United They Stood, Divided They Didn't
Fall: Culture and Politics in Mi'kmaq

By
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United They Stood, Divided They Didn’t Fall:  
Culture and Politics in Mi’kmaq Nova Scotia, 1969 - 1988

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Abstract

The structure and membership of First Nations political organizations can reveal much about the culture of an aboriginal society. This thesis is an examination of the cultural experiences found within the political organization of the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia between 1969 and 1988. The analysis demonstrates that within the political realm, the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia displayed distinctions with respect to the values placed on particular aspects of their culture.

The Union of Nova Scotia Indians was established in 1969 to politically represent the Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq population. By the mid-1970s, however, tensions and divisions were evident that eventually resulted in the formation of the Confederacy of Mainland Micmacs in 1986. The result was a divided Mi'kmaq political landscape in Nova Scotia along a geographical boundary – Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia – with each organization representing a segment of the provincial population and attempting to control as much of the sociopolitical space as possible.

The thesis argues that although cultural differences were not solely responsible for the splintering of the first provincial organization in Nova Scotia, the cultural value placed on language, religion, politics and economic factors varied between the two organizations.

United They Stood, Divided They Didn’t Fall: Culture and Politics in Mi'kmaq Nova Scotia, 1969 - 1988

Michelle Coffin
October 8, 2003
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCCB</td>
<td>University College of Cape Breton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFXUEDA</td>
<td>St. Francis Xavier University Extension Department Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANS</td>
<td>Public Archives of Nova Scotia</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIAC</td>
<td>Maritimes Indian Advisory Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSI</td>
<td>Union of Nova Scotia Indians</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMM</td>
<td>Confederacy of Mainland Micmacs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Ulnueeg Negonidike</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCNS</td>
<td>Native Council of Nova Scotia</td>
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<td>UNBI</td>
<td>Union of New Brunswick Indians</td>
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<td>NIB</td>
<td>National Indian Brotherhood</td>
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<td>AFN</td>
<td>Assembly of First Nations</td>
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Most importantly, to my parents and my bro, thank you for your unconditional love and your patience.
Introduction: Culture Through the Lens of Politics

Neither politics nor political organizations define a culture or a people. However, an examination of political organizations certainly can assist in the understanding of a people and the value they place on the various aspects of their culture. Raymond Breton has argued that an understanding of ethnic communities is virtually impossible or will be very limited if “inadequate consideration is not given to the political dimension.”\(^1\) However, within the Atlantic Canadian context, the study of First Nations political organizations has not received the attention it deserves. This thesis is an attempt to shed some light on the ‘political dimension’ of the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia. It will demonstrate that an examination of the political organization of the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq reveals cultural differences along a regional boundary – Cape Breton Island and mainland Nova Scotia.

Although political organizations are not new to the aboriginal political scene, the place of contemporary First Nations political organizations within the Canadian political and social framework has changed dramatically over the last few decades. Today, aboriginal organizations exist in every province and have representation through umbrella organizations at the national level. Breton has contended that although, “ethnic communities have always had significance in the institutional arenas of the larger society; today, however, their existence and role in society are becoming increasingly institutionalized. Ethnic communities are becoming explicitly incorporated as such into the institutional fabric of society.”\(^2\) Today, native provincial and national organizations are influencing First Nations policy and effectively articulating native issues and

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concerns to Canadians through the use of mass media and other mediums. The attention surrounding the recent election of the national chief of the Assembly of First Nations attests to the institutionalization of native politics within the Canadian political framework.

First Nations organizations have played a vital role in the revitalization of aboriginal cultures and were instrumental in the movement that led to a national awakening of aboriginal peoples to their rights within Canadian society. It is fair to suggest that without these organizations, the strength of aboriginal cultures would again be in jeopardy. Breton has argued that the core features, beliefs and values of a people “need to be embedded in and conveyed through social forms that will recurrently affirm, evoke, and reinforce them. Otherwise they weaken.”

Since first contact with the outside world, the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia have defined and redefined themselves. Conversion to Catholicism, while maintaining aspects of traditional spirituality, led to a new worldview. Today this influence is expressed in the presence of a patron saint of the Mi’kmaq, St. Anne, who many honour through annual religious events. Eighteenth century British colonization in Halifax resulted in bounties placed on the scalps of the Mi’kmaq on mainland Nova Scotia. This affected the attitudes of mainland Mi’kmaq towards colonization differently from those of the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq. The Indian Act and twentieth century federal government policies have restructured Mi’kmaq society and its political leadership. The Department of Indian Affairs’ centralization policy of the mid-1900s uprooted Mi’kmaq families and

\(^2\) Ibid, p. 2.
\(^3\) Ibid, p. 140.
took them away from traditional hunting and fishing grounds and tried to transform their communities into agricultural economies. The introduction of the band system in 1958 broke ties with communities and established a foreign leadership selection process. The residential school system robbed Mi’kmaq children of their culture. The Mi’kmaq were affected by a variety of policies imposed by Europeans and Canadian governments over the last 500 years. Since the nineteenth century, many policies have been well-intended, although often with unfavourable results. Throughout this period the Mi’kmaq have had to reevaluate and reconstruct their place within their world. The introduction of aboriginal economic development and native run education systems during the last thirty years once again meant the restructuring and redefining of what it is to be Mi’kmaq.

This thesis can be defined as an ethnopolitical and ethnohistorical study of the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia. It is an examination of the role that culture played within the First Nations political organization in Nova Scotia, between 1969 and 1988. This time frame was chosen because the Union of Nova Scotia Indians was formed in 1969 and maintained representation of the provincial ‘status’ Mi’kmaq population until 1986, when a second political organization was created, the Confederacy of Mainland Micmacs.

The work argues that although the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia share the same culture there are differences in the importance placed on the values within that culture. It also argues that the cultural differences existed along a geographical boundary – Cape Breton Island and mainland Nova Scotia. What it does not argue is that the UNSI

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* A “status Indian” is anyone “registered” as an “Indian” in the “Indian Register” under the Indian Act. The “Indian Register” refers to the “register of persons” that is maintained under Section 5 of the Indian Act. In 1975, the Native Council of Nova Scotia was established to represent non-status First Nations people in Nova Scotia.
splintered only because of these cultural differences. Instead, the thesis suggests that cultural differences are evident through an examination of the political organizations which represented the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia. This is a study of the cultural variations found within the political realm of the Mi’kmaq during the period under study. As will be demonstrated, the cultural value placed on language, religion, politics and economics differed between the two regions. As Breton maintained, the study of ethnic politics allows for a greater understanding of a people. Hopefully, this work will add to the available literature and provide a greater understanding of the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq people and their political organizations.

Theoretical Framework

The eighteenth century philosopher of language, Johann Gottfried von Herder, declared that “nothing was more indeterminate” than the word culture. A.L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn published a major study on the meaning of culture in which they provided 164 definitions of the concept, including many references to the differences between culture and civilization. Raymond Williams maintained that culture was one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language. “Both the problem and the interest of the sociology of culture can be seen at once in the difficulty of its apparently defining term: ‘culture.’”

The word ‘culture’ has been linked to the Latin word ‘cultura,’ a reference to the cultivation of the soil but soon took on another meaning with Cicero’s cultura animi or

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5 Johann Gottfried von Herder, *Samtliche Werke*, (Complete Works) Volume 13. The 33 volumes were published between 1877 and 1913 after Herder’s death in Berlin.
“culture of the soul.”8 ‘Culture’ has often been used interchangeably with the word
‘civilization’ since it too derives from a Latin word, ‘civis’ or citizenship where it seems
to have taken on the meaning of superiority over the barbarian. Dante made this link in
his work, Convivio, when he introduces the Italian ‘civilta’ from the Latin ‘civilitas’, a
more specific reference to the notion of culture.9

The words ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’ did not gain any real acceptance until the
second half of the eighteenth century despite their almost 2000 year history. Until then
the place of the people in the world was analyzed through various theories mostly related
in some way, to the debate between natural law and the supremacy of the human being.
Giambattista Vico’s New Science (1725) advanced the notion of common-origin theory
arguing that the different ways culture is manifest represent the modifications of a
general culture common to all nations.10 Montesquieu, in De L’Esprit des Lois (1748),
spoke of the emerging “general spirit” of any given society and described the part that
geography and climate plays in that process.11 Kant applied the word ‘cultur’ to ‘being
cultivated’ - the older meaning of the word ‘civilization’.12

The classical meaning of the word ‘culture’ was established from the middle of
the eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth centuries when, in harmony with the word
‘civilization’, it reflected a state of superiority - of being raised up. That classical

8 The overall concept of culture is described in Cicero’s De Natura Deorum.
9 See Chapter XVIII of Thomas Chubb’s Dante and His World, Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1066;
Edward Moore’s Studies in Dante – Textual Criticism of the ‘Convivio’ and Miscellaneous Essays, Oxford:
10 Giambattista Vico, The New Science, translated by Thomas Bergin and Max Fisch, New York:
Montesquieu’s view on geography – the volume of territory inevitably affects the psychology of those who
reside in a country – is fully developed in chapter’s 16 – 20 of Book VIII of The Spirit of the Laws.
12 “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View” in Kant – On History, Lewis Beck
meaning of culture was to meet with a challenge. By the early 1870’s the word was being
defined anthropologically although it would take another fifty years before the definition
was accepted by British or American dictionaries. E.B. Tylor published two works,
*Researches in the Early History and Development of Mankind* in 1870 and *Primitive
Culture* in 1871. Tylor built his work to some extent on that of Gustav E. Klemm who
was himself moved by the thought of scholars like Vico and Herder. In any case, by
around the mid-1850’s, a new definition of culture - more descriptive and less normative
- was being introduced. Tylor’s definition bears this out: “That complex whole which
includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits
acquired by man as a member of society.”

Others like Matthew Arnold and later T.S. Eliot would hold to the traditional view
of culture and the view of tradition. Arnold saw culture as moral self-perfection, “the best
that has been thought and known in the world.” Eliot, who tended to bridge the gap
between Tylor and Arnold, still could describe culture as individual self-cultivation.

But the word ‘culture’ had now become a description of a whole way of life and,
as the educator Julia Evetts observed, “its usage is morally neutral.” The definitions
and descriptions multiply and many, including Karl Marx (who never developed a
complete theory of culture) had something to say about the word. The definitions had
much in common. E. Adamson Hoebel defined culture as “the integrated sum total of

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18 Marx did provide an outline of culture in his *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* in
1859.
learned behavior traits which are manifest and shared by the members of a society,” and Clyde Kluckhohn refers to it as “the distinctive way of life of a group of people, their complete design for living.”

Anthropological definitions of culture have moved beyond those accepted during the classical period of the discipline. Today, theories of culture recognize the fluid nature of societies; as a society changes, develops and evolves so too does the culture of that society. This contrasts with earlier views of culture as static, never changing occurrences within a society. As societies are not homogeneous, neither is the culture of those societies. The experiences of societal members are always varied therefore their cultural learning and understanding is also varied. As a result the political and socio-economic characteristics of a culture or people are not uniform.

Franz Boas in his Introduction to Ruth Benedict’s *Patterns of Culture* notes, “The desire to grasp the meaning of a culture as a whole compels us to consider descriptions of standardized behavior merely as a stepping stone leading to other problems. We must understand the individual as living in his culture; and the culture as lived by individuals.” Gerald Sider has taken this view a step further, warning anthropologists against a concept of culture as homogeneous:

We must call into question the anthropological notion of culture as ‘shared values.’ This concept is simplistic, for people must – just in their ordinary lives and not as an explicitly ‘political’ act – struggle against and learn not to share some of the values of the dominant society and of each other…. We should thus pay more attention to culture both as an arena of struggle not just between but within the ethnic groups and classes, and as a wholly integral part of other transformative projects.

Working within a conceptual framework that ethnicity is not a "mere reflection or reflux of culture," Jack David Eller suggests that no ethnic group "treats all parts of its culture of history as markers of its identity," suggesting it would be impossible to do so.\textsuperscript{23} As mentioned earlier, the Mi’kmaq have had to define and redefine what it means to be Mi’kmaq. Throughout that constant process, the Mi’kmaq have not come to a homogeneous conclusion, but instead, have developed a rich and varied understanding of themselves, their society and their surrounding societies. No society or group shares the same life experiences. As such, each individual member of that society or group has a different understanding of themselves and how they fit into that society or group. An individual who attended the Shubenacadie Residential School, spending much time away from his or her family, friends and community had a different experience from that of an individual who attended school within his or her own community. A Mi’kmaq woman who lost her ‘Indian status’ and had to move away from her community as a result of marrying a non-native does not share the experience of a Mi’kmaq woman who married a native, retained her status and remained in her community. A chief of a community with the ear of government does not share the experience of a Mi’kmaq welfare recipient who cannot afford the same luxuries as the chief and cannot articulate his vision of Mi’kmaq Nova Scotia to Ottawa.

Boas, Sider and Eller provide a framework in which this thesis is argued. For the purpose of this study, culture is the concept of the expressions, beliefs, knowledge and symbols of individuals within a society, recognizing that different cultural experiences exist within members of that society. In this case, the study will examine those cultural
differences within the political organizational structure of the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia.

A study of the people within the political realm would be incomplete without a brief
discussion of ethnic political organization. Raymond Breton argues that,

Creating an ethnic consciousness is one of the basic tasks to be accomplished if an
ethnic polity is to be established and maintained, let alone function effectively.
The definition of the collective identity, of the social and symbolic boundaries of
the community, is, accordingly, a central dimension of the formation and
functioning of the ethnic polity.24

Therefore this work will examine the Mi’kmaq ‘collective identity’ as well as the ‘social
and symbolic boundaries’ of the group. To do this, the thesis will provide an historical
perspective on the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq to identify how the ethnic polity was created.

Breton describes two perspectives in which ethnic communities have been
analyzed: the social demand approach and the social supply approach. In the social
demand approach the ethnic community is organized in order to meet a demand for
commodities, services, social support, protections, or cultural expression. The demand
can be for housing or employment needs or language training; for the “cultural activities
or the transmission of values and ways of life to the next generation;” for solidarity
needs; or for the defence against discriminations and hostility.25 In other words,
it has to do with meeting the needs and wants of a community.

In the second approach, community organization and its functioning are examined
from the perspective of individual entrepreneurship; those who see opportunities for
personal gain in terms of power, prestige, income, or ideological commitments.26 Breton
points out that these two approaches are not mutually exclusive because, “community

23 Jack David Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An anthropological Perspective on International
24 Breton, p. 7.
politics involve both concerted action and competition for resources and power among subgroups with divergent interests and ideologies.  

This thesis' framework can also be found within the social demand approach, that being, that the Union of Nova Scotia Indians and the Confederacy of Mainland Micmacs were established to meet the various needs of the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq society of the 1960s – 1980s. It must be kept in mind, however, that both approaches are evident within each other.

Breton suggests the sociopolitical environment, “constitutes a set of opportunities available to members of ethnic groups, a set of possible problems and constraints with which they have to cope, and resources that can be mobilized to improve the condition of individual members or of community institutions.”  

Harold McGee has contended that ethnic communities will adapt a strategy that provides for “the greatest amount of power to influence the total society as well as its own members.”  

While agreeing with Breton and McGee, the question that remains is what happens when a society is faced with a different sociopolitical environment or seeks to adopt opposing or competitive strategies? This was the experience of the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia during the period under study. The Cape Breton Mi’kmaq political community chose to continue to be represented by the UNISI, while the mainland political community opted to create a new organization to meet its needs.

Breton has suggested that the dimensions of polarization and distribution of power within a community yield four political configurations: accommodation,

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27 Ibid, p. 11.
28 Ibid, p. 41.
segmentation, political ascendancy and truncated polities. For the purpose of this study it is the segmented political orders that are most relevant. Within this configuration, Breton notes:

parallel subsystems exist in more or less intense opposition to each other, each governing a particular segment of the community…. They tend to include only two segments. Such a segmented political order is usually the result of negotiations that failed or of the outright refusal on the part of at least one subgroup and its leaders to negotiate a common arrangement. The greater the number of overlapping divisions in a community and the longer the political and institutional history of the antagonisms, the more arduous the process of building an overarching structure.\textsuperscript{30}

Breton contends that segmentation usually occurs in the early years or decades of community development, because different groups are in intense competition for political power.\textsuperscript{31} Each group, he argues, is attempting to occupy as much of the sociopolitical space as possible to weaken the other and thereby strengthen their group. Breton compares this occurrence in a fractured community as it being “carved into two or more segments, each with its sociopolitical space defined in terms of territory or functions.”\textsuperscript{32} Mi’kmaq sociopolitical structures will be examined within the conceptual framework of a segmented political order.

**Methodology**

The methodology used relies heavily on interview sources and primary materials. A limited number of scholars have chosen to study First Nations political organizations in Atlantic Canada, therefore the secondary sources available to complement this work are scant. As a result, to a large extent, the thesis is the result of a series of informal

\textsuperscript{30} Breton, p. 21.  
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, p. 21.
interviews that were conducted between 1996 and 2003 in casual environments with
individuals who were involved with the UNSI and the CMM between the period under
study. Interviews with political observers and members of the Mi’kmaq community also
contributed to the study. Interview participants were told of my interest in examining the
cultural differences that existed within the political realm of the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia.
Throughout this work, participants have only been identified when it was determined
necessary to adequately make an argument, or if participants’ perspectives had already
been published, for example in a local newspaper. However, all participants were asked
if their identity could be revealed. In some instances participants refused, but all agreed
to have their interviews included and recorded in the study.

Primary archival materials were also located at the St. Francis Xavier University
Extension Department Archives in Antigonish. The Extension Department had been
heavily involved with community development and leadership training in all five Cape
Breton Mi’kmaq communities as well as two in eastern Nova Scotia. As will be
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two, the department trained many of the
individuals who became involved in organizing the UNSI. Invaluable primary and
secondary archival documents were also located at the Mi’kmaq Resource Centre which
is housed in the Beaton Institute of the University College of Cape Breton. The
institute’s archives contain a vast collection of materials relating to the history of Cape
Breton, including newspaper clippings and documents revealing not just the Cape Breton
zeitgeist but also the Mi’kmaq zeitgeist, both of which proved valuable to this work.

32 Ibid, p. 22.
33 The two eastern Nova Scotia communities were Afton and Pictou Landing.
Although there is limited literature available on the cultural differences that exist within the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq, a few sources deserve mention. The work of Harold McGee is certainly one of them.\(^{34}\) Although examining the boundaries between the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq and their larger surrounding society, McGee provides evidence and some detail of cultural differences among the Mi’kmaq along the geographic border of Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia. Fieldwork for his Ph.D was carried out during the early years of the UNSI and as an observer and often backroom participant of UNSI meetings his findings were particularly valuable to this work. Tord Larsen, also an anthropologist, was entering the field as McGee was completing his research.\(^{35}\) Larsen also examined the relationship between the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia and the larger Nova Scotia society. Like McGee, his observations are recognized in this work. Lynda Kuhn Boudreau’s 1982 work on the economic strategies of the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia also includes an analysis of the differing economic and political strategies of the Cape Breton and mainland Mi’kmaq prior to the establishment of CMM.\(^{36}\)

An examination of the literature encompassing Canada’s First Nations peoples quickly concludes that although regional gaps are slowly being filled, most of the analysis to date concentrates on the experience of western Canada’s aboriginal peoples. Although the available literature spans many disciplines, the study of the First Nations peoples of Atlantic Canada has been humble. Locating materials on First Nations political organizations poses an even greater challenge within the local context. As Frank Cassidy attested to a little over a decade ago: “Despite considerable interest, research

\(^{34}\) McGee, 1973.
about aboriginal government has yet to emerge in a defined, bounded and self-generating manner. \(^3^7\)

The last three decades have witnessed a growth in the interest of academics and non-academics alike in the study of First Nations issues. However, there is a glaring disparity in research examining the relationships that exist within a First Nation, and particularly within the political organizational framework. This is certainly the case in Atlantic Canada. Despite the significant contribution that these organizations have made to their communities, it has not translated into a corresponding academic analysis.

James Frideres, for example, in his chapter on native organizations in his 1988 monograph *Native Peoples in Canada* provides one cursory mention of UNSI and disregards the albeit brief existence of Ulneegg Nesonidike as well as the Native Council of Nova Scotia, established in 1975.\(^3^8\) Wayne Daugherty also omits the existence of the UN and the NCNS in his 1982 *Guide to Political Native Organizations in Canada*.\(^3^9\) JR Miller omits any reference to First Nations political structures in Atlantic Canada in *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens*.\(^4^0\) In Doug Sanders’ analysis of the “Indian lobby” during the constitutional talks of the early 1980s, there is no mention of any First Nations political organization east of Ontario.\(^4^1\) This, despite three members of the executive of the UNSI appearing as witnesses before the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of

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\(^3^8\) Ulneegg Nesonidike was formed in 1968 and dissolved with the establishment on the UNSI, although the UNSI was not its replacement. In 1975 the Native Council of Nova Scotia was established as an offshoot of the Union of Nova Scotia Indians.


\(^4^0\) JR Miller, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989.

the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada. Even local scholars lack an understanding of contemporary Mi’kmaq political organizations. Leslie Jane McMillan, in her study of the Mi’kmaq Grand Council, identifies the CMM as a political construct of 1970, a full decade and a half before its establishment in 1986.\footnote{Leslie Jane McMillan, Mi’kmawey Mawio’mi: Changing Roles of the Mi’kmaq Grand Council From the Early Seventeenth Century to the Present, Master of Arts thesis, Dalhousie University, 1998, p. 113.}

Fortunately, other areas of Mi’kmaq study have experienced more analysis. Due to the lack of a comprehensive literature base on Mi’kmaq political organization, many of these sources have been consulted. While early histories often neglected First Nations peoples, or presented them through a European and Euro-Canadian perspective – ignoring aboriginal concepts and worldviews – later historians presented a more balanced version of history, incorporating native peoples into their work and revealing the relationships between Europeans and aboriginal peoples. These histories often tell of the role native peoples played in the success or failure of early European – aboriginal contact and settlement, recognizing that it was native peoples who held the balance of power in the early years of contact and later settlements. Others, such as historian John Reid, have examined what he referred to as the “resilience” of the Mi’kmaq during the decade between 1600 to 1610 in response to European colonization.\footnote{John G Reid, Six Crucial Decades: Times of Change in the History of the Maritimes, Halifax: Nimbus, 1987, p. 4.} Olive Patricia Dickason, a Mi’kmaq with a doctorate in history, has examined the relationship between the French and Mi’kmaq at Louisbourg concluding that the French were the most successful of the three major colonizing powers in North America at forging a relationship with the
Mi’kmaq. She argued that the, “The French genius lay in recognizing and developing Indian potential” for “instruments of empire.”

In addition to Reid and Dickason, historians Stephen Patterson, William Wicken, Leslie Upton, Ralph Pastore, and Jennifer Reid, have examined the Mi’kmaq people of Atlantic Canada within an historical perspective. One rather interesting contribution to the historiography is Peter Twohig’s recent examination of healthcare delivery to the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Harold McGee, Janet Chute, Virginia Miller, Tord Larsen, Wilson and Ruth Wallis, Philip Bock, Bernard Hoffman and Patricia Nietfeld have studied the Mi’kmaq structures within an

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anthropological context.\textsuperscript{47} Extensive research on many First Nations peoples in Canada, including some analysis on the Mi'kmaq has also been compiled by Frank Speck.\textsuperscript{48} Stephen Davis has added to the collection of Mi'kmaq research with his archaeological digs throughout Nova Scotia and his corresponding written analyses.\textsuperscript{49} Traditional Mi'kmaq economies have been studied by Ellice Gonzalez, while Fred Wien has studied methodologies for restoring economic balance into Mi'kmaq communities.\textsuperscript{50}

First Nations education issues have also received attention from academics. This is due, in part, to the success of the Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq in attaining a high degree of autonomy over the education of their students and their curricula. Marie Battiste, born in


\textsuperscript{48} Frank Speck's research includes studies of the Penobscot, Naskapi, Iroquois, Beothuk, Montagnais, Catawba, Rappahannock and his work on the Mi'kmaq: Frank Speck, Beothuk and Micmac, New York: AMS Press, 1981.


Maine but with strong roots in the Chapel Island community in Cape Breton, has examined the literacy of First Nations students and analyzed the socialization patterns of the Mi’kmaq to assist in developing curricula and learning environments conducive to aboriginal learning. Bernie Francis, along with his non-native counterpart, Doug Smith have developed methods for teaching Mi’kmaq and have contributed to a language revival among young Mi’kmaq people. Trudy Sable’s masters thesis on the necessary requirements to develop a science curriculum for Mi’kmaq students has added to the education literature.

James Sekej Youngblood Henderson, from the Chickasaw First Nation, who was employed with the UNSI, reconstructed and “decolonized” the European perspective of the legal history of the Mi’kmaq and recontextualized it through his First Nation perspective.

Nova Scotia has seen a proliferation of Mi’kmaq writers and scholars during the last two decades many of which have been beneficial to this study. Noel Knockwood, Spiritual Leader to the Mi’kmaq Grand Council, has written on traditional Mi’kmaq teachings and prayers as well as human rights. Murdena Marshall, a masters graduate of Harvard University, has produced works describing the values, customs and traditions

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of the Mi’kmaq Nation and is completing work on the changing roles of Mi’kmaq women within native politics.\textsuperscript{56} In addition to Marie Battiste’s work in the field of education, she has also examined the socialization patterns of Mi’kmaq children.\textsuperscript{57} Isabelle Knockwood’s compelling story of her plight at the Shubenacadie residential school tells the tale of young Mi’kmaq students who went to the school not knowing how to speak English and left it not knowing how to speak Mi’kmaq.\textsuperscript{58} The first Mi’kmaq authored history of his people was Daniel N. Paul’s controversial \textit{We Were Not the Savages}. Paul presents his perspective of the past and adds to the debate over the historical relationships between the Mi’kmaq Nation and the foreign governments they endured.\textsuperscript{59} In 2000, Paul published a second edition of his work giving readers even more to digest with additional information on the history of Mi’kmaq-European relations.\textsuperscript{60}

Despite the existing analyses of the Mi’kmaq in Atlantic Canada, most research on First Nations peoples has occurred outside Atlantic Canada. However, even within a western Canadian context, the study of First Nations political organizations has seen scant analysis, despite these political organizations often being the administrative arm through which self-government initiatives are carried out. Conversely, self-government and aboriginal rights have received much study in Canada’s west, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s.

\textsuperscript{60} Daniel N. Paul, \textit{We Were Not the Savages}, Halifax: Fernwood, 2000.
The federal government’s *Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy* of 1969, known as the *White Paper*, and the constitutional talks of the early 1980s ignited an interest in academics to study the relationship between First Nations peoples and the federal government. Sally Weaver’s analysis of the federal policy is one of the most accepted and most thorough on the topic. Weaver examined the relationship that resulted between First Nations peoples and the federal government during and after the introduction of the *White Paper*.  

In examining the constitutional debates between 1982 and 1987, Kathy Brock discovered the paradoxical experience of self-government in Canada. Brock argues the “constitutional failure to entrench aboriginal self-government contributed to its success in other areas and possibly to its future development as a constitutional issue.” When constitutional talks broke down, the federal government appealed to societal groups for support. For the First Nations peoples “the final result was the entrenchment of aboriginal rights in the constitution.”

University of Lethbridge professors Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long have contributed a great deal to the analytical and theoretical realm of First Nations research. In *Surviving as Indians: The Challenge of Self-Government*, Boldt discusses the potential successes and failures of future of native peoples in Canada. He argues that the time has come for all Canadians to embrace a new framework for envisioning the future of First Nations peoples. He argues:

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63 Ibid.
At present, two prominent discourses are ongoing with respect to the future of Indians in Canada. One is conducted from an Indian perspective; the other from a Canadian perspective. Each is conducted in isolation and is insulated from the other, and the participants in each seem to be imprisoned in the concepts and logic of their particular discourse.

Boldt and Long conceptualize a grassroots approach to self-government in one of their several collaborative efforts. While J. Rick Ponting has studied grassroots attempts that have created autonomy and control in the form of First Nations governance, Long’s solo comparative study on the effects of community-based self-government analyzed the influence of external First Nations policy on the governing practices of two plains nations. Unlike the much of the analysis on First Nations issues, Long examines the political governing structures that existed within these two communities at different periods, not the relationship between First Nations peoples and the federal government.

Frank Cassidy and Robert L. Bish’s examination of the experience of First Nations peoples in British Columbia also analyzes political structures within these communities. Cassidy and Bish, however, pay particular attention to what they call the “practical issues of Indian government” — the issues that allow First Nations governance to function effectively, or “a perspective that accents the meaning of Indian government

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65 Ibid., p. xiii.
in practice.”\textsuperscript{70} It is an analysis that focuses on “Indian people who wish to resolve particular problems or achieve particular objectives as groups organized into governments.”\textsuperscript{71}

The study of First Nations issues continues to grow and teach us much about the original inhabitants of the land and territory that became Canada. Every study adds to the debate and body of knowledge needed to recognize the proper place of aboriginal peoples in the literature. The hope is that this work provides a small piece of recognition to that proper place.

**Chapter Structure**

This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first provides an overview of the influence of contemporary First Nations political organizations on native peoples in Canada. This chapter focuses on three major themes of aboriginal organization during the Pan-First Nations movement: (1) resistance to government policies, (2) a new generation of educated leadership and (3) the tendency of organizations to fracture in their early years. The second half of the chapter examines early Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq political organization and presents the case of a history of a strong political culture among the Mi’kmaq of Cape Breton.

Chapter Two discusses the establishment of the Union of Nova Scotia Indians and the Confederacy of Mainland Micmacs. It examines the structure that the organizations assumed, the reconstruction that was required within Mi’kmaq society to ‘make space’ for the organizations, and the roles of the individuals involved. Throughout the chapter a

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., p. xx.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p. xxi.
dichotomy between the Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq is demonstrated.

The following three chapters provide the substance for the thesis’ argument. Chapter Three examines the differing value placed on the Mi’kmaq language between the two groups. The chapter demonstrates the ability of the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq to speak their traditional language at a rate much higher than their counterparts on mainland Nova Scotia. It will reveal that there was a language barrier that existed between the two groups causing friction within the political realm. Chapter Four examines the presence of stronger ties to the Catholic Church and the Mi’kmaq Grand Council in Cape Breton. This again will show the dichotomy between the mainland and Cape Breton Mi’kmaq. Chapter Five examines the political and economic motivators of the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia and suggests that geographic boundaries and opposing ambitions for future goals were evident within the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq community. Once again the argument is not that these cultural differences are solely responsible for the fracturing of the UNSI that occurred during the mid-1980s.
Chapter 1: Contemporary Political Organizations Emerge

Most contemporary First Nations’ political organizations, those established to resist government policy, were established during the second half of the twentieth century. The Grand General Indian Council of Ontario and Quebec is perhaps the exception. Established early, in 1870, it was formed by the Iroquois and the Ojibwa to resist the government’s implementation of Indian policy.⁷² Throughout the 1900s several native organizations were established on the national and regional levels. While some organizations lasted many years, others quickly folded, splintered off to create separate organizations or joined forces with other organizations. The Indian Association of Alberta, still in existence today, is an example of both organizational splintering and longevity. It was formed in 1939 after it split from the League of Indians in western Canada.⁷³ The Inuit Tapirisat of Canada is an example of a national organization that split into six different organizations because of inconsistent worldviews and cultural differences.⁷⁴

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first examines three themes present in twentieth century First Nations political organizations in Canada: resistance, education and most important to this thesis, organizational fracturing. This section also examines the role of First Nations political organization in the Pan-First Nations movement across Canada. The second section focuses on the history of twentieth century Nova Scotia political organizations prior to the establishment of the Union of Nova Scotia Indians and argues that a strong political culture was evident among the Mi’kmaq of Cape Breton.

