical. The argument might go as follows: "Asking, 'What colour is it?', or 'Does it

need watering?', would be a clear case of *predicative* questioning. But not so in the case of

asking about the *subject* of these predicates. To ask, say, 'Is this a rose or a poppy?' is to ask

about, well, a *thing*. The objective of this Q is to name some thing. This being so, it is

clearly interpretive". So the argument might go. But this is not quite right. Even though this

Q nominally concerns the "essential what" of some thing, even though it asks for the *name*

of the thing, it still might not be all that hermeneutical.

The better thing to say would be: The predicative Q has the meaning-materials and

is ready to determine which of the materials 'answers' to the given object. The "thing Q",

"Is this a rose?" could just as well be predicative as the "property Q", "Is this rose red?" As

for the *hermeneutical* Q, its characteristic mark is that it looks for the meaning-materials,

without which a proper aiming cannot be carried out. If I fail to fully understand what it is

that I am pointing at, or to the extent that I don't understand--this is a matter of degree,

notice--then I cannot quite aim at it intentionally. "What is this in front of me . . . that

everybody names a 'rose'?" Moreover, the hermeneutical Q concerns not just essences

of "things", but also of "properties". Consider, for example, this Q, which, given the way it

is asked, is hermeneutical rather than predicative: "What colour is it?" "Red". "But what

sort of red is it? I don't have the finer distinctions in hand. Let me see, is it 'vermilion' or

'crimson', as they call it? But what are these colours anyway?" In trying to find out how to

aim, or "see understandingly", the Q is hermeneutical. And the answer might finally be,

after taking a crash course in learning how to identify colours on the spot, "Now that's

vermilion, not crimson, and I know vermilion when I see it!"

What is the point of the examples? For one thing, the metaphysical status of the

object and its hermeneutical status ought to be kept distinct. The "metaphysical object"

itself might serve as the target of a what Q; but then so, too, might some "attribute" of it.

The target of a what Q may be "metaphysically" a noun-object (a rose); but this is not a

sufficient condition for the what Q to be hermeneutical. (Since the hermeneutical Q can be

about either "thing" or "predicate", it is perhaps best that I drop the misleading "thingifies".)

What's more, a Q might be a hermeneutical Q, even though it may appear to be predicative.

Metaphysically, the target might be an "adjective-object", or "verb-object", etc., rather than

a noun-object, and yet be the object of an interpretive Q. But in any case, the Q, so far as it

is interpretive, tries to name something, be it adjectivally, verbally, modally, . . . as well as

noun-ishly. The hermeneutical what-is-it Q asks, to this effect, "What is this thing, *which is*

already fully in view, called? What does this thing 'mean'?" In a sense, the interpretive act

regards this movement, this activity, this event, this flux, this becoming, as well as this

"attribute", and this "thing", as *thing-like*; the interpretive act "nominalizes" it. And just as

it happens in the realm of things, so it happens also in the realm of texts. A similar sort of nominalization or "reifying" takes place when words get defined or interpreted: When you answer the Q, "What does 'run', 'quickly', 'bright', etc. mean?", verbs, adverbs, adjectives, . . . as well as nouns, get "nounified".[2]

I use the terms "a-pluralize", "fix", and "individuate", almost interchangeably. Maybe "atemporalize" would be a better term to use. But whatever word we use for it, just what does it mean to say that an interpretive Q "noun-ifies" or "fixes" its object? I shall develop the idea in the second part of this chapter. But by way of concluding, I should like to hint at what this idea of "atemporalizing"--let's call it this, instead--actually involves.

Briefly, a predicative Q has a fixed rather than flowing target. What colour is this? What time is it? How fast is it moving? At what rate is it accelerating? The SsAs behind these objects-in-Q are fixed. Right now, or for two seconds, or for two years, it is this colour for two seconds. Right now, the time is five (given the parameters we are working with, the answer will do for about five or ten minutes say). Right now, the train is moving this fast. Right now, the acceleration of the train is fixed at 4 m/s^2.

The object of a hermeneutical Q, "What is it?", is given as insufficiently pre-fixed. And the *result* of this Q is to have fixed its object—"atemporalized" it--in such a way that the act can now "see" that this apparent flowing is . . . a river, . . . a fire, . . . triangularity. . . . an Aztec pyramid. This "apparent flowing" is the object of the hermeneutical Q; and the result of the Q is to have picked out what remains invariant in this flowing, independent of this or that instantiation. "True, the circumstances have changed, this and that attribute have disappeared, the arrangement has altered somewhat. But now that I see into the 'essence' of

these various appearances--have 'de-pluralized' them--I can also see, in its plurality of manifestations, this thing, this river, this fire, this event, this monolith, this ship after a thousand repairs and replacements, this tune in its every note, in its every performance, etc."

Notice, the semantic differences between a hermeneutical and a predicative what do seem to have a good deal to do with temporality. The understanding of the *interpretandum* is linked up with the anticipatory structure as regards its possible appearances. The better structured, the more it can "pin down the flow", the better is the understanding. I shall take up this point in different ways as I go along. Admittedly, my description is only a sketch of what is involved in the "atemporalizing" work of an interpretation. Moreover, the examples, which are mostly about the perception of things, slant the analysis somewhat. This talk about "hermeneutically fixing the object" would no doubt require some changes when applied to a description of interpreting, say, a text. (Does the text also get "atemporalized"? Does a text otherwise "flow"? What does that mean? Does the reading of it arrest or "apprehend" the invariant, or the *meaning*? I shall only assume, then, that, *mutatis mutandis*, the same goes for the problem of a text; to interpret it is to aim to fix its object, for the time being.)

This idea that to "interpret is to fix" will make better sense in the two sections that follow. In the first, I discuss the *method* by which interpreting is carried out. How do you find out what is "atemporal"? Answer: See what is invariant over time. Let us consider this method-over-time (so to speak), which is something like, or identical with, what Husserl calls the "variation". The better-known word for "variation" is "experiment".[3]

2. The What Q, the Experimental Q

Typically, a predicative Q is a single-shot Q. "What time is it?", "What colour is it?"--each of these Qs is "single-shot" in that it requires, in order to answer it, only one logical move. Sure, there are exceptions to this rule. Consider, for example, the predicative Qs, "Which of you ten are not going?", "Which numbers between 2 and 10 are prime?", "Which colours is it?" In order to answer any one of these, it would take a *plurality* of moves. That said, a predicative Q is still *typically* "single-shot". And even when the predicative Q does get "divided up" into a plurality of moves, the original Q is still, *logically*, the same Q that is being asked, albeit over and over again (e.g., "Is 2 prime? Is 3 prime? Is X prime? . . . "; "Is this colour red? Is this colour blue? Is this colour X? . . . ").

What about the hermeneutical Q? Unlike a predicative Q, it is inherently a "many-shot" Q; it takes more than a single strategic move to answer that one Q, "What is it?" And unlike a many-shot predicative Q, the various individual "moves" internal to a hermeneutical Q are *not* logically identical with each other (as are, say, the Qs, "Is x prime?" and "Is y prime?", or "Is the colour red?" and "Is the colour blue?"). Moreover, these internal moves may be grouped (artificially, I admit) in sets. Each set of attempts involves, so far as its logical formation goes, a Q different from that which is formally being asked, "What is it?" (and which, if asked by itself, is *emptily* asked). To illustrate: I ask, "What is this?"[4] One of the many sets of attempts in answering this involves the Q-set {What if this "this" is in motion? What if this "this" is not in motion? Does it make a difference?} Or: {What if the "this" is here? What if it is somewhere else? Does it make a

difference?} Such Qs, which are nested "inside" the hermeneutic Q, are sometimes called "hypothetical Qs".

Now, the point of these sets of Qs, if guided by the what Q, is not to determine the predicative specifics, e.g., "It so happens that this is in motion", "It so happens that this is blue", etc. Rather, the point of them is to perform miniature *experiments*. (Whether these experiments are performed methodically, kinaesthetically, subliminally, or whatnot is neither here nor there for the purpose of this discussion.) The set of experiments consists in asking, {"Given this is in motion, assuming it, presupposing it, etc.--what happens to the 'this'?" "And if this is *not* in motion--what happens to the 'this'?"} Each of the many sets of experiments are performed and guided by one and the same, persisting, "What is it?" The experimental Q guiding set 1 is: How are this thing and motion related. And the experimental Q guiding set 2 is: How are the thing and its position related?

What concerns us here is not the intricacies of the experimental strategy of the what Q. Rather, what concerns us is the strategy itself. Given how it *basically* works, what does it reveal about the very objective of the interpretive Q? The process of the what Q is "longitudinal"; logically, it consists of sets of experimental Qs. (I stress "logically"; it is not as if the overriding Q has to proceed in a tidy fashion, taking care of one experiment, and then, only when that is out of the way, proceeding to the next.) In any case, the *temporal* strategy of this Q, I suggest, matches up to what the Q goes after--namely, what is *atemporal* about this thing which is in Q. That the hermeneutical Q is longitudinal follows from the nature of the thing--the "what"--that the Q is after. "What is this?" means, "What is this that persists"; or, "What is this 'what' that endures throughout all these variations?";

or, "What remains invariant in the "flux" of these presumably related phenomena?" In order to find this out, the Q fluctuates or "varies" the thing in Q. {"If you move X, what happens to it? And what if you don't?"} {"If you dunk it under water, what happens? And what if you don't?"}

To be more exact, the interpretive activity uncovers two sorts of invariance: *closed invariants* (emeralds are green; electrical wire must be made of metal; the Eiffel Tower is in Paris) and *open invariants* (a house may be painted any colour; roses come only in a limited array of colours; the Eiffel Tower is visited by different numbers of people from day to day; electrical wire may be made of copper, or aluminum, or silver).[5] (Notice, the hermeneutical Q, in that it ascertains the invariants, open as well as closed, has to be prior to the predicative Q. After all, the open invariants, on the basis of which the predicative Q sets out, have to be worked out by the hermeneutical Q to begin with.) Anyway, should you come across an instantiation of X in the future, you should be able to recognize so many facts about it, given that you now "understand" its closed invariants (Trivially, "uninformatively", just by definition, this emerald would have to be green!"). And you should also be able to put to it, as if ready-made and pre-formulated, so many predicative Qs, which would be in reference to its open invariants ("Then how much does this emerald weigh? Where from? How much?").

To sum up: To understand the essence of a thing is to understand that thing's invariant structure--its closed and open invariants. Second, the what of it is teased out by sets of experimental Qs built into this "many-shot" activity of answering the what Q. More

exactly, a hermeneutical Q is a *one-and-many Q*; Or, it is no more a single Q than is a tune a single note.

(a) A Parenthetical Note on Single-Rayed and Many-Rayed Intentions, and Part-Intentions

Our talk about the "single-shot" Q and the "many-shot" Q may call to mind Husserl's distinction between the "many-rayed" (or "polythetic") act and the "single-rayed" (or "monothetic") act (*LI* V, §§33, 36; *Ideas I*, §§118, 119). A many-rayed act points at a "categorial object" (a SAs); it "registers" the fact that, say, <This rose is red> or <This rose, a birthday present to Jill, my high school friend, is red>. Such an act can then be "nominalized", or compressed, into a one-rayed act, e.g., "that this rose is red" or "that this rose, a birthday present . . . , is red". ("The fact is closed up, the accordion is closed". as Sokolowski aptly describes the transition from the many-rayed to the single-rayed act [1974, 42].) The single-rayed act is an empty intending; it calls for completion in the form of a many-rayed act. How, then, do these two distinctions, Husserl's and ours, line up?

(i) Our distinction has more to do with the "moves" (one move or many?) that the act must make than with the structure of the intended object of that act. (ii) I hedge on this: Whether a Q is "strategically" single-shot or many-shot, it is a single-rayed act. "Grammatically", a Q is a truncated judgment (single-rayed: "the rose, which is red"; "the red rose"; etc.) in need of "fulfilment" or saturation (many-rayed: "The rose, which is red, is in the vase on that table by the door"). (This point was discussed at length in Chapter 3.)

(iii) An answer, on the other hand, points to a *state of affairs* as answered. To express our view in Husserl's terminology, an answer has to be many-rayed or polythetic.

(iv) Again, Sokolowski identifies two types of "empty" (and "filling") intending in Husserl's theory of intentionality. The one type has to do with the absence and presence of the "material ingredients", and this we are roughly coordinating with the predicative Q (and answer). The other type has to do with "syncategorematic" intending, and this we are roughly coordinating with hermeneutical questioning (and answering). Sokolowski identifies yet a third type of empty (and filling) intending: A single-rayed act is "empty" and a many-rayed act is "full". Where should we fit this *third* distinction in our twofold distinction between the predicative and the hermeneutical? I propose that we do not quite think of it as a "third" distinction. This would be the better to look at the matter: Q is a single-rayed act (and an answer a many-rayed act). It so happens that there are *two ways* in which it can be single-rayed (and an answer can be many-rayed): predicatively and hermeneutically.

(v) A predicative Q points toward its fulfilment "in" a many-rayed act. The *structure* of that many-rayed act is already worked out (e.g., "The rose--is such-and-such a colour", "This flower--is such-and-such a kind"). With a hermeneutical Q, by contrast, it is this very many-rayed structure that has yet to be worked out. It requires more than just "filling in the blanks". (vi) It seems that a predicative Q, even if it happens to be a many-shot Q, does not, or doesn't have to, work its way up to a higher- and higher-level of categorial objects. (If one ask, "What colours is this house?", it is not as if one would ordinarily go from "the house that is blue" to "the house, which is blue, that is green", etc. More likely, the strategy

of this Q would move from a single-rayed to a many-rayed act *once*, from "The colour

of this house" to "--is blue, and, ah, green, and . . . black, . . . ".) In answering a

hermeneutical Q, by contrast, it would seem that the act keeps shuttling back and forth from

the single-rayed to many-rayed mode, all the while moving up to a higher-level categorial

object.

(vii) The Husserlian concept that is most akin to our concept of the "many-shot Q"

is the "fusion of part-intentions". "Whether I look at this book from above or below, from

inside or outside, I always see *this book*. It is always one and the same thing, and that not

merely in some purely physical sense, but in the view of our percepts themselves" (*LI* VI,

§47, 789). Each percept would be a "*part*-intention"--not a disjointed fragment, but a part--

of a "whole" intention. And the whole intention would be a synthesis of these parts, or

"phases", as opposed to a mere series of epochally disjointed pieces. The overriding Q, e.g.,

"What is this?", would be a the temporal "whole"; and each temporal phase of this "many-

shot" whole would be a "part-intention".[6]

B. On the Reduction of Hermeneutical Noise

With the predicative Q, "Is this a man or a mannequin?", "Is this a poppy or a poinsettia?".

"Red or blue?", the noise is that of two contending possibilities which are mutually

exclusive *so far as they might obtain in fact*. It is a man or it is a mannequin, but it can't be

both at the same time. Poppy or poinsettia, but not both at the same time. Such is the logic

of the predicative Q and the sort of possibilities it is meant to deal with. How about the

logic of the *hermeneutical* Q? The interpretive issue is not so much about (if at all) what

does and does not obtain. As a first approximation, the problem has more to do with what

belongs, or *can belong* (a,b,c) and *does not belong*, or *can't belong* (d,e,f), and this quite apart from whether a,b,c,d,e, and f actually do or do not obtain. "Belongs and does not belong"—*to what?* To the object that has yet to be interpreted. The interpretive Q starts out with the noisy *maybe's* of "maybe this belongs, maybe it doesn't belong". This is to speak only roughly: The aim of such a Q is to filter out the maybe's—"This belongs, this doesn't"—and to restore the *interpretandum* to clarity, even if this means having to amend one's previous understanding of it.

I differentiate, or abstract, two types of hermeneutical noise: "internal" noise and "fringe" noise. The distinction is not to be pressed too hard. In any case, first (in the logical sense of "first") comes the *fringe noise*. This gives rise to the Q that effectively reads, "Does this belong, or doesn't it?" Next comes the *internal noise*, which gives rise to the Q that reads to this effect: "If it belongs, then it must be a part of a whole. Is there a place for this part in this hierarchical 'whole'?" The "whole" is in good, interpretive working order; but then along comes something from the outside that is possibly eligible for membership: "Does this belong, or doesn't it?" With this, fringe noise arises. Then again, something from the inside is exposed as no longer fitting so well. Then this, too, goes to the fringes of the whole: "Does it belong, or doesn't it?" The means by which membership is granted is "internally".

I divide the present discussion into two sections, which correspond to the ideas of "internal noise" and "fringe noise" respectively. (1) In the first section, I give what is intended to be no more than a very brief sketch of the "logic of parts and whole" and of where this logic fits into our phenomenology of questioning. (2) I then proceed to an

examination of what essentially "bugs" the interpretive act. With fringe noise, what is "lost"? With its reduction--with the interpretation--what is gained? One possibility might be the art of being able to conditionally predict the thing (just as an information theory might have it): If a is done to X, then this is what happens; if X is turned around, then this is what you see; etc. Indeed, predictability is part of the story, but it is not, as I shall show in section (3), the whole story.

1. On the Logic of Part and Whole

Husserl's treatise on the logic of parts is worked out in the third of the *Logical Investigations*. Among the main categories in this logic are: *pieces* or independent parts (*LI* III, §3) and *moments* or nonindependent parts (§4). A *piece* is a part of something that is "phenomenologically" separable. For example, one can separate out the trunk of a tree from its roots, branches, and leaves, and can see or imagine this thing by itself. The trunk is a "piece" of the whole (as are the roots, branches, and leaves). A *moment* is a part of something that does not admit of being "separately presented". For example, brightness of this green, or red, or any other colour, is a moment of that colour. Brightness is a moment of colour in that the one logically presupposes the other.

