

**‘Vietnam: It’s Our War Too:’
The Antiwar Movement in Canada: 1963-1975**

by

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Canada

To Tracey, Mo Anam Cara.

Abstract

No single issue more defines the latter half of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s as the Vietnam War and the movement that opposed it. While this movement was centered in the United States, it was not limited to that country. Rather, it was international, involving marches and rallies in all six continents. Canada was very much a part of this social phenomenon. For almost ten years – 1964 to 1973 – Canadians actively participated in opposing American intervention in Indochina. At its height, this movement was national in scale, extending from British Columbia to Newfoundland. While at times American émigrés participated in this movement, leaders and participants were, by and large, Canadian. However, from its start, antiwar activism was shaped by the larger international movement. In its earliest phase the Communist Party of Canada – and by extension the larger international Communist movement with its leadership in the Soviet Union – played a vanguard role in the antiwar movement in Canada. The Communist Party, however, did not retain leadership of the movement. For a short while the Student Union for Peace Action – influenced by new left groups in the United States, specifically Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) – took on this role. By the late 1960s, however, the Trotskyist movement, affiliated to the Fourth International and with strong ties with the Socialist Workers' Party in the United States, had risen to be the undisputed leader of the anti-Vietnam War movement in Canada. Throughout the life of the Canadian movement it was strongly influenced by numerous international influences. Despite the unmistakable national and international dimensions of the movement, there was clearly a special relationship with the antiwar movement in the United States. Most of the major antiwar

campaigns in Canada were part of larger ones coordinated south of the border. This began prior to the deployment of combat troops in March 1965 and was apparent throughout the earliest International Days of Protest to End the War in Vietnam. Such a relationship continued through the Mobilization to End the War as well as the Moratorium movement. Reaction in Canada to the invasion of Cambodia and the subsequent shootings at Kent State University clearly showed the strong the relationship between the Canadian and American antiwar movements. Following the events of May 1970 the movement steadily declined, both internationally and in Canada. By the time of the Communist victories in Indochina in April 1975 antiwar activity in Canada had for the most part ceased.

Acknowledgments

This seeds of this project were planted on 4 May 2000 when I attended the thirtieth anniversary commemoration of the shootings at Kent State University. At the time I was finishing up a Masters degree in labour history at Memorial University of Newfoundland. As an antiwar activist most of my adult life, and someone who, like Myrna Kostash, has always been “in love with the sixties,” the opportunity to meet and speak with so many survivors of 4 May 1970 opened up a whole new world of history for me. The generosity of those people, and their colleagues whom I subsequently met, in informally sharing their experiences with me, was really the engine that began this project. For that reason I will always be indebted to Alan Canfora, Tom Grace, Joe Lewis, Dean Kahler, Barry Levine, Jerry Lewis, Roseann Canfora, the late Robbie Stamps, and the late Jim Russell. In addition, I am especially grateful to Chandler Wiland, who in many cases was the one to introduce us.

Upon my return to Canada in May 2000 I soon learned from my then co-supervisor Gregory Kealey that the impact of May 1970 was very much felt in Canada. As I read more about the 1960s, the war in Vietnam, the movement that opposed the war, and how that movement manifested itself in Canada, the idea for this dissertation was born. It is therefore appropriate and most fortunate for me that Dr. Kealey was able to supervise this project. His friendship, support and scholarly input, as well as that of Linda Kealey, have been unceasing since my days in Newfoundland.

In addition I would like to thank the other two members of my committee, Dr. David Frank and Dr. Jeffrey Brown. Both were able to point me towards literature in their respective fields of expertise that I would otherwise have missed. Their many questions

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I would be remiss in not mentioning the many helpful staff at Library and Archives Canada, as well as those at the following university archives: Toronto, McMaster, McGill, Concordia and Dalhousie. I would also like to thank the staff at the Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec, the Ontario Multicultural History Society, Fanshawe College, the British Columbia Federation of Labour, the Northwest Territories Public Library in Hay River, and, of course, the Harriet Irving Library at the University of New Brunswick.

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Abbreviations

ADC	American Deserters' Committee
AEL	American Ex-Patriots' League
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFSC	American Friends Service Committee
AP	Associated Press
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
BCFL	British Columbia Federation of Labour
CALCAV	Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam
CARM	Committee to Aid Refugees from Militarism
CAVC	Canadian Aid to Vietnam Civilians
CIL	Canadian Industries Limited
CCF	Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
CCV	Canadian Committee on Vietnam
CCW	Congress of Canadian Women
CCEWV	Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam
CEWV	Committee to End the War in Vietnam
CFSC	Canadian Friends Service Committee
CLC	Canadian Labour Congress
CLM	Canadian Liberation Movement
CNLF	Canadians for the National Liberation Front
CNTU	Confederation of National Trade Unions
CP	Canadian Press
CPC	Communist Party of Canada
CPC-ML	Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist)
CPL	Canadian Party of Labour
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CCND	Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
COLD	Committee Against Leftist Demonstrations
CSIS	Canadian Security Intelligence Service
CUCND	Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CUP	Canadian University Press
CUS	Canadian Union of Students
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
EBS	Edmund Burke Society
FOR	Fellowship of Reconciliation
HDCCEWV	Hamilton and District Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam
ICC	International Commission of Control
ICCS	International Commission of Control and Supervision
ILWU	International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union
IPC	Indochina Peace Campaign
IWA	International Woodworkers of America
LSA	League for Socialist Action
NCC	National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam
NCC	National Council of Churches

NDP	New Democratic Party
NDY	New Democratic Youth
NLC	New Left Committee
NPAC	National Peace Action Coalition
NSA	National Student Association
PAL	Peace Action League
PAVN	People's Army of Vietnam
PCPJ	People's Coalition for Peace and Justice
PRG	Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam
PWM	Progressive Workers' Movement
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RIN	Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale
RV	Republic of Vietnam
SAC	Students' Administrative Council (University of Toronto)
SDS	Students for a Democratic Society
SDU	Students for a Democratic University
SFU	Simon Fraser University
SMC	Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam
SNCC	Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee
SUPA	Student Union for Peace Action
SWP	Socialist Workers Party
TADP	Toronto Anti-Draft Program
TCC	Toronto Coordinating Committee (to End the War in Vietnam)
TCND	Toronto Committee for Nuclear Disarmament
UAE	Union of American Exiles
UAW	United Auto Workers
UBC	University of British Columbia
UE	United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America
UFAWU	United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union
UQAM	Université du Québec à Montréal
VAC	Vietnam Action Committee
VCC	Vancouver Coordinating Committee (to End the War in Vietnam)
VDC	Vietnam Day Committee
VMC	Vietnam Mobilization Committee
VOW	Voice of Women
VPAL	Victoria Peace Action League
VVAW	Vietnam Veterans Against the War
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
WSP	Women Strike for Peace
YS	Young Socialists/Ligue des Jeunes Socialistes
YSA	Young Socialist Alliance

Timeline of Key Events

1964

2 August – Gulf of Tonkin Incident.

6 August – first recorded anti-Vietnam War demonstration in Canada takes place in Montreal.

December -January 1965 – CUCND morphs into SUPA.

1965

8 March – US introduces combat troops into Vietnam.

17 April – SDS March on Washington. Solidarity rallies held internationally as well as in Montreal, Toronto, London, Winnipeg and Vancouver.

14-15 October – first International Days of Protest to End the War in Vietnam.

Demonstrations in Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal.

1966

19 February – UGEQ leads Montreal antiwar protest. Largest to that time in Canada.

28 February-4 March – SUPA holds Canada-Vietnam Week in Ottawa, 61 arrested.

25-26 March – second International Days of Protest. Demonstrations across Canada.

1967

September – SUPA dissolves.

1968

18 May – Vietnam Mobilization Committee established in Toronto.

28 November-1 December – Communist Party sponsors Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam in Montreal.

1969

15 October – First Moratorium To End the War.

13-15 November – Second Moratorium/Mobilization. Demonstrations across Canada.

1970

29 April-31 May – United States invades Cambodia. Ohio National Guard kills four at Kent State University. International protests last until end of May.

1971

24 April – International Day of Protest. Peak of antiwar activism.

3-8 November – massive demonstrations across Canada in opposition to scheduled nuclear weapons test on Aleutian island of Amchitka.

1973

23 January – cease-fire signed. American combat troops withdraw from Indochina.

1975

30 April – DRV victorious.

Introduction

The American war in Vietnam, or what the Vietnamese refer to as the American War, unlike most wars, does not have a definitive start date. Perhaps it began in 1950 when the United States began bankrolling French efforts to maintain their colonies and introduced its first military advisors. Maybe its beginning came in 1954 with the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the subsequent Geneva Agreements which the United States made all efforts to undermine. Perhaps it began with the 1956 decision of the Lao Dong (Communist Party of Vietnam) to authorize their members in the south to defend themselves against depredations by the Republic of Vietnam forces of Ngo Dinh Diem. Both the 1959 decision of the Lao Dong to resume armed struggle and the formation of the National Liberation Front (NLF) in December of the following year can also be seen as beginnings. The tripling of US military advisors in Vietnam from just over 3,000 to more than 9,000 between 1961 and 1962 was certainly significant in tracking America's trajectory in Indochina. By early 1964 that number had risen to 23,300. And intelligence overflights, the dropping of propaganda materials, and commando raids – all targeted against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) – had been initiated by the United States. In August 1964 the Gulf of Tonkin Incident served as a pretext for the US to begin bombing the DRV, and later the introduction of what would become hundreds of thousands of American combat troops, beginning on 8 March 1965.¹ Perhaps it is most accurate to say that the American War in Vietnam had many beginnings. It is clear, however, that by the time it ended in April 1975 over 58,000 Americans and their allies

¹ George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*, fourth edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002) 27, 80-82, 104, 139, 156.

were dead. This, of course, paled in comparison to the over two million Vietnamese and untold numbers of Cambodians and Laotians killed.

As the war escalated in the early 1960s opposition to it climbed. By the early summer of 1965 a movement to oppose American military intervention in Vietnam was firmly established in the United States. Chroniclers, however, often neglect the international dimensions of the antiwar movement. In the spring of 1965 Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) led Americans in Washington, D.C., in the first major protest against the war. Forgotten are the marches which took place in England, Germany, Japan, and Canada.² Five years later, in the wake of the American invasion of Cambodia, and the fatal shooting of four students at Kent State, protests took place not only in the United States, but throughout Europe as well as Australia, Israel, South Africa and elsewhere. In Canada, demonstrators marched in cities from St. John's to Vancouver. By the time of the cease-fire in January 1973, and the departure of the remaining US combat troops, the mass antiwar movement in the United States was a spent force; so too was the much smaller movement in Canada.³

This dissertation examines the antiwar movement in Canada as part of an international movement. While it would be interesting to look at this movement beyond the confines of North America, such a task is beyond the scope of this work. Specifically, this thesis seeks to present a history of the antiwar movement in Canada from its first stirrings in 1963, to its disintegration in the early 1970s. Contrary to the popular – and to

² N. Dunfield, "World Protest Viet War, *Young Socialist Forum*, Early Summer, 1965, reproduced in "YSF on the Antiwar Movement, 1965-1968," 3-4, <http://www.socialisthistory.ca/Docs/1961-/Vietnam/YSF-Anitwar-65-68.htm>. Accessed 16 October 2006.

³ A much smaller, more professional, antiwar lobby had largely replaced the mass movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s in the United States, and it fell to that lobby to continue to oppose America's more subtle, and in some ways more insidious, war in Southeast Asia during the period from 1973 to 1975.

a large degree scholarly – perception that the antiwar movement was solely an American phenomenon, I argue that there was a vibrant and diverse movement in Canada that opposed the war in Vietnam. Given the historic special relationship between the United States and Canada – geographically, culturally, economically, ideologically – the movement in Canada was profoundly influenced by its American counterpart. Therefore, one issue this dissertation seeks to address involves the nature of the relationship between the antiwar movements in the United States and Canada. Tracing the development of the movement in this respect requires diligent attention to the American movement.

Accordingly, this study is transnational in nature. The movement in Canada paralleled the one in the United States to a large degree. This is not to say the movement in Canada was dominated by its American counterpart – it was not. There were significant differences. The most obvious of these was size. With ten times the population of Canada, the United States bred a movement that dwarfed the Canadian version. Other factors, too, contributed to this difference in scale. With their own fellow citizens killing and being killed, Americans had a more direct investment in the antiwar movement. Canadians neither had to worry about being drafted to fight in Vietnam, nor did they need to worry about family members being caught up in the fighting.⁴ Also distinguishing the Canadian movement was the problem of competing nationalisms. How much, if at all, was the antiwar movement in Canada an expression of left nationalism (the increasingly popular notion in the 1960s and 1970s that socialism would only be accomplished through articulating a nationalist agenda). This is a complex question. Its answer varies according

⁴ There are exceptions to this. These included those with relatives in the United States or one of its allied countries with troops fighting in Vietnam, as well as those Canadians who purposely traveled to the United States and enlisted in the armed services of that country, serving in Vietnam in American uniforms. See Fred Gaffen, *Unknown Warriors: Canadians in Vietnam* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1990.)

to which period of the war we look at, and which faction of the movement we consider. The Vietnam War, at least that portion of it characterized by the presence of US combat troops, lasted a very long time – eight years. Throughout, the antiwar movement enjoyed the support of many Quebecois nationalists, but such participation fluctuated. English-speaking Canadians, too, were not immune to nationalist sentiments, but as is often the case, such feelings were difficult to differentiate from anti-Americanism. Certainly the Vietnam War fed the latter, but it would be inaccurate to describe the antiwar movement in Canada as an expression of anti-Americanism. Perhaps surprisingly, the cause of Canadian nationalism was adopted by many Americans coming to Canada to escape the war.

Another significant difference between the antiwar movements north and south of the border is that, unlike in the United States, no national organization emerged in Canada to coordinate protest activities. While activism in the United States unfolded on both the grassroots and at the national level, activism in Canada was largely local or regional. There was no organization in Canada comparable to the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, the Spring Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam, or the National Peace Action Committee, although such organizations did spread their influence across the border. The closest to a national organization in Canada was Voice of Women (VOW), but as will be seen, VOW never attempted to lead antiwar coalitions. This is not to say that the movement in Canada was not national in scale – IT WAS. This thesis seeks to move away from the dominant narrative that the antiwar movement was for the most part limited to Toronto, and to a lesser extent Vancouver and Montreal. While these cities were certainly centres of activism, the movement, at its

height, manifested itself from Atlantic to Pacific. Still, it would be a mistake to see the antiwar movement in Canada strictly in terms of its national or even trans-national dimensions. Several international factors influenced the movement in Canada. One of these was the international Communist movement. Indeed, Canadian Communists played a pivotal role in shaping the antiwar movement, especially in its earliest days. While it is arguable how much autonomy the CPC exercised with regard to the Soviet Union, clearly there was influence. This is seen more indirectly in the support that the Communist movement gave to its allies in the peace movement, nationally through the Canadian Peace Congress, and internationally through the World Peace Council. Indeed, Party members were routinely instructed to carry out the Party's peace program through these organizations. Voice of Women, also, added to the internationalism of the opposition to the war in Vietnam through its participation with such organizations, as well as with its own international initiatives, such as coordinating speaking tours for Vietnamese revolutionaries and providing direct aid to Vietnam.

Also adding to the internationalist flavour of the antiwar movement in Canada was the important influence of the Trotskyist movement. Unlike the CPC, which could look to the Soviet Union, the Trotskyist League for Socialist Action (LSA) could not look to a foreign government for leadership or support. Although a member of the Fourth International, such affiliation does not appear to have been overly significant. What was of critical importance, however, was the LSA's fraternal ties to its US counterpart, the Socialist Workers' Party (SWP). The SWP was a significant bloc within the US antiwar movement that distinguished itself in several ways. Unlike the Communist Party and its allies, which called on the US government to negotiate with its Communist adversaries in

Vietnam, the SWP denied the legitimacy of US intervention in the region, calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops. Also distinguishing the SWP were its numerous attempts throughout the war to establish a single national antiwar organization. While never successful in this regard, the SWP contributed significantly to the success of national and international antiwar campaigns. By focusing on these initiatives, the Canadian-based LSA ensured that their contributions to the antiwar movement were most often tied to larger international efforts, or at least to those in the US.

The division between Trotskyists and Communists over Vietnam is best illustrated by the slogans they adopted. The Trotskyist position was “Out Now,” abbreviated from “Withdraw US troops (and their foreign allies) now.” The CP slogan for much of the war was “Negotiations Now.” Another of the CP slogans, “Stop the Bombings,” echoed the DRV’s insistence that it was not prepared to negotiate until the United States ceased bombing targets in the DRV. The Trotskyists insisted that one does not negotiate with imperialists, and American military presence in Southeast Asia was surely imperialism. The US military presence in Vietnam, according to the SWP, had absolutely no legitimacy; the only thing for the Americans to do was to go home. The Communists, on the other hand, were more pragmatic, and understood the struggle in Vietnam as both military and political. A US withdrawal would ultimately have to be negotiated.⁵ It was critical, therefore, to get the US to the negotiating table, where the DRV and NLF would have the legitimacy that came with participant status. But the DRV would not negotiate while the US continued to bomb them. Hence the slogan “Stop the Bombings” was not only moral; it was practical.

⁵ Fred Halstead, *Out Now: A Participant's Account of the American Movement Against the Vietnam War* (New York: Monad Press, 1978), 101.

The United States (and its allies, including Canada) interpreted the conflict in Vietnam as one of northern aggression against the South. In its view, the NLF was a group of terrorists operating on behalf of the DRV.⁶ Both the Trotskyists and Communists appreciated that the DRV and the NLF were two parts of a revolutionary force engaged in the process of national liberation. The Geneva Accords of 1954 provided for a temporary division of Vietnam with elections scheduled in 1956 to determine the government of all Vietnam. Had such elections taken place, every indicator pointed towards an overwhelming victory for Ho Chi Minh and the Communists. Knowing this, the United States ignored the Geneva Accords and proceeded to create the client state of the Republic of Vietnam. When it became clear that reunification would not take place, Hanoi gave the go ahead for the establishment of the NLF in the South.⁷ Ho Chi Minh had not fought the French for eight years for independence of only half his country. The introduction of US combat troops into Vietnam in 1965 was a tacit admission that the Republic of Vietnam could not defeat the revolutionary process. It would take the Americans another eight years to understand that neither could the United States. US military presence in South Vietnam prolonged the struggle and resulted in more damage and loss of life than would have occurred were the provisions of the Geneva Accords adhered to. This explains why it was so popular among protesters, especially in the early years of the war, to call for a return to the provisions of the Geneva Accords. But for the DRV and the NLF to secure a victory the first step was to get the United States to the negotiating table. Such differences in analysis and slogans were of paramount importance

⁶ Douglas A. Ross, *In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954-1973* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 256.

⁷ Herring, *America's Longest War*, 49. 53-82.

to partisans within the antiwar movement, though they were sharper in the United States than in Canada.

Another theme related to the international dimensions of this work is the importance of the civil rights movement and the new left. Admittedly, in relation to this thesis, the subject is more trans-national in that here we limit our discussion to the connections between these movements in Canada and the United States. But the new left was by no means confined to North America.⁸ I include the new left and the civil rights movement together because –in the early stages of the antiwar movement – they operated in tandem. Although the civil rights movement in the United States was concerned with the rights of African Americans, it was supported by white activists in numerous organizations, most notably the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) (prior to the expulsion of its white members) and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). In this respect it would be somewhat artificial to separate the civil rights movement from the new left. Similarly, it is difficult to separate these organizations by nationality. While SNCC established chapters in Canada, Canadians sympathetic to SDS gravitated to the Student Union for Peace Action, in many ways SDS's Canadian counterpart. SUPA maintained strong fraternal ties with SDS. In this way both SNCC and SDS helped to energize the antiwar movement on both sides of the border. In later years, when the civil rights movement had given way to black power, and SUPA and SDS ceased to exist, the new left continued to influence the antiwar movement in Canada, but in most cases its manifestations were local, not national, and certainly not international.

⁸ For more on the international dimensions of the new left see George Kastiaficas, *The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968* (Cambridge: South End Press, 1987).

Also central to this narrative is the role of organized labour and the democratic left – the New Democratic Party (NDP) and its youth wing the New Democratic Youth. I place labour and the NDP together because, like the civil rights movement and the new left, the two often operated together. Also, in both cases their participation in the antiwar movement was neither consistent nor predominant. Several qualifiers, however, must be placed on this statement. First, although long past playing an influential role in Canadian labour unions, the Communist Party of Canada was not an entirely spent force. There were unions that had survived, in some cases barely, that continued to demonstrate a degree of sympathy with the Communist Party and its causes. Among these were the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, the International Woodworkers of America, the United Electrical Workers, and the United Fishermen and Allied Workers. Not surprisingly it was these unions which became most active in the antiwar movement early on. Other unions, such as the United Auto Workers, joined later. Some labour bodies such as district labour councils, provincial federations of labour, and even the Canadian Labour Congress expressed opposition to the war on occasion – often quite tepidly – while others flatly refused to condemn US aggression. Often the latter was a manifestation of sympathy for the AFL-CIO's support of the war. This was also reflected in the NDP, whose leader and youth wing were more inclined to oppose the war than many regular members of the party.

Another recurring theme throughout this thesis is the importance of vanguard organizations in shaping and leading the antiwar movement. Originating with Lenin's tract *What is to be Done*, the concept of vanguardism was easily adapted to the antiwar

movement.⁹ What is meant by the term in this context – and what distinguishes it from leadership in general – has more to do with style than substance. Vanguardism is a strategy in which a small core of disciplined, committed and energized individuals attempts to place itself at the centre of a movement, guiding it in a direction consistent with its own preconceived analysis and proposed solutions. The role of the vanguard organization is twofold: to ensure the correct line is followed and to educate recruits in the validity of the core organization's analysis and slogans. Its impact is felt disproportionately within the larger movement. Again, a similar dynamic manifested itself in the movement in the United States. Indeed, south of the border friction between competing vanguard organizations was much more heated than in Canada. Not surprisingly, the two organizations most known for vanguardism were the Communists and the Trotskyists (the latter being particularly adroit). But they were not alone. SUPA – or at least the element of SUPA most concerned with antiwar activism – had its own vanguardistic tendencies. Indeed SUPA's involvement with the antiwar movement exposed a significant cleavage within the organization between those who genuinely adhered to the principles of participatory democracy and those who merely went through the motions to ratify a pre-determined course of action.

Regardless, protest rarely just happened – someone organized it. In the case of the antiwar movement in Canada there were three overlapping phases in which different vanguard organizations played a leading role. Initially that role was played by the Canadian Peace Congress, with the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) and its allies supporting it. This influence was felt from the earliest stirrings of the antiwar movement

⁹ V. I. Lenin, *What is to be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement* (New York: International Publishers, 1969).

in 1963, but was largely spent by 1968. For a short while following the deployment of American combat troops to Vietnam in 1965 the Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA) filled this role. Other campus-based new left organizations from time to time would attempt antiwar protest, but their efforts were largely local and often in competition with other groups. Also, as Roberta Lexier argues, the democratization of universities, rather than the war, was always the priority of such groups.¹⁰ The organization that took prominence from 1968 until the cease-fire of 1973 was the Trotskyist League for Socialist Action (LSA). Of course other groups would exercise leadership roles in the antiwar movement from time to time. This includes the NDY, as well as unions and other groups. But unlike the CPC, the LSA, and SUPA, the NDY's role was never vanguardist. Significantly, it was when all of these organizations worked together that the greatest numbers of Canadians were mobilized in protest against the war.

The methodology employed in researching this thesis has involved a review of secondary sources, as well as, contemporary newspapers and magazines. I have also consulted documents in numerous archival collections. Certain collections have been particularly helpful in revealing the story of the antiwar movement in Canada. The Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Collection at McMaster University proved particularly helpful in illuminating the roles played by CUCND and SUPA in the early years of the movement. The Voice of Women Collection at Library and Archives Canada provided much of the information regarding VOW. I have also attempted to include the voices of many participants in the events described here through oral history interviews. I have attempted to include voices from as many constituencies

¹⁰ Roberta Lexier, "The Community of Scholars: The English-Canadian Student Movement and University Governance," in Hammond-Callaghan and Hayday, *Mobilizations, Protests and Engagements*, (125-144) 126.

within the antiwar movement as possible; but I have had limited success. It is difficult to find subjects forty years after the events in which they were involved. Some have passed away. In cases of women activists, there is always the challenge of names changing due to marriage. For reasons not quite clear, members of certain constituencies were particularly enthusiastic in coming forward to participate in this project. These included former American exiles and former members of the Trotskyist movement. On the other hand, organizations such as the Communist Party of Canada and the Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist) ignored my invitation to participate in this study. In the case of the Trotskyists and American immigrants, I can only speculate that these groups are especially proud of their contributions to the movement and welcomed the opportunity. In the case of the CPC, the lasting legacy of McCarthyism might help to explain this. The Communist Party made great efforts to obfuscate its role in the antiwar movement at the time. Perhaps old habits are hard to break. In the case of the Marxist-Leninists, they have nothing to boast about. The most mixed response came from former activists of the new left. While many were enthusiastic participants, an equal number would have nothing to do with the project. This is likely more a function of different personalities than anything else. This dissertation also uses Royal Canadian Mounted Police files obtained, in most cases, by the result of over fifty separate Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) applications. Most of these files have been redacted, sometimes moderately, sometimes heavily. These documents must be interpreted with caution as RCMP agents' prejudices sometimes enter the record as fact. In many cases, however, these files are the only written record of the internal dynamics of the antiwar movement. Also, in addition to RCMP reports and other documents contained in these files, government agents kept

extensive clipping collections from the press. Sometimes these are from popular publications such as the *Globe and Mail* or the *Vancouver Province*, but often they are from obscure political, ethnic or religious organizations not readily available to the public.

This dissertation is composed of nine chapters. The first is a review of the historiography of this topic. It begins with an analysis of the literature concerning the antiwar movement in the United States. This rich body of scholarship identifies many facets of importance concerning the movement in Canada. There is no comparable collection of literature specifically concerned with the antiwar movement in Canada, but the chapter nevertheless discusses what work exists on the topic. This takes both a chronological and a thematic approach. First it examines the growing literature concerning the sixties in general in Canada, and the impact of various left and peace organizations in shaping the antiwar movement. It then discusses the work specifically concerning the organization Voice of Women. A considerable body of literature has emerged over the years on this group. As for the literature concerning American exiles, I have embedded it directly in the chapter on the subject. My primary reason in doing so is space. So much literature is available on this topic that it could warrant its own chapter. Also, as I make clear below, there is good reason to consider what has come to be called the “anti-draft” or “war resister” movement, as distinct from the antiwar movement.

The second chapter explores the early stages of the antiwar movement in Canada between 1963 and 1965. It includes a discussion of the role of existing peace organizations in raising the banner of the antiwar movement. Among these organizations were the Canadian Peace Congress, the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament,

the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and their successor organization the Student Union for Peace Action. In addition, the role of left parties – Communists, Trotskyists, and New Democrats – and the roles they played in the early movement are examined. Of particular importance here is the interplay between the student groups in Canada and the United States, most clearly seen in the relationship between SUPA, SNCC and SDS.

Chapter three looks at the period from the fall of 1965 to the end of the summer of 1966. Of particular importance here is an analysis of the early International Days of Protest called by the Berkeley-based Vietnam Day Committee. While the first International Day of Protest in October 1965 elicited limited Canadian participation, the second one, in March 1966, saw the first national antiwar protest in Canada. Notably, it was preceded by the first mass antiwar protest against the war in Quebec.

Chapter four examines the fracturing and re-consolidation of the antiwar movement from the fall of 1966 to the end of 1968. During this period the movement experienced an on-again, off-again feud between one faction grouped around the CP and another around the LSA. This period is also marked by the diminishing leadership roles of both SUPA and the Communist Party in the antiwar movement. By the end of 1968 the Trotskyist-oriented Vietnam Action Committees in Western Canada and the Vietnam Mobilization Committees in Ontario would be the key organizing groups within the movement.

The fifth chapter follows the rise and fall of the moratorium movement during 1969-1970. Taking its cue from the movement begun in the US, activity was initially slow. By the second round of moratorium protests in November 1969, however,

Canadians had joined with their American cousins in the thousands to proclaim their opposition to the war. As in the US, the moratorium movement rapidly evaporated in the early months of 1970.

Chapter six concerns itself with reaction in Canada to the April 1970 US invasion of Cambodia and subsequent killing of young protesters in the United States by law enforcement agencies, most notably at Kent State University in Ohio. Although paling in comparison to the national student strike that these events engendered in the United States, May 1970 was clearly an international phenomenon with significant activity in Canada.

Chapter seven, a break from the chronological approach of this dissertation, is an examination of Voice of Women (VOW). Specifically, it examines VOW's role as an antiwar organization. While many in and around the organization have downplayed the centrality of the war in Southeast Asia during this period, here I argue that during the peak years of VOW's existence – 1963-1975 – it was the war that did more to mobilize its members than any other issue.

Chapter eight is also thematic in nature. Here we look at the phenomenon of military-age Americans in Canada during the war. This includes draft dodgers, deserters, and others who left the United States to pursue lives in Canada. The chapter examines Americans' motivations for emigrating, their political background, and the contributions they made to the antiwar movement upon their arrival in Canada. Much has been written of the contribution of American immigrants to the antiwar movement. This dissertation questions this popular narrative, in part by examining the various political organizations established in Canada by and for American exiles.

The final chapter resumes the chronological approach, encompassing the period from 1971 to 1975. Beginning with some of the largest protests in Canada during the Vietnam era, the antiwar movement quickly collapsed in the year leading up to the 1973 cease-fire. Following the withdrawal of American troops the movement all but disappeared in Canada. By the time of the final Communist victories in Indochina very few were still paying attention. The explanation for this is complex. In the United States, a professionalized antiwar lobby had eclipsed the mass movement by the early 1970s. No such professional lobby emerged in Canada. Partly this reflects the reality that there were few to lobby in Canada regarding US government practices. More significant, the war, and the movement that arose in opposition to it, had run its course. The movement in Canada was always a movement of the streets. When mass demonstrations in the United States declined, when international antiwar initiatives were no longer emanating from south of the border, the movement in Canada no longer had a lead to follow.