⁷³ Ibid, p. 264.
Contemporary Political Organizations in Canada

Resistance and Political Organization

Mobilization did not occur simultaneously in all provinces. The British Columbia Nishga’a organized early in the late nineteenth century. Manitoba’s First Nations people did not organize until the 1950s\(^\text{75}\) and New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island in 1968.\(^\text{76}\) Although organization took place at different times throughout the country, several trends have emerged. One common theme shared by these organizations was the pretense to organize for the purpose of united resistance. Resistance to government policies and paternalism, to land loss, to neglected treaties and ignored aboriginal rights were the main focus of these groups. Many examples demonstrate this point. On the national scene, JR Miller has noted that some native organizations that participated in the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on aboriginal issues between 1946 – 48 were:

particularly forceful in their condemnations of department political interference in band affairs, compulsory enfranchisement, inadequate economic assistance, and failure to adhere to the terms of treaties. On the whole, the Indian representatives sought changes that would enable them to advance economically and re-establish control of their own affairs, without assimilating and giving up status.\(^\text{77}\)

This occurred at a time when the committee had assumed that “the work of assimilation and integration was well advanced, and that all that was required was a little more time and less bureaucratic intervention in Indian communities.”\(^\text{78}\)

\(^{74}\) Ibid, pp. 266 – 67.
\(^{75}\) Ibid, p. 264.
\(^{76}\) Ibid, p. 264.
\(^{77}\) JR Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989, p. 221.
\(^{78}\) Ibid. p. 221.
A national organization, the National Indian Brotherhood, experienced some success during the constitutional talks of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The NIB demanded that it have representation at First Ministers’ meetings and, when refused, boycotted the meetings. They opted instead to initiate a lobbying campaign in Britain which seemed to influence the Canadian government’s commitment to future participation in the talks scheduled for the fall of 1979. Despite this promise not being honoured, the lobbying resulted in the “existing aboriginal and treaty rights” being “recognized and confirmed” in the 1982 Constitution.

A discussion on the resistance of First Nations political organizations during this period would not be complete without including The Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, commonly referred to as the White Paper. In 1969 Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal government introduced a policy initiative aimed at fulfilling his concepts of a “just society” and “participatory democracy.” Prior to the June unveiling of the White Paper in the House of Commons, country-wide consultation with native peoples took place to discuss possible amendments to the Indian Act. The consultations revealed that aboriginal peoples were concerned with the future of treaty and aboriginal rights and the settlement of land claims. In fact, native leaders and representatives for the Department of Indian Affairs unanimously agreed that a general declaration of intent containing the principles and spirit of the treaties and native rights, would have to be adopted before any discussion on the Indian Act would take place.80

Despite this, an entirely new policy proposal was introduced in the spring of 1969. There were six key elements to this new proposal: (1) The Indian Act and Section

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91 (24) of the Canadian Constitution were to be abolished, 81 (2) Canadians were to recognize the "unique contribution of Indian culture to Canadian life," (3) the Department of Indian Affairs was to be dismantled within five years, (4) only treaty and land claims under present examination were to be considered by government, (5) reserve lands were to be transferred to native peoples, and (6) those First Nations who were in greatest need would be given the most assistance. 82

Many First Nations were not prepared to administer their own social, economic, and political programs. Band governments had been established under the Indian Act and had relied on the department to provide legislated resources and services. There was also the issue of the Indian Act itself. Native people saw the Act as a treaty between themselves and the government, and to revoke it was to default on its legal obligations. First Nations leadership also felt betrayed when the government failed to acknowledge the agreement to address treaty and land claims before discussions on amendments to the Act would continue. As a result, Canada's native peoples overwhelmingly rejected the White Paper, some calling it racist, accusing the government of intentionally trying to assimilate them into Canadian society. Others went further, claiming cultural genocide.

There were four formal responses to the White Paper from Native political organizations and activists. All opposed the paper and presented their own recommendations for the future of First Nations policy. 83 Aboriginal people across the country protested on Parliament Hill and sent letters to their Members of Parliament and the Minister of Indian Affairs. In Nova Scotia, many prominent Mi’kmaq people voiced

81 Section 91(24) states: "Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians."
their concerns over the *White Paper* proposal. They claimed that this was the federal government's plan "designed to make natives into white people" and to rid itself of the country's 'Indian problem.'

For the Mi'kmaq it was impossible to "sweep everything under the rug." Mi'kmaq leadership refused to forget the long-standing grievances and claims they had before the government. The Mi'kmaq, like their counterparts, also wrote letters to their Members of Parliament and to the Minister of Indian Affairs expressing their concerns with, and opposition to, the proposal. The nationwide rejection of the proposal resulted in its withdrawal in the spring of 1970.

The resistance to the *White Paper* marks the first time in Canada's history that aboriginal peoples across the county mobilized for a common cause. At the local level, organized resistance had been evident for decades but in 1969 native peoples from east to west collectively and effectively held the government accountable to First Nations people. The result was the pinnacle of the Pan-First Nations movement in Canada whose early beginnings were evident in the efforts of those such as the Indian Association of Alberta.

The 1960s witnessed a proliferation of social movements across North America. In the United States there were demonstrations and protests against involvement in the Vietnam War. African American students were also demanding justice and equality in their classrooms and Black Power ideology was developing and spreading quickly across America. In Canada, The Front de Liberation du Québec (FLQ) was formed in 1963 to

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84 Joe B. Marshall, personal interview, December 17, 1996.
85 Ibid.
protest political and social domination of the Francophone population in Quebec.\textsuperscript{86} In Nova Scotia, influenced by the Black Power movement in the United States, the Black United Front was established to fight social injustices such as the destruction of Africville.\textsuperscript{87}

Influenced by the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, Canadians became concerned with the rights of minority groups, including First Nations peoples. The anti-poverty movement was equally influential as public attention was focused on the economic disparity between native people and the general public.\textsuperscript{88} Church groups, academics, civil rights activists and journalists became engaged in the plight of First Nations peoples. Media reports cited the state of affairs of native people and the government’s apathy toward their circumstances.\textsuperscript{89} This movement was also felt within the walls of politics and government. During the federal election of 1968, Liberal leader Pierre Trudeau promised Canadians a more ‘participatory democracy’ through involvement in the policy development process. At the same time, civil servants were promoting social change and acting as facilitators to gauge public opinion which in turn would lead to speedy government responses.\textsuperscript{90}

It was during the 1960s that the government seemed to finally take notice of aboriginal leadership that was calling on the government to address the conditions under which their constituents were living. In 1961, The Joint Committee of the Senate and the


\textsuperscript{88} Weaver, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p. 13 & 15.
House of Commons on Indian Affairs presented its second and final report. This report recognized that, “the winds of change have been blowing through the ranks of Indian people and that there is also a growing awareness and recognition of their problems and needs amongst the non-Indian population.”

The emergence of contemporary First Nations organizations assisted in creating what has often been referred to as a cultural renaissance or revival in aboriginal communities, which accelerated during the social movements of the 1960s. The leadership within these organizations reminded fellow native peoples that they were not conquered people but a proud people with rights and means to determine their own futures. Menno Boldt has suggested that the leadership in native organizations has developed their own concept of “native society.” He stated:

This pan-Indian concept and the emergent political and cultural movement with which it is associated is serving to identify new boundaries and to create new over-arching Indian loyalties at the national level. It is a movement to enhance a sense of community and group consciousness which goes beyond mere political organizations to include recognition of a shared history of oppression, cultural attitudes, common interests, and hopes for the future.

James Frideres agreed stating fifteen years ago that native organizations were “imbedded with a sense of cultural nationalism...” This nationalism was a result of the resistance provided by contemporary First Nations political organizations during this period in history.

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90 Ibid. p. 19.
92 Located in Frideres, p. 273.
93 Ibid. p. 269.
Education and Political Organization

The peak of the Pan-First Nations’ movement witnessed another turning point for Canada’s aboriginal peoples – higher education. During the 1960s, Canada’s aboriginal population was more educated than ever before. Community leaders had attended colleges and universities and had received community development and leadership training. The result was an educated leadership prepared to negotiate with governments and articulate the concerns of community members. Frideres acknowledged the importance of education in the establishment, success and structure of First Nations’ political organizations when he stated: “The genesis of… [the aboriginal cultural revival] lies in the emergence of Native intellectuals graduating from White schools.”

The role of education in the creation of native political organization cannot be overlooked. As Boyce Richardson has observed, during the 1960s there was an extraordinary increase in the number of aboriginal people receiving a formal education at colleges and universities. As the aboriginal political organizations have shaken down – very often breaking up, then regrouping – they have come into the hands of the first generation of aboriginal leaders who are capable of engaging the Euro-Canadian political structure with some hope of changing it to their advantage.

This education, at least in part, was also responsible for the structure that these contemporary organizations would assume. First Nations’ political organizations created in the 1960s mirrored the structures of Canadian government. By the end of the decade, all three aboriginal groups – Indians, Metis and Inuit – had national and provincial representation. The newly formed, educated leadership of First Nations organizations understood that if native political organizations were to be recognized as legitimate and effective bodies by federal and provincial governments, the structures of their

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94 Ibid. p. 269.
organizations must be compatible with those of Canadian society. Sally Weaver has suggested that organizations adopt the institutions of the larger society in an effort to influence government policy, while Harold McGee has suggested that ethnic groups will assume a strategy that provides them with the greatest degree of power. This, however, is not to suggest a complete lack of traditional structure in contemporary native political organizations. Raymond Breton has argued that:

[ethnic] communities structure their institutions by borrowing from the cultural practices of the larger society as well as transferring from the group’s own culture and historical experience. People cope with the modalities of their social environment by using the cultural capital at their disposal. But this capital can be drawn both from the heritage and experience of their own group and from the cultural environment in which it is encapsulated.

In Nova Scotia, as will be shown, the Mi’kmaq people developed their organizational structure based on Canadian institutions but added elements of traditional government practices.

_Splintering & Political Organization_

Another thread running through the fabric of contemporary First Nations organizations was the tendency for them to splinter, particularly during the early years. For example, The Union of British Columbia Chiefs, which collapsed in the 1970s, was replaced with several organizations to represent Nisga’a, Nuu-chah-nulth, Carrier-Sekani and the Gitksan-Wet’suwet’en. Another example is the Inuit Tungavinga Nunamimi which splintered from the Northern Quebec Inuit Association. First Nations in the

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96 Sally Weaver, “Political Representivity and Indigenous Minorities in Canada and Australia,” in Noel Dyck (ed.), _Indigenous Peoples and the Nation-State_, (St. John’s: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1985, pp. 11-150, p. 116.
98 Breton, p. 51.
100 Frideres, p. 267.
Prairie Provinces also broke away from the NIB during the 1960s until it was revamped and replaced with the AFN.\textsuperscript{101} Several reasons have been articulated for these organizational splits or divisions. Mergers, structural changes, dealings with various levels of government and the refusal of some members to ratify deals with governments have all been suggested as factors in organizational fracturing.\textsuperscript{102} Although there has been rare mention of “internal discord” and “diversity”\textsuperscript{103} as factors in organizational splits, there is often no elaboration provided.

There is another explanation for the divisions that occur within native political organizations. Cultural diversity along with geographic divisions can also create a dichotomy that leads to splintering. McGee made reference to the presence of a geographic division among the Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia in the early 1970s, even predicting a split within the UNSI along this boundary.\textsuperscript{104}

Anthropologist Noel Dyck recognized cultural diversity within a First Nations organization describing the “established divisions” present within the political organization during the late 1960s and early 1970s.\textsuperscript{105} While employed with a provincial organization, Dyck observed the “ethnic and linguistic discreteness” as well as the “geographical separation of band reserves” within the organization.\textsuperscript{106}

Although the Pan-First Nations movement is still very much alive, the unity demonstrated during the resistance to the \textit{White Paper} could not be maintained within some of the organizations that had been successful in opposing it years before. As Dyck

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\textsuperscript{101} Richardson, p. 359.  \\
\textsuperscript{102} Frideres, p. 266 - 67.  \\
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid. p. 267 & 270.  \\
\textsuperscript{104} McGee, 1973, p. 117  \\
\textsuperscript{105} Dyck, “Representation and Leadership of a Provincial Indian Association,” in Adrian Tanner (ed.), \textit{The Politics of Indianness}, St. John’s: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1983, pp. 197 – 305, p. 199.  \\
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid, p. 199.
\end{flushleft}
observed, "In some provinces Indian associations that in 1969 were widely supported by reserve communities have gradually lost that support and have maintained in existence but alongside other associations that have arisen to oppose them."\textsuperscript{107} As this thesis will demonstrate, this is the history of political organization in Mi’kmaq Nova Scotia. Alan B. Anderson and James Frideres have suggested that, "Ethnic consciousness is perhaps more likely to arise as visible minority members group together in defensive solidarity, in defensive reaction to perceived or actual discrimination and exploitation."\textsuperscript{108} While certainly true, once the threat that required defensive reaction has eased, divisions that were always present begin to resurface, as was the case among the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia.

The funding arrangements that became available through changing aboriginal policies in Ottawa are often cited as the cause of organizational fracturing. Dyck suggested that, "The government’s policy of distributing a set amount of funds among all Indian associations within a province has resulted in rivalry among the associations that further alienates reserve communities."\textsuperscript{109} While this is true, what often have been overlooked are the cultural differences that exist between the members of First Nations political organizations. The last three chapters of this thesis will demonstrate the existence of cultural differences within the UNSI. It will show that organizational splintering occurred in part, as a result of these cultural differences.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid, p. 291.
\textsuperscript{109} Noel Dyck, "Representation and Leadership of a Provincial Indian Association," p. 291.
Nova Scotia Pre-White Paper Political Organization

The Union of Nova Scotia Indians is often considered the first native political organization established in Nova Scotia. This is not entirely accurate. It would be more factual to consider the UNSI the longest lasting and one of the most successful political organizations in Nova Scotia, but not the first. One of the earliest examples of political organization occurred in the mid-twentieth century, decades before the establishment of the UNSI.

Mi’kmaq resistance began to take new forms as social and political organizations were established by the same type of leadership that had earlier petitioned their elected representatives, bureaucrats and even the Crown for land, adequate services and recognition of treaty rights. Although little is known about an organization called the Indians of the Maritime Provinces and the Province of Quebec, in 1945 the organization passed several resolutions during a meeting held at in the Mi’kmaq community of Big Cove, New Brunswick. The following are some of the resolutions passed during the meeting:

WHEREAS by the Treaty of 1752 between the Government or the Representatives of the King... certain privileges were granted to the Indians of this Country and whereby by subsequent Treaties thereafter, these privileges were confirmed and the Department of Indian Affairs was established to see that the Indian privileges were granted.

AND WHEREAS in these privileges were the rights to free fishing and hunting throughout the whole season, besides other privileges which would be too many to enumerate.

AND WHEREAS in the course of years some of these privileges have been unlawfully taken away by the Governments of Canada and of the different Provinces.
AND WHEREAS the Indians feel that the Governments are not observing the terms of the Treaties and are taking advantage of their powers to unlawfully breach the conditions contained in those Treaties.

NOW the Indian Representatives of the Reserves from the Province of Quebec and the Maritime Provinces united in this grand Meeting, hereby resolve as follows:110

The resolution continues, requesting that the federal government address their concerns, including a “true investigation” into “Indian lands occupied by white people;” a request that “Indians not be removed from one Reserve to another without their consent;” the establishment of “the right to free fishing and free hunting during the whole season,” as was already given to them by the Treaties; a request for the Department of Indian Affairs sees “that a Doctor and Hospital care as well as house repairing, all of which privileges have been neglected, be continued to the Indians as originally.”111

There is evidence to suggest that the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq participated in this organization. These resolutions were discovered in files located at the Mi’kmaq Resource Centre of the Beaton Institute, which houses Cape Breton related archival material. They were found within the UNSI collection in the appendix of meeting minutes along with a submission to a Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons which was written by a Cape Breton Mi’kmaq leader. The UNSI collection housed at the centre arrived there straight from the UNSI offices which are located in the community of Membertou, Cape Breton. Both pieces of evidence suggest that a Cape Breton Mi’kmaq person attended these meetings, in all likelihood Chief Ben E. Christmas from the Membertou reserve.

110 Beaton Institute, UCCB, UNSI Collection, Submission of Ben E. Christmas to the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons, n.d. but after July 22, 1946 and prior to the end of 1947. Christmas thanked the “Honourable Mr. Glenn”, who according to Department of Indian Affairs documents was the minister responsible for Indian Affairs between 1945 – 47.
Ben Christmas was the President of the United General Indian Council of Nova Scotia, sometimes referred to in archival materials as the United General Indian Council of Cape Breton. Documentation on this organization is also very limited. It is clear however that Christmas submitted a document to the 1946 – 48 Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons, which discussed the Indian Act, sometime after July 22, 1946 to oppose the government’s policy of centralization and the residential school system.

The centralization program was implemented in 1941 after the government determined it would be easier to administer Canada’s native people if they were located on fewer, but larger reserves. After lobbying his department and government since 1918, senior federal bureaucrat H. J. Bury’s concept of a centralized reserve system for the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia was realized.¹¹² In Nova Scotia, two reserves were chosen: one in Cape Breton at Eskasoni, the other on mainland Nova Scotia at Shubenacadie. The policy resulted in the uprooting of many Mi’kmaq families and their removal from traditional territories as the government persuaded many to leave their homes by promising them new housing and improved education and economic conditions. Many were told that sawmills and industries would be built on these two reserves.¹¹³

In the Mi’kmaq community of Whycocomagh, the school and farms were set on fire by the Indian Affairs Branch to assist the Mi’kmaq in their decision to move to

¹¹¹ Ibid.

Eskasoni. \footnote{Marshall, et. al., 1989, p. 89} Threats by Indian Affairs to close schools and end medical care on the reserves forced many Mi’kmaq families to relocate to one of the centralized reserves.\footnote{L. Patterson, 1985, p. 103} Unfortunately, the Mi’kmaq – some of whom had left behind employment in coal mines, the Sydney steel plant, or the pulp industry – soon learned that the only economic opportunity available at their new reserve was the construction of low grade houses with no indoor plumbing or heating. Others, while unemployed in their communities, were at least able to maintain a level of self-sufficiency through raising livestock and fishing.\footnote{Ibid., p. 104 - 105}

Another ill-conceived federal government policy during the middle of the twentieth century was the residential school system. Across Canada, First Nations children were enrolled in schools, many of which were run by the Catholic Church. In Nova Scotia, this school was located in Shubenacadie and opened its doors in 1930. Many Mi’kmaq parents enrolled their children as they trusted the Catholic priests and nuns who ran the school. Other children were literally snatched from their communities by RCMP officers and taken to the school without their parents’ knowledge or consent.\footnote{Joel Denny, President, Mi’kmaq Historical Society, January 26, 1999}

Speaking the Mi’kmaq language was forbidden at the residential school; students were beaten or threatened if they were overheard speaking in their traditional language. Brothers and sisters were separated from each other, and families were only permitted to visit on weekends. The school robbed parents of the opportunity to raise their children, and the students lost many aspects of their culture and traditions.\footnote{Ibid., p. 104 - 105}

Ben Christmas spoke passionately against these two policies in his submission to the committee:
"The Indians to my knowledge did not agitate for [centralization], were not even consulted when the scheme was contemplated, and consequently, had no choice in the matter... Personally, I do not think the existing conditions at various reserves throughout Nova Scotia are such to warrant wholesale removal if Indians. Some of the worst conditions I think could be more easily and economically remedied than the present plan for centralization."

He continued:

Centralization has become a great instrument to beat the Indians into submission, including our veterans who have fought for King and Country in the last two world wars....Our Indian veterans understand by virtues of their services to King and Country they are now entitled to receive set rehabilitation grants as per Order-in-council 5932. Yet the local administration in bold discrimination asserts that our veterans cannot receive such grants unless becoming centralized. To our knowledge the local administration is doing absolutely nothing to assist our veterans to become permanently re-established.

On the issue of the residential school, Christmas was just as resistant to government policy.

I do realize, however, the value and importance of an education and would like to see the day when every Indian will be given every opportunity to acquire proper education. We do not want our day schools abolished. The residential school at Shubenacadie should be thoroughly reorganized. Indications are that too much child labour is prevalent there and not enough class room study. High school is needed for Nova Scotia Indians, with more encouragement for collage education. Vocational training should be established as soon as possible, as well as adult and agricultural education.

Together, the work of these two organizations demonstrates the existence of Mi'kmaq resistance to government paternalism and misguided policies. They also indicate that the Mi'kmaq were not the passive victims as some literature has portrayed. However, both the resolutions, and in particular, Christmas' submission to the Joint Committee, tell us more. The submission also indicates Christmas' attention to, and

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119 Beaton Institute, UCCB, UNSI Collection MG7, 1 2000-1-1131, Resolutions of Indians of the Maritime Provinces and the Province of Quebec, August 7 – 8, 1945.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
concern for, Cape Breton Mi’kmaq communities. Throughout his presentation there are only two references to mainland communities and only to state that Shubenacadie was a centralized reserve and home to the residential school. However, references to Eskasoni, the centralized reserve in Cape Breton, are mentioned in detail as are other Cape Breton Mi’kmaq communities. For example, Christmas stated:

“From our viewpoint of the Indians, the site selected in Cape Breton was unsuitable and offered no advantages over our present reserves...secondary roads are impassable several months of the year completely isolating the reserve...and severely interfering with food supplies, medical attention, hospitalization and general traffic. There are no fishing, hunting or trapping opportunities.... Lumber operations are limited....Employment is very irregular and wages low. Unfinished homes are cheaply constructed....No proper water supply and no sanitation...”

He continued, “centralization takes place, and now the original population of Eskasoni reserve is asked and does share the heavier burden to expand its once finished church to meet the heavier population through no fault of its own...” Before completing his submission he provides the committee with some advice for economic development in Cape Breton Mi’kmaq communities:

*Our* reserve here in Cape Breton contains millions of tons of good grade limestone, which, if properly developed would create one of the biggest industries of its kind, whether processed or crushed, could easily be transported by rail and water, and the paved highway is right through the reserve. This industry alone should give employment to many Indians in various ways, and should be worth considering. (emphasis added)

At first glance the omission of any references to mainland reserves does not suggest the presence of cultural differences among the Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia. A closer inspection, however, suggests the presence of political cultural differences among the mainland and Cape Breton. In both cases it appears to have been Cape Breton Mi’kmaq

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122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
leader, Ben Christmas, who initiated the mobilization of the Mi’kmaq people. It also seems that Christmas was involved in the North American Indian Brotherhood, an organization formed by Andrew Paull of British Columbia. Although the organization did not gain national acceptance, Paull lobbied Ottawa to address First Nations land claims and other general issues. In his submission to the Joint Committee, Christmas spoke in support of the work of the Brotherhood and “heartily endors[ed]” the organization. It is perhaps even his relationship with Paull prompted Christmas’ submission to the Joint Committee. Paull was attempting to mobilize the Canadian Aboriginal population at the time. It is fair to suggest that Paull could have informed Christmas of the committee and the possibility of submitting a presentation before the body. This could also be why we find references to both a Nova Scotia and Cape Breton organization lead by Christmas in the archival material. Paull’s desire to create a national organization consisting of provincial representation could be responsible for Christmas’ referral to his organization as a provincial body of the Joint Committee.

Christmas was an outspoken member of the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq community who became known to government officials at Indian Affairs as, “the man behind the gun” for his activism on behalf of Mi’kmaq people. Christmas’ activism and resistance are clearly depicted not only in his submission to the Joint Committee, but throughout his life. As chief of the Sydney reserve during the 1920s, he was an ardent opponent of the conditions there, and after an outbreak of tuberculosis demanded that the federal government address the problem. During the forced relocation of the community

124 Ibid.
125 Miller, p. 219.
126 Beaton Institute, UCCB, Submission of Ben E. Christmas to the Senate and Members of Parliament, n.d. but after July 22, 1946.
during 1925 – 26, Christmas initiated a letter writing campaign addressed to Members of Parliament, calling on the government to provide an acceptable environment for his constituents at the new reserve.\textsuperscript{128}

Ben Christmas also became a prominent opponent to the government throughout the Sylliboy case. In 1928, Grand Chief Gabriel Sylliboy, also from Cape Breton, challenged the 1926 \textit{Lands and Forests Act} after a number of Mi’kmaq had been charged with illegal hunting despite a treaty right to hunt. In what appears to be an attempt to mobilize the Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia, Christmas wrote a letter to Shubenacadie Chief John B. Maloney asking for his support in locating “every hunter and trapper” in his community for the purpose of presenting Mi’kmaq rights to the Nova Scotia legislature. Christmas’ desire to organize is evident in his letter:

\begin{quote}
If we do not fight for our Rights nobody will. Time is now getting short, and you cannot afford to lose any time. I mean business, and no half about it and I intend to tell the government so…. Get behind this biggest movement ever attempted to help the Indian hunters and trappers of Nova Scotia.\textsuperscript{129}
\end{quote}

Yet another example of the Membertou chief’s activism and Mi’kmaq pride was demonstrated in 1935 when he brought 25 members of the community to Halifax to participate in the provincial exhibition. According to the \textit{Sydney Post-Record}, Christmas “set up a major attraction for the Nova Scotia Exhibition.” In addition to the Halifax exhibit, the story indicates that Christmas often showcased Mi’kmaq culture. There are mentions made of “an encampment” held at Victoria Park in Sydney and a “show” at Louisbourg as well several upcoming “performances [in Sydney] and in the nearby

\textsuperscript{127} Dan Paul, \textit{We were Not the Savages}, Halifax: Nimbus, p. 281.


\textsuperscript{129} Beaton Institute, UCCB, Ben E. Christmas to Chief John B. Maloney, January 26, 1935.
towns.” These illustrations, along with Christmas’ involvement in the Indians of the Maritime Provinces and the Province of Quebec and the United Indian General Council of Nova Scotia, as well as Grand Chief Sylliboy’s court challenge, provide some evidence of a strong political culture among the Mi’kmaq of Cape Breton.

Although the circumstances surrounding the dissolution of the Indians of the Maritime Provinces and the Province of Quebec and the United Indian General Council of Nova Scotia remain unclear, it appears that there was little or no formal Mi’kmaq political organization during the 1950s and early 1960s. Demonstrations on individual reserves and protesting outside government buildings appear to be the extent of political mobilization at this time. However, in 1968 a group of Cape Breton Mi’kmaq men joined forces to create Ulnuegg Neganidike meaning ‘Indians, we are going forward.’ Many of these men had been experiencing mounting dissatisfaction with the conditions on the Cape Breton reserves and wanted to constructively create a positive environment for the Mi’kmaq people.

The goals of the UN were: (1) to create full sharing of all native people in the responsibilities and duties of a democratic society and the full sharing of its benefits; (2) to cooperate with non-native people; (3) to participate in the decision-making process; and (4) to share information on native rights and the protection of those rights. UN organizers hoped the organization would gain acceptance and recognition as the voice for Nova Scotia’s native population. They traveled to the five Cape Breton Mi’kmaq

131 According to the Cape Breton Highlander of November 6, 1968 the organizers included in the roster were Dan K. Stevens, Lawrence Paul, Wilfred Prosper, Adrian Morris, Levi Denny, and Dan Paul.
133 Personal collection, Harold McGee, Cape Breton Highlander, November 27, 1968.
communities to rally support for the organization and to recruit members. The group, and particularly the chief of Membertou, Lawrence Paul, was able to use a local newspaper as an outlet to condemn the government for the conditions in Chief Paul’s community. However, the UN failed to secure the necessary support in Cape Breton because it was an appointed body and the constitution was presented to the people instead of developed with the people. This inferred ownership by a few and as a result the organization was unable to muster the support of the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq community.

There is strong evidence to suggest that the UN had no support or even recognition on mainland Nova Scotia. During his fieldwork, McGee was unable to locate one mainlander familiar with the organization.¹³⁴ Even if there was support for the UN on the mainland it is clear that once again it was the Mi’kmaq of Cape Breton who demonstrated that mobilization and resistance were embedded in their political culture. The example along with the activism of Chief Ben Christmas and Grand Chief Gabriel Sylliboy provide evidence of a strong political culture among the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq population during the first half of the 1900s.

The next chapter will discuss the establishment of the Union of Nova Scotia Indians and the Confederacy of Mainland Micmacs. It will suggest that the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq continued to demonstrate a strong political culture and reveal the fragmentation the was present within the political realm of the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia along a regional boundary.

¹³⁴ McGee, 1973, p. 115. However articles appeared in at least two Halifax newspapers, Chronicle-Herald (Nov. 6, 1968) and The People and Community News (Feb. 27, 1968), stating that the UN had been established and explained its goals and intentions.
Chapter 2: Unity Then Division: The Political Realities

In Nova Scotia, evidence of the ‘winds of change’, referred to in the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons, was taking place in Mi’kmaq communities and throughout the province. For example, in May 1968 the Cape Breton Post reported that a “mass demonstration” was planned at Eskasoni.\textsuperscript{135} The newspaper reported that demonstrators protested outside the community’s Department of Indian Affairs office, chanting “now is the time for action,” “medicine, houses and transportation we need,” and “we are the victims of injustice by the government.”\textsuperscript{136} Department of Indian Affairs employees were not able to enter their offices that day. The mindset of the protesters was articulated by Chief Charlie Francis, who remarked, “It is not what they think is good for us but what we think is good for us.”\textsuperscript{137} In April 1969, the Chronicle-Herald reported that Charles Pictou of the Millbrook reserve was “spearheading a drive for better housing conditions on the reserve,”\textsuperscript{138} and had scheduled a meeting with Truro town council to address the issue. According to the records of Indian and Northern Affairs, Pictou was neither a chief nor a councillor in any of the Mi’kmaq communities surrounding the town of Truro. Whether Pictou was attempting to usurp the powers of the elected chief and councillors or establish a new form leadership it demonstrates the influence of the Pan-First Nations movement with provincial Mi’kmaq communities.