A few other distinctions are worth pointing out. In Husserl's terminology, brightness is, relative to colour, an *immediate* moment; and, relative to extension, on which colour is "founded", brightness is a *mediate* moment (§16). The moment of brightness is *more remote* from the "whole" called "extension" than is the moment of colour; the moment of colour is *more proximate* to that whole (§18). And if A is a "moment" of B, then A is *founded* and B is *founding*. Or if C depends upon A, then, relative to it, A and B are

founding, etc. (§16). And if A is a moment of B, then A may also be called the

abstractum of B, and B may called the *concretum* for A (§17).

I shall be saying a little more about the "logic of parts" as I go along.[7] For the time

being, we should have enough to work with in order to be able to ask about where

"interpretation" fits into this logic. Here is how I think it basically works.

In order to interpret one must figure out in effect (this is the "external" problem)

what belongs and what doesn't belong to the *interpretandum*. But in order to do this, one

has to figure out (this is the "internal" problem) whether this or that can fit into the whole to

begin with. And if it does fit, then, indeed, it does belong, in this way or that. Here is a

sample of what would be "internally" involved in the asking, hermeneutically, "What is

this?": The being coloured of a thing, say, depends upon that thing having a surface; its

being coloured is a part, or, better still, a "moment" of the surface. The surface depends

upon the thing having extension; the surface is a moment of the extension. The thing itself

doesn't change when in motion; the motion is only a moment of the whole . . . . Roughly,

then, the object of understanding, and interpretation, is a "logical whole", or an "order",

consisting of "parts"; and roughly, the meaning of this order or "what" is the sum-total of

logical relations that obtain between the parts.

To jump ahead for a moment, we can ask at this point, What makes for "external

noise"? In reference to a pre-understood whole, I see that these parts no longer quite appear

as if they really belong; or they no longer appear as if they belong in their former places; or,

if newly introduced, they no longer appear to be serious candidates for membership into this

whole; etc. The "internal" aim of the what Q is to determine *where* these parts fit *as parts*

into this not-quite deciphered whole. What are their logical positions? What is founded, what is founding? To the extent that the logical positions of the parts have been figured out, the interpreter has answered, "What is it?" The interpreter now discerns, no longer so vaguely, but now clearly, the structure of the whole. If this or that part can fit, it stays in; if it can't, it stays out. The internal problem, then, is driven by the external or "fringe" problem.

However, a pre-condition to there being a fringe problem in the first place is that the interpreter already has some grasp of the whole. For it is only in the context of this pre-grasping that candidate-parts can begin to look as if they might or might not belong to it. (Admittedly, the logic of a riddle works somewhat differently. Asked the riddle, I don't see the order, not even vaguely. I only wager that there is a hidden order or "what". I wager that what is given to me are, in fact, "clues", which is to say, *parts*, which belong to something. And in getting the answer--notice this--I don't leave the clues behind, as it were, as if their job were only to get me to the what answer. Rather, I *re-identify*, or remember, the clue-parts in the whole. I don't say, "Aha! That's the answer. As to whatever those clues were, I forgot"; rather, I say, "Aha! That's how the clue-parts fit together and that's where they fit!" Hitting upon the solution, the clues interpenetrate each other and pervade the whole.) It is to an examination of "fringe noise" that I now turn.

2. Reducing the Noise Around the "Fringes" of a Thing

I already see the phenomenon in such a way that it is already ordered. The understanding of this order is, at this given moment, as adequate as need be--until, for whatever reason, I begin to lose sight of it. How does this happen? I begin to fail to see how certain aspects of it are to be accounted for, how these aspects fit into this order as parts, or whether they even

do so. With this, the external noise presents itself. And in this context, the Q arises, to this effect, "Does this belong in the pre-understood whole, or doesn't it?" *This* Q makes itself manifest in, "What is this?" And it works itself out in the interpretive answer. Notice, the hermeneutical motive is not so much to come up with a better, more comprehensive interpretation. A "better interpretation" is more a by-product, or function, of having to deal with a prior problem. Or rather, the motive is to come up with a better interpretation--*in the sense* that the fringe noise throws off and subverts the original understanding and that the reduction of this noise would (inevitably?) bring with it a better interpretation.

A pre-understanding of the given order has to be in place before the excluding or including can even begin. It is not as if you start by excluding, or by including--on what basis?--and then, once done, point at the order and say, "That is what it is!" (Imagine a Galileo filtering out all the "noisy" phenomena, *and* pin-pointing the relevant phenomena, until he gets, step by step, little "Aha!" by little "Aha!", to the theoretical entity he suspected being there all along. "The angle, the duration of the cycle, the length, . . . I shall call this abstraction, this theoretical object, a 'pendulum'. That is what it is!". Even a Galileo has to start with a hermeneutical hunch, which is called a "pre-understanding".) In any case, you have to understand the order to begin with, and only then, on the basis of that vague familiarity, can you proceed to interpret.

The philosophical importance of the idea of a pre-understanding has to do not just with the quite familiar *epistemological* questions of: what about the "vicious circle"? where to begin? with what criterion? The hermeneutic solution to this problem is to say that the interpretive act begins with a pre-understanding. However, there is more to this notion of

pre-understanding than just the question of one's starting-point. The notion also has to

do with the problem of *what prompts the Q* and *what the Q goes after*. For purposes of the

present analysis, the issue is not so much, "Where do we start?" (Answer: It starts with a

pre-understanding). The issue is, "*How* does the activity start? What prods it on?" Answer:

It starts with the *subverting* of this pre-understanding.

The what Q effectively asks, "Where does this belong in this whole?"; but it does so

in order to find out whether it belongs in this whole. Why should this problem even come

up? Because there is (external) noise, or "*contending messages*". And in order for there to

be such messages, what is minimally required is that there be in place a pre-understanding

against which these messages could come to be heard as "noisy" in the first place. We

require this notion of pre-understanding, then, in order to be able to explain the background

conditions for the possibility of hermeneutical noise and hence the possibility of its

reduction, i.e., *the interpretation*. In other words, if philosophers had not already provided

us with the concept of the hermeneutical circle, then we would have had to devise it

ourselves--not so much for epistemological reasons, but for "informationalist" reasons. Our

"information theory" of questioning requires that there be a pre-understanding already in

order against which anomaly, deviancy, i.e., *noise*, can take place.

The what Q deals with the internal noise of what part goes where; and if that part

doesn't fit anywhere, then it does not belong to the given order. Moreover, this what Q is

motivated by the "external" concern of what might or might not belong. These possibilities

arise around the "fringes" of the object in Q--which is another way of saying that they have

to be *interesting* or *non-trivial* contenders, which are neither obviously "orthodox" nor

obviously "heretical". Consider it this way: To comprehend this thing as this thing (this epoch, this monetary crisis, this tune, this river, this tower, this constitution, this rose) is to individuate it, to see it as this, not anything else. (E.g., These many objects, these many houses--a single plurality called a "street of houses". These many objects, these many streets--a single plurality called a block . . . . This vast array of pluralistic singularities or "wholes"--this "last individuated" *interpretandum* called a city.) However, it just so happens that now and then the ontological problem arises, and the hermeneutical Q responds to it. "Where" this takes place is around the fuzzy perimeter of the thing. What is well beyond the perimeter obviously doesn't belong; but then registering this fact, "This doesn't belong" is trivial and boring. And what is well within the perimeter does belong; but then registering this fact, "This does belong" is also trivial and boring. It is in reference to what skirts around the thing that the what of the thing becomes *hermeneutically interesting*.

Summing up: First comes the understanding. Next comes the "noise", which throws off that understanding. Next comes the interpretive Q, which sets out to reduce this noise. And not to press the distinction too hard: The reduction is the aim; the interpretation is the result. A "better interpretation", a more sophisticated reading, is the functional "spin-off" of this reduction. (I don't start with a "vague understanding". My understanding is perfectly clear. It is when the noise enters into the understanding that this understanding becomes not just "vague", as if all that were needed would be clarification, but "bad", in the sense that some things are going to have to be improved here.)

That said, we are still left with the question, To what end? Sure, we know, formally, that the objective is to "reduce the noise". But the question remains: Why should reducing it even matter?

3. Predictability isn't Everything

Let us back up a step and first reconsider what it means, experientially, to have grasped what something is. To understand that, say, "This is a rose", is to recognize not just this specific phenomenon at this specific moment as being a rose. To understand this also involves, inseparably, "being able to" recognize, or "being ready for", different manifestations of this same rose as a rose. (And this would also involve, presumably, being able to recognize different individual roses as roses should you happen upon any one of them.) Our point is basically Husserlian: The meaning of an act is correlated to the possible things that would make it true. What goes with the territory of understanding that this is a rose is, inseparably, an understanding of the array of ontological possibilities of what makes for a rose.

Now, it is to be noted that the aura of possibilities "around" this given thing (as regards what else this thing could be) is *not* by itself enough to constitute hermeneutical noise. I understand that this thing could be determined differently. The rose might be white rather than red. But these predicative possibilities, and the different ways that the object might be predicatively "supplemented", have nothing essentially to do with hermeneutical noise--unless, that is, I am under the impression that maybe, or maybe not, roses *have* to be red, or *have* to be white. . . . To repeat, hermeneutical noise is correlated to my not being sure about whether this belongs or does not belong to the "whole".

When hermeneutical noise comes up, I lose what I had taken for granted. What I "had", or felt to have had, was an understanding of the given thing, a rose. A function of this understanding is a preparedness for future appearances of it (and, by implication, instances of its kind). It is not that I am trying to get ready for tomorrow, before I go to the botanical gardens, as it were; the world, and every flower on it, could just as well end tonight. The point is that understanding this thing, right now, brings tomorrow into it. To understand is correlated to the "predictability" of the thing. And this predicability does not involve having stored up, say, a billion different takes on this species of flower; it is the grasp of a single matrix, with its closed and open invariants. Around this matrix, a billion different combinations might cluster. All this accords well with what we said (in Part A) about the way the interpretive act sets out to "freeze" or "atemporalize" the structure of its object.

Returning, then, to our question: Why does the reduction of hermeneutical noise matter? One explanation might go as follows. To understand is to be ready for the future appearances of the thing. (Agreed.) Hermeneutical noise is correlated to a loss of this "predictability". (Agreed.) The reduction of it restores what is lost. (Agreed.) This would suggest that the aim of the reduction--the point of asking, "What is it?"--is to restore "predictability". In that case, the business of interpreting is to get ready for the future. Agreed also, but only so far as it goes. On our view, the "need for predictability" is only part of the explanation, and by no means the main part. The better explanation is that the primary objective of a hermeneutical Q is just what it looks like: The reason I ask, "What is it?" is that I want to understand the thing for what it "realistically" is. "Predictability" is a

function, or a necessary condition, of understanding; but predictability is *not* to be identified with understanding.

What is more, predictability is *also* (it seems) a necessary condition for there to be noise. To illustrate: Every time there is sun-spot activity, there is a surge in monetary inflation. With this *predictability*, noise is at the "fringes" of this mereological circle called "inflation". Does the content of "sun-spots" or "solar activity" enter into this whole as a part? What could be the *internal* connection here? This regularity, far from "explaining" anything, *requires* an explanation. The hermeneutical Q does not settle for statistical regularities, associationism, coincident phenomena, behaviourist black-box conjunctions, or whatnot. The Q, "What is it?" *begins* with the noticing of the "noisy" regularities, associations, conjunctions.

Information theory, or one version of it (so far as I understand it) puts much stock in the idea of cashing out the concept of "knowing", or "understanding", in terms of being able to predict. ("Predicting" here does not necessarily mean anything *about* the future. The messages may be about medieval law, triangles, or speculation about colonization on Pluto. "Anticipating" would be the better term to use.) We concur with this view; we are maintaining, in effect, that the better one understands (or apparently understands), the better one can "predict" the possible, forthcoming messages of the *interpretandum*. However, given our ambivalent ties to information theory, it is well to forestall a misinterpretation to which our analysis might be especially prone. On our view, to understand has to involve *something more* than just being able to predict the next message. I shall begin with an illustration.

Take the example of the lecturer and the audience: (A) The lecturer speaks in Swahili, a language that nobody else in the room understands. Anything and everything can be "predicted"; that is, there is no predictability here at all. Noise is at the maximum. The levels of informativeness and interestedness are at zero. They can ask no Qs, they can give no answers. (B) The lecturer speaks in a language the audience understands and about a subject in which they are experts. Every message can be predicted. Although for a different reason, informativeness and interestedness are, again, at zero. They will ask no Qs and give no answers. (C) The lecturer speaks in a language they all understand and in a subject about which they all know something, but not too much: Then the questioning and answering begin. It is in this middle zone of messages--not too noisy, not too unnoisy--that informativeness and interestedness are at a maximum.

I should add that by a "message", *we* mean the incoming signal that is not so much (if at all) what is being said, but what is being disclosed in that saying (if indeed there is any saying involved to begin with). Take this example of *wordless* messages: One walks around a house, which is so poorly designed that he does not know what to expect on the other side (maximum noise, bad architecture). One walks around a house, which is so monotonously designed, every side looks the same (zero noise, bad architecture). One walks around a well-designed house--not too exciting, not too dull--and finds the "messages" (the appearance of this side, then that side) as "informative" ("middle zone" noise, good architecture).

I have coordinated a battery of notions--questioning, answering, informativeness, interestedness, noise, evidence, truth--with the notion of being able to anticipate what comes next. Indeed, to know what a thing is would involve the ability to recognize it under

this lighting, in this corner, at this time of day, upside down, with this piece broken off,

etc. This doesn't mean that the stated objective of an interpretation is, to this effect: "I want

to be able to recognize what this thing is tomorrow!", as if it might even still be around, as if

there might even be other things like it, as if that is even, or has to be, considered. No, to

understand it is to be able to anticipate its many different possible manifestations right now.

This business about tomorrow or no tomorrow, whether this thing will still exist tomorrow,

whether there are other things like it is beside the point. Thus we stand by our

"informationalist hermeneutic" according to which understanding and "predictability"--or

"anticipation", the term we now prefer to use--are intimately connected.

In what sense are understanding and anticipation correlated? A few examples should

help: To understand a thing is to understand its schedule. I turn the thing around; in so

doing, the different sides of it are revealed. I understand the thing to the fuzzy extent that I

more or less "know", or feel I know, what is to be revealed next. As I turn it around, I

already understand at least the trivial, "open invariants" of this side: it is a surface, it is

coloured, etc. The second example conveys the more crucial lesson: The lecturer, speaking

in Swahili, shows some slides of: a scroll; a pen; a printing press; a type-writer; a computer;

a telephone; a telegraph; a smoke signal. He repeats this lecture throughout the week.

Attending all of them, I begin to master the art of predicting which slide comes after which.

But this predicting is not enough. Indeed, it is what helps *elicit* the interpretive Q. For what I

begin to ask is: What do these appearances, which I can predict so well, have to do with one

another? In what way are these predictable appearances joined together, assuming that they

are? Why the correlation between them? Is it a mere accident? Are they parts of a complex? If so, how are they related?

Summing up: To understand is to be able to anticipate what comes next. But more precisely, it is to master the many details of the schedule of *one thing*, of *one whole*. Put another way: Our informationist hermeneutic requires that the notions of prediction and mereology be put together. And our idea that understanding involves the predictability as regards the *parts* implies that our phenomenology of the hermeneutical Q points in the direction of a "realist" hermeneutic, in this "anti-nominalist" sense: Predications are useful, but they are not answers. They do not divulge reality; they are invitations to look into it. Seeing that solar flares and monetary inflation are correlated is not yet to understand something. It elicits an understanding. It puts before the interpreter the riddle-phenomena-- accidents with a possible cause, conjunctions without connections--to which the interpretive Q may then be put: "What?", or (its hermeneutical cousins), "Why?", or "How?"

C. "Truth", "Evidence", and "Informativeness"

In Chapter 4, I explained how truth, and evidence for it, work on the predicative side of the answering act. A predicative truth is the recognizing of "what is". The evidence for it-- predicative evidence--is the denying as false its logical contrary. ("The rose is *red*--which means to say, not any other colour".) With this, I ended up advancing the idea that where this sort of truth and evidence are brought together, there lies a predicative answer. Now, we should think that something like this also takes place on the interpretive side of things. The hermeneutical Q, "What is this?", like the predicative Q, does arise within a context of

contending possibilities. Its aim, like that of its predicative counterpart, is to reduce

these noisy contenders. And the answer to it, like a predicative answer, in some sense

"recognizes" this contender as the winner and these contestants as the losers. Those are the

outstanding similarities. What, then, about the differences? What makes hermeneutical (1)

truth and (2) evidence specifically hermeneutical? And where does "informativeness"--the

reduction of contending possibilities--fit in with these categories?

1. Hermeneutical Truth

The average speaker would have no linguistic qualms in using the words "true" and "false"

when referring to those things (tables, trees, chairs, houses) the interpretations of which are

ready-made and commonplace. However, he would be somewhat less prepared to invoke

the word "true" when referring to an interpretation that *stands out* as an interpretation. For

sure, the speaker can get away with calling this or that "reading" of something "true" (or

"false"); it is not as if he would be going against linguistic instinct in a big way. Still, the

preferred words to use in the assessment of an interpretation are more likely to be

"appropriate", "good", "flexible", "comprehensive", "workable", "better than that one".

How, then, should *we* technically speak of the interpretive answer? In terms of "true" and

"false"? And are we not committed to this view already? After all, we did make the

assertion quite early on that any and every Q, which of course means hermeneutical as well

as predicative, elicits a "true" answer. Indeed, I propose that we do speak of the interpretive

answer in truth-terms, so long as we keep the following in mind.