Chapter One: Historiography

While there is a vast body of literature concerning the antiwar movement in the United States, the topic has only recently begun to be explored in Canada. What literature there is on the Canadian movement tends to focus on the 1960s in general, the student movement, or on the new left. We begin, therefore, by reviewing the literature concerning the movement in the United States, where the movement has been the subject of analysis since the early years of the war. Originally part of a larger historiography of “the sixties,” the antiwar movement in the US has been written about to such an extent that it now warrants consideration on its own. Because the historiography is so substantial, we will limit our discussion here to a sampling of the most significant works, avoiding surveys, syntheses, and histories of protest in the sixties in general except where they add to the overall discussion.¹

The literature is almost evenly divided between studies of specific antiwar organizations such as Women Strike for Peace and Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and more general studies of antiwar opposition as a whole. Those who write about this subject are in many ways a reflection of the movement’s leadership. While the overwhelming majority of these writers are men, women have made a substantial contribution as well. Except in a few cases, these authors are also almost universally white and middle-class, though, as we shall see, there are significant contributions to the literature of antiwar protest from workers as well as from Mexican-Americans and African-Americans. What is most noteworthy about this literature, however, is that there

¹ For readers interested in the larger movement history of America in the 1960s, there are many such books available. A particularly helpful one is Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage* (New York: Bantam, 1987). Gitlin, a past president of Students for a Democratic Society, focuses on that organization, its emergence from McCarthyist America, its relationship with the civil rights and antiwar movements and its factional implosion in 1969.

is a significant consensus about the impact of domestic opposition on American foreign policy decision makers. Of the many works discussed here, only two break from this consensus. On the other end of the spectrum, only one is willing to say without qualification that opposition ended the war. The great consensus lies in the middle: opposition acted to shorten the war and limited the United States' ability to escalate and broaden it. A more recent trend in the historiography is to focus not on the contribution of the antiwar movement in ending the war, but rather on how the war, and the antiwar movement it spawned, affected the lives of Americans. Finally, there is also the "legacy" of the antiwar movement to consider; until recently the long-term results of the movement were to limit US military adventurism in the Third World.

The year 2002 marked a watershed in the literature of the antiwar movement with the publication of the first survey text of the antiwar movement, Melvin Small's *Antiwarriors*.² The implication is that now the antiwar movement can be taught separately from the larger topic of the 1960s. But Small's text was preceded, and has been followed, by an ever-growing body of literature concerning the antiwar movement. Small provides a synthesis of most of the existing literature to that time. While many works have followed, the general consensus among historians regarding the impact of the antiwar movement has not changed. An examination of *Antiwarriors* sets the stage for a consideration of earlier work in the field. Subsequent texts are addressed in chronological order. The literature review that follows should not be construed as comprehensive, but as representative.

² Melvin Small, *Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America's Hearts and Minds* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2002).

As a survey, *Antiwarriors* relies on already published materials. Small argues that the antiwar movement did not end the war in Vietnam, but was influential in limiting the ability of both Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon to escalate it. Small contends that the movement played a key role in Johnson's decision not to seek a second term, and in Nixon's decision to resign.³ Although opposition did not disappear with the withdrawal of US troops, the end of the draft, and the end of American battle deaths, Small tells us that dissent paled in size and impact following the cease-fire. In fact, other than a few words in passing, Small does not discuss antiwar opposition during the period 1973-1975 at all, unfortunate given that it was during this time that the movement was forced to go "mainstream," becoming more creative in its efforts.⁴ In fact, it can be argued that the most effective American opposition to the war came after the withdrawal of US troops. *Antiwarriors* is informed by Small's previous work, which emphasizes the role the media played in portraying antiwar dissent in general as a small minority of belligerent, disagreeable activists, rather than the inclusive mass movement it eventually became.⁵ Despite negative portrayals of demonstrators in the press, most antiwar activists, Small asserts, considered themselves to be loyal and patriotic Americans. He describes anti-Vietnam War opposition as the largest, most intense and sustained movement of its kind in US history.⁶

Published in 1973, Kirkpatrick Sale's *SDS* is an icon of historical writing on the antiwar movement, although technically speaking, it is not a work of history as Sale is

³ Small, *Antiwarriors*, 1.

⁴ Small, *Antiwarriors*, 119, 159.

⁵ See *Covering Dissent: The Media and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994); also *Johnson, Nixon and the Doves* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988); and, *The Presidency of Richard Nixon* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999).

⁶ Small, *Antiwarriors*, xi-xii, 3.

not a historian, but rather an independent scholar and freelance writer. Regardless, Sale was one of the first to engage in the discussion. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) served as a vanguard in the United States for a nascent antiwar movement, only to abandon antiwar activism, at least on a national level, soon after it distinguished itself as its leader. Important to this dissertation, SDS served as something of a prototype for its Canadian counterpart, the Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA), though no mention of this organization is made in Sale's book. Sale argues that SDS was the force that shaped the politics of a generation and rekindled the fires of American radicalism for the first time in thirty years. It was the largest student organization in US history and the major expression of the American left in the 1960s.⁷

Sale shows that SDS demonstrated great prescience in taking a position against US support for the Diem regime in Saigon long before the introduction of American combat troops in 1965. Its earliest public statement on the subject dates to December 1962: "As long as we are involved in a commitment to support men like Diem in South Viet Nam,⁸ we will be forced to face revolution and discontent." In September 1963 SDS worked with the Student Peace Union in protesting a visit to the United States by Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem's sister-in-law, and wife of his chief of secret police. At the National Council (NC) meeting in New York City in December 1964 members voted to organize a national demonstration in Washington, D.C., against the burgeoning war. The NC scheduled the demonstration for 17 April 1965. Between the decision to launch

⁷ Kirkpatrick Sale, *SDS* (New York: Random House, 1973) 5.

⁸ Mention should be made here of the spelling of Vietnam. In the 1960s it was commonly written as two words. In today's Standard English, it is written as one. The Vietnamese write it as two. Some scholars write it as two as a gesture of solidarity with a formerly-colonized people. For example see Lorena Oropeza, *¡Raza Si! ¡Guerra No! Chicano Protest and Patriotism During the Viet Nam War Era* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). I use the Standard English approach except in cases of direct quotes.

the demonstration and the day of the actual event, President Lyndon Johnson introduced US combat troops to Vietnam. SDS expected a few thousand people to attend, but a crowd estimated at between 20,000 and 25,000 turned out. It was the largest peace demonstration in US history to that time. SDS was placed firmly on the map as a major antiwar organization. Significant to our purposes was the presence of many demonstrators from Toronto and British Columbia.⁹ No sooner had SDS established itself as a major part of the movement against the war, however, than it abdicated this position, abandoning national antiwar work and leaving it to individual chapters to take on such activism at their own discretion. At its annual convention, 9-13 June 1965 at Kewadin, Michigan, SDS voted to not become a leading antiwar organization.¹⁰ Because Sale is more concerned overall with SDS as a new left organization, rather than a some-time antiwar group, he is not overly critical of this decision. But the implications of SDS's decision to not become a leader in the antiwar movement were huge. SDS failed to recognize the war in Vietnam as *the* issue of the times, one that youth and others could effectively organize around. While the civil rights movement had performed this function to that time, the rise of the black power movement and the expulsion of white activists from organizations such as SNCC and CORE left the war in Vietnam as really the only national issue to mobilize around. For this reason Sale's contribution to the literature of the antiwar movement is limited by SDS's contribution to the movement itself. Still, *SDS* is an important book in that it represents one of the first scholarly attempts to discuss the antiwar movement at a time when the war in Vietnam was still raging.

⁹ Sale, *SDS*, 78, 119-120, 170-187.

¹⁰ Sale, *SDS*, 203-213.

Fred Halstead's 1978 *Out Now* in many ways represents a break from the consensus that antiwar activism had an impact in shaping the outcome of the war. Like Sale, Halstead stands out for what he is not: an historian. Still, he presents an outstandingly researched book. As few books on the topic were available at the time, Halstead was a pioneer in his attempt to present a history of the antiwar movement. As a union and antiwar activist, and a leader of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Halstead was personally involved in the movement he wrote about. He was, however, cautious not to rely on his memory of events, but to cite legitimate historical sources.¹¹ Halstead argues that it was radicalized youth that were most responsible for ending the war in Vietnam. The process of radicalization, which he equated with the abandonment of the Democratic Party, had its roots in President John F. Kennedy's aborted Cuban counterrevolution at the Bay of Pigs and Johnson's abandonment of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. This was further compounded by the anticommunist exclusionist practices of existing peace groups in the early 1960s. By the time the United States introduced combat troops into Southeast Asia, according to Halstead, "a core of a few thousand young radicals were ready to get active over Vietnam." He credits radicals with initiating, building, and keeping alive opposition to the war. Like Small, Halstead largely disregards the period 1973-1975 when antiwar activism became a part of mainstream politics. The "movement" Halstead asserts, "had to arise and maintain itself apart from and in defiance of both (the Democratic and Republican) parties." "Dove politicians didn't lead," says Halstead, "they followed, far behind, stumbling and mumbling all the way." Halstead broke from the consensus of historians long before there was a consensus. In addition to giving credit to the Vietnamese in their struggle in

¹¹ Halstead, *Out Now*, 2.

winning the war – something few authors do – Halstead is the only writer to emphatically, without qualification, credit radical protest with bringing US forces home.¹²

Halstead was a Trotskyist, so it should come as no surprise that *Out Now* is unique in that it is the only work to place US antiwar dissent in the context of a larger international framework. Using the October 1965 and March 1966 International Days of Protest as examples, he argues that in addition to mobilizing thousands across the United States, antiwar activists organized demonstrations throughout the world, including Canada. Canadian antiwar activists, then, were not unique in protesting a war that their country was not directly involved in. Not surprisingly, Halstead is particularly critical of the old-line Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA). He accused to the Party of being more inclined to align itself with the left wing of the Democratic Party with its calls for a bombing halt and negotiations.¹³

Following the publication of *Out Now*, it was not until well into the next decade that significant scholarship on the antiwar movement resumed. And again, it would be the work of journalists, rather than historians. *Who Spoke Up*, Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan's 1984 work, takes its title from an October 1966 article in which journalist I. F. Stone referred to the destruction of Vietnam as "the crime our country is committing." He challenged the American people: "(T)his is what we must condemn, lest a later generation ask of us, as they ask of the Germans, who spoke up?"¹⁴ Zaroulis and Sullivan argue neither for nor against the effectiveness of antiwar dissent. What is

¹² Halstead, *Out Now*, 14-16, 711-13, 729.

¹³ Halstead, *Out Now*, 94, 111-112, 452-453.

¹⁴ Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan. *Who Spoke Up? American Protest Against the War in Vietnam, 1963-1975* (New York: Doubleday, 1984) ix.

important to them is that many people did speak up. It is a reminder to Americans, say the authors, “that times come when citizens can and indeed must challenge their government’s authority.” Rather than making a statement on the strength or weakness of antiwar opposition, Zaroulis and Sullivan remain ambivalent, giving equal weight to Halstead’s position that antiwar protest effectively ended the war, and to those such as former SDS President Tom Hayden, who credits both dissidents and Congress in ultimately ending the war. Interestingly, like Small, Zaroulis and Sullivan credit dissent as “arising from profound patriotism.”¹⁵ Indeed, the theme that protest is patriotic runs through much of the literature.

In 1987 James Miller published *Democracy is in the Streets*, the second major study of SDS.¹⁶ Unlike Sale, Miller is a professional historian. There is considerable overlap in the territory the two cover. While Sale focuses on leadership organizations such as the National Council, however, Miller takes a more biographical approach, following the lives of the key architects of early SDS from 1962 to 1969. Unfortunately neither Sale nor Miller discuss what was happening in SDS at the chapter level. Miller is particularly interested in the early life of the organization. Indeed the first half of the book concerns itself with the period leading up to the 1962 Port Huron Statement. For Miller, the Port Huron Statement, and specifically its philosophy of participatory democracy are central to the narrative of SDS.¹⁷ The latter part of Miller’s book continues its biographical framework, following the lives of former SDS leaders who had left the organization in the latter 1960s and had moved on to other projects.

¹⁵ Zaroulis, *Who Spoke*, 418-19, xi-xiii.

¹⁶ James Miller, *Democracy is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987 [1994]).

¹⁷ Miller, *Democracy*, 18, 142-143.

Miller's work is revealing in that he indicates just how reluctant SDS was to become involved with the antiwar movement. Its December 1964 decision to organize what became the first mass antiwar march of the era came very close to not happening. The motion put to the National Council initially failed. It was only after an aggressive – and ultimately successful – effort on the part of antiwar partisans to reconsider the motion that SDS proceeded with the March on Washington.¹⁸ The march was successful beyond anyone's predictions. SDS expected a crowd of 10,000; according to Miller's figures between 15,000 and 25,000 showed up. The march on Washington established SDS as the unqualified leader of the antiwar movement. But no sooner did it assume this position than it abdicated it in favour of pursuing other causes. Yet it was SDS's initial antiwar activism that led thousands to join it. In the six-month period subsequent to the April demonstration SDS doubled in size. By Thanksgiving it had a membership of 10,000. By 1968 it boasted 100,000 members.¹⁹ It is for this reason that the absence of any scholarly work on SDS at the chapter level is frustrating. Clearly, many joined SDS to oppose the war. And while it is likely that SDS chapters were active in antiwar activism, the national body was not. Miller quotes former SDS President Paul Booth regarding the organization's decision not to lead the antiwar movement:

We really screwed up... We had the opportunity... to make SDS *the* organizational vehicle of the antiwar movement. It was ours. We had achieved it. Instead, we chose to go off in all kinds of different directions – not including the direction of systematically organizing all the antiwar groups on all the campuses into our own network: The main thrust of antiwar activity was left unorganized by us.²⁰

¹⁸ Miller, *Democracy*, 227.

¹⁹ Miller, *Democracy*, 237-238, 255, 259.

²⁰ Miller, *Democracy*, 235-236.

Given SDS's withdrawal, the antiwar movement looked elsewhere for leaders. One place it found them was in the ranks of organized labour.

Given the overwhelmingly middle-class nature of the antiwar movement, the subject of class is not common in this literature. There are, however, some notable exceptions. One of these is Philip Foner's 1989 *U.S. Labor and the Viet-Nam War*.²¹ Best known for his voluminous history of the American labour movement, Foner brings his background in labour history to the literature of the antiwar movement. He argues that while the leaders of the AFL-CIO – George Meany and Jay Lovestone – consistently supported the policies of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon in Vietnam, an ever-increasing constituency within US labour opposed them. An early example was the second International Day of Protest in March 1966.²² One of the many demonstrations that took place that day was in New York, where 50,000 attended. Many marched behind a banner reading "Trade Unionists for Peace." Several of them went on to found the Trade Union Division of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) the following May.²³ In contrast to more radical elements within the antiwar movement, most notably the Socialist Workers' Party, SANE did not advocate immediate withdrawal of US troops, but rather advanced the slogan "Negotiations Now." This seemingly more accommodating position mirrored the position taken by the Communist Party and its liberal allies. Foner, himself a Communist, does not address the different positions taken by these two factions. Indeed, he makes little mention of either the CP or the SWP, although he does give credit to what he terms "independent unions" such as the

²¹ Philip S. Foner, *U.S. Labor and the Viet-Nam War* (New York: International Publishers, 1989).

²² Although Foner does not investigate the international dimensions of the war, it is worth mentioning that it was the March 1966 International Day of Protest that first saw large numbers of Canadian trade unionists marching against the war.

²³ Foner, *U.S. Labor*, 36-37.

International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, the United Electrical Workers, and Mine Mill²⁴ – all unions with a long history of Communist influence.

Out of the Trade Union Division of SANE emerged the National Labor Leadership Assembly for Peace which convened at the University of Chicago in November 1967. It represented fifty international unions from thirty eight states. Among those participating were Victor Reuther and Emile Mazey of the United Auto Workers (UAW). According to Foner, the Assembly “destroyed the impression of a monolithic labor structure in support of the war,” and “brought a section of the American labor movement in line with organized labor the world over.” Until November 1967 labour was noticeably absent from the antiwar movement. The Assembly changed that. Also, it worked to end red baiting in the union movement.²⁵

Foner illuminates the disconnect between the American labour movement and its members over the war. In December 1967 the overwhelming majority of delegates to the AFL-CIO convention voted to support Johnson's policies in Vietnam. However, a Gallup poll taken the following month showed that fifty percent of organized workers felt the war was wrong.²⁶ In 1969 Reuther withdrew the UAW out of the AFL-CIO, ostensibly over the issue of the war, and joined with the Teamsters in forming the Alliance for Labor Action. This organization argued against the war not in moral terms, but in economic ones. The inflation caused by the war was wiping out the savings of their members. That same year the Moratorium to End the War garnered mass labour support. On 15 November tens of thousands of union members joined with several hundred

²⁴ Foner, *U.S. Labor*, 41, 17.

²⁵ Foner, *U.S. Labor*, 49-55.

²⁶ Foner, *U.S. Labor*, 57-62

thousand other Americans in a march down Pennsylvania Avenue.²⁷ Following closely on the heels of the Moratorium, the shootings at Kent State brought workers into the streets as never before, adding further impetus to the labour component of the movement. This mobilization culminated with the establishment of Labor for Peace in June 1972, the largest gathering of organized workers against the war of the era.²⁸

The first comprehensive study of the antiwar movement is Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chaftfield's *An American Ordeal*. Published in 1990, it is a liberal account of the movement and is representative of the consensus that in and of itself dissent did not end the war. Protest limited the war's escalation and kept Vietnam an issue in the public eye long enough for both the public and politicians to conclude that the war was a mistake, and that the United States should get out. More importantly, *An American Ordeal* indicates what the authors refer to as the "central paradox" of the antiwar movement: that dissent was both a political *and* a cultural phenomenon. "(I)ts cultural power," they argue, "compromised its political effectiveness. It gave cultural dissonance a political import more surely than it affected public policy." Put another way, the public images of violence and disorder, often unfairly associated with protesters, did more to alienate the public than to mobilize it. Public opinion indicated increasing resentment of protesters while at the same time increasing agreement with them. While proclaiming the irrelevance of the antiwar movement, both Presidents Johnson and Nixon went to great lengths to discredit it and mobilize opposition to it. Antiwar dissent also pushed Johnson and Nixon to make increasingly unrealistic claims regarding US success in fighting the war. When these claims were proven false, such as during the Tet Offensive of January

²⁷ Foner, *U.S. Labor*, 87-90.

²⁸ Foner, *U.S. Labor*, 99, 133, 151.

1968, opposition to the war increased.²⁹ Also, unlike much of the work in this area, *An American Ordeal* does not dismiss the 1973-1975 period in a few short words. Rather, DeBenedetti and Chatfield clearly show the transition of opposition from peripheral to mainstream:

Antiwar activists contributed to the growth of public disaffection with the war and helped give it a focus, but they were unable to harness it. At least prior to the 1973 peace accords, they did not establish themselves as a positive reference point for the many politicians and millions of people whose early support of the war turned into resentful neutrality.³⁰

It was only in the aftermath of the cease-fire, with the falling away of the visibly belligerent from antiwar circles, and an increasing professionalization of dissent that the war finally ended. This was facilitated by the election of increasing numbers of antiwar partisans to the House and Senate.

The year 1990 also saw the publication of Mitchell Hall's *Because of Their Faith*. Hall takes his title from a quote from Barbara Fuller, a member of Clergy and Laity Concerned about Vietnam (CALCAV): "We've simply got to say something ... because of who we are, and because of our faith."³¹ Hall's work is representative of an expanding historical literature, in the 1990s and beyond, focusing on specific antiwar organizations, in this case CALCAV. Begun as a doctoral dissertation, *Because of Their Faith* agrees that antiwar organizations did not play a decisive role in ending the war, but were a contributing factor. Hall argues that CALCAV "helped influence public opinion against the war, limited government options in conducting the war, and defended the right of dissent." Arising out of the ecumenical religious peace movement of the post-war era,

²⁹ Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990) 1, 396-400.

³⁰ DeBenedetti, *American Ordeal*, 393-94.

³¹ Mitchell Hall, *Because of their Faith: CALCAV and Religious Opposition to the Vietnam War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) 177.

CALCAV was originally organized on a local level in New York City in October 1965 by about 100 members of Roman Catholic and mainstream Protestant churches and Jewish synagogues. In later years, as the organization began to concern itself with issues other than Vietnam, it shortened its name to CALC. By 1972 it had forty seven chapters and a mailing list in excess of 40,000. Drawing upon existing materials as well as CALC's records in the Swarthmore College Peace Collection, FBI files, and personal interviews, Hall concludes that "In the end, CALC was preaching to the converted."³² For the purposes of this discussion, Hall's work is helpful in that it shows us the support that CALCAV sent to Canada to assist American exiles who had fled the United States as draft dodgers or deserters.³³

Amy Swerdlow's *Women Strike for Peace* is, as her title indicates, a study of that antiwar organization. Her subtitle, *Traditional Motherhood and Radical Politics in the 1960s*, suggests the process of radicalization the organization went through during the course of the war. Her use of the word "radical" should not be confused with the way in which Fred Halstead uses it. Swerdlow's radicalism is a transition from "feminine to feminist." Women Strike for Peace challenged the fundamental roles that women played in society, and especially within the political process. At no point did it challenge the political structures of the United States. In fact, the election of Bella Abzug to the House of Representatives was a crowning achievement of the organization. This process came about through WSP's antiwar activism. Liaisons with women's organizations affiliated

³² Hall, *Because*, x, 5-8, 14-15, 53, 156-57, 174.

³³ Hall, *Because*, 83-85.

with the Hanoi government and the NLF assisted in this radicalization. In effect, the war in Southeast Asia had a greater effect on WSP than WSP had on the war.³⁴

Unfortunately for the purposes of this study, Swerdlow does not explore the very active relationship of WSP with its Canadian counterpart Voice of Women (VOW), founded two years prior to the birth of the American organization.

Peter Levy's 1994 *The New Left and Labor in the 1960s* retraces many of Foner's steps, but Levy is more sympathetic to the AFL-CIO, arguing that the relationship between labour and the antiwar movement was complex and that labour's support for Johnson was strategic. Levy acknowledges but minimizes the role of what he calls "fringe unions": UE, Mine Mill and others. This argument is based on four points: Johnson was labour's friend, war was good for business and therefore meant bigger pay packets, both labour and the administration shared a common anticommunist ideology, and labour generally bought into the premise that the war in Vietnam was the result of DRV aggression. Finally, cultural differences did much to aggravate tensions between blue collar workers and middle-class protesters. Distorted images of long hair, drugs, promiscuity and flag burning offended many workers.³⁵ Despite this, by 1971 sixty one percent of Americans favoured withdrawal of US troops from Indochina.³⁶ Much of that support came from union homes. While Levy indicates that the 1968 Tet Offensive and the 1970 killings at Kent State were pivotal in the turning of American opinion, he also gives credit to the establishment of Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) in 1967.

³⁴ Amy Swerdlow, *Women Strike for Peace: Traditional Motherhood and Radical Politics in the 1960s* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) x, 1-4, 214, 232.

³⁵ Peter B. Levy, *The New Left and Labor in the 1960s* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994) 52-53.

³⁶ Levy, *New Left*, 62.

The mid-1990s saw several additions to the growing literature of the antiwar movement, some of it quite conservative in its interpretation. *Campus Wars*, by Kenneth Heineman, is a somewhat enigmatic piece. Published in 1994, it is neither a study of antiwar activism as a whole, nor of a specific organization. It is, rather, a case study of a constituency, specifically students at state universities. Heineman closely examines antiwar activism during the 1960s and early 1970s at four, in his view dissimilar, state universities: Kent State, Michigan State, Penn State, and SUNY-Buffalo.³⁷ Of all the literature considered here, *Campus Wars* is one of the few to claim that antiwar activism had no effect in ending the war in Southeast Asia. Indicating that student opposition to the war was pretty well finished by 1972, Heineman asserts that the United States withdrew from the conflict because the war could not be won militarily.³⁸ This, however, is not Heineman's primary concern. *Campus Wars* is geared, rather, towards dispelling what Heineman refers to as the myth that campus activism was led by students at elite universities. He approaches the subject by first presenting the reader with some of the dominant images of campus unrest in the 1960s: the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, Harvard SDS waylaying Robert McNamara, the Columbia Strike, the Cornell Strike, and Kent State. Only the last of these involves a non-elite school, and yet it is this image more than any that shows the savage repression of antiwar dissent. This is not coincidental, argues Heineman. Although elite schools were most associated with dissent in the public's mind, non-elite schools were just as, if not more so, inclined towards

³⁷ Kenneth J. Heineman, *Campus Wars: The Peace Movement at American State Universities in the Vietnam Era* (New York: New York University Press, 1994). It is not clear what Heineman means by dissimilar. All four campuses are predominantly white, located in the Northeast, and within a day's drive of each other.

³⁸ Heineman, *Campus Wars*, 9, 2.

dissent. More important, authorities were more inclined to attack dissenters at state schools than at elite ones:

(S)ince the bulk of state university students were middle to working class, such administrators did not have to worry about serious economic and political retaliation from parents whose children had run afoul of the police. This reality meant that if National Guardsmen were to come onto a campus and bayonet or kill students, then the institution involved would not be a Harvard, but rather a Kent State.³⁹

While there is certainly validity to Heineman's conclusions, examining only state universities disregards the savagery visited upon students at elite universities. Examples of these include the shooting death of James Rector by Berkeley police and the brutal attack on Wisconsin students by Madison police.⁴⁰ While such schools were publicly funded, they both represented elite campuses in large state university systems. This is to say nothing, of course, about the butchery that took place on the campuses of historically black colleges and universities in the United States, such as South Carolina State and Jackson State.⁴¹

Tom Wells's *The War Within*, also published in 1994, is another comprehensive history of domestic opposition to the war in Southeast Asia – though it should be noted that Wells is a sociologist. Like *An American Ordeal*, it is representative of the consensus that the antiwar movement limited the war's escalation and kept the issue in the public eye. Somewhat to the left of DeBenedetti and Chatfield, Wells suggests that the

³⁹ Heineman, *Campus Wars*, 267.

⁴⁰ See Sale, *SDS*, 511, 637.

⁴¹ For an examination of the shooting at South Carolina State, in which 30 students were shot, three of them fatally, see Jack Nelson and Jack Bass, *The Orangeburg Massacre* (New York: New World Publishing, 1970). For accounts of the three shootings that occurred at Jackson State between 1964 and 1970, see Tim Spofford, *Lynch Street: The May 1970 Slayings at Jackson State College* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1988). For accounts of police slayings at other African American campuses see Clayborne Carson, *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Adam Fairclough, *Race and Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana, 1915-1972*, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995); and William H. Chafe, *Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).

movement had a more dramatic impact on the outcome of the war than others of this school. Wells argues that the movement was at “the cutting edge” of antiwar sentiment as a whole and that it played a major role in restricting, de-escalating, and ending the war. Further, he adds that one legacy of the movement was that it limited the Reagan administration’s military interventions in El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980s.⁴²

Adam Garfinkle argues the opposite of Wells. Like many others who write on the topic of the antiwar movement, Garfinkle is not a historian. Rather, his credentials are in foreign relations. Among his many achievements, Garfinkle has worked as a speech writer for two secretaries of state, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. His 1995 *Telltale Hearts: The Origins and Impact of the Vietnam Antiwar Movement* asserts that the antiwar movement had absolutely no impact, that the war in Vietnam was lost by the political and military leadership of the United States. Garfinkle argues that America could have won the war, an assertion that no other scholar on the subject has ever argued.⁴³ Further, Garfinkle blames the antiwar movement with prolonging the war. Other factors such as mounting casualties and costs, failure to win, and an increasing credibility gap led to the loss of public support for the war, not the actions of antiwar activists.⁴⁴ Garfinkle disagrees with Wells specifically: “Those observers, such as historian Tom Wells, who still believe that the antiwar movement ‘played a major role in constraining, de-escalating and ending the war’ are wrong.”⁴⁵ There is a grain of truth to some of Garfinkle’s assertions, most notably the disconnect between what he deems

⁴²Tom Wells, *The War Within: America’s Battle Over Vietnam* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1994) 579-82.

⁴³ Adam Garfinkle, *Telltale Hearts: The Origins and Impact of the Vietnam Antiwar Movement* (New York: St Martin’s Griffin, 1995), 27.

⁴⁴ Garfinkle, *Telltale Hearts*, 1-3.

⁴⁵ Garfinkle, *Telltale Hearts*, 3.

antiwar sentiment and the impact of antiwar activism. As the war ground on, more and more Americans opposed it. In Garfinkle's analysis, however, these people's opinions were uninfluenced by the antiwar movement. This is what DeBenedetti and Chatfield refer to in their work as the "central paradox" of the antiwar movement. Indeed, DeBenedetti and Chatfield indicate the absolute hostility of many Americans to the antiwar movement despite their agreement with it. But whereas Garfinkle uses this as a rationale to dismiss the relevance of one of America's largest social movements, DeBenedetti and Chatfield use it to help illustrate its complexities. *Telltale Hearts* is nothing if not iconoclastic.

Terry Anderson's 1995 *The Movement and the Sixties: Protest in America from Greensboro to Wounded Knee* is a comprehensive account of American political dissent in the postwar era. As his subtitle indicates, he specifically looks at the period 1960 to 1973, adopting a variation of what some have come to see as "the long sixties."⁴⁶ Anderson begins his work, however, with an examination of the 1950s, in order to illustrate what he terms the "Cold War culture" that enveloped America at the beginning of the 1960s. "The movement" and the sixties did much to diminish the omnipotence of this culture. In contrast to most writers of the 1960s, Anderson does not present an organizational history. Rather, he argues that the 1960s were characterized by a movement for social change. This all-encompassing movement included civil rights, antiwar, women's, gay, red, and brown power, as well as an emerging environmentalist

⁴⁶ While it is unclear who first coined the term "the long sixties," it is generally understood to delineate the period from the mid-1950s until the mid-1970s. Some scholars, such as Arthur Marwick and Joan Sangster employ the term in this respect. More recently, Tom Hayden has come to assert that the sixties have yet to end. See Arthur Marwick, "The Cultural Revolution of the Long Sixties: Voices of Reaction, Protest, and Permeation," *The International History Review*, 27:4, December 2005, 780-806; Joan Sangster, "Radical Ruptures: Feminism, Labor, and the Left in the Long Sixties in Canada," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 40:1, March 2010, 1-21; Tom Hayden, *The Long Sixties: From 1960 to Barack Obama* (Paradigm: Herndon, VA, 2009).

movement. While sometimes reading as a smorgasbord of activism, Anderson's point is that the Sixties represented a sea change in American society, that by 1973 the United States was –politically, socially, culturally, and in terms of foreign policy – a different country.⁴⁷

Anderson divides the 1960s into two distinct phases. The first, lasting from 1960 to 1968, was driven by activists born in the 1930s and early 1940s. Energized first by the civil rights movement, and later the antiwar movement, it was a political phenomenon. The second phase, 1969-1973 saw a merging of the counterculture with the political struggles of the day. It also witnessed the emergence of newer constituencies within the overall movement: women, natives, environmentalists, Chicanos, gays and lesbians. Leaders of this second phase tended to have been born in the postwar era.⁴⁸ Despite the movement being sparked by the struggle for African American civil rights, it was the war in Vietnam, Anderson argues, that was the engine of the 1960s. Without the war, the period would have remained one of liberal reform.⁴⁹ It was the war, more than anything, that radicalized America. It did not happen overnight. Anderson cites a 1965 Gallup poll indicating that in the initial stages of the war young people had supported it. By 1971, however, a majority of Americans favoured immediate withdrawal. Like Foner, Levy and others, Anderson credits this change to economics. In his words, “the economy had caught up with the war. Despite this profound change in public opinion, Anderson echoes

⁴⁷ Terry Anderson, *The Movement and the Sixties: Protest in America from Greensboro to Wounded Knee* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 412.