\textsuperscript{135} Beaton Institute, UCCB, Scrapbook 85 A, “Mass Demonstration is Planned” Cape Breton Post, May 6, 1968.
\textsuperscript{136} Beaton Institute, UCCB, Scrapbook 85 A, “Indians Protest” Cape Breton Post, May 7, 1968.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
Outside the Mi’kmaq community, sentiments of change were also being expressed. In one local radio commentary calling for a Head Start program for native children, CBI radio host David Newton articulated his view of the reserve system, stating:

We have good reservations; Membertou, parts of Eskasoni and Whycocomag are examples, but essentially the whole reservation system defeats Indian aspirations for equality...For let there be no doubt, the reservation system is the practice of a form of apartheid that we so vigorously condemn when it is practiced in South Africa.\textsuperscript{139}

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first discusses the establishment of the Union of Nova Scotia Indians and demonstrates the strong Cape Breton Mi’kmaq influence in that organization. The second section addresses the formation of the Confederacy of Mainland Mi’kmaqs and will introduce some of the cultural and geographic divisions to be discussed in Chapters Three to Five.

**Post White Paper Organization**

In 1965, as part of the new Department of Indian Affairs policy of encouraging aboriginal self-government, Indian Affairs organized national and Regional Indian Advisory Councils. In the Maritimes, this council was known as the Maritime Indian Advisory Council and consisted of Mi’kmaq appointed band chiefs, elders, and prominent individuals in Mi’kmaq society. Included on the council were Ben E. Christmas, Chief of Membertou; Richard Matthews, a Membertou band councillor; Tom Marshall, Chief of Chapel Island; Noel Doucette, from Chapel Island; Charles Francis of Eskasoni and John Bernard, a social activist from Indian Brook.\textsuperscript{140} The Council’s membership demonstrates the strong political culture among the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq.

\textsuperscript{139} Beaton Institute, UCCB, MG 12, 86, David Newton, Radio Scripts, CBI, 1969.

The department articulated to the members that the council’s intent was to inform native people across the country of the department’s programs and receive advice and policy direction from Canada’s First Nations. The Mi’kmaq welcomed the council, encouraged that the government was finally willing to accept that First Nation peoples could find solutions to problems that were paradoxically created by government.

At this time the Mi’kmaq of eastern Nova Scotia were also taking advantage of education opportunities offered through the St. Francis Xavier University Extension Department. Recognizing that education would bring the Mi’kmaq people closer to self-determination, many leaders throughout the eastern Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq communities enrolled in part-time and full-time leadership and community development courses.

In 1964 the Extension Department received funding from Indian Affairs to continue its community development training and leadership courses on the five Cape Breton and eastern Nova Scotia reserves. It appears, however, that the first initiative involving the Mi’kmaq and the department occurred in October 1957 when, at the request of the St. Anthony Daniel Parish in Sydney, the department conducted an adult education program in the Membertou community. According to the reports from the Extension Department, “the process of achievement of these concrete developments had incalculable social and psychological effects.” on the programs’ participants. Additional leadership courses were hosted by the Extension Department in Margaree, Cape Breton between 1957 and 1963 and involved at least four of the five Cape Breton Mi’kmaq communities.

141 SFXUEDA, Indian Affairs, RG 30-3/33/25.
143 Ibid.
A story from *The Casket*, the local paper in Antigonish as well as the diocesan newspaper, and home to the Extension Department, dated February 15, 1964, described the government-funded program “as a means of training leaders, stimulating thought and helping Indian people generally.” Courses included leadership and community organization, cooperation on the reserves, meeting procedures and the work of credit unions. Other courses focused on domestic and health issues such as nutrition, alcoholism and the role of parents.

The Extension Department’s community development program provided the training required for the creation of a Mi’kmaw administered political organization. The reports of the Extension Department can be used to argue this point. The increasing influence and affects of the programs offered by the department are articulated in many of these reports. A 1965 report, for example, identified that the level of efficacy among Mi’kmaw people was increasing. The report notes that, “a more concerned and aggressive Indian is developing.” This contrasts with a report five years earlier stating, “In previous years it had been extremely difficult, at times, to get people to attend meetings, and the attitude of ‘don’t get me involved’ is still more prevalent this year.” Some graduates of the program were also given employment with the Extension Department. They were employed as field workers who were able to assist their communities in local development projects. In addition to providing training, the reports of the Extension Department indicate that the department also attempted to secure

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employment opportunities and markets for Mi’kmaq products and assist Mi’kmaq
communities in their negotiations with the Department of Indian Affairs.\footnote{148}

Why Representation was Needed

For the first time in Canadian history, First Nations peoples across the country
believed they had influenced the future of government native policy when, in 1968,
aboriginal people across the country were asked to participate in a dialogue on the future
of the Indian Act. However, the next year First Nations peoples realized their input had
been ignored when the White Paper was introduction, and as a result, native people
across the country felt betrayed. As JR Miller has suggested, “the lack of true and
meaningful dialogue before the White Paper had a devastating effect on Indian-white
relations. The result was disillusionment and the political unification of native people in
opposition to the White Paper.”\footnote{149} The sentiment Miller described certainly resonated
among the Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia. As one Mi’kmaq participant has suggested, “The
White Paper was the best wake up call there could have been for natives across
Canada.”\footnote{150}

The White Paper created an environment that supported a province-wide
Mi’kmaq political organization. It created an artificial unity among the Mi’kmaq of
Nova Scotia. Its introduction came on the heels of social movements that were taking
place across North America, uniting and educating people on issues of poverty,
minorities and human rights. The Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia, like many Nova Scotians,
were influenced by these events and issues, which directly affected their lives. Many
Mi’kmaq defined the White Paper as a policy of genocide, or at least of acculturation.

\footnote{148} SFXUEDA, Indian Affairs, RG 30-3/33/78-85; SFXUEDA, Indian Affairs, RG 30-3/33/
\footnote{149} JR Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989, p. 278.
The resistance to the *White Paper* was the first time, at least in recent history, that the Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia joined forces to fight a common enemy – the federal government. McGee has argued the *White Paper* “prompted support” from the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq for the creation of a provincial native political organization, “support it might otherwise not have had.”\(^ {151}\)

Another leading stimulus for organization was the government’s response to Mi’kmaq input on the Maritime Indian Advisory Council. In April 1969, the MIAC met and agreed on recommendations to address the social problems in Nova Scotia’s First Nations communities. It was at this time, that Bart MacKinnon, the Regional Director of Indian Affairs, disclosed that the MIAC was merely an advisory body and that the department was not mandated to accept any recommendations made by any of the Regional Indian Advisory Councils across the country.\(^ {152}\) MacKinnon’s response to the work and recommendations of the MIAC demonstrated to the Nova Scotian Mi’kmaq contingent the need for a stronger unified voice for the native people of Nova Scotia.\(^ {153}\)

The creation of other First Nations political organizations in Canada, particularly the Union of New Brunswick Indians, which was formed in 1968, also gave Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq a model to follow. In fact, the UNBI’s constitution was examined when developing the UNSI’s constitution. Nova Scotia’s Mi’kmaq population was the last in Canada to establish a province-wide First Nations political organization. When combined with the additional reasons for organization, it was clear to the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq that the time had come for their collective voice to be heard.

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150 Bernie Francis, personal interview, September 24, 1999.
152 Marshall, 1996.
An examination of the documents and reports of the Extension Department relating to its involvement in training and leadership courses in the Mi'kmaq community indicate the presence of a paternalistic attitude of Extension Department directors – another motivation for Mi'kmaq mobilization. Its proposal to renew its contract with the Department of Indian Affairs for the years 1967 – 1969 demonstrates this attitude. The report states under one section entitled, “To Develop The Band Council,” that councils “will be advised as to their proper roles as councillors.” (emphasis added)\(^{154}\) Another report, again from the same period implies a lack of cognizance on the part of the Mi'kmaq people and a seeming conclusion that the department ‘knows best.’ “The self-government idea is still very prevalent and, in itself, is an excellent goal. However, it is our feeling that there is no realization of the magnitude of the job. A great deal of effort has gone into making them realize this, but at the moment no significant progress has been made,” the report revealed.\(^{155}\) A letter to the editor of the Micmac News, from a student, reveals this paternalism. Hector Pictou wrote, “There were some people who were asked right out to leave this course because of conflict of interest with the course directors. I guess it was not considered to be a good thing to do if a person had too many questions at the social councillors course session.”\(^{156}\) Pictou’s letter also identifies the conflicting belief systems of the Mi'kmaq Nation and the Extension Department. He continued:

You see the main objective in counselling[sic] was in direct contradiction to my beliefs of reaching out to sincerely putting an Indian student on track in his or her

\(^{153}\) Joe B. Marshall, Public Lecture, St. Mary’s University, March 13, 1997.
\(^{156}\) Beaton Institute, UCCB, Scrapbook 85 A, “Letter to the Editor” Micmac News, undated.
attitude toward themselves and the relevant issues (or any other Indian person who sought counselling). You see, we were told to refer to the person as a client, not a person, we were to dehumanize an individual to treat a person as a subject and not a human being.¹⁵⁷

McGee detected Mi'kmaq opposition to the Extension Department's role in community development. He suggested that the Mi'kmaq people were opposed to the large salaries paid to department workers to execute the plans that Mi'kmaq people could and should be managing in their communities.¹⁵⁸ Some Mi'kmaq, including those who joined forces to create the UNSI, were equally dissatisfied with the improvements in community development on Mi'kmaq communities despite the Extension Department's thirteen year experience. According to McGee, the Mi'kmaq community complained that most of the funding the department received from Indian Affairs was spent on research and conducting surveys on issues that had obvious results such as the higher unemployment rates on reserves and a less educated Mi'kmaq population compared to non-Mi'kmaq society.¹⁵⁹ McGee's observation is supported with Extension Department documents that indicate that it too realized the discontent of the Mi'kmaq with the program. In a letter to band councils dated May 15, 1969 Michael Brosseau, the department's Director of the Indian Community Development Program, wrote:

The Indian people have expressed various opinions on the Community Development Program St. F.X. Extension is carrying out on the seven reserves involved. The Indian population was not consulted on the present contract, and there is some speculation to the effect that perhaps the Community Development Program carried out at present should not be renewed when the present contract with the Indian Affairs Branch expires on March 31, 1970.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.
¹⁵⁹ Ibid.
¹⁶⁰ SFXUEDA, Indian Affairs, RG 30-3/33/990.
After a decade of Extension Department leadership training, it was clear the Mi’kmaq people wanted the opportunity to put that training into practice.

Who Did the Representing

The same April 1969 evening that the MIAC Mi’kmaq representatives heard that their voices were to be muted at the federal level, they met in a Halifax hotel and laid the cornerstone for an organization that would represent the eleven Mi’kmaq bands in Nova Scotia. This group, soon appealed to several Mi’kmaq individuals who were working for various government departments and other organizations, including the Extension Department, to assist them in designing the constitution for this new organization. On May 13, 1969 this organizing committee met at the Fort Cumberland Hotel in Amherst to discuss the formation of a Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq political organization. This group consisted of six Cape Breton Mi’kmaq representatives: Noel Doucette, Chapel Island’s band manager; Nyanza’s Chief Francis Pierro; Adrian Morris, an Eskasoni councilor; Alex Denny, from Eskasoni and the Grand Council’s Grand Captain; Bernie Sylliboy from Whycocomach; and Chief Roy Gould from Membertou. There were two mainland representatives including Chief John Knockwood of Indian Brook and Chief Gerald Gloade of Millbrook, as well as two representatives from PEI: Chief Jim Sark and councillor Raymond Lewis. At the close of the meeting Noel Doucette was nominated the group’s chairperson by secret ballot to “spearhead the organization.” A working committee was established that same day. This group gathered later the same month at

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161 Beaton Institute, UCCB, Minutes of Organizing Meeting, May 13, 1969.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
the offices of the Extension Department to study the structures and constitutions of other native organizations and began to put together one of their own.\textsuperscript{165}

Once a draft constitution had been developed the committee spent the next three months traveling to the reserves across the province gathering information for the constitution. On July 11 - 13 a public organizing meeting was held and overwhelmingly those in attendance supported the creation of a provincial organization to represent the Mi’kmaq people of Nova Scotia.\textsuperscript{166} Even individuals who would eventually break away from the UNSI and be heavily involved in the creation of a mainland Mi’kmaq organization expressed the need for provincial Mi’kmaq representation. One participant, who would later be instrumental in the formation of the CMM acknowledged “the concept” of a political organization was needed to represent Mi’kmaq interests. The draft of the constitution was presented on September 12 and 13 at another meeting and was read clause-by-clause, with motions for amendments carried or defeated.\textsuperscript{167} The constitution was ratified and the Union of Nova Scotia Indians was formally established.\textsuperscript{168} The motto ‘united we stand, divided we fall’ was adopted from a speech given by Membertou resident Peter Christmas during the organizational meetings of July (See Appendix I).\textsuperscript{169} The following day the membership voted, electing Noel Doucette of Chapel Island the new organization’s first president, Joe B. Marshall of Eskasoni and

\textsuperscript{165}The committee consisted of Noel Doucette, Joe B. Marshall, Alex Denny, Roy Gould from Cape Breton and John Knockwood, from Indian Brook. According to the organizational meeting documentation Alex Denny resigned as a member of the committee at the organizing meeting held in July and Alison Bernard from Eskasoni was Denny’s replacement.

\textsuperscript{166}Beaton Institute, UCCB, UNSI Collection, Minutes of Organizational Meeting, July 11, 12 & 13, 1969.

\textsuperscript{167}Beaton Institute, UCCB, UNSI Collection, Minutes of Second Organizational Meeting, September 12 &13, 1969.

\textsuperscript{168}Article III, section 2 (a) of the 1969 constitution read: “Any person who is eighteen (18) years or over and is of Indian status is eligible for general membership to the Union.”

\textsuperscript{169}Beaton Institute, UCCB, UNSI Collection, Minutes of Organizational Meeting, July 11, 12 & 13, 1969.
John Knockwood of Indian Brook to the positions of vice-president and Stanley Johnson of Millbrook as secretary-treasurer.\textsuperscript{170}

The new executive had experience with various organizations and a diversity of leadership experience. Doucette and Marshall had gained experience while in the Royal Canadian Air Force and through their employment and training with the Extension Department and Department of Indian Affairs. Both found valuable experience with the St. Francis Xavier Extension Department. The minutes of the organization meetings indicate that five or six members of the small group held college degrees.\textsuperscript{171} An Extension Department report acknowledged Doucette’s abilities. “Noel proved to be a well-balanced, capable worker with a sincere desire to contribute to the welfare of his fellow Indians,” it stated.\textsuperscript{172} The Mi'kmag community chose these individuals to represent them because they were considered capable of negotiating with the federal and provincial governments and representing their interests to all Canadians. As discussed in Chapter One, this was the first generation of leadership trained to go toe-to-toe with the government.

Although the history of the UNSI has been well-documented through newspaper and archival sources, there is little consensus within academia as to why the UNSI was formed or even who did the establishing. Two recent works demonstrate this point. Daniel P. Strouthes in his 1994 study on real property law in Eskasoni contends:

The Indian Affairs Branch created and funded the UNSI to give Micmac in the province a means to develop programs they feel are important, and to provide a means whereby democratically elected leaders engage in formal communication

\textsuperscript{170} Beaton Institute, UCCB, UNSI Collection Minutes of Second Organizational Meeting, September 12 & 13, 1969.
\textsuperscript{171} Beaton Institute, UCCB, Constitution of The Union of Nova Scotia Indians, First Draft, September 12, 1969, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{172} SFXUEDA, Indian Affairs, RG 30-3/33.
on common issues with all levels of Canadian government...as well as to represent the Micmac people in legal actions.\textsuperscript{173}

It is unfortunate that Strouthes did not heed the advice of Frank Cassidy when examining First Nations political organization:

Aboriginal governments cannot be understood primarily as ‘creatures’ of federal policies and programmes; nor can they be projected as achievements of constitutional reform. To the contrary, if aboriginal governments are to be understood, they can be understood most usefully as products of aboriginal peoples living and working to form the political structures they require to meet [their] challenges.\textsuperscript{174}

On the other hand, Sarah Brennan, in her 2000 study of Mi’kmaq resistance in Nova Scotia does not take into adequate account the role of the White Paper in creating the necessary unity among the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia required to organize - which previously had not existed.\textsuperscript{175} This is not to suggest that aboriginal political organization would not have been established in the province, but simply that it might have occurred along different regional borders as it has been since 1986.

Structure of the Organization

The UNSI formally joined the eleven Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq communities. Noel Doucette expressed his emotion with this new association: “We have our own bureaucracy now. We have one strong voice rather than the weak voices of individual bands.”\textsuperscript{176} Prior to the formation of the UNSI, each reserve functioned as its own independent political unit. To an extent, the eleven reserves, or at least their band

\textsuperscript{174} Frank Cassidy, “Aboriginal Governments in Canada: An Emerging Field of Study,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. XXIII, no. 1, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{175} Brennan, 2000, p. 177.
\textsuperscript{176} Beaton Institute, UCCB, Scrapbook 85 A, \textit{Chronicle-Herald}, Sept. 15, 1969. According to MCGee, originally, Noel Doucette wanted to unite the entire Mi’kmaq Nation, including on and off-reserve, status and non-status Mi’kmaq, but could not due to funding restrictions.
councils, were in competition for funding and other resources from the Department of Indian Affairs for housing, employment, social programs and other requirements. However, the creation of the UNSI forced the reserves to often work toward a common goal.

The organizational structure of the UNSI was similar to that of other native organizations in Canada. Although smaller than many in terms of staffing and membership, it served the same functions as larger western organizations. The UNSI consisted of an executive, a board of directors, and various full-time and contract employees. The executive was determined by election that took place every two years.\(^{177}\) Although the first election was held at the close of the public organizing meeting in 1969, the constitution was amended and provided for an election in each of the eleven Mi’kmaq communities.\(^{178}\)

According to the 1969 UNSI constitution (See Appendix II), the executive was to be responsible to, and act on the advice of, the board of directors. The board of directors was comprised of the chief from each Nova Scotia reserve and was responsible for the policy directions of the UNSI.\(^ {179}\) This structure was partially determined by the Department of Indian Affairs. During the organizational phase of the UNSI, department employees on the working committee received a letter from the department notifying them that neither the department nor the government of Canada was responsible to the organization. Instead, it claimed it would only negotiate with band chiefs and councils.\(^ {180}\)

\(^{177}\) Beaton Institute, UCCB, UNSI Collection, Constitution of the Union of Nova Scotia Indians, Article IV, sections 1 (a), 1 (b), September 12, 1969.

\(^{178}\) In the mid 1990s, the UNSI amended its constitution and now appoints an executive director, doing away with its executive.

\(^{179}\) Article IV, section 2 (c).

\(^{180}\) Joe B. Marshall, Public Lecture, St. Mary’s University, March 13, 1997.
To solve this problem, the UNSI’s constitution was structured to ensure the board of directors consisted of the twelve chiefs.\(^{181}\)

The UNSI employed individuals for a variety of positions within the organization. The federal government soon provided funding for several lobbying initiatives including community development, education, self-government, and health. The UNSI also provided jobs for Mi’kmaq people who otherwise would have been forced to leave their communities and perhaps even the province, to find similar job opportunities. Non-Mi’kmaq professionals were also hired when knowledge gaps occurred within the Mi’kmaq community. For example, Stu Killen, a former employee of the DIAND, was hired to direct the research activities. With his additional knowledge of the department and the relationship between it and First Nations peoples, he was considered an asset to the organization in the early years.

The structure and processes of the UNSI were unlike any previous Mi’kmaq organization, such as the Mi’kmaq Grand Council (which will be discussed in upcoming chapters). It was more ‘Canadianized’ in its practices. As McGee has pointed out, parliamentary procedures were generally followed during the UNSI meetings he attended.\(^{182}\) The 1969 constitution confirms McGee’s observations. Under ‘Duties Of The Executive’ it reads the president, “shall conduct these meetings in an orderly and parliamentary manner.”\(^{183}\) Unlike other Mi’kmaq organizations, non-native people were often present at UNSI meetings.\(^{184}\) Government departments and agencies were

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\(^{182}\) McGee, 1973, p. 125

\(^{183}\) Beaton Institute, UCCB, UNSI Collection, Constitution of the Union of Nova Scotia Indians, September 13, 1969.

sometimes asked to attend UNSI meetings to confirm policy or learn of Mi’kmaq goals and future plans.

The structure of the organization was sometimes criticized for its lack of tradition. However, the young executive made little apology and sometimes disputed the absence of Mi’kmaq convention. As Chapter One has suggested, First Nations leadership understood their organizations must exhibit similar structures to that of Canadian organizations, institutions, and government departments. To successfully negotiate for program and services funding, the UNSI utilized a blueprint familiar to its dominant society. Raymond Breton has argued that ethnic groups’ organizations share similar characteristics with the larger society around them for two reasons. It is “partly a matter of organizational acculturation and partly a matter of functional necessity. Groups and their leaders have learned from experience that adopting organizational patterns compatible with those of larger society is an effective way to deal with the problems the larger society presents and the opportunities it offers.”\(^\text{185}\) However, he also suggests that groups maintain their own culture and historical experience when creating organizations. “People cope with the modalities of their social environment by using the cultural capital at their disposal. But this capital can be drawn both from the heritage and experience of their own group and from the cultural environment in which it is encapsulated.”\(^\text{186}\) This, has been the experience of the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia. For example, the first constitution of the UNSI was read and accepted clause by clause at a public organizing meeting and future amendments were approved by general assemblies.

\(^{185}\) Breton, p. 58.
\(^{186}\) Ibid. p. 51.
Restructuring of Relationships

The establishment of the UNSI required the restructuring of many relationships within Mi’kmaq society. Its formation required various portions of the Mi’kmaq community to reconstruct their place within that community. While individuals would not be directly affected by the creation of the UNSI, the political terrain of Mi’kmaq society certainly required redefining.

UNSI

For the UNSI to be effective and successful it required the support of the community, band councils, chiefs and government. To maintain this balance, the UNSI was prudent in its approach. Policy direction was driven by the board of directors, therefore the UNSI executive required an excellent working relationship with the twelve chiefs. Without the policy direction of the chiefs, the UNSI executive lacked a mandate. The result would have been a weak and powerless organization. The UNSI’s first president, Noel Doucette, expressed the value of this relationship at the organization’s ratification on September 13, 1969:

Just by this small meeting alone we have five or six college graduates. These are the people we have to depend on for advice. The chief’s who are here think that by electing an Executive that they are off the hook. No! No! They are the Board of Directors. These are the gentlemen who we are going to work for. What they want us to do we will do, but first they have to advise contin[uously]. They have to tell us what we want; otherwise we will not be able to function. ¹⁸⁷

However, it was not just within Mi’kmaq society that the UNSI had to reconstruct relations.

The establishment of a provincial First Nations organization affected the relationship between the organization’s executive and board of directors and the federal
and provincial levels of government. Most of the UNSI executive was familiar with
government departments as former employees, or in their role as employees or students
with the St. Francis Xavier University Extension Department. In the past, it was these
individuals who were outspoken in their opposition to the department’s paternalistic
policies. Because the UNSI’s existence relied on government funding, the UNSI
became more strategic in its criticism of government. Two examples occurred in 1972,
one after the UNSI disbanded its research committee the other related to housing funding.
Noel Doucette publicly condemned the federal government for “destroy[ing]” the
committee by failing to provide adequate funding. The UNSI’s research director argued
that the committee had been “a thorn in the side of government” because it raised
grievances with the federal and provincial governments. At the UNSI’s second annual
conference Doucette criticized the government for providing inadequate housing funding.
Again publicly, Doucette accused federal civil servants of deliberately undermining
UNSI efforts to unite Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq in their quest for better housing and other
services because they were afraid of losing their jobs to Mi’kmaq people. On both
occasions the intent of Doucette’s criticism was to induce a favourable government
reaction because of the president’s public government lashing. This occurred at a time
when support for aboriginal peoples, and improving their quality of life, was high in
North America.

187 Beaton Institute, UCCB, Constitution of The Union of Nova Scotia Indians, First Draft, September 12,
1969, p. 11.
188 Beaton Institute, UCCB, Scrapbook 85 B, “Committee Killed, Ottawa Blamed” Chronicle-Herald,
April 14, 72.
189 Beaton Institute, UCCB, Scrapbook 85 B, “Chiefs Try to Heal Housing Fund Split,” Chronicle Herald,
The objective of the UNSI was to gain aboriginal rights and self-determination for the Mi'kmaq people, and that required working with, and not against, the Department of Indian Affairs. The organization therefore had to create a balance between criticizing government and working with it.

**Band Chiefs and Councils**

Prior to the creation of the UNSI, band chiefs and council were responsible to the members of their band, and in certain instances to the Department of Indian Affairs. The UNSI was established as the federal government was transferring some its administrative authority to native bands. Prior to this, band chiefs, and to a lesser degree band councils, were responsible for implementing policy imposed by the department and addressing matters directly related to their communities such as the allocation of funding, community employment and disagreements between band members.

The structure of the UNSI put additional responsibilities on both the chiefs and councils. Membership on the board of directors made the chiefs policy makers not policy implementers. As a result of the Department of Indian Affairs’ devolution of power, an unprecedented level of responsibility rested on the chief’s shoulders. But not only was he creating policy for his reserve, his decisions were impacting all twelve Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq communities.\(^{190}\) Competition for government resources often resulted in band councils competing for limited resources. The structure of the UNSI forced the chiefs and council to reconstruct these relationships and attempt to work in the best interest of the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq community.

**UNSI Objectives & Early Activities**

According to the UNSI’s 1969 constitution, the organization aims and were to:
(1) relate to the problems of Nova Scotia's First Nations, (2) represent their concerns and present their ideas at all levels of government, (3) promote the welfare and well-being of First Nations, (4) promote the progress of all native people whether living on or off reserve, (5) seek and maintain the rights of First Nations peoples and inform them of those rights, and (6) cooperate with non-native organizations and agencies in regard to aboriginal issues.  

As a result of the changing policy directions within the Department of Indian Affairs that were taking place concurrently with the establishment of the UNSI, new funding became available for political organizations. The organization immediately took advantage of this funding. The takeover of the community development program previously offered through the St. Francis Xavier University Extension Department illustrates this promptness. On September 28, just two weeks after the formation of the UNSI, president Noel Doucette sent a letter to Reverend Father George Topshee, the director of the Extension department. It stated:

It was decided that the Union will take on the task of carrying out C.D. work on Indian communities in Nova Scotia....The Union of N.S. Indians will be making a submission to the Indian Affairs Branch for take over of the Community Development Program for the year commencing 1 April, 1970. It is the hope of the Union of N.S. Indians that the St. F. X. Extension Department will not submit a proposal for C.D. Services on Indian Reserves for the coming Contract Year.... 'We now have the leaders among our numbers prepared to be MASTERS OF OUR OWN DESTINY'.

Masters of our destiny was a phase that would have resonated often through the halls of the Extension Department during the UNSI's leaders training at department. It was coined by Moses Coady, the founding director of the Extension Department, and a socio-

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190 In 1984 the Horton Band was established, making it the thirteenth band in Nova Scotia.
191 Beaton Institute, UCCB, UNSI Collection, Constitution of the Union of Nova Scotia Indians, September 13, 1969.
economic movement that spread throughout many parts of the world. Coady’s principles and ideologies of the belief of adult education and economic cooperation were deeply imbedded in the Extension Department. Masters of Their Own Destiny is the title of the story of his life and the philosophical principles behind his beliefs.193

Earlier, on May 15, 1969, Michael Brosseau, a director with the Extension Department, indicated in a letter to band councils that his department, “will not make an effort to renew our contract [with the Department of Indian Affairs] unless the Indian people ask us to do so…. The decision is yours.” However, on December 12, months after receiving the letter from Doucette, the Extension Department did request another contract with the Department of Indian Affairs. Brosseau writes, “We feel that certain problem situations warrant a contract renewal with the Branch for the period of time from April 1, 1970 to March 31, 1973.” Brosseau even included a proposal at this time but did not indicate the nature of the “problem situations.”194 There is also evidence from archival materials that the Extension Department attempted to persuade mainland Mi’kmaq band councils — who previously had not received training from the Extension Department — to support the department in its efforts to renew its contract. A letter sent to Brosseau dated January 20, 1970 from Leonard Pictou, the Shubenacadie band council’s clerk, indicates that the band had been approached to participate in the department’s programs. Pictou responded on behalf of the council, stating,

    Haveing [sic] met and disscused your program for the next three years we feel that where we have not been involved in your program for the past ten years it would be unwise for us to get involved now….If you can show us what you have

192 SFXUEDA, Indian Affairs, RG 30-3/33/1806.
194 SFXUEDA, Indian Affairs, RG 30-3/33/1784, Letter from Michael Brosseau, Director, Indian Community Development Program, St. Francis Xavier University Extension Department to W H Rogers, Director, Community Affairs, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.
done for us we may reconsider your proposal....As far as we are concerned you are not going to solve our problems by spending a Million Dollars, on hiring research staff. And Ten Thousand, on the problem itself.\textsuperscript{195}

The correspondence suggests that the Extension Department was willing to suppress the development of the Mi’kmaq people to garner the increasing funding available for aboriginal programs through the government. The department’s calculated ambition suggests its commitment toward genuine community development was not what it appeared. Despite the Extension Department’s undisclosed request, the UNSI assumed responsibility for community development programs in all Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq communities effective August 1, 1970.\textsuperscript{196}

The organization was soon appealing to various government departments and agencies to fund Mi’kmaq initiatives. However, government paternalism continued despite the redirected policy initiatives. Other organizations seemed equally unwilling to accept the UNSI as a competent, qualified organization in its early years. An example occurred in 1972 after the UNSI presented a proposal to address the housing problems on Nova Scotia’s reserves. It was a solid plan developed by the UNSI and a consulting firm from Halifax. However, the Department of Indian Affairs was developing its own plan. It forced the disheartened UNSI’s president to speak publicly on the issue stating, “We are not being given a chance to see if our ideas will work and we have not yet been told by Ottawa what their program is.”\textsuperscript{197}

\textsuperscript{195} SFXUEDA, Indian Affairs, RG 30-3/33/-58.
\textsuperscript{196} SFXUEDA, Indian Affairs, RG 30-3/33, Letter from D. Greyeyes, Regional Director, Maritimes, Indian and Eskimo Affairs to Father George Topshee, Director, St. Francis Xavier University Extension Department, July 6, 1970.
However, most of the UNSI’s initiatives were not this frustrating or as unsuccessful. In May 1970, just seven months after the creation of the organization, the UNSI hosted a conference on economic development. The conference documents describe the event as accomplishing two major achievements: “A good line of communications was established between the Union and the agencies represented,” and “The problems and aspirations of the Indian people in Nova Scotia were publicized and undoubtedly stirred the consciousness of a lot of people.”198 In 1971, the Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia, under the leadership of the UNSI, refused to pay provincial sales tax. The UNSI presented a legal brief to Premier Gerald Regan and soon the provincial government exempted the status Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia from paying provincial taxes on reserves.199 In 1972, the UNSI also lobbied and quickly gained access to social assistance for Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq according to the Canada Assistance Plan.200 In fact, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, the UNSI was so successful that a committee examining First Nations socio-economic development in Canada suggested it as a “demonstration area once the task group has completed all of the necessary planning work.”201

However, despite the UNSI’s early success, it was unable to maintain the support of Nova Scotia’s Mi’kmaq population. In 1986, the majority of mainland Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq bands broke away from the UNSI creating their own political organization, the

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200 Joe B. Marshall, president, UNSI, personal interview, December 17, 1996.
201 Beaton Institute, UCCB, UNSI Collection, Appendix of 11th Annual General Assembly, 1980, Report of the National Indian Socio-Economic Development Committee, “To Have What is One’s Own,” also referred to as the Beaver Report.
Confederacy of Mainland Micmacs. Many mainland Mi’kmaq leaders and members viewed the UNSI as a Cape Breton organization with Cape Breton Mi’kmaq interests. One prominent mainland Mi’kmaq who would be instrumental in the creation of the CMM suggested that the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq “took control” of the UNSI and was “determining who could be a Mi’kmaq.”