(a) What's True is not the Interpretation

First of all, what is true is *not* an interpretation *per se*. An interpretation is not something at which the act points. Rather, the act points at the *phenomenon* that is already pre-understood, or that is to be interpreted, or that has come to be interpreted. The interpretation itself is the *objectum quo* (to use the Scholastic term), or the mediating "object by which"; it is the phenomenon, by contrast, the *objectum quod*, which is the object known or the object which comes to be known. Our linguistic instinct is right, after all: An interpretation ought not to be spoken of as being "true". When it comes to the interpretive act, what is "true" is the act that gets it right about *the phenomenon*—"This is a rose", "This is what roses look like", or even, "This is rosehood", but not about the meaning itself. Focus is on the "this", the phenomenon, the legal situation, the theological quandary, etc.

(b) Arriving at Truth by a Different Road

The second point, which is the more complicated, is that "hermeneutical truth" is not quite the same as "predicative truth" in the sense that the respective experiences of "arriving" at truth are different. I shall begin by stipulating what I mean by "verificationism", which pretty closely conforms to standard usage. According to this theory of meaning (or understanding), the meaning of, say, a sentence is, precisely, a function of what would warrant or *verify* its assertion. (*Mutatis mutandis*, the same goes for the meaning of a non-linguistic act.) The understanding of what the sentence means is to be correlated, then, to having grasped the conditions that would verify such-and-such if it were true. Some of the positivists have espoused this theory of meaning. Husserl, and we, also espouse it, albeit in a milder form.[8]

On *our* view, however, "verifying" applies only in the case of the *predicative* act. I hear what I surmise is the buzzing of high-voltage lines overhead; I look up and I recognize them for what they are. I "verify" the truth of the matter in the predicative fulfilment. In the case of the hermeneutical act, by contrast, my leaning on the verifying conditions or having grasped them in advance is precisely the thing that I *cannot* do. There are no "verifying-conditions" for the interpretive Q for the reason that it is the *meaning*, which is correlated to the verifying-conditions, that *has yet to be found*! (Or rather--it is not as if identifying the verifying-conditions per se is the principal aim here--the meaning, in terms of which the verifying-conditions would follow, has yet to be found.) It is only when the "verifying conditions" *are* found, or grasped. that the act can "go predicative". But in the meantime, it is the meaning—"What's that buzz overhead?"--which is "out there" waiting to be discovered. that I have yet to *find*.

The point to be stressed is that how predicative, or hermeneutical, an act is happens to be a matter of degree. The more I have "mastered" the sign, the more familiar I am with it, the more I have gotten past those hard days of having to interpret that thing for the first time, the more predicative and "verificationist" is my intentional relation to it. The buzz in the rain means--that's easy--hydro lines overhead. The white flag--that's easy--means they're surrendering. It is when the what of a given phenomenon is less than obvious that the related act, rather than being "predicatively" in need of the material "intuition" that would fulfil it, looks for the meaning. And what it looks for is precisely those *connections* between the "visible" things that *cannot* be seen.

(c) "No Truth-Conditions--What Then?"

In asking, "What is this?", the interpreter has not yet grasped the "verifying" or "predicative" conditions. After all, finding the meaning is the very point of this Q; and it is the meaning, in terms of which any subsequent talk about truth becomes possible, that has yet to be found. If the interpreter already understands what would predicatively fulfil (or "verify") the act, then there is no more interpreting to do at that moment. It now remains to be explained how the interpreter, with apparently so little to go by, is able to tell when he hits on the right interpretation. By what criterion (if only a vague one) does he know, "This is it"?

In order to find out what is the height of this house, how hot is the sun and what it's made of, etc., I have to "go outside" and "do research" or "collect information". (Or in order to test which theory--which of the already fully developed interpretation--is best [Predicatively, "Is it A, or B, or C?"], I ask, *predicatively*, "Given A, then--?", "Given B, then--?", etc.) In any case, I predicatively *re*-identify one member of a set of possibilities. In this re-identifying (of the "truth-conditions"), I experience a predicative "truth" and the predicative Q is "fulfilled". What about the fulfilment of a *hermeneutical* Q? Although the experience of the truth of an interpretive answer involves, as does the truth-experience of a predicative Q, a "re-identifying", this latter re-identifying is of a qualitatively different sort.

(i) Something Like Trying to Remember

To interpret is to tease out what is, in some sense, *already there* for the taking. To have interpreted, to have cracked the code, is, if not literally a remembering, then very like a "remembering" in the sense of: "Where did I see that face before?!", or "If only I could

remember the face!" To answer the question (or objection), "If you don't have the truth-conditions in advance, then isn't the business of interpreting arbitrary?": It is no more, or less, arbitrary than is trying to remember something. In either case, you'll know what you're looking for once you have found it.[9]

Take the following example of a questioning: A witness (someone like Meno's slave-boy) is at the scene of the crime. When the police arrive and ask for a description, the witness finds himself having forgotten the face of the perpetrator. At this point, they bring in their office illustrator (someone called "Socrates"). His job is to "draw out" those details quite forgotten by the witness; his job is to help the witness remember. The witness has a blurred image; that much he can remember. But he still lacks at the moment the "sign" with which to point at it, individuate it, and make it out. With the help of the illustrator, the witness "ploughs back" from part to whole, until he finally "solves the riddle". "The eyes--further apart, closer together . . . . That's it. A rounder face. No, not so round. That's better . . . . Now I am beginning to remember. Change that a bit. Getting warmer."

The experience of a hermeneutical truth is a *remembering* of sorts. By implication, not being able to get the meaning involves a kind of *having-forgotten*. To be sure, our example involves a situation of having "forgotten", and trying to "remember", in the everyday, literal senses of the terms. Moreover, interpretive activity is often interweaved with "doing research" and "getting facts". The mnemonic help of the illustrator is not always enough; in other words, it is not always, or even usually, just a matter of having to remember what one already knew all along. But taking this bit about "doing research" into account, our *partial* explanation is not that far off the mark: What is manifestly operative in

this literal case of interpreting--forgetting and remembering--brings out what is also

operative in those other cases of interpreting, even if less conspicuously.

(ii) Still, There are Hermeneutical "Truth-Conditions" of Sorts

With the predicative Q, it is obvious that the questioner has something to go by before

going into the world, some "criterion" of what would make for a fulfilling answer.

However, it is not as if the hermeneutical Q, by contrast, is at a complete loss when it sets

out. There *is* a re-identifying. What is re-identified are the material ingredients. Whereas

with the predicative Q, it is the "meaning" that gets re-identified in the material ingredients,

with the hermeneutical Q, it is the other way around: the material ingredients get re-

identified in the new-found meaning.

To illustrate, take the example of trying to solve the riddle: "Take care of me, I am

everybody. Scratch my back, I am nobody. Who am I?" "I give up!" Answer: "A mirror". It

is the clues--the material ingredients--that are re-identified. I stress, "re-identified". The

clues do more than just lead one to the solution and then, after having done their job as

guides, drop out of sight. They are *re-identified* as parts *in* this new-found whole called a

"mirror". Solving, or fulfilling, this hermeneutical Q comes with pulling these "parts"

together. Or rather, the solution comes about upon *discovering* how these "parts", be they

pieces or moments, have already been pulled together as *parts of a whole*.

One merely verbally notes that "A and B", "A belongs to B", etc., not really seeing

into the syncategorematic connections "and", "belongs to", "but", "or", or whatnot. (Or one

merely notes the clues, "A" and "B" and, in being asked, "What is it?", one is asked to

identify the "and-whole" [so to speak]. This, the interpreter later discovers, is that structure

called a "mirror".) But until he can get a hermeneutical insight into the fact that "A

AND B" or that "A **BELONGS TO** B", the interpreter merely emptily intends the

syncategorematic elements, "in name only". In the meantime, he is stuck with the

interpretandum {A, B}. To be sure, the (presumed) parts are already given as parts.

However, what remains missing--hidden or eclipsed--is the whole or logical matrix within

which these "parts" could be understood as parts.

2. Hermeneutical Evidence

By "hermeneutical truth", what we have in mind is the idea, minimally, of having just

arrived at the end of an interpretive activity. There has to be an after-glow of that

hermeneutical questioning still "in the air". But once the interpretation begins to go without

saying, once the retention of the interpretive activity fades away, and the whole matter gets

old, this "truth"--more carefully, the "experience of truth"--ceases to be *hermeneutical*.

What has made the situation hermeneutical is simply this: I don't know, or just found out,

what to make of the phenomenon. Being able to see that this rose is not a poppy, a daisy,

much less that fan, that fridge, that door is easy enough for everybody else. But not yet for

me; what I still have to do is be able to sort out that this is not a fan (even though the fan is

red), is not the prickly velcro . . . . Until I have sorted out what, at the fringes of this thing,

belongs inside it and what belongs outside it, I am still in the interpretive mode as regards

my making sense of this thing.

Hermeneutical evidence is the denying of what might be otherwise. I recognize the

hermeneutical truth that "This is A", but in so doing, I am not, as it were, pointing at a dot

and calling it "A". Rather--this is achievement of the interpretive act--I have drawn a circle around an area (call it the "whole", the "what", the "order" of the phenomenon). I recognize that what happens to be inside this circle is truly "A". And I deny that what is outside it--what the interpretive act "denies"--belongs inside. (The "not" of predicative evidence is "this does not obtain". For example, I see this is blue--which is to say, not any other colour. The "not" of hermeneutical evidence is "this does not *belong*--whether it happens to obtain or not". I see, for the first time, that this is "blue itself"--not the wallpaper, not the sky, etc.)

Putting this another way: Determination is negation; to understand X is to know what stays outside X. Hermeneutical evidence consists of reducing (i.e., negating) the noise (i.e., the indeterminacy) that now and then blurs the ontological perimeters of the object. To borrow Spinoza's dictum for our own purposes: "All determination is negation". Or rather: All indeterminacy around the fringes is in need of negation. "'A house is not a tower'-- *that's uninformative*". "'A town is not a village'--that's fuzzy, *that's interesting*. What is a town? What is a village? What is the difference?" "'Solar activity is not monetary inflation'--that's fuzzy, *that's interesting*, since the two appearances are 'predictably' connected. What is the connection? Is there a connection? An answer to this would be *hermeneutically informative*". "How many hairs on the head do you have to have before you're no longer bald? That's fuzzy, *that's interesting*". Our position on what makes for hermeneutical evidence--seeing that it is not otherwise--is perhaps not all that far removed from Husserl's own view. This is from Robert Sokolowski, in a section on "Negative Necessity":

There is another aspect to eidetic intuition which is only mentioned in passing in Husserl's texts, but is so important that without its presence eidetic intuition would not be what it is. This is the negative aspect of free variation: the insight that removal of certain moments in a variant, or the addition of certain moments to it, destroys the individual--either totally, as a being, or at least as an instance of the eidos we are trying to isolate . . . . As long as the removal leaves our imagined object intact as still a variant of our paradigm and still an instance of the eidos we are concerned with, we know we have not displaced anything essential. [1974, 80-81]

D. Conclusion

The main driving force in asking, "What is it?", is just irreducibly that: the Q wants to know what the given thing is. What it means to know it is to have, in addition to predictability, insight into the structure of a thing. Yes, knowing involves a predictability of sorts. But that alone will not do. In fact, it is in noticing the conjunctions that questioning, rather than ending, begins. Noticing these conjunctions is not the "end" of science, but the beginning of it. It is at this point that the Q arises, "Is this a coincidence--or something more?" Read: "What is it?", "Why is this?", "How come?" Hermeneutics begins where associations, coincidences, and conjunctions leave off. All this is what I have tried to show in the present chapter.

Admittedly, this analysis of the hermeneutical Q is far from complete, but we now have a secure beginning. By way of closing, I shall briefly comment on two points: (1) on the other hermeneutical Qs (why? and how?), and (2) on how the details of Husserl's logic of parts and wholes might figure in our analysis.

1. Why, How, and Because

An interpretive Q, "What is it?", is "profounder", or "wiser", "deeper", than a predicative Q. And finding out what this *is* is profounder than finding out about this or that attribute of it. Just what is "profound"? And why should the hermeneutical what be profounder? I shall examine this problem in the concluding chapter. In the meantime, I shall simply put this forward as a *fact*. Assuming for the moment, then, that the what Q is profounder than the predicative Q, what are we to say about those other sorts of Q which are every bit as profound—namely, the Qs of "cause"? Are not, "Why is this?" and "How come?" every bit as pressing or "interesting", and answers to them every bit as "informative", as Qs and answers regarding "What is it?"? (For our purposes, we need not get sidetracked with the problem of spelling out the differences and similarities between how's and why's, and how and why how's and why's work differently when it comes to things human, things logical and mathematical, things natural, and so forth.) The objection, then, might go that we have left out of our analysis a form of questioning too "important" and "profound" to leave out. Is the objection fair? I admit, a fuller analysis would require a separate chapter just on the how Q and the why Q, or a lengthy chapter on each. But on the other hand, we have been talking about the how and the why all along. Consider the following.

What is a why Q? Take this example. I observe an eclipse, and *understand*, "This is an eclipse. This is what happens. The earth gets darker, etc." But then I ask, "Why? How does it come about? What is behind this eclipse-phenomenon?" What I am doing is not "losing" an understanding of the phenomenon; that much is secure. I am shifting my perspective and asking *another* what Q. The eclipse is now regarded as the predicate-clue;

and the aim is to solve the riddle, "What is this?" Not, "What is this eclipse?", but,

"What is this 'planetary system'--that's what we'll call it--that on some days, this 'attribute'

of it called an 'eclipse' sometimes happens?" To ask, "Why?", is to ask, "What is this

'what' that I now take to be a clue?" As with a what Q, the why proceeds from consequent

to antecedent, from phenomenon to ground.

I said that the aim of an interpretive Q, "What is it?" is to "plough back" from the

parts to the whole. Answering the interpretive Q is to "name" that whole. For example, the

reflectivity of a certain object depends upon their being a surface, the surface depends upon

their being extension. The actual reflection depends upon their being light, etc. All these

parts, which are so related, come together to form a whole called a "mirror". Of course, this

ploughing back is not unique to our dealing with things. And what we try to unravel are not

just the "arguments"--the mereologies--of things out there, but also the arguments of

"texts". Trying to disentangle a certain text, we ask, for example, "What 'presupposes' what

here? Which step comes first, what step second? What is behind this assertion? What is

supposed to be the conclusion? Where is the argument going?" But in either case, the

hermeneutical task consists in *questioning backwards* from this part that *depends* upon that

part; that part that *depends* upon this sub-whole; and these two parts . . . *depend* upon this

"last whole"--which is called a "mirror".

Now, given that this relation of part to whole is a relation of dependence, it would

not be unreasonable to say that the *logic* of asking interpretively, "What is it?" works

somewhat as follows: In asking, "What is this?", one looks for the antecedent p that would

"explain" the consequent q. Asking the interpretive, "What is it?", one is asking, "What is p

that accounts for this phenomenon 'it' called '*q*'?" One asks, effectively, "[?]-->*q*". I'm unsure how hard or literally to press this formulation on the what-is-it Q. But taken as a first approximation, the formulation accords well with the logical relation that obtains between the whole--the antecedent--and its parts--the consequent.

Ploughing back from consequent to antecedent is the mark of the hermeneutical Q. This being so, there are two other sorts of Q that we should also classify as "interpretive". The why Q and the how-come Q also operate accordingly. These Qs also proceed from "effect", "phenomenon", "clue", "cipher", "code", or what have you, *to* the "cause", the "reason", the "condition", or "ground".[10]

Put differently, *the hermeneutical Q is a Q of aetiology*. To ask, "What does it mean?" is to ask, "What is its cause--or ground?" Moreover, given that there are different types of interpretive Qs, the aetiology is "Aristotelian". (Aristotle has a fourth, "material" cause; we are counting here only three of them.) Or in any case, it allows for the eminently sensible idea that there are different types of "cause" or "ground". We can see this in the different ways that interpretive questioning gets formulated. One way is: "What is this essentially?" (a "formal" Q, in Aristotle's scheme of things). Another way: "What is the 'meaningfulness' of this?" Or, maybe, "What is it 'meaning' to do?" Or, "Why is it?" (a "final" Q). Another way: "How is this done?". Or, if there is any etymological connection, "By what 'means'?" (an "efficient" Q).

Our account is Aristotelian in one other sense. Better still, it is capable of *explaining* the intuition that not just the Aristotelians, but almost everybody, with maybe the exception of the positivist, already has about what the sciences are meant to accomplish. The point of

doing science is to establish the "causes" of things. Our explanation for why this is so is that this is what inquiry—questioning—is already doing before it goes scientific. So far as questioning is interpretive, it seeks the causes—the grounds—of things. More than that, so far as it is interpretive, it is also felt to be "deeper", "more important". Asking, for example, "What is this?", "Why is this?" just seems profounder than, say, "What colour is this?", "How much does this weigh?" I shall say more in the concluding chapter about why the hermeneutical Q comes across as "deeper" than its predicative counterpart.

2. A Logic of Questions and Parts

I did not bring into our analysis of the hermeneutical Q a detailed examination of Husserl's logic of parts. Doubtless, a fuller treatment would require that I pay closer attention to how "mereology" and "hermeneutics" are to be hooked up. In such a study, these are some of the topics that might be worth tracking down: (a) Ordinarily, a Q suggests its answer(s) more so than an "answer" suggests its Q—perhaps much in the same way that a "cause" suggests the effect(s) more than the effect suggests its cause. Such a Q would seem to be a *predicative* Q. The hermeneutical Q, by contrast, seems to be stuck with the harder job of having to move backwards from consequent to antecedent, from effect to cause. Could it be, then, that in a logic of parts, the predicative Q characteristically moves from "whole" to "part" and the hermeneutical Q characteristically from "part" to "whole"?