⁴⁸ Anderson, *The Movement*, np, 130, 135, 242, 245, 294, 317, 343.

⁴⁹ Anderson, *The Movement*, 135.

DeBenedetti in pointing out that regardless of their opinion of the war, most people still hated antiwar protesters.⁵⁰

A significant error in Anderson's narrative is his assertion that the 1973 Paris Peace Accords "ended US involvement" in Vietnam.⁵¹ It would be more correct to state that the cease-fire ended the movement as it had existed to that time. But the United States continued its involvement with Vietnam long after it withdrew its combat troops. It continued to bankroll the government of Nguyen Van Thieu, arming and training his military, and providing intelligence. American involvement in Vietnam only ended with a Communist victory in April 1975.

Like Wells and DeBenedetti, Anderson discusses the legacies of the era in general and the antiwar movement in particular. For one, activism became normalized, and not just on the left. Conservatives, too, were doing it. The sixties also transformed the Democratic Party into an organization more representative of its name. Also, by 1973 there was recognition that America had become a multicultural society. Related to this is the questionable progress America had experienced with regard to race. While *de jure* discrimination had been ended, *de facto* segregation and African American poverty had increased.⁵² The antiwar movement had taught the United States that it was not invincible, and that its leaders were not to be trusted on foreign policy. Anderson's conclusions regarding the antiwar movement echo those of DeBenedetti, Wells and Hall. While the movement was not alone in ending the war, "it did provoke citizens out of Cold War allegiance, it generated and focused public opposition, and influenced

⁵⁰ Anderson, *The Movement*, 163, 150

⁵¹ Anderson, *The Movement*, 408.

⁵² Anderson, *The Movement*, 406, 413-416.

Presidents Johnson and Nixon.” Unlike the US Army in Vietnam, the antiwar movement “lost every battle but *eventually* won the war” for America’s hearts and minds.⁵³

Andrew Hunt’s study of Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), aptly titled *The Turning*, takes its name from testimony given by VVAW member John Kerry to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1971:

(W)hen thirty years from now our brothers go down the street without a leg, without an arm, or a face, and small boys ask why, we will be able to say ‘Vietnam’ and not mean a desert, not a filthy obscene memory, but mean instead a place where America finally turned and where soldiers like us helped it in the turning.⁵⁴

Hunt argues effectively that VVAW was not only representative of that turning, but was in many ways the agent of it. Antiwar protest by Vietnam Veterans, says Hunt, was “the highest form of patriotism.”⁵⁵ Again, the narrative of protest as patriotic is a common one in the American literature. Hunt emphasizes the fact that outside of organized labour, VVAW represented one of the few predominantly working-class organizations involved in the antiwar movement.⁵⁶ Contrasting the working-class war veterans with the Port Huron generation of SDS, “bred at least in modest comfort, housed now in universities,” Hunt, like Swerdlow and Anderson, views the war itself as an agent of radicalization. Unlike the students of the early 1960s who came to challenge the war as the result of an intellectual process, *The Turning* tells us “there was nothing abstract or theoretical about the war in Southeast Asia to VVAW joiners.” Like the members of Women Strike for Peace and other groups, the members of VVAW were radicalized by the war itself.

⁵³ Anderson, *The Movement*, 417-418.

⁵⁴ Andrew Hunt, *The Turning: A History of Vietnam Veterans Against the War* (New York: New York University Press, 1999) 110.

⁵⁵ Hunt, *The Turning*. This in fact is the title of the first chapter in Hunt’s book.

⁵⁶ Hunt’s work was joined in 2001 by Gerald Nicosia’s *Home to War: A History of the Vietnam Veterans’ Movement* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2001). In addition to Vietnam veteran opposition to the war, Nicosia extends the narrative into the 1980s and beyond, looking at the issues of healing and the struggle for veterans’ benefits.

Unlike them, however, they were radicalized by direct participation in it. By placing Vietnam veterans at the forefront of the movement, Hunt asserts, VVAW actually transformed the antiwar movement and “contributed significantly to ending the war in Vietnam.”⁵⁷

Diverging from the broad consensus that the antiwar movement was a significant factor in ending the war is Michael Foley’s *Confronting the War Machine*.⁵⁸ Originally a doctoral dissertation and published in 2003, Foley’s work focuses on the anti-draft organization in the Boston area calling itself the Resistance. First organized in 1966, the organization disbanded in 1968. Boston was the first city in the United States to give birth to a draft resistance movement, and at its peak the Resistance boasted seventy five chapters.⁵⁹ Foley argues that the draft resistance movement was the leading edge of opposition to the war between 1967 and 1968, and that its members were the moral equivalent of the civil rights movement’s freedom riders or sit-in participants. Civil rights activists are today seen as heroes. Foley’s concern is that their counterparts in the draft resistance movement are viewed in the United States as cowards and traitors. Foley’s purpose is to reverse this perception.⁶⁰

Foley’s definition of a “resister” is significant to this dissertation’s account of American exiles in Canada. Foley embraces the language of the Resistance by defining a resister as one who rejected the entire selective service system. He distinguishes between what he refers to as draft evaders and draft resisters. Evaders were those who used the system of deferments – student, medical, psychological, conscientious objector, etc. – to

⁵⁷ Hunt, *The Turning*, 192, 201.

⁵⁸ Michael Foley, *Confronting the War Machine: Draft Resistance During the Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

⁵⁹ Foley, *Confronting*, 15.

⁶⁰ Foley, *Confronting*, 9.

evade military service. Resisters, by Foley's definition, were those who risked going to jail by publicly refusing to participate in the draft system at all. Similarly, both Foley and the Resistance movement of the time, viewed going to Canada as a variation on deferments as it was secretive and only risked legal recriminations by returning to the United States. Resisters invited legal prosecution.⁶¹ What distinguishes Foley's narrative is his inclusion of those other than straight, white males. While African-Americans were indeed rare in the movement, the experience of women, who were recruited into the movement in support roles only, was mixed. While some viewed their experience with the movement as the ultimate indignity, other women saw it as an extension of the civil rights movement's "beloved community." Foley argues that the treatment of women in the Resistance was quite progressive in contrast to what he refers to as "the sexually predatory nature of SDS and the Weathermen."⁶² Similarly, Foley discusses the role of gays and lesbians in the movement, albeit in a limited manner. Looking back over thirty years later, some of Foley's informants indicate that it was common to hear "fag jokes" and references to "faggots" and "cocksuckers" around the office of the Resistance. Gay men and women who did take part in the Resistance generally kept themselves closeted.⁶³ Foley disagrees with claims that the draft resistance movement helped end the war, leaning towards the position that the United States withdrew from Vietnam because it came to the conclusion that it could not win. However, this is not Foley's primary concern. He concludes:

⁶¹ Foley, *Confronting*, 6-7.

⁶² Foley, *Confronting*, 181 -189, 334-335. According to Foley the handful of women who were left in the Boston chapter of the Resistance when it folded in 1968 went on to form Boston's first consciousness raising group which eventually became part of the Bread and Roses women's collective.

⁶³ Foley, *Confronting*, 184.

At the end of the day, then, whether or not the antiwar movement prolonged the war is not a particularly meaningful issue. A more important one is a moral one: to what extent is a citizen responsible to his country when the government is engaged in a violent war that he deems “illegal,” “immoral,” and “obscene?”

To Foley, it is the choices that individuals made in responding to the war that were more important than the impact those choices had.

The work of Lorena Oropoza, *¡Raza Si! ¡Guerra No! Chicano Protest and Patriotism During the Viet Nam War* is one of two works published in 2005 that address the issue of race and the antiwar movement. Originally a dissertation, Oropoza’s work agrees with Swerdlow and Hunt that the war did more to change Americans than the antiwar movement impacted on the outcome of the war. Specifically, Oropoza examines the Mexican American community and the antiwar movement that emerged within it. Historically, service in the armed forces of the United States was not only a badge of masculinity for Chicano men, but also served as a vehicle for entry into the larger society, into whiteness. Oropoza argues that the war in Vietnam, and growing Mexican-American participation in the antiwar movement it engendered, led to an increasing racial pride in *la raza*. Mexican Americans developed a consciousness of themselves as “a people of color, a colonized people, and as men and women who had struggled against oppression for centuries.” Their fight was not in Vietnam, but at home. The war in Vietnam, asserts Oropoza, presented Mexican-Americans with the opportunity to reject and dispute the traditional parameters of citizenship.⁶⁴ What is unique about the Mexican-American community is that it was the only minority group in the United States to organize against the war *as a constituency*. Mexican Americans established the National Chicano

⁶⁴ Oropoza, *¡Raza Si!*, 5, 7.

Moratorium Committee following the fall 1969 national Moratorium.⁶⁵ During 1970 more than a dozen Chicano Moratorium demonstrations took place across the United States, culminating in a march on 29 August in Los Angeles in which between 20,000 and 30,000 Mexican-Americans took part. It was the largest gathering of Mexican-Americans ever. Despite the peaceful nature of the march, police attacked it ferociously, opening fire on unarmed protesters and killing three. Needless to say, the Chicano killings did not take on the iconic status that Kent State did.⁶⁶

Also in 2005, Simon Hall published his *Peace and Freedom: The Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements in the 1960s*. In it, Hall discusses the complex relationship between these two social movements. African American participation was never substantial in the antiwar movement, but by the end of the war every major civil rights organization had taken a stand against it. While radical organizations did so early, more moderate ones joined them later. Hall explores two themes. The first is that throughout the war civil rights organizations were not united on the subject of Vietnam. Secondly, African Americans were conspicuous in the antiwar movement by their absence.⁶⁷ As a constituency, African Americans were the most antiwar of all groups. Hall cites a 1967 poll that indicated 57.3 percent of African Americans opposed the war.⁶⁸ But such sentiment rarely translated into active opposition. Still, African Americans were present in the antiwar movement from its earliest days. For instance, Hall indicates that African Americans were well represented at the April 1965 SDS March on Washington. Bob

⁶⁵ For a full account of the national Moratorium see Paul Hoffman, *Moratorium: An American Protest*, (New York, Tower Publications, 1970).

⁶⁶ Oropoza, *¡Raza Si!*, 6, 9, 145-152, 160-163, 172.

⁶⁷ Simon Hall, *Peace and Freedom: The Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements in the 1960s* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 2.

⁶⁸ Hall, *Peace and Freedom*, 11.

Moses, former chair of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee was one of the featured speakers. The SNCC executive had supported the march, though it preferred to focus its energies on civil rights work.⁶⁹ Hall argues that more militant organizations such as SNCC, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) were distrustful of white antiwar organizations based on their organizing experience in the South. The MFDP's experience at the Atlantic City Democratic National Convention – where America's leading liberals brokered a deal to seat the all-white Mississippi delegation – made it painfully aware of how quickly white liberals would abandon their democratic principles in the South while at the same time intervene in Vietnam in the name of democracy. “(O)ur criticism of Vietnam policy does not come from what we know of Vietnam,” said Bob Moses, “but from what we know of America.”⁷⁰ Such distrust, Simon tells us, worked in the opposite direction as well. Given the significant number of Jewish activists in the antiwar movement, the real or perceived anti-Semitism of many African American militants harmed efforts at creating coalitions.⁷¹ Adding to distrust was the concern of many moderate civil rights leaders that opposing the war in Vietnam would alienate the Johnson administration, whom they considered a friend. Also, civil rights leaders feared dividing their forces, believing that taking on the war in Vietnam would only weaken the struggle for civil rights. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters President A. Philip Randolph warned “(Y)ou cannot fight a war on two fronts at the same time without sacrificing one.”⁷² It was only after the departure of the Democrats from the White House that moderate civil rights

⁶⁹ Hall, *Peace and Freedom*, 24-25, 32.

⁷⁰ Hall, *Peace and Freedom*, 22.

⁷¹ Hall, *Peace and Freedom*, 114

⁷² Hall, *Peace and Freedom*, 88.

organizations, including the NAACP, joined in opposing the war. The 1969 Moratorium to End the War marked the entry of moderate African American organizations into the antiwar movement. Still, despite a turnout of 700,000 in Washington that weekend, African Americans were largely absent except for those at the podium.⁷³

The final book examined as part of the American historiography is Mary Hershberger's 2005 *Jane Fonda's War*.⁷⁴ While the antiwar movement bred its own celebrities, few indeed achieved the status of Fonda. As a Hollywood actor, she brought her celebrity with her to the movement. Much of Fonda's early antiwar work was with VVAW, raising funds for them, promoting them on talk show appearances, and, most significantly, playing a leading role in organizing the Winter Soldier Investigation of January and February 1971.⁷⁵ Fonda subsequently became involved in entertaining troops, producing antiwar films, and touring extensively. Following one such speaking engagement in Canada, she was arrested at the Cleveland airport on trumped up assault and drug charges. The incident that Fonda is most famous for was her first visit to the DRV in 1972. During the trip she was photographed sitting at an anti-aircraft gun. The implication, of course, is that Fonda was ready to shoot down American flyers.

Hershberger argues that the incident did much to create the myth of "Hanoi Jane."⁷⁶

Hershberger argues that Fonda's name became intimately bound up in a myth intended to

⁷³ Hall, *Peace and Freedom*, 160.

⁷⁴ Mary Hershberger, *Jane Fonda's War: A Political Biography of an Antiwar Icon* (New York: New Press, 2005).

⁷⁵ Hershberger, *Jane Fonda's War*, 24, 27-30, 51-60. On 16 March 1968 approximately 500 Vietnamese civilians were murdered by US troops under the command of Lt. William Calley. The military was able to suppress the story until the fall of 1969. When the story did finally come out only Calley was charged with any crime. The story was largely portrayed as an isolated incident. VVAW argued that it was representative of how the war was being fought; that the truly guilty parties were those in the Pentagon who planned and executed US military policy. To make their point they organized the Winter Soldier Investigation in which veterans testified before an independent hearing about war crimes that they personally had been a party to or had witnessed.

⁷⁶ Hershberger, *Jane Fonda's War*, 82-95.

intimidate democratic opposition to the war. The myth is based on the premise that the United States is invincible, that losing the war in Vietnam must have been the result of acts of treason from within: the infamous “stab in the back.” While such rhetoric was first promulgated by President Nixon, it took greater root in the 1980s during the Reagan era at a time when the United States was trying to reassert itself militarily in places such as El Salvador and Nicaragua. Rather than learn from the lessons of Vietnam, someone had to be blamed for the treachery and Fonda was an easy target.⁷⁷

Fonda came late to the antiwar movement and stayed. So Hershberger’s work is important because it presents an account of the antiwar movement in the period between the 1973 cease-fire and the fall of Saigon in 1975, a time when most activists had either stopped protesting the war or moved on to other causes. The most important antiwar organization during this period was the Indochina Peace Campaign, organized by Fonda.⁷⁸ It is unfortunate that Hershberger does not give as much attention to this group as it characterizes the profound change that the antiwar movement underwent between 1973 and 1975. The question of whether Fonda had an impact in ending the war is irrelevant to Hershberger. As with the work of Swerdlow, Hunt, and Oropoza, this is a story of what the war in Vietnam did to Americans. In Fonda’s case, it first turned her into an activist. Then it stripped her of her civil rights as the FBI conducted a campaign of harassment against her, lasting until she sued the agency and settled out of court in February 1975, two months before the liberation of Saigon.⁷⁹

Throughout the American literature, several themes emerge. One is that of antiwar activism as an expression of patriotism. If the popular press has allowed

⁷⁷ Hershberger, *Jane Fonda’s War*, 1-2.

⁷⁸ Hershberger, *Jane Fonda’s War*, 128-136.

⁷⁹ Hershberger, *Jane Fonda’s War*, 170-171.

dissidents to be labeled as unpatriotic, the scholarly press has certainly reversed that trend, wrapping their subjects in Old Glory. More recent historiography emphasizes the impact the war and the antiwar movement had on Americans; for this work the substantive question is not whether the movement contributed to ending the war quicker, but what the war did to people? Hunt's work is the most obvious in that he addresses veterans of the war itself. Foner and Levy focus on workers, while Swerdlow and Oropoza show what it did domestically to women and Mexican Americans respectively. Hershberger shows what it did to one individual. Another issue that emerges is the status of the movement during the period between 1973 and 1975; from the time of the withdrawal of US combat troops to the fall of Saigon and America's (and Canada's) end of support for that regime. While some, such as DeBenedetti and Wells, give careful scrutiny to this period, showing the transformation of a mass movement into a political lobby, others, such as Small and Halstead largely ignore the period. Most important, the literature shows a convergence of opinions as to the impact of the antiwar movement on foreign policy decision-making. Outside of this consensus are Adam Garfinkle and Kenneth Heineman, who both lean towards the conservative side of the spectrum in suggesting that students at non-elite universities were active, but ineffective. On the other end of the spectrum is Fred Halstead, who argues without equivocation that the movement was instrumental in ending the war. Between these two, however, is a great consensus of opinion that argues the antiwar movement was somewhere in the middle, that it limited the ferocity, escalation and expansion of the war, and that it left a legacy, that for a short while at least, kept American combat troops away from foreign shores.

Unlike the United States, Canada has no established historiography of the antiwar movement. Indeed, the overall purpose of this dissertation is to begin the discussion. On an optimistic note, the topic has been rearing its head with increasing frequency in recent years as more scholars publish works on the 1960s in Canada. But as a topic in and of itself, the antiwar movement in Canada had been buried in the larger narrative of Canada in the 1960s. To a lesser extent, opposition to the war in Southeast Asia often enters into the history of the left during this period, but again, it is a small body of literature. Discussion of anti-Vietnam War dissent appears in literature concerning the peace movement. This is especially the case regarding the organization Voice of Women, the subject of chapter seven. But again, this body of writing is extremely limited. One area of discussion where the literature is voluminous is the subject of Americans who immigrated to Canada to avoid military service in Vietnam, discussed in chapter eight. This subject presents two challenges. The first is the sheer size of the literature. As in the case of the American literature, here I opt for a sampling rather than a comprehensive analysis. Secondly, as I discuss in chapter eight, there are problems with the assumption that the anti-draft movement was part and parcel of the antiwar movement. While closely related, they were in fact separate movements. This discussion of literature pertaining to the antiwar movement in Canada, therefore, is partly thematic and partly chronological. This discussion begins with an overview of the work concerning the sixties in general, the new left, and the peace movements of the 1960s. From there we move to a discussion of the literature concerning Voice of Women.

I begin with Gary Moffatt's *History of the Canadian Peace Movement Until 1969*. Published in 1969, at the height of the Vietnam War, Moffat attempts to present of

comprehensive history of peace activism in Canada to that time. Although by no means a professional scholar, to date Moffat stands alone as the only writer to discuss the dynamics of the anti-Vietnam war movement in Canada. Moffatt argues that the peace movement in Canada reached its zenith between 1959 and 1963, and that it began to burn out in 1967 when the main focus of the movement shifted from keeping nuclear weapons out of Canada to opposing the war in Vietnam. By 1969, Moffatt argues, the trend amongst activist groups was increasingly to focus on the perceived causes of war such as racism and poverty.⁸⁰

While crediting most peace groups of the era – CCCND, CCND, SUPA, and others – for their efforts in opposing the war, he gives particular credit to the Canadian Peace Congress for its pioneering role, pointing to its education campaign and post card petition in 1965 urging an end to Canadian support for US policy in Vietnam. In fact, Moffat asserts that in 1965 the Congress was more consistently active in opposing the war in Vietnam than any other group in Canada (with the possible exception of university students).⁸¹ It is not clear if the author includes SUPA in this assessment.

Moffat grudgingly credits SUPA for its antiwar activism. Giving brief mention to several events in Toronto during 1965, he mentions one vigil at the University of Saskatchewan and an information table at the University of Alberta. Moffat points out that by December 1965 SUPA still had no official position on the war in Vietnam.⁸² This is unfair to SUPA, which as an organization was quite active in opposing the war, especially in its early stages. This must be qualified, however, in that most of SUPA's

⁸⁰ Gary Moffat, *History of the Canadian Peace Movement Until 1969* (St. Catharines: Grape Vine Press, 1969), 1.

⁸¹ Moffat, *History*, 80.

⁸² Moffat, *History*, 164-166, 172.

antiwar efforts emanated from its Toronto office. Branches in western Canada were often more concerned with other issues. For this reason SUPA should not be considered a national antiwar organization.

Moffat is quite critical of the Trotskyist faction within the movement. He accuses the League for Socialist Action of taking over SUPA initiatives, and generating the divisiveness that characterized the larger antiwar movement in the late sixties. While advocating a single-issue approach to the war, in contrast to SUPA's many issues, the LSA persisted in distributing its own materials at antiwar events. This led to its expulsion from the Toronto Vietnam Coordinating Committee in the summer 1966 (it was subsequently re-admitted that December).⁸³ The structure of the coordinating committees, in Toronto as well as in Montreal and Ottawa, was based on a coalition model, in which each member organization had one vote. Moffat accuses the LSA of creating front organizations to join such coalitions in order to increase the number of votes at its command.⁸⁴ This is an accusation that was also levelled against the LSA's counterpart in the United States, the Socialist Workers' Party.⁸⁵ The net result of this, says Moffat, is that one by one, the non-LSA groups withdrew from the committees. By 1967 the Toronto committee collapsed, leaving the LSA to continue alone.⁸⁶

This dissertation revises Moffat's narrative of the LSA. It argues that the LSA was a major player in the antiwar movement from its beginnings. In later years, it was the moving force behind the Vietnam Mobilization Committees in Ontario, the Vietnam Action Committee in Vancouver, and other antiwar groups in Canada. Although the

⁸³ This is the name Moffat uses, but the proper name of the organization was the Toronto Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

⁸⁴ Moffat, *History*, 167, 184-185.

⁸⁵ Wells, *War Within*, 451.

⁸⁶ Moffat, *History*, 186.

Trotskyist movement never organized a national antiwar organization in Canada as it did in the United States, it represented by far the most consistent and organized antiwar effort in Canada throughout much of the era. Through their ties to the Fourth International, and the American SWP, Canadian Trotskyists did much to keep the antiwar movement in Canada solidly on an internationalist footing.

Following closely on Moffat's work is James Laxer's 1970 article "The Americanization of the Canadian Student Movement."⁸⁷ Laxer's work was published in a collection of essays on the larger theme of American influence in Canada. Laxer was a leading figure in the left nationalist Waffle faction of the NDP. His concern with American influence on the student movement and the new left has significant bearing on the antiwar movement. Asserting that the ranks of the new left in Canada were composed of youth and students, Laxer argues that the Canadian student movement in 1970 still bore "the stamp of American influence. It has been unable to formulate a political strategy relevant to Canadian society." Laxer further asserts that the Canadian new left "derived much of its style and ideology from the United States, and American-centred issues filled its political agenda." Organizations such as the Student Union for Peace Action, the Company of Young Canadians, and the Canadian Union of Students, says Laxer, can directly trace their ideas and personnel to SDS and SNCC.⁸⁸ Further, states Laxer, the new left in Canada was tied with a cultural revolt that had developed from beatniks and hippies and most important the black power movement. "The identification of middle-class Canadians with a second-hand culture based essentially on that of

⁸⁷ James Laxer, "The Americanization of the Canadian Student Movement," in Ian Lumsden, ed., *Close the 49th Parallel etc: The Americanization of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 276-286.

⁸⁸ For more on the CYC see Margaret Daly, *The Revolution Game: The Short, Unhappy Life of the Company of Young Canadians* (Toronto: New Press, 1970).

American blacks,” says Laxer. “has not put Canadian youth enthusiastically in a politically meaningful position.”⁸⁹

Assumed in Laxer’s position is the inclusion of the antiwar movement as a part of the new left. This dissertation argues that in many ways the new left was, in fact, a part of the larger antiwar movement, a not so subtle difference. It does not dispute that organizations like SDS and SNCC played pivotal roles in influencing the antiwar movement domestically and internationally; indeed it clarifies those roles. The connection between these organizations and affiliated groups in Canada is well documented. Perhaps the more important question to ask is so what? As Ian McKay’s work, discussed below, points out, most left movements in Canada had roots beyond its borders. Laxer’s provincialism implies that the antiwar movement, by virtue of being American-influenced, was inherently tainted. Laxer is ambiguous on the subject of the war in Vietnam. He argues that the development of an oppositional political movement in Canada was more important than ending the war in Vietnam. Ironically, SDS adopted a similar position in the United States with regards to the war. At the same time Laxer argues that the new left did not adopt a specifically “Canadian” enough response to the war.⁹⁰ As jingoistic as this may sound, there is validity to it. To a large degree the new left quickly abandoned specifically antiwar work in favour of anti-draft efforts (again, mirroring SDS). It was often left to other organizations to maintain sustained opposition to the war itself. In this respect Laxer is correct when he argues issues such as the draft were “marginal” to Canadians. But one is left wondering if Laxer is implying the same about the war itself. Laxer also implies that the antiwar movement in Canada was in

⁸⁹ Laxer, “The Americanization,” 276-277.

⁹⁰ Laxer, “The Americanization,” 279-281.

many ways a project of the new left. Absent from his narrative is any mention of the old left and other organizations that actively opposed the war and built the antiwar movement. This dissertation acknowledges SUPA's vanguard role in the early days of the antiwar movement, while at the same time recognizing that SUPA was one of several key actors in the antiwar movement in Canada.

Myrna Kostash's 1980 popular history *Long Way from Home* represents the first attempt to document the overall protest movement of the 1960s in Canada. Kostash's work is similar to David Anderson's *The Movement and the Sixties* in that she argues that the defining characteristic of the 1960s was the existence of a movement culture. Where the two fundamentally differ is over the centrality of Vietnam. Anderson, writing as an American, argues that the war in Vietnam was the driving engine of that movement culture. Kostash, a Canadian, asserts that although there were transnational connections related to anti-Vietnam War protest, the movement culture in Canada was independent of the antiwar movement. Regardless, the antiwar movement figures prominently in her work. Kostash's purpose is partly nostalgic. In her own words, "I am in love with the Sixties." More significant, however, was her sense of frustration at the public perception that protest in the 1960s was primarily an American phenomenon. *Long Way from Home* is an attempt to present the Canadian version of the 1960s.⁹¹ Kostash gives an account of what could be broadly defined as the left in Canada during the 1960s, in particular the new left, although to be sure the 1960s was a time of many lefts. She gives a sampling of various movements, starting with the antiwar one, and then proceeds to other topics, including student power, the counterculture, the women's movement, and Quebec.

⁹¹ Myrna Kostash, *Long Way From Home: The Story of the Sixties Generation in Canada* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Co, 1980), xi-xiii.

Kostash celebrates the protest movements of the era, proclaiming that they circumscribed ruling-class hegemony. Kostash concludes by asserting that the 1960s was the peak experience for her generation. Despite its ultimate assimilation into mainstream society, it is important, in her words:

(T)o remember that there was a moment, an hour, a day when we were successful, when the system could not, even though just for a day, proceed with impunity. When, in years to come, all about us say it cannot happen, we will know, it did happen.⁹²

Of particular interest here is the first section of *Long Way from Home*, which deals with the early antiwar movement. Kostash begins her account on Christmas Day 1959, with the CUCND vigil at the National War Memorial. This was, she states, the first student demonstration since the end of World War II. In order to give a theoretical dimension to the nuclear disarmament movement, the CUCND launched its journal, *Our Generation Against Nuclear War* (later shortened to *Our Generation*) in 1961. Although presenting CUCND as the primary player in the disarmament movement, Kostash is clear that it was by no means alone in its struggle. It was joined by other organizations, including the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Voice of Women, the Peace Research Institute, the journal *Sanity*, the Canadian Peace Congress, and the Youth Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. In addition, shortly after the emergence of the CUCND, the CCF allied itself with the Canadian Labour Congress to form the New Democratic Party. Much of the membership of the CUCND overlapped with the new party.⁹³ Hence, from the beginning of the 1960s, the old left was as much a part of the peace movement as the new.

⁹² Kostash, *Long Way*, 275.

⁹³ Kostash, *Long Way*, xxii, xxvii-xxviii.

Kostash also credits the two major new left organizations in the United States with playing a significant role in the shaping of the nascent antiwar movement north of the border. The first of these was Students for a Democratic Society. Throughout the life of CUCND and later SUPA, representatives of SDS were frequent visitors. Also, beginning in 1965 with the demonstrations in support of voting rights activism in Selma, Alabama, SNCC would also influence the Canadian movement.⁹⁴ The first chapter of this dissertation revisits this terrain for several purposes. First, it seeks to further develop the links between the movements in the United States and Canada. Second, it attempts to explain this influence on a national scale. Kostash mentions select incidents pertaining to the antiwar movement in Ottawa and Vancouver, but for the most part her narrative is Toronto-centric.

The other relevant section of *Long Way from Home* is its account of the demonstrations in Toronto and Vancouver following the US invasion of Cambodia in 1970 and the subsequent shootings at Kent State University. Again, this dissertation builds on Kostash's work by viewing these events in both a national and international context. This is the subject of chapter six.

While Kostash gives a broad sampling of various protest movements in Canada during the sixties, Cyril Levitt, in his 1984 book *Children of Privilege*, takes a markedly different approach, focusing on three new left organizations in three different countries: Canada, the United States, and West Germany. In doing so he provides a more complete account of SUPA.⁹⁵ Levitt argues that the generation of student activists in the 1960s was privileged; it revolted against its own position of privilege and in the process demanded

⁹⁴Kostash, *Long Way*, 9-25.

⁹⁵ Cyril Levitt, *Children of Privilege: Student Rebellion in the Sixties: A Case Study of Student Movements in Canada, the United States, and West Germany* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984).

greater privilege. Levitt follows what historian David Churchill describes as the “declension” model.⁹⁶ He portrays student dissent in the 1960s as peaceful in the early days of the period, but increasingly violent, out-of-touch, and vanguardist as the decade proceeded. “(I)f non-violence and participatory democracy were central to the early new left,” states Levitt, “vanguardism and terrorism characterized the later movement.” Levitt ultimately concludes, however, that the new left in Canada revamped middle-class life, altered sexual relations, sensitized the public to environmental issues, and empowered women and minorities.