Diverging aspects of Mi’kmaq culture were evident in many facets of Mi’kmaq life between 1969 and 1988 including recreational activities such as baseball and hockey games, but also within the UNSI. Several Cape Breton Mi’kmaq participants noted the taunting they received from mainlanders for speaking the Mi’kmaq language during athletic competitions. For as long as many Mi’kmaq can remember, there has always been a degree of separation between the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia along this geographic boundary. It seems to be impossible to pinpoint at what time this dichotomy first occurred. One mainland Mi’kmaq participant stated that the differences date back “a very long time” while other Cape Breton Mi’kmaq participants suggested that the dichotomy has “always been there” and that those from Cape Breton are “a separate people.”

This separation was evident in 1958, after the government’s centralization policy was abandoned and Cape Breton was divided into five bands by the Department of Indian Affairs. A memorandum to the director of Indian Affairs revealed, “the Cape Breton Indians would waive any claim to reserve lands on the Mainland portion of Nova Scotia provided that the Mainland group would similarly waive any interest in reserves in Cape Breton.”202

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Although at the UNSI organizational meetings in 1969 there was a sense of solidarity among the provincial Mi’kmaq, it did not take long for divisions to expose themselves within the organization. In fact, it can be argued that these differences subtly exposed themselves during the organization meetings of 1969. At the first Mi’kmaq community meeting held in July, those in attendance broke up into discussion groups and were asked to respond to a series of questions. One of those questions was, “How large an executive” should a Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq union, if established, contain? One group responded that such a union should consist of three executive members, “One president from either area. Two Vice-Presidents – one from each area.” Although this does not demonstrate the presence of cultural dissimilarities, it does demonstrate the geographical division that existed. The UNSI’s first constitution even stipulated that a vice-president must be elected from each region.\textsuperscript{203} It was quite evident during the first election that each vice president was elected to represent the Mi’kmaq people from each region. The minutes of the last organizational meeting state: “Declared that Mr. John Knockwood be the Vice-President representing the Indians on the mainland…. Mr. Joe B. Marshall has been elected as the Vice President representing the Indians from Cape Breton,” the minutes stated.\textsuperscript{204} McGee has suggested that institutionalizing the regional vice-presidents, as well as placing the chiefs on the board of directors was an attempt to overcome the “distrust of the mainlanders” toward the organization and “another device for winning support of the mainland.”\textsuperscript{205} Because the mainland had more bands, mainland chiefs would assume more power within the board if each chief was given a position.

\textsuperscript{203} UNSI, 1969 Constitution, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., p. 10
McGee and Tord Larsen have both made reference to the presence of a geographical boundary and cultural differences among the Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia during the period under study. Larsen observed that a “division” existed among the Cape Breton and mainland Mi’kmaq and the dichotomy was “a real one culturally and socially.”\textsuperscript{206} In describing the conflicts with Mi’kmaq communities, Larsen concluded that, “The latent conflict between the Micmac on Cape Breton and those on the mainland is made worse by cultural differences, Cape Breton being the more Micmac part of the province, at least as far as language is concerned.”\textsuperscript{207} One Cape Breton Mi’kmaq participant contends that the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq have “hung on to traditional values, beliefs, customs and language,” unlike the mainland Mi’kmaq. McGee observed this dichotomy within the early years of the UNSI suggesting the possibility of a “fission along regional lines.”\textsuperscript{208} By early 1985 the fission was so severe on the Mi’kmaq political terrain that it prompted at least one mainland band councillor to state, “We don’t trust the union anymore.”\textsuperscript{209} As a result, most mainland bands joined efforts to create an organization to represent the mainland Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq communities.

**Establishment of the Confederacy of Mainland Micmacs**

*Why Representation Was Needed*

Although the division between the Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia factions of the UNSI, according to research participants, had been evident since the mid-1970s, it was not until a decade later that the organization splintered. The Confederacy

\textsuperscript{205} McGee, 1973, p. 117.


\textsuperscript{207} Ibid, p. 102.

\textsuperscript{208} McGee, 1973, p. 117.
of Mainland Micmacs was officially established in December 1986 by five of eight mainland bands – Indian Brook, Millbrook, Afton, Pictou Landing and the newly created Horton band. The Horton band was created that same year after one of two factions within the Annapolis Valley band decided to apply to the Department of Indian Affairs to create its own band.

One of the larger areas of discontent within the mainland component of the UNSI was the failure of organizational constitutional reform. Many mainland bands wanted amendments to the UNSI’s constitution which would have allowed for an alternate method of selecting the executive. Mainland chiefs had been arguing for some time that the higher Cape Breton Mi’kmaq population resulted in an unfairly high number of Cape Bretoners elected to executive positions. As Table 1 demonstrates, the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq population was larger than the mainland population. Because the mainland had more bands, however, the appointment of the executive by the Nova Scotia chiefs would have given the mainland the advantage in determining the UNSI executive (see Table 2 and Appendix III). Chief Lawrence Paul from the Millbrook Mi’kmaq community near Truro even suggested the UNSI was partly responsible for the formation of the CMM by not addressing the mainland chiefs’ concerns over the overrepresentation of Cape Breton within the organization.210 The chief said in 1987 the UNSI failed to heed the mainland chiefs’ warnings, suggesting that once the UNSI had “great political clout” when it was established but since the mid-1970s it “waned” and had “outlived its usefulness.”211 This issue was addressed at a 1984 UNSI General Assembly, however according to the

minutes of the meeting four mainland bands walked out the assembly before any votes were cast, leaving the assembly without its required quorum. As a result, the meeting ended leaving many members in attendance unsure if the UNSI was still in existence.

Table 1

![Bar chart showing total Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq population from 1969 to 1988.](chart)

Source: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada

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212 Beaton Institute, UCCB, UNSI Collection, 16th Annual General Assembly, July 3 & 4, 1985, UNSI
Table 2
Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq Bands Post-1985

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<tr>
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<td>Eskasoni</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapel Island</td>
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<td>Wagmatcook</td>
<td>Bear River</td>
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<td>Whycobah</td>
<td>Horton</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Millbrook</td>
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<td>Pictou Landing</td>
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One Cape Breton chief was so unsure he asked the chair: “Does this mean we longer have an association?”\textsuperscript{213} The division and deep rooted tension between the two groups during the assembly, and another in Bear River, was articulated by the editor of the *Micmac News*, who wrote about the event nearly a year and a half later:

Two controversial assemblies in Halifax and Bear River in 1984 left a sour taste in everyone’s mouth ending in bitterness, division and the fall of a tired and wounded president [Noel Doucette]…. While it may have made good press, it left

\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.
deep scars on the Micmac nation and impeded its march towards liberation from the tutelage of federal and provincial governments.\textsuperscript{214}

This would be the first of many occasions during the course of the next few months and years that Nova Scotia’s Mi’kmaq political leaders would be unsure of the future of the UNSI.

The mainland chiefs also wanted to take control of administrative programs which were currently being provided by the Department of Indian Affairs. While the UNSI was viewed as a lobby or political organization, the mainland chiefs wanted to administer programs under the department’s Tribal Council Funding Policy. This policy allowed for First Nations organizations to receive funding for advisory services in five areas: financial management, band government support, economic development, community planning and technical services.\textsuperscript{215}

Although the CMM was officially formed in December 1986, talks had begun earlier with some of the mainland chiefs. In May 1984, the chiefs and representatives from Millbrook, Afton, Pictou Landing and Acadia met and signed a tentative deal to create a new council. Then on February 6, representatives from Millbrook, Afton and Horton met again to discuss the creation of a mainland organization. The next day, Millbrook and Afton along with Indian Brook, which had not attended the earlier meetings, officially withdrew from the UNSI,\textsuperscript{216} although all four continued to attend UNSI meetings with the understanding that the UNSI politically represented all UNSI bands. Together with Horton, which never officially sought membership within the UNSI – although attended its meetings – these three bands organized the creation of a

new First Nations organization. On December 2, the Pictou Landing band joined this group and met with the Nova Scotia District Manager of the Department of Indian Affairs to discuss the possible funding option for their new council.217

The CMM was created to be an administrative organization, with political representation still provided by the UNSI. Chief Lawrence Paul, who was leading player in the creation of the CMM, stated in January 1985, that the new organization had a "purely administrative" function.218 Although the members of the CMM continued to attend UNSI meetings for political representation, it soon became evident that the relationship became too strained. In September 1987, Indian Brook and Millbrook withdrew completely from the organization. The next month Pictou Landing and Afton also withdrew, and Horton decided to no longer attend UNSI meetings.219 Bear River joined the CMM later that same year and severed its ties with the UNSI at the same time. The Acadia Band had attended CMM meetings and is considered a founder of the CMM, but after a community band meeting it was decided to remain with the UNSI.

Throughout the two year process that ended with the establishment of the CMM, the UNSI leadership continued to articulate the importance of a cohesive provincial Mi'kmag organization. On April 23, 1987 the UNSI president, Alex Christmas, addressed the membership during the 18th Annual General Assembly, stating, "We must speak with a strong, united voice," despite, "certain elements which seek to divide us."220 The president concluded, suggesting that, the Nova Scotia leaders should focus their energy fighting against the federal and provincial governments, instead of amongst

themselves, obviously speaking of the dissident CMM bands. By September, however, the president seemed to accept the reality of the political landscape of Mi’kmaq Nova Scotia. In a letter sent to each band with CMM affiliation, he stated the UNSI accepts the bands’ decision "with deep regret." The UNSI president accused the federal government of using tribal councils as a divide and conquer technique to politically weaken the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia. "This strategy denies our inherent right to govern ourselves as implied in out treaties. It further seeks to fragment our nation into tiny little pieces so we can lose sight of our precious national rights." According to a Micmac News story, Christmas went so far as to suggest the, “Confederacy was nothing but a pawn in Ottawa’s game plan to sell the federal brand of self-government which will lead to the creation of municipal government units dependent entirely upon the Minister of Indian Affairs...." Despite the president’s plea, the five mainland bands proceeded with their plans of creating a new organization to represent the needs of mainland Mi’kmaq bands. The UNSI’s president’s remarks reveal the opposing strategies of the CMM and UNSI. While the UNSI was seeking to control its own programs, the CMM was seeking to take over government aboriginal programs.

Structure of the Organization

The structure of the CMM was also unlike that of the UNSI. The CMM had an appointed executive director who was selected by the chiefs not elected by band members. There was no band election system as was required by the UNSI’s

221 Ibid.
constitution. The CMM’s constitution gave complete control over the organization’s activities to the member band councils.\textsuperscript{225} This reaffirmed the band councils as the legal governments of the bands and also the councils’ responsibility to their community for negotiations and agreements with government.

Unlike the UNSI, member chiefs were unable to be employed with the CMM. A clause in the CMM’s by-laws prohibited any chief or band councillor from employment during their term in office.\textsuperscript{226} This was to keep the organization from becoming too political and instead maintained employee responsibility to the CMM and not to individual bands. The organization also set up a trust fund with a goal of raising $1 million to cover the cost of defending aboriginal rights as well as benefits and entitlements to member bands.\textsuperscript{227}

By June 1987, the CMM had eight employees including the executive director, Daniel N. Paul, who was appointed by the five chiefs. All were previous employees of the federal government or other aboriginal organizations, including the UNSI.\textsuperscript{228} Don Julien, a former employee with the UNSI, was the CMM’s first research director. Paul described the importance of an educated, qualified CMM staff in his monograph, \textit{We Were Not the Savages}. Paul wrote:

\begin{quote}
During the early 1970s, one of the biggest unexposed scandals that took place [within the Department of Indian Affairs] was the way the Department handled the ‘devolution of programs’ to Bands. Taxpayers would have been outraged at the time had they known how this was mishandled. Millions upon millions of dollars were distributed by bureaucrats to Band governments without ensuring that they had the wherewithal to manage and account for the funds.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{225} Beaton Institute, UCCB, “Tribal Councils to Get $16 Million,” \textit{Micmac News}, October 1987.
\textsuperscript{227} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{228} Ibid.
This was wrong and exhibited bureaucratic incompetence at its highest level. The negative fallout from this incompetence is still felt by Band governments today. Because of it they lack sound financial management procedures and many are debt-ridden. To assure that the newly created Confederacy of Mainland Micmacs was [not] victimized by this, when I was hired as its first Executive Director in 1987 I wrote the operation by-laws in such a way that it requires CMM’s manager to operate it in a professional and fully accountable manner. Thus the organization employs only fully qualified people who can do the jobs they have been recruited to do. For this reason the organization has been viewed by a good many Department bureaucrats as a threat to their existence, because if all other Indian organizations followed CMM’s lead the Department would soon disappear.229

The structure of the CMM demonstrates the variances between the two organizations.

The UNSI constitution allowed chiefs to be members of the board of directors while holding a remunerated executive position. In fact, more often than not, it was chiefs who were elected to the executive positions.

Restructuring of Relationships

Although by the end of 1987 several CMM chiefs had withdrawn completely from the UNSI, the thirteen chiefs still held directors’ positions together on other boards. Several UNSI off-shoot organizations were in existence by 1987, as well as some independent agencies and authorities, such as the Micmac Association of Cultural Studies and the Mi’kmaw Kina’matnewey (the Mi’kmaq Education Authority). Often these organizations represented all, or many, Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq communities. As a result, the chiefs represented their communities on the board of directors of these organizations. This required a working relationship between chiefs represented by the CMM and those represented by the UNSI. It also meant the chiefs had to put aside their political differences for the benefit of the communities they represented.

229 Paul, 2000, p. 309.
As previously mentioned, membership in the CMM was restricted to the chiefs and councillors of member bands. This differed from the UNSI's structure which had community membership and public annual general assemblies in which band members could pose questions to the executive and the chiefs. Although the chiefs and councillors were responsible to their bands through the CMM constitution and by-laws, the CMM was less accessible to Mi'kmaq communities because they were not part of the membership. Community decisions were made by chiefs, with the approval of their council, not the community membership. Conversely, in the UNSI, every community member was able to participate, to an extent, in the activities of the organization.

The CMM did not have an executive, instead the member chiefs appointed an executive director. Therefore the executive director was not directly responsible to the Mi'kmaq community, but to the chiefs who were responsible to their communities. The CMM, therefore, because of its structure, did not have elected vice-presidents or a secretary-treasurer. All employees, including the executive director, were hired based on their qualifications not their popularity. This too, became an issue of contention within the UNSI prior to the establishment of the CMM. With the elected executives often Cape Breton chiefs, often being elected because of the higher Cape Breton population, mainland chiefs accused the executive of displaying a Cape Breton bias. While chiefs were responsible to their community, and not a region, the geographical dichotomy that was evident within the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia exacerbated the accusations.

Objectives and Activities

Although the members defined the CMM as an administrative organization within the Mi'kmaq community, it quickly assumed a political role, making its top priority land
claims and treaty rights. Although the CMM did take over programs formally administered by the Department of Indian Affairs, the organization did become politically active. Discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five, the CMM held separate meetings with provincial and federal government representatives on issues of land claims and the recognition of treaty rights. The CMM also became involved in court cases and assumed the costs of representing Mi’kmaq individuals charged with illegal hunting and fishing. Member chiefs of the CMM also attended First Ministers’ Conferences, a political move the UNSI was against. The editor of the Micmac News observed this political behavior in 1987 when he noted:

The Confederacy was intended to function as an administrative agency, set up with federal funds, to deliver services which are currently provided by the Department of Indian Affairs. However, it soon became engaged in political activities making its presence felt provincially and nationally, even if it meant breaking ranks with the Union on major issues.230

However, despite criticism from the UNSI on its political nature, the CMM continued to press ahead with its agenda and was quick to make progress on several of its key priorities.

During a September 10, 1987 CMM meeting, the executive director told the membership that the organization had completed research on a Halifax County land claim and three others had been submitted to the Department of Indian Affairs’ Office of Native Claims.231 A Band Management Training program had also been established and was training band employees.232 The CMM staff had also completed a catalogue of all funding foundations in Canada and had begun working on catalogues for the United

232 Ibid.
One month later, during a board of directors meeting, the CMM chiefs presented a position paper on the Department of Indian Affairs’ tribal council funding. The chiefs perspective on the new organization was expressed in this paper and recorded in a *Micmac News* story:

The Chiefs feel that the Confederacy is proving to be a success, as their band employees are receiving information and training that will assist them with coping with cutbacks. Their councils are receiving assistance in solving long outstanding land problems, a development corporation is being set up, a trust fund has been established, ten of their band members are employed with the CMM, alternative sources of funding are being identified, individual band members are being assisted in solving personal problems, and three land claims have been submitted to [the Department of Indian Affairs] for validation. All the activities mentioned, have been accomplished in a short time, the chiefs said, as the CMM has only been in full operation since June 1, 1987.

By the summer of 1988, the Atlantic Region Director General of the Department of Indian Affairs publicly commented on the success of the CMM. During the CMM’s second annual assembly, Bill Cooke noted:

I [have] never seen a tribal council move forward [as] aggressively and effectively as you have with very open and forthright dialogue. That is certainly a sign of maturity..... You are serving as a model for the rest of the region – in education, capital moneys, housing, financial management and planning – all programs taken over by the Confederacy.

Cooke concluded that the CMM has seen more success than similar organizations in Ontario. Although Cooke’s sentiments express the success of the CMM, it was comments such as these from government representatives as well as the relationships the CMM had with government officials that caused the UNSI’s president to suggest “the Confederacy was nothing but a pawn in Ottawa’s game plan...”

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233 Ibid.
236 Ibid.
Despite the backing of Cooke, the Department of Indian Affairs again displayed its paternalism toward the Mi’kmaq peoples, as was the experience of the UNSI, when the Mi’kmaq attempted to control their own lives and futures. In 1987 the CMM chiefs attempted to take over the department’s post-secondary education program. The request, officially made by the executive director of the organization, was initially rejected, according to the Department’s Regional Director of Education, because after consulting the Memorandum of Association for the CMM, the director determined that the organization was advisory in nature. This did not sit well with the executive director who was intimately familiar with the constitution – he wrote it.\footnote{Paul, 2000, pp. 309 – 10.} After a year of negotiating the department finally succumbed. Although government paternalism continued to rear its head periodically in the CMM’s attempts to administer government programs, the organization was tremendously successful in gaining autonomy over the control of future programming.

Using Raymond Breton’s definition, the establishment of the CMM officially created a segmented political order within the Mi’kmaq sociopolitical structure. The UNSI and the CMM were now “parallel subsystems”\footnote{Breton, p. 21.} each governing and representing its own segment of the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq community. As is typical of a segmented political order, this split occurred early in the community development period of the Mi’kmaq community. Community development began in the early 1960s under the direction of the Extension Department and accelerated after many individuals trained at the department were instrumental in the establishment of the UNSI. However, with that establishment – conflicting agendas and ideologies, cultural and otherwise – were soon
apparent. Although the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq political landscape was officially and legally altered in late 1986, the factors which finally led to the splintering of the UNSI were evident more than a decade earlier. The next three chapters will examine some of these factors through an analysis of the cultural differences that were evident between the Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq within the political sphere between 1969 and 1988.
Chapter 3: Language in Politics: The UNSI Experience

One of the most pronounced cultural differences between the Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq communities between 1969 and 1988 was in language. During the period under study, the retention of the Mi'kmaq language on Cape Breton was much higher than on mainland Nova Scotia. Cape Breton Mi'kmaq linguist Bernie Francis suggests that close to 95 per cent of Cape Breton Mi'kmaq were able to speak Mi'kmaq during these years. 240 All Cape Breton chiefs during this period were bilingual. Conversely, the mainland chiefs often spoke only English, and encouraged their community members to speak it as well. This cultural difference spilled over into the political realm of Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq society as this chapter will demonstrate.

The Mi'kmaq Language

The Mi'kmaq language is the northernmost eastern Algonquian language, and was once spoken by the entire Mi'kmaq Nation, which covers Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, the Gaspe area of Quebec and parts of Newfoundland (See Figure 1). Virginia Miller has suggested that it is likely that the language is closely tied to that of the Malecite, a nation west of traditional Mi'kmaq territory. 241 While there is no one accepted view of the origin of the language, she notes that the Great Lakes area is probably the source of the language family, given that the Mi'kmaq migrated to Atlantic Canada from the area centuries ago. 242 Miller obtained this information during papers read at various Algonquian Conferences and the resulting material published in

242 Ibid.
Figure 1

the Proceedings of the Meetings. This suggests that there is academic support for this conclusion.

The pre-contact Mi’kmaq had no written language, but instead had a strong oral tradition. According to Ruth Holmes Whitehead, the Mi’kmaq had “very efficient ways of passing information on to following generations – ways of teaching the children of their past and their customs, of how the world worked and the [Mi’kmaq’s] place within that world.” Nicholas Denys, observed the importance of and reliance on oral tradition during his time with the Mi’kmaq in the early seventeenth century. He noted the people, “composed stories which were pleasing and spirited. When they told one of them, it was always as heard from their grandfather. These made it appear that they had knowledge of the Deluge, and of matters of the ancient law.” According to Bock, during the seventeenth century, however, Chretien Le Clercq, a Catholic missionary, developed a hieroglyphic system to assist the Restigouche Mi’kmaq in memorizing prayers. Abbé Pierre Maillard continued this system there into the eighteenth century, but it is no longer in use. According to McGee, in the late 1960s in Nova Scotia there were still a few elderly people who corresponded using hieroglyphs to write personal letters. Additionally, the hymns sung at Chapel Island during the St. Anne’s Day celebrations are sung from hieroglyphic texts.

The Restigouche Mi’kmaq discreetly developed their own orthography in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century which Father Pacifique, who arrived among the Mi’kmaq in the twentieth century, modified and translated into scriptures in an effort to

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encourage literacy. Pacifique published *The Micmac Messenger* in Mi’kmaq for 17 years. Although Pacifique’s system is still in use, during the 1970s, the Micmac Association for Cultural Studies employed linguist Doug Smith along with Membertou resident Bernie Francis to develop a more appropriate writing system, known as the Smith-Francis orthography. They found that Pacifique under-differentiated the Mi’kmaq sound system by not using enough letters of the Roman alphabet. Pacifique incorporated 13 letters, where Smith and Francis uncovered 27 distinct sounds and 17 letters to represent those sounds. This system quickly replaced Pacifique’s and became the most commonly used writing system.

The Value Placed on the Mi’kmaq Language and The UNSI Experience

Although English seems to have been spoken almost exclusively in the early years of the UNSI, as the organization matured, however, it increasingly incorporated the Mi’kmaq language. McGee, who attended some of the first UNSI meetings, observed only the use of English during these meetings and General Assemblies. However, research participants who were directly involved in the UNSI – both mainlanders and Cape Bretoners – discussed the use of Mi’kmaq within the UNSI. While official business was carried out in English, Mi’kmaq was spoken by Cape Bretoners and those few mainlanders who had an understanding of the language.

The Cape Breton Mi’kmaq peoples’ valuing of their traditional language is the result of their historical experiences, as well as their geography. The importance was

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245 Bock, 1978, p. 109. Because Bock conducted most of his research in Restigouche, it is fair to conclude that he is speaking of the Restigouche Mi’kmaq of Quebec in his findings.
246 McGee, personal correspondence.
248 Ibid.
expressed repeatedly by the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq during research interviews. The Mi’kmaq language is considered by many who speak it to be the cornerstone of Mi’kmaq culture. As Table 3 demonstrates, the use of the Mi’kmaq language during the period under study was most prevalent in Cape Breton and eastern mainland Nova Scotia. In Cape Breton, the language was the “usual” or “occasional” language spoken in the homes of 95 per cent of those surveyed. This figure can be extrapolated to reflect the UNSI Cape Breton membership who shared this use of the traditional Mi’kmaq language. Language contextualizes the culture to Cape Bretoners; without it there is no culture or the culture is incomplete. One Cape Breton Mi’kmaq participant articulated the importance of language this way: “The Mi’kmaq language is intrinsically linked to the culture – the two cannot be separated. Without the language there is no culture; it is superficial without it. Language is intertwined with everything.” Another Cape Bretoner described the cultural importance of language as, “the foundation of who Mi’kmaq are as a people, we need [language] to understand ourselves fully as Mi’kmaq....Language allows for everything else: pride, spirituality [and] understanding you are part of the land.... Cape Breton Mi’kmaq are spiritually happier [than mainland Mi’kmaq] and are culturally independent.” The implication was that Cape Breton Mi’kmaq people are culturally independent of the mainlanders, particularly those who do not speak the Mi’kmaq language.
Table 3

Micmac Language
On-Reserve Adult Population 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Used at Home</th>
<th>Southern Mainland</th>
<th>Central Mainland</th>
<th>Eastern Mainland</th>
<th>Cape Breton</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Usually</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>91.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Marie Battiste, a Mi’kmaq born in Maine but who has studied Mi’kmaq language, described the place of language in Mi’kmaq culture, she suggests:

The Mi’kmaq language exists as the essential base of knowledge and survival. More than just a knowledge base, Mi’kmaq language reflects a philosophy, a philosophy of how we shall live with one another, a philosophy that reflects how we treat each other, and how all things in the world fit together. We all live in a circle and within the circle we are all dependent on each other and are in a constant relationship with each other.\textsuperscript{250}

As is the perspective of many Mi’kmaq CapeBretoners, to Battiste, language is an important symbol of identity. She argues that, “once people lose their language they very quickly begin to lose their cultural identity…. Language embodies the worldview, the values and traditions and it [is] all manifested in the culture – the food and clothing and

\textsuperscript{250} Battiste, “Mi’kmaq Socialization Patterns,” pp. 147 – 48.
Language is the basis for [Mi’kmaq] knowledge.”

One Cape Bretoner identified language and the oral tradition as the greatest difference between mainland and Cape Breton Mi’kmaq people during the period under investigation. The importance of oral tradition to some Mi’kmaq is demonstrated through Murdena Marshall’s understanding of the tradition. It is from:

Oral traditions that one can view the world through the window of tribal consciousness. It is through this window that our behaviour has been governed, a behavior which is acceptable within our tribal world. It is crucial that we are accepted in our world initially. It is vital in order for one to survive in this world, to learn these sets of rules that have been given to us by the Creator.

An interesting perspective on Mi’kmaq language is provided in Leslie Jane McMillan’s work on the Grand Council. In the study, Grand Chief Ben Sylliboy of the Mi’kmaq Grand Council comments on the relationship between language and culture:

One of the things I love about our history is that even though we were the first to be contacted, we still retain our language, whereas other[s] contacted after us have lost it all, they have been gobbled up by white society.... I mean anybody can wear a headdress, anyone can wear a choker and whatever else, but if you don’t have the language, you don’t have the culture.

What makes the Grand Chief’s comments so interesting is his position within Mi’kmaq society. As the Grand Chief of the Grand Council he would suggest that he represents the entire Mi’kmaq Nation. However, his philosophy on the value of the Mi’kmaq language would alienate the vast majority of mainland Mi’kmaq, by suggesting that mainlanders lack Mi’kmaq culture. The philosophy reveals the division between the mainland and Cape Breton Mi’kmaq people, at least in terms of the value placed on their

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traditional language. It reflects the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq experience and their relationship with their traditional language as this chapter will demonstrate.

Mainlanders, most not being fluent in Mi’kmaq, have a contrasting value of the place of language within Mi’kmaq culture. One mainlander responded with this when asked about the use of Mi’kmaq on mainland Nova Scotia:

We can’t apologize for being assimilated, but we know that it’s a going concern. Language is an issue, but we can’t apologize for being assimilated, because we are. We just have to live with that…[Cape Bretoners are] so isolated. There are so many people in Eskasoni, they kept the language. We’re here in town, and like I said, I’m half Irish and half Mi’kmaq, so you talk English, so I speak English as well.

When asked to respond to a Cape Breton Mi’kmaq perspective that being Mi’kmaq means an ability to speak Mi’kmaq, the same participant explained:

A friend of mine told me one time [that] some guy said to him: ‘If I smashed you in the head with a bat right now, and you couldn’t speak, or hear, or understand anymore, would you consider yourself any less Indian?’ And that’s the truth, that’s what it comes down to. You go around here, and there’s lots of dark people that are full-blooded Indian who don’t speak their language. Through no fault of their own, we just went to school in town, we participated. A lot of people would argue we’re better off speaking English.

To this individual, being Mi’kmaq has little, if anything, to do with an ability to speak the Mi’kmaq language. Instead, identity is symbolized by ancestry, the individual’s reference to “dark skin” and “full-blooded” Mi’kmaq people suggest that heredity is given a greater value than language.

This perspective can be illustrated by referencing almost any mainland interview. Here, three are chosen. Although most mainlanders agree that the retention of their traditional language should be preserved, all agreed that a command of the English language was more valuable to the Mi’kmaq people. As one mainlander explained it: “It
would do me no good to go into a meeting with you if I wanted something or had to negotiate with you and I went in speaking Mi’kmaq.” Another mainland’s comments almost mirrors that of the first respondent:

[Cape Bretoners] passed [the language] down to their children. Down there [in Cape Breton] there were no mixed marriages. My father grew up in [a non-native Nova Scotia community], he didn’t grow up on a reserve, he did a lot of fishing with his grandfather on the Banks of Newfoundland and my grandfather hung around the white society, just the same as everybody else. My father would be classified as 50% now under the Indian Act. His mother was white and his father was native....

Of course its good to retain your culture, but in another way if you speak the Mi’kmaq language all the time you’re kind of shy to get out and speak to government officials when you speak broken English.... The language among [mainlanders] kinda [sic] died out.... In the Mi’kmaq language there is no him or her, there is no distinction between the two. My ex father-in-law spoke a lot of Mi’kmaq and when he took a woman to town [and later discussed the outing in English] he said ‘I took him to town,’ and when he took a guy to town he said ‘I took her to town.’ So when he spoke English he didn’t think about him or her, he got mixed up...

I married a girl that lived [on a Cape Breton reserve] once and I lived [there] for three months and I was going nuts. They would talk English to you one on one but as soon as another native came along they started Mi’kmaq talk and I didn’t understand what they were talking about. It caused difficulties with the marriage too, because, when my in-laws came down [to my reserve] to visit me they all came in the house and sat around the kitchen table and talked Mi’kmaq, [and left] me sitting there like a God damn idiot never understanding what they were saying, so I said [to myself] back then yep, this is going to ruin [the marriage]. I’d go in the other room and get a book and read and my wife would come in and say ‘you’re kinda [sic] slighting my people – my mother and sister.’ I would say, ‘Why should I sit out there, if they speak English I’d join them, but they speak Mi’kmaq. They know I don’t understand it so why do they do it. They’re ignorant. So therefore I’m not going to join them until they speak English.’