(b) In asking, "Why?", there is both attention to the abstract and the concrete, the moment and the whole, the founded and the founding. Asking, "Why X?", I begin to see the "concretum" as an "abstractum", or a moment of a whole which remains hidden from view.

(c) A moment can be measured according to how "proximate" or "remote" it is from what ontologically precedes it. (Brightness is more proximate to colour than to extension.) Correlating this concept of "proximate" and "remote" moments, we may speak of proximate and remote why Qs and how Qs, depending upon "how far back" they go. (d) I cannot present a moment separately (how can I see brightness without colour?). However, I can talk, or begin to think, about a moment abstractly. It is when I do so that the possibility of asking, "Why is it?", or "How come?", begins to present itself. It might be that an "abstracting" is a form of hermeneutical noise. No longer seeing this X as foundational, or founding, or "concrete", I ask, "What grounds this abstractum?", "Why is it?", "What is behind it?" I look for a reason, not because I need "becauses"; I look for it because I musn't look at this moment, this abstractum, as separately presentable! Thanks to the why Q, and the how, I don't end up reifying every abstractum under the sun.

(e) The act of interpreting has both an analytic side and a synthetic side. Analytically, it "teases out" or explicates what is already there (e.g., "The big red barn" is explicated into "The big barn is red"). But it also "synthetically" sees into how the parts actually work as parts. In terms of what *prompts* the interpretive act, it may be that "analysis" precedes synthesis. I start out with a synthetic pre-understanding of the whole. But with the introduction of hermeneutical noise, or "passive analysis", certain possibilities suddenly show up near the ontological fringes of the object. In response to this analysis, the hermeneutical Q arises, "Does this belong, or doesn't it? How does it belong?" The analysis is "interesting", the subsequent synthesis is informative.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. The riddle has an elder cousin, which we might call the "original interpretation", or the "unformulated riddle". As a model of interpretive activity, the riddle is limited in that it does not embody the logic of that sort of interpretation called "original". To illustrate: One's finding out for the very first time that this "something", which is red, thorny, fragrant, etc. is a rose, and, presumably at the same time, that any other "something" which is like it is also a rose, is a case of an original interpretation. By contrast, being asked a riddle, "What is X?", presupposes that the original interpretation of X has already taken place. (Otherwise asking it isn't "fair".) A riddle is a "repeated interpretation", so to speak. "It is red, thorny, fragrant, etc. What is it?" Answer: "It is--aha!--a rose!"

The original interpretation, just as the repeated interpretation, has to start out with some clues. However, the original interpretation is, by contrast, an *unformulated* riddle (let's say) in that, besides the fact that it has yet to work out the what of "X", the clues themselves are not precisely narrowed down. (What counts as a clue here? What is constituent of this X that I am trying to determine? Is the red a "clue"? Prickly? Fragrant? Vase-like? Made of ceramic? Made in Mexico? . . . . The last few possibilities got filtered out of the original interpretation, which we eventually called "rose".) More later on the problem of separating out what belongs from what does not belong to the unknown X. But these differences aside, it is, of course, the similarity between the "repeated" and the "original" interpretive acts that makes them both interpretive. The similarity consists in looking for, and finding, the meaning, and this is quite apart from whether this involves, repeatedly, finding the meaning once again, or, originally, finding it for the first time. With this first problem taken care of, let us turn to the main problem in hand.

2. *"What is this thing?"*, *"What does this word mean?"*: Imagine the not unfamiliar case in which someone doesn't understand the meaning of the word and sets out to find the definition of it. The person consults a dictionary, or asks someone else, in order to get the meaning of the word, say, "dream". This would seem to be a case of hermeneutical questioning, and so it is. How is that? The person understands—"wagers" might be more

like it--that the word "dream" does stand for something. This wagering part of it is certainly key; only then can the word itself actually operate as a *sign* of sorts. The word, or speaking it, points at an un-deciphered object, which is understood to be roughly the same object that everybody else points at when they use the same word. When *they* use the word, they point at the idea of dreamhood, or the actual occurrence of a dream, or what-not. When *he* looks for the meaning for the word "dream", he, too, points at this object. But of course, there is this one, big difference. When he says the word, he can't make sense of the object being aimed at.

This act of defining is hermeneutical. What is to be interpreted here is not so much the meaning of the word itself. Rather, it is the meaning of the *object*, which the uttering of a certain word "aims at", "intends", "means", etc., and it is this object which is to be interpreted. But it gets more complicated. Of course, the words that can get defined are not just nouns. We also find definitions for verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and (no doubt more problematic) connectives like "but", "and", and "or"--in short, definitions for any and every word of any type. Defining a noun, such as "dream", one aims at, or "means", its "defined object". But much the same can be said of defining an adjective, or whatever. Each of these has *its* defined object also. And why stop with words? The same can be said about "longer words", which are called "sentences", "paragraphs", "papers", "poems", and "books". In the act of reading them, these, too, *mean* or *intend* their objects.

Again, in the defining of a word, the act points at an object. But whether the word happens to be a noun, a verb, or whatever, the object itself is nominalized or *noun-ified*. What does this say about interpreting things "out there", rather than meanings to which words, or sentences, point? To answer: The hermeneutics of "What does this 'text' mean?" and "What is this 'out there'?" are quite similar, in the following respect. Just as one can obviously ask about WHAT a word means, a word of any type, not just about nouns, so also one can ask about the WHAT of any number of aspects of a given thing. Consider the Qs, "What is the meaning of 'rose'?", or ask, "What is the meaning of 'red'?". These are interpretive Qs. But much the same takes place in asking, "What is this thing *out there*?", or asking, "What is the colour *out there*?"--when the "out there" proves to be a *rose*, or proves to be *redness*. For just as the defined object of a word has to be noun-ified, so in a parallel

way does the object "out there", which is being interpreted, have to be "thing-ified". And just as the defined object is noun-ified, whether the correlated word is a noun, adjective, verb, or whatever, so in a parallel way does any *aspect* of the object "out there" get "nounified".

3. See, for example, Husserl's *EJ* §87, "The Method of Essential Seeing" and *Ideas I* §70, "The Role of Perception in the Method of Eidetic Clarification". The "variation" is for Husserl a method of (indeed) *varying* this or that aspect of the object. In so doing, one can determine the "eidos" or "essence"--the *what* that remains invariant--of the given object. This "method", I should carefully note, is not in the first place a formalized methodology, to be carried out when doing phenomenology. Before it gets formalized, should it even reach that stage, the method of variation is already operative in our everyday commerce with the things around us. I take this to be Husserl's own view on the matter, and certainly it is our own.

Edward Casey (1977), in "Imagination and Phenomenological Method", notes that according to Husserl "imagination is responsible for securing all essential necessities and essential laws--all genuine intuitive *a priori*" (*ibid.*,72). He goes on to say: "Hence Husserl grants imagination a status of its own--but only within the specific philosophical method [i.e., the variation] he advocated" (*ibid.*,73). *Our* position on the role of "imagination" goes as follows. (Casey's interpretation to the contrary, it may also be, in fact, Husserl's position.) (i) Imagination has its role not just "within a specific philosophical method". Imagination already has a role in our everyday, interpretive commerce with things, and this is prior to, and apart from, any talk about some part it plays in a "philosophical method". Hypothesizing, thought-experimenting, testing, probing--this is what our everyday, hermeneutical attempts to gain eidetic insight into this and that are *already* "imaginatively" up to. (ii) Imagination is not just the means by which the variation method is carried out. It is also, I suspect, the very *problem* that the application of the method is meant to solve! In the present work, I am not investigating the origins of the "noisy field" *within which* questioning arises in response, and so I shall say this only tentatively. "Imagination", be it passive or active, must somehow be in complicity with--maybe even identical with--

"noise". And if this is the case, then, like "noise", imagination must be logically prior to the questioning act. (iii) "I say 'a proper' and not 'the proper' method because it cannot rightly be claimed that phenomenology provides the only satisfactory method for achieving an adequate philosophical account of imagination. Wittgenstein is justified in asserting that 'there is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies" (ibid., 79). I would reply, being less open-minded: "'Philosophy' has nothing to do with it. As far as interpreting goes, variation is THE method".

4. A "what" does not require a plurality of like things which fall under it. To know the what of something is primarily to be able to "predict" the plurality of appearances of that something or things of that kind. How is that? In asking, "What is it?", the Q is rivetted on some given thing. Primarily, to ask, "What is it?" is to ask, "small-mindedly", about this one thing. Does the what Q, then, seek a universal? Yes, if by a universal is meant that order which can cover the plurality of instances of this one thing. "What is this—call it a 'chair'?" One puts the chair in the corner of the room, places it upside down, throws it down the stairs, places it next to the table, then moves it away from it. With these "experimental variations", one eventually works out the abiding order of this one thing. Once this particularistic idea is worked out—the universal in the plurality of possible instances of this one individual thing—the "bigger idea" is also effectively worked out—the universal covering a plurality of individuals. My point?

First, it is not as if in asking, "What is individual?", that the Q has in view—or has to have in view, or even ordinarily has in view—the less particularistic idea of coming up with a "universal" in order to cover a plurality of such individuals. If that were the case, then we might not be able to understand, or interpret, individuals of which there is, arguably, no "plurality" to speak. For example, "What is this one-and-only planet Mars, or one-and-only Triassic period?" (The sciences don't just deal with universals, notice.) Or, "What is this one-and-only Eiffel Tower? What is its 'meaning'?" Or, "What is this one-and-only Van Gogh?" Or, "What is this single group of many? A bevy of girls? A grove of trees? A flock of birds?" (LI VI, §51, "Collectiva and Disjuntiva".) Or, assuming that "Who?" is akin to "What?", which is a very big assumption, and not one that we are going to explore here:

"*Who* is this person?" In any case, even if the interpreter has in mind the problem that there might be other individuals out there of the same type, this does not take away from the "individualism" of the interpretive act. The Q is still, e.g., "What is this thing?" To interpret the what of it is to understand, in effect, what different guises this one thing could assume without deviating from what it is.

5. "Openness" can mean a number of things. When Daubert uses the term (*Öffnung*) it means "aperture", "hole", "gap", "opening". Accordingly, a Q points outward to an opening in a given SAs (25v, 42v, 85r). An *Öffnung* is the open structure of the thing in Q. To bring about an opening requires, of course, a subject, without whom the opening just isn't there. (It is not as if the object could be "in question" all by itself and exist with Q marks all over it even though there is no one looking at it and "reading off" the questions which were there to be discovered. Hence the existence of an opening implies the existence of someone who does the opening. The idea of openness in this Daubertian sense--the structure of the object--ought not be confounded with the openness (*Offenheit*) that Gadamer, for example, has talked about. (as, for instance, in his discussion on the "hermeneutical priority of the question" [*TM* 2, II, 3, c, i-ii]). Openness in this case is what might be called "open-mindedness" (*Aufgeschlossenheit*), or "receptivity" (*Empfänglichkeit*), or something of a combination of the two. In one's openness, a person is open to someone else's opinion on the matter; one's prejudices are open to correction; one is open to a change of plans; etc. Gadamerian openness, then, would seem to lie more with the attitude of the subject than with the structure of the object. Quite so. But there is more to it than that. Where Gadamer's notion of openness comes close to Daubert's own is in the passage in which he mentions how the emergence of a Q breaks open (*aufbrechen*) the being of the questioned thing (*Befragten*): "The emergence of the question opens up [*aufbrechen*], as it were, the being of the object." And: "Hence the logos that sets out this opened-up being [*aufgebrochene Sein*] is already an answer" (*TM* 2, II, 3, c, i).

What is our own view on this? First, in response to Daubert: (i) So far as I am aware, Daubert's analysis deals only with what we are calling the "predicative" Q. (This is not to say that the possibility of there being a distinction between the predicative Q and the

hermeneutical what Q has even occurred to him). Daubert's notion of the *Öffnung*, which pertains to the "*Frageverhalt*" (the "state of affairs as questioned"), is therefore limited to only one sphere of Qs. (ii) Whether our position on this is at odds with Daubert's position is debatable, but in any case we preferred to describe the "state of affairs as questioned" as the "object-in-Q", which "eclipses" the SAs behind it. The "opening" is not in the structure of the SAs; it is an epistemological gap, that hole, or valence, which remains to be "saturated" by the answer. (iii) It is not the predicative Q itself that does the opening. It arises within a "field of noise"--or "openness", so as not to mix metaphors.

Second, in reply to Gadamer: (i) It is not the Q, or the questioning attitude, that brings about "openness". Openness, as we understand it, be it hermeneutical or predicative, is a field of contending possibilities, to which the Q responds with an aim to *closing* them off. (ii) However (not that this represents a disagreement, or an agreement, with Gadamer), the aim in closing them off is precisely in order to see the object itself in *its* **openings**. To explain: The objective of the predicative Q is to zero in on a possibility, closing off the others ("Blue--not any other colour"). The opening in the predicative Q has to be "epistemologically" saturated. The objective of the hermeneutical Q is, in sharp contrast, to open up whatever can be opened up so far as the object itself goes, and then be "closed-minded" about it. To know what the thing *is* is to know what it can be and to be ready for its future instantiations or "applications". Putting all this differently: The aim of the what Q is "ontological" rather than epistemological. It is to know the *object's* "openness". In a manner of speaking: "These are *its* invariants, closed and open. It is in reference to these 'openings', as well as 'closings', that the predicative Q concerning this thing may be asked".

6. In his discussion of the "fusion of part-intentions", Husserl notes: "We may also be unsatisfied with a single glance, we may handle the thing from all sides in a *continuous perceptual series*, feeling it over as it were with our senses" (*LI* VI, §47, 789). "Feel it over *as it were*"? Husserl's haptic metaphor, about "handle" and "feel", should be taken more literally than "as it were". I discuss this point in the concluding section of the concluding chapter.

7. For general discussions on Husserl's science of parts and wholes, see his *EJ* §§30-32. See also Robert Sokolowski (1974, 8-17) and (1977; first published in 1967-68); Barry Smith (1982) *Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology*; Peter Simons (1987) *Parts: A Study in Ontology*; Jay Lampert (1995, 73-87), "The Theory of Parts and Wholes: The Dynamic of Individuating and Contextualizing Interpretation"; Kit Fine (1995, 463-85) "Part-Whole".

8. Smith and McIntyre, commenting on Husserl's theory of meaning, have noted, rightly:

> The *verification* theory of meaning, espoused by the pragmatist C.S. Peirce and later by some of the positivists, holds that the meaning of a sentence is determined by what would count as evidence for its truth. In its strongest form the theory identifies the meaning of a sentence with the set of possible experiences (perceptions) that would verify the sentence . . . .[W]e can see that there is some affinity between Husserl and the verificationist . . . . Husserl correlates with every act, and hence with every *Sinn*, an act-horizon. This act-horizon he defines, to begin with, as the set of possible experiences or perceptions co-directed and compatible with, but more determinate than, the given act. And Husserl sees the unfolding of an act's horizon as the "peculiar attainment" of intentional analysis, which "brings about . . . an 'explication' [*Auslegung*], a 'becoming distinct' and perhaps a 'clarification' of what is consciously meant [*Vermeinten*], of the objective Sinn" ([*Cartesian Meditations*], §20). Hence, according to Husserl, the *Sinn*, or meaning, of an act can be "explicated" [interpreted] in terms of the possible acts . . . that make up the act's horizon. [1982, 267-68]

However, as the authors rightly point out, there are "important differences" between the verificationist's theory of meaning and Husserl's theory of meaning. Husserl does not cash meaning in terms of only perception or language. More than that (and this is the main difference), Husserl resists this positivist "reduction" of identifying the grasp of a meaning

with possible verifying experiences. (I imagine that an extreme case of verificationism would be the "predictability theory" of an explanation, which we rejected--for example, of understanding what it means for Saturn to be in this planetary position with a draught next year). Husserl does not identify, but only *correlates* meaning with the act-horizon.

9. If we want to cast all this in informationalist terms, how might we do this? This, I think, would be the *start* of an answer to this question: Hermeneutical informativeness is a matter of *remembering*. Or, it is a function of "re-collecting" the different parts or members of a whole. How well the interpreter "remembers" is a function of how fulfilled or satisfactory is the interpretive answer. In that case, interpretive noise, which the "coming into remembering" tries to reduce, or eliminate, would have to be, in some way, correlated to the loss of remembering. There is a word that approximates this, and it is called "forgetting". Here, we might be tempted to respond to Plato of the *Meno* (and the *Phaedo*, 72e-76c; also Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 71a), *viz.*, his doctrine of "recollection" (*anamnesis*), starting with the assertion: Yes, the aim of interrogating into the "form" of a thing (the "what" of it, as we have been calling it) comes down to recollecting the form. But conversely, what has set the interrogation into motion is having lost—"forgotten"--what was pre-understood. The first thing the teacher has to do is to hit the student on the head with a book in order that he forgets everything.

10. A word about my preference to use the term "ground". I originally thought of using the realist term "cause" as the operative term, but then thought against it. And the reason for this was simply that using "cause" so expansively runs counter to ordinary usage. How, for example, could we talk sensibly about, say, the what of a thing as its "cause", or the idea that constituted objects have "causal efficacy". Aristotle's translators can get away with using the term "cause" (αἰτία) so expansively, but we can't. The better translation of αἰτία might be "reason". That might work up to a point. However, one drawback is that not every *interpretive Q* can be introduced with a "why". The Q, "What is it?", *might* be translated into, "Why is it what it is?". But what about the Q, "How to do it?"? Rewording this with a "why" in front of it would be stretching it. The other drawback with "reason" is that it is too

mentalistic to account for the causes of things "out there". I also thought of the term, "condition", which is less subjective than "reason"; but it doesn't have any ontological ring to it. And so by default I have opted to use *ground* as the operative term.