There are certain difficulties with *Children of Privilege*. A sociologist, Levitt is protective of his sources, often referring to them in anonymous terms such as “a SUPA activist.” Needless to say, anonymous sources cannot be corroborated. Also, despite the presence of numerous chapters of the Friends of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in Canada, Levitt makes no mention of them. For Levitt, The American new left is exclusively SDS, and the Canadian, SUPA. This might be explained by identifying SNCC not as a new left organization, but as a civil rights one. But there is a great overlap between the two movements, especially with regard to SNCC. While SNCC never described itself as a new left organization, many of its white members certainly described themselves as new leftists. Also, the absence of a definition of “new left” does not help in this matter. In fairness to Levitt he is not unique in this matter. Levitt misses the opportunity to clarify what constitutes “old” and “new” in the Canadian context. For simplicity’s sake, I suggest that new left can be applied broadly to those organizations which arose in the 1960s and 1970s that rejected the established left parties of the day –

⁹⁶ See David Stewart Churchill, “When Home Became Away: American Expatriates and New Social Movements in Toronto, 1965-1977,” Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2001, 33-36.

Communist, Trotskyist and socialist – and espoused a commitment to the principles of participatory democracy. I qualify this, however, by stating that despite pronouncements on participatory democracy, often the term was more rhetorical than substantive. Also, in the later 1960s and early 1970s, many organization describing themselves as new left began to take on the language of the old left. Nor is it ever clear why Levitt compares the student movement in Canada to those in the US and West Germany. Certainly it would make more sense to include the UK, given the roots of CUCND in the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Also, his discussion of the new left in Canada is restricted to English Canada. He does not discuss the student movement in French-speaking Quebec, seeing it an entirely different phenomenon.⁹⁷ Levitt is right, however, in drawing the ties between the new left in Canada and the United States. He cites only the connections between SUPA and SDS, and sheds light on a fascinating dynamic within SUPA that is worthy of further research. SUPA, like SDS, was a decentralized body, with individual chapters exercising high levels of autonomy. According to Levitt, branches in southern Ontario tended to closely follow the line espoused by SDS, leaning more towards antiwar activism, while chapters in Montreal and Saskatoon tended to focus on other issues. Levitt does not mention that SDS, at least on a national level, ceased its antiwar activism quite early in the war.

Also in 1984, Douglas Ross published his study of Canadian foreign policy with respect to the war in Vietnam. Neither a study of the 1960s, nor of the peace movement, *In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954-1973*, is one of the few works to examine this topic. A political scientist, Ross argues that Canada's role in Indochina was

⁹⁷ For a discussion of the sixties in Quebec see Francois Ricard, *The Lyric Generation: The Life and Times of the Baby Boomers* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1994).

to put a leash on the extremes of US policy, that in supporting, or at least not criticizing, the United States, Canada gained entrée to US leaders, which it used to restrain them from using nuclear weapons.⁹⁸ In pursuing this agenda, Ross asserts, Canada's Vietnam policy objectives were little different from the Americans' from the mid-1950s until the early 1960s. In 1959, once the shooting war began in earnest, however, Canada had to stand by its ally. Only later, with increased use of carpet bombing, napalm, torture, and assassinations, did Canada's support of the US weaken. This, Ross tells us, was due to growing public protest.⁹⁹ But Ross rarely elucidates on the nature of such dissent. When he does, it is usually in reference to occasional religious opposition to the war. With the exception of brief mention of the protests arising from the shootings at Kent, which he dismisses as counterproductive,¹⁰⁰ Ross largely ignores the antiwar movement.

Another popular account of Canada's 1960s is Ron Verzuh's 1989 *Underground Times: Canada's Flower-Child Revolutionaries*.¹⁰¹ Verzuh recounts the era through an analysis of the underground press. He argues that the underground press was a pillar of both the counter-culture as well as the political movements of the time. According to Verzuh:

(T)he news that the underground press printed was more often about "narcs" and drug "busts" and police brutality and protest marches ... they led the charge against the Vietnam War, the local narcotics squad and all things held dear by the establishment.¹⁰²

There are, however, limits to Verzuh's assertions. For example, the first underground newspaper did not publish in Canada until 1968, three years after the

⁹⁸ Douglas Ross, *In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954-1973* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984).

⁹⁹ Ross, *In the Interests*, 12, 14.

¹⁰⁰ Ross, *In the Interests*, 330.

¹⁰¹ Ron Verzuh, *Underground Times: Canada's Flower-Child Revolutionaries* (Toronto: Deneau, 1989).

¹⁰² Verzuh, *Underground Times*, 3.

consolidation of the antiwar movement. The underground press could hardly be considered to have “led the charge” against the war. Secondly, more often underground papers were much more focused on the counter-cultural aspects of the era. A legitimate left-wing publication such as *AMEX*, limited though it was in promoting the antiwar movement, was much more politically engaged than underground papers such as Montreal’s *Logos* or Toronto’s *The Harbinger*, where often radicalism was expressed in terms of publishing the word “fuck” or referring to police as pigs. Verzuh quotes American expatriate and writer Jim Christy, on his views regarding the Toronto underground paper *The Harbinger* as an example: “It was just an incestuous hippie rag Bad poetry, bad graphics, bad proofreading. Of no interest to anyone.”¹⁰³

Until recently the most scholarly and comprehensive study of Canada during the 1960s was Doug Owrām’s *Born at the Right Time*, published in 1996.¹⁰⁴ Owrām argues that the singularity of the post-war generation derived from four main historical sources: (1) its relative size, (2) the affluence of its members, (3) its “link to the turbulent decade” of the 1960s, and (4) the boomers’ “expectation that they would have a special effect” upon society. While conceding that most Canadians born during this period came from the working class, Owrām asserts that the cultural dominance of the baby boom generation was reflected in its class and ethnic homogeneity; it was a solidly Anglo Saxon middle-class phenomenon.¹⁰⁵ Unfortunately, by employing such a framework,

¹⁰³ Verzuh, *Underground Times*, 145.

¹⁰⁴ Doug Owrām, *Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby-Boom Generation* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996).

¹⁰⁵ Owrām, *Born at the Right Time*, 80-82.

those born during this period that do not fit these criteria are excluded. In this respect, working-class Canadians are not a part of Owram's narrative.¹⁰⁶

Owram partially credits the post-war educational system in English Canada with creating the rebellious generation of the 1960s. The emphasis on experience, self-worth, and anti-authoritarianism in the education system (except in Quebec where the system was still controlled by an authoritarian church) engendered a spirit of rebellion.¹⁰⁷ This thesis is questionable. While there was certainly a spirit of rebellion in English Canada during the 1960s, nothing remotely resembling the Parti Québécois, let alone the FLQ, emerged in English Canada. While the NDP, or its left-wing faction the Waffle, might compare to the PQ for its social democratic ideology, only in Quebec was the very nature of Canada's existence challenged. This would suggest that an authoritarian upbringing gave boomers born in Quebec more to rebel against.¹⁰⁸ *Born at the Right Time* also exclusively considers those educated in universities during this era. Owram himself admits that a university education was the exception, not the rule. Most boomers graduated from high school and went to work. Though still a minority, those attending university went in larger numbers than ever before.¹⁰⁹

One of the two most significant events affecting students in Canada in the 1960s, asserts Owram, was the SDS Port Huron Conference of 1962. The conference, Owram is quick to indicate, included a few Canadians. The other, he states, was the 1959 CUCND

¹⁰⁶ For an example of a working-class immigrant experience of the 1960s in Canada, albeit an Anglo-Celtic one, see Catherine Macleod, *Waking Up in the Men's Room: A Memoir*, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1980). Also see chapter six, entitled "The Other Sixties," in Sam Gindin, *The Canadian Auto Workers*, (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1995).

¹⁰⁷ Owram, *Born at the Right Time*, 135.

¹⁰⁸ Former FLQ leader Pierre Vallières credits much of his later rebelliousness to his authoritarian schooling. See Pierre Vallières, *White Niggers of America*, translated by Joan Pinkham (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971) 169-178.

¹⁰⁹ Owram, *Born at the Right Time*, 172-175.

vigil at the National War Memorial. Protest in Canada was greatly influenced by events in the United States. No single issue became more prominent, according to Owram, than the war in Vietnam. Despite such prominence, Owram makes little effort to analyse the movement in Canada which is often portrayed as largely a Toronto affair. There was, Owram suggests, an underlying assumption that Toronto was the heart of the antiwar movement due to its accessibility to the United States. Indeed, if there is one common feature of the Canadian literature in its treatment of the antiwar movement, it is the centrality of Toronto. While recognizing the pre-eminence of the city, this dissertation moves away from what can be termed the metropolitan approach to the antiwar movement.

Pierre Berton's popular history *1967: The Last Good Year* is another general survey of the sixties in Canada, except in this case Berton concerns himself with a single year. As his subtitle suggests, he argues that 1967 marked the end of an era. The economy was strong. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development rated Canada second only to the United States as the most affluent country in the world. The stock market was rising and dividends were paying out at record highs. Every province but Newfoundland recorded a budgetary surplus. It was the year of Expo. It was the centennial. Canada celebrated a year-long birthday party. More important, Berton argues, 1967 was "a year Canadians felt good about themselves and their country."¹¹⁰

Central to Berton's argument is the relationship between English and French-Canadians. In July French President Charles de Gaulle gave his famous "Vive le Quebec libre" speech from the balcony of Montreal City Hall to cheering crowds, giving, Berton asserts, legitimacy to the growing separatist movement. More importantly, argues Berton,

¹¹⁰ Pierre Berton, *1967: The Last Good Year* (Toronto: Doubleday, 1997), 14-17, 20-22, 364.

was the response of English-Canadians, who reacted with fury and bitterness. The publication that November of the first volume of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, in contrast, was somewhat anticlimactic. Elevating the status of French-Canadians outside of Quebec, the report called for an equal partnership between French and English. It issued a warning that few took seriously. Canadians were more concerned with the threat posed by hippies, stated Berton, than from separatism. What he considered *the* great historical event of 1967, however, was the departure of René Levesque from the Quebec Liberal Party, ultimately leading to what would become the Parti Québécois.¹¹¹

Of more interest here is Berton's discussion of the Vietnam War and how Canadians responded to it. Given the amount of international protest that occurred throughout that year, Berton's scant reporting on it is somewhat surprising. Mainly he looks at the response of the federal government, and in particular former finance minister and President of the Privy Council, Walter Gordon. In addition to his economic nationalism, best represented by his sponsorship of the Watkins Report, Gordon was an advocate of Canadian opposition to the war. He felt the government should take a strong stand against the war. In his own words, he was "sick at heart" over the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, fearing it would lead to all-out nuclear war. Having already called for Canada's withdrawal from NATO, and knowing Prime Minister Pearson's "quiet diplomacy" would lead nowhere, he broke cabinet solidarity and publicly called for all Canadians, and especially their government, to press the U.S. to halt the bombings. This elicited a popular response and led to Pearson publicly, though mildly, calling for an end to the bombings. It did not, however, lead to Canada opposing the war itself. According

¹¹¹ Berton, 1967, 306, 360,335-354.

to Berton, “As far as the war was concerned, the political establishment stood foursquare with the United States.”¹¹²

Berton’s coverage of the movement that opposed the war, Canadian complicity in it, and the federal government’s support for it, is lacking at best. He describes SUPA as “a Canadian branch of an American group concerned about the Vietnam War,”¹¹³ a description that is simply not accurate with respect to both SDS and SUPA, especially among its chapters outside of Toronto. Berton is more concerned about the Vietnam War’s impact on the Company of Young Canadians.¹¹⁴ When several of its members were publicly identified marching in an antiwar demonstration in Toronto that year, it caused something of a tempest in a teapot. Politicians questioned the propriety of individuals on the government payroll demonstrating. Prime Minister Pearson later stated that what people did on their own time in a democracy was their own business, ending the issue.

Berton also does discuss November 1967 antiwar demonstration in Montreal. As previously indicated, rarely in the literature does the narrative of the antiwar movement move away from Toronto. In this particular demonstration that Berton recounts, police viciously attacked demonstrators, wounding 20 and arresting 46.¹¹⁵ As will be seen throughout this dissertation, Montreal was also a centre of antiwar activism.

Perhaps one of the most informative recent works on the peace movement in Canada is that of Steve Hewitt. By exploring the RCMP’s surveillance of university activists, he illuminates the rich history of the movements targeted. In his *Spying 101*,

¹¹² Berton, 1967, 62-68.

¹¹³ Berton, 1967, 176.

¹¹⁴ For a full discussion of this organization see Margaret Daly, *The Revolution Game: The Short, Unhappy Life of the Company of Young Canadians* (Toronto: New Press, 1970).

¹¹⁵ Berton, 1967, 324.

published in 2002, Hewitt contends that the force was initially compelled to observe universities for fear that certain professors would abuse their positions of authority and corrupt the defenceless minds of students. Increasingly, however, it was students themselves who became the subject of police surveillance. While much of his narrative concerns the period from the 1920s to the 1950s, it is his discussion of the 1960s that is of most concern to us.¹¹⁶

In the 1950s the RCMP's very public hunt for Communists at universities engendered an environment of belligerent anti-Communism. The RCMP continued to monitor groups such as the Student Christian Movement, as well as campus CCF clubs, not because the force believed them to be subversive, but because it believed that such groups would attract Communist infiltrators. In the late 1950s, however, the force became increasingly concerned about the burgeoning peace movement and Communist connections to it. Topping the list of suspect organizations was the Canadian Peace Congress. In 1959, Hewitt informs us, many former members of the Congress embarked on a more aggressive approach to peace issues by forming the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CUCND). Unlike the Congress, the CUCND was not connected with the Communist Party. It also employed more direct action tactics than the Congress, such as its silent vigil at the National War Memorial in Ottawa in December 1959, and its picketing of a military base in North Bay the following year to protest the deployment of BOMARC missiles. This non-Communist and direct action organization signalled the emergence of a new kind of dissent that the RCMP was unused to. The force monitored the CUCND, believing, as it did with other organizations, that it

¹¹⁶ Steve Hewitt, *Spying 101: The RCMP's Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 52-53.

would attract Communist infiltrators. Later, when CUCND disbanded and became the Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA), the RCMP continued to monitor it.¹¹⁷ Like Hewitt's work, this dissertation makes extensive use of RCMP files. They contain a wealth of information on virtually every organization involved in on the antiwar movement in Canada.

Gary Miedma credits the 1960s with ending Canada's self-perception as a specifically Christian nation. In his book *For Canada's Sake*, published in 2005, Miedma argues that in the 1960s Canada ceased to self-identify as a Christian society. Until then, he argues, Christianity was a privileged religion in Canada. To profess a belief in Christianity was part of what it was to be a Canadian. During this decade, however, this privilege either disappeared altogether, or was altered to conform to a new religious neutrality that attempted to give equal status to all faith groups in Canada. The sixties saw the beginnings of a conscious effort on the part of federal politicians and state officials to reshape Canada as a country "united in diversity." The adoption of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's policy of multiculturalism in 1971, asserts Miedma, was a delayed response to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism established in 1963.¹¹⁸ While the policy of multiculturalism officially ended Christian privilege, this was in fact a process that had been ongoing for several years.

Also published in 2005, Ian McKay's *Rebels, Reds, Radicals: Rethinking Canada's Left History*¹¹⁹ provides the historical context with which we can observe the connection between the left and the antiwar movement. McKay presents his work as a

¹¹⁷ Hewitt, *Spying 101*, 75, 85, 89-90, 94, 128.

¹¹⁸ Gary Miedma, *For Canada's Sake: Public Religion, Centennial Celebrations, and the Re-making of Canada in the 1960s* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), xv, xvii-xviii, 13, 46-48.

¹¹⁹ Ian McKay, *Rebels, Reds, Radicals: Rethinking Canada's Left History* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2005).

“reconnaissance” of the left in Canada, showing that despite the left never having held power nationally, it has made significant contributions to Canadian society. He emphasizes the need for any study of the left in Canada to not only revisit the work of Gramsci, but more emphatically that of Marx. (This, suggests McKay, should be done not in a sectarian way, but rather in terms of reading the work of these political philosophers as process rather than product.) Making a better world is an on-going project, never a finished work. Rejecting more specific labels such as socialist, Communist, social democrat and others, McKay prefers the more all-embracing term leftist.¹²⁰ For the most part discounting specific organizations, McKay takes what he terms a “horizontal” approach to leftist activity in a given set of historical contexts, identifying moments of crisis and change, which he refers to as “matrix-events.” In the context of this dissertation, the Vietnam War can be considered such an event. Before second-wave feminism, before red power, before gay rights, before the environmental movement, there was the antiwar movement. The militancy and sense of moral outrage over the war spilled over into many facets of Canadian society. But this was by no means a purely “Canadian” moment. This dissertation places the antiwar movement within both an international and to a larger degree, a transnational context.

McKay argues that this movement was part of a larger counter-liberalism or “new left.” This should not be confused with Levitt’s definition of new left as essentially SUPA. Indeed, often in the literature there is an implied and unquestioned assumption that the antiwar movement was part and parcel of the “new left.” This is especially the case in American literature, largely stemming from SDS’s early contribution to the antiwar movement. There were, in fact, many “lefts” influencing the antiwar movement during its

¹²⁰ Ian McKay, *Rebels, Reds, Radicals*, 32-33.

lifetime. There was an especially strong element of the “old left” present. Indeed, one of the themes this dissertation argues is that old left organizations have not been properly credited for the work they did in mobilizing opposition to the war.

McKay’s analysis of SUPA – the first major youth organization in Canada to actively oppose the war – contributes to our discussion in a noteworthy manner. McKay’s observations of SUPA extend to most modern left movements. They tend to see themselves as something new and divorced from all that has come before them, failing to understand the historical continuum upon which they rest:

(They) lacked the historical specificity and depth that would allow them to meaningfully regard their own society and their own times as historical problems. Radical ahistoricism underwrites the acquisitive individualism rampant through liberal order, because it rules out any possibility that we, as present day activists, are connected with older forms of activism.¹²¹

In short, not only SUPA, but other peace activists as well, failed to learn both from their own mistakes, and from the mistakes of their forebears.

Two collections of essays on the 1960s have recently been published. The first is Dimitry Anastakis’s 2008 *The Sixties: Passion, Politics, and Style*.¹²² The essays in this volume discuss a range of topics on the sixties in Canada including the Quiet Revolution, citizenship, masculinity, drug abuse and architecture. The only essay concerning the antiwar movement is Frances Early’s study of the Voice of Women. What concerns us here is Anastakis’s introductory article, which provides an overview of the period. Anastakis raises two points in particular that are especially relevant to this dissertation. One is his discussion of civil rights. Anastakis argues that the real focus of civil rights

¹²¹ McKay, *Rebels, Reds, Radicals*, 85-86.

¹²² Dimitry Anastakis, ed., *The Sixties: Passion, Politics and Style* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008).

activism in Canada during the 1960s was on Francophones in Quebec, and to a lesser degree New Brunswick.¹²³ Anastakis is correct in his analysis. Often the literature of the era, when it does discuss civil rights in 1960s Canada, either focuses on the spillover of the African American civil rights movement or on SUPA's various projects with aboriginal groups and Doukhobors in western Canada, poor whites in Kingston, and African Canadians in Halifax.¹²⁴ Anastakis provides needed context for the broader discussion of civil rights. But this does not negate the pivotal importance that SNCC provided in mobilizing Canadians in anticipation of the antiwar movement.

Anastakis's second point concerns anti-Americanism. Canadians' attitudes toward the United States during this period were complex. He writes:

Consumerism, culture and conflict was a cross-border experience, and Canadians understood the sixties as Americans, while at the same time often feeling just as vehemently anti-American. For English-speaking Canadians, the "otherness" of the United States was both a wellspring for their own cultural touchstones and a source of their own determination to be different.¹²⁵

Anastakis's point informs this dissertation. The antiwar movement was not at heart an anti-American phenomenon. Rather, it was a manifestation of opposition to that which offended a good number of US citizens and others. Added to this was a groundswell of opposition to the ubiquity of racism in American society. Canadians in the antiwar movement stood in solidarity not only with the Vietnamese fighting American aggression, but equally with like-minded Americans. To argue that Canadians who opposed the war and supported African American civil rights were anti-American, would, in a perverse way, give credence to the position held by conservative elements in the

¹²³ Anastakis, *The Sixties*, 7.

¹²⁴ For more on SUPA's Kingston Project see Richard Harris, *Democracy in Kingston: A Social Movement in Urban Politics, 1965-1970* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988).

¹²⁵ Anastakis, *The Sixties*, 5.

United States that supporters of these movements in that country were un-American. This is a point that scholars of the movement in the US have been arguing against since early in the development of the literature.

The second recent collection of essays on the 1960s is *New World Coming: The Sixties and the Shaping of Global Consciousness*, edited by Karen Dubinsky, Catherine Krull, Susan Lord, Sean Mills and Scott Rutherford.¹²⁶ Unlike Anastakis's *The Sixties*, which presents an overview of the 1960s in Canada, *New World Coming* presents a range of topics on the 1960s from around the world. In their introductory essay, the editors reject the themes of youth revolt, student unrest and middle-class alienation as American manifestations of the decade. They argue that globally the 1960s was about transnational ideas and culture interacting with local conditions.¹²⁷ What is problematic with this assertion is its underlying American exceptionalism. As we have already seen in the work of Foner, Levy, Hunt and others, the sixties in the United States was by no means an exclusively middle-class, youth phenomenon. Workers and other constituencies were as much a part of the social movements of the period in the United States as they were elsewhere. Another question this interpretation raises is where to locate Canada within this analysis. Was Canada joined with the United States in housing an alienated middle-class, or was it part of the larger global interaction of culture and ideas? While rejecting this false dichotomy of America versus the rest of the world, this dissertation argues that the antiwar movement in Canada is the best example of a transnational idea interacting with a local culture that included workers, women, leftists, religious activists and others.

¹²⁶ Karen Dubinsky, Catherine Krull, Susan Lord, Sean Mills, and Scott Rutherford, eds., *New World Coming: The Sixties and the Shaping of Global Consciousness* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2009).

¹²⁷ Dubinsky, *New World*, 4.

Two of the essays in *New World Coming* are of particular significance to this dissertation. Lara Campbell's discussion of women and the anti-draft movement is discussed below in the chapter on American immigration. Ian McKay's "Sarnia in the Sixties: (Or The Peculiarities of the Canadians)" raises several important points concerning the 1960s in Canada. Of particular relevance to this dissertation is his argument that since the 1890s every major left movement in Canada has had its roots in other countries, specifically the United Kingdom and the United States. So too was the case in the 1960s, although, McKay informs us, by this time France, too, was asserting influence on the Canadian left.¹²⁸ This dissertation extends the argument by examining the international and transnational connections of the antiwar movement. McKay also contextualizes the Canadian sixties as part of a larger global era, one that was not as much generational as it was geohistorical. It was a time, argues McKay, when formal empires "were challenged by new conceptions of a postcolonial realm of freedom and new struggles to achieve it."¹²⁹

The 2009 publication of Bryan Palmer's *Canada's 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era* has done much to cover terrain left unexplored by Owsen. More thematic than Owsen's, Palmer's work is firmly rooted in a materialist approach to Canadian identities in the 1960s. He begins by discussing Canada's economy and how, particularly in the post-war period, it increasingly re-aligned itself from Britain to the United States. Not surprisingly, Canada's identity underwent a similar shift. During the 1960s, according to Palmer, Canadian identity changed from a white, British dominion to its current configuration. What that is, exactly, is still an open question. The irony, for

¹²⁸ Ian McKay, "Sarnia in the Sixties: (Or The Peculiarities of the Canadians)," in Dubinsky, *New World Coming*, 26-27.

¹²⁹ McKay, "Sarnia," 29.

Palmer, is that though Canada struggled to forge a new image of itself, during the sixties the result was uncertainty:

The 1960s wrote *finis* to the safety of being Canadian. As the decade's developments unfolded they did so in ways that ended forever the possibility of changing *one Canada* with its Britishness a settled agreement.

The 1960s, asserts Palmer, wrote *finis* to an outmoded understanding of Canada.¹³⁰

Palmer explores the integration of Canada's defense policies with those of the United States, as well as issues of sexuality, race, the new left, class struggle, the not so Quiet Revolution in Quebec, and red power. While from time to time the topic of the war in Vietnam crops up, it does not predominate, because it is implicitly seen as less "Canadian" than these other issues. Those who became active against the war were always a minority (as were those who became involved in other issues of the day). One point of criticism, perhaps, is that Palmer presents the war as the glue which linked the new left in Canada with that of the United States.¹³¹ This statement is true for the period 1965-1967, but it diminishes the links between the new left in Canada and the civil rights movement in the United States, in particular with SNCC. As well, Palmer's focus on the new left may minimize the role of the old left in opposition to the war. Of course both of these criticisms hang on just how the term new left is defined.

How Palmer delineates the 1960s in Canada – when it began, when it ended – makes for an interesting choice. Historians of the United States have framed the era both by the decade strictly conceived, and by redefining it as the "long sixties," sometimes starting as early as 1948 and ending as late as 1975. The literature in Canada is still too

¹³⁰ Bryan D. Palmer, *Canada's 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 5, 21, 419.

¹³¹ Palmer, *Canada's 1960s*, 269-270.

scant for periodization to be an issue, but Palmer's narrative is decidedly decadal, ending with the October Crisis of 1970 and the Canadian state's resort to martial law in an effort to stem separatist violence.

Palmer marks the turning point in Canada's assertion of a new identity as 1968. "(A) deluge of dissent that flowed forth from 1968 on," Palmer tells us, "often left Canada's flag in tatters; Notions of national identity balanced precariously on such circumstances."¹³² Palmer here is referring to the increasingly violent demonstrations of students, First Nations, women, and Québécois. However, to lump all such manifestations of dissent together as a challenge to Canada's national identity tends to diminish the centrality of Quebec to Canada's identity crisis. Choosing to conclude the narrative with the War Measures Act, of course, suggests that this is not the case. In the end, Palmer is ambiguous on the issue. Indeed, perhaps the most significant question Palmer raises is, how important is national identity anyway?¹³³

Moving away from a chronological approach to the literature concerning the 1960s in Canada, we now look specifically at the single antiwar organization in Canada for which a body of literature exists: Voice of Women. This literature can roughly be divided into two phases. The first, beginning in 1972 and ending in the early 1990s, is composed of memoirs and biographies of the significant personalities in the organization. While not always elucidating on the subject of VOW, they do tell us much about its leaders. The second stage, the scholarly investigation of the women's organization, began in the late 1980s and continues.

¹³² Palmer, *Canada's 1960s*, 425.

¹³³ Palmer, *Canada's 1960s*, 430.

The initial work in the first category is *A Woman in a Man's World*, Thérèse Casgrain's memoir of her political career released in 1972. Although married to a prominent Quebec Liberal MP before he was called to the bench, Casgrain was provincial leader of the CCF throughout much of the 1950s. A founding member of the Quebec wing of VOW – Voix des Femmes – she helped to recruit 100 members to the organization within its first month of existence in 1960. Elected as national president of VOW in 1962, she did not finish the one year term of office as she resigned to run as an NDP candidate in Outremont-Saint Jean in 1963. As VOW had a policy of non-partisanship she could not do both. Appointed to the Senate in 1970 by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Casgrain served nine months there (despite the established practice of CCF, and later NDP, members of not accepting Senate appointments) before retiring at the mandatory retirement age of 75.¹³⁴ While her memoir does not tell us much about VOW or her involvement in it, it does establish several points: first, that Casgrain was unmistakably a member of the elite; secondly that as an early leader of Voice of Women her ideology was distinctly to the left of centre; and finally, that as a long-time CCF and NDP activist in Quebec she was used to fighting unpopular struggles, a quality that would serve her well in VOW.

Kay Macpherson took over national leadership of VOW after Casgrain's departure. Her memoir, *When in Doubt Do Both: The Times of My Life*, was published in 1994. Serving as VOW President until 1967, it is understandable that Macpherson has significantly more to say about the organization.¹³⁵ Macpherson's work reinforces the

¹³⁴ Thérèse Casgrain, *A Woman in a Man's World* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972), 134, 157-158, 161, 183.

¹³⁵ Kay Macpherson, *When in Doubt Do Both: The Times of My Life* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 21, 54.

argument that the antiwar movement in Canada was highly internationalized.

Macpherson tells us that throughout the war Voice of Women worked closely with both the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom internationally and Women Strike for Peace in the United States.¹³⁶ It also worked closely with women's organizations in Indochina. Hence, VOW's antiwar efforts were consistently informed by influences beyond Canada's borders. Interestingly, like much of the literature concerning VOW, Macpherson goes to great lengths to diminish the centrality of the war in Vietnam to the overall development of Voice of Women.

With Macpherson's decision not to seek re-election in 1967 the torch was passed to Muriel Duckworth. Duckworth's story is told in Marion Kerans' *Muriel Duckworth: A Very Active Pacifist*. Like Macpherson's work, Kerans's also diminishes the centrality of the war in Southeast Asia in the overall narrative of VOW. She lists Vietnam as only one of many issues that VOW concerned itself with throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Among other causes she lists nuclear fallout, foreign aid, Canada's membership in NATO and NORAD, the War Measures Act, the status of women, and other issues.¹³⁷ This is common in much of the literature on VOW. While it is not untrue, the reality is Vietnam was VOW's most significant cause by far during this period. It is not clear why this trend of downplaying VOW's antiwar role exists. Likely it was – as with other organizations such as SDS and SUPA – a conscious effort to be perceived as a multi-issue organization, rather than one solely committed to ending the war. Perhaps too, it was to put the focus on VOW as a women's, rather than as an antiwar group.

¹³⁶ Macpherson, *When in Doubt*, 118.

¹³⁷ Kerans, *Muriel Duckworth*, 89-90.

Although never rising to the top leadership, Claire Culhane, as VOW's Quebec Vice-President, was influential within VOW. Her biography by Mick Lowe, titled *One Woman Army: The Life of Claire Culhane*, is aptly titled.¹³⁸ VOW, however, was rather peripheral to Culhane's antiwar efforts. Keeping the spotlight on herself, she at times dragged VOW into supporting her own antiwar initiatives.¹³⁹

In 1987 the journal *Atlantis* published an article by Kay Macpherson entitled "Persistent Voices: Twenty-five Years with Voice of Women."¹⁴⁰ The piece represents a transition in the historiography from memoir and biography to a more scholarly approach to VOW. Not quite scholarship, not quite memoir, it is an attempt to give an overview of VOW's first quarter century. Avoiding discussion of the organization's ideological divisions in its early years, Macpherson continues the trend of presenting Vietnam as simply one of many issues VOW took on during this period. Others include the Seven Day War [sic] in the Middle East, the Colonels' coup in Greece, and government upsets in Africa and Latin America. She equates the knitting project with the group's anti-war toy campaign and its collection of baby teeth,¹⁴¹ two campaigns that paled in comparison.

Macpherson explains the significant drop in VOW's membership in the 1970s as the result of women joining other groups such as feminist and environmental organizations. She also attributes the organization's decline to the rise of women working

¹³⁸ Mick Lowe, *One Woman Army: The Life of Claire Culhane* (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1992).