A third mainland participant noted that the ability to speak Mi’kmaq would be “nice” but then added that if the ability existed there would be no one to speak to because everyone else spoke English where the individual was raised:

I asked my mother why [she] did not teach us the language and she said years ago it was for our betterment. They thought it was right not to teach us. This was
part of what was happening to the native.... So, you almost got into... a 'white is right' policy which is more common on the mainland bands, and I don't know why maybe because they were affected the most. What benefit [would it be], who am I going to talk to?

The majority of mainland Mi'kmaq interview participants suggested that, while the traditional language was important or would like the ability to speak it, they are "better off" speaking English.

While McGee and Larsen disagree on the importance of language to the culture of the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia, validity can be given to both interpretations if recontextualized. McGee has suggested that during the early period under investigation the Mi’kmaq language was "by far the most important determinant of one’s being considered a Micmac."254 Larsen on the other hand has argued that, "language functions as a way of signaling identity, but Micmac can be used only on reserves where people are fluent and at ease with the language. In other parts of the province, place of residence, or even surname, serves the same purpose."255 Throughout the study, Cape Breton Mi’kmaq research participants repeatedly presented the value of the Mi’kmaq language by identifying it as the greatest cultural difference between themselves and mainlanders, or stated that without knowledge of the language they would not feel that they were Mi’kmaq. Given this, to suggest that language was not the most determining factor of being Mi’kmaq in Cape Breton during this period, and perhaps even today, holds little credence. However, the distinction should be made between Mi’kmaq cultural identity on Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia. Interestingly, however, was the collage of mainland participant responses to the question: What does being Mi’kmaq mean to you? In stark contradiction to the responses of Cape Bretoners, the mainlanders did not provide

consistent replies to questions that focused on cultural values or cultural identity. The
most significant theme throughout the comments focused on the historical treatment of
Mi’kmaq by Europeans and the pre-contact Mi’kmaq period. Two responses provide the
element here.

Being damn proud of where I come from, who I am and the fact that we come
from a people that overcame and survived one of the most sadistic regimes that
ever existed. And that in fact many of us that are here today are able to sit down
and talk to people like you... I was taught to be ashamed of my heritage in school
and it gave me a horrendous inferiority complex. And then to learn that what I
taught was just the opposite of what the truth. I feel very good about who we
came from and I think this modern society is light years behind the enlightened
society that the Mi’kmaq people had. The social benefits of living in that society
is not even comparable, everyone was equal, there was no such thing as jealously
and greed, or possessions, or language, or colour. Everyone was treated as equal
there was no such thing as discrimination. If other Native American Nations had
been like the European people and possessed the same drive for greedy
possessions we wouldn’t be here today. They would have devoted most of their
energies toward developing armaments to kill one another and would have been
very well prepared to repulse any enemy at the time Columbus landed in the
Caribbean. But not being societies that were centred on self and aggrandized,
there was no need...

The second:

It’s kinda [sic] a tough question, I would say. Years ago before they started
changing history books in education, curriculum and things like that. How they
treated native people when I was going to school is quite different than how they
are treated today. The books were mostly about the French and English. There
was nothing in the books about natives. A lot of people that were of native
descent, if they had a lot of money and looked like a non-Indian, they wouldn’t
admit that they had native blood in them. They thought they would be
discriminated against if people found out they had native blood in them...

Well, I don’t know, I guess, the way you look at it, you are brought up on a native
reserve which is kinda [sic] a different society, [in terms of] the way you were
brought up. Mi’kmaq people were raised on Catholic religion, they were very
devote Catholics. I think a lot of it was the superstition side of the native people –
the priests, sisters and catechism things like that, preaching about purgatory and
hell and terrifying the natives to be good, is what I said when I got older....

Being a Mi’kmak, well I guess it’s something to be proud of, you’re the first people here and you got a lot of reasons to be proud. Native people are a proud race of people with their own way before the coming of the non-Indian. They had a political system with rules and regulations in place that were second to none.... Then the non-Indian settlers came over here and their population superceded the native population... Then the native people had a cultural upheaval and there was a change – they had to accept a different culture. They put in history books and Catholic religion that the old [Mi’kmak] ways were pagan ways, were savage ways and this is the right way. So you were always ashamed of your own race because they didn’t think they had anything to be proud of. It was not until later on that the contributions that native people made to early settlers, and assisting them were put in books. The contribution that the native people made to Canada in general took a long time be recognized.... Kids now are more proud of their ancestry....It is starting to be portrayed in its rightful way.

It is interesting to note another mainland participant referencing ancestry, in this case “native blood” was a symbol of Mi’kmak identity. During the course of the interviews, however, not one person identified themselves by surname or place of residence as Larsen suggested were symbols of Mi’kmak identity. Despite this, Larsen’s theory of language as one of several possibilities to signal identity would be stronger if limited to mainland Nova Scotia.

McGee also observed what he referred to as an “anxiety” over the potential loss of the language among the Mi’kmak during the early part of the period under study. He commented that:

All of the adult, and many of the young, Micmac with whom I spoke expressed concern that the language is dying and the people must work very hard to make sure that the language is preserved. This anxiety, I believe, is more the result of hostility by whites to the use of the language than to any lack of knowledge of the language among the youth. The Micmac are discouraged from using their language by teachers, priests and nuns, government officials, the courts and other whites and white institutions. I have yet to meet a Micmac who was not fluent in his native tongue, regardless of age. Micmac will not soon die out as a language, but the anxiety over its loss will remain as long as the dominant society continues to hold it in low esteem.256

It was not McGee’s intention to segregate the Mi’kmaq he encountered into regional groupings, and therefore did not suggest whether this anxiety was predominantly among the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq. However, what is interesting is that the anxiety McGee referred to is still evident among the Mi’kmaq in Cape Breton. Most Cape Breton research participants expressed concern over the loss of the language. The looming death of the language was expressed by several participants; despite measures that have been taken to ensure its survival since McGee’s fieldwork.

A Mi’kmaq studies program was introduced at UCCB several years ago that offers Mi’kmaq language instruction, and a Mi’kmaq Resource Centre has been established at the Beaton Institute to house Mi’kmaq related materials which include a variety of documentation on the Mi’kmaq language. Cultural programs have also been introduced into the education curriculum in many areas to promote Mi’kmaq language and culture. Although beyond the scope of this work, today, Mi’kmaq is still spoken during UNSI meetings. The UNSI’s Board of Directors is fluent, as well as the executive director and much of its staff.

Several participants contend that “no one under the age of 40 can speak the language anymore on some reserves.” Yet, anyone spending any time at UCCB can observe the use of Mi’kmaq among Mi’kmaq students who are half that age. A trip to a shopping mall or store in Cape Breton located near a Mi’kmaq community will reveal Mi’kmaq parents communicating with their young children in their traditional language.

**Language and the UNSI**

The place of language within the political organizational framework of the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq between 1969 and 1988 has already been discussed in this chapter to an
extent. The perspectives discussed in the previous pages of this chapter are of those who were directly involved in Mi’kmaq politics; were keen observers attending UNSI General Assemblies or participated in the CMM in its early years.

One Cape Breton Mi’kmaq individual directly involved in the formation of the UNSI suggests that the Mi’kmaq language played a role in the establishment of the organization. Cape Breton’s Mi’kmaq communities articulated their vision of a Mi’kmaq union in the Mi’kmaq language. One former Cape Breton UNSI executive explained the use of Mi’kmaq within the UNSI, contending that Cape Breton Mi’kmaq could understand and express themselves more completely in Mi’kmaq. Another Cape Breton participant made similar connections between the use of Mi’kmaq and the UNSI’s functioning, suggesting that: “Language is the basis of the culture, and the organization understood that because they were Mi’kmaq.” In describing the language, the same participant suggested that it was “important to the Cape Bretoners, but the mainlanders didn’t understand Mi’kmaw concepts such as Netukulimk,” which explains sustaining life. During UNSI meetings concepts were discussed by Cape Breton leaders in Mi’kmaq “because there are no terms in the English language” to explain the ideas brought forward by leaders.

For the Mi’kmaq of Cape Breton, then, the language was a symbol of who they were, it was their natural mode of communication, essential for expressing their ideas, concepts and emotions. The Mi’kmaq language was what distinguished them from non-Mi’kmaq society, and in many instances from mainland Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq, particularly on the provincial political terrain. Cape Bretoners did not want to separate themselves from the language, because it was that language that expressed who they
were. It was a vital symbol of their identity. Marie Battiste has explained how the thought processes in Mi’kmaq differ from those in English. She describes Mi’kmaq as: a verb-based language which focuses on the processes, cycles and interrelationships of all things. Unlike English and its related languages that are noun-based, Mi’kmaq identifies objects and concepts in terms or their use or their relationship to other things in an active process. Mi’kmaq language resonates the importance or relations and relationships, for these are important to our total survival. Mi’kmaq people believe that because all things are connected, all of us must depend on each other as a way of life, for that is what it means to be in balance and harmony with earth. If we do not care about each other and about animals, about the plants and their survival, about the trees and their survival, then we will not survive ourselves for very long.257

The use of Mi’kmaq within the organization exacerbated other tensions that were growing within the UNSI, some of which will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five. Similar to the experience of the mainlander who thought his Cape Breton in-laws were ignorant for communicating in Mi’kmaq when they knew he did not understand the language, mainland politicians did not grasp why Cape Breton UNSI members communicated in Mi’kmaq when they too realized that many mainlanders could not take part. One mainland participant described the Cape Bretoners use of Mi’kmaq as condescending:

I felt they felt they were more superior; they speak more of the Mi’kmaq language than the mainland and they use it, you know... I wasn’t brought up on [the Mi’kmaq language]. I was born off-reserve ...My parents spoke Mi’kmaq but I never could learn it ...too much of a tongue twister...I had a deaf ear to Mi'kmaq but the Cape Bretoners would deliberately speak it but a lot of the mainlanders couldn’t speak it...they held that against us. They had their conversations, about us, I guess, or, whatever they wanted.

Another spoke of a scenario during a UNSI meeting. “They used to speak Mi’kmaq at meetings. One chief said ‘to be a true Indian you have to be able to speak the language.’ And that’s what caused a big rift [between the Cape Bretoners and the mainlanders].”
Although, not related directly to the UNSI experience, another mainlander recalled a similar incident when applying for employment with a Cape Breton band. "I applied for a job one time at a Cape Breton band," the participant revealed, "and they said, 'you are no longer native if you don't speak Mi'kmaq.'" The inability to speak Mi'kmaq cost this individual stable employment.

It seems, however, that while mainlanders felt the Cape Bretoners were acting "superior," the Cape Bretoners felt the mainlanders were intolerant of their traditional language. One astute Cape Breton Mi'kmaq observer of native politics suggested that language "caused problems for the UNSI because mainlanders were offended by the use of Mi'kmaq...mainlanders didn't like Mi'kmaq speakers...They chose to speak English and thought Cape Bretoners were stupid for speaking Mi’kmaq." Several Cape Breton participants mentioned the harassment that they received from mainland Mi'kmaq when they spoke Mi’kmaq. One commented that:

Shubenacadie prided itself on speaking English. That was quite odd to me, they always made fun of us for speaking Mi’kmaq. They said, 'you guys are stupid for not speaking English.' There is a long-standing history of rivalry between Cape Breton and the mainland.

While another Cape Bretoner, deeply involved in the UNSI for many years, suggested that the torment that Cape Bretoners received from speaking Mi’kmaq, played a role in the splintering of the UNSI:

One of the real deep down problems was those people in the mainland, particularly reserves that broke-away first, [they] were reserves where very little, if any, Mi’kmaq was spoken by either the leaders or the people in the communities.... As a speaker the way I saw them, and the way I felt they were treating those people from here who were more Mi’kmaq speaking than they were English speaking, was by looking down their noses at them and making fun of them when they tried to speak English. When they spoke Mi’kmaq they made fun of them, and these are Mi’kmaq people. I think that had a lot to do with the

animosity between the two groups. However, that carried over into sports, politics, whatever.... I think that’s one of the reasons that the spoke was so easy to come out [of the UNSI wheel].

There are some people still today, [who] insist on teaching their children to speak only English. They are hoping that their children are going to be super intelligent and fit into Canadian society. And all that they find when they grow up, in all these Canadian societies, is that they get a boot in the ass when they see that people see the colour of their skin and recognize who they really are. I can imagine that must be an awful, awful thing.

It is interesting to note the use of the terminology chosen by this individual: “those people on the mainland,” when referring to mainland Mi’kmaq people. It was often the case throughout the interview process to hear both groups refer to themselves as “we” or “us” and to the other group as “those” or “them.” The use of these descriptions speaks to the separation that existed, and still exists, between the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia. It signals to them, and to observers, that, at least on some levels, the two groups identify themselves as a separate and distinct people.

An examination of the minutes from an early 1970’s UNSI General Assembly, combined with Larsen’s more detailed account, provides an excellent example of the differing cultural value placed on language between the two regional groups. Below is Larsen’s interpretation of a verbal exchange between a mainlander and a Cape Bretoner during the assembly.

*Jim vs. Mary Ann.* Jim was an incumbent to a high office in the UNSI. However, there was widespread discontent about his past performance on the executive, especially by Cape Breton Islanders (Jim was a mainlander), and prior to an annual assembly, there were rumours that people would try to get rid of Jim.

According to the constitution of UNSI, the executive was to be elected at the annual assembly. But when Jim was voted into office, the elections were held at each reserve to allow as many as possible to have a say. Based on a strict interpretation of the constitution, this procedure was unconstitutional and the election of the present executive invalid. (Actually, a change in the constitution had been made to the effect that elections should be held on reserves, but the
amendment had not been sent to the Registrar of Societies, so that it had not formally become part of the constitution.

A motion was made to regard the unamended constitution as formally binding, including its provision that the executive be elected at the annual assembly. With this motion, the election of the present executive would have to be declared invalid and a new election called. In this way, Jim’s critics hoped to be able to unseat him. But after hours of debate, the assembly was finally persuaded (mainly by the lawyer consultant) to let the amendment count. The motion was defeated, and the election of Jim and other members of the executive accepted.

A few minutes later, Mary Ann, one of Jim’s strongest opponents, demanded re-election of the executive. The chairman ruled her out of order, and so she asked Jim directly why he did not resign in view of all the criticism directed at him. Jim defended himself, saying that he did not want to disappoint all the people who voted for him. He added that this kind of criticism would not have materialized if the meeting had been held on the mainland. Mary Ann then switched to Micmac in answering him, knowing full well that Jim did not understand a word. The chairman interrupted to remind her that Jim was not fluent in Micmac and asked her to say what she had to say in English. Mary Ann turned to Jim: “Nestoumin Lnuiktuk?” (Do you understand Indian?), to which Jim answered that he did not.

Mary Ann did not succeed in unseating Jim, but her strongest and final argument was that – at least by one criterion – he was not an Indian.²⁵⁸

This illustration, along with the many others provided in this chapter, clearly provide a solid case for the argument that the cultural value placed on the Mi’kmaq language differed greatly between the Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq within a political organizational context.

**Historical Socio-political Perspectives**

To understand why there were cultural differences between the Cape Breton and mainland Mi’kmaq people in Nova Scotia within the political dimension, it is important to provide an historical perspective on the people under investigation. The prevalence of the Mi’kmaq language in Cape Breton and its limited use on mainland Nova Scotia was not entirely arbitrary during the period under discussion. The distinct cultural value placed on language is the result of the historical experience of the Mi’kmaq of Nova
Scotia. Government policies, particularly the residential school system and centralization, hindered the survival of the traditional language in areas of the mainland. As mentioned in Chapter One, the Indian Residential School at Shubenacadie resulted in the loss of Mi'kmaq culture for some of the students who attended.

The federal government established the school in 1930 and it remained open until 1967. The purpose in creating the residential schools, according to the Department of Indian Affairs, was to provide for “underprivileged” children, who were defined as those who were orphaned, neglected or living too far from day schools.\(^{259}\) It was up to the department to define which children fell into these three categories. The *Indian Act* dictated that the educators at the school must be of the same religion as the students, therefore nuns were chosen to teach the students and priests were hired as the school’s principals. The curriculum was similar to that of the Nova Scotia Department of Education, “except for the courses in religion and in how to be ashamed of being an Indian,” as Daniel Paul has described the courses.\(^{260}\) Children, were accordingly, taught in English.

One Deputy Superintendent General of the Department of Indian Affairs, Duncan C. Scott, stated the objective of the school was to make its graduates self-supporting and “not return to their old environment and habits.”\(^{261}\) In other words, to encourage students to leave their communities and speak the English language. The teachers at the school were advised to note the suggestion under the category of “Language” in their instructions: “Every effort must be made to induce pupils to speak English and to teach

\(^{259}\) Paul, 2000, p. 261.
\(^{260}\) Ibid, p. 259.
\(^{261}\) Ibid, p. 261.
them to understand it. Insist on English during even the supervised play. Failure in this means wasted efforts.”\textsuperscript{262} It is no wonder that Paul described the school as a place of child “incarcerat[ion].”\textsuperscript{263}

Isabelle Knockwood, of the Indian Brook Mi’kmaq community, wrote of her experience in her 1992 work, \textit{Out of the Depths}. She describes the effects of the school on language this way: “The world of Mi’kmaw language and culture from which the children were taken when they went to the Residential School had its roots in the knowledge of many generations.”\textsuperscript{264} Knockwood’s book is filled with stories of various abuses and mistreatments that took place at the school. Many detail the punishments received for speaking Mi’kmaq. Peter Julian tells the story of how he and his sister were punished for speaking his language. He states:

Neither me nor Teresa could speak a word of English because at home we had spoken all Indian – our native tongue. So they started off with an interpreter who was one of the older kids who told me if I was caught talking Indian again I was to be beaten and that sort of put a fright into me. I had to put out with as much English as I could and keep from talking Indian. So inside of four or five years, I forgot all my Indian. When I got out in [1947], I knew very little of my native tongue. I felt sort of ashamed talking Indian. Well, just think, it was pounded out of me with a few strappings from the nuns. Also, I had missed a few meals every time I got caught talking Indian.\textsuperscript{265}

One mainland research participant described the school environment on the mainland in the following context:

Here on the mainland [English] was something that was forced on the Mi’kmaq by the government. It became a capital offence in schools, and residential schools, to speak the language. On the school grounds where I went to school you couldn’t even say a Mi’kmaq word, if you did you were thoroughly punished.

\textsuperscript{262} I. Knockwood, 1992, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{263} Paul, 2000, p. 259.
\textsuperscript{264} I. Knockwood, 1992, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{265} Ibid, p. 34.
The impact of the residential school system hit the mainland Mi’kmaq communities particularly hard. The school’s location – in the Town of Shubenacadie, near Indian Brook and other mainland reserves resulted in a high attendance by mainland children. Although Cape Breton children attended the school, it was at a lower rate. Unfortunately, figures are not available on the exact regional breakdown. The result was generations of Mi’kmaq individuals who were raised outside their culture, by nuns and priests who taught the students to be like them – non-native.

Centralization, another government policy of the same era, can also be attributed to the loss of Mi’kmaq language on mainland Nova Scotia. As briefly discussed in Chapter One, the centralization policy, which began in 1941 and official withdrawn in 1957, herded Nova Scotia’s Mi’kmaq population onto two reserves – Eskasoni in Cape Breton and Indian Brook in the mainland. Promises of employment, better healthcare, schooling and other services convinced some Mi’kmaq families to migrate to another reserve. Those that still were not convinced were threatened that medical care and education would cease in their old communities. Once families relocated, the government torched their homes to dissuade them from ever returning. Upon arriving at their new homes, most were disappointed. The promised high quality houses were incomplete and substandard, and the promised sawmills and industry were non-existent.

Government officials and the Catholic Church used Mi’kmaq children as leverage when impressing the need to move. Parents were threatened that their children would be taken away from them because they would be seen as unfit parents if they did not relocate to one of the two designated reserves. The devout Catholic Mi’kmaq trusted the priests and took their advice to move to Indian Brook and Eskasoni. However, most Mi’kmaq
people were against the relocation and hundreds signed petitions against the plan. As previously mentioned, Ben Christmas, the long-time Membertou chief, was vehemently opposed to the scheme, stating before the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons:

It is true that modern administration buildings with all necessary conveniences have been established at centralized reserves at considerable expense with no benefit to the Indians, but I would like the members of this Royal Commission to inspect the Indian homes built there, and compare them with some of the better homes you have perhaps already visited or will visit. Not only are the homes disgraceful, but the Indians cannot call them their own. The local administration dictates who should occupy them, and when to vacate them. These are not the only reasons, however, why Nova Scotia Indians oppose centralization. Indians living at their present reserves are more contented, and healthier. They have spent their lifetime on them, are accustomed to their reserves and like them. They know and understand the communities upon which they live. They can always judge where their next meal is going to come from.266

Both mainland and Cape Breton interview participants recognized the effects of these two government policies on the language and culture of the Mi’kmaq. When asked why the language was stronger in Cape Breton, almost all responded that these policies were, as least partly, at fault. When asked why the Mi’kmaq language is used less on the mainland, one mainland participant described the policies, stating:

That goes way back to centralization and residential schools. If you [did not] go to one of these places they [would] take your children away from you – you [were] unfit as a parent. It was like an orphanage... And there it was taught you don’t speak Mi’kmaq, you speak English... There became a big education process in that, saying what happened to us is what happened to us. Centralization, residential schools and the loss of the language actually did happen

A Cape Breton participant responded similarly: “The mainland was in dire straits. The Catholic Church forbade the use of Mi’kmaq [at the residential school] and children were

266 Beaton Institute, UCCB, UNSI Collection, Submission of Ben E. Christmas to the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons, n.d.
forced to speak English. The other reason was centralization. The mainland reserves are
closer to urban areas and they were influenced by that.”

In 1957, when the government permitted the Mi’kmaq people to return to their
original reserves (at their own expense), they took with them their experiences from
centralization. The same holds true of the experiences from the residential school. After
graduation, former students entered society without the knowledge of the culture they had
entered with years before. While both Cape Bretoners and mainlanders were affected by
the centralization policy, some academics have argued that Indian Brook’s proximity to
towns and cities, and the interaction between the Mi’kmaq and the residents of these
larger non-native communities, resulted in the acculturation of the mainland Mi’kmaq.
Tord Larsen has argued, “the proximity of mainland reserves to the labour markets in the
United States and Canada is probably one of the reasons why the Micmac language is not
used as much on the mainland as it is on Cape Breton Island.”267 This proximity resulted
in employment opportunities outside the reserves, often nearby but sometimes in the New
England states.

Conversely, the isolation of Eskasoni, it can be argued, protected the Mi’kmaq
language from the influence of non-native English speakers. With the closest
larger non-native community being 45 minutes from Eskasoni, there was limited
reason to travel to Sydney, the only city in Cape Breton.

There is perhaps another closely associated rationale for the retention of the
Mi’kmaq language in Cape Breton – racism. The presence of racist attitudes towards the
Mi’kmaq by the larger Cape Breton society was referenced by almost all of the Cape
Breton Mi’kmaq research participants. One Cape Bretoner suggested that racism kept
many on the reserve because:

267 Larsen, 1983, p. 60.
People try to avoid the pain that is associated with being a victim or target of racism by staying in a place where racism is non-existent.... People living together in an isolated or semi-isolated environment seem to be bonded together spiritually, emotionally or psychologically and they get very uncomfortable if they venture outside their physical or non-physical boundaries.

Another referred to Cape Breton as “the most racist place in Canada.” Interestingly, not one mainland participant referred to racism, at least when discussing the period under review. The suggestion here is that racism holds individuals to the reserves. This is in contrast with the experience of mainland Mi’kmaq who found employment in nearby urban centres, or in Maine or Massachusetts. Cape Breton Mi’kmaq often faced discrimination when they attempted to secure employment off the reserve. One Cape Bretoner noted that the larger Cape Breton society were “protective” of the available jobs and ensured they did not go to Mi’kmaq individuals. This speaks to the high unemployment rate that has historically puzzled Cape Breton. It appears that in the struggle to find employment, Cape Breton society attempted to limit access to certain segments of the Cape Breton population. As a result, the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq community maintained strong ties and retained cultural traditions such as language because it bound them together spiritually, emotionally and psychologically.

Another historical distinction between the Cape Breton and mainland Mi’kmaq people occurred during the eighteenth century. Without re-examining the history of Nova Scotia during that period, a brief overview is needed at this point. During the century, the English and French fought on and off for territory of present-day Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. Officially, the war of the Spanish Succession ended in 1713 with the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht. The treaty provided Great Britain with present day mainland Nova Scotia, leaving the French present day
Cape Breton and other Maritime territories. Throughout the next 45 years, the French and British battled sporadically for today’s Maritime provinces. In 1758, however the French lost their fortress at Louisbourg to the British for the last time and officially relinquished their claim to Cape Breton in 1763.

The establishment of the British settlement of Halifax in 1749 was seen as an act of aggression by the Mi’kmaq. Halifax was located on hunting and fishing grounds, and the British government constructed and expanded it without the Mi’kmaq Nation’s permission. The Mi’kmaq retaliated by attacking settlers, and the British responded in ways that have been described as genocide by Mi’kmaq activists and writers, such as Daniel N. Paul.

Of course, the Mi’kmaq never did attain the relationship with the British that they had developed with the French – whose most grand atrocity was their desire of “salvation” for the Mi’kmaq through conversion of the Mi’kmaq Nation to Catholicism. Unlike the French, the British attempted to reduce the Mi’kmaq population through various methods of food poisoning; germ warfare; camp destruction; bounty hunting, including scalping, and even recruiting the Mohawks, an enemy of the Mi’kmaq, to attack their camps.268 Periods of fighting were punctuated with nation-to-nation treaties signed between the two groups.

Meanwhile in French Cape Breton, the Mi’kmaq experienced much better relations with their immigrant population. From the beginning, the French took a different tack to colonization – conversion to Catholicism, rather than military subjugation. Over the coming decades, the shared religion strengthened the relationship

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268 JR Miller, 1986, p. 365
between the Mi'kmaq Nation and the French. Leslie Upton described the relationship between the French and the Mi'kmaq in his work, *Micmac and Colonists*. He argues:

The settlers tended to acculturate to the Micmacs, adopting their habits of dress and transportation. Many of the early French took Micmac wives, and the community of LaHave, for example, was a métis settlement. The relationship proved to be a source of security as well as population to the settlers, for blood ties ensured their protection and good treatment at the hands of the Micmac.  

On the English mainland, however, the Europeans suppressed Catholicism. French settlers were deported, leaving the Mi'kmaq without an ally to face an enemy they could no longer hope to defeat.

One mainlander speculated that it was this relationship with the British and the resulting contact some mainland bands had with the English since then that set them apart from the Cape Breton Mi'kmaq:

The Union is very loyal to its employees and to people who serve there. It’s unfortunate because the Confederacy hires people who can get the job done. If you can’t get the job done, step aside for somebody who can. That’s the mentality we have. If we’re going to be number one, we’re going to have to move where other people won’t. And yeah, it’s going to get nasty and you have to let people go….and it becomes easy to do when that person isn’t accountable. ..I still see this loyalty and dedication that a lot of the bands have to them and it’s, ‘oh man you guys are killing yourselves.’ We are more modernized with the non-native society, and maybe where the English comes from, a little divide and conquer and maybe a little materialistic and stuff like that.

Although it was only a 45-year experience in a history of contact with Europeans that had already spanned more than two-and-a-half centuries, it was a definitive period for the Mi'kmaq, particularly on the mainland. It was a period that saw Mi'kmaq attacked and persecuted on the mainland, while those in Cape Breton lived in peace. For the first time, the Mi'kmaq population in Nova Scotia was divided by an external force which ultimately resulted in divergent experiences for the aboriginal people. Many
mainlanders look to their ancestors’ endurance during this period, which is signified by the treaties signed with Britain,\footnote{Upton, *Micmac and Colonists*, p. 26.} as an integral symbol of identity.

Anderson and Frideres suggest that, “different ethnic groups have emphasized different criteria at different times for different reasons. Not all members of an ethnic group take a subjective interest in their ethnicity, genealogy, or group’s history.” They argue that some ethnic groups may stress language while others stress religion or folkways.\footnote{Treaties were negotiated and signed in 1725, 1726, 1749, 1752, 1760 & 1761. For a discussion see Wicken, 2002.} While they suggest that, “It is quite possible...for an ethnic group to lose its traditional mother tongue without losing its sense of identity,”\footnote{Anderson and Frideres, 1981, p.38.} there must be some tradition or symbol that the group clings to for cultural distinctness. In the case of the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq, it is clear that one of the traditions and symbols of identity that they have stressed is the value of the Mi’kmaq language. In the case of the mainland Mi’kmaq, it is more difficult to identify exactly what it is within the political realm that is used to symbolize identity. Perhaps, its their history of surviving the occupation of their territory by the English in the eighteenth century, or the “dark skinned” and “full blooded” Mi’kmaq people that still survive in Nova Scotia or the “divide and conquer” ideology adopted from the English. As Breton argues, “Collective self-conceptions or representations frequently derive from the nature of the group’s relationship with other groups and not only from intergroup comparison along cultural, political, economical, or other lines.”\footnote{It should be noted, as Table 3 illustrates, mainland Mi’kmaq people did, and do, speak the language of their ancestors to varying degrees, just at a rate lower than their Cape Breton counterparts. Noel Knockwood from Indian Brook, for example, has}
contended that, “Much of the wisdom is passed down in the use of our traditional language. If people cannot speak their Micmac language, they have lost a very important link connecting to the wisdom contained in our beliefs.”

The next chapter will examine the role of Catholicism in Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq society and the influence the relationship with the Church had within the political organizational framework of the UNSI and the CMM. Like this chapter, it will demonstrate that the historical experience and interpretation of the past can affect the relationships and perspectives within a contemporary framework.

273 Breton, p. 138.
Chapter 4: The Grand Council: The Intersection of Religion and Politics

As the cultural value of language for the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia is connected to their historical experience, the place of Catholicism in Mi’kmaq society is best understood by examining the past. This chapter examines the place of Catholicism within Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq society between 1969 and 1988. To do this, it must analyze the relationship the Mi’kmaq Grand Council had with the UNSI and the CMM. The chapter will also present evidence that the strength of language is tied to the strength of Catholicism within Mi’kmaq society.