Chapter 6:

What We Know by Now, and What Comes Next

Introduction

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     2. Having an Object Doesn't Necessarily Make the Act Intentional

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D. Can an Answer to a Question "Become" True?

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Notes to Chapter 6

Introduction

The objective of the present work has been to examine the notion of intentionality (in roughly the Husserlian sense of the term) in terms of the idea that questioning and answering are basic to it. I mean "basic" not in the sense that questioning and answering are obviously "important" types, or common types, of intentional activity, in the same way that promising, advising, inviting, and warning are "important" and "common". By "basic" I

mean that the structure of intentionality—"thought-to-thing" as opposed to "thing-to-thought"--*is* that of questioning and answer. The nominal description of our analysis—"the intentionality of questions and answers"--could just as well have been, "a question-and-answer analysis of intentionality".

This, briefly, is what we did, from Chapters 2 to 5.

In **Chapter 2**, we worked through a number of traditional interpretations of a Q, until we had eventually arrived at the idea that the very notion of directedness ought to enter into the definition. Accordingly, we defined a Q as "a multi-directed act, the aim of which is to reduce its 'multiplicity'". The importance of our definition was not just what it technically said about a Q, but what it allowed us to do with it. In our having defined a Q in terms of "directedness", the idea presented itself that we should directly correlate the notions of questioning and intentionality. Although explicit mention of the definition dropped out, the key ideas contained in it were made use of all along: it is the mark of a Q to do commerce with a multiplicity of possibilities; and it is the aim of a Q to reduce the possibilities.

Now, our lining up the notions of questioning and intentionality inevitably gave way to the idea of correlating the two categories so basic to an intentional act--*empty* and *fulfilled*--with questioning and answering respectively. All this turned out to be more than just a matter of having to redescribe the old in new terms. ("'Empty'? That's a Q. 'Fulfilled'? That's an answer".) (i) For one thing, there exist, as we discovered, two quite different types of Q--the predicative Q and the hermeneutical. A separate, and brief, treatment of the one type was provided in **Chapters 3** and **4**, and then of the other type in

Chapter 5. The predicative Q already has the meaning-materials in hand, and has only

to ascertain which one of them points to what is in the world. ("Is this a rose?", "Is the rose

red?", "What colour is the rose?") The hermeneutical Q, by contrast, proceeds on the basis

of the clues already provided; this Q has only to ascertain the "what" of the thing already in

front of it, fully in view. (ii) Second, given our "information theory" of questioning and

answering, the notions of "empty" and "fulfilled", and the correlated notions of truth and

evidence, had to be revised accordingly. I turn now to a few words about the idea of

informativeness, which figured so centrally in the overall argument.

A Q is not just a directing **toward** a directedness; it is also a directing "*away from*".

The act of answering aims "toward" the truth, so to speak; but in this act there is also the

moment in which the contending possibilities are reduced, or eliminated, as false. An

answering act, I argued, consists of both recognizing a truth and, marginally, denying the

contender as false. It was in reference to the fact that answering has these two sides to it (it

both recognizes and denies) that we could make sense of what makes a given act--a Q--

interested in its object and what makes the act--an answer--*informative*. Doubtless, this is to

oversimplify the matter, but here is a list of the key theses of our "information theory" of

questioning and answering: (i) So much "noise", i.e., so much contentiousness in a given set

of possibilities entertained by the act, so much interestedness. Questioning arises within a

"field of noise". (ii) So much reduction of noise, so much informativeness. With answering

comes the reduction of it. (iii) So much informativeness, so much evidence. Indeed, these

last two terms have come to mean pretty well the same. Evidence, on our account, is not just

a "flooding in" of, say, a categorial or perceptual intuition; it is a *crowding out* of

possibilities. Evidence is about finding out what is *not* there. (I mean "finding out" in the sense that either the intention actively denies it or passively sees that the object itself has denied, or cut off, those possibilities.) (iv) So much interestedness or informativeness--so much questioning and answering--so much experience of the intentional object as "real". (v) Correlatively, so much lack of one or the other, so much ontological "neutrality" toward the object. Hence, the problem of one's experience of the object's being real, and less and less real, is *internal* to the act itself.

Our analysis tells us that the phenomenologist's job is not to "bracket out" questions of existence, but to recognize that consciousness gets *de-neutralized* precisely in its *becoming* intentional, in its *turning into* questioning or answering. And this happens (putting it roughly) according to how "interesting", or "informative" the object is. (The *act* "takes an interest" and the act "gets informed".) Put another way: The extent to which an intentional target is intentional is a function of that target's "looking" real. Thus, a defense of a realist phenomenology, a defense of which has been an underlying theme of the present work. The strategy of this defense has been to argue, if only incompletely. that the experience of reality--the *Innesein*--is the condition for the possibility of aiming.

Thus ends a summary of the present work. What else might we want to say about intentionality in light of our "question-analysis"? And given what we now know about questioning, what might we want to say about the problem of "thing-to-thought" intentionality, about which very little has been said up to this point? In these concluding remarks, I shall only touch on these questions.

A. Intentions without Objects, "Intentions" with Objects

"Intentionality" is a relation between the intentional subject and the object that is intended. Hence, an intentional act has to be a pointing at an object. That, at any rate, was the minimal definition of intentionality with which we started out. In light of what we have found out since then, it is well that we reexamine this definition. (1) Does the intentional act have to be pointing at an object? No, so long as it is looking for it and presumes it to be already somewhere out there to be found. (2) Does just having an object make the "act" intentional? No, if the object is not taken as being real. I shall briefly explain each of these two answers in turn.

1. Intentional, But without an Object

Does an intentional act have to point at an object? I mean, could an "act" be an act, could it be intentional, without quite having anything to point at? I suggest that it can, in a way. Even though the act operates in the dark, it operates on the "assumption" that the object is out there, waiting to be found. Even if the act is not target-fixing, it is still an act if it is "target-searching".

I recall our discussion, in Chapter 2, about the idea of defining a Q in terms of desiring. Now, one might allow this, but only with the proviso that such a desire would have to be "lucid" as opposed to "dark". This distinction is captured in the following passage, from Husserl:

> . . . desire does not always seem to require conscious reference to what is
> desired, that we are often moved by obscure [i.e., "dark"] drives or pressures
> towards unrepresented goals, and if one points especially to the wide sphere

of natural instinct, where goal-consciousness is at least absent at the

start, one may say: This is a case of mere sensations . . . i.e. of experiences

really lacking intentional reference, and so also remote in kind from the

essential character of intentional desire. [*LI* V, §15b, 575]

Now, so far as a *questioning* involves "desire" (not that Husserl says anything about this),

this desiring would have to be lucid (i.e., articulate) as opposed to "dark". And this is

because a Q is always specific as to its target. So the argument might conceivably go. In

fact, Husserl almost seems to say as much when, a little later, he calls a question a "definite

[*gewissen*] wish" (*LI* V, §29, 616). By this we may take him to mean: A Q is *intentional*:

Here we are dealing with intentional experiences, but with such as are

characterized by indeterminateness of objective direction, an

'indeterminateness' which does not amount to privation, but which stands

for a descriptive character of one's presentation. The idea that we have when

'something' stirs, when there is a rustling, a ring at the door, etc., an idea had

before we give it verbal expression, has indeterminateness of direction, and

this indeterminateness is of the intention's essence, it is determined as

presenting an indeterminate 'something'. [*LI* V, §15b, 575]

These so-called indeterminate acts are what we are calling "dark". To the extent that such

experiences do "not amount to privation", desire has not entered into them. Questioning, on

the other hand--this is our view--*is* marked by "privation". It is "felt" to be incomplete; it

"sees" the indeterminateness for what it is. Something stirs—"What stirs?" Someone's at

the door--"Who's at the door?" It is black, white, and red all over"—"Then what is it?" So

far as a Q is a desiring, it is a desire that, lucid about its being in the dark, seeks more lucidity.

More precisely, a *predicative* Q is clarified as to its "object" in the object-in-Q, even if the details of the target have yet to be ascertained. A *hermeneutical* Q, on the other hand, is *in varying degrees* in the dark as to its object. Trying to answer a riddle is a case in point. Sure, the Q has the predicate-clues in hand, and is to that extent lucid. However, the Q aims *through* these clues, not at them, toward a target "out there", the "what" of which has yet to be found. I retract, then, the original stipulation that the mark of intentionality is the relation between the subject and the object: It is so related, but then again it isn't.

In the case of a Q, any Q, the object has to be presumed to be out there (or, if not that, then it is asked, "Is it out there?"); but this is not to say that the intended object has to be in view. The phenomenon of the Q brings home the fact that intentionality is not just a relation between two points, but a striving and a finding. The point of a *hermeneutical* Q is that it strives to individuate the object from the flux of appearances in which it still remains hidden--to track down a moving target. Once "fixed", "noun-ified", "atemporalized", "individuated" (or whatever other word we used to describe this achievement of an interpretation), the object can be taken as a *river*, a *fire*, a *process*, a *mountain*, a *building*, a *bridge*.

Summing up, an "act" can still be an act, even if it lacks its object. What makes this sort of act--a "Q", as it is better known--intentional is that it is looking for its object, which is presumed to be out there. To be more precise about this, the Q to which I am referring here is *hermeneutical*. A predicative Q already has its object in view. Say you've lost your

cat and ask, "Where is the cat?". You are *already* aiming at the cat itself, the object of the Q. Alternatively, you are already aiming at the object-in-Q, the objectual correlate of the Q. Not so with the hermeneutical Q. In asking, "It 'miaws'; it has 'whiskers'; it 'purrs' what is this?", you cannot yet see the (hermeneutical) object, even though it is staring right at you full in the face. You can't yet see the object, and yet you are intentionally related to it. What about the obverse case? Could it also be that even though a certain, given "act" has, supposedly, an object (a golden mountain, a unicorn), it is *not* an act, is *not* intentional, for all that? The answer to this second question is: Just because the "act" has an object does not make it intentional. Let us go over this second point.

2. Having an Object Doesn't Necessarily Make the Act Intentional

Consider a level of understanding at which there is no differentiation between the "act-horizon" and the "object-horizon", or at a level at which all anticipations are dictated by the act-horizon alone. At this level, the object is **given** as being no more than a phenomenalist object. The act sees this side of it; in so doing, it anticipates the *experience* of seeing the other side, and then the other side, and so forth. However, it is not so much the "other side", or "sides", that it anticipates; it anticipates appearances. Hence, what this "act" does not yet experience, and will not experience until the differentiation between the two horizons takes place, is the "realist" understanding of those "possibilities" that lie within the orbit of the object. The act-possibilities are one thing, the object-possibilities are quite another. Only once this differentiation has taken place will the other sides of the object be **taken** by the act as *co-present*, be taken as *hidden from me*. Only then are the conditions met for the possibility of questioning.

My point is that one cannot ask about a "phenomenalistic" object. The object of a Q, or an answer, has to be taken as being "thick".[1] (A "thick" object is an object that is taken to be real: this warehouse, those electrons running through that filament, etc.) To replace the phenomenalist slogan, *esse est percipi*, we should say instead: To experience the *esse* of something is to take this something as having sides, or "profiles", *co-present* with the side presently appearing. To the extent that one sees this other side as itself having different possibilities, so one also sees it as co-present, as hidden. The phenomenological thickness of the object is a function of the "noise", or "contentiousness", or "problematicity" that comes up around this object.

How this actually "comes up" is a question that I have not tried to answer in the present study. Suffice it to say only this much about the matter: First, a Q anticipates its answer, but not (as it were) as yet another possible experience that concerns yet another appearance. The answer, or what it discloses, is taken as having been there all along. (If the reality to which an answer pointed came about only at the moment, and maybe also from that moment on, of *answering*, if the reality disclosed is not taken as having been there before I got to it, then what would "questioning" possibly mean? Would we not call such a questioning "making"?) Second: Questioning and answering, which concern what is hidden from view, and what is subsequently disclosed, take place within this "realistic field". They constitute active "responses" to the object so far as it is taken as being real.

Third: The issue about the "metaphysical" status of the intended object (Is it real?) cannot be written off as phenomenologically irrelevant. This point is borne out by the very fact that questioning and answering require for their very operation that their object be taken

as real. The counter-reply to this argument might go as follows: "Granted, a Q and answer presuppose the reality of their object. Granted also, pointing this out has philosophical significance to the extent that questioning and answering are major players in consciousness. However, none of this takes away from the fact that the intentionality of an act is nonetheless logically independent of the ontological status of the object that is intended. The concrete 'act' and the 'content' are what matters, not the ontological status of the 'object'". I do not agree; if the thought-to-thing act is not doing commerce with what it takes to be real, then it is not doing any commerce at all. Or: Either the thought-to-thing act is questioning or answering, or it is not an act at all.

What is the argument for this? The "look" of the object's reality is a function of there being different contending possibilities about it. That is what makes the different sides "co-present", that is what solicits my exploration of it. The less real the object looks--the more the "act-horizon" takes over--the more phenomenalist is the object. And the more phenomenalist the object, the ontologically thinner it gets. Then the object is given as no more than a stream or series of barely or entirely unrelated appearances. Yet the more it is given in this way, the less intended is this object. The less intended the object, the less intentional is the act, or the less is that act an act. How does the reality of the object "thin out" (and how, therefore, does the act itself become less intentional)?

My hunch is this: The more I am at one with every appearance of the object, the "dreamier" and less real it looks. The more the act-horizon takes over, the less intentional does the act become. So much phenomenalism, so much thinning out of the object. Conversely, so much experience of reality, so much intentionality. That thought-to-thing

intentional response to this experience of "taking this as real" is called "questioning and answering".

Husserl (of the *LI* at any rate) would insist that an intentional act needs an object. I am saying: Not necessarily; minimally, the object-less act has to look for an object if it is to be an act. Just because the "act" has an object does not thereby make it intentional. A questioning act that can't quite aim, that can't quite make out its object--a hermeneutical Q--may be ten times more intentional than an "act" that points at the clearly visible house on the hill over there. If I am just staring at it, if I do not take the other sides of it as co-present--if the lights are on, but nobody is home--the supposed "act" of seeing the house is not really an act. What matters here, what makes the act intentional, is that the object be taken as real. Only then can I ask, for example, "How to build a perpetual motion machine?"--or for that matter, "Who lives on the golden mountain?", or "Is the unicorn running?"

3. But Can't We Just Picture Things?

Our "phenomenology of questioning" not only assures us, in principle, that realism is an "internal issue". It also assures us that the worry about hyper-realism is a bugaboo. It is true that I can say, and think, "The mountain is golden", or "The unicorn is running". But I cannot sensibly say, in the way of an answer that both recognizes and denies, "The mountain is made of gold--not iron", or "The unicorn is running--not trotting", as if its being otherwise could ever be an issue. However these things are given, "The mountain is golden", "The unicorn is running", etc., do not, as they stand, point to states of affairs.

That said, you might still object: But can't one just picture something, envisage it, all the while knowing that it doesn't exist? Of course one can. But then does that not pose a

problem for the thesis that the intentionality of an act is tied up with the presumption of the object's being taken as real? I admit, this does pose a problem, and not a trivial one at that. Part of the solution, and this would deal with "fiction", would be to take something like Roman Ingarden's approach. On this view, the correlate of a literary work of art, for instance, is a constituted object "out there". The other part of the solution would to be to pay more attention to thing-to-thought intentionality. Much of our picturing, envisaging, imagining and suchlike, so far as they are "thing-to-thought" or "plans", or, though not quite the same, predictions--these acts do have "objects" of sorts, even though the objects are expressly taken as *not yet* real. This problem is entirely different from talk about golden mountains, unicorns, and other ontological bugaboos. What, then, about the object of a plan?

(i) One possible explanation is that the planning act points at an object in the future perfect, as something "already finished". The problem with this explanation, attractive though it is, is that aiming at a future perfect is only one of a few ways of pointing into the future. Worse, the explanation sounds like special pleading and an effort to save at any cost the theory that an intention has to point at an object. (ii) The better explanation is that, "in the meantime", the act is *not* really pointing at an object (i.e., the SAs concerning this object); it is *awaiting that SAs*, looking forward to its arrival, fearing for its realization, or whatnot. And second, the act is still doing commerce with "the real". That the object itself is not yet real is *not* the issue! The golden mountain? That doesn't exist; one doesn't point at it. The chimney? That doesn't exist either; but the bricklayer, even though not pointing at the object (it's not there) is still aiming at *something*.

What is real is the *relation* itself. What does this second point tell us? When we look for the *ontological* common denominator of "cognizing" intentions and "cooking" intentions, what we find is this. The act's being intentional does not turn on whether there's an object at the other end. Fundamentally, it turns on whether the act *anticipates* X, or has *come to find* X, whether the act is going somewhere, as in questioning or making, or whether it has just come from somewhere, as in answering and completing. What makes for the experience of the real, then, is not whether I am pointing at an object (in fact, this is not necessary); it is whether I am anticipatorily stretched toward the prospect of meeting up with it or (releasing the temporal bow) have just met up with it. An act is obviously temporal; but more than that, and this is becoming increasingly clear to us, the act has to be *temporally modulated* if it is to be authentically intentional, if the relation is to "feel real", if the intention (*intendere*) "tends toward" or is "bent on", reaching its object. Temporally, the act must be either going somewhere or coming from some place. If it is neither a whereto nor a wherefrom, it is not "intentional".