¹³⁹ The best case example of this is when Culhane chained herself to a seat in the gallery of the House of Commons and rained leaflets down on members while yelling questions at the Members. See "Vietnam Leaflets Tossed in the House," *Vietnam Special*, excerpt from *Montreal Star*, 5 March 1971, clipping in VOW, Box 3, File 28; "Claire Culhane's Testimony in Reply to a Charge of 'Creating a Disturbance' in the House of Commons, Ottawa, March 1971," *Voice of Women National Newsletter*, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 1971, VOW, Box 3, File 29; Lowe, *One Woman Army*, 213-214; Culhane, *Why is Canada*, 9.

¹⁴⁰ Kay Macpherson, "Persistent Voices: Twenty-Five Years with Voice of Women," *Atlantis*, 12:2 Spring 1987, 60-72.

¹⁴¹ Macpherson, "Persistent Voices," 61.

outside of the home and no longer having time for such pursuits.¹⁴² However, there is a certain mutual exclusivity in these explanations of VOW's drastically declining membership during this period. If women did not have time to pursue activism in VOW because of employment outside the home, then how did they have time for feminist and environmental pursuits? The short answer is they chose other groups over VOW, but the more important question is why? I pose here that the primary reason is that between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s VOW's focus was its antiwar activism. That is what attracted members. With the withdrawal of US troops in 1973 and the victory of Communist forces in 1975 VOW lost its *raison d'être* for many women. They had won their fight. Significantly, in both Macpherson's book and her article, discussion of the war in Vietnam does not conclude so much as simply fades away.

The first genuinely scholarly, albeit negligible, discussion of VOW emerged in 1989 with the publication of Barbara Roberts' "Women's Peace Activism in Canada." Examining the history of women and peace activism in Canada from the latter part of the nineteenth century to the 1980s, Roberts gives a brief overview of VOW and its activities during the 1960s and 1970s.¹⁴³

This was followed in 1992 with the publication of Jill Vickers' "The Intellectual Origins of the Women's Movement in Canada" in a collection of essays on the history of the women's movement in Canada and the United States.¹⁴⁴ Vickers argues that there is no separation between first and second wave feminism in Canada, but that they are in fact

¹⁴² Macpherson, "Persistent Voices," 65.

¹⁴³ Barbara Roberts, "Women's Peace Activism in Canada," in Linda Kealey, ed., *Beyond the Vote: Canadian Women and Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 276-308.

¹⁴⁴ Jill Vickers, "The Intellectual Origins of the Women's Movements in Canada," Constance Blackhouse and David H. Flaherty, eds. *Challenging Times: The Women's Movement in Canada and the United States* (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 1992).

part of a continuum and that the most important part of this continuum is represented by groups such as the CCF women's caucuses and VOW. The fact that there was an old left in Canada with an active women's movement within it, Vickers asserts, did much to deflect a lot of the influences of the women's liberation movement coming from the United States. Vickers emphasizes the importance of alliances that women's organizations developed – between English and French, left and right, young and old – and suggests that VOW was masterful at cultivating such alliances. Vickers concludes that the women's peace movement and VOW in particular, acted as a bridge between old and new feminism. This, she attributes largely to VOW's respectability.¹⁴⁵

The first scholarly work specifically concerning VOW is an article in the same issue of *Atlantis* as Macpherson's twenty-fifth anniversary piece written by Candace Loewen. Titled "Mike Hears Voices: Voice of Women and Lester Pearson, 1960-1963," the article recounts the earliest years of VOW.¹⁴⁶ In particular it focuses on the organization's relationship with Liberal Leader Lester Pearson and his reversal on the issue of nuclear weapons in Canada.¹⁴⁷ Loewen concludes by citing that the political impact of the Cuban missile crisis led to Pearson's reversal on nuclear weapons and that this in turn led VOW to concentrate on international issues such as recognition of the People's Republic of China, a nuclear test ban treaty, and the treatment of children in

¹⁴⁵ Vickers, "Intellectual Origins," 39-40, 42-43, 52-54. In a companion essay by Micheline Dumont in the same volume, Dumont presents a list of prominent feminist leaders in Quebec during the 1960s but fails to indicate that the overwhelming majority of them were at various times members of Voix des Femmes. See Micheline Dumont, "The Origins of the Women's Movement in Quebec," Constance Blackhouse and David H. Flaherty, eds. *Challenging Times: The Women's Movement in Canada and the United States* (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 1992), 83-84.

¹⁴⁶ Candace Loewen, "Mike Hears Voices: Voice of Women and Lester Pearson, 1961-1963," *Atlantis*, 12:2, Spring 1987, 24-30.

¹⁴⁷ Loewen, "Mike Hears Voices," 24.

Vietnam.¹⁴⁸ However, this analysis must be questioned. First because it accepts at face value Pearson's claim that it was the threat of Cuba that led to his reversal. The Cuban missile crisis had been resolved the previous year, however, with the removal of the weapons from Cuba. More significantly, no discussion is made of likely American pressure on Canada to accept nuclear warheads, which was the more probable underlying reason for Pearson's decision. Also, to present this as the reason for VOW becoming more international in its orientation is to deny the international implications of the increasing conflict in Vietnam. It was not only VOW that turned increasingly international at this time, but also the CCND and the CUCND, as well as their counterparts in other countries. Vietnam was increasingly becoming *the* issue for peace organizations.

The most comprehensive study of VOW is Christine Ball's PhD dissertation, "The History of Voice of Women/La Voix des Femmes – The Early Years."¹⁴⁹ Like Loewen, Ball focuses on the first three years of VOW's existence leading to the internal rift in the organization following its break with Pearson. However, unlike Loewen, the break with Pearson is construed as only part of the reason for this split. Making extensive use of archival materials, oral histories, and a survey of past members, as well as newspapers, magazines and secondary sources, Ball argues that the turn toward international issues was more than just about Bomarc missiles. Rather, it was "a search for direction and empowerment in the face of claims that Voice members were 'fellow-travelling innocents' who were dealing with issues beyond their understanding." Ball's conclusions echo the work of Vickers in stating that VOW was a hybrid organization

¹⁴⁸ Loewen, "Mike Hears Voices," 29.

¹⁴⁹ Christine Ball, "The History of the Voice of Women/La Voix des Femmes – The Early Years," PhD thesis, University of Toronto, Toronto, 1994.

within the continuum of earlier Canadian women's movements for peace, women's rights and social justice. In fact, Ball almost repeats verbatim Vickers' assertion that VOW bridged both waves of the feminist movement.¹⁵⁰

One area of discussion that Ball alone addresses is the issue of red baiting, both inside and outside the organization. Throughout much of its early years VOW was accused of Communist sympathies.¹⁵¹ Another useful aspect of Ball's work is her inclusion of numerous appendices offering demographic information about VOW members during its early years. Its members were generally highly educated, older, middle-class, married women, although a high percentage of its members came from labour backgrounds. While over 66 percent were born in Canada, almost 16 percent came from the United States and another 8 percent from Great Britain. Most were resident in British Columbia, Ontario or Quebec, and were overwhelmingly Protestant. The vast majority joined VOW because of its commitment to peace issues. Indeed, many came into the organization from other peace groups.¹⁵²

This decade has seen the publication of additional scholarly studies of VOW, including two regional studies done in 2004 and 2005 on the VOW chapters in Regina and Halifax respectively. Roberta Lexier, in her "Linking the Past With the Future: Voice of Women in Regina," argues for the importance of VOW as a maternal feminist organization, emphasizing the role of women in society as wives and mothers. In addition, Lexier's research reemphasizes the elite nature of the organization, informing us that the Regina chapter was made up of "some of the most prominent and respectable

¹⁵⁰ Ball, "History," 4-5, 8, 32, 506.

¹⁵¹ Ball, "History," 171.

¹⁵² Ball, "History," 553, 554, 559, 563.

women in the city.” Indeed, as an organization of mothers and wives, maintaining an image of respectability was often a concern of the group.¹⁵³

Lexier argues that the Regina VOW was active in its opposition to the Vietnam War. It participated in the knitting project, assisted draft dodgers and deserters, and organized a torch-lit march for the 1969 Moratorium. Regina VOW hosted a delegation of women from the NLF and DRV during their cross-Canada tour the same year, wrote Prime Minister Trudeau calling for an end to Canadian complicity in 1971, and presented a brief to the Saskatchewan government in 1972 calling upon it to take an active role in bringing the war to an end. It also wrote to all Saskatchewan candidates during the 1972 federal election asking them to declare their positions on Vietnam.¹⁵⁴

Regina VOW ceased meeting regularly in mid-1973 and ceased to exist altogether shortly thereafter. Supporting Macpherson’s conclusions, Lexier attributes the Regina chapter’s demise to the emergence of second wave feminism and the increase in women working outside the home and thus no longer having the time for such voluntary pursuits.¹⁵⁵ My critique of Macpherson applies here as well. If women were too busy working to be involved with VOW, why were they not too busy working to be involved with second wave feminist organizations? Also, the centrality of anti-Vietnam War work to VOW is missed. By 1973 US troops had left Vietnam. Just like other antiwar groups in North America, VOW had lost its primary purpose. While VOW had been involved in issues other than Vietnam, the Regina chapter’s dissolution so soon after the signing of the cease-fire is no coincidence.

¹⁵³ Roberta Lexier, “Linking the Past With the Future: Voice of Women in Regina,” *Saskatchewan History*, 56:2, Fall 2004, (24-34) 24-25, 27.

¹⁵⁴ Lexier, “Linking,” 27-29.

¹⁵⁵ Lexier, “Linking,” 32.

Frances Early's "'A Grandly Subversive Time': The Halifax Branch of the Voice of Women in the 1960s," chronicles the early history of a very atypical chapter of VOW. She argues three theses: that an understanding of the Halifax VOW helps us understand the spirit and purpose that propelled Canadian women into the international peace movement, that it facilitates an understanding of VOW and social justice coalition politics in Halifax, and that it identifies "a moment of inscription that heralded a new style of feminist politics."¹⁵⁶ Unlike others, she does not recount the decline of the organization in the early 1970s, but rather asserts that the group "kept on course in the era that ushered in the new wave of feminism." This is largely attributable to the Halifax chapter's commitment to coalition politics, community organizing, educational work, and political lobbying.¹⁵⁷ Although Early does not state it, we can also deduce that the Halifax VOW's longevity was linked to its diverse, genuinely multi-issue character.

Also distinguishing the Halifax VOW was its commitment to civil rights. Nova Scotia had a substantial and historic African Canadian population. Halifax VOW committed much of its resources and energies to the civil rights movement in Canada, often working in partnership with the Nova Scotia Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, as well as SUPA's Nova Scotia Project.¹⁵⁸

Understandably, Early downplays the significance of the Vietnam War to the Halifax chapter, choosing instead to focus on civil rights. She does indicate, however, that after 1963 VOW, as a national body, shifted much of its focus to the war and that Halifax followed suit, participating in the knitting project, hosting speakers, and

¹⁵⁶ Frances Early, "'A Grandly Subversive Time': The Halifax Branch of the Voice of Women in the 1960s," Judith Fingard and Janet Guildford, eds., *Mothers of the Municipality: Women, Work, and Social Policy in Post-1945 Halifax* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), (253-280) 255.

¹⁵⁷ Early, "Grandly Subversive," 272.

¹⁵⁸ Early, "Grandly Subversive," 265-268.

sponsoring meetings. Early goes as far as to state that VOW was at the centre of the antiwar movement in Halifax.¹⁵⁹ While this is likely correct, compared to the rest of the country, the antiwar movement in Atlantic Canada was small. While most who have documented the story of VOW have tended, incorrectly in my view, to downplay the centrality of the Vietnam War to the organization, there is some validity to this in the case of Halifax. Vietnam did not have the same prominence for the Halifax VOW that it did for other chapters.

A more recent addition to the literature on VOW is Marilyn Sweet's MA thesis on VOW's knitting project entitled "Purls for Peace: The Voice of Women, Maternal Feminism, and the Knitting Project for Vietnamese Children." It is also the first work in this literature to focus specifically on VOW's role as an anti-Vietnam War organization. Sweet, like Lexier, takes up the mantle of maternal feminism. Specifically she argues that the women of VOW saw their role, "as bearers of life had the right and the duty to participate in the public realm" and that it was this ideology that acted as an essential motivator throughout VOW's participation in the knitting project. Sweet further argues that VOW was able "to maintain a firm stance of opposition to the Vietnam War, while not conveying itself as solely a radical or political organization." She continues:

By focusing on the maternal desires and instincts of women, the organization was able to enlist hundreds of women to its cause while at the same time educating the supporters about the fundamental purpose of their organization: to bring women together for the cause of peace.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ Early, "Grandly Subversive," 261.

¹⁶⁰ Marilyn Selma Sweet, "Purls for Peace: The Voice of Women, Maternal Feminism, and the Knitting Project for Vietnamese Children," MA Thesis, University of Ottawa, 2007, 2-3

In doing so, Sweet states, VOW, and Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians – VOW’s partner in the knitting project – were able to find a way to express their tacit condemnation of the war.

What is surprising about Sweet’s thesis is that despite her argument regarding the centrality of maternal feminism to VOW’s knitting project, she never actually addresses the subject of knitting itself, a skill traditionally associated with women. This begs the question, did the knitting project reinforce the notion of a division of labour within society based on gender roles? And if so, did such a division work to repel women from the organization in later years with the emergence of second wave feminism? Did the knitting project do more harm than good in the long run for women, effectively turning it into the ladies’ auxiliary of the antiwar movement? I argue that the answer to this question is a resounding “no” for two reasons. First, VOW’s knitting project has to be considered as only one of the many antiwar activities that VOW undertook to end the war in Vietnam. Second, as will be argued below, the knitting project was more important for its propaganda value than it did in providing aid to the children of Vietnam.

The two most recent additions to the literature concerning VOW are both articles by Frances Early. The first appears in Anastakis’s 2008 *The Sixties*, titled “Canadian Women and the International Arena in the Sixties: The Voice of Women/La Voix des femmes and the Opposition to the Vietnam War.” In this essay Early focuses on three specific projects that VOW undertook in its opposition to the war: Kay Macpherson’s 1968 trip to the DRV, the knitting project, and the 1969 visit to Canada by women representatives of the DRV and NLF. Early suggests that these actions contributed to antiwar sentiment in Canada and helped shape how the North American peace movement

articulated its opposition to the war. VOW helped shape a perception that Canada was “uniquely placed to promote peacemaking over war making.”¹⁶¹

Early’s second article, “Re-Imaging War: The Voice of Women, The Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians and The Knitting Project for Vietnamese Children, 1966-1976,” was published in the April 2009 volume of *Peace and Change*.¹⁶² The article provides both a brief overview of VOW’s changing perspective of the war in Vietnam, and an analysis of the knitting project as an example of the organization’s antiwar work. “VOW members,” argues Early, “shared the conviction that ‘exposing the pain of others’ could strengthen the resolve of Canadian citizens to develop a critical perspective on their government’s *de facto* support of U.S. policy in Vietnam.”¹⁶³ Although often associated in the public view as a creation of VOW, the knitting project, as both Sweet and Early point out, was in fact the initiative of Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians. But it was largely through the Ontario VOW’s efforts, and the international support of Women Strike for Peace and the International Women’s League for Peace and Freedom that made it a North American effort. The images of women knitting for Vietnamese children, and “the discourses they engendered among peace activists and the many volunteer knitters who placed themselves outside of the conventional oppositional political practice,” asserts Early, “helped to recast in critical fashion the hegemonic discourse of war in a manner unique to the gender, time, and place of the Knitting Project participants.”¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Frances Early, “Canadian Women and the International Arena in the Sixties: The Voice of Women/La voix des femmes and the Opposition to the Vietnam War,” in Anastakis, *The Sixties*, 26, 38.

¹⁶² Frances Early, “Re-Imaging War: The Voice of Women, The Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians and The Knitting Project for Vietnamese Children, 1966-1976,” *Peace and Change*, 34:2, April 2009.

¹⁶³ Early, “Re-Imaging War,” 149.

¹⁶⁴ Early, “Re-Imaging War,” 160.

In concluding this literature review of the peace movement and the 1960s in Canada, several general comments can be made. The first is that while the number of books and articles continues to grow, there is still no work that specifically examines the anti-Vietnam War movement in Canada. This dissertation is an attempt at just that. Second, the antiwar movement in the United States was much more youth-oriented than was the case in Canada, although in both cases movement numbers were augmented by older, more experienced activists. Third, in the United States, Vietnam was the burning issue of the day from 1965 until 1973. In Canada, issues of identity took on greater priority as the decade progressed. Finally, Voice of Women stands out within this literature as it represented better than any other group a genuinely national antiwar organization. Although it had its roots in the pre-Vietnam peace movement, the war changed this. VOW's development as an antiwar organization, however, was gradual, and it is to other organizations that we must look to see the origins of the movement in Canada.

Chapter Two: Dirty War

On page three of the 7 August 1964 edition of the *Montreal Star* is a photograph of a middle-aged woman. Everything about her is normal in the context of 1964. She is of medium height and build, with dark hair and horn-rimmed glasses. She wears a dress and a fashionable jacket and hat. In one hand she clutches a purse. In a sense she is the image of middle class and middle age. However, in her other hand she carries something else, a picket sign. In large, apparently professionally printed letters is the message: “Remember Hiroshima!” Given that the previous day was the anniversary of the first nuclear attack in history, a public commemoration of such an occasion was not unusual in the post-war era; such events still occur in Canada. What was exceptional about her picket sign were the words which followed: “End the Dirty War in Vietnam.”¹ Given that many North Americans at the time would have been challenged to find the small Southeast Asian country on a map, the woman’s opposition to a low intensity conflict on the other side of the globe was unique. It was also prescient. It is possible that this photograph represents the first image of an anti-Vietnam War protester in Canada. In that respect, the woman in the picture represents a harbinger of a movement that would come to involve thousands, indeed tens of thousands, of Canadians in the years to come. The photo is also significant in that the woman is anonymous. She remains unknown, as do most Canadians who publicly opposed this war throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. Canada had no Jerry Rubins or Tom Haydens, no Jane Fondas or Bernardine Dohrms.² While a few rose to mild prominence at certain moments, the antiwar movement in Canada was largely anonymous – especially in its earliest days.

¹ “Gather at Cenotaph: Demonstrators Mark Hiroshima Anniversary,” *Montreal Star*, 7 August 1964, 3.

² Perhaps this is because the Canadian movement did not attract movie stars, aspiring terrorists or celebrity trial defendants.

Sentiment in Canada against the slowly escalating war had been present, if minimal, since 1961. An occasional letter to the editor or article would appear in a newspaper, alerting people to the growing conflict and warning of the risks of increased US escalation.³ At the time, however, these were lone voices crying in the wilderness. Even the radical left, in Canada and elsewhere, was slow to appreciate the significance of the conflict in Vietnam. In a resolution to the Communist Party of Canada's 18th National Convention in March 1964 the Party identified eight priorities for peace work. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries was listed as priority number seven. The resolution specifically indicated Cyprus and South Vietnam.⁴ That the two countries took equal status might indicate how far off the radar Vietnam was for even the CPC, even though these small conflicts held the potential escalate in ways that could precipitate a world war. In a keynote address to the delegates, General Secretary Leslie Morris elaborated on the Party's peace plan, advocating that Canada withdraw its troops from Germany, recognize the People's Republic of China, stop taking orders from Washington in general, and promote extension of the partial test ban treaty on nuclear weapons. He urged the Party to focus all peace activity on cancelling the nuclear weapons deal Canada had recently entered into with the United States. Morris presented the subject of Vietnam within the context of Canada's membership on the International Control Commission, the body consisting of Canada, India and Poland which had been established to monitor and enforce the Geneva Accords. "(U)ntil Canada, as a member of the Armistice Commission, denounces the dirty war in Viet Nam and demands that all US forces

³ For example see Dick Clements, "Keep Uncle Sam Out of Viet Nam," Tuesday, 14 November 1961, *The Georgian*, 6-7.

⁴ "A Foreign Policy for Peace and Peaceful Coexistence," Resolution for the 18th National Convention of the Communist Party of Canada, 23-26 March 1964, in Kenny, Box 5, File 2.

withdraw,” Morris argued, “our foreign policy will continue to bear the brand of the Cold War and preparations for war.”⁵ Still, in spite of Morris’s 1964 pronouncements, Vietnam remained a war looking for a peace movement.

The development of the antiwar movement in the United States was little different, albeit slightly faster to articulate protest against America’s increasingly belligerent role in Vietnam. Picket signs protesting the war first appeared at the 1963 annual Easter Peace Walk in New York sponsored by the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE). This was in response to Bertrand Russell’s condemnation of US actions in Vietnam earlier that year. Russell was the head of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), SANE’s British counterpart. While SANE itself did not take a position on the war, this absence of a position did not stop others from showing up with their picket signs. The SANE march was followed by a wave of campus demonstrations in the fall of 1963 protesting the tour of Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, sister in law of South Vietnamese dictator Ngo Dinh Diem, and wife of the head of the South Vietnamese secret police. She had earlier distinguished herself with comments referring to the self-immolation of Buddhist monks protesting against the Diem regime as “barbeques.” Demonstrations occurred at Columbia, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, University of Michigan and University of Wisconsin at Madison. One of the groups protesting against the war in Vietnam was the May Second Movement, or M2M, named for the date in 1964 that coordinated protests took place in New York, San Francisco and other cities. All small affairs, these demonstrations were organized by members of SDS, the Progressive Labor Party (PLP, a breakaway group from the Communist Party USA

⁵ Keynote Address to 18th Convention of the Communist Party of Canada, 27 March 1964, Leslie Morris, 8-10, Kenny, Box 5, File 2.

which looked more to Beijing than Moscow for its inspiration); and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), the youth wing of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers' Party (SWP).⁶

The first Canadian attempt at organized protest was likely related to these developments in the United States. On 27 April 1964 the Manitoba Peace Council issued a press release calling for a one hour demonstration at the US Consulate in Winnipeg at 10:00 on 2 May. Its purpose was to oppose US involvement in the war in South Vietnam, call for the withdrawal of US troops, and urge the re-convening of the Geneva Conference to restore independence, neutrality and peace to Vietnam. The press release went on to express concerns that there were forces in the US that wanted to extend the war into North Vietnam, which could lead to a nuclear war. "But even more important," the document continued, "is the fact that the United States is carrying on a 'dirty war' in Vietnam, bolstering a military regime that does not represent the wishes of the Vietnamese people and is participating in the systematic burning of villages and villagers under the pretext of 'routing out the Vietcong.'"⁷ Whether there was any formal cooperation between the Manitoba Peace Council and M2M is difficult to ascertain. It is significant though that the first attempt at organized protest in Canada was linked with the larger antiwar movement in the United States and also related to the threat of nuclear war.

The Manitoba Peace Council was the provincial component of the Canadian Peace Congress, which had been established in December 1948 under the leadership of

⁶ Halstead, *Out Now*, 33-36.

⁷ Press Release, Manitoba Peace Council, "Demonstrate to Oppose War in Vietnam," April 27, 1964. Communist Party of Canada Collection, Library and Archives Canada, hereinafter referred to as CPC, Box 49, File 09. It is assumed that the demonstration went ahead, but it should be indicated that other than the press release cited here no evidence has so far been found to confirm that it did. Another question this source begs is were similar demonstrations scheduled for this date in Canada by other Peace Councils or other organizations? To date this is the only evidence of any 2 May 1964 antiwar activity taking place in Canada.

former United Church Minister James Endicott. Endicott had resigned from the ministry following a dispute with the church's leadership over his very public support of Mao Zedong.⁸ According to Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, in their book *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957*, the Congress functioned as what amounted to a front group for the Communist Party of Canada. They define such organizations as ostensibly non-Communist, but under some measure of control by the Party. According to the authors, most such groups were a waste of time, attracting little more than "the usual suspects." Whitaker and Marcuse, however, indicate two exceptions to this rule – one was the Canadian Soviet Friendship Society, the other was the Canadian Peace Congress. Early in the life of the Congress, James Endicott – never a Party member himself – met with Tim Buck and other CPC leaders and made it clear that the decisions of the Congress would be made by the organization's own executive. Still, the majority of active Congress members were also members of the CPC.⁹ Although most known for support for unilateral disarmament, the Congress's seven-point program, adopted at its first national conference in May 1949 included support for colonial aspirations of self-determination, hence leaving the door open for opposition to US intervention in later years. In its early years it enjoyed a brief popularity, being able to bring out 8,000 to 10,000 supporters to its rallies. It enjoyed a brief courtship with United Church ministers; 16 of its original executive of 30 were clergy, 14 of them from the United Church. The Congress reached the height of its popularity in September 1949 when it garnered

⁸ Victor Huard, "The Canadian Peace Congress and the Challenge to Postwar Consensus, 1948 – 1953," *Peace and Change*, January 1994, Issue 1, 19:1, (25-50) 30-31. Accessed through EBSCOHOST. For more on Endicott see Stephen Endicott, *James G. Endicott: Rebel Out of China* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980).

⁹ Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 211-212, 367.

300,000 signatures on a ban-the-bomb petition. Endicott's anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist rhetoric, combined with the Congress's opposition to Canada's membership in NATO and its participation in the Korean War, however, led to the organization's marginalization. Relentlessly attacked by the Canadian state, the RCMP was especially merciless in threatening its supporters. The CCF actively discouraged its members from involvement with the Canadian Peace Congress although many did so regardless. The United Church publicly broke with the Congress in 1952, a decision that was supported by all sections of the church. The Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), an interfaith pacifist organization, refused to endorse the Congress because of its perceived "close relationship with Marxianism." Such a perception could only have been strengthened when the Soviet Union awarded Endicott the Stalin Peace Prize in 1953. By this time the Congress was a spent force,¹⁰ although it continued to be active in the ban-the-bomb movement throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. It continued its commitment to decolonization and anti-interventionism with its opposition to US adventurism in Cuba,¹¹ an issue also championed by the Soviet Union.

As the conflict in Vietnam escalated in the early 1960s the Canadian Peace Congress and its affiliated peace councils, as well as the Communist Party, were the only organizations in Canada making efforts to inform public opinion on the war. Gary Moffat, in his study of the antiwar movement in Canada up to 1969, states that with the exception of the Canadian Peace Congress, the Canadian peace movement had given

¹⁰ Victor Huard, "The Canadian Peace Congress and the Challenge to Postwar Consensus, 1948 – 1953," *Peace and Change*, January 1994, Issue 1, 19:1, 25-50. Accessed through EBSCOHOST. Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 364-381.

¹¹ For an example of the Canadian Peace Congress's support for Cuba see its leaflet "A Canadian Letter to President Kennedy," a reprint of a letter from Endicott to JFK also containing reprints of various articles showing US leadership of the Bay of Pigs invasion. In his letter Endicott equates the Cuban Revolution with the American. nd, Kenny, Box 53, File 4.

scant attention to Vietnam prior to the winter of 1964-1965.¹² Moffat's assertion, however, is not entirely accurate, as other groups began to take notice throughout 1964.

In May of 1964 Ian Angus was a student at Carleton University. Among the political organizations he was active with at the time were the CUCND and the New Democratic Youth (NDY). He had just recently joined the Young Socialists (YS), the youth wing of the Trotskyist League for Socialist Action (LSA). Angus asserts that in the spring of 1964 he was part of a group of about a dozen people in Ottawa calling themselves the Citizens' Committee on Vietnam. The group was composed of some fellow Trotskyists, a member of the Communist Party, and some Quakers. It did not organize demonstrations – Angus remembers that the main peace groups at the time would not allow people to carry anti-Vietnam War signs at their protests – but mostly wrote leaflets which they would stick on the windshields of people's cars. The group became inactive between December 1964 and January 1965. This is ironic given that it was at the same time that SDS began planning the first mass anti-Vietnam War march scheduled for April in Washington, DC.¹³

Supporting Angus's assertions of the early involvement of Trotskyists in the antiwar movement in Canada is an article which appeared in the *Young Socialist Forum* in the summer of 1964. The article provides background to the conflict in Vietnam, America's role in it, and Canada's complicity in the US war effort. Given that the article makes no reference to the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, which served as a pretext for American escalation, the issue was likely published prior to August 1964. This would indicate that the Trotskyists were in fact one of the first groups in Canada to publicly

¹² Moffat, *History*, 177-178.

¹³ Ian Angus, Interview with author, 6 November 2006. For an account of the planning for the March on Washington see Sale, *SDS*, 170-187.

oppose the war in Vietnam. However, contrary to their own propaganda, the Trotskyists were not the only ones.¹⁴ In contrast, the Trotskyist movement in the United States did not become involved in antiwar opposition until January 1965. Canadian Trotskyist opposition to the war in Vietnam, therefore, was not merely a cooperative effort with its fraternal organization in the United States, but rather undertaken independently of the US party.¹⁵

Assuming the accuracy of Angus's memory, it is significant that Angus too records the early days of the antiwar movement in Canada as essentially a coalition of Trotskyists, Communists and Quakers. Despite the differences in the three disparate groups, from its earliest beginnings the movement brought together an alliance of revolutionary leftists who in most other contexts would be considered sworn enemies, together with religious pacifists. Uniting them was their opposition to the war in Vietnam.

It is noteworthy who Angus does not name as part of this nascent antiwar coalition: the established peace movement in Canada. The two main peace groups in Canada in 1964 were the CCND and its sister organization the CUCND. As their names indicate, they were both concerned with the threat of nuclear war. They are often referred to as "ban-the-bomb" groups – single issue, non-ideological groups solely concerned with eliminating nuclear weapons, as opposed to groups such as the Canadian Peace Congress which were quite ideological and concerned with an assortment of issues pertaining to

¹⁴ John Riddell, "Get US Troops out of Vietnam, *Young Socialist Forum*, Summer 1964. Reprinted in <http://socialist history.ca/Docs/1961-/Vietnam/YSF-Vietnam-64-66.htm>, accessed 16 October 2006.

¹⁵ *SWP Discussion Bulletin*, Vol. 25, No. 5, Ross Dowson Fonds, Library and Archives Canada, 10995, hereinafter referred to as RDF, Vol. 6, File 8. A review of the index of the Socialist Workers' Party publication *Bulletin* indicates the party published nothing on the war in Vietnam prior to June 1965. See Bulletin List, Socialist Workers' Party – 1939 – September 1968, RDF, Volume 4, File 1.

war and imperialism. The CCND began in 1959 as the Canadian Committee for the Control of Radiation Hazards, a study group focused on anti-nuclear weapons testing under the leadership of Dr. Hugh Keenleyside, former chair of the Canadian-American Joint Defense Board. He later stepped down and was replaced by the Reverend James Thompson of the United Church. In 1962, energized by the hugely successful marches at Aldermaston in Britain by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the Canadian committee changed its name, and its focus. It published a regular newsletter titled *Sanity*, likely drawing upon the popularity of SANE in the United States. To illustrate how quickly it rose in popularity, in 1960 it hosted a rally in Toronto and attracted 60 protesters. A year later a similar rally attracted 1,000. At its height, the CCND had branches in Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Regina, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Toronto, Welland, London, Hamilton, Ottawa and Montreal. There were no chapters east of Montreal.¹⁶

The CUCND was also established in 1959, taking its name and mandate from an organization in Britain of the same name which was affiliated with the CND in that country. Membership was open to students and faculty, but the CUCND was primarily a student organization.¹⁷ Co-founder Dimitrios Roussopoulos describes it as a coalition of liberals and radicals, “more a liberal pressure group than a social movement.”¹⁸ Members were expected to put aside partisan politics, at least publicly when representing CUCND. As per the constitution of the CCND, each CUCND chapter was in effect a chapter of both organizations. In its earliest days it was exclusively a Montreal-based organization and first gained prominence when 1,100 students and faculty from McGill, Sir George

¹⁶ Moffat, *History*, 86-91, 93-102.