Catholicism and the Mi’kmaq

As discussed in Chapter Three, French clergy introduced Catholicism to the Mi’kmaq and reinforced the religion through the use of translated prayers and scripture. Religious conversion was important to French settlement. In fact, in 1603 when the King of France granted a charter to Pierre Du Gua De Monts it was under the condition that the native peoples be converted. In 1610, the first Catholic missionary arrived in Acadia. Jessé Flesché performed the first Mi’kmaq baptism within months of his arrival to present day Nova Scotia, baptizing Grand Chief Membertou and about twenty other Mi’kmaq individuals.275 During the ceremony, the Mi’kmaq presented the Church with wampum belts signifying the agreement between the seven Mi’kmaq districts and the Holy See. The belts were also sent out to the other districts to notify them of the new alliance. Upton suggests that by 1630 most of the Mi’kmaq Nation had been baptized. However, John G. Reid contends it is unlikely at this early point in history.276 Although there is no consensus on when the majority of Mi’kmaq were baptized, most eventually

275 Reid, 1987, p. 15.
276 Upton, 1979, p. 86; John G. Reid, personal correspondence.
were and accepted Saint Anne as their patron saint. In 1629, two Jesuit priests, Father Barthélemy Vimont and Father Alexandre de Vieuxpont dedicated the first chapel in New France, built in Cape Breton, to St. Anne d’Apt. It appears that over time, the Mi’kmaq associated this St. Anne with St. Anne de Beaupré,\textsuperscript{277} whom many today consider their saint.

This union allowed the Mi’kmaq to retain traditional spirituality, incorporating their religious beliefs with those of Catholicism. Leslie Upton has argued that:

Both Indians and French saw culture and religion as a unit and neither expected them to operate independently of each other. Both believed in direction by a supernatural power which could be ritualistically consulted, and their common faith in the reality of mystical experience was an important bond.\textsuperscript{278}

As mentioned in Chapter Three, this relationship grew stronger as time passed. However, conversion resulted in some traditional Mi’kmaq spiritual symbols being replaced with symbols of Catholicism. According to Upton:

The Catholic Church at first co-existed with the Mi’kmaq religion, but the new faith gradually undermined the influence of buoin, or medicine men. Traditional healers were confounded by the new diseases imported from Europe, and began to borrow Christian symbols such as holy water. In time, Jesus was seen as equivalent to the sun and saints took over the roles of guardian spirits in the Mi’kmaq world view.\textsuperscript{279}

This is not to suggest a total exclusion of Mi’kmaq symbols from Catholicism, however. Even today there still remains an element of traditional Mi’kmaq spirituality within the Christianity practiced by the Mi’kmaq, often referred to as Mi’kmaq Catholicism.

**History of the Mi’kmaq Grand Council**

The Mi’kmaq Grand Council of the present period is predominantly a religious organization represented by a Grand Chief, Grand Captain and a Putus with subordinate

\textsuperscript{277} Chute, 1992, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{278} Upton, 1979, p. 23.
Captains on various reserves throughout the traditional Mi’kmaq territory. However, many Mi’kmaq and few academics argue that a pre-contact Mi’kmaq Grand Council existed and represented the Mi’kmaq Nation politically.\textsuperscript{280}

Although there is no scholarly consensus on the history of the Mi’kmaq Nation’s political structure, particularly prior to contact, most agree that the band level was the nucleus of social and economic activity. Ralph Pastore suggesting that the sixteenth century Mi’kmaq did not “appear to be organized along tribal lines;”\textsuperscript{281} while Patricia Nietfeld has contended that it was probably not until the eighteenth century that Mi’kmaq political structure existed beyond the local level.\textsuperscript{282} Where theories diverge is usually with the degree of political organization and structure present among the Mi’kmaq throughout the pre-historic and historic period. Some scholars suggest that there was a high level of pre-contact organization, while others suggest political structures had not evolved beyond the band level. Virginia Miller has suggested the Mi’kmaq had a “complex political organization,” for “a non-horticultural people.”\textsuperscript{283} William Wicken argues that while there is no “direct evidence” that supports the existence of the Grand Council prior to the 1700s, there are records of intervillage council meetings between the Mi’kmaq and the French governor in Cape Breton as early as 1717.\textsuperscript{284} Janet Chute suggests that “the fairly rigid hierarchy characteristic of Micmac leadership probably

\textsuperscript{279} Upton, 1979, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{281} Pastore, 1994, pp. 35-37
\textsuperscript{282} Nietfeld, 1981, p. 475
\textsuperscript{284} Wicken, 2002, pp. 21, 51-52.
arose in response to European political and military initiatives during the French colonial period..."285

It is not the intention of this work to examine the various theories on the organizational structure of the Mi’kmaq, or provide yet another perspective. However, a brief discussion of the history of Mi’kmaq political organization is necessary to understand the role of religion in politics between 1969 and 1988. What is clear is that in some period, whether the historic or the pre-historic, the Mi’kmaq Nation was divided into seven districts (See Figure 2). A chief was responsible for each district, dividing its hunting territory for band use. Within each district there were a number of bands with a corresponding band chief.286 There certainly also appears to have been a grand chief of the entire Mi’kmaq nation, who was responsible for issues affecting the nation.287 Although, it appears that district chiefs also had powers to determine these issues for their districts. Membertou, the first baptized chief, appears to have been a grand chief.288 Collectively, the grand chief, district chiefs and band chiefs, became known as the Mawiomi wjit Mi’kmaq, or the gathering of the Mi’kmaq.

What is of particular interest to this study is the transformation of the Mi’kmaq Grand Council from a political structure to that of a religious construct, and its role as the Church’s representative within the political organizational framework of contemporary Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq society. At some point in history the Mawiomi wjit Mi’kmaq became the Santi Mawiomi, meaning Holy gathering. Each July, the Mi’kmaq gather in several locations – with the largest and most symbolic being in Chapel Island – for the St.

286 V. Miller, 1981, pp. 43-44.
288 V. Miller, 1981, p. 44.
Anne’s Mission, which celebrates their patron saint and their devotion to Catholicism.\textsuperscript{289} It is unclear when the Mi’kmaq first began to gather each summer. There is a healthy scholarly debate as to whether the gathering was a political national gathering, or merely an occasion for collective social activity.\textsuperscript{290} Regardless, however, it is clear that the Grand Council and its annual gathering became a symbol for Catholic devotion, ritual and ceremony.

In her study on the Mi’kmaq Grand Council, Leslie Jane McMillan has suggested that Grand Council meetings became “largely associated with celebrations of St. Anne—their patron saint”\textsuperscript{291} as early as the seventeenth century. The political role of the council decreased farther, McMillan suggests, with the introduction of Indian Act chiefs.

The Canadian government... chose to ignore the traditional Mi’kmaq government. The federal and provincial government’s implemented the Indian Act Chiefs and Band Councils in order to facilitate their fiduciary responsibility and bring about Mi’kmaq assimilation. Band Chiefs were ascribed power and authority that did not come from traditional bases. This power was not particularly strong during the first half of the century as Mi’kmaq rights were very restricted; the Mi’kmaq had little freedom and a financial base inadequate to function in a capitalist society. Gradually, Indian Act bands became the primary locus of political activity for Mi’kmaq people instead of regular Grand Council meetings. The Grand Council, although still expressing some political power, tended to focus more on spiritual unity manifested by the annual St. Ann’s gathering on Chapel Island.\textsuperscript{292}

Many scholars suggest that at the turn of the last century, Cape Breton was seen as the “headquarters” of the Mi’kmaq Nation. It is interesting to note that, at least in recent history, the Grand Council executive members have all resided in Cape Breton. In fact, the Cape Breton participants argue that the Grand Chief has always been from Cape

\textsuperscript{289} Chute has observed that in recent times the St. Anne’s Mission is attended by “only a few Micmac communities.” See Chute, 1992, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{290} For a discussion on the debate see Wicken, 2002, Part One.
\textsuperscript{291} McMillan, p. 76.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid, p. 92.
Figure 2

Breton and must be chosen from this region. In terms of the Mi’kmaq seven districts, the
district of Una’ma’ki,\textsuperscript{293} or Cape Breton, historically was considered the head district, or
the capital. According to Philip Bock, “It was, and still is, the residence of the Grand
Chief.” McMillan argues that as “the Catholic Church continued to play a significant
role in the lives of the Mi’kmaq, St. Anne’s Mission at Chapel Island, Cape Breton
became the focal point of Grand Council activity.”\textsuperscript{294}

This is not to suggest that the Grand Council surrendered all traditional political
functions, as the actions of Grand Chief Gabriel Sylliboy, discussed in Chapter One,
reveal. However, the formation of the UNSI in 1969, decreased much of the remaining
political authority and influence of the Grand Council, leaving it little more than a
religious role. For example, one of Grand Chief Donald Marshall’s priorities was the
rebuilding of the Chapel Island church after it was struck by lightening in 1976.\textsuperscript{295} The
Grand Chief also met with Pope John Paul II in recognition of the Mi’kmaq Concordat,
signed in 1610 when Grand Chief Membertou was baptized.\textsuperscript{296}

Unfortunately, it is impossible to get the first-hand perspective of the Grand
Council’s Grand Chief during the period under investigation. Grand Chiefs are only
replaced at death, and the current Grand Chief was selected in the early 1990s. However,
according to the current Grand Chief, the most important role of the Grand Council is “to
maintain the cultural aspects and the religion .... This is accomplished through Mi’kmaq

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\textsuperscript{293} There are various spellings for the seven districts. One reason for this is due to the fact that the Smith-Francis orthography developed different spellings than Pacifique’s orthography. Prior to the Smith-Francis orthography Mi’kmaq people did not use consistent spellings, often spelling phonetically.

\textsuperscript{294} McMillan, p. 99.

\textsuperscript{295} Found in McMillan, p. 114.

\textsuperscript{296} McMillan, p. 114.
history month and various [Captains] and myself going out to schools to talk about our history, and to explain the history of our ways, and to explain our distinctness.”

However, in recent history not all Mi’kmaq communities have Grand Council Captains. According to the current chief, the communities along the south shore have no Grand Council representation and know little about the Council and its functions. This is the Chief’s response to McMillan’s question: Do all Mi’kmaq reserves have captains?:

No, even in Nova Scotia, down the south shore, they do not have [captains]. I do not know why, they never had that much involvement with the Grand Council. All reserves should have [captains] though, they really help the communities. I am trying to solve this problem down there [south shore]. I was talking to the chief of Yarmouth and we want to get someone from there on the council, but first we have to explain about the role of the [captain], to teach them.

It is interesting to note that the south shore Mi’kmaq communities also have the least ability to speak the traditional Mi’kmaq language, as Table 3 in Chapter Three illustrates. The connection between language and religion will be discussed in greater detail at a later point in this chapter.

**Differing Interpretations of the Grand Council**

During the period under investigation, the Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia political leaders had very different interpretations of the Grand Council. From the history of the Grand Council to its role and value within the recent history of Mi’kmaq society, the two segments of the provincial aboriginal population shared little in their perspectives of the Council.

The Cape Breton Mi’kmaq participants suggested that there was only one Grand Chief at any given time who represented the entire Mi’kmaq Nation. The mainland participants, however, have another interpretation of the leadership of the Grand Council.

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297 Found in McMillan, p. 144.
For example, many mainland participants suggest that historically the Grand Chief had no power over the traditional seven districts of the Mi’kmaq Nation. One mainlander suggested the districts were equivalent to separate countries spread throughout traditional Mi’kmaq territory:

[Districts] are different countries, and this is what people fail to realize. The Mi’kmaq are divided into seven countries, it wasn’t one unified country. They seem to forget that the Grand Council was not a government of the Mi’kmaq, it was another organization that was there to enable the leaders of the Mi’kmaq countries to come together and jointly resolve mutual problems and protect themselves from attack from, in particular, the Iroquois. It wasn’t the government... it was something similar today to NATO, but these were countries, that had the same language and all the rest.

Another mainlander contended that the Grand Chief’s role was that of coordinator:

The thing about district chiefs, there where seven districts in the Mi’kmaq Nation. The seven district chiefs got together and elected one person to coordinate the meetings. He had no authority over the other districts, so they called him the Grand Chief. But his job was to coordinate meetings.... Under the district chief there were village chiefs, there were war chiefs and there were other chiefs under the district chief and they had a good political structure.... They were all independent; just because a couple of districts decided to go to war doesn’t mean the other five would... You see their policy was they always shared everything with each other. Before the coming of the non-Indian, we had our own rules, laws and regulations.

Mainlanders also disputed the suggestion that there was one Grand Chief at a time. This is what one mainlander said of the concurrently of Grand Chiefs: “There was more than one Grand Chief, there was a Grand Chief down around the Digby area and there was a Grand Chief around Pictou. Actually the Mi’kmaq Nation had about three different Grand Chiefs.” The same individual said this of his understanding that some Cape Breton Mi’kmaq suggest Grand Chiefs have always resided in Cape Breton:

No, that’s not true. We had a grand chief in what we call Digby now another in Pictou County. The last political chief, hereditary chief, was William Paul. The

298 Found in McMillan, p. 143.
Grand Chief wasn’t originally from Cape Breton Island he was from the mainland, here. History has turned itself differently. They had a Grand Chief from Cape Breton but we had one on the mainland at the same time. Different kinds of set-ups, what could you do? You were under two governments. The Cape Breton Island Mi’kmaqs were under French control and the mainland Mi’kmaqs were under English control. It had to be different.

Another mainlander commented that growing up he was told that the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq claimed that the Grand Chief had always lived in Cape Breton, but that it was not accurate:

I have some documents that the head chief of the seven districts came from Shubenacadie. But my father told me that the Cape Bretoners always wanted to be the head of that – the seven districts. And there was always that tension with them, even before centralization. That’s what I heard when I was growing up.

The participant continued, claiming that a Cape Breton chief accused him of possessing the Grand Chief medal that belonged in Cape Breton:

When [the navy Christened] the Mi’kmaq ship I was invited as a guest… and I had the [Grand Council] medals. So, I told the Grand Chief out of courtesy, ‘I’ll let you wear the medals for the pictures.’ Then one day, a Cape Breton chief asked me how come I got a hold of Cape Breton medals.

It is clear that mainland political leaders share a vision of the Grand Council as an historical political construct. As a result, within a contemporary framework, they see the Grand Council as defunct because it no longer serves this role. This is how one mainlander described the contemporary Grand Council:

The Grand Council was put together by the Jesuits. We never had no [sic] word like ‘major’ Jean Baptiste Cope, we never had a word like ‘major’ in Mi’kmaq. That’s military. Where did the ‘major’ come from? There was no word in the Mi’kmaq language as ‘captain,’ there was no such thing as a ‘captain.’ That was brought over by the non-Indians, so how can they call themselves captains? There was no such thing. That’s not portraying the Grand Council the way it’s supposed to be set-up.

This contrasts with the explanation of the “traditional” Grand Council that was given by a Cape Breton Mi’kmaq:
The 'old Grand Council', or 'traditional Grand Council' was made up of male elders. Their main goal was to support the Roman Catholic Church on matters of faith, and especially in regards to keeping the faith alive and strong in the worship of 'Our Grand Council.' Therefore, the 'traditional Grand Council' was not [at] all engaged in political matters.

Although during communication with this individual it was revealed that he believed that the Grand Council is a pre-contact political organization, for him the Council symbolizes a Catholic-mandated organization.

Language and Catholicism

There is evidence to support the argument that there is a connection between the strength of Catholicism among the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia and the strength of the Mi'kmaq language. In presenting this position, the intent is not to suggest that mainland Mi'kmaq people no longer practice Catholicism because they do not speak Mi'kmaq. It is clear, however, that the strength of that religion is strongest where the Mi'kmaq language is strongest. Chapter Three has already identified that within the political organizational framework of the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia, language was stronger in Cape Breton. Therefore, there is no need at this point to re-introduce that discussion. It is important, however, to make the correlation between language and religion.

According to the present Grand Council Grand Chief, Grand Chief Membertou's conversion to Catholicism is at least partly responsible for the retention of the Mi'kmaq language:

One of the things I love about our history is that even though we were the first to be contacted, we still retain our language, whereas other[s] contacted after us have lost it all, they have been gobbled up by white society. I think this can be attributed to the agreement Membertou signed, that Concordant. Even though we joined Catholicism, he agreed we would maintain what we believed in. I believe it was the culture, the language aspect of the culture. I mean anybody can wear a
headdress, anyone can wear a choker and whatever else, but if you don’t have the language, you don’t have the culture.²⁹⁹

Although the comment is partly recycled from Chapter Three, there is merit in its repetition. The fact that a perspective that has been previously used to argue language differences among a people can also be used to explain the retention of religion speaks to the connection between the two cultural symbols. McMillan’s research showed similar results. She suggested that “some” of her interviewees claimed that their Catholicism helped them express the value of their traditional language.³⁰⁰ She described the importance of the St. Anne’s Mission and its bond with the Mi’kmaq language:

St. Anne’s Mission at Chapel Island is the focal point of Grand Council activity. St. Anne’s Mission is an invented tradition as it is incorporated by the Grand Council as its foremost responsibility and the occasion on which it conducts business. Indeed, the traditional political organization of the Grand Council did not have a religious role; it was only after conversion that such a role was created. Aside from local funerals, the Mission is where most people learn about the Grand Council; it is where the council is most visibly active, and this is why it is seen today as largely a spiritual organization. One of the ways the Grand Council has been maintained is through the repetitive nature of the annual St. Anne’s event. It takes place every year around the same time, with similar patterns of ritual and ceremony, reinforcing the spiritual aspect of the Grand Council and reinforcing the Grand Council’s ties with Catholicism.

Many Catholic rituals are inscribed with Mi’kmaq symbols and are conducted in the Mi’kmaq language. Priests in Catholic churches with a large proportion of Mi’kmaq members wear clothing made of animal hides embroidered with the insignia of the Grand Council flag. Common prayers are recited in Mi’kmaq, hymns are sung in Mi’kmaq, and the sacraments are conducted in Mi’kmaq.³⁰¹

It was not McMillan’s objective to identify differing perspectives within the Mi’kmaq population in her study of the Grand Council, but rather to gather an understanding of the organization through an examination of several sources, including Mi’kmaq interview participants. Therefore, it is impossible to verify whether the

participants who claimed a connection between Catholicism and the Mi’kmaq language were her Cape Breton sources. However, there are other indicators that can be used to suggest that it is the Cape Bretoners who have this connection between the two cultural symbols.

In addition to the Grand Chief’s belief that Grand Chief Membertou’s conversion to Catholicism assisted with the retention of Mi’kmaq language, further evidence was derived from participants during the research for this study. One Cape Breton Mi’kmaq argued that the Mi’kmaq cannot separate language and Catholicism. “Where language is not known, there is no religion; you can’t separate the two.” Another Cape Breton participant suggested that most mainland Mi’kmaq communities do not participate in St. Anne’s Missions, the most religious occasion for Mi’kmaq Catholics. It is also the event in which the Grand Council plays its largest role and where most Mi’kmaq learn of the Council. Additionally, the Mi’kmaq language is spoken during the religious ceremonies. The participant observed while planning the 375th anniversary of the conversion of Grand Chief Membertou:

The missionaries since the time of Abbe [Maillard] who spoke the language fluently were very effective in maintaining control over the Mi’kmaq through language and prayer. The mainland native communities, except for Pictou Landing, did not have this relationship with the ‘Church’. The Pictou Landing Mi’kmaq also gather on Merigomish Island in honour of St. Anne. The saint (icon) is considered to be the spiritual grandmother of all Mi’kmaq. When I organized the Membertou celebrations at Port Royal, there were only two other communities who identified with the St. Anne’s missions, these were Big Cove, NB and Restigouche, PQ. Both of these communities had strong retention of the Mi’kmaq language.

It is interesting to note that Pictou Landing was also one of two eastern mainland communities to receive training from the heavily Catholic-influenced St. Francis

301 Ibid.
University Extension Department, discussed in Chapter One. Also, as Table 3 in
Chapter 3 points out, Pictou Landing retained its language at a higher rate than other
mainland reserves.

Mi’kmaq participants also expressed differing ideologies on the place of the
Catholic Church within their societies. Cape Bretoners were more devoted to
Catholicism, while the mainlanders were more cynical of the value of a European
religion. For example, one mainlander commented on the abuse children suffered at
residential schools, when asked to comment on the Catholic religion:

[Mi’kmaq peoples’] faith was rocked here in the last 20 years with all the things
about the Catholic religion, you know, the priests and ... what they did to the kids
in residential schools ... It shook the belief of a lot of native people in the Catholic
Church and we’re at the point now that they may have a priest here but don’t trust
the priest like they used to 40 years ago, before all this bad publicity came out...it
was all exposed.

Kids suffered all kind of indignities [from priests]. With the abuse they suffered
[at residential schools] at the hands of the clergy there should be no argument here
that they owe these people compensation for the psychological damage they did to
those people at that time. [The priest] going out on the balcony and yelling a
number and that kid [with the number] would have to go up to his room and
performed all kind of sexual abuses on the kid.

Another mainland participant suggested that Catholicism lapsed in the mainland because
of institutional abuse, and also because of the treatment they received throughout history
from Europeans. When asked about the strength of Mi’kmaq Catholicism on the
mainland, the individual responded with the following:

Residential schools, native schools and our constant contact with white
communities and our bitterness toward nuns and priests that treated us as
inferiors. Then, there is something that is not too often looked at. The Mi’kmaq
who suffered the brunt of the English crimes against humanity were the Mi’kmaq
of the mainland of what is today Nova Scotia. The Mi’kmaq in Cape Breton
naturally were not involved in the wars, although some of the warriors may have
volunteered with some to mainland warriors to fight the English, but by and large
they stood aside.
This is in comparison with Cape Bretoners, who were generally quite devoted to the Church. One Cape Bretoner, involved with the UNSI, was quoted in the Cape Breton Post, commenting on a Christmas celebration being held in Eskasoni. He contended that Christianity has been a strong part of Mi’kmaq culture for centuries. The Mi’kmaq “are very steadfast in our new found religion....You will find the Indian people quite supportive of the clergy. It is because of the strength of their beliefs.”

One Cape Breton participant praised the Grand Council for the retention of Catholicism in Cape Breton: “Catholicism would not have continued in Cape Breton if not for the Grand Council. When Catholic priests were thrown out of British territory, the Grand Council assumed the role of priests, giving last rites and performing baptisms. They maintained Catholicism until the British let the priests back in.” Another Cape Breton participant had a statue of what appeared to be St. Mary or St. Anne in his home on a pedestal.

Anderson and Frideres have suggested that religion has been,

Frequently used to bolster ethnic consciousness and perhaps language maintenance...Religion contributes to a sense of identification in an age of depersonalization; it may be a nationalistic force and assume the role of the protector of ethnicity; it promotes social integration; it attempts to validate a people’s customs and values; it inculcates values through socialization; it affirms the dignity of ethnic group members who might be considered by non-members as having low-status...

Religion has certainly been a symbol of identity for the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq during the period under study. It can also be argued that religion has created an environment that has assisted in the maintenance of the Mi’kmaq language. It was through prayer and ritual that the language was reinforced and to an extent preserved. Breton has argued

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302 Beaton Institute, UCCB, “Micmac Indians Mix Cultures when Celebrating Christmas,” Cape Breton Post, December 2, 1986.
303 Anderson and Frideres, p. 41.
that, “Religious festivals and rituals can be powerful expressions and...can play an
important role in the maintenance of the ethnic identity by bringing to consciousness
images and meanings of the culture of origin.”

In the case of the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq, it appears that the St. Anne’s Mission and the Grand Council’s participation in
the annual ritual have acted as powerful expressions that reinforced the Mi’kmaq peoples
devotion to Catholicism. Although not part of the culture of origin, Catholicism has
certainly been adopted by many Mi’kmaq people and has become a cultural invention
that brings consciousness and meaning to Mi’kmaq culture.

**Politics and Religion**

At first glance there appears to be little connection between religion and politics
within the political structures of the Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia. However, a closer
examination reveals otherwise. As the Catholic Church’s representative in Mi’kmaq
society, the Grand Council’s position within these organizations can be studied to
uncover the place of religion on the political landscape. This section of the chapter will
demonstrate that the role of the Grand Council varied within the UNSI and the CMM.
While the Grand Council held no formal authority within either the UNSI or the CMM,
the Council did have an honorary place on the Board of Directors of the UNSI. In fact,
one Cape Bretoner referred to the UNSI as the “political arm of the Grand Council,”
therefore making the Council the religious arm of the UNSI.

The CMM, however, did not recognize the Grand Council as a representative on
the political terrain in any capacity. One mainlander responded with this when asked if
the CMM recognized the Grand Council:

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304 Breton, p. 141.
No, because they are appointed. The Cape Breton chiefs, they recognize the [Grand Council] as a religious organization, but they have no say over the chiefs... ‘You mind your own business, you’re a band member from Whycocomagh.’ [The Grand Chief] has no authority over the thirteen bands in Nova Scotia. He’s religious, not political, so he has no control over Indian Act chiefs.

This individual was speaking of the current Grand Chief who resides in Whycocomagh, a Mi’kmaq reserve in Cape Breton, suggesting that he was little more than an average band member from a Cape Breton Mi’kmaq community.

A common perspective displayed by mainlanders was their strong separation of religion and politics, and their interpretation of the Grand Council as a pre-historic political structure of the Mi’kmaq Nation and not a religious representative body. In other words, mainland participants defined the Grand Council as the system of government present in Mi’kmaq society prior to European settlement. As demonstrated with the below perspective on the Grand Council:

It was constituted by the Catholic Church. As a band council it disappeared a long time ago. During the French-English wars here in what they called Acadie, after the English took over in 1713, the French wanted some spies on the mainland which included New Brunswick at that point in time. [The French], generally speaking, appointed somebody in each Mi’kmaq community and designated that person a ‘captain’ who reported to the government at Louisbourg on a regular basis at that time. And, the Casteel incident that happened at Halifax in 1763 demonstrates the influence that these so-called captains had in the business of who they reported to. They didn’t report to chiefs they reported to the powers that be in Louisbourg. The Catholic Church became involved and provincially this was turned into a council which promoted the Catholic religion. I have no proof whatsoever that the present council is constituted to be political.

This last sentence speaks to the fact that mainland participants do not see a place for religious representatives in the political arena. This, however, is not to suggest that the Cape Breton participants did not also identify with a pre-contact Grand Council political
structure, but instead that they included an element of religion into their interpretation of the Council.

As previously mentioned, the Grand Chief sits on the UNSI Board of Directors as an honorary member. Although, there is no constitutional authority given to the Grand Council within the UNSI, Grand Chiefs, and sometimes the Grand Captains, attend meetings. This is what one Cape Breton UNSI executive has said of the Grand Chief’s role:

The Union serves an administrative function for the Grand Council. For instance, if the Grand Council decides that we should push an issue one way or another, once the initial approach has been made by, or on behalf of the Grand Council, then the Union conducts any surveys, gathers the public opinion and makes presentations to the government. The Grand Council, along with the chiefs as the board of directors of the Union, drives the policy and direction of the Union. The Union is set up so that each individual band that subscribes to the Union is a voting member at the general assembly meetings. There is no formal recognition of the Grand Council within the structure if the Union; however, in the mind of everyone that is part of this, they are there.

The chiefs have more direct influence than the Grand Council. They handle the municipal affairs. When they act as a group, they usually do it with sanction from the Grand Council. The Union does not necessarily act independently from the Grand Council. We more or less get approval from them. We go with whatever the chiefs decide, but they are careful that the Grand Council is somehow involved. The Grand Chief attends all the meetings and he has a direct involvement. It is not all that often that he says too much, but if there was something to be said from the Grand Council, he would take it to the floor.305

In addition, the Grand Chief opens the meetings with a prayer conducted in the Mi’kmaq language. This is in contrast to one mainlander’s perspective of role of Grand Council within the CMM:

Chiefs have the final say, Grand Council don’t [sic] have it. Grand Council that’s in place right now is put together by Jesuit fathers and things like that to look after the morals and the sins of Mi’kmaq people by way of Catholic religion. They had a political Grand Council, the last political Grand Chief was William Paul from Indian Brook and that was the last one that was [political and after him the

Council] went more under the Catholic religion. So they have no political clout, the Grand Chief can’t tell me what to do. They are not elected, they are appointed, they are like the Senate. We are elected chiefs. We have to go through a campaign and everything else. So they don’t have the same kind of qualification of a chief or council because we are all elected. [Chiefs] have the support of [the] people.

Again, the importance of the separation of politics and religion is observed in this statement. However, not all UNSI members see the Grand Council as predominantly a religious body. The current Grand Captain,306 who is a Cape Bretoner, supports a more politically active Council:

In order for our land claims to be settled, whereby everybody is involved and no one gets screwed, it is imperative that the Grand Council gets involved. I think the Indian Act chiefs have a role to play, but in order to maintain and guarantee fairness, the Grand Council must take a lead role in politics. Politics Grand Council style and politics Indian Act style or white style are two different things. Our policy is to ensure everyone gets a fair shake, but nowadays, people who get the most votes get the most things, not necessarily the ones who need them. That has to change, in order for fairness in judgement and distribution in wealth.307

**The Mainland Grand Council**

The political rift that culminated in the creation of the CMM in 1986 took on spiritual dimension the following year when mainland leaders formed their own Grand Council. Frank Wightly of Indian Brook was appointed District Chief308 at a CMM meeting on September 10, 1987, while the chiefs and councillors of the CMM bands were named Grand Council members.309

The spiritual role assumed by the Grand Council with its executive based in Cape Breton was shrugged off by the mainland council. Instead, the CMM expected its Grand Council to represent it only on treaty issues. One mainland chief argued the new council

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306 The Grand Captain has held his position since 1968.
308 Although the Micmac News refers to Wightly as the Grand Chief, interview participants described him as the district chief.
was formed specifically to protect the Treaty of 1752, a role he insisted could not be
fulfilled by the Cape Breton Grand Council. He went so far as to produce documents that
he considered proof the 1752 treaty applies to only mainland Mi’kmaq. The chief
explained that the appointment of a Grand Chief in mainland Nova Scotia "is so nobody
can discuss the Treaty of 1752 without involving us."\(^{310}\) Mainland chiefs contended the
reactivation of what they referred to as the “traditional” seven district Grand Council
gave Afton and Pictou Landing absolute control over all specific treaty claims in the
counties of Pictou, Antigonish and Guysborough. Millbrook and Indian Brook had the
same control over Halifax, Hants, Colchester and Cumberland Counties.

At this time, the CMM also served notice it no longer recognized the existing
Grand Council, then led by Grand Chief Donald Marshall. However, out of respect for
the mainland captains that were members of the religious Grand Council, the CMM’s
chiefs said they "could" continue to hold their positions.\(^{311}\) The Cape Breton-based
Grand Council reacted with dismay. The Grand Chief refused to recognize the validity of
the new Grand Council. He told the *Micmac News* that he was going to appeal to
Archbishop James Hayes of Halifax and Bishop Colin Campbell of Antigonish to
withhold the Catholic Church’s blessing of the new Grand Council. The Cape Breton
Grand Chief explained there has been a strong relationship between the Church and the
Mi’kmaq Grand Council ever since the conversion of Grand Chief Membertou to
Christianity in 1610.\(^{312}\) Appointments to the Grand Council generally required the
approval of the Grand Chief and the Church, although usually only a formality after

\(^{310}\) Ibid.
\(^{312}\) Ibid.
people have been recommended by the Mi’kmaq communities, generally by church congregations.