B. On the Selectivity of the Act

An adequate theory of intentionality should be able to say something about the *selectivity* of the intentional act. Why rivet on this? Why in this way? With this persistence? How, in this crowded room of ten cock-tail conversations, does the hearer rivet on just this one? Why in this direction, even if the object cannot yet be sighted? And why grow bored of it? To say that the aiming or intentionality of an act is a function of the noematic *Sinn*--the "vector co-ordinates" of a given act--is to start at the wrong end of the explanation. Not the least of the problems with this explanation is that the intentionality of the hermeneutical act is such that

it has to look for those "vector-coordinates" prior to the aiming. The noematic *Sinn* is what you end up with once you have arrived at the destination, so to speak. In any case, what about the selectivity of the act?

(A) One "cognitivist" explanation has it that perceiving is something foisted on me.[2] There is around me much that is meaningful--for example, the ten conversations in one room. Attentiveness to the one conversation involves that the nine other be actively filtered out. A variation on this explanation has it that every one of the conversations around me is actually "processed", but only one of them is remembered. In this case, attentiveness would have to be a function of remembering. (B) Yet another cognitivist explanation for attentiveness is the "Gibsonian" account. Clearly, the information around us is indefinitely rich. There is always more in a situation than meets the eye. But then why don't we see it all? As Urlic Neisser, a Gibsonian, explains it:

> The answer most frequently offered, theoretically seductive but quite misleading, is that we "filter it out". . . . from a formal point of view, it is entirely correct. . . . The perceiver simply does not pick [the information] up, because he is not equipped to do so. . . . Selection is a positive process, not a negative one. [1976, 79-80]

We agree with the point that selection is a positive process, but we should add to it a few points of our own: (i) The first explanation has it that attentiveness is a function of my remembering only that one of the many, many things I have heard. This first explanation has this much going for it: I don't "remember" nine of the ten conversations. But the reason for this is that they were *not* "processed"; and the reason they were not processed is that I never

did relate to them in an *anticipatory-questioning* way in the first place. Retention, it seems, is a function of what I anticipate. (It retains at t-2 what I had anticipated at t-1). No wonder I can't remember the other nine conversations. I was on tenterhooks to hear just this one. (ii) My not hearing the other nine conversations is not a result of my "rejection" of them, as if they are being actively dismissed as "irrelevant". Nor am I even "just ignoring" them. They are simply *not there* to be heard.

(iii) We may speak of two senses of "filtering noise". The **first** is a filtering only in some logical sense. Sure, there is more here than meets the eye (or "ear", if we don't want to mix metaphors). But it is not as if anything here necessarily "met the eye" to begin with. When I rivet on one thing, it is not as if all the other things, vying for my attention, had to be pushed to one side. They were not initially noticed to begin with, and they certainly will not get noticed now. If anything, the rivetting act, rather than filtering out the other nine messages, *prevents* the possibility of my attending to them. It is not, "filter first, and then rivet on the left-over"; it is, "rivet on this; the 'filtering' will be sure to follow". The **second** sense of "filtering noise" has to do with how we have used that term all along. Whereas the one sense of filtering might be summed up as "rejection is a consequence of loving something else", the other sense of it is, "truth is whatever wasn't turned away".

(iv) Our question, then, is not primarily about why I don't look in these directions; it is about why I look in this direction--the "consequence" of which is my not looking anywhere else. ("Consequence" in big, inverted commas, for in fact I was not "looking anywhere else" to begin with.) Why, then, do I look in this direction and rivet on this? It is not "because" of questioning and answering. That is *how* I look and rivet; questioning and

answering is more a function of selectivity than the actual selecting itself. The one

arises within the *interesting* "field of noise"; the other *informatively* filters out that noise.

Digging down further, then: What makes for noise? Why was such-and-such a problem

noisy for those people, for that time, but not for us, not for our time? Why, at this point in

time, is it noisy for us, but not for everybody else?

Sure, it might be that it is my interlocutor who suggests a set of conflicting

possibilities or my imagination or the "situation" may suggest it. But these factors are at

best only necessary conditions--the "efficient causes"--of noise. They are not by themselves

enough to make those possibilities "contentious" or noisy and, hence, they are not enough to

touch off a Q. What is required, before this is to take place, is, first of all: a *pre-*

understanding of the situation. This pre-understanding is *not*, or not quite, intentional.

Rather, it is that in terms of which a given thing may "show itself" to me in its possibilities,

or "opportunities" for me. (This is get-at-able, is get-underneath-able, is break-able, is mate-

with-able, etc.) It is then that my relation to it *becomes*, or fully becomes, "intentional".

Second, the possibilities show themselves so far as they are noisy. Here is an illustration of

the idea.

My pre-understanding of something may be "equipmental" (Heidegger); or, put

another way, I may already understand the thing in terms of its "affordances" (Gibson).[3] The

hammer affords my nailing, the floor affords walking. However, these things, in reference

to what they "afford" me, don't light up as Q-targets until these affordances enter to

conflict. The floor affords walking, but that rotting board in the middle might "afford" me

falling. The hammer affords nailing; but it might not afford sinking such a big nail. To be

sure, even an "affordance" is not enough to make for noise. Yes, what is required is a pre-understanding of a thing's possibilities. And yes, also required is that these possibilities be in a logical conflict. But what is also needed is that the conflict *matters to me*. How does it begin to matter? What makes it *interesting*? Our analysis has not gotten around to burrowing down that far. But this much we do know by now. Interestedness is anticipatory or "protentional" in some essential way. And second, the very thing that comes out of this "field"--questioning--is also, small wonder, essentially anticipatory.

C. Potential, Actual; Future, Factual

A Q was initially characterized as a "many-directed act", the aim of which is to reduce this "multiplicity". That definition has turned out to be less than adequate, on two counts. First, the term "many-directed" might give the false impression that a Q necessarily comes equipped with the many options already worked out. Certainly, this is not how a hermeneutical Q works, which is not purged of its indefiniteness. (In fact, such a Q is *essentially* indefinite or "unformulated". And the more formulated a hermeneutical Q is, the more it has "interpreted itself", the more it is already answered.) And second, the term "many-directed" might also vaguely give the false impression that a Q has "intentionally" or "directionally" more going for it than an answer. After all, does not a Q do *more* in the way of aiming than an answer? That is the wrong way to look at the matter. A Q "singularly" points at *one* target, not many targets. (E.g., "What colour is this 'one thing'?"; "Which of these books belong to this 'one library'?"; "Which of these numbers belong to the 'one category' of prime numbers?") And the "problem" of a Q is that there is a multiplicity of *possible* ways to aim at that target; the objective is to find the one right way--the only "real"

way--to aim at it. Only then is the act "really" or "actually" aiming. "Many-directed" is ontologically *less than* "single-directed". In any case, I propose to replace the misleading term "many-directed" with the terms "potential" and "actual". Accordingly, a "potential intentionality" is a Q, an "actual intentionality" is an answer. What makes the act "potential" is a lack of determination of the directedness at the object. It is either A or B or C. Which is it? In finding out which of the possibilities of this given target is real--I use that word to stand for what is "out there"--the act itself shifts from the "potential" to the "actual". The questioning act, which is really a "potentiality", becomes an actuality. Herein lies the mechanism by which we experience the real.

To Q is to anticipate. To anticipate is to anticipate *what has not yet arrived*. Anticipation is fraught with the "non-being" of the future, the "not-yet". The act becomes actual when the anticipation is "filled up" with the *bringing-about* of an answer. Hence, the experience of a reality being "out there" is nothing less than the act itself becoming actual. This act itself becomes actual--real--in its shift from the anticipatory to the presenting. It is in this way that I experience the reality which is out there: the answering act is itself a realization. Indeed, how else can the act experience the real? Reality is not something that I can "see" and take note of. It is something I hook up with in the actualization of the act itself. So much potentiality, so much reality that I take as hidden from view. And so much actualization, so much reality disclosed to me.

Do the Aristotelian terms "potential" and "actual" convey a sense that the terms "empty" and "fulfilled" do not already convey? And if they don't, why multiply the terminology? To answer this objection, I think that these Aristotelian terms do carry an

additional nuance; but in any case, my use of these terms is meant to bring home the idea, easily overlooked, that the ontological status of the act is itself an issue. The act does more than just do commerce with "ontology"--it gets ontologized in so doing. The intentional "aboutness" of the act, the tendential "relatedness" between the I and the object, shifts *from* being only potentially related to the real *to* being actually related to it. In being actually related to it, the relatedness itself becomes "real". This shift from the potential to the actual is a shift from Q to answer. In the potentiality of the act, the act is "interested" in the questionable possibilities put before it; in the actualization of the act, the act is "informed".

D. Can an Answer to a Question "Become True?

To Q is to anticipate; but this hardly makes a Q a matter of "predicting", "forecasting", "prognosticating", in the usual senses of those terms. A Q "anticipates" its *answer*, or the incoming message; better yet, it anticipates a *disclosure* of the intended object that that answer or message brings about. But ordinarily, there is no "prediction" as regards the anticipated message itself. When I hear someone who is about to answer my Q, it is not as if I am predicting that his next message will be such-and-such. Strictly speaking, it is a matter of indifference whether the intended object, the disclosure of which I anticipate, is about tomorrow, or a billion years hence (a "futuristic Q"), or for that matter about yesterday, or a billion years ago (a "historical Q"). In short, any and all Qs anticipate, but only some of them predict--if, that is, they can predict at all. It is by no means "obvious" whether questioning and answering can do this. Up to this point, I have taken it for granted that Qs

can be directed toward the future, just as they can be directed toward anything else. But can they? This is the point I shall briefly examine next.

Before entering into a discussion of the problem, it is expedient to put the problem into context. Some philosophers take the position, as we do, that the events of the future do not have the ontological credentials that events of the past do. True, the past is "no longer", just as the future is "not yet". Still, the past has something going for it that the future doesn't have. Things of the past, not to say also things of the present, things of the "always" (2+2=4), are "*facta*"; they are done deeds, complete and consummated. Not so with "*futura*", or things of the future; they belong to an ontological class all of their own. They have yet to gain entry into the world of the "real". In the meantime, if one wants to talk about a future event (such as whether there will be a sea-battle tomorrow), one should not imply that it is already real or that talking about it could already be "true" or "false".[4]

Now, if this position is basically correct--if talk about a future event can be neither true nor false--then we have a problem. For according to our own view, questioning "has to" elicit the truth of the matter and answering is "supposed to" provide it. Putting two and two together, we seem to have committed ourselves to the weird position of having to maintain that one cannot *ask* about the future. How are we to get out of this predicament?

The first way would involve relaxing the rule that an answer has to be true or false and allowing that those answers concerning specifically the future prove to be an exception to the rule. The first move strikes me as too *ad hoc* and too big a concession; I suggest that we stick to our guns and insist that, without exception, *every* Q goes after the truth, *every* answer is "supposed" to provide it. The second way out would involve insisting on the

thesis that any and every Q is after the truth and rejecting the view that "futura" are no less factual than "facta". This, I think, would also be the wrong way to go. Future contingencies are not facts; this "viewpoint" follows from, is internal to, our analysis of what a questioning act is. (More on this point section [2] below.)

So, then, can we put Qs to the future? The answer is that of course we can and everybody else already knows that. To be more precise, then: What is it that we are really asking when we put Qs to the future? And what do our answers to them really mean?

1. Aiming at Facts about "Futures"

To begin with, it must be conceded that when we talk about the future, it is very often the case--not always, but often--that our utterances are intended as statements. When I say, e.g., "The sun is going to shut down in thirty billion years", I mean that as a truth. I don't mean to the effect that it won't be true until it happens. Nor do I mean that I'm fairly sure it is true, even though I can't be absolutely sure until it has happened. I mean what I say and say what I mean, to the effect that it is true that this is what is going to happen to the sun in thirty billion years hence. What is going on here? I am "truly" pointing *not* at a *futurum* (which can't be done), but at what I take to be a *fact* about the "future", in big scare quotes-- the fact *that* what hasn't happened will happen, or what hasn't happened could happen, etc. What I am pointing at is not a *futurum*, but a fact about the future. This fact is temporally neutral, just as is a fact about the past, or the fact that 2 and 2 is 4 is also temporally neutral. Admittedly, we can, and we do, talk of facts about futures, just as we talk of facts about the past, the present, the always. To reformulate the opening question, then: So far as we point

straight at a *futurum*, can a Q be put to it? And, not that a "yes" necessarily follows if a Q can be put to a *futurum*: Can such a Q be answered?

2. Aiming at "Futures"

For argument's sake, let us say that I "know" all about a forthcoming occurrence (that tomorrow there will be a sea battle). I "know" that it will happen, how it will happen, the details of it, and what will happen after that. (Or, not being too sure about one detail, I "know" that there is an 89% chance that I shall be there to watch it. I know these "facts" about the future; and I know the index of missing information of these facts.) Yet I can still ask Qs about the forthcoming event. How is that? What I ask in this case is *not* about the facts about the future, but the *"futura"* themselves. I am not asking, "When will it be?" (for argument's sake, I know this already), "Will it happen?" (it will begin at the stroke of twelve), "What is the day after tomorrow, if today is Wednesday?" (small wonder, I know that, too).

What I am asking is something more like: "Is it 'now' yet?", "Is it twelve yet?", "Is it Friday yet?", "Tell me, has it begun?". My Q is about the *realization*, or *factualization*, of a state of affairs. It points not at an "object-in-Q"--an "eclipsed SAs"; rather, it *waits* for the coming-into-being of a SAs. Call this, for short, the "futurum Q", as opposed to the ordinary (factum) Q. With the futurum Q, the actualization of this potentiality called a "questioning 'act'" is contemporaneous with a realization of something in the world. With an answer to a futurum Q, the Q circles back on itself: This anticipatory thing is fulfilled by the timing of the event itself. The futuristic answer--or, really, the "now-answer"--is not an answer "about" time; it is a dimension of time itself, the "presentifying" of an event in time.

To repeat yet again our opening question: Can we ask those Qs, and answer them, that deal not with *facta* but with *futura*? So far as I am dealing with *futura*, I HAVE to ask about it. To see a vase in a free-fall between the table-top and the floor, I see, say, two *futura*: it will break, it is will remain as it is. So far as I anticipate the "event", so far as it is "interesting", so far as the possibilities are contentious, I cannot help but put a Q to this free-falling thing. Yet although I cannot help but Q it, I CANNOT answer my Q about it. A perfect predictive power cannot alter this fact. "Epistemology" has nothing to do with this shortcoming—as if knowing everything about the future would get rid of the very idea of the future. I *cannot* answer this until the "event" is no longer a *futurum*, until it is realized "into" a *factum*. Why is that? Answering consists of two moments: the truthful moment of recognizing the *thus-and-so* and the evidential moment of denying *it isn't otherwise*. The thus-and-so has not yet arrived into the present, whatever it may be. Neither has the "not otherwise", the competing *futura*, been ontologically ruled out.

3. Fact-Acts and Future-Acts

We started out with a distinction between thought-to-thing acts and thing-to-thought acts. Thought-to-thing acts "take cognizance" of what is already the case in the world. "Potentially", the thought-to-thing act is a Q; "actually", it is an answer. Thing-to-thought acts, by contrast, bring about a change according to a "plan". Carrying out a plan, keeping a promise, following a directive—these are examples of thing-to-thought acts. This distinction is all well and good, but only so far as it goes. (i) For it now turns out that certain Qs— "futurum Qs"—are not, after all, thought-to-thing in their direction of fulfilment. (ii) Moreover, it also turns out that the thing-to-thought category is only a species of the generic

"coming-into-being". My pursuance of a plan, my closing the door, etc., involves a coming-into-being, courtesy of my agency. But not so when it comes to my watching for a shooting star, or my waiting for morning. My act in relation to these forthcoming events (if indeed the act is anticipatory) is one of waiting, not of making or doing. (iii) Now that we are allowing for the existence of the "futurum Q" (e.g., "Is the sun up yet?", or concerning an "enduring now", "Is it still Wednesday?"), it is no longer so clear in what way the "thing-to-thought" acts of making and doing, which are "future-acts", are so *very* different from Qs. Sure, we know *that* there is a difference; however, the border-line between them has turned out to be fuzzier than we first thought.

Making is dealing with that sort of Q the answer to which becomes true when you get to it. Conversely, questioning is dealing with that sort of making the completion of which you have only to take note of or discover. Whether you try to take note of what is the case in the world (a "fact-act"), whether you wait for a modification in the world (a future-act) or bring that modification about (a future-act), the point is the same in every case: The business of the act, *its* "actualization", involves a coming into contact with a reality. Your answer to Qs about this or that reality, this or that "fact", is meant to be "true". But this experience of truth is not so very different from the experience of seeing that this has just arrived into the world. Nor is it all that different from the experience of bringing a work to completion, even though you say "Voilà!" instead of "This is true". Given that the experiences of cognizing and cooking are identical "ontologically", it is small wonder, incidentally, that we have such a hard time telling the two apart in practice.[5]

E. What Makes a Question Shallow, What Makes It Deep

Most of us do value "wisdom" over "polymathy", the "big picture" over knowing the "facts". Not only do we value "insight" over "fact"; in some cases, we positively *dis*value coming to know about the details of certain things. Except for an *idiot savant*--a certified positivist--who else would care about memorizing a telephone book or knowing the value of pi to the one-millionth decimal place "for its own sake"? In an analysis of questioning, something must be made of the fact that one variously values, and disvalues, this or that piece of knowledge, that there are things about which one variously cares, and doesn't care, to ask. The aim of a Q is to reduce noise. But what is the motive? Or what almost comes to the same: What makes noise so "noisy" that it is worth the effort to filter it out *via* this activity that is called "questioning"?