¹⁷ James Harding, interview with author, 25 November 2008.

¹⁸ Dimitrios Roussopoulos, ed., *The New Left in Canada* (Montreal: Our Generation Press, 1970), 9-10.

Williams, and the Université de Montréal signed a petition against the deployment of Bomarc missiles at La Macaza, Quebec, and North Bay, Ontario. On Christmas Day of that year they gained national prominence with a demonstration at the National War Memorial in Ottawa. Branches quickly formed in Toronto, Ottawa and elsewhere. In Montreal it published its journal *Our Generation Against Nuclear War*, later shortened to *Our Generation*. While the Quebec branches advocated Canada's withdrawal from NATO and NORAD, the more conservative Toronto group opposed this position. The group was united, however, in its call for unilateral nuclear disarmament.¹⁹

Almost from its inception the organization was monitored by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. One investigator, reporting on the organization in July 1961 alerted his superiors that "the more you read and see of this organization the more convinced one becomes that it's a Communist 'front' organization."²⁰ He was wrong. The CCND/CUCND, like its counterparts in the United Kingdom was non-partisan, supporting neither the Soviet Union nor the United States. They not only distanced themselves from the Communist Party, but actively purged Communists from their ranks. The best known instance of this is illustrated by what was recorded in the CUCND files as "The Goldstick Affair."

Danny Goldstick was the president of the University of Toronto Communist Party Club from 1959 to 1961. During the 1959-1960 academic year he was involved with a group of faculty and students in forming the Toronto Committee for Disarmament. The

¹⁹ Moffat, History, 147-149; RCMP evidence Document No. 0-2420 – CUCND Constitution," Canadian Security Intelligence Service (hereinafter referred to as CSIS), RG 146, Box 82, File 98-A-00025; Resolutions and Reports of the Annual Conference, Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Toronto, February, 1963," 2-3; Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Collection, McMaster University Archives (hereinafter referred to as CUCND) Box 11, File 5, SUPA Founding Conference. Regarding the founding of *Our Generation* see Levitt, *Children of Privilege*, 40; Roussopoulos, *The New Left*, 8.

²⁰ RCMP Transit Slip for Headquarters Use, 27 July 1961, CSIS, CUCND, Box 82, File 98-A-00025.

group organized a few demonstrations and later that year Goldstick, along with some Quakers and members of FOR became founding executive members of a campus group entitled Students for Peace, modeled after the Student Peace Union in the United States. We see here a precedent of Communists and religious pacifists coming together to oppose Canadian government defence and foreign policy. Contact was made with the CUCND and the group jointly participated in the spring 1960 demonstration at North Bay. Throughout that summer Goldstick was active in establishing a Toronto chapter of CUCND; this was formalized in the fall. Within a year CUCND had expelled Goldstick for his Party affiliations, fearing the public perception that the Toronto branch was dominated by Communists. Supporting his expulsion was Rabbi Abraham Feinberg of the local CCND. In a letter to Sydney Leslie Welley, a Communist and CUCND activist in Montreal, Goldstick asserted Feinberg was “also hot for the expulsion.” The same letter alleged that Dimitrios Rousoupoulos had sent a letter to the Toronto chapter on behalf of the National Secretariat of CUCND threatening to revoke their charter if they did not expel Goldstick. Again, according to Goldstick, his expulsion was effected when “dozens of people were rounded up to go to the meeting who had little or nothing to do with CUCND before that date.”²¹

The Goldstick Affair shows that while Communists were certainly involved in the early CUCND, it was by no means a Communist front group. Communists, however, were not the only radical leftists trying to stake out territory within the Canadian peace

²¹ Notes on the History of the CUCND with Special Reference to Toronto, CUCND, Box 13, Tony Hyde File; Correspondence, Dan Goldstick, President, University of Toronto Communist Party Club to Dr. Ross, Secretary, *The Caput*, University of Toronto, 14 December 1959, CPC, Box 54, File 43; Correspondence, Daniel Goldstick, President, Communist Party Club to unknown, (likely Dr. R. Ross), 14 January 1960; Correspondence, Daniel Goldstick, to Welley, nd. CPC Box 54, File 43; Correspondence, Sydney Leslie Welley, Member of Montreal Regional Council of CUCND and President, McGill Socialist Society to Danny Goldstick, President, Communist Party Club, University of Toronto, 22 November 1961, CPC Box 54, File 43.

movement at the time. The North Bay protest had served as an entry point for the Canadian Trotskyist movement to take on peace work. In an internal party report Joe Black boasted that the Young Socialist Alliance (they had not yet changed their name to Young Socialists/Ligue des Jeunes Socialistes, differentiating themselves from the Trotskyist youth movement in the USA) was an established youth group, having played a substantial role in organizing Montreal, Ottawa and Toronto students for the North Bay protest. The same report also indicated that YSA members had organized picketing of Woolworths in Toronto in solidarity with African American sit-ins in the American south. Pickets were maintained for five consecutive Saturdays.²² Another internal YSA report, dated the same day, gives a description of the multifaceted ideological make-up of the Toronto CUCND chapter and the role Communists played in it. Speaking about university students in general, the report indicates “a growing uneasiness on the campuses about Canada’s military alliances” and the threat of nuclear annihilation. “The latter is manifested in the growth of the antiwar movement, particularly on the campuses.” An example of this, the report pointed out, was the CUCND chapter at the University of Toronto:

(T)his group, at a time of year when students are scattered, organized a number of open air meetings, in parks, attracting from one to three hundred people at each – key people in this also organized the North Bay motorcade and a picket line at the French Consulate protesting the Sahara atomic test – YSA participated in all of these projects.²³

The report described the “leading committee” of the chapter as “composed of CCFers, ‘unofficial’ representatives of the off-campus Stalinist YCL (Young Communist League), (the) campus CP group, independent radicals and ourselves, and minor representatives

²² Joe Black, “Youth Report,” 14 September 1960, RDF, Box 19, File 7.

²³ Strong and Banson, “Youth Work,” 14 September 1960, RDF, Box 19, File 7.

from Liberals, Tories, etc.” It complained that “Stalinists (are) in the forefront” though the official line of the CUCND chapter was “no politics,” meaning that the groups would work together for CUCND’s stated goal of unilateral nuclear disarmament and not bring their own partisan positions to the fore. “We are the only opposition to this,” the report boasted in reference to the Trotskyists’ refusal to put aside their own sectarianism in working with the CUCND chapter. “The most consistent supporters of this present position,” it argued with regards to the position of non-sectarianism, “are the Stalinists,” meaning of course the old-line CPC supporters.²⁴ The report was prescient in its analysis of CUCND, at least in the short-term:

The CUCND has possibilities of becoming a mass student organization. It exists in the two Montreal universities (meaning the English-speaking ones) and has contact with other campuses. It has plans this fall, initiated by us, to set up equivalent high school groups and to open a mass (membership) drive.²⁵

Thus we can see that by as early as 1960 there were distinct groupings which had staked out ideological territory within the peace movement in Canada. On the far left were the Trotskyists and the Communist Party, the latter demonstrating an element of conservatism in an effort to work with the more mainstream CCND/CUCND. All of these groups would ultimately play a role in opposing the war in Vietnam to varying degrees, but throughout the early years of the 1960s their concerns were more with nuclear disarmament.

The turning point for the antiwar movement came with the escalation of the war itself in August 1964. On 4 and 5 August American bombers struck DRV torpedo boat bases in the Gulf of Tonkin in response to two alleged attacks by North Vietnamese

²⁴ Strong and Banson, “Youth Work.”

²⁵ Strong and Banson, “Youth Work.”

torpedo boats against the American destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy. In actual fact the Turner Joy was never attacked and the attack on the Maddox was done in the context of the DRV correctly believing it was playing a support role for South Vietnamese attacks on the North Vietnamese island of Hon Me. In what is now known as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, the US administration distorted the picture and fabricated evidence to justify air strikes on North Vietnam. It also provided a pretext for the US Senate to introduce the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, legislation which authorized the US to take “all necessary measures to repel any armed attacks against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” It was, in Senator Wayne Morse’s words, a “predated declaration of war.”²⁶

Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in Canada was mixed. The CCND issued an immediate press release stating that American retaliatory action against the DRV greatly increased chances of a general war in the region. It also called on the Canadian government to support French President Charles De Gaulle’s proposal for a neutral Southeast Asia, a reconvening of the Geneva Convention, and recognition of the People’s Republic of China and its admission to the United Nations.²⁷ In the House of Commons both Prime Minister Lester Pearson and Opposition Leader John Diefenbaker supported the American actions. Pearson blamed the “dictatorship” of North Vietnam for not living up to its obligations under the Geneva Accords. (He failed to mention how the Republic of Vietnam’s attack on Hon Me was a violation of the same accords.) Tommy Douglas, leader of the New Democratic Party, took a dissenting position, echoing Senator Morse in the US stating that American actions were tantamount to a declaration of war. Canada,

²⁶ Herring, *America’s Longest War*, 141-145.

²⁷ Press Release, CCND, 5 August 1964, CUCND, Box 14, File – Clippings, Publications and Documents.

said Douglas, should not support the “discredited regime of South Vietnam.” In the end Ottawa decided to send a diplomat to Hanoi to act as a crisis intermediary.²⁸

For the purposes of this discussion, the most important dialogue that took place was in Ottawa. On 5 August an unnamed source approached the Press Officer of the US Embassy requesting background information on the situation in Vietnam. The press officer was most helpful, providing everything he could get his hands on. That night a working group composed of members of the CUCND, the New Democratic Youth, the CPC, the Youth Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (the CCND’s high school wing) and the Ottawa Human Rights Committee reviewed the material supplied by the press officer and formulated further questions for the US Embassy.²⁹

The following day a representative of the group again approached the Embassy, this time with a request for someone from the Embassy to meet with a delegation representing various Ottawa peace groups. Second Secretary to the Ambassador John Vaught agreed to meet with up to three people that day at noon. A delegation was put together composed of Professor George Johnson of the CCND, John Allcock of the CUCND, Peter Schultz on the YCND, Gilles Paquet of le Mouvement pour le Désarmement Nucléaire et la Paix, and Edith Holton of the CPC. Representatives from the NDY and the Human Rights Committee were unable to attend.³⁰ Allcock and Schultz met with Vaught for two hours. They were genuinely surprised at how the diplomat clung to the American interpretation of recent events. When questioned specifically on the Gulf

²⁸ W.A. Wilson, “Pearson Informed by Rush,” *Montreal Star*, 5 August 1964, 1,4; “Commons Divided on Crisis,” *Montreal Star*, (Canadian Press), 6 August 1964, 2; “Diplomat to Visit Hanoi – Canada Ready to Serve as Crisis Intermediary,” *The Globe and Mail*, August 7, 1964, 1.

²⁹ “Ottawa Report on Action in Ottawa, In Connection with the Viet Nam Incident,” CUCND, Box 13, Vietnam, 1964-1965. The groups listed in this report are given as abbreviations. CPC could mean Communist Party of Canada or Canadian Peace Congress. Likely it was the latter.

³⁰ “Ottawa Report,” CUCND, Box 13. Again, only abbreviations are given. For more on MDN see “MDN Maps 64 Program,” *Sanity*, Vol. 1, No. 9, 1-2.

of Tonkin Incident, they noted, “(h)e seemed astounded that we should expect him to doubt the word of the president!” Allcock and Schultz were surprised that Vaught was unable to think outside of the Cold War box: “He did not seem to catch on to the idea that the Civil War in Viet Nam might have deeper roots than ‘Communist aggression.’”³¹

Most significant about the meeting at the embassy is that it is the first evidence of various peace and political groups in Canada cooperating in their opposition to the war in Vietnam. The report summarizing the meeting concluded that “(t)he above action was designed purely for the purpose of gaining information – it is not a protest. On the basis of the information realized on the occasion, further directly agitational activity is being planned.”³² It is not clear what, if any, actions resulted from these consultations and planning.

Early opposition to the war in Vietnam was not simply the moral issue it became, a case of the world’s most powerful country brutalizing a small developing nation struggling to emerge from the shackles of colonialism. There was a widely held fear that the conflict would escalate into a nuclear confrontation between China and the United States. Immediately following the Gulf of Tonkin Incident China reiterated its commitment to defend the DRV.³³ If the US became involved in a larger war north of the 17th parallel it would find itself at war with another nuclear power. It is this context that the CCND/CUCND began its shift from “ban-the-bomb” to a more encompassing antiwar orientation.³⁴ The Communist-oriented wing of the movement had already set out

³¹ “Ottawa Report,” CUCND, Box 13.

³² “Ottawa Report,” CUCND, Box 13.

³³ Charles Taylor, “Right to Intervene Staked Out by China, But Avoidance of Clash Believed Hope,” *The Globe and Mail*, 7 August 1964, 1. Clipping located in CPC, Box 49, File 1.

³⁴ Janet Rober, “Vietnam: Oh What a Lovely War,” *Sanity*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 5. Such fears were reinforced the following April when a spokesperson for the US government stated that it would use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances in Vietnam. In spite of this, Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson reaffirmed

a commitment to national liberation as early as the 1940s. The Trotskyist movement viewed the conflict as a vehicle with which to radicalize and mobilize youth.³⁵ Such was the situation on 6 August 1964 when our anonymous woman with the nice hat and purse, accompanied by 100 others organized by the Montreal Peace Centre, marched to Dominion Square in Montreal to commemorate Hiroshima with one hand, and to end the dirty war in Vietnam with the other.³⁶

The period following the Gulf of Tonkin Incident up to December 1964 was fairly quiet for the emerging antiwar movement in Canada, and internationally as well. In November CCND and CUCND submitted a joint brief to Parliament urging support for De Gaulle's proposal to neutralize Vietnam by withdrawing all foreign troops. It also called upon Canada to recognize the People's Republic of China. The brief described the war in Vietnam as "a popular struggle by most Vietnamese people against a corrupt and repressive government which is maintained in power by American support." It also charged the Canadian government with doing little as a member of the International Control Commission to bring truce violations to world attention.³⁷ Later that month students at Queen's University submitted a petition signed by 1,100 students to Kingston Member of Parliament E.J. Benson calling upon the Canadian government to bring about a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Vietnam.³⁸ That same week pacifist religious and radical groups in the United States called for internationally coordinated demonstrations

his support for "the purposes and objectives of US policy in Vietnam." See "PM Concerned at A-Arms Reports," *The Globe and Mail*, 27 April 1965, 8. Clipping in CPC, Box 49, File 01.

³⁵ "Political Report – The Anti-War Movement," *Youth Discussion Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 1, April 1966, 1-5, RDF, Box 19, File 12.

³⁶ "Gather at the Cenotaph; Demonstrators Mark Hiroshima Anniversary," *Montreal Star*, 7 August 1964, 1.

³⁷ "may change name: New Roles for Peace group." *The Varsity*, 2 October 1964, 3; "CUCND to lobby on Vietnam," *The Varsity*, 4 November 1964, 1.

³⁸ "Petition on Vietnam," *The Varsity*, 13 November 1964, 1.

against the war in Vietnam for 19 December. Turnout was small by later standards. In New York Phil Ochs sang "Talkin' Vietnam Blues" to a crowd of 1,000, while in San Francisco Joan Baez entertained 600. Marches were held in Minneapolis, Miami, Austin, Sacramento, Philadelphia, Boston and Cleveland. Even as early as this time, opposition to the war was internationalized. In addition to protests in the US demonstrations took place in Hamburg, Munich and London, as well as France, Brazil, Ireland, India, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Canada was no exception. The University of Toronto chapter of CUCND organized a demonstration at the corner of Bloor Street and Avenue Road, attracting 80 protesters. Another demonstration took place in Montreal attracting 68 people. The Canadian Peace Congress published an open letter to President Johnson in which it stated that because Canada was a military ally of the United States, Canadians were obligated to protest policies which were "unrealistic and dangerous." Comparing US actions in Vietnam to the Nazi holocaust, the letter went on: "You have elevated the bestialities of Auschwitz and Buchenwald into a science of 'Special Warfare.' The toll of dead, wounded and burned is now one million." The letter went on to call for LBJ to end the war, reconvene the 1954 Geneva Conference, and negotiate a reasonable and just settlement.³⁹

The 19 December 1964 international protests were the first internationally coordinated protests against the war in Vietnam. While Canadian participation was minimal, it is notable that it was present from the start of the internationalizing of the

³⁹ Barry O'Neill, "CUCND to parade for peace in Vietnam," *The Varsity*, 16 December 1964, 1; Harvey Shepherd, "Good Will with Placards," (editorial) *The Varsity*, 16 December 1964, 4. DeBenedetti, *American Ordeal*, 100; "Canadians Support World Wide Call Against war," *Sanity*, Vol. 2, No. 7, February 1965, 8. The *Sanity* article puts the number in New York and San Francisco at 1,500 and 1,000 respectively. See also leaflet, nd, "An Open Letter to President Johnson," reprint from *Ottawa Citizen*, 19 December 1964.

antiwar movement. While evidence suggests the participation of CCND/CUCND as well as the Canadian Peace Congress, it is doubtful the Trotskyists participated in these demonstrations.⁴⁰ Significant, too, is that these demonstrations took place three months prior to the commitment of US combat troops to the war in Vietnam. Hence, the formation of an international antiwar movement, which included Canadian participation, was already underway prior to the massive US intervention which occurred in the early months of 1965.

By the time of the December 1964 protests CUCND was on its way to oblivion. The role of faculty members had dwindled and the organization had effectively become a student one. In the United States, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) served as an example of a multi-issue student organization that could challenge not just the threat of nuclear annihilation, but also racism and economic inequalities. Like the CUCND, it was highly influenced by the writings of Columbia sociologist C. Wright Mills. Also originating in the United States, but starting to take hold in Canada, at this time, was the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) with its commitment to non-violent direct action. Both SDS and SNCC shared a commitment to participatory democracy. In contrast to these, CUCND was a highly centralized, single-issue organization. Many of its members wanted to branch out to challenge what they believed to be the underlying causes of war such as racism and poverty. The examples of SDS and SNCC, and the pressure to decentralize, led CUCND to change its name and structure at its membership

⁴⁰ This can be deduced from two factors. For one the YSA in the United States did not begin antiwar activism until January 1965. Secondly, it is telling that Fred Halstead's encyclopedic account of the antiwar movement in the US makes no mention of these demonstrations, despite their international dimension. Halstead, a leader of the Socialist Workers' Party for many years, would not have missed such a significant occurrence unintentionally. Likely he overlooked it because the SWP was not a part of it. In Canada it can be assumed that the Canadian Peace Congress took part given their open letter. Similarly it can be assumed that the CCND took part as they reported on it. There is no evidence to suggest that the Canadian Trotskyist movement took part.

conference in Regina from 28 December 1964 to 1 January 1965.⁴¹ The new organization – the Student Union for Peace Action, or SUPA for short – was similar to SDS and SNCC. Although SUPA continued to follow the CCND policy of non-alignment with any specific political philosophy, its formal affiliation with that organization was quietly severed. In place of a strong national secretariat as under CUCND, SUPA adopted a regional structure which included British Columbia, Prairies, Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic Canada. Its national council was composed of five table officers – not surprisingly in 1965 all men – and five regional chairs, only one of whom was a woman. Reflecting the group’s gender, as well as its orientation to a youth culture steeped in television heroes, some took to calling themselves “Supa-men.” Notably, the chair for Atlantic Canada was left vacant as the organization was inactive there.⁴²

Of particular importance to the Regina conference was a draft policy statement entitled “The Student and Social Issues in the Nuclear Age.” Intended as a Canadian version of SDS’s iconic Port Huron Statement,⁴³ the fifteen-page, single-spaced 8 ½ x 11 inch document attempted to outline the major domestic and international issues of the 1960s and the role of students in shaping them.⁴⁴ Conspicuously absent from the draft policy paper is any discussion of the war in Vietnam and Canada’s potential in contributing to a peaceful resolution. It is indeed ironic given the inspiration that SDS

⁴¹ “May change,” *The Varsity*, 2 October 1964, 3; “CCUND gets new name, takes on broader role,” *The Varsity*, 6 January 1965, 3; Harvey A. Feit, “SUPA Conference Report – Regina 64/65,” *Sanity*, Vol. 2, No. 7, February 1965, 6.

⁴² Jim Harding of Saskatchewan was elected national chair. His fellow table officers included Dick Woodsworth of Vancouver, John Conway of Saskatoon, Danny Drache of Kingston, and Dimitrios Roussopoulos and Harvey Feit of Montreal. Pro-tem regional chairs included Dennis Newman of BC, Michelle Rohatyn for Prairies, Tom Hathaway for Ontario and Willie Papier for Quebec. “CUCND disbanded; SUPA-men emerge,” *Sanity*, Vol. 2, No. 7, February 1965, 1; Harding, interview.

⁴³ Adopted at the SDS conference in Port Huron, Michigan in 1962, the Port Huron Statement effectively served as the mission statement for the organization for most of its life. More significantly it serves as an expression of the hopes of a generation. Sale, *SDS*, 69-70.

⁴⁴ “Draft Statement – The Student and Social Issues in the Nuclear Age,” CUCND, Box 11, SUPA Founding Conference, Regina, December 1964.

had provided to the new group that as delegates to the Regina conference were debating this document, the leadership of SDS was planning the first mass march on Washington to protest the war in Vietnam.

Despite the Regina conference's failure to discuss Vietnam on a national level, the newly-named University of Toronto chapter of SUPA focused its energies on antiwar activism. The U of T chapter was in a strategic position to mobilize student opinion on the war. As a formally recognized student organization, it had access to university resources and spaces and a concentrated population of young people – one of the largest in the country. In January it circulated a campus-wide petition requesting the Canadian government to seek a cease-fire in Vietnam and to promote a re-convening of the Geneva Conference. Chapter president Ian Gentles informed the student newspaper the *Varsity* that SUPA volunteers would visit classrooms, residences, cafeterias and the Campus Co-op in an effort to inform students about Vietnam.⁴⁵

In February the United States began to escalate the intensity of its operations in Vietnam. This was the beginning of what Americans typically see as the start of the Vietnam War. In retaliation for an NLF raid at Pleiku that killed seven US servicemen and wounded 109 others, as well as destroying 18 helicopters, the United States resumed bombing attacks on the DRV. It also began the introduction of combat troops. In Toronto, on Saturday, 8 February, in a rare display of non-sectarian cooperation, the Trotskyist Young Socialist Forum and the Canadian Peace Congress hastily organized a demonstration in which 250 protested. The next day at the University of Toronto the Students' Administrative Council, along with other campus political groups, held an emergency meeting, deciding to send a telegram to Prime Minister Lester Pearson calling

⁴⁵ "Petition Ottawa to seek cease-fire in Viet Nam," *The Varsity*, 11 January 1965, 1.

for Canadian action towards neutralization of Vietnam and withdrawal of foreign troops. The meeting also called for a demonstration the following day. On Monday about 300 students representing the campus Liberals, Conservatives, and New Democrats as well as the Student Christian Movement and SUPA, assembled at Convocation Hall where they were addressed by Professor Donald Wilmott, a sociologist and an expert on Vietnam. From there they marched to the US Consulate where they encountered about 200 counter-demonstrators carrying picket signs reading "The SAC Does Not Speak for Me" and "Johnson's Right, You Gotta Fight." There were no incidents, although the *Toronto Star* reported moments at which the confrontation threatened to become a brawl. Ironically, Pete Seeger, the famed leftist folk singer and antiwar activist was in town for a show that night and was around the corner ice skating at Nathan Phillips Square at the time of the demonstration. Smaller protest actions continued on the University of Toronto campus throughout the week.⁴⁶

Not everyone agreed with the Toronto demonstrators. The 200 counter-demonstrators who showed up to confront the antiwar protesters at the consulate initiated further repercussions on campus. The *Varsity* received numerous letters criticizing not only the protesters, but also the paper's allegedly biased coverage. One angry letter writer referred to the paper as the English language version of *Pravda*. In total the paper published 29 letters, 20 of which were hostile to the demonstrators.⁴⁷ Hostility to the

⁴⁶ Sale, *SDS*, 173; "Picket US Consul Over Viet Nam Raid," *Toronto Daily Star*, Monday, 8 February 1965, 17; Barry O'Neill, "Plan protest on Vietnam bombing: March on US consulate; Send telegram to Ottawa," *The Varsity*, 8 February 1965, 1; "High Priest of Folk: Singalong with Seeger," *Toronto Daily Star*, Monday, 8 February 1965, 20; "Student Pickets Clash Over US Raids," *Toronto Daily Star*, 9 February 1965, 26; "Vietnam Protest Continues: 300 protest bombing; 200 protest protest," *The Varsity*, 10 February 1965, 1. "Vietnam Protest Continues: To blitz campus for protest petition," *The Varsity*, 10 February 1965, 1.

⁴⁷ "Storm of angry letters protest Viet Nam Action," *The Varsity*, 10 February 1965, 3.

protesters indicates the fact that in 1965 there was still considerable support in Canada, as in the United States, for Johnson's war effort.

Toronto was not the only Canadian city to experience protests as a result of the resumed US bombing of North Vietnam. In Regina plans were made to set up a literature table to distribute information on the war in Vietnam. An open meeting was planned for the Wednesday and approximately 25 turned out for a march scheduled for the following Saturday. Another march was scheduled for Winnipeg that week.⁴⁸

It was Montreal, however, that distinguished itself as the most antiwar city in Canada. On Thursday, 11 February a small scandal ensued when a group of students representing New Democrats and Young Communists marched out of McGill University's annual model parliament to join about 80 off campus protesters at the US Consulate to protest the bombings. In addition to campus Communists and New Democrats, the demonstrators also included members of the Socialist Society (another Communist affiliated group) and the separatist Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN). Indeed, Québécois nationalists would be prominent in the antiwar movement in Quebec throughout the 1960s.⁴⁹

Another rally at the consulate followed on Sunday, sponsored by the McGill NDP, YCL and the Socialist Society. They were joined by members of RIN, the Montreal Peace Centre and the Montreal Council for Peace for a total of 200.⁵⁰ A third march

⁴⁸ Correspondence, Saskatoon Branch (SUPA) to Prairies Region Branches, 8 February 1965, CUCND, Box 22, File 1, Correspondence; James Harding, "Note on the Days of Protest," SUPA Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 6, 19 April 1966.

⁴⁹ "Bombing protested in demonstration," *McGill Daily*, 12 February 1965, 1; "Statement from NDP Leader," *McGill Daily*, 12 February 1965, 3; "Statement from the Chairman," *McGill Daily*, 12 February 1965, 3.

⁵⁰ "No More War!" (photo and caption only) *McGill Daily*, 15 February 1965, 1; "Demonstrate ad explained," *McGill Daily*, 15 February 1965, 1; also see the advertisement for the demonstration in *McGill Daily*, 12 February 1965, 2.

followed on Tuesday, 16 February. In this event, students held near-simultaneous rallies at McGill and Sir George Williams. At McGill an open rally was held in the Arts Building where CUCND activist and future labour activist Stan Gray chaired the meeting. Gray expressed disappointment at the absence of support from the Students' Executive Council. As usual, participants were made up of members from the Socialist Society, the NDP and the YCL, as well as SUPA. At Sir George a rally sponsored by the hastily-formed Committee for Vietnamese Self-Determination in conjunction with the campus chapter of SUPA filled Birks Hall with several hundred students. Following the two rallies students from both universities marched to the US Consulate on McGregor Street where a third, combined rally composed of 300 lasted twenty minutes.⁵¹ Following the February demonstrations in Toronto and Montreal, antiwar activism took a back seat to another social justice issue also emanating from the United States. It would energize the antiwar movement.

The issue that was catching the attention of an increasing number of Canadians in late 1964 was not the war in Vietnam, but the civil rights movement in the United States. Vietnam was still a low-intensity conflict. The status of US military personnel in Vietnam had yet to change from advisors to combat troops, and bombings of North Vietnam had not yet resumed. Yet in the United States the civil rights movement had been gaining steam since the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision of the Supreme Court. On 1 February 1960 four African American students sat down at the whites-only Woolworths lunch-counter in Greensboro, North Carolina, and attempted to order a meal, touching off a wave of sit-ins across the American south and eventually leading to the establishment

⁵¹ "Students to Hit US Intervention on Viet Nam," *Georgian*, 16 February 1965, 1, 5; Students Protest U.S. in Viet-Nam," *McGill Daily*, 17 February 1965, 1; "Students Demonstrate After Birks Rally," *Georgian*, 23 February 1965, 7, 12.

of SNCC. With their commitment to grass-roots community activism and non-violent direct action, SNCC captured the imaginations of more Americans than any other civil rights organization.⁵² SNCC, however, would soon expand its horizons and move north into Canada. After a false start at the University of Toronto in 1963, a chapter of Friends of SNCC started there in October 1964 under the leadership of Dianne Burrows, a graduate of Trinity College who had spent the previous summer working for SNCC in the South as part of its Freedom Summer project.⁵³ A few weeks later a second chapter was formed at Queen's. A third chapter began at McGill in January of 1965. By February there were chapters at Western, Carleton, Waterloo, McMaster and the University of Saskatchewan, as well as one in Belleville, Ontario.⁵⁴

If there is one single event in the history of the American civil rights movement of the 1960s that made itself felt in Canada it was the voting rights demonstrations in Selma, Alabama.⁵⁵ On 10 March 1965, in an act of solidarity with the protesters in Selma, 250 students assembled at Soldier's Tower on the University of Toronto campus and marched to the US Consulate. Thirty five of them entered the consulate. Among them were Judith Pocock and Dianne Burrows. Pocock, daughter of well-known pacifists Jack and Nancy Pocock, remembers, "they promptly threw us on the sidewalk." Pocock and her comrades

⁵² Clayborne Carson, *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996 [1981]), 9-18.

⁵³ Volkmar Richter, "SNCC will try again at U of T," *The Varsity*, 3 October 1964, 10.