However, what the Grand Chief failed to realize was the intentional omission of Catholicism in the new Council. Instead, its role was entirely political. The Grand Chief expressed concern that the rival Grand Council was attempting to create a mainland Nova Scotia-Cape Breton division among Mi’kmaq people.\(^{313}\) The Grand Captain blamed the current political turmoil on the erosion of Mi’kmaq language and culture, and the adoption of non-Indian social and political structures,\(^{314}\) structures which the CMM chiefs had considered the “legal” entity of native band government.\(^{315}\)

Mainland leaders claimed there was an historical precedent for a mainland Grand Council. One chief said the Grand Chief traditionally resided in Indian Brook, which he described as the oldest Mi’kmaq community in the province. According to the mainland chiefs, the Mi’kmaq people were divided into seven independent districts before European colonization. Each had a district council, which consisted of the leaders of the small bands that inhabited the area they represented. Each district council had the power to wage war, negotiate peace and distribute hunting and fishing grounds among the inhabitants of the district’s territory. They argued that the district councils continued to function until the unilateral reorganization of bands under the Indian Act in 1958. There had been district grand councils in the Antigonish area, Shubenacadie/Cobequid area, Cape Breton and the southwestern area of the province until the early 1900s, with Grand

\(^{313}\) Ibid.
\(^{314}\) Ibid.
Chiefs at each. By the 1940s, however, they had dwindled to only two – Cape Breton and mainland districts with chiefs located at Eskasoni and Shubenacadie.

One mainland participant involved in the creation of the new Grand Council explained its purpose was to re-institute traditional Mi’kmaq government organization:

It’s something that we tried to reconstitute to a certain degree. The political system that existed before the Europeans came and destroyed it, which was seven Mi’kmaq districts like Mi’kmaq countries. And we thought it had its place and we hoped this would encourage other districts to look at themselves and say maybe we should try something similar. Cape Breton in many ways, although they don’t have a district chief, acts as a unified country.

The agenda of the Mi’kmaq on the mainland of Nova Scotia is very different from the agenda of Cape Breton and in PEI and New Brunswick. We have different governments to work with, different situations and different hopes and aspirations. But, by working independently, and then coming together and working jointly on matters of joint interest, I think we would be far more effective, because the present system tends to encourage people in certain areas to try to bring within their grasp all the power and influence that they can. Which is not conducive to bringing harmony among the people.

While the Cape Breton Grand Council continued to reflect the religious aspirations of the Mi’kmaq people in Cape Breton, the aspirations reflected by the mainland council were secular. In Cape Breton, the religious Grand Council continued to organize St. Anne’s Missions. On the mainland, however, the new Grand Council went into business trying to win concessions from government that were based on a treaty signed during the 45-year period in the eighteenth century when the two territories were occupied by different European powers.

The rejection of Catholicism in the wake of the residential school experience and European domination described earlier in this chapter by some mainland leaders helped to make possible the creation of a secular Grand Council, with its ideology based on the
separation of religion and politics. This ideology was expressed this way when describing the role of the district chief of Shubenacadie/Cobequid area on the mainland:

When talking about the [Cape Breton] Grand Council today we are talking about religion – the Captains the Grand Chief is religion [sic]. There is a clear division between religion and politics and what [the mainland district chief] represents is what the true chiefs are, the true leaders that were lost through the white man, through the federal Indian Agents who said ‘no, we are going to sub-divide you.’ So [the district chief] represents a true political leader back before when there was a division between religion and politics.... The district chief should actually have a say, should be recognized.... It is the Confederacy recognizing history.

The creation of the mainland Grand Council helped to complete the political rift between the mainland and Cape Breton that manifested itself with the creation of the CMM. Although the mainland council was never fully established, the district chief continued and continues to represent the CMM and sit on the board of directors.\(^{316}\)

The interpretations of the Grand Council and the importance of the role of Catholicism among the Mi’kmak of Nova Scotia demonstrates the fluid nature of culture and the rich and varied experiences of the people. The variations and life experiences demonstrate the contrasting perspectives evident within their political organizations. As in the previous chapter, the cultural differences between the two Nova Scotia regional groups are easily identified. The Cape Bretoners’ devotion to Catholicism helped them to maintain their traditional language and maintain close ties to the cultural invention of a Catholicized Mi’kmak Grand Council. The mainlanders, conversely, did not mirror the devotion for the Catholic Church and have lost much of the ability to speak their traditional language. While they continue to hold the Grand Council as a cultural

\(^{316}\) To date there have been three district chiefs: Frank Wightly, Daniel N. Paul and John Knockwood. According to participants, other traditional district areas were approached to appoint district chiefs, but the initiative was not followed through in other areas. One participant suggested this was because the CMM was only able to fund one district chief within its organization, therefore other individuals were not interested in having the position without compensation.
symbol, their interpretation of the council is one based on its past, when the organization maintained its political role in Mi’kmaq society.

The next chapter will continue to demonstrate the cultural differences between these two geographically divided people. It argues that, as there are language and religious differences between the two within the political realm, there are also political and economical distinctions.
Chapter 5: Power Struggle: The Divergence of Economics and Politics

Within the political organizational framework, some of the most obvious tensions between the Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq were created by the political and economic ambitions of the two groups. This chapter will demonstrate that these differences, combined with those outlined in Chapters Three and Four, provided the two groups with little impetus for political unity. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first demonstrates that the economic factors of the two regions assisted in driving a wedge between the Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq population, and the second examines the political aspirations of the members of the UNSI and CMM.

Economic Differences

The cultural differences between Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia Mi'kmaqs are reflected in the economic performance of native communities during the period of study. Most Cape Bretoners lived on reserves, many deriving income from social assistance and traditional industries. Mainlanders tended to live off-reserve almost as much as they lived on-reserve, while many found employment in the administrative and service sectors.

This dichotomy appears to be both the result of, and reinforcement for, cultural differences such as language and the integration with non-native society. Lynda Kuhn Boudreau has argued that the economic conditions in Cape Breton derive in part from geographical isolation from industrial centres and associated opportunities. While the largest reserve, Eskasoni, is only a 45-minute drive from Sydney, the opportunities in Cape Breton's urban centre were poor during the period of study. In the 1950s and
1960s, coal mines and the Sydney Steel mill fell under government control after private operators decided they were unprofitable and resolved to close them. As noted in Chapter Three, some Mi’kmaq people in Cape Breton describe the neighbouring non-native communities as racist, a perception that would discourage aboriginal peoples from seeking employment.

In contrast, Mi’kmaq communities on the mainland tended to be near centres of employment. Indian Brook, for example, is a short drive from the Halifax International Airport and half an hour from metro Halifax. Both Indian Brook and Millbrook are in the busy Truro-to-Halifax corridor, served by Highway 102, which was twinned during the period of study.

Language also played a role. Mi’kmaq was the first language of Cape Breton native communities, which tended to isolate residents when it came to off-reserve employment opportunities. In return, this isolation resulted in greater cultural integrity among Cape Breton Mi’kmaqs, helping to preserve their language, as well as traditional family and social structures. That traditional culture, suggested Boudreau, provided the “vehicle for articulation of social, political, economic and educational goals on the reserves.”

The prevalent use of English and greater integration with non-native culture on the mainland reserves increased the employability among Mi’kmaq people in the area and broadened employment prospects. Mainlanders living on-reserve were far more likely to have year-round employment in 1975, with 33 per cent working steadily throughout the

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318 Ibid.
year, compared with 20 per cent in Cape Breton. At a particular point during the first half of 1976 when seasonal work was scarce, the unemployment rate on Cape Breton reserves was 74.7 per cent, compared with 52 per cent on the mainland (See Table 4). Part of the difference was the ability of mainlanders to find work in the immediate area of their communities. On the mainland, 12.8 per cent of those who had jobs worked in the immediate area in 1975, compared with 7.7 per cent in Cape Breton (See Table 5). Mainlanders living on-reserve were only marginally less likely to collect social assistance, but of those who relied on social assistance, 20.2 per cent were drawing old age pensions in the mainland, compared with 14.3 per cent in Cape Breton. Cape Breton residents were far more likely to collect unemployment insurance, however, with 11.7 per cent receiving assistance in that form. Only 3.1 per cent of mainlanders were on unemployment insurance.320

Table 4

Employment Status of the Adult Labour Force On-Reserve Cape Breton and Mainland, At One Point In Time During The First Half of 1976 (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Status</th>
<th>Cape Breton</th>
<th>Mainland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5
Location of Work For The Adult Labour Force On-Reserve, Cape Breton and Mainland
Main Job in 1975
(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Work</th>
<th>Cape Breton</th>
<th>Mainland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On the Reserve</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Immediate Area (Off Reserve)</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nova Scotia</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Opportunities for reserve residents were only part of the picture. The Mi’kmaq on the mainland lived off-reserve in large numbers, and this had a significant impact on their ability to find employment. A comparison of on-reserve and off-reserve populations shows a dramatic difference between the mainland and Cape Breton, with almost equal numbers living on and off-reserve on the mainland throughout the period of study; only a small minority of Cape Breton Mi’kmaq individuals lived off reserve (See Tables 6 & 7).
Table 6

Mainland On-Reserve vs Off-Reserve Population

[Bar chart showing population trends from 1974 to 1998 for On-Reserve and Off-Reserve categories]
Table 7

Cape Breton On-Reserve vs Off-Reserve Population

![Graph showing the population of Cape Breton on-reserve vs off-reserve from 1974 to 1988.](graph.png)
The reasons for living outside traditional communities are many, but improved economic conditions were an important factor. The dramatically increased opportunity for earning employment income living away from traditional communities can be found by stripping off-reserve Mi’kmaq from a survey conducted by Wien showing the level of dependence on social assistance. In 1980, 64.5 per cent of Mi’kmaq people living on Nova Scotia reserves received social assistance; only 18.5 of off-reserve Mi’kmaq individuals in the province derived income from social assistance.321 Off-reserve Mi’kmaq individuals joined the labour force in large numbers. By 1986, labour force participation rates for off-reserve native people approached the provincial average in Nova Scotia. Among men, 71.3 per cent of Nova Scotia’s aboriginal living off-reserve were in the labour force, compared to 73.6 per cent among all men in the province.322 This difference of 2.3 percentage points is considerably lower than the 10.6-point spread found across Canada.323 Among off-reserve women, the participation rate, at 50.8 per cent, was actually higher than the average of 50.1 per cent for the entire Nova Scotia population.324 Across Canada, the participation rate for native women was 45.2 per cent, 10.2 percentage points less than the total population. Income levels for aboriginal peoples continued to lag the provincial average, however.325

Moving to Halifax paid-off for many Mi’kmaq people. The unemployment rate for aboriginal people living in Halifax was 12 per cent in 1986, compared with 20 per cent for off-reserve aboriginal people across the province. This contrasts with the much higher unemployment rates for on-reserve Mi’kmaq individuals just a decade earlier,

321 Ibid, p. 64.
322 Statistics Canada, Canadian Social Trends, 1991, p 5
323 Ibid.
324 Ibid.
demonstrated in Table 4. There was also more money to be made. The average annual income for native people in Halifax was 20 per cent more than the provincial aboriginal average.\textsuperscript{326} While we cannot assume that all the Mi’kmaq residing in Halifax were from mainland reserves, statistics illustrate that the argument can be made for suggesting that the majority of those Mi’kmaq in Halifax had their origins in mainland Mi’kmaq communities. Tables 6 and 7 provide the evidence. These tables demonstrate the contrasting trends of the residency patterns of the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq. The tables tell us that the vast majority of Cape Breton Mi’kmaq individuals reside on-reserve, while most mainlanders do the opposite choosing to leave the reserve system. Therefore, using these tables we can suggest that most of those Mi’kmaq in Halifax were not from Cape Breton but from mainland Nova Scotia. Boudreau explained that mainland Mi’kmaq populations recognized the benefits of employment outside the traditional reserve context. She suggested that mainland populations expressed, “more desire to integrate into existing non-Indian economic and educational institutions or to provide parallel institutions on the reserve and to create greater employment mobility for their people off-reserve.”\textsuperscript{327}

The type of employment found by Mi’kmaq people in Cape Breton and the mainland differed significantly. The leading employer for reserve residents in both areas in 1975 was construction trades, accounting for 33.3 per cent of the active Cape Breton native workforce and 34.8 per cent of mainland workers. Hunting, trapping, fishing and forestry employed 21.4 per cent of active Cape Breton Mi’kmaq, but only 3.4 per cent of

\textsuperscript{325} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{327} Boudreau, p. 92.
mainlanders. Mainland Mi'kmaq workers were more likely to be found in administrative, clerical and service jobs, which employed 32.2 per cent. Only 17 per cent of employed Cape Breton Mi'kmaq people were found in those fields (See Table 8).

Cape Breton Mi'kmaq communities have long enjoyed greater access to traditional sources of income. Competition from European settlement and the introduction of new, non-sustainable hunting practices among the Mi'kmaq led to a collapse of animal populations 200 years ago in parts of the mainland. Mi'kmaq communities near Halifax complained there was no game as early as 1803; similar observations were not made in Cape Breton until 1846.328 The Mi'kmaq fishery in mainland Nova Scotia was largely abandoned in the late nineteenth century because improved technology used by non-natives had made fish scarce near the shore. However, the native fishery at Chapel Island was reported to be expanding at the same time.329 Mi'kmaq communities turned increasingly to farming in the early twentieth century, with output peaking in 1920, just as Nova Scotia was about to enter a long economic depression. Agricultural production declined during the Second World War and collapsed completely in the late 1940s after the government's centralization policy was implemented.330 By 1975, it remained non-existent in Cape Breton and employed only one native person out of 264 surveyed on the mainland.331

Hunting and trapping also declined with centralization, with mostly older men continuing to pursue the traditional livelihood.332 According to Gonzales:

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329 Ibid, p. 87.
The resettlement program eradicated years of developing the Micmac agricultural sector. It also destroyed bonds made between employers and Micmac employees, although I suspect the more-successful wage earners opted to remain in or near urban centres, rather than move from known sources of income. The delicate economic equilibrium created by the Micmac from the 1880s to World War II, was destroyed by the community development program. And, although today most Micmac families have greater material wealth than their parents or grandparents, it is possessed at the expense of being supported, for the most part, by government subsidies.\(^{333}\)

This statement has greater validity on Cape Breton than the mainland, where so many Mi’kmaq individuals have chosen to escape dependence on government subsidies by moving off-reserve.

**Table 8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Category</th>
<th>Cape Breton</th>
<th>Mainland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managerial, Administrative</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Related</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and Related</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing, Hunting, Trapping</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry and Logging</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In Cape Breton, Mi’kmaq workers have sought to replace pre-relocation forms of employment by reviving traditional occupations such as hunting and trapping, but these activities leave practitioners dependent on government assistance in the off-season and perpetuate their separateness from the non-native economy. Boudreau argues that the perceived differences in values and interests on the economic plane created a “situation

of factionalism” between Cape Breton and mainland bands at the political level. At the
time she was writing, in 1981, this impeded their ability to set development goals for
Mi’kmaq people across Nova Scotia. She argued that,

Major differences exist between mainland and Cape Breton bands concerning the
relevance of Micmac culture and community life in shaping development
aspirations at the community and political level…These differing economic
situations and aspirations create conflict at the provincial level of organization
when bands endeavor to form political positions regarding development concerns
to articulate to various government agencies with which Micmacs interact on
development issues. These internal conflicts are currently restricting the
organization and establishment of policies and programs which would assist in
resolving the serious socio-economic plight of Nova Scotia reserves.334

Mainland bands were more exposed to industrialization and existed in closer proximity to
urban and industrial centres, transportation and market links. As a result, their goals,
interests and opportunities differed from those of Cape Breton bands. Cape Bretoners
possessed a different range of skills, some of them indigenous and connected to their
experience with renewable resources such as hunting, fishing and forestry. These
different situations led to different aspirations, which in turn created conflict at the
political level within the UNSI. During an election for the UNSI executive in 1979, for
example, Eskasoni resident Joe B. Marshall, who was seeking the presidency of the
organization campaigned for “small economic development projects that originate with
the residents of reserves and employ two to 10 people. Projects should be resource-based
like fishing and forestry, and should reflect the Micmac culture.”335 While Marshall
would eventually win the UNSI presidency, mainlanders were not inclined to go along
with the kind of policies he described.

334 Boudreau, p. 92.
335 Beaton Institute, UCCB, Scrapbook B, “Micmacs Fight to Keep Their Culture,” Cape Breton Post,
April 21, 1979.
Less than a decade later, Millbrook chief Lawrence Paul said the CMM would not endorse a protest over the moose hunt because natives no longer hunted with bow-and-arrow and no longer relied on hunting and fishing for their sustenance.\(^{336}\) These conflicts restricted the ability to establish province-wide policies and programs that could assist in resolving the serious socio-economic problems on Nova Scotian reserves. Instead, the CMM bands, according to one participant, “decided years ago that the world was passing us by and we must get into free enterprise and we must cope with the non-native on the same basis for the almighty dollar.”

**Political Struggles**

One of the first political struggles that faced the UNSI occurred early in the organization’s history and remained a fixture of the organization. The issue of dividing government funding between Cape Breton and mainland bands resulted in recurring problems within the Union of Nova Scotia Indians. Approximately 65 per cent of the provincial Mi’kmaq on-reserve population resided in Cape Breton during the period. However, although the mainland’s population was smaller, the mainland faction of the UNSI claimed that there were many mainland Mi’kmaq who were attempting to return to their reserves but could not because the bands lacked adequate funds to provide housing for their off-reserve population.

An example of the tensions that resulted when funding was to be disbursed occurred as early as 1972 at the UNSI’s second general assembly, after the UNSI had received $445,000 for housing funding. Mainland UNSI board members supported an even division of the funding between Cape Breton and mainland bands. Cape Bretoners,

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however, rejected the proposal on the grounds that Cape Breton’s Mi’kmaq population was higher, therefore requiring 65 per cent of the funding. Cape Breton and mainland delegates appeared as divided on the funding as their chiefs, with the mainlanders calling for an equal portion of the funding and the Cape Bretoners rejecting it on the floor during the assembly. Eventually, the UNSI president addressed the crowd:

I could see this conflict starting from the outset in 1969....We are at a crossroads. What we should do is initially divide the money on a per capita basis, and then get together – perhaps only the chiefs – to find out which reserves need houses most....Because I can see this division carried over into other areas, not just housing. We have had this problem since we got organized, I saw it coming, and I was afraid of it.338

After the speech, a mainland delegate moved a motion that the housing funding be equally divided among the two groups, which caused outrage from Cape Bretoners who argued against the motion on the grounds of the population difference between the two regional groups. In the end, the board of directors was unable to settle the disagreement and a representative from the Department of Indian Affairs allocated the funds based on the on-reserve population, giving the Cape Breton Mi’kmaq a 65 per cent share of the housing funds.

The fact that this disagreement erupted on the regional boundary between the two groups speaks to the political separation the existed within the UNSI. It is clear that both the mainlanders and Cape Bretoners had their own political agenda for disbursing housing funding. Despite the lower mainland population, the mainland UNSI board members wanted access to half of the housing funding regardless of need and the reality of the population disbursement. The Cape Bretoners, on the other hand, expected their

338 Larsen, p.103.
per capita allotment, despite the housing shortage for off-reserve mainlanders who wanted to return to their communities.

Interview participants for this study spoke of the funding problems that plagued the UNSI. The housing example epitomizes the UNSI’s internal funding formula struggles that saw the mainlanders and Cape Bretoner at odds over limited government money. One mainlander described what many viewed as the inequitable funding guidelines used by the UNSI:

Fundamentally there was a power struggle. In many ways it wasn’t being operated in a fair manner and under the principles of the Mi’kmaw people, which is share and share equal. We had no problems with the people over there getting their fair share of available funds, but we did have a problem with us not receiving our fair share of it.

One mainlander summed up the mainlanders’ funding experiences within the UNSI and compared it with the experience within the new mainland organization:

We felt that we weren’t getting our fair share of funds, and the Union was using its political influence more for the benefit of the Cape Breton bands than the mainland bands. [In the CMM] we were very effective ... and made deep inroads into funding that had previously been given, in many cases for political reasons, I mean bureaucratic political reasons, to Cape Breton. So it re-balanced the funding in the area which was the one of the goals that we had and I think we were very effective...

The mainlanders’ frustration over receiving what one mainlander referred to as “the crumbs” of UNSI funding, prompted the mainland faction of the organization to press for a selection method that would have resulted in them receiving a greater share of the funding. Because the UNSI held elections on each reserve to select their executive leadership, the mainlanders argued that Cape Bretoners were often chosen to fill the positions because of the higher Cape Breton Mi’kmaw population. The rift between the two groups often resulted in each supporting ‘their’ candidate in the election.
Instead, the mainlanders advocated a system in which the board of directors appointed the executive, which, they suggested, was based on their true ancestral leadership selection process. Because there were now eight mainland reserves and only five in Cape Breton, mainlanders believed they would have gained the advantage when choosing their executive. The Cape Breton leaders, including the chiefs, objected to this selection process, calling the existing system more democratic and open. The CMM chiefs wanted to replace the executive with an executive director, responsible for political lobbying, a program director, responsible for staffing policies and programs supervision and a financial controller – all hired by the UNSI board.\textsuperscript{339}

One Cape Breton participant blamed the funding conflicts on the Department of Indian Affairs’ funding formula and what appeared to be an out-dated UNSI constitution:

The problem with UNSI constitution is that it was formulated by a general assembly in 1969 and 1970 when there was strong solidarity in the membership across the province. At first, it appeared to be adequate because it was just a lobby group trying to speak with one voice against the very powerful federal government represented by the Department of Indian Affairs. I believe that the difficulty arose when there was an abundance of grant money available for economic development projects and these projects became funded on a per capita basis, therefore Eskasoni and Shubenacadie did very well on those formulas. Ambitious leaders, like Chief Lawrence Paul of Millbrook, who saw the inequity within this formula for funding, wanted an organization like CMM to break the power base so they too would benefit as much as the ‘Big reserves’ on a different funding formula.

A mainland interviewee, although also suggesting inadequacies with the constitution, points the finger at the UNSI for assuming an administrative role and accepting federal government dollars, which undermined the organization:

Separation of the Union of Nova Scotia Indians from the people happened over a considerable period of time. I think the biggest mistake occurred when they constituted the Union in the beginning, because the president of the Union was elected, it was an elected office, which gave the person occupying that office a

perception that they had some precedence over the chiefs of the bands....The fall of the Union from grace was gradual. It happened in the same peril as the Black United Front. The Union was constituted specifically as a lobbying group, not a program administrator, and the first we knew governments were into the Union the same as the Black United Front, funding all kinds of programs that make these organizations more dependent on governments than on people, and that begins to make them suspect in the minds of the people. The best way to undermine confidence in something is by making it appear that entity is maybe in your pocket....Union was very effective when first formed primarily because it had no real funding. It had, how would you say it, it had no egos to stroke in the bureaucracy or anything like that. But then eventually, it became almost essential to its well being that they be very considerate of what bureaucracy told them. So, I would say that in the beginning, the participation in Union elections was almost proven— the people all over voted, but by the last election only about 600 or 700 people that actually voted. It had become irrelevant.

The issue of how executive members should be chosen dominated the 1984 General Assembly. It was the first item on the assembly’s agenda. It turned highly divisive, and turned out to be only item discussed during the meeting. At the end of the first day of discussion, it was decided that four immediate questions must be addressed by the assembly. What follows is the minutes detailing the questions and a selection of comments which followed the next day.

There are four issues on which this meeting should provide its instruction so that the next draft of the Constitution will better reflect the wishes of its members. They are:

1. How should the members of the executive be chosen?

Four options have been discussed:

a) The existing method, i.e. by popular vote among all members of the Union. The person with the highest total number of votes across the province is elected to each position.

b) By carrying the most bands than [sic] all members of the Union would vote, by band. The candidate with the most votes by the members of that band would carry the band. The choices of that band would then be compared and the candidate carrying the most bands (not necessarily a majority) would win.

c) This option would be like b except polls would be organized so that the mainland and Cape Breton would have the same number of polls. A way would have to be found to organize bands into polls (or zones) acceptable to all.
d) By appointment by the chiefs, this is the option in the draft brought forward for consideration.

2. What offices should make up the executive?
The present system is to have four members: a president, two vice-presidents and a secretary/treasurer.
The draft suggests keeping the number at four but breaking the secretary/treasurer into two offices – a secretary and a separate treasurer. This would leave a president and a vice president (or chairman and vice-chairmen).

3. Should the make-up of the executive ensure representation be both the mainland and Cape Breton?
Possible options:
   a) Specify that all four offices cannot be held by either mainlanders or Cape Bretoners; that is, not all mainlanders or all Cape Bretoners.
   b) Specify that two must come from mainland and two from Cape Breton.
   c) Specify that if the president is one, the vice-president must be the other.
   d) Do not be concerned about geography.

4. Should the executive no matter how they are selected, be full voting members of the board of directors?
Possible options:
   a) Not members of the board of directors, at all (do not attend and do not vote).
   b) Not members of the board of directors, but attend (president’s chair) do not vote.
   c) Full voting members.

After two days of discussions and various options put forward, an agreement could not be reached. As a result, the Whycocomagch chief moved a motion that the delegates accept the current process of electing the UNSI executive – elections on each reserve with the individual receiving the most votes being declared the winner. The vote was taken by hand count with the result of 27 in favour of the motion and 23 opposed. This result did not sit well with some of the mainland delegation. The representative from Indian Brook felt compelled to speak on behalf of her community:

We, the people of Indian Brook have come to these meetings to change the constitution of the Union of Nova Scotia Indians. Because of the problems we have encountered in the firm belief and hope of doing that the Union would be revitalized and get a new direction. We entered into these discussions to the effect and made a presentation to the Assembly, and at that time it was voted

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against. No one came up with an alternative. At this present meeting we have
done all the work, made all the concessions and proposed all the alternatives. Mr.
Chairman, we feel we have done our best to enter into and participate in
constitutional reform, to better the Union and give it new direction rather than
having it [dissolved], but unfortunately we are the only ones who want the Union
to succeed. With that in mind, Mr. Chairman, we feel that by rejection of our
ideas and our alternatives by our objections to the constitution that we are no
longer welcomed. As members of the said Union, it is with deep regret that we
hereby give NOTICE THAT WE ARE WITHDRAWING FROM THE UNION
OF NOVA SCOTIA INDIANS until such time as productive and meaningful
negotiations are undertaken to reflect the new direction it must go. Thank you
Mr. Chairman.341

Afton, Pictou Landing and Horton followed suit. There were no Millbrook
representatives at the meeting, who in all likelihood would have withdrawn as well;
considering its tenuous relationship with the UNSI at the time. The defections left the
UNSI General Assembly without its quorum and the meeting was adjourned.

One mainlander expressed the frustrations felt by mainland politicians during the
time, and spoke of the mindset of leaders that finally resulted in the early steps which
ultimately led to the formation of the CMM:

Most of the housing went to Cape Breton. Most of the funding went to Cape
Breton because they had access to top government affairs officials, Indian Affairs
officials. We were looking at the big picture, so we said we have to do something
about this we have to have more equality. ‘They [UNSI] have to change their
whole policy of the Union of Nova Scotia Indians, they gotta [sic] have a
president that would serve from Cape Breton and the next two years serve from
the mainland of Nova Scotia. And they must have one vice-president from the
mainland and one vice-president from Cape Breton and we must have a secretary-
treasurer that alternates back and forth.’ This is what we put forward, there were
seven bands from the mainland at that time. The powers that be up there [in Cape
Breton] didn’t want to do that, so we said okay, and we had the new regional
director come down. [The Department of Indian Affairs] had a new funding
mechanism in place that they called tribal council [funding] that they had in place
in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and out west. So when Bill Cooke came down as the
regional director and told us about this funding we could get; we looked at that
very carefully and put a proposal in and got funding for a tribal council. The

341 Beaton Institute, UCCB, UNSI Collection, Found in the 16th Annual General Assembly, UNSI, July 3 &
tribal council was put in place and took over some programs that Indian Affairs was running. We took over social and eventually housing and education. Things that were run in the 1960s by Indian Affairs and these people at that time didn’t have too much control over their destiny or change in policy, didn’t have any voice. So we formed the CMM, and we remained political so we had a big meeting in Membertou… it was almost total war up there. We were like poor second cousins and we were tired of it. ‘You didn’t want to be what we suggested, you didn’t want to put it in place so we would have equality, so we have no choice.’

Another mainlander simply said at the time, “We had the crumbs long enough, it’s time we had some of the cake and the icing.”

Another bone of contention within the UNSI was connected to the population break-down of the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq. Because of the selection process of the executive, and the outcome that frequently favoured Cape Breton candidates, there were internal accusations that the UNSI had become too Cape Breton-oriented and no longer met the needs of the mainland bands. One mainlander interviewed remarked on his perspective of the executive and the lack of mainland representation:

[The executive] was very much for the needs of the Cape Breton bands…They took control of it. They were determining who could be a Mi’kmaq…Cape Bretoners think they are the role models that others should follow. There was an arrogance within the leadership who thought they were the keepers of the faith…The people controlling the Union thought they should issue orders and everyone should march behind them and be mute. And politically we weren’t being represented. We had no effective lobbying power say in Ottawa or Halifax, and the Confederacy gave these bands the wherewithal to go to Ottawa and sit down with ministers and other ministers at Halifax to lobby for our own agendas, which we did very effectively. In Truro, the developments that are up there today, and what have you, are an offshoot of our collective venture. And [the] Pictou Landing land claim wasn’t started when the Confederacy wasn’t in place, but by having the Confederacy in place helped tremendously in bringing that to a successful conclusion.

Also at issue was the fact that the UNSI’s headquarters was in Cape Breton and mainlanders suggested that the staff consisted of too few mainlanders. According to a

Cape Breton interviewee, who was employed at the UNSI at the time, the Cape Breton staff checked the employee records and determined that the staff had an equal percentage of mainland and Cape Breton employees. The participant suggested that particular individuals had been the driving forces behind the push for the establishment of a mainland organization and this was an attempt to create a larger rift between the two groups at a time when relations were tenuous.

However, the formation of the CMM in 1986 did not put an end to the bickering over government funding. The tables quickly turned after the CMM was established and began receiving funding for various programs. Now it was the UNSI accusing the CMM of making "sweetheart deals" with the federal and provincial governments and suggesting that federal funding schemes favoured the mainland organization. The faction that had once accused the Cape Breton UNSI officials of "being in bed with Indian Affairs" was now being accused itself of playing backroom politics. The CMM's executive director rejected the claims, instead referring to the success of the organization as "a professionally managed native organization responding to the needs of the native population and government demands for financial accountability." An obvious shot at the UNSI, which many mainlanders viewed as lacking the proper management and financial controls.

The two political factions often found themselves at odds over political issues, particularly after the establishment of the CMM. In addition to the re-instatement of what the mainlanders called the traditional Grand Council, or the seven district council, the groups locked horns over treaty issues and negotiations with the provincial

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government. This disagreement has its origin in the period when Nova Scotia was divided between the French and British rule.

The Treaty of 1752 was signed between Major Jean Baptiste Cope on behalf of the Mi’kmaq and Governor Peregrine Hopson of Nova Scotia. The treaty reaffirmed the Treaty of 1725, which was ratified the following year by the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq, provided that the signatories would be guaranteed the right to hunt and fish.\(^{344}\) (See Appendix IV).