Tentatively, one might say that a Q is "profound" or "wise" in proportion that it is interested in the thing in Q "for its own sake". The meteorologist asks, profoundly, "Is this a storm?", for the sake of investigating how storms work in general; the cosmologist asks, profoundly, "Does God exist?", for the sake of figuring out whether this piece should be fitted into the puzzle. Perhaps the description better than "profound Q" is "*intrinsic Q*", and it is better for two reasons: First, "intrinsic Q" nicely describes what a Q "for its own sake" does. Such a Q looks "into" the object under interrogation. And second, the counterpart of an intrinsic Q is not "shallow", as the other term for "intrinsic"—"profound"--would imply. Being afraid of getting wet, one might ask, extrinsically, "Is it raining?"; or in writing up one's itinerary, one might want to know the answer to the Q, "Does God exist?", just in

case. Such Qs can hardly count as "shallow". In any case, let us say that the counterpart

to the intrinsic Q is the *extrinsic* Q.

Where does the *predicative* Q fit into this classification? Just going by our definition

of what makes for "intrinsic", a predicative Q cannot be intrinsic unless it *points into* the

object that is being questioned. Only to the extent that it does so, to the extent that the Q is

not really "predicative" after all, to the extent that it is *hermeneutically* motivated, is that Q

intrinsic. The apparently predicative Q, "Is this rose red?", might be a phase in the

"variation" or experiment in which the Q activity tries to figure out what is essential about

roses in general; but in that case, the Q is hermeneutical. Or for a different reason, the

apparently predicative Q, "Is this rose red?", might be hermeneutical to the extent that it

points "into" the *haecceity*, or the thisness, of this one-and-only rose. This rose's being red,

and its being all these other things, might be regarded, for one "poetic" moment, as essential

to what this thing is, just as that green might be regarded as essential to the meaning of

Bruegel's *Icarus*.

We ought not to suppose that a predicative Q is "less" intrinsic than its

hermeneutical counterpart--as if to say that in accumulating a million predicative facts about

an object, one could get closer and closer to determining the what of that object. The sum of

the object's factual components never adds up to the hermeneutical whole. Unless the

accumulation of these facts enters into trying to answer the Q, "What is this?", all that one is

left with at the end of the day are a lot of facts that simply do not hang together. To sum up,

then: Predicative answers, which provide us with facts, are worth acquiring so far as they

are "hermeneuticized" and are in the service of answering, "What is this?" Or (this is the

other reason) facts are worth acquiring to the extent that they are of potential use in our "shallow", i.e., *extrinsic* concerns of having to figure out what to do next. (I shall not go into the problem of whether that in itself might constitute a hermeneutical move.)

Evidently, then, knowing a fact is of no apparent value in and of itself. The predicative Q may become pressing in relation to what it may *hermeneutically*, or "intrinsically", contribute to our understanding of this thing or to our planning for that. However, coming into possession of what it delivers—a fact—is *by itself* of no worth to us whatsoever. Why ask anything at all? For the *intrinsic* sake of "theory" and the *extrinsic* sake of "practice". Which brings us to our next question: What is it about certain of our Qs, intrinsic or extrinsic, that they are *pressing*, or *worthwhile*, or *interesting*? (1) One answer is that the value of knowing a fact is what we can do with it practically and, moreover, that this is the only value of it. (2) The other answer, which I think is the right one, is that the value of knowing a fact is correlated to what we can do with it theoretically as well as practically. (The second approach assumes that there is a distinction between "theory" and "practice", as opposed to the first approach, which either makes light of the distinction or reduces theory to practice.)

1. The Practical Q

Relative to the hermeneutical Q, the practical Q is so much more transparent in its motives. One asks such a Q in order to be able to deal with a future event. Quite arguably, in these cases what one is interested in is not "facts" but "futures", not seismology, but when and where the next earthquake is coming, how big the quake will be, etc. This is not to say that practical Qs are exclusively in the business of predictions. Nor is it to say that predictions

themselves are necessarily "practical". (What is so "practical" about trying to determine

when the Milky Way will burn out?) Anyway, those practical Qs that are in the predictive

business are so not for the sake of knowing about "facts of the future" (a problematic

expression, I admit), but for the sake of acting on these facts (such as evacuating the citizens

of Tokyo, who sit on top of a conjunction of tectonic plates). What about this relation

between the practical Q and the fact that it has its eye on the future? For one thing, having

its eye on the future is by itself not enough to make the Q *pressing*.

People who do philosophy are sometimes met by the assertion, dressed up as a Q,

"But is it practical to do it?" What their critics really mean to ask, and answer in the

negative, is: "Is it pressing? Is it worthwhile?" But to this we have only to say, without

deflecting the point: "Sometimes it is pressing, sometimes not." But the same point applies

to 'practical' matters. Being 'practical' does not automatically make it pressing. Asking

about the 'identity of indiscernibles' can be *felt* to be a waste of time. But so can the

practical Q, and the 'practical' doing itself, such as building a bridge to nowhere. Hence, the

uselessness of the asking about what pi is to the millionth decimal place ought not to be

thought of as the problem of "theory" specifically. The practical answer about how to

portage a ship over a mountain might have something utterly useless and empty about it as

well.

Having said all that, the point remains that the future still has *something* to do with

what makes the practical Q pressing. What makes the Q about it pressing is that we can see

ourselves in it and that we have some stake in it. Will the sun blow up tomorrow? Will there

be an earthquake? How to avoid a war? How to win it? And allowing that we sometimes do

ask Qs about the past in order to figure out what to do next, or what to avoid: How did they do it? I take it that the point is obvious enough about these Qs: We ask such Qs, not because they are about the future, pure and simple, but because they are about the future *with us in it*. Where does all this leave the "intrinsic" or "theoretical" Q, the Q that "points into" the object, and asks, "What is this?"? What makes this Q pressing? For the very same reason--a line of argument that a pragmatist might take--that certain of our practical Qs are also pressing? Namely, for the reason that they, too, are about the future, "with us in it"? Or rather: Is it for the reason that they, too, are practical Qs, albeit dressed in a theoretical disguise? Our answer to this last question is no and yes.

2. The Theoretical Q

In the fifth chapter, I discussed the relation between understanding and "predictability", pointing out that understanding is a complex of predictabilities concerning the *parts of a whole*. To understand is to be able to recognize the thing under its many different manifestations. Hence, there is certainly a connection between the understanding and "the future". However, this connection hardly makes "practical" an attempt to reconstruct (or interpret) a prehistoric reptile on the basis of a few fossil-clues, "practical" an attempt to calculate (interpret) an asteroid's density on the basis of a few spectroscopic-clues picked up by a passing probe. No, these inquiries are highly theoretical; what these Qs are interested *in* is the "what" of their objects. Our Qs are not always "about us", even though we are the ones who obviously do all the asking.

"Practical" might not be the right word; so let us say that the hermeneutical Q, which does ask for the sake of the object, which points into it, asks also, but more fundamentally, for the sake of *the preservation, or upkeep, of one's own being*. Consider it in this way: With the answering act, the act is actualized. With this, comes one's experience of the real. The contact with the real coincides with the "actualization" of the self. We have gone over that much already. In light of this, the question is: Why is the hermeneutical Q "deep", "profound", "intrinsic", or whatever, and more pressing than its predicative counterpart? This is only a closing speculation, but I think a detailed case could be made for it.

The what Q (and its hermeneutical cousins, the how and the why) is instrumental in tying the questioner together, so to speak. The what Q attempts to draw out and fix the hidden object in the flux of otherwise more or less disjointed appearances. Put another way: It "sees" apparent coincidences or "conjunctions" of phenomena. But it is not enough that they are just placed side-by-side, in a merely predictable way. In the meantime, they are just individual snap-shots. The aim is to see, or intuit into, the "conspiratorial what" that pulls these otherwise disparate phenomena together. Calendar-like, *seriatim*, they are arranged in a certain order. (Oswald was--; the CIA botched--; the mob--; JFK was shot; Oswald shot--; then the war in Southeast Asia, etc.) The interpretive aim is to decipher how these "clue-notes" enter into the constitution of a "tune", or an argument, a story, a narrative, or whatever other *types* of mereological wholes that there might be.[6] Then we ask, "What is it?" Or, should the temporal whole be fractured, thanks to a deviant phenomenon, then instead we might ask, "Why is that?"

In any case, what happens alongside this activity is that the "I", which accompanies all these disjointed appearances, is also, marginally, sought after. And as the appearances are brought together into a fixed whole—"This is what it is"--so also is, marginally, the self—"This is me"--which is held together over a stretch of time and recognized in its new-found object. How does this connect with our "realist" thesis?

The predicative Q approaches its subject-matter as real. The range of possibilities is not just "imagined" or "dreamt up"; it has to be given, at this moment, pertaining to this thing, as subject to the logic of "this and not otherwise". Otherwise, the Q itself, though maybe intelligible at a remove ("I understand it. But what a stupid, nonsensical thing to ask!"), much as a stage-Q is intelligible, cannot be asked. True, one might say, "It's red, white, and blue, not just one colour", and in effect reject the formulation of the original Q. But this only confirms the point. The Q is rejected precisely *on the basis* that it was not, after all, subject to that stricture of being that is called --speaking loosely, I admit--the law of the excluded middle. What, then, about the *hermeneutical* Q? It, too, looks for the "real thing", albeit in a much profounder way.

Predicatively, I can ask about a certain musical note, "Doe, ray, mee, fah, sow, lah, tee, doe? Which one is it?" The "exercised metaphysics" of this Q, its existential claim, is that it has to be one of these (or at least one of them) at time t-1. To this extent, the object appears "thick". Consider how much "thicker", how much less phenomenalist, is the object of the Q, "What is this?" Or anyway, consider how the Q might "see" (or in this case, "hear") its object as possibly thin, and merely phenomenal, and how it wants to find out whether there is more here than meets the eye (or in this case, the ear). There's a note at t-1,

another at t-2, then another, etc. "Objectivistically", what we have here is no more than a phenomenalist sequence of appearances, which, apart from being "before", "after", in some cases "simultaneous", are simply ontologically unrelated.

The aim of the what Q is to "hear" how the notes hang together as parts of a tune, or how this whole tune fits in as part of a sonata, etc. (much the same way that the scientist begins to ask, on the basis of a conjunction of phenomena, "What?", "Why?", "The explanation?"). The aim is to decipher the "synchronous what" that reappears, or is presumed to reappear, through each note, at the beginning, the middle, and the end, and everywhere in between. Or the aim is to decipher the synchronous what that keeps reappearing through each line of a syllogism, through each proposition of a logical argument, each "profile" of this house.

Whichever one comes logically first, this much does seem fairly certain: The hanging-together of the self and the hanging-together of the object are of a piece. Second, we are fond of "order"--in the display in the shop-window, in the atom, in our lives--not because order is statistically rare and or because if coal were rarer than diamond, it would be a girl's best friend. No, war is arguably much rarer than peace, and we don't value it the more for that reason. And order is all around us, even though, being fond of it, its charm begins to wear off over time. It seems that we value looking for order in the world, and for putting it into the world, because that is our access--the key access, I think--to reality. Why should *this* should matter? Because we want to know? But why should we want to know? Presumably, it has to do with the preservation of the self. This doesn't mean that the questioner just "uses" the world and asks about it as an instrument by which to hang

together. More plausibly, the self is a *function*, or *valence*, of this reality, and, as a function, it now and then gets more or less fulfilled in finding out about it.[7] What fulfils it is "order", or "information" as it is sometimes technically called.

Questioning is not the only way in which we exist as functions toward reality. The other way we get filled up is by thing-to-thought activity. It would be reasonable for us to expect to find, then, some parallels between the making realm, in which possibilities are "realized", and the questioning realm, in which they are "ascertained". Then on what points do these two types of intentional acts coincide? Here are only a few leads that I think would be worth following up in a separate study. I would begin by examining the *thing-to-thought* analogues of doubting, evidence, noise;,interestedness, informativeness, negative facts, truth,"acknowledging" and "denying", the phenomenon of emphasis, the yes-no Q, and the word Q. I would also examine the nature of desiring in the realm of thing-to-thought. (If "questioning desire" is a mark of my lack [it seems to be that way], might not "making desire" be a surplus of the self, the surplus that allows "art to complete what nature cannot"?) And I would also examine, most of all, the parallels between the mereology of questioning—"hermeneutics"--and the mereology of making--call it "designing" or "systems engineering".[8] And here are a few points on which we could expect these two mereologies to coincide:

(a) The thought-to-thing difference between the "sage" and the "fact-collector" corresponds, almost one-to-one, to the thing-to-thought difference between the designer or inventor, on the one hand, and the technician, the assembly worker, and the "go-for", on the other. Why this difference? The hermeneutical Q is "profounder" than its predicative

counterpart; "intrinsically", finding out the *what* of a thing is simply more informative, more pressing than determining some predicative fact about it. One does try to determine the order of what is; but one hardly spends much time looking for a fact "for its own intrinsic worth". A parallel "logic of importance" is to be found in the domain of making: One does try to construct things; but one never just, say, closes a door "for its own sake".

(b) There comes a point in a given inquiry in which asking more Qs and getting more answers would amount to "overkill". At that point, when "enough is enough", the researcher has what Husserl himself might call "evidence". The same mysterious logic of "enough is enough", the same problem of when, and how, to know it is enough, also shows up in the realm of making. I spoke of "evidence" and "informativeness" as pretty well interchangeable terms. Hermeneutical evidence is the reduction of "noise" and, along with it, the "truth-disclosure" of order; so much reduction, so much informativeness. We might want to say that the thing-to-thought counterpart of informativeness is *informing*, i.e., of bringing "order" into the materials out there.[9] (c) Finally, it would be worth asking whether intentionality is "in its element", as it seems to be, when doing commerce with order, whether that means in finding order or in instituting it.

F. Touching, which Makes for a Better Model than Seeing

When we philosophers talk about the relation between consciousness and its object, what we usually take as our model is the act of *seeing*; and what we very seldom consider as an exemplary of intentionality is the sense of *touching*. One advantage that the haptic model has over the visual model is that it doesn't as easily allow the philosopher to take too seriously the bugaboo about non-veridical experiences—a problem to which the visual

model more easily lends itself.[10] "Maybe what you *saw* was a picture, or a vivid memory, or a dream, but not the real thing". I rather doubt that one can *as readily* get away with saying, "Maybe what you *touched* wasn't real". Why is that? Because what it touches resists it? Because the touched object offers more resistance than the seen object? And that this resistance offers a degree of evidence of the object that merely seeing it cannot? There is something to all this, no doubt, but I suggest that we take it a tentative stage further.

Maybe one reason why, as a model of intentionality, touching has enjoyed so little philosophical prestige is that, unlike seeing, it *manifestly* cannot make sense of its object in a single take. It is as if it were only on occasion that seeing has to be preceded by a "looking for". Touching, by contrast, is "ordinarily defective". That is, picking up information by touching ordinarily--or always--requires exploratory movement. The deformation of the skin, the position of the joints, the speed of the limbs--it is only by way of *changing the positions*, by way of "haptic *variations*", that these Qs can pick up and decipher the tactile clues. We might say that compared with seeing, touching is more conspicuously a questioning. Moreover, given its mode of operation--the "variation"--it is precisely *this* member of senses--the homely sense of touching--that is clearly "hermeneutical". Putting this the way around: Reading is more like "touching" than seeing.

What I am recommending is not that one "model" of intentionality be replaced by another--the seeing model replaced by the haptic model. My point is: (a) What is self-evidently true when it comes to touching is *also* true of seeing, even if it is not as conspicuous. A Gibsonian would be the first to say as much: "haptic perception does not occur in any one instant and does not result from processing a single input. . . . But this is

also true of vision, about which we know less than is generally supposed" (Neisser 1976, 26). I would just as soon keep "seeing" as the model, so long as the point is hammered home that seeing works according to a similar strategy. Aristotle may be right in saying that we love seeing more than the other senses because it brings to light differences between things (*Meta.*, 980a20). But to this we, and the Gibsonian, should add: Seeing brings these differences to light in the very same way as does touching--by moving "saccadically" across its object. The reason for loving sight more than the other senses might be that it is *faster* at questioning and answering. Philosophy, wonder, and all that begin right at the finger-tips. (b) It is not that what is touched "feels" more real than what is seen. (Never mind here the point that the senses do come together under a "*sensus communis*", so that what one sees, one might also touch, taste, and so forth.) Rather, it is that, as far as the real thing goes, touching is somehow thought to be more trustworthy. The eyes can play the Cartesian; the finger-tips cannot nearly as readily play that game.[11] What is it about touch that it is more "fool-proof" against non-veridical experience? That the touched object "resists" the toucher? That is part of the reason.

But might not the other part be that *haptic* resistance is a function of the exploratory movement that goes with touching? Might it not also be that this exploratory movement is to be found in other types of act as well--the seeing act, the mathematical act, the hearing act, the reading act, . . . as well as the touching act? In that case, do we not experience these objects, in our interrogation of them, as putting up resistance also? In that case, do we not also take these objects, whether "existing" or "constituted", as real, for the very same reason that objects of touch are taken to be real? Might it be that touching does not, after all, have

some "privileged access" to the real that the seeing act, or the mathematical act, presumably lacks? Might it be that, to the contrary, its access to the real is manifestly mediated, and the only way it can pick up the information of the world is manifestly *over time*? Might it not be that what we find out through touch is so real because we can't get at it except through questioning?