⁵⁴ "Friends of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, McGill University, Communist Activities Within, Montreal Quebec," RCMP Reports, 5 November 1965, 25 November 1964, 16 March 1965 and 4 February 1965, CSIS, Access to Information Application, RG 146, A-2006-00301, Friends of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee – McGill, Part 1; RCMP Information – re (Student) Non-Violent Coordinating Committee – Queen's University Branch – Kingston, Ontario, 25 November 1964, 97-100; CSIS, Box 39, File 95-A-00062, Student Union for Peace Action; "SNCC sets up program to aid Freedom Schools," *McGill Daily*, 5 March 1965, 3; "Campus to get SNCC; founding meeting today," *McGill Daily*, 2 January 1965, 3; *Freedom Now* (Newsletter of Canadian Friends of SNCC) Vol. 1, No. 2, nd, 2; "Civil Rights Demonstration in Toronto," *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1 April 1965. SNCC chapters in Canada were commonly called Friends of SNCC, but were sometimes known as Canadian Friends of SNCC or simply SNCC.

⁵⁵ Carson, *In Struggle*, 157-162.

mounted an immediate sit-in in front of the consulate. It lasted 10 days. “People moved out onto the sidewalk and at different times we’d have hundreds of people sitting in on the sidewalk,” recalls Pocock. “(B)asically three quarters of Toronto (was) driving by, giving us sleeping bags, coffee, throwing money at us.”⁵⁶ Protesters would take turns at sitting in, taking shifts. On the third day of the sit-in 2,000 gathered at Queen’s Park and marched to the Consulate to join those sitting in. On the fifth day of the sit-in between 2,000 and 3,500 demonstrated in Ottawa. The Friends of SNCC chapter at the University of Western Ontario chartered two buses and sent 82 SNCC supporters to the Ottawa rally. Nine buses were chartered from Toronto. Other protesters came from Montreal and Kingston. Among the speakers was NDP leader Tommy Douglas, the only party leader to address the demonstration.⁵⁷

Selma solidarity protests were not confined to Ontario. On 16 March the Student Executive Committee at McGill sponsored a rally featuring Lafayette Surney of the SNCC executive. Following the rally, 1,500 chanting students marched to the US Consulate on McGregor. At the Consulate nine members of the Montreal Peace Centre were forcibly removed from the building after attempting a sit-in there following a fifteen minute meeting with the Consul General R. H. Hawkins. Some of the protesters kept up an overnight vigil. A week later, in a march co-sponsored by the l’Union Générale des Étudiants du Québec (UGEQ) and the Student Action Committee at McGill, 2,000 demonstrators again protested in front of the US Consulate, hundreds of them sitting-in on the pavement in front of the building. The march was timed to coincide with the

⁵⁶ Judith Pocock, interview with author, 13 November 2006.

⁵⁷ RCMP Report, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, 13 April 1965, CSIS, Access to Information Application RG 146, A-2006-0031; “UWO Group Among 2,000 in Ottawa Protest March,” *London Free Press*, 15 March 1965 (clipping in above file); “Agony in Alabama: SEC Sponsors Protest,” *McGill Daily*, 16 March 1965, 1.

arrival in Montgomery, Alabama of the march from Selma to the state capital led by Dr. Martin Luther King.⁵⁸

In Vancouver, where Friends of SNCC did not have a chapter, Selma solidarity actions were markedly smaller. On 15 March SNCC field workers spoke to an audience of 500 in the Main Hall at the University of British Columbia. According to an RCMP report, another demonstration was to take place at the US Consulate the following day. This was likely attended by 200 demonstrators with the blessing of the Vancouver Labor Council.⁵⁹ Vancouver appears to be the only city in Canada where Selma protests had the endorsement of organized labour. Vancouver unions would continue to play an active role in the antiwar movement.

What was it about Selma that was able to mobilize so many Canadians in what would appear on the surface an American problem? The US civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s had been building since 1954, but until Selma it had stayed south of the border. The change is partially explained by SNCC's desire to fundraise in Canada. Starting in 1964 it was not an uncommon occurrence for Canadian university audiences to be entertained by the SNCC Freedom Singers, a small group of singers who acted as

⁵⁸ Bryan Goodyear, "Mass March Staged on U.S. Consulate: Nine Demonstrators Forcibly Removed," *Montreal Gazette*, 17 March 1965, (clipping in CSIS, ATIP A2006-00301); "Students rally for Selma," *McGill Daily*, 22 March 1965, 4; "Montreal Students Pick Up Cue From Toronto In Civil Rights Protest to United States," (photo and caption only) *The Globe and Mail*, 24 March 1965, 27.

⁵⁹ RCMP Report, 17 March 1965, SNCC, University of British Columbia, Access to Information Application RG 146, A-2006-0031; "City labor backs rights fight in U.S.," *Pacific Tribune*, 19 March 1965 (clipping in above file). The chronology and details of Selma protests in Vancouver are sketchy. RCMP reports only specifically mention the meeting in the Main Hall attended by 500 and indicates the meeting planned for the next day. *Pacific Tribune* mentions a rally at the Consulate attended by 200 but gives no date. Likely it is the same rally being referred to.

ambassadors for SNCC through song. In the months leading up to Selma the Freedom Singers performed at the University of Toronto, McGill, and other campuses.⁶⁰

Also important to consider is the organizing ability of Dianne Burrows. In an August 1965 article on SNCC in Canada, SUPA activist Harvey Shepherd credits Burrows with being the organizing force behind the organization's success north of the border. Judith Pocock also points to Burrows as the leading force of the organization at the University of Toronto. Pocock makes no mention of other campuses.⁶¹

Likely the most significant factor in popularizing the African American civil rights movement in Canada was television. Sasha Torres, in her study of the role of television in popularizing the civil rights movement, argues that in the ten year period from 1955 to 1965 organizations like Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference as well as SNCC were media darlings who skilfully exploited the medium of television. Events such as Selma were extensively covered by the press and the images projected, asserts Torres in a play on words, were "black and white." There were no greys; one side was right and the other wrong. Television, says Torres, invited whites to identify with the struggle for civil rights.⁶² Selma was in many ways the last hurrah of this invitation. The alliance between media and civil rights organizations disintegrated among images of race riots and Stokely Carmichael chanting "black power."

⁶⁰ The first ad for a SNCC Freedom Singers concert appeared in the 27 January 1964 issue of the *McGill Daily* for a performance in the Leacock Building at McGill on 30 January. See McGill ad in Access to Information Application RG 146, A-2006-00301, Friends of SNCC, McGill, Pt.1; Volkmar Richter, "SNCC brings Freedom Singers," *The Varsity (Review)* 15 January 1965, 11;" Freedom Singers here tomorrow," *McGill Daily*, 29 January 1965, 5; "Concert ups fund: Net \$2,500 in campus drive for civil rights workers," *The Varsity*, 25 January 1965, 1.

⁶¹ Harvey L. Shepherd, "SNCC in Canada," *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 8, 30 August 1965, 15-17; Pocock, interview.

⁶² Sasha Torres, *Black, White, and in Color: Television and Black Civil Rights* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 7-8.

Also to be considered with regard to the emergence of SNCC in Canada and the popularity of the Selma demonstrations is the overlapping membership between SNCC and CUCND/SUPA. SNCC emerged in Canada just as CUCND began to make the transition towards SUPA. By the time the Selma demonstrations took place SUPA had been in existence for barely two months. It was young and energetic and brought those qualities to SNCC as well. In Toronto both SNCC and SUPA shared the same office.⁶³ In addition to the RCMP, another organization which kept a close eye on SNCC and the left in general, was the Communist Party. In an internal report from June 1965 the Party recorded the intermingling relationships between SUPA, SNCC, the NDP and the Student Christian Movement:

The relationship between organizations like the SUPA, SNCC and to a lesser extent the SCM and the NDP University Clubs is almost as one of the participants in the sit-in put it “positively incestuous.” Especially between SNCC and SUPA it is almost impossible to tell the difference in membership ... and leadership.⁶⁴

Such overlapping memberships allowed these groups to channel energy and resources to a given issue with ease and to keep their members active and motivated. Although there was already a budding antiwar movement in Canada prior to March 1965, SNCC in general, and the Selma demonstrations in particular, did much to popularize dissent. Dual membership in SUPA and SNCC illustrates the difficulties in separating the “new left” and the civil rights movements. SNCC was part of both. In looking back on her

⁶³ RCMP Report, SNCC, Toronto, 26 October 1965, CSIS, Access to Information Application RG 146, A-2006-00301, Pt 21.

⁶⁴ “The Young Generation and the Communist Party,” Report of the CPC, Metro Toronto City Club, in RCMP Report, CPC Metro Toronto City Committee, 24 October 1965, CSIS, Access to Information Application RG 146, A-2006-00301, Pt. 20.

participation in the antiwar movement and other political activism of the 1960s, Judith Pocock reflects: “SNCC had a tremendous influence on things.”⁶⁵

As Canadians mobilized to support the Selma marches, the war in Vietnam continued to escalate, and with escalation came increasing dissent. In early February the US began systematic bombing of selected targets in the DRV. The International Control Commission issued a report critical of the bombing. The Canadian members of the ICC issued a minority report supporting the US assertion that the DRV was largely to blame for the war. Canadians were still largely supportive of Johnson and his war in Vietnam, but such support was slipping. Prime Minister Pearson felt increasing pressure to distance himself from LBJ’s war. Such pressure came from the public as well as an increasing number of left-leaning members of the Liberal Party, especially in Quebec.⁶⁶ On 2 April Pearson gave a speech at Temple University in which he meekly suggested that the US implement a bombing pause and demonstrate more flexibility in negotiations with the DRV. To his credit, Pearson was the first leader of a NATO ally to question US conduct of the war. But he did not question the United States’ overall mission in Vietnam. In fact, he was publicly supportive of it:

I am not of course... proposing any compromise on points of principle, nor any weakening of resistance to aggression in South Vietnam. Indeed resistance may require increased military strength to be used against the armed and attacking Communists.⁶⁷

The next day Pearson met with President Johnson at Camp David. The President was furious, lambasting Pearson. At one point Johnson grabbed the Prime Minister by his lapels. It is not clear if it was at this moment or at another point in his harangue that he

⁶⁵ Pocock, interview.

⁶⁶ John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester B. Pearson, 1949-1972* (Toronto: Alfred E. Knopf, 1992), 367; Charles Ritchie, “The Day LBJ Confronted LBP,” *Macleans*, January 1974, 35-36, 42.

⁶⁷ English, *Worldly Years*, 362-364; Ross, *In the Interests*, 15, 358.

said “You don’t come here and piss on my rug.” In his biography of Pearson, historian John English states that from then until the end of Pearson’s term Canada was left in the dark about US plans for Southeast Asia. Despite Canada’s continued public support for the US war effort, it was no longer considered a “reliable ally.”⁶⁸

Two weeks later the antiwar movement came of age. On 17 April SDS held its March on Washington to protest the war in Vietnam. Organizers had hoped to get 10,000 out at most; between 20,000 and 25,000 turned out. According to Kirkpatrick Sale, ties were in a minority, but not by much. Most women wore skirts. Particularly notable about the march was that for the first time in fifteen years Communists were openly invited to participate. During the early years of the Cold War peace groups had excluded Communists from participating in marches. Organizers and antiwar activists on both sides of the border were shocked by the turnout. The antiwar movement was no longer marginal. The March on Washington was the largest peace march in American history to that time. People came from all across the United States as well as Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver. The SUPA branch at the University of Toronto chartered a bus.⁶⁹

SUPA decided to join the march at its National Council meeting of 20-21 March. Present at the meeting, and likely encouraging SUPA’s participation, was SDS National Director Rennie Davis. Davis’s presence at the meeting signalled what would become a fraternal relationship between the two organizations. Several SUPA members planned to stay on in Washington following the march to attend the SDS National Council meetings there. Buses were scheduled to leave Hart House at the University of Toronto on the

⁶⁸ English, *Worldly Years*, 362-364, 367; Ross, *In the Interests*, 259; Ritchie, “The Day LBJ,” 35.

⁶⁹ Sale, *SDS*, 185-186; Angus, interview; DeBenedetti, *American Ordeal*, 111-112; “March on Washington,” *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 14 May 1965, 3.

evening of Friday, 16 April and return on Sunday morning. Travelers were charged fifteen dollars.⁷⁰

Other groups planned actions to coincide with the Washington march, internationally and in Canada. In England, the annual Easter peace march effectively became an anti-Vietnam War march as between 20,000 and 50,000 Britons jammed Trafalgar Square. In New Zealand about fifty demonstrators protested at Wellington airport as Henry Cabot Lodge, President Johnson's special envoy on Vietnam, arrived as part of a six-country tour to explain US policy there. Later, about eighty protesters kicked his car and ripped the US pennant from the vehicle chanting "New Zealand will not support you" and other slogans.⁷¹ The Montreal Peace Centre sponsored a march. Described by *Montreal Star* reporter Walter Poronovich as "Communist and separatist supported," the march attracted the attention of thousands of Easter shoppers as it stopped traffic on St. Catharine Street. Two hundred supporters of the Montreal Peace Centre were joined by about thirty members of the Chevaliers de l'Indépendance. Members of the Quebec Communist Party and the YCL carried self-identifying banners. Marchers were described by the *Star* reporter as "beatnik types for the most part." An additional hundred protesters joined the march at Phillips Square, where they rallied for half an hour before proceeding on to the US Consulate.⁷² In Toronto Dr. David Gauthier of the University of Toronto's philosophy department led a march of almost 600 from Queen's

⁷⁰ National Council Report – March 20-21, "Vietnam," 1, *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 1965; Minutes, SUPA National Council Meeting, 20-21 March 1965, Toronto, CUCND, Box 22, File 2; Sale, *SDS*, 138; "US Students to March on Washington," *Sanity*, Vol. 2, No. 8, April 1965, 6; correspondence, Arthur Pape to Jim Harding, 14 April 1965, CUCND, Box 13, Tony Hyde File.

⁷¹ "20,000 Jam Square in London," *Montreal Star*, (Reuters) 19 April 1965, 1; "New Zealanders Attack American Envoy's Car," *Montreal Star*, (Reuters), 19 April 1965, 1; N. Dunfield, "World Protests Viet War," Young Socialist Forum, Early Summer, 1965, reprinted in Socialist History Project, <http://www.socialisthistory.ca>, accessed 29 December 2008.

⁷² Walter Poronovich, "230 Leftist Marchers Score US Air Strikes on Viet Cong," *Montreal Star*, 19 April 1965, 5; Dunfield, "World Protests."

Park to City Hall. Rabbi Abraham Feinberg, Dianne Burrows and the Reverend John Morgan of the First Unitarian Congregation all gave speeches calling on the Canadian government to seek a settlement to the Vietnam conflict. Given the inclement weather, one reporter quipped there were almost as many umbrellas as picket signs.⁷³ In Vancouver 150 turned out to protest the war. Smaller demonstrations took place in London, Montreal and Winnipeg.⁷⁴

Following the March on Washington six SUPA members remained in Washington to attend the National Council meeting of SDS. Following Rennie Davis's earlier attendance at the recent SUPA National Council meeting, the presence of the six Canadians signalled a continuing development in the fraternal relationship between the two student organizations. Discussion of the march focused on how it served as a beginning, a tool to build a much larger antiwar movement.⁷⁵ More meetings between the two groups regarding possible joint action on Vietnam were held. During the weekend of 1 May future SDS president Carl Oglesby met with SUPA members in Toronto for discussions on Vietnam and the importance of non-violence. Oglesby's suggestions included continued demonstrations around US federal buildings and weapons manufacturers, picketing university classes whose departments received research grants from the US State Department, a second March on Washington, and a major nation-wide student strike.⁷⁶

⁷³ "End Vietnam War: soaking snowstorm fails to deter peace marchers," *Canadian Tribune*, 26 April 26 1965, (clipping in CSIS, Access to Information Application A-2006-00301, SNCC, University of Toronto, Pt. 4); "600 March in Toronto," *Montreal Star* (Canadian Press), 19 April 1965, 1; Dunfield, "World Protests."

⁷⁴ Dunfield, "World Protests."

⁷⁵ "National Council Meeting of Students for a Democratic Society," *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 4 May 1965, 3. SUPA members attending the SDS National Council meeting included Henry Tarvainen, Tony Hyde, Tom Hathaway, Liora Proctor, Arthur Pape, and Dimitri Roussopoulos.

⁷⁶ Untitled, *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 4 May 1965, 4-5.

Unfortunately for the antiwar movement, no sooner had SDS managed to organize the largest peace march in US history than it pulled out of the antiwar movement. At its national convention 9-13 June near Kewadin, Michigan, delegates voted not to become a national antiwar movement, but rather leave the issue for its individual chapters to pursue. In doing so, SDS failed to recognize Vietnam as *the* issue confronting American youth in the 1960s. Although the organization gave its grudging support to future demonstrations in Washington, SDS, on a national level, went on record as opposing mass demonstrations. "We are for action that educates," stated one delegate, "not action that demonstrates."⁷⁷

In addition to delegates coming from across the United States, thirty members of SUPA and Canadian Friends of SNCC attended the Kewadin convention. In conjunction with the convention, SDS hosted an Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP) training institute, which greatly interested the Canadians. Reporting on the activities for SUPA was Nancy Hannum. Her report, published in the subsequent edition of the *SUPA Newsletter*, shows how SUPA was far more influenced by SDS with regards to its ERAP projects than it was with its antiwar activism.⁷⁸

Ken Drushka, another Canadian reporting on the conference noted how the Canadians and Americans differed in their approach to non-violence. The Canadians, he felt, seemed much more committed to the concept of non-violence as a principle, whereas the Americans viewed it more as a tactic to be used where needed. Also, SDS appeared as more vanguardist in their organizing the lower classes and more informed by class analysis. The Canadians on the other hand were of the mind that if important social

⁷⁷ Sale, *SDS*, 203-213.

⁷⁸ Ken Drushka, "SDS-ERAP Conference," *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 23 June 1965; also Nancy Hannum, "Peace and the Professions," in same issue.

change was to come about, then it would have to occur within the middle and upper classes as well. In addition, he observed that SUPA members appeared more philosophical and theoretically driven. Most interesting about Drushka's report is his conclusion. In a self-effacing way he intimates that the work being done by SDS was more important:

But even there differences were valuable for the SUPA members who were forced to explain their concepts and principles to people who have put their beliefs into practice in the "real world."⁷⁹

The idea that SDS somehow operated in the real world and SUPA did not indicated that at least one of the Canadians at Kewadin perceived the role of SUPA to be not as important as that of SDS.

Further strengthening the bonds between SUPA and SDS at the Kewadin convention was the election of Liora Proctor to the SDS National Council. Proctor had graduated from the University of Toronto in 1964 with a degree in sociology. A long-time activist, Proctor had been director of a Zionist youth group from 1958 to 1962 and editor of the University of Toronto's University College newspaper *The Gargoyle* from 1962 to 1963. A member of the CUCND National Secretariat from 1962 to 1964, she had also been instrumental in re-organizing *Sanity*, the newsletter of CCND.⁸⁰ Later, Donald McKelvey, former SDS Assistant National Secretary would visit SUPA chapters and make semi-regular contributions to the SUPA Newsletter.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Drushka, "SDS-ERAP Conference," *SUPA Newsletter*.

⁸⁰ Sale, *SDS*, n210; Resume, Liora Proctor, CUCND, Box 13, Tony Hyde File.

⁸¹ For example, see Donald McKelvey, Report on Trip to Ottawa, 2-3 December 1966, CUCND, Box 16, SUPA Branches; also Confidential – Report by Donald McKelvey on visit to Queen's SUPA, 26 November – 2 December and 2-5 December 1966, same file; also Don McKelvey, "The State of SDS," *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 3, No. 10, August 1967, 14-16.

SDS's rationale in not becoming a single-issue, antiwar organization was that unlike other organizations, most notably the Socialist Workers' Party, it did not perceive the Vietnam War as a vehicle that could be used to radicalize youth. This, SDS believed, could more realistically be done through directly organizing people at the community level. This was the function of its Economic Research and Action Projects, or ERAP (pronounced eerap). Focused on building interracial movements of the poor in northern inner cities including Chicago, Cleveland, Newark, Chester, Pennsylvania; and Hazard, Kentucky; ERAP projected SDS as the SNCC of the North.⁸² It was likely this aspect of SDS that had first garnered CUCND's attention and led to the development of SUPA. CUCND, it will be remembered, had been a single-issue organization and had abandoned that principle in favour of the multi-issue SUPA. Emulating SDS, SUPA initiated grassroots community projects working with Doukhobors in British Columbia, First Nations on the Prairies, working-class whites in Kingston, and African Canadians in Nova Scotia. In June, former national president of SDS Tom Hayden came to Toronto to assist in a training session for volunteers of the Kingston project.⁸³ Vietnam was largely, though not exclusively, a project of the Toronto office.

One of Toronto SUPA's first antiwar activities following April's March on Washington was a teach-in. The first teach-in had taken place at the University of

⁸² Peter Boothroyd to Murray Thompson et al, "Report on Conference on Community Movements and Economic Issues – 10-12 April, Ann Arbor, Michigan (year not indicated), CUCND, Box 5, SDS-USA; Sale, *SDS*, 158. SDS's choice to not take a leadership position in the antiwar movement was reaffirmed at its National Council meeting at the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana in December 1966. According to former SDS president Carl Oglesby, who was in a minority position advancing the antiwar issue, delegates associated with SDS's ERAP projects and under the influence of another past president – Tom Hayden – succeeded in defeating a motion demanding US withdrawal from Vietnam. Hayden, ironically, was absent from the meeting, preparing to depart for a tour of the DRV. It was only much later, Oglesby accuses, that Hayden came over to the antiwar camp, "a classic case of the leader running to catch up with his followers." Oglesby argues that SDS's concerns about becoming a single-issue, antiwar organization were somewhat moot because it became one anyway. See Carl Oglesby, *Ravens in the Storm: A Personal History of the 1960s Antiwar Movement* (New York: Scribner, 2008), 103-106, 315.

⁸³ "Training Session," *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 6 June 1965, 4.

Michigan in Ann Arbor on 24-25 March 1965. It was initiated by approximately two dozen young faculty members. Originally it was intended as a one-day strike during which time special classes would be held in an effort to teach the truth about Vietnam. The idea was opposed by the faculty Senate and received weak support, so in place of a strike what was proposed was that professors would teach their regular classes during the day and then from eight in the evening until eight in the morning special classes would be taught on Vietnam. Because it was intended as a protest, it was called a teach-in as an analogy to a sit-in. The University was so grateful for the change of plans from a strike that it cooperated in providing the facilities. It even suspended the rule prohibiting women students to be out past curfew. The Ann Arbor teach-in was a huge success, attracting 3,000 participants. Organizers encouraged faculties at other universities to follow suit and by the day of the Michigan teach-in dozens of campuses had scheduled their own. Hundreds more followed in April and teach-ins were commonplace throughout the next year. It is important, though, to keep in mind that the original intent of the teach-in, as its name implied, was to protest the war in Vietnam, not to engage in scholarly debate with representatives of the State Department, which is exactly what happened during many of these events.⁸⁴

SUPA's teach-in was tied in with the national teach-in in Washington, D.C., on 15 May. The plan was to gather in one central location and listen to a broadcast of it. At the last minute the group decided to add their own session at the end. Other than the panel, the Washington teach-in was a disappointment to SUPA members. Discussion centred on factual and technical aspects of the war, avoiding any serious criticism of US foreign policy. Professor Robert Scalapino of the University of California at Berkeley

⁸⁴ Halstead, *Out Now*, 62-66.

defended US strategy. Reporting on the event, Liora Proctor recommended against broadcasting future such events as it was an incentive to stay home and listen to them on radio or watch on television. It was better to bring people out, she asserted, as it would get them involved, make them feel a part of something and build a movement. She did feel, though, that the exercise helped in preparing for the vigil planned two weeks later to protest the University of Toronto's decision to award US Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson an honorary degree.⁸⁵

The Stevenson affair was a significant episode in the emergence of the antiwar movement at the University of Toronto. After hearing of the decision to award the degree on 5 May, Toronto SUPA wrote a letter to the University's President, Dr. Claude Bissell, urging him, as chair of the Senate, to reconsider the decision. Chapter president Gary Teeple accused Stevenson of being a spokesperson for policies which "are in clear violation of the principles of scholarship and humanism which are supposedly the underpinnings of academia." In addition to the students' efforts, a week later a group of eight faculty members sent a similar letter. Bissell complied with the students' wishes and took the issue to the Senate where on 14 May it voted 149-1 to proceed with conferring the degree on Stevenson. Four days later an open meeting of 100 students and faculty voted to continue to protest. When Stevenson, accompanied by External Affairs Minister Paul Martin, Sr., arrived on campus on 28 May, they were greeted by fifty students chanting "Get out of Vietnam." Later, a silent vigil was conducted by students and faculty members. In addition to SUPA, members of SNCC, the New Democratic Youth, and the Young Socialist League participated. Between 250 and 350, many in academic gowns, stood in silence along both sides of the walkway the academic

⁸⁵ Liora Proctor, "Teach-In," *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 6 June 1965, 9-10.

procession took to receive their degrees. A SUPA member reporting on the protest described it as solemn and impressive: “It was clear that silence can speak many words.”⁸⁶

In his convocation address Stevenson declared that “civil wars” no longer existed since the USSR and the People’s Republic of China both found it in their interests to overthrow established regimes in the post-colonial world. The United States, pronounced Stevenson, must naturally support anti-Communist establishments, at least until new forms of international machinery could be designed to carry out that same intervention. Despite the protesters, Stevenson received a standing ovation. Joining him on stage to share the applause was Paul Martin, Sr., according to SUPA, to show the federal government’s solidarity with US policies in Vietnam.⁸⁷ The awarding of the honorary degree to Stevenson garnered more attention to the antiwar movement in Canada to that point than any previous action.⁸⁸ It also marked the end of the academic year. As students went off to summer jobs, the number of American troops in Vietnam continued to climb throughout the summer.

The war had gradually increased in intensity since Kennedy’s surge of military advisors in 1961, but so had the movement opposed to it. Once the domain of Communists, it had quickly drawn in their Trotskyist arch-rivals as well as religious pacifists. Once US military presence in Vietnam moved beyond advisors and into the

⁸⁶ Correspondence, Gary Teeple, President, SUPA, University of Toronto Branch, to Dr. C.T. Bissell, Chairman, Senate, University of Toronto, 5 May 1965; “U of T awarded honorary degree to Adlai Stevenson – has resulted in more news coverage than any other Canadian protest of US actions in Vietnam,” *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 6 June 1965, 1-2; Alan Dawson Jr., “Stevenson Undaunted By Pickets,” *Ottawa Journal* (Canadian Press), 29 May 1965. Clipping in CSIS, Access to Information Application RG 146, A-2006-00301, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, University of Toronto, Pt. 4; “Stevenson Defends Interventions,” *New York Times*, 28 May 1965, Clipping in CUCND, Box 5, Adlai Stevenson Visit, May 1965.

⁸⁷ “U of T awarded,” *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 6 June 1965, 1-2;

⁸⁸ “U of T awarded,” *SUPA Newsletter*.

bombing of the DRV, opponents of the war were joined by the moderate left both politically in the form of the NDP, and within the peace movement with the CCND and the CUCND. The latter organization, emerging as SUPA and adopting many of the trappings of SDS and SNCC, went far in internationalizing the movement in Canada as the Johnson administration introduced ground troops into the conflict. By the time classes resumed in the fall there was no doubt that the United States was no longer fighting a “dirty war,” in South Vietnam, but was rather the primary belligerent in a full-scale conflict in Southeast Asia. As hostilities continued to escalate, so too did efforts to end the war.

Chapter Three: Peace Train

The summer of 1965 was an active one for the movement, particularly in Toronto. In July the NDP held its federal convention which passed a resolution ambiguously calling for negotiations. Following the convention between 100 and 150 delegates led by Kootenay West MP Bert Herridge marched on the US Consulate. Also out of the convention emerged the Committee of Concerned New Democrats which agitated within the party for a stronger position on Vietnam. The Committee was never entirely successful in this regard. In September the Ontario NDP organized a public meeting in Toronto on the war. Party Deputy Leader David Lewis defended British Prime Minister Harold Wilson's support of the US war effort in Vietnam, stating both sides were to blame and that the greatest threat to peace was China. He was roundly booed by rank and file members who realized their opposition to the war would have to be carried on largely outside of the party.¹ Toronto SUPA continued to work with SDS throughout the summer on antiwar activity. SDS had abandoned antiwar work on a national level, but its individual chapters continued on. In July the SUNY Buffalo chapter sponsored a discussion of the war, dubbing it a "solve-in." Invited speakers represented SDS, SNCC, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA, the youth wing of the Socialist Workers' Party), the DuBois Clubs (the youth wing of the CPUSA), and SUPA.² But the activity that would keep Toronto SUPA engaged well into the fall had begun to unfold that spring.

In early June faculty from the University of Toronto and Carleton University, along with a group of SUPA members, traveled to Ann Arbor, Michigan, to attend a meeting of the Inter-University Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy. Following up

¹ Carl Fleming and Joe Young, "Seven Years of Struggle to End the War," *Labor Challenge*, 9 April 1971, reprinted in Socialist History Project, <http://www.socialisthistory.ca>, accessed 9 January 2009. Note: Carl Fleming is a pseudonym for George Addison; Isitt, "Tug-of-War," 380.

² Leaflet, "There are Solutions to the War in Vietnam – Come to the Solve-in," Kenny, Box 54 File 2.

on the recent teach-in in Washington, the committee met to determine the location for the next teach-in. Representing the University of Toronto was philosophy professor Charles Hanley. Hanly convinced the committee to hold the next teach-in held at the University of Toronto 8-10 October. SUPA was unsuccessful in having it scheduled a week later to coincide with the first International Days of Protest to End the War in Vietnam.³

Despite the wishes of SUPA, the Toronto teach-in was never intended to be just about Vietnam. The original major teach-ins – Michigan, Washington, Berkeley – all focused on the war. In Berkeley the teach-in was the result of efforts by the Berkeley Vietnam Day Committee, one of the largest antiwar organizations to that time.⁴ Thus, by the time of the Toronto teach-in the term was largely associated by the public with the war. But the Toronto event was to be more encompassing. Titled “Revolution and Response,” the Toronto teach-in was composed of five sessions which covered broad international topics. The session titles reflected their themes: “Revolution and Ideological Conflict;” “Latin America: Revolution and Intervention;” “ Vietnam: Revolution and Intervention;” “ Revolution and the Right to Self-Determination;” and, “Revolution and the Citizen’s Moral Responsibility.”⁵ Despite the diminished centrality of the war, the Vietnam session would still be one of the most well attended.⁶

Also, unlike the original University of Michigan teach-in, the Toronto event was never intended to be a protest. The Toronto International Teach-in Committee was

³ “International Teach-In,” *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 6 June 1965; “Background Stated by International Teach-in Committee,” Voice of Women Collection, MG 28 1-218, Library and Archives Canada (hereinafter cited as VOW) Vol. 5, File 8; Henry Tarvainen, “International Teach-In for Toronto this Fall,” *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 23 June 1965.

⁴ Halstead, *Out Now*, 62-72.

⁵ Statement of International Teach-in Committee, University of Toronto, September 1965, VOW, Box 5, File 8.

⁶ “Officials Call Teach-In a Tremendous Success,” *The Globe and Mail*, 12 October 1965, clipping in VOW, Box 5, File 8.

headed by an elite body composed of President Bissell as honorary chair, Hanley as chair, and an honorary board consisting of Murray Ross, President of York University; Northrop Frye, Principal of Victoria College; and faculty members J. Tuzo Wilson and Escott N. Reid. While there were other members of the committee who were actively opposed to the war in Vietnam – Chandler Davis being the most notable among them – control of the committee was firmly in the hands of Hanley. The Committee redefined the word teach-in so that there would be no mistake as to the non-partisan nature of the event. A teach-in, it stated, was “a confrontation between informed, authoritative persons who hold differing views concerning an issue in international affairs.” Failing even to specifically mention the recent US military interventions in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam, or the recent US-supported coups in Brazil and Guyana, the statement merely said that the teach-in, entitled “Revolution and Response,” was a rejoinder to “recent developments in Vietnam and Latin America.”⁷

Afraid that the teach-in would be used as a platform for protest, Hanley exercised complete control. All questions for the main sessions would have to be submitted in advance. Hanley made it clear that protesters would not be allowed in the main area and indicated that due to the diplomatic importance of some of the guests there would be a squad of RCMP both in and out of uniform, as well as university and city police on hand. In addition, he indicated that there would be a “special band of ushers and marshals (to) assist students to their seats and escort any protesting elements from the area.” Said Hanley, “We will be prepared for any disturbances.”⁸

⁷ Statement – “What is a Teach-In,” by International Teach-In Committee, University of Toronto, VOW, Vol. 5, File. 8; “Statement of International Teach-in Committee,” University of Toronto, September 1965, VOW, Vol. 5, File. 8; Paul Carson, “U of T plans October teach-in,” *The Varsity*, 20 September 1965, 1, 3.

⁸ Paul Carson, “Organizers confident teach-in will succeed,” *The Varsity*, 4 October 1965, 5.

The Students' Administrative Council (SAC), the student government at the University of Toronto, added further legitimacy to the teach-in when it voted its support. Echoing the administration, it stated that its endorsement was based on the premise that the teach-in was intended as an educational exercise rather than a protest. In an editorial leading up to the teach-in, *The Varsity* asserted that SAC support would ensure the teach-in's success by associating students with the professed aims of an exchange of ideas and academic freedom.⁹ Just how committed to such ideas the teach-in committee was, however, was called into question by last-minute changes to the program.

In the absence of representatives from the DRV and the NLF, two Americans believed to possess credentials representing these parties were scheduled to speak on the Vietnam panel. One was William Worthy, a Prague-based African American freelance journalist. Worthy, it was understood, would be representing the views of the NLF.¹⁰ Reported to be representing the views of the DRV was Michael Myerson, a graduate of the University of California at Berkeley, International Secretary for the W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs, and a member of the World Peace Council.¹¹ That Worthy and Myerson represented the Communist position on the conflict there can be no doubt. They were asked to speak because both the NLF and the DRV refused to address the teach-in. The Saigon government had been asked to appear by the Government of Canada, but no such courtesy was extended to either Hanoi or the NLF.¹²

⁹ Deanna Kamiel, "SAC endorses U of T international teach-in," *The Varsity*, 24 September 1965, 1; "SAC is wise to endorse teach-in," *The Varsity*, 24 September 1965, 4.

¹⁰ It was only following the teach-in that Worthy was adamant that he was not representing the views of anyone but himself and was most emphatically not a representative of the NLF. See his letter to the editor, *The Varsity*, 15 October 1965, 4.

¹¹ St. Bruno, "Viet Nam reps American," *The Varsity*, 8 October 1965, 1; "Americans to present views of Hanoi at U of T teach-in," *Toronto Star*, 8 October 1965, 27.

¹² Martin Knelman, "What the teach-in did," *The Globe and Mail*, 16 October 1965, 9.

At the last minute, however, the committee removed Myerson from the program, bowing to pressure from Professor Robert Scalapino, also from Berkeley. Scalapino, who would be presenting the views of the US State Department on the subject of Vietnam – but without its endorsement – refused to debate Myerson, stating that he “would not debate anyone else that did not accept responsibility for his views either as an official representative or as a citizen of the country he purported to represent.”¹³ Hanley was emphatic that Scalapino had nothing to do with the dropping of Myerson, but Chandler Davis and two other members of the committee insisted Scalapino was behind it.¹⁴ Bowing to Scalapino’s demands and dropping Myerson amounted to removing one unaccredited speaker at the insistence another – his opponent. The voice advancing the cause of the DRV was silenced in order to allow the voice of the State Department to be heard, in spite of the committee’s insistences that the event was to be educational, not partisan.

Dumping Myerson was the most controversial aspect of the teach-in. A *Globe and Mail* editorial on the subject stated that the committee had in effect made Myerson the star attraction by dropping him from the program. “At the same time,” the piece continued, “they devalued the teach-in by making it something less than a frank and open review of opinion from all sides.”¹⁵ Also critical of the committee’s handling of the affair was fellow presenter and Yale historian Staughton Lynd. Although by no means an expert on Vietnam, Lynd was pervasive within the antiwar movement during this period.

¹³ “Deny Myerson Asked to Talk at Teach-in,” *The Globe and Mail*, 12 October 1965. Clipping in VOW, Volume 5, File 8. It is not clear why Scalapino only objected to Myerson and not Worthy, who proceeded as scheduled.

¹⁴ Knelman, “What the teach-in did,” *The Globe and Mail*, 16 October 1965, 9. Clipping in VOW, Volume 5, File 8; letter, Worthy, *The Varsity*, 15 October 1965, 4; “Myerson dropped as ‘unaccredited,’” *The Varsity*, 13 October 1965, 1.

¹⁵ “Exclusive,” *The Globe and Mail*, 12 October 1965. Clipping in VOW, Volume 5, File 8.

Having distinguished himself in the civil rights movement during the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer Project, he launched himself into antiwar work the following year, making numerous speaking engagements in the United States and Canada. Lynd got to the very heart of the matter: "This is a violation of free speech that contradicts the very essence of what a teach-in should be." Martin Knelman, writing in *The Globe and Mail*, stated:

(T)he committee's blunder thus contributed to the general tone of anti-Americanism that characterized the teach-in despite the committee's pious proclamations for weeks in advance that the objective of the teach-in was education rather than protest.¹⁶

This alleged tone of anti-Americanism can largely be accredited to Toronto SUPA's reaction to Myerson being dropped.

After learning of the last minute program change, SUPA embarked on a three-track response: it attempted to negotiate with the committee to have Myerson put back on the program; at the same time, in anticipation of failure in that effort, it began to organize protest action around Scalapino's presentation. In addition it organized its own alternative presentation to give Myerson an opportunity to present his views. SUPA's efforts to negotiate with the committee came to naught. Worse, the energies expended in negotiating with the committee prevented it from organizing an effective protest. Intending to mount a major protest on the Saturday, SUPA abandoned these plans. As one observer noted, "Saturday's plan failed because the demonstration leaders were talking when they should have been organizing." A sit-in was attempted on the Sunday in

¹⁶ Knelman, "What the teach-in did," *The Globe and Mail*, 16 October 1965, 9. Clipping in VOW, Volume 5, File 8; letter, Worthy, *The Varsity*, 15 October 1965, 4. In December 1965 Lynd, along with former SDS president Tom Hayden and Communist historian Herbert Aptheker, would travel to the DRV, giving first-hand accounts of the effect of US bombings upon their return. Lynd's antiwar work would ultimately cost him his job at Yale.

an effort to block speakers' access to the stage, but it failed due to low numbers.¹⁷ The handful of protesters was easily removed by the two dozen police present. In the end SUPA and its supporters were reduced to heckling Scalapino during his presentation. It is possible that such behaviour did more to endear Scalapino to his audience; at the conclusion of his speech he received substantial applause.¹⁸ Such a response on the part of the audience might be interpreted as support for Scalapino, hostility towards SUPA, or a combination of the two. It might also indicate continuing support in Canada for America's war in Southeast Asia.

SUPA's greatest success in addressing the issue of Myerson was providing him with a venue to present his views outside of the official teach-in program. Working with the Student Christian Movement, the Socialist Club, and the Toronto International Vietnam Day Committee (a new group taking its name from the better-known group in Berkeley, California, though organized by the Toronto branch of the League for Socialist Action¹⁹), SUPA was able to attract 500 people to hear Myerson on the Sunday night.²⁰ Given the amount of time SUPA had to organize this, they could claim a limited victory. It paled, however, in comparison to the 6,000 who attended Scalapino's talk.

Despite the controversy, the University of Toronto declared the teach-in "a tremendous success." The main sessions were held in the Varsity Arena where at

¹⁷ Heather Mitchell, "Protest loses Out," *The Varsity*, 12 October 1965, 2. While SUPA claimed 75 attempted to sit-in, the *The Varsity* reported one third that number. Committee chair Charles Hanley, in contrast, claimed 200. See Hanley's letter to the editor, *San Francisco Examiner*, 24 October 1965. Clipping in VOW Volume 5, File 8. Also "Metro police thronged teach-in," *The Varsity*, 13 October 1965. Clipping in VOW, Volume 5, File 8.

¹⁸ Hanley's letter cited above indicates Scalapino received a standing ovation, however, this is the only source that states this.

¹⁹ Correspondence, W.H. Kelly, Assistant Commissioner, Director, Security and Intelligence, to Mr. D.F. Wall, Secretary of the Security Panel, Privy Council Office, 16 March 1966, SECRET, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312, Stack 5, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA.

²⁰ "Million Hear U of T Teach-in," *The Varsity*, 12 October 1965, 1; also leaflet, "Meeting for Myerson," Kenny, Box 54, File 1.

different times between 2,200 and 6,500 attended. Of these, approximately one thousand were students from outside of Toronto, half of them coming from the United States. In addition, approximately a million tuned in by radio.²¹ The University of Toronto had certainly established itself as a member of the teach-in community of universities. More significantly, it made quite clear whose voice it considered more important in a “free and frank exchange of ideas” on the war in Vietnam.

The week following the teach-in marked a new watershed in the antiwar movement, in Canada and internationally, with the first International Days of Protest to End the War in Vietnam. The idea of an internationally coordinated protest was the product of the Vietnam Day Committee, the organization responsible for the hugely successful Vietnam Day teach-in at the University of California, Berkeley, held the previous May. The Berkeley event drew approximately 35,000 people. In many ways the antithesis of the Toronto teach-in, the Berkeley teach-in was unmistakably a protest against the war. Following the teach-in, the Berkeley-based Vietnam Day Committee (VDC) became one of 33 founding groups of the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NCC), organized at a conference in Washington, DC, on 7-9 August. Chaired by Jerry Rubin and Stephen Smale, the VDC emphasized the importance of international opposition to the war. It was in this context that it called for the International Days of Protest to End the War for October 15 and 16. Stated the VDC:

People around the world must now move beyond single demonstrations and rallies to one massive internationally coordinated action.... We ask that organisations throughout the world take the most militant and dramatic actions compatible with local conditions on October 16th. Of course this should not preclude demonstrations against the war on other dates; however, the full impact of world opinion can best be brought to

²¹ “Million Hear,” *The Varsity*; leaflet, “Meeting for Myerson;” “Officials Call Teach-In a Tremendous Success,” *The Globe and Mail*, 12 October 1965, clipping in VOW, Volume 5, File 8.

bear against the policy of the American government by simultaneous protest on October 16.²²

The VDC acted as the international headquarters for the International Days of Protest, while the NCC coordinated actions around the United States. Their efforts proved successful, with possibly up to 100,000 Americans taking part in Berkeley, New York and sixty other American cities. Internationally, demonstrators marched in twelve European countries as well as Australia, Mexico, Chile and elsewhere.²³ In Canada, the International Days of Protest marked the first coordinated nation-wide protests against the war in Vietnam, with many local antiwar groups taking on the name of Vietnam Day Committee or the Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

The International Days of Protest to End the War in Vietnam also initiated increasing participation in the antiwar movement by members of trade unions. The entry of organized labour into the movement in Canada significantly preceded any substantial antiwar activity by unions in the United States. In April 1965 Canadian Labour Congress president Claude Jodoin called on Prime Minister Pearson to appeal to all parties to implement an immediate cease-fire and a negotiated settlement.²⁴ Those unions in Canada historically associated with the Communist Party – particularly the International

²² “International Days of Protest Against the War in Vietnam,” Reprinted by Vietnam Action Committee, nd, Youth Campaign Against Conscription Collection, State Library of Victoria (Australia) MS 10002; Halstead, *Out Now*, 87-88.

²³ “International Days of Protest Against the War in Vietnam,” Reprinted by Vietnam Action Committee, nd, Youth Campaign Against Conscription Collection, State Library of Victoria (Australia) MS 10002; Halstead, *Out Now*, 87-89, 96, 111-112; “Vietnam Day Committee – International Days of Protest,” Vietnam Day Committee, nd, c. September/October 1965, also in same collection. While many local antiwar committees took on the name Committee to End the War in Vietnam, the RCMP concluded in May 1966 that the NCC was not operating in Canada. See “RCMP Report – SECRET, 18 May 1966, re Committee to End the War in Vietnam, University of British Columbia.

²⁴ Jodoin’s call for a cease-fire, however, should not be seen as criticism of US policy in Southeast Asia. He was as equally critical of the DRV, China and the NLF as he was of the United States, giving equal significance to “the daily use of terror, subversion and assassination by the guerrilla forces” and to the general bombing campaign being conducted by the US. See “CLC Calls for Armistice in Vietnam,” *Canadian Labour/Le Travailleur Canadien*, April 1965, 45.

Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU); the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (commonly known as Mine Mill); the United Fishermen and Allied Workers (UFAW); and the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers' Union (commonly abbreviated to UE) – had been early to adopt antiwar positions. In the fall of 1965 the Canadian Area Convention of the ILWU debated a resolution calling for the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam, a return to the terms of the Geneva Accords, and for the US and Canadian governments to respect Vietnamese autonomy. But it was not only unions associated with the Communist Party that began to agitate against the war in Vietnam in the fall of 1965. In Windsor, Ontario, Local 200 of the United Auto Workers circulated postcards addressed to Prime Minister Pearson urging a return to the Geneva Accords. On the west coast the British Columbia Federation of Labour had been moving towards a position of opposing the war for half a decade. These efforts culminated in a 1965 convention resolution calling for the withdrawal of US troops.²⁵ By the fall of 1965 the ground was well prepared for Canadian labour to expand its antiwar work.

In Vancouver protest efforts began somewhat earlier than those in Toronto. On the evening of Thursday, 14 October, Minister of External Affairs Paul Martin Sr., speaking on the subject of Vietnam, was repeatedly interrupted and heckled, first by a

²⁵ In 1960 the BCFL's International Affairs Committee reported to its convention its concern with the "meddling of world powers" in the affairs of Laos and Vietnam, suggesting the area would continue to flare up unless the people there were permitted to solve their own problems. In 1963 the committee criticized US funding for South Vietnam following the coup there. The following year the committee reported on continuing turmoil in South Vietnam, noting the country would finally collapse if military aid was withdrawn. Finally, at the 1965 convention the committee reported on the escalation of the war and called for an immediate cease-fire and recognition of the NLF for the purposes of negotiations. A resolution submitted by Carpenters' Local 452 was amended on convention floor and adopted. It called to "Leave Vietnam for the Vietnamese," withdraw all foreign troops, halt the war, and return to the terms of the Geneva Accords. "Vietnam," (resolution of the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union Canadian Area Convention, 1965) 7th Annual Convention, in CSIS, RG 146 Access to Information Application A2006-00312, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA, carded 20 October 1965; Foner, *US Labor*, 12. Special thanks to John Weir, Archivist for the British Columbia Federation of Labour, for his review of Vietnam-related convention documents. See personal correspondence with author.

youth who read an appeal for peace in Vietnam signed by eight Nobel Peace Prize winners. Martin allowed the speaker to go on for about two minutes and then said he would respond at the end of his address. A little later another heckler asked Martin what Canada was doing in Vietnam. The minister responded that people needed to be more critical of Hanoi and Peking rather than Canada and the United States.²⁶

Similar theatrics were enjoyed by the federal Progressive Conservative opposition across the Georgia Strait in Victoria the following evening. There, a group of anonymous peace demonstrators masquerading as Conservative Party ushers and “committeemen” attempted to disrupt a Tory meeting of 3,500 at the Bay Street Armouries where party leader and former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker was speaking. About 20 youthful demonstrators wearing sailor hats and carrying placards supporting various Conservative candidates interrupted “the Chief” at regular intervals with demands for US withdrawal from Vietnam.²⁷

Organizing of more formal protests in British Columbia began as early as 4 October when an open meeting of the University of British Columbia Vietnam Day Committee was held at the Labour Temple, again illustrating the increasing union presence in the movement. According to an RCMP informant who had infiltrated the group, local Trotskyists led by Phil Courneyeur dominated the meeting. Benson Brown, who chaired, supported the Trotskyists’ demands for radical demonstrations. John McNiven attended on behalf of Paddy Neale, Secretary Treasurer of the BCFL. Neale had originally been asked to chair the meeting but could not attend.²⁸

²⁶ “Martin silences Hecklers,” *Vancouver Province*, 16 October 1965, 6.

²⁷ “Marchers masquerade as Tories,” *Vancouver Province*, 16 October 1965, 2.

²⁸ RCMP Report, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam – USA, 20 October 1965; also (Vancouver) *Committee to End the War in Vietnam Newsletter*. Both documents found in CSIS,

In addition to the UBC Vietnam Day Committee, the local Committee to End the War in Vietnam (CEWV) was also planning activities around the proposed courthouse demonstration. The newly-formed committee held its first organizing meeting 7 October at UBC. Attended by fifty students, Wayne Cameron chaired the meeting. Its stated goals were the immediate withdrawal of US troops, an immediate bombing halt, and self-determination for the Vietnamese. Following the courthouse demonstration the group planned to post a manifesto to the door of the US Consulate demanding an end to the bombings, adherence to the Geneva Accords, and an end to US aggression. The demonstration at the Consulate attracted about 500 people.²⁹

Little evidence exists of participation in the first International Days of Protest in the Prairie Provinces. The exception to this was a planned joint action at the US-Canada border by student groups from the Universities of Manitoba and Minnesota. It is not clear which groups these were, although RCMP believed the Canadians involved were members of SUPA. An officer was instructed to cover the event but no report of it is available.³⁰

In Montreal, members of SUPA, the Student Christian Movement, Friends of SNCC and the New Democratic Youth established a local Vietnam Day Committee. It organized a total of four rallies for Friday, 15 October. Three took place simultaneously

RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00327, Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee, Disc 1, Stack 4

²⁹ RCMP Report, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam – USA, 20 October 1965; also (Vancouver) *Committee to End the War in Vietnam Newsletter*. Both documents found in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00327, Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee, Disc 1, Stack 4; “Student Anti-War Protest Grows,” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 November 1965, 1, 3. Clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00427, Students for a Democratic Society, USA. The RCMP mistakenly referred to the UBC group as the Vancouver VDC, a group that was in fact not established until March 1966 following the second International Days of Protest.

³⁰ “Vietnam International Protest Days,” *Sanity*, Vol. 1, No. 1, September 1965, 8; RCMP Message Form, 15 October 1966, Winnipeg, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA. Again, only plans for the action are documented. It is not clear if the action took place, although there is no reason to doubt that it did.

on the campuses of McGill, Sir George Williams, and the Université de Montréal. From there the three groups marched to Dominion Square. Addressing the rallies were Cheddi Jagan of British Guyana and William Worthy, both fresh from their appearances at the Toronto Teach-in, as well as Key Martin, an undergraduate at Columbia University and a representative of a small radical organization called Youth Against War and Fascism. Significant in this appearance is that it was the only overt sign of the presence of the radical left. The Montreal actions do not appear to have had the official endorsement of either the Communists or the Trotskyists, though it is likely they participated in the events as members of the Vietnam Day Committee without showing their party affiliations.³¹ Despite the participation of students from three universities and numerous student groups, the Montreal actions failed to garner significant numbers. The main rally at Dominion Square attracted only 150 participants. Organizers of the VDC attempted to link the action with the ongoing federal election campaign. Accusing candidates of evading the issue of Canadian complicity in America's Vietnam policies, the VDC encouraged those present to keep the issue in the public eye.³²

The greatest participation in the International Days of Protest in Canada took place in Toronto where various groups had been planning protest action for at least a month. On 18 September 132 people representing numerous organizations met at the

³¹ Indeed, the secretiveness of Marxist-Leninist parties is a recurring challenge in this work. Often it is simply impossible to discern where members of such parties are at work. At other times they are quick to step into the light and take credit for their organizing work. For a discussion of the secretiveness of the Communist Party and the challenges it presents to academics, see Ellen W. Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 25-26.

³² "150 Gather in Dominion Square: Jagan Flays US Policies at Student Viet Nam Protest Day Demonstration," *Montreal Star*, 16 October 1965, 30; "Days of Protest: Students to gather at Union for Dominion Square demonstration: Jagan stays in Canada to speak," *McGill Daily*, 15 October 1965, 1; "Viet Nam protest day scheduled for Friday," *McGill Daily*, 13 October 1965, 1; also leaflet, "Vietnam Day Committee, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00301 Part 1, Friends of SNCC – McGill, Part 1.

Carpenters' Hall on Gerrard Street.³³ The meeting appointed a Committee of Action on Vietnam consisting of David Hemblen, 24, a graduate student in English at the University of Toronto; David Middleton, an NDP candidate in the previous federal election; Carmen Guild, a lecturer at York University; William Sone, 22, a student at York and an NDY member; and Henry Tarvainen, a full-time organizer with SUPA.³⁴ A subsequent meeting took place featuring Cheddi Jagan, in town for the Teach-in. According to an RCMP report over 800 attended, with 750 sitting in chairs and another seventy five standing. Less than half were described as between the ages of sixteen and twenty five, showing that the antiwar movement was by no means solely the concern of students or youth. The meeting was organized by the Toronto Association for Peace, an affiliate of the Canadian Peace Congress. On hand was a plethora of Trotskyist literature so League for Socialist Action members were likely well represented. One of the speakers, local Quaker John Pocock, represented an ad hoc group recently formed called Voters for Peace, which he described as a coalition of various peace groups attempting to make peace an election issue in the then ongoing federal election. The group planned to disband after the election. The Unitarian Church offered the use of its address for the purposes of mail.³⁵

Three rallies took place in Toronto on 16 October. The first to assemble were about 150 members of the Toronto International Vietnam Day Committee. They met at City Hall at 1:00. Speakers from several organizations addressed demonstrators. Despite

³³ These included SDS, NDY, SUPA, the Society of Friends, the YCL, the Young Socialist Forum, the Canadian Peace Congress and the Toronto Peace Centre.

³⁴ "Peace Groups Unite Over War Protest," *The Globe and Mail*, 20 September 1965, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00300, Canadian Committee on Vietnam, Part 1. Throughout the literature Tarvainen's first name is alternately given as both Henry and Harvey. I use whichever the source cites.

³⁵ RCMP Report, 18 October 1965, Toronto Association for Peace, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA. Details of this meeting – for instance time, date and place – are sketchy as the first page of this report is exempted under access to information legislation.

having been organized by the LSA, the Toronto VDC rally represented a range of old left organizations. Speakers included David Hemblen, who acted as master of ceremonies, David Middleton, Bill Lewis of the Progressive Workers Movement, and Art Young of the NDY.³⁶

At 1:30 about one hundred members of SUPA, joined by Voters for Peace, met at Queen's Park where the Reverend Gene Young of St. Luke's United Church addressed them. Between 150 and 300 SDS members from SUNY Buffalo and other upstate New York universities, calling themselves the Assembly of Unrepresented People in Exile, traveled by bus to demonstrate at the US Consulate. One of the sponsors of the rally was the University of Toronto Socialist Club, the campus Trotskyist affiliate. It called for unity with the NLF. The groups at Queen's Park and City Hall marched to the US Consulate where together with the Americans already there their combined numbers reached between 400 and 800. Demonstrators were also joined by about fifty counter-demonstrators, largely of Eastern European background, carrying signs reading "Better Dead than Red." A complement of fifty Metropolitan Toronto Police kept the two groups apart.³⁷

³⁶ RCMP Report, 5 November 1965, re "Protests and Demonstrations, Re: US Action in Vietnam, Ontario, CSIS, Access to Information Application A-2006-00427, Stack 1, Students for a Democratic Society, USA; also Program, Toronto International Vietnam Day Committee, Saturday, 16 October 1965, Kenny, Box 54, File 2; "Resolution Proposed to the Assembly in Nathan Phillips Square, Saturday, 16 October 1965," Toronto International Vietnam Day Committee, in same file. The Progressive Workers' Movement was a Maoist group established by Jack Scott in 1964 following his expulsion from the Communist Party amid the Sino-Soviet split. It folded in 1970. See Ben Isitt, "Tug-of-War: The Working Class and Political Change in British Columbia, 1948-1972," PhD Dissertation, University of New Brunswick, October 2007; *A Communist Life: Jack Scott and the Canadian Workers Movement*, Bryan D. Palmer, ed (St. John's: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 1988).

³⁷ "The Great Student Viet Nam Protest," *Toronto Daily Star*, 18 October 1965, 29; Martin Knelman, "Beards and Sneakers in Protest Parade," *The Globe and Mail*, 18 October 1965, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00427, Stack 1, Students for a Democratic Society, USA.; "Toronto Protest Draws 800," *Montreal Star*, (Canadian Press), 18 October 1965, 29; "Students plan Viet protest marches," *Toronto Daily Star*, 16 October 1965, 2; Richard Reive, "Plan peace march on US

Canadian participation in the International Days of Protest was important for several reasons. First, it demonstrated that there were sufficient numbers of people in Canada willing to cooperate in an international demonstration. While the numbers overall were not great in comparison to later demonstrations, they showed that opposition was widespread across the country with the exception of Atlantic Canada.³⁸ Second, it showed involvement of a broad spectrum of organizations. The participation of SUPA, Trotskyists, Communists, the NDY and others indicated a rare unity of old and new left. Third, the events of 15-16 October 1965 were a turning point in the popularization of dissent, in Canada, the United States, and around the world. Not since the 1930s had Canadians in any great numbers marched in the street to challenge their government. That the issue was one of international concern, dealing with points of morality and ideology, rather than the more immediate concerns of hunger and desperation of the 1930s, showed that people were willing to voice their concerns regardless of the risk of appearing to support an unpopular cause. The unpopularity of antiwar activism is illustrated by the presence of so many counter-demonstrators at such events. Still, the International Days of Protest marked a new peak of antiwar dissent. No longer was the war an issue solely of concern to Communists, academics or beatniks; the issue of Vietnam was no longer a fringe issue.

Shortly following the success of the International Days of Protest, the NCC scheduled a convention in Washington to coincide with a second mass antiwar march in

Consulate," *The Varsity*, 15 October 1965, 3; Judy Pocock, "U of T SUPA," *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 10, 26 October 1965, 14; "Peaceful protest," *The Varsity*, 18 October 1965, 1.

³⁸ A teach-in on American policy in Vietnam was scheduled for two weeks later at the Fredericton campus of the University of New Brunswick, but no coverage was given to it by either the local or student press. See "Teach-In Next Week," *Brunswickan*, October 1965. A review of the student newspapers at Dalhousie and Memorial University of Newfoundland revealed no antiwar activity in Halifax or St. John's at that time.

that city sponsored by SANE and SDS the weekend of 27 November – American Thanksgiving.³⁹ Fifteen hundred individuals attended the convention, representing 150 local committees against the war. While an unspecified number of Canadians participated, RCMP reports indicate that despite the existence of local CEWVs throughout Canada, there was no affiliation between them and the US-based coalition. Among the decisions made at the convention was one to organize a second international days of protest for 25-26 March 1966.⁴⁰

The greatest controversy on the convention floor was over whether or not to become a national, membership-based organization. About thirty of the 150 local committees represented at the convention were controlled by the YSA. For four days these groups worked hard for a centralized, national organization. In the end, the majority voted for the NCC to remain a decentralized body.⁴¹ Malcolm Fast, writing on the convention in the *SUPA Newsletter*, described the convention as an anarchic, divisive fiasco. Fast's impressions of how the Canadians present at the convention perceived the proceedings are interesting in that they show an attempt to clearly distinguish Canadians from Americans:

The Canadians present did not feel genuinely part of the scene. We seemed isolated from their problems and sensed less emphasis on radical relationships which we are accustomed to. We feel that SUPA can gain knowledge, exchange ideas and ... research. The American Movement has plenty to teach us. But we are different in character, and thus are not an integral part of the American scene.⁴²

³⁹ Although SDS had sworn off antiwar marches, when SANE approached the student organization for its support in the project, SDS could not say no. SANE knew it could not pull off a successful march without SDS's participation, and SDS knew it would look foolish if it did not participate. See Oglesby, *Ravens in the Storm*, 93-94.

⁴⁰ "New Anti-War Demonstration Planned," *Sanity*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Dec. 1965, 1.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Malcolm Fast, "The Washington Convention," *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 13, 21 December 1965, 1. Other Canadians attending the convention included Donald Forsyth and John Seely of SUPA. For more on the second march on Washington see DeBenedetti, *American Ordeal*, 131-132; also Sale, *SDS*, 240-245.

In one way Fast felt that the Canadians were more sophisticated than their American counterparts, while admitting they had much to learn from them. That Fast felt Canadian involvement was not integral to the American scene was in all likelihood a correct analysis, but does not consider the importance of Canadian participation in the antiwar movement as part of a larger international effort. While it was certainly Americans who could influence the United States government most directly, international pressure was also an important aspect of the overall antiwar movement. Just as the presence of Australian, New Zealander, Filipino, Thai, Taiwanese and South Korean allies in South Vietnam gave the Americans added legitimacy, antiwar protest outside the United States did the same for the antiwar movement. It should also be noted that the only Canadian perceptions of the convention we have to draw from are those associated with SUPA. It is not clear if Canadians from other organizations were present or not. If organizations oriented towards either the CPC or the LSA had been present, it is likely their perceptions would have been informed by a more internationalist outlook.

The demonstration that accompanied the convention took place on Saturday 27 November. The second major antiwar march on Washington in less than a year, this event did not have the same impact as the one led by SDS the previous April, but it was equally well attended by some 25,000 protesters. Joining them were over one hundred Canadians who arrived on SUPA-chartered buses from Toronto.⁴³

Solidarity marches were held in various Canadian cities. In Toronto Hans Modlich of the University of Toronto Socialist Club announced a simultaneous

⁴³ "U of T students join protest," *The Varsity*, 29 November 1965, 1, 6. The headline is somewhat misleading as many of those attending were non-students, including Toronto pacifists John and Nancy Pocock. See registration list, CUCND, Box 13, March on Washington, 1965.

demonstration at the US consulate in Toronto.⁴⁴ In