In 1980, James Matthew Simon was arrested for possession of a rifle and shotgun cartridges out of season under Nova Scotia’s Lands and Forests Act. It was argued, however, that Simon had the right to hunt under the Treaty of 1752, in combination with s. 88 of the Indian Act, which offered him immunity from prosecution. Article 4 of the treaty states that the Mi’kmaq have "free liberty of Hunting & Fishing as usual." The Treaty of 1752 was upheld in the Supreme Court of Canada in 1985, making it the first treaty between an aboriginal nation and the Crown to be upheld in Canada.

The CMM chiefs sided with the provincial government on its interpretation of the ruling. The province of Nova Scotia had adapted an interpretation of the Supreme Court’s ruling that limited the effect of the treaty to a small piece of land in eastern Nova Scotia, where much of the mainland population resided. Grand Captain Alex Denny, of Eskasoni, a former organizer and executive member of the UNSI, rejected the argument by the CMM that the Treaty of 1752 was applicable only to the Mi’kmaq in mainland Nova Scotia. He claimed the treaty, signed between the entire Mi’kmaq Nation and the

British Crown is "still valid, existing and in force." The Grand Captain argued that the benefits from any treaty signed between the Mi'kmaq and the British Crown apply to all Mi'kmaq peoples and that "it was foolish to think the treaty belongs to any one specific group."\textsuperscript{345}

The CMM chiefs arranged separate meetings with the province to discuss the treaty. When formal talks began between the province and the Mi'kmaq, the CMM was invited to participate in the discussions but the UNSI was excluded. The UNSI chiefs and executive accused the province of using the conflict between the two groups to ensure the failure of the talks. The UNSI argued that the CMM was an administrative organization lacking a political mandate of the Mi'kmaq.

It is clear that the UNSI and CMM's historical interpretations of the Treaty of 1752 were at odds. The mainland politicians suggested that Major Baptiste Cope was not a Grand Chief and therefore the treaty only applies to one district – the Shubenacadie area. They also argued that because Cape Breton was still under French control in 1752, that district was not entitled to the benefits under the treaty. One mainlander framed the CMM's position this way:

Cape Bretoners weren't part of that treaty. There was a treaty that was signed by the chief of the Shubenacadie district – the chief and council of the Shubenacadie district. Under that treaty, a section was included that required John Baptiste Cope do his utmost to encourage other chiefs to sign similar treaties, which he was having a great deal of success with until the Casteel incident happened in 1753 which led the Mi'kmaq to renew their declaration of war against the English. Nowhere in history is it ever stated that John Baptiste Cope was the Grand Chief of the Mi'kmaq. He was not.

Another mainlander focused on the reality that Cape Breton was under another jurisdiction's authority:

We know at the time the Treaty of 1752 was signed Cape Breton Island was under French control, it wasn’t until 1763 that it was under British colonial rule. And we could never find a treaty that the Mi’kmaq of Cape Breton Island ever signed one that [was] similar.”

Yet another former mainland chief echoed these mainland views. “Cape Breton was under French control and at war with Britain when the treaty was signed.”

These perspectives are in stark contradiction to those of the Cape Breton political leaders who interpreted the Treaty of 1752 as a treaty between nations. As demonstrated in the UNSI president’s message that Mi’kmaq strength would be found through, “working together… and realizing that we share a common treaty.”

The UNSI seemed to adopt a more militant strategy when dealing with both the federal and provincial governments. The UNSI, in opposition to the philosophy of the CMM, did not want to negotiate with the provincial government and did not want to merely administer the Department of Indian Affairs’ programs. In 1982, the UNSI withdrew its membership from the Assembly of First Nations over a dispute with the federal organization’s continued acceptance of the provinces in talks on aboriginal rights.

CMM chiefs, by contrast, believed that the province would eventually have authority to determine the future of native peoples. The CMM sought more than one avenue for self-government, including the administration of programs formally under the responsibility of the Department of Indian Affairs.

This distinction was demonstrated in April 1985 when the UNSI refused to participate in the First Ministers’ Conference to discuss the future of aboriginal rights.

The chiefs who would soon officially establish the CMM, however, took advantage of the opportunity to negotiate with the government, even sitting at the table with the Province

346 Ibid.
of Nova Scotia. This is one mainland chief's reasoning of the need to negotiate with the province:

We had to take part in that first part in that First Ministers' Conference for the simple reason that if you don't negotiate, how can you go into the court system and have any credibility if you refuse to negotiate first. The whole First Ministers' Conference was to enshrine aboriginal rights in the Canadian Constitution under Section 35 [which] is vague, they don't say what [the rights] are....Being a chief you have to make your own decisions. We felt it was in our best interest to go up there and see what we can negotiate in the Canadian Constitution. It was better for our people. [The UNSI] was on a different wave length at that time, they wanted more to do with the court system.

This contrasts with the position taken by the UNSI at the time:

We should see ourselves as citizens plus... and make people realize that Micmacs are the real landowners and the real governments in Nova Scotia. Sovereignty and the free exercise of nationhood by our people is our position on self-determination...We need to change who rules our lives. This we believe is still the best road to our future and to a time when we will be our own government again.348

The UNSI said it wanted to use treaties upheld by the courts to negotiate hunting right and self-government; not municipal self-government, but nation-to-nation government. The UNSI thought the government was attempting to undermine aboriginal rights and self-determination through the creation of tribal councils. The president argued that the CMM, "bands are being bought off by the federal government and selling their rights for cash and administrative control of programs previously delivered by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development."349 However, the CMM chiefs held an opposing interpretation of the future of tribal councils. "The beauty of the tribal council would be to assume the responsibilities when devolution of power comes.

The UNSI is mainly just a lobbying group,” said one CMM chief of the takeover of federal native programs.

The conciliatory nature of the CMM was demonstrated after the Treaty of 1752 was upheld in 1985. To respond to the province’s less-than-enthusiastic acknowledgement of the treaty, the UNSI along with the NCNS, participated in a moose hunt not sanctioned by the provincial government. The CMM opposed the hunt, stating that Mi’kmaq people no longer require hunting for sustenance. One CMM chief contended that the moose hunt was not in the best interests of the Mi’kmaq people, instead the chief called the hunt a ploy to muster support for UNSI leaders in a time of “sagging popularity with the Indian people.” Instead, the CMM chiefs proposed an agreement with the provincial government. The CMM chiefs were willing to “modify treaty privileges to reflect modern times.” One chief said, “we are not at odds with the province. We are close to reaching an agreement.” In fact, the minister responsible for aboriginal affairs, who attended the CMM’s second annual assembly, stated, “[The provincial government and the CMM] fundamentally share the same concerns and goals such as hunting, fishing, environment, quotas and conservation.”

The UNSI was not satisfied to meet with provincial officials or even government ministers. Instead, if they were going to be forced to deal with the province on treaty issues, the chiefs wanted to negotiate with the premier. At this time, it was common for the premier to refuse to meet with aboriginal nations and instead have officials or ministers handle the strategy and negotiation. This occasion was no different.

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351 Ibid.
particularly since the province did not consider the Cape Breton bands signatories to the Treaty of 1752. The UNSI then adopted the strategy of negotiating with the federal government – their preferred choice of negotiator – for the appointment of mediator to solve the dispute between the Mi’kmaq and the province.

The breakup of the UNSI in 1986 allowed the already diverging political aspirations of mainland and Cape Breton Mi’kmaq people to take two distinct paths. Differences between the CMM and UNSI policy became so great on some issues that one group could sometimes be found attacking the other’s position. This rift grew out of the UNSI’s failure to reform itself in a way that would satisfy mainland leaders looking for a better internal deal and Cape Breton leaders who were content with the status quo.

Antagonism crystallized over money – specifically the sharing of federal funding for programs. Separation allowed for two distinct approaches to economic development, reflecting differences between mainland and Cape Breton Mi’kmaq economic conditions that date back at least to the nineteenth century and became clear after centralization in the 1940s. Cape Bretoners hoped to build on traditional strengths within their linguistically isolated reserves, while mainlanders hoped to find prosperity by building stronger links with the non-native economy and society.

Conclusion: The Union and The Confederates: The Cultural Divide

In this thesis I have argued that although the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia share the same culture, the value they place on aspects of that culture can vary. Cultural discrepancies were examined through the political organizational framework in Mi’kmaq society between 1969 and 1988. This revealed that the Mi’kmaq have had a fluid and diverse cultural past that was the result of a variety of historical experiences and relationships within their nation and contact with other societies. As a result of their history, the Mi’kmaq of Cape Breton and those of the mainland developed differing and sometimes opposing interpretations of Mi’kmaq symbols. Breton’s argument that shared historical events provide group members with a commonality and allegiance to one another\(^{354}\) certainly applies to the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia.

Language symbolized Mi’kmaq identity for the Mi’kmaq of Cape Breton. To the mainlanders, however, the Mi’kmaq language held less cultural value, instead often being a symbol of backwardness. The place of the contemporary Grand Council also held differing symbolic meaning within the provincial political dimension. To mainland politicians, the Grand Council was a relic of a period in time when Mi’kmaq leaders governed themselves without interference from external forces. Conversely, for many Cape Breton Mi’kmaq, although recognizing and identifying with the Grand Council’s historic role, during the study period they also interpreted the Grand Council as a symbol of the accord signed between the Mi’kmaq Nation and the Holy See. To Cape Breton Mi’kmaq people, the Grand Council is also the Catholic Church’s representative within their society.

\(^{354}\) Breton, p. 136.
Using Breton’s concept of segmented political orders, the thesis demonstrated that two of Nova Scotia’s Mi’kmaq political structures – the UNSI and the CMM – had opposing perspectives and ideologies, each responsible for governing particular segments of the Mi’kmaq population. The thesis also demonstrated that prior to the formation of the CMM, the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia were also exhibiting a number of overlapping divisions within the political context. As this work points out, there were several cultural, political and economical variations between the two regional groups. Breton has argued that:

while controversies may arise in a community because groups have contradictory interests (material or symbolic) with regard to specific issues, they may also take place because groups have divergent conceptions of the sociopolitical order, of the driving forces in it, and of the strategies that are the most likely to be effective in it.355

This was the case of the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia. The mainland Mi’kmaq felt that the UNSI’s funding formula was prejudiced against mainland bands and proposed a new executive selection process which would have increased their power base within the organization. The Cape Breton Mi’kmaq, however, argued that the existing population-based formula was fair and blocked constitutional change. After the mainland bands left the UNSI, the strategies of Mi’kmaq political leaders diverged to the point of bitterness. It was pointed out during the research for this study that mainland leaders chose the name for the Confederacy of Mainland Micmacs to evoke images of the American Civil War in its new relationship with the Union of Nova Scotia Indians. This speaks to the level of animosity present between the two regional groups. As in the Civil War, the cultural and political separation of the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia demonstrates the divisions that are sometimes evident within a people or society. The mainland sided with the provincial
government over the Treaty of 1752, arguing that it did not apply to Cape Breton, instead of working together for a positive outcome for all Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq. The mainland political leadership opted for a strategy of conciliation when negotiating treaty rights with government, while the UNSI chiefs and executives were more militant in their approach toward self-government and treaty and aboriginal rights, accusing the CMM of backroom dealings. Throughout these disagreements and opposing strategies, unity and compromise became unattainable. Breton suggests that this is often the case when two groups are so opposed in their philosophy that neither is willing to compromise.

The willingness to compromise also depends on the ideological distance between the various groups involved with the issue. The more that these philosophical principles are part of the basis of the organizations’ and its leaders’ identities, the more painful any compromise will be. It is virtually impossible to negotiate identities and fundamental principles.356

As this thesis demonstrates, the identities of the Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq, at least within the political realm, were often at odds and the result was a fracturing of the political organization that had represented the “status” Mi’kmaq of the province for 17 years.

The political fault line fell across the Strait of Canso, reflecting not only the differing economic and political aspirations apparent in contemporary accounts, but also underlying linguistic and religious differences that can be traced to variations within the historical experience. The period under study was a time of acute political divisiveness for the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq. One of the former presidents of the UNSI described the relationship between the mainland Nova Scotia and Cape Breton Mi’kmaq as one of “ill-will, animosity and mistrust...”357 Although since the splintering of the UNSI in 1986,

355 Breton, p. 105.
356 Ibid.
the two organizations have slowly been building a political relationship, the cultural and political differences between the two groups are still very much evident within the political realm. As one mainland summed it up:

The United States broke free from Britain because they had different ideologies and they were going in different ways in that period of time. If there was a mountain, the people from [my reserve] would climb it first. If there was a river, the people from [my reserve] would swim it first. [Cape Breton Mi’kmaq] have that attitude, but we also have that attitude. Okay, our ideologies, demographics have made us different. We just can’t be the same, you’re there and we’re here the demographics have changed us. So we’re going to go our way and you’re going to go you’re way. You can have a superior attitude and we will have ours, and we’ll see who wins in the long run.

This thesis has only scratched the surface of politics in Mi’kmaq Nova Scotia. First Nations politics is a fascinating and complex dimension within native society and one that has not received adequate attention. Still so much more is needed to truly understand the political structures and leadership within aboriginal societies, particularly within an Atlantic Canadian context.

Today, the divisions that were evident within the political realm of Mi’kmaq Nova Scotia still exist. As the years have passed the UNSI and CMM have learned to co-exist and continue to develop a stronger working relationship. However, the cultural and political divisions that were evident between the Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq persist. The UNSI continues to incorporate the Mi’kmaq language into its meetings and general assemblies while the CMM conducts its meetings exclusively in English. The Grand Council continues to play a role in Cape Breton Mi’kmaq politics while also representing the Catholic Church within the Mi’kmaq community. Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq political leaders still have opposing interpretations of the Treaty of 1752 and should be protected under the agreement.
Politically and economically the UNSI and CMM have perhaps drifted even further from each other in approach, focus and direction. The CMM continues to gain programming and funding from the government to advance the mainland Mi’kmaq communities it represents while still funding some mainland individuals in treaty and aboriginal court challenges. The UNSI, however has lost funding and programming and concentrates its efforts and resources on representing Mi’kmaq individuals in the court rooms against the federal and provincial governments’ attempt to limit what the organization believes are its aboriginal and treaty rights.

As this thesis has demonstrated, Mi’kmaq politics is evolving and ever-changing and so to are the organizations that represent the Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia. The future of Mi’kmaq politics will undoubtedly be as challenging and fascinating as in the past. The upcoming tripartite negotiations with the federal and provincial governments are scheduled to begin this year. It will interesting to observe if the approach taken by the UNSI and CMM will be as opposed as it has been at times throughout the history of the two organizations or whether the two will work in cooperation for the future of the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia.
Appendix 1

Source: Beaton Institute, UCCB, UNSI Collection, Organizational Meeting, UNSI, May 13, 1969
APPENDIX "C"

TALK ON MICMAC UNITY

The reason for this seminar which has been widely publicized is an attempt to arrive at a structure which will unite Micmac thought. Individuals differ greatly in many respects, it is extremely difficult to fuse the thinking of two individuals... let alone hundreds. A structure will be only one of many means, but an important one, to achieve the goal of unity.

At no greater time in our history do we need to strive for total unity, provincially and nationally. A unified voice is a must to express a unified approval or disapproval of any bill from any government which may better or worsen various aspects of our lives. We need a democratic structure which will present the views of the majority of Micmacs to the different governmental powers. No one person can surely understand the implications of "white papers" on Indians. No one person can assess our problems, can offer solutions, and then negotiate to bring about these solutions.

You will meet many problems in the initial stages of organizing the union. There will also be problems throughout subsequent years in maintaining among Micmacs a high interest in their organization. By taking the bull by the horns you are proving that, no matter how difficult the task appears, you can rise above all criticisms, discouragements, failures or near failures, and other obstacles - the quality which is so essential to make your idea become a reality. You are a core of Micmacs who will provide leadership for others. However, you must understand that not all Micmacs will participate in the organization, just as not all Nova Scotians participate in their community affairs. You should seek a quality organization; quantity will take care of itself.

Of all the problems that you will face, none will be greater than that of communications. Communications is a life line of any organization; if it's cut off, the organization will die quickly. No matter how perfect your structure appears, interims of quality leadership, availability of funds, and an excellent constitution, once you fail to achieve or maintain open channels with your members, it will crumble.

Communications, simply put, is an exchange of ideas. If you establish a structure, you must allow for dialogue and plenty of it. Get people involved through local leadership and discussion. In fact, if you want to make the organization as democratic as possible, the people at large should have a major say in the running of it.

This can be done by having regional branches of the association. You may envision a regional branch as the now constituted Indian Band Councils. Or, it may be a separate body with its regional President, Treasurer, and Recording and Corresponding Secretaries. Or, it may be a compromise of both. No matter how you prefer to structure regionally, these branches in the reservations will be vehicles to convey ideas from the membership to the parent body by way of motions or resolutions. To knit together these regional branches, you have to have a Provincial Executive consisting perhaps of the President, Treasurer, Recording and Corresponding Secretaries, and executive members at large.
It is in this body that a constitution can be drawn, written, and rewritten to be approved by the membership through a regularly called Annual General Meeting. The Annual General Meeting would also deal with the resolutions coming from the regional branches. To arrive at this pyramidal structure, move with care and caution, and, above all, do take criticisms with a minimum manifestation of emotions.

Many attempts have been made to answer the question "What do the Indians want?". It's obvious that what we want now more than ever before is status. We want an identity so that society will appreciate our problems, will recognize our needs, and will assist us in becoming acceptable parts of the Canadian society. We must not allow ourselves to hold forever the proverbial tin cup. We, too, must seek our identity and be willing to contribute to society.

If someone asked you this question "What is your identity?", it will take some pondering to arrive at a satisfactory answer. The biggest single factor of identity of any race, I feel, is its culture. What is culture? Culture is the sum total of the attainments and activities of any specific period, race or people, including their implements, handicrafts, agriculture, economics, music, art, religious beliefs, traditions, language and story. By this definition our culture is rich indeed. It's too bad, though, that the present generation of Micmacs continually make excuses for their culture, especially the language. We are fearful of resurrecting something which will give us identity. We feel that the Micmac culture is more a liability than an asset in our search for a place in society. We feel that is not good enough. How many Micmac youths scorn the use of our beautiful language? How many of our teenagers are eloquent in the native tongue, let alone speak it? How many Micmacs know at least one Micmac chant? How many can read and write in Micmac? How many can interpret Micmac hieroglyphics? How many know our history, traditions, legends, and handicrafts? All seem to be lost, but that can be rectified. A Micmac union can retain and revitalize our culture. When provincial standing committees are formed, it would be wise to establish a committee on Micmac culture. Who knows -- perhaps from this committee will arise text books on Micmacs to be used in all of our provincial schools? Perhaps from this committee will be born a text book in Micmac to be used by our Micmac students. Perhaps from this committee will arise Micmac gala festivals. Perhaps from this committee we will have displays of Micmac art and handiwork, etc.

There could be a standing committee on Micmac education -- a committee which will prevent the education system from becoming a bleaching agent to make Micmacs all white. This committee will be a key one for it will enter into direct dialogue with the education officials - namely, the Department of Education, the school boards, and the teachers.

There could be many other committees which could be established depending on our needs and resources. Involvement and participation will be the end result. It would ensure that the organization does not become identified with any one person or clique. If it does, then democratic action will be jeopardized.
In the future, I can envision this organization as a training ground for both our youth and adult leaders. Youth should not be excluded or discouraged from taking active part in the organization - a mistake made by many.

I can foresee this organization as the biggest unifying factor since the invention of glue.

I can foresee this organization bettering our standard of living.

I can foresee this organization as a guiding light and a guardian of our rich heritage.

I can foresee this organization as a unifying force with the rest of the Canadian Indians.

All of us should heed the message of this famous quote: "United we stand, Divided we fall".

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COMPiled BY: Roy Gould, Co-ordinator
Irene Stevens, Secretary
Appendix II

CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNION OF NOVA SCOTIA INDIANS

- P R E A M B L E -
"UNITED WE STAND, DIVIDED WE FALL"

* * * *

13 SEPTEMBER 1969

Source: Beaton Institute, UCCB, UNSI Collection.
ARTICLE I

The name of the organization shall be "The Union of Nova Scotia Indians".

ARTICLE II

The Union of Nova Scotia Indians shall be democratic and shall act only on the behalf of the Indians of Nova Scotia and shall not directly or indirectly be affiliated with any political party.

ARTICLE III

1. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

(a) The aims and objectives of the Union of N.S. Indians shall relate to the problems of the Indians of Nova Scotia,

(b) Shall act as a liason with all Indian people keeping in line with all ideas, opinions and representation of these ideas at the national, provincial, municipal and local levels,

(c) Shall promote the welfare and well-being of Indians,

(d) Shall promote progress of all Indians in Nova Scotia, on or off the reserves,

(e) Shall seek and maintain the rights of the Indians of the Province of Nova Scotia and elsewhere and inform the Indians of their rights,

(f) Shall co-operate with non-Indian organizations or agencies in matters pertaining to Indian interests.

2. MEMBERSHIP

(a) Any person who is eighteen (18) years or over and who is a Registered Indian or who has previously been a Registered Indian shall be eligible for general membership to the Union.

(b) Any person who is a registered Indian or has been registered previously, who have formed themselves into a band local subject to the approval of the Board of Directors may form themselves into a local of the Union.
ARTICLE III (CONTINUED)

2. MEMBERSHIP

(c) No member may use the name of the Union of N.S. Indians for private schemes, personal profit or commercial enterprises. No member may act as a representative of the Union of N.S. Indians unless duly authorized by the Board of Directors and is provided with credentials explaining the mission pertaining thereto, and the said authorization must be endorsed by at least three (3) officers of the Executive.

ARTICLE IV

1. ELECTION OF THE EXECUTIVE

(a) The Executive of the Union of N.S. Indians shall consist of:

(i) A President.
(ii) Two Vice-Presidents, one from mainland Nova Scotia and one from Cape Breton.
(iii) A Secretary-Treasurer.

(b) (i) The term of office will be for two (2) years for the President, Vice-Presidents and the Secretary-Treasurer.
(ii) Elections should be held a month before the beginning of the term of office of the new Executive.

(c) A retiring member of the Executive shall be eligible for re-election.

(d) Where a vacancy occurs among the Executive, it will be necessary to hold a bi-election to fill such vacancies.

(e) The Executive may meet together for the dispatch of business, adjourn or otherwise regulate such Executive meetings as they determine.

(f) Notice of Executive meetings shall be given a week in advance, unless regular dates are agreed upon. Executive members may unanimously consent to meet at any time.

(g) A majority of Executive personally present shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of an Executive meeting.
ARTICLE IV (CONTINUED)

1. ELECTION OF THE EXECUTIVE

   (h) Any resignations shall be in writing to the Secretary-Treasurer thirty (30) days prior to date of actual resignation.

2. BOARD OF DIRECTORS

   (a) The Board of Directors shall consist of all chiefs of all the bands in Nova Scotia or their appointed delegates.

   (b) The policy of the Union of N.S. Indians will come from the Board of Directors.

3. DUTIES OF THE EXECUTIVE

   (a) The President shall preside at all General and Executive meetings of the Union, and shall be ex-officio member of all committees. He shall conduct these meetings in an orderly and parliamentary manner. He shall be the official representative of the Union of N.S. Indians.

   (b) The Vice-Presidents shall perform the duties of the President in his absence.

   (c) The Secretary-Treasurer shall be responsible for an accurate account of the minutes of all meetings; shall be custodian of all correspondence and shall carry out such duties as assigned by the President. A copy of the minutes, or other material related to the Union shall be sent out to those members as the President shall direct. Minutes of all meetings shall be completed and forwarded within twenty-one (21) days of meetings. The Secretary-Treasurer shall be responsible for the safekeeping of all books and records of the Union.

4. QUALIFICATIONS FOR OFFICE

   Any voting members of the full age of eighteen (18) years shall qualify to run for office.
ARTICLE V

1. **FINANCIAL - AUDIT OF BOOKS & RECORDS**

   The books, accounts and records of the Secretary-Treasurer shall be audited at least once every year by a certified accountant. A complete and proper report of the standing of the books for the previous period shall be submitted at the bi-annual meeting of the Union of N.S. Indians.

2. **FISCAL YEAR**

   The thirty-first (31st) day of March shall be the end of the fiscal year for the Union of N.S. Indians.

3. **INSPECTION**

   The books and records of the Union of N.S. Indians may be inspected by any member of the Union of N.S. Indians at any meeting or at any time convenient to the officer or officers having charge of same. Each member of the Executive shall at all times have access of such books and records.

4. **FINANCIAL**

   Disbursements of the funds shall be made by cheque, prepared by the Secretary-Treasurer, signed by any two members of the Executive.

5. **BONDING OF MEMBERS**

   All members of the Executive shall be bonded.

ARTICLE VI

GENERAL MEETINGS

1. Two (2) General Meetings shall be called annually by the Executive.

2. Notice of General Meetings will be given, in writing, to:

   (a) The chiefs of each band in Nova Scotia, who in turn will inform the members of his band, twenty-one (21) days prior to the date of meeting, unless there is a case of emergency meetings.

   (b) The members of the Executive.
ARTICLE VI (CONTINUED)

GENERAL MEETINGS

3. A General Meeting may be called at any time provided it is requested by the majority of the Board of Directors.

4. RESOLUTIONS - All resolutions at meetings of the Union of Nova Scotia Indians and the Executive and the Board of Directors shall be passed upon a majority vote of all voting members present.

ARTICLE VII

QUORUM OF THE UNION OF NOVA SCOTIA INDIANS

Fifty-one per cent (51%) of the Executive and the Board of Directors combined shall constitute a quorum of the Union of N.S. Indians.

ARTICLE VIII

VOTING

Any member of the Union may vote at a General meeting. Any member of the Executive may vote at an Executive meeting. Any member of the Board of Directors may vote at any meeting other than Executive.

ARTICLE IX

The Articles contained herein may be amended at a General meeting of the Union of Nova Scotia Indians.

ARTICLE X

Upon the dissolution of this organization, any remaining funds will be turned over to an Indian organization in Nova Scotia recommended by the Executive.

ARTICLE XI

The Chairman of any meeting of the Union of N.S. Indians should decide at the beginning of each meeting which set of rules for parliamentary procedure the meeting will follow.

* * * * *
Appendix III

Nova Scotia
1 Acadia
2 Afron
3 Annapolis Valley
4 Bear River
5 Chapel Island
6 Eskasoni
7 Horton
8 Membertou
9 Millbrook
10 Pictou Landing
11 Shubenacadie
12 Wagmatcook
13 Whycocomagh

Modified from: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Map of Atlantic Canada Provinces Reserves, March 1996
Appendix IV
v) Treaty of 1752

Treaty or Articles of Peace and Friendship Renewed

between

His Excellency Peregrine Thomas Hopson Esquire Captain General and Governor in Chief in and over His Majesty's Province of Nova Scotia or Acadie Vice Admiral of the same & Colonel of One of His Majesty's Regiments of Foot, and His Majesty's Council on behalf of His Majesty.

and

Major Jean Baptiste Cope Chief Sachem of the Tribe of Mick Mack Indians, Inhabiting the Eastern Coast of the said Province, and Andrew Hadley Martin, Gabriel Martin and Francis Jeremiah members and Delegates of the said Tribe, for themselves and their said Tribe their heirs and the heirs of their heirs forever. Begun made and concluded in the manner form & Tenor following, viz.

1. It is agreed that the Articles of Submission & Agreements made at Boston in New England by the Delegates of the Penobscot Norridgwork & St. John's Indians in the Year 1725 Ratified and Confirmed by all the Nova Scotia Tribes at Annapolis Royal in the Moon of June 1726 and lately Renewed with Governor Cornwallis at Halifax and Ratified at St. John's River, now read over explained & Interpreted shall be and are hereby from this time forward renewed, reiterated and forever Confirmed by them and their Tribe, and the said Indians for themselves and their Tribe and their Heirs aforesaid do make and renew the same Solemn Submissions and promises for the strict Observance of all the Articles therein Contained as at any time heretofore hath been done.

2. That all Transactions during the Late War shall on both sides be buried in Oblivion with the Hatchet, and that the said Indians shall have all favour, Friendship & Protection shewn them from this His Majesty's Government.

3. That the said Tribe shall use their utmost Endeavours to bring in the other Indians to Renew and Ratify this Peace, and shall discover and make known any attempts or designs of any other Indians or any Enemy whatever against his Majesty's subjects within this Province so soon as they shall know thereof and shall also hinder and Obstruct the same to the utmost of their power, and on the other hand if any of the Indians refusing to ratify this Peace shall make War upon the Tribe who have now Confirmed the same; they shall upon Application have such aid and Assistance from the Government for their defence as the Case may require.

4. It is agreed that the said Tribe of Indians shall not be hindered from, but have free liberty of hunting and fishing as usual and that if they shall think a Truck house needful at the River Chibenaccadie, or any other place of their resort they shall have the same built and proper Merchandize, lodged therein to be exchanged for what the Indians shall have to dispose of and that in the mean time the Indians shall have free liberty to bring for Sale to Halifax or any other Settlement within this Province, Skins, feathers, fowl, fish or any other thing they shall have to sell, where they shall have liberty to dispose thereof to the best advantage.

5. That a Quantity of bread, flour and such other Provisions, as can be procured, necessary for the Families and proportionable to the Numbers of the said Indians, shall be given them half Yearly for the time to come; and the same regard shall be had to the other Tribes that shall hereafter Agree to Renew and Ratify the peace upon the Terms and Conditions now Stipulated.

6. That to Cherish a good Harmony and mutual Correspondence between the said Indians and this Government His Excellency Peregrine Thomas Hopson Esq. Capt General & Governor in Chief in & over His Majesty's Province of Nova Scotia or Acadie Vice Admiral of the same & Colonel of One of His Majesty's Regiments of Foot hereby promises on the part of His Majesty that the said Indians shall upon the first day of October Yearly, so long as they shall Continue in Friendship, Receive Presents of Blankets. Tobacco, some Powder & Shot, and the said Indians promise once every year, upon the said first of October, to come by themselves or their Delegates and Receive the said Presents and Renew their Friendship and Submissions.

7. That the Indians shall use their best Endeavors to save the Lives & Goods of any People Shipwrecked on this Coast where they resort and shall Conduct the People saved to Halifax with their Goods, and a Reward adequate to the Salvage shall be given them.

8. That all disputes whatsoever that may happen to arise between the Indians now at Peace and others His Majesty's Subjects in this Province shall be tried in His Majesty's Courts of Civil Judicature, where the Indians shall have the same benefits, advantages & Privileges as any others of His Majesty's Subjects.

In Faith & Testimony whereof the Great Seal of the Province is hereunto appended, and the Parties to these Presents have hereunto interchangeably Set their Hands in the Council Chamber at Halifax this 22nd day of Nov. 1752 in the 26th Year of His Majesty's Reign.

P.T. Hopson

Chas. Lawrence
Benj. Green
Jno. Salusbury
Willm. Steele
Jno. Collier

Jean Baptiste H x Cope
His Mark

Andrew Hadley x
Francois x
Gabriel x

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