Notes to Chapter 6

1. Hubert Dreyfus makes a similar point in the conclusion of his critique of Aron Gurwitsch's theory of perception:

> I not only take it that objects have other sides, I am here and now actually set to explore them. So the other sides are not experienced as *possible* experiences implied by the present *appearance*; they are experienced as *actually present* but concealed aspects of the present *object* soliciting further exploration. [1982, "The Perceptual *Noema*", 121-22]

2. See, for example, Urlic Neisser's chapter on "Attention and the Problem of Capacity" (1976, 79-105). "When perception is treated as something we do rather than as something thrust upon us, no internal mechanisms of selection are required at all" (84). "Attention is nothing but perception: we choose what we will see by anticipating the structured information it will provide" (87).

3. For Heidegger, our original understanding of a piece of equipment lies in our use of it, not in our "apophantic" talk about it:

> In dealings such as this, where something [a hammer] is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the "in-order-to" which is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time; the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unvieledly is it encountered as that which it is--as equipment. [BT H69, p.98]

J.J. Gibson's concept of "affordances", which he developed in his last years, is not that far removed from Heidegger's concept of "readiness-to-hand". Here are a few items in a "suggestive" list of affordances that Gibson draws up (1982, 404-405): a stand-on-able

surface (a place that affords rest); a walk-on-able surface (a place that affords a "footing"); sit-on-able; get-underneath-able; mate-with-able; bump-into-able; food (substance affording nutrition); poison (substance affording illness); stick (object affording a longer reach). Gibson himself has noted a connection between his work and phenomenology in "Autobiography" (1967), notably at the very end of it:

> The one with whom in recent years I have been in strikingly near agreement
> is Albert Michotte, of Louvain--in everything but the notion of external
> information and external meaning. . . . It is a notable lesson in the
> convergence of experimental science that such a man as he and such a one as
> I, from totally different backgrounds, should have found ourselves agreeing
> so thoroughly and so delightedly--he a student of Cardinal Mercier and I of
> the materialist Holt; he a . . . phenomenologist and I a . . . behaviorist. . . .
> We got the same result. This is what counts. It makes one believe in the
> possibility of getting at the truth. [1982, 22]

4. This is the obligatory allusion to Aristotle's classical discussion of future contingents in *On Interpretation*, IX. See Richard Gale's *Philosophy of Time* (1978, 169-291) for a sample of the issues that crop up around the problem, "Can a predictions be true?", or, "Does the law of the excluded middle apply to future?" The length of Gale's bibliography (506-11) on the subject of the "open future", dated at that, should serve to secure that my own analysis of the problem is only "tentative".

5. This last point can be expanded upon in light of the problem of having to interpret a text. Here, I shall comment on the following passage, by Connolly and Keutner (1988), which is taken from the Introduction to their book, *Hermeneutics versus Science?* The two authors (hereinafter C&K) argue for a "constructivist semantics" and reject a "realist semantics". What I shall do here is comment on a point brought up in their discussion. Here, then, is one piece in C&K's argument for constructivism.

Take, for example, any pre-twentieth-century interpretation of *Hamlet*;
it is unlikely to include the view that Hamlet intends to avenge his father's
murderer. . . . But the question does arise, why then does he *not* kill
Claudius? One kind of answer traditionally given is that he has the character
of a procrastinator. Early in this century, however, . . . Otto Rank (1915) and
others argued that Hamlet does not really intend to avenge the murder, for
what in fact preoccupies him is the question of his mother's sinful union
with Claudius. A 'semantical realist' . . . thinks that it is a necessary truth
that *either* Hamlet intends to avenge the murder *or* that he does not (i.e., the
traditional view and the view of Rank are incompatible and that one of them
must be true), and thus regards the question as a decidable one on the basis
of the facts (author's intentions, text-intention, or whatever).

However, [a constructivist-approach] contends that the realist
overlooks the element of construction in literary interpretation, i.e., the
construal of the text by the reader . . . The philosophical point is that the
literary-critical question whether or not Hamlet wants to avenge the murder
is not decidable independent of [construal] of the text. . . . If one abandons
one interpretation in favour of another, this may seem to be the result of a
new intuition into the 'real essence' of the text; but it would be more correct
to say instead that such a change represents the decision to construe the text
in a new way. [(1988, 24-25)]

To comment on this text: I am not so familiar with the play as to be able to say so for sure,
and so I shall say it for argument's sake instead (which I think is true, anyway): (i) We argue
that *of course* the explanation for Hamlet's delay has to be construed or "constructed". And
the semantic realist (or one species of the semantic realist) would be quite mistaken in
thinking that there is a criterion for deciding on such an explanation. But admitting all this
hardly amounts to a concession to the view that interpretation is constructivist after all. To
the contrary, admitting this is predicated on a "realist" position: The reason that the
explanation for Hamlet's delay has to be *construed* is that, unmysteriously, there is no

information on *this particular issue* in the first place that would allow one to do anything else.

(ii) Pointing out that the explanation for the delay has to be construed (there's no doubt about that), C&K then go on to say that to interpret is to construe. But this is to beg the whole question, or at least to pass over a conciliatory distinction. This is how we would break down the situation: *To construe* is a "thing-to-thought" matter of putting what is not there into the text, of "making" sense of it. Hardly controversial, this first point is true almost by definition. And second, which I shall only state as a premise, not a conclusion: *To interpret* is, by contrast, a "thing-to-thought" matter of finding what is already, in some sense, there to be found. It is looking for and "finding sense"; it is act of questioning and answering.

I do not mean to imply that there is anything controversial in making the distinction between questioning and making. However, what does seem to be controversial (and going by the debate between the constructivist and realist, it certainly looks this way), is our proposal that this distinction be imported into an explanation of how the meaning of a text gets "worked out". *Both* activities, questioning and making--interpreting and construing-- take place in this same working out. Granted, it may be, in practice, hard to tell the two apart, or, if they are so interwoven into each other, next to impossible. But none of this should take away from the formal distinction itself, which gives one the clear philosophical advantage of being able to have it both ways. Constructivism or realism? This all depends upon what I, the reader, am doing, on what problem I am up against, and a host of other factors. In reading the play, at this moment I "construct", at the next moment I have to "find" what is already there.

Not only are the two activities compatible. In some (or all?) cases--maybe in the case of "literary" texts--the conjunction of the two activities is necessary in order to get an adequate sense of the text. Not only does one have to interpret the text "correctly"--the constituted object leaves "*spots of indeterminacy*", which *have to be* "construingly" filled in. (The term, "spots of indeterminacy" [*Unbestimmtheitsstellen*] is Roman Ingarden's, who speaks of it in, among other places, his *Literary Work of Art* (starting at §38), *On the Cognition of a Literary Work of Art*, and *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt* [1965; II/1 200

ff], a work that has yet to be fully translated. See also Jeff Mitscherling [1997, 107-9] on Ingarden's notion. Some other time, it might be profitable that we contrast Ingarden's view, and ours—our talk about the "open" and "closed" invariants of a "what"—with Meinong's doctrine of "incomplete objects". [Evidently, it is also, according to Roderick Chisholm, rather like the one attributed to William of Champeaux.] In any case, on Meinong's view, the object of the *idea* of a triangle, should there be such an object, would have to be incomplete. The triangle as such can be neither oblique, nor rectangular, nor equilateral, nor scalene. So far, so good. But then, Meinong goes on to say, this incomplete object *remains* incomplete in the actual triangle itself. See R. Chisholm [1983, 49-52] and J.N. Findlay [1963, 156 *ff*].)

Now, it seems to me that what is needed in the debate concerning "realism versus constructivism"—when it comes to texts—is, first of all, a recognition that there is room for both. The reader both finds sense and makes sense. And more than that, in some cases the reader *has to* construe and "fill in" "spots of indeterminacy". (I'm not quite using the term in the way Ingarden does.) These spots are not to be counted as so many "opportunities" for freedom and fancy; they are places that *obligate* the reader to append his or her own signature. What is also needed is due recognition of these two seemingly incompatible things: we do some constructing in working out a text, but that in spite of even knowing about our constructivist contributions, the working-out is still an "experience of the real" for all that.

All this would suggest that defining the debate in terms of "realism vs. constructivism" is misleading in that the operations of both interpretation and construal can come up side-by-side. And it is misleading in that it implies that constructivism is at odds with realism, when in fact this is far from the case. Constructivist acts bring with them the experience of the real. In the *actualization* of a Q—in answering it—I experience the *reality* of the disclosure of the thing being Q'd. I experience reality in the various fulfilments of thought-to-thing acts. But the same goes for thing-to-thought acts. In the actualization of these acts of making, construing, executing, etc., I experience a reality of something that, although not there already, *comes to be*. This "reality-experience" of bringing something to

completion is not entirely different from that of answering a Q, even though one says, instead of "This is true", something more like, "Voilà!"

6. My example might be taken to mean that I am suggesting that "narrativity" is a key to hermeneutical relevance--of what should and should not be asked, of what is interesting, of what is informative and "evidential", and so forth. I see no problem in that interpretation, so long as "narrativity" is taken to be a *type* of mereological whole. It is in reference to the whole that asking about x, y, and z—"Do they belong?", "How do they belong?"--become interesting and answers to them informative. I stress the word "type", because it is not just with narratives, in the usual "literary" sense of that term, that the hermeneutics of parts and wholes is concerned. (A work of history unfolds as a narrative; a mathematical proof, or a theory of quantum mechanics unfolds, but not as a narrative, at least not in the ordinary sense of the word. However, what they do have in common is that they are "mereological".) Second, I should also stress that there are, on our *un*contentious view, two sides of mereology: the side of finding and the side of making. This two-sidedness would imply our rejection of the "discontinuity thesis", i.e., the thesis that there is, or has to be, a discontinuity between narrative and reality and that if (say) the historian wants to be respectably scientific, he had better get down to casting off the literary form of his exposition. I am aware that the "discontinuity thesis", what with all the arguments for and against it, is vastly more complicated than I am presenting it here. For a slightly dated overview of the problem, and who's who in the discussion, see David Carr's *Time, Narrative, and History* (1986,7-17).

7. A few comments on Johannes Daubert's "realist" critique of Husserl's later "egology" are in order. Admittedly, it might be hard to find a philosopher nowadays who would find it even worth criticizing this Cartesian view of the "subject". Belief in the idea of a self-contained "subject"? In any case, let us consider Daubert's argument. (I shall rely here on Schuhmann and Smith's article (1985) "Against Idealism: Johannes Daubert vs. Husserl's *Ideas I*".) According to Daubert, consciousness, rather than a self-contained entity, is a "function" in need of saturation. What saturates it comes in from the outside. So much,

then, for Husserl's phenomenological reduction, as proposed in *Ideas I.* To be sure, there are passages in the text in which the author does seem to reject a two-world theory (*Ideas I*, §§88, 90). But that said, Husserl's attempt to carry out the reduction is nonetheless predicated on the idea that consciousness is a substantive entity and is, accordingly, logically independent of its involvement with the real world (1985, 769n12). To this extent, Daubert's critique is on the mark. It is with the help of Husserl's own treatment in the Fourth Investigation (*LI*, §9, 11) of the syncategoremata that Daubert formulates his own positive account of the "I". According to Husserl (rightly, according to Daubert), when we talk about, for example, the conjunction "and", the referring is "anomalous". The meaning of "and" is in need of supplementation; in making sense of it, we implicitly make reference to its original context, "A *and* B". Daubert extends Husserl's own account of "anomalous referring expressions" to the idea of "consciousness". Just as "and" is not an existent object, but a function, so also, *analogously*, is "consciousness" (1985, 771). "'The functioning being of consciousness has no special existence of its own and is nothing real" (1985, 770). Consciousness is "nothing existing by itself, but only a *function directed towards reality*" (1985, 769).

Let us take this basic insight and see how it cashes out in terms of our own analysis.

(i) When Husserl and Daubert talk about "consciousness", what they have in mind, invariably--not that they actually put these distinctions to work--is the consciousness of "looking" rather than "doing", "cognizing" rather than "cooking"--*questioning* rather than *making*. When Daubert insists, in criticism of Husserl, that consciousness is a *function* rather than a substantive entity, what he is referring to is, in fact, consciousness so far as it is specifically thought-to-thing in its direction of fit. And this functionality, going by our terminology, could just as well be described as the functionality of questioning. We can take Daubert's point a step further, insisting that there is also the functionality which stands in relation to *futura*. I wait for something to happen; it happens, and my waiting is saturated. I execute a plan, turning a *futurum* into a *factum*; my making is then saturated. By implication, so far as the idea that the functionality of the questioner could be deployed as part of an argument for the existence of the world--it is reality that "saturates" this function--then the same would have to be said about the functionality of the maker. The controversy

over existence of the world turns not just on whether things in the world answer—
"saturate"--my Qs; it turns also on whether the world can "realize"--saturate--the plans that I
execute.

(ii) The functionality of questioning, and making, and waiting--the functionality of
acts--is to be distinguished from the functionality of what is "out there". Act functionality
("this is actual") is one thing, ontological functionality ("this is real) is quite another. When
I answer my Q, or complete the execution of the plan, the *act* is fulfilled. The object of my
answer, given that it is a *factum*, is ontologically "saturated", with or without my looking at
it. The product of my work, given that this *futurum* has been turned into a *factum*, is also
ontologically saturated. Of what use is *our* distinction here between an act function and an
ontological function? The thing I cognize is ontologically saturated. The things I have made,
the things that come to be behind my back--these, too, are ontologically saturated. But what
about this "I"? What is *its* "saturation"? On the side of the subject, is it just the "sum-total"
of *acts* of cognizing, making, and waiting that get fulfilled?

(iii) So far as I can tell, Daubert does not talk about a Q as being a "function", let
alone whether these two functions might almost come to the same. In other words, he did
not link up his 1930/1931 "functionalist" critique of Husserl's *Ideas I* (*Daubertiana A13*)
with his 1911/1912 work on the "phenomenology of questions" (*Daubertiana A12*). Nor do
Schuhmann and Smith consider the idea of making some such connection on Daubert's
behalf. Why try to make the connection? Daubert was taken up with the problem of the
awareness of reality from the start. According to Schuhmann, Daubert had accepted the
advice of Theodor Lipps that he write a dissertation on this very problem. (See Schuhmann
[1990, 199-200], which concerns Daubert's critique of Anton Marty's doctrine of existential
judgments.) I can say this only on the authority of the secondary literature: It is not all that
evident whether, and how, Daubert's phenomenology of questions is integrated into his
larger project concerning the awareness of reality. One way that *we* could integrate it--on
Daubert's behalf, I would like to think--would be by coordinating the *two* notions of
functionality and arguing something like: "Daubert has this 'realist' notion that
consciousness is a '*function directed towards reality*'. Questioning, that thing he talks about
in an earlier work, is precisely that: a function directed towards reality".

8. See Simon Ramo (1963, 73), "Parts and Wholes in Systems Engineering": " . . . there is a field of engineering that is concerned with the integration of the whole, as distinct from the design of its parts. This is, in fact, the field of 'systems engineering'. . . . Any device, no matter how simple, represents to some extent a systems engineering kind of problem. This applies to a chair as well as to a transcontinental railroad, to a hand tool as well as to an intercontinental ballistic missle. . . . There is always the problem of relating the parts to the whole, and the whole to the outside world that will be the user and that will expect a useful result".

9. See, for example, I.A. Richards (1963, 163), "How Does a Poem Know When It is Finished?", who begins: "I can set out from Edgar Allan Poe: 'I have often thought how interesting a magazine paper might be written by an author who would--that is to say could--detail, step by step, the processes by which one of his compositions attained its ultimate point of completion' (*The Philosophy of Composition*)".

10. In the same realist vein, Merleau-Ponty notes that:

> In visual experience, which pushes objectification further than does tactile experience, we can, at least at first sight, flatter ourselves that we constitute the world, because it presents us with a spectacle spread out before us at a distance, and gives us the illusion of being immediately present everywhere and being situated nowhere. Tactile experience, on the other hand, adheres to the surface of our body; we cannot unfold it before us, and it never quite becomes an object. Correspondingly, as the subject of touch, I cannot flatter myself that I am everywhere and nowhere. [1979, 316].

11. Norwood Hanson points out that Aristotle (among others) had at one point interpreted seeing as consisting "in emanations from our eyes. They reach out, tentacle-fashion, and touch objects whose shapes are 'felt' in the eye. (Cf. *De Caelo* 290a,18; and *Meteorologica*, III, iv, 373b,2. [Also Plato, *Meno*, 76c-d.] But he controverts this in *Topica*, 105b,6.)

Theophrastus argues that 'Vision is due to the gleaming . . . which [in the eye] reflects to the object' (*On the Senses*, 26, trans. G.M. Stratton). . . . Similarly Donne in *The Ecstasy* writes: 'Our eye-beams twisted and . . . pictures in our eyes to get was all *our* propagation.' This is the view that all perception is really a species of touching, e.g., Descartes *impressions*, and the analogy of the wax. Compare: 'Democritus explains [vision] by the air between the eye and the object [being] compressed . . . [it] thus becomes imprinted . . . "as if one were to take a mould in wax" . . . . Theophrastus (*op. cit.*, 50-3)" (Hanson, 1961, 180n2). This talk about "impressions", "wax", "imprints", and the rest is modelled not, as Hanson thinks, on the idea not that perception is a species of touching, but on the idea that seeing, along with touching, is a species of *die-casting*—of being stamped (the mind is dough) or, going the idealist route, stamping (the mind is equipped with transcendental cookie-patterns). The intentionality of touching that *we* are talking about ought not to be confused with the die-casting model of Democtritus or Descartes. No, touching isn't casting a die, it isn't stamping, it isn't taking a Polaroid. Touching is tentacle-like; to touch, and for that matter to see, is to move across the object over time. "And like the exploratory gaze of true vision, the 'knowing touch' projects us outside our body through movement" (Merleau-Ponty [1979, 315]).

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
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IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (QA-3)

150mm

6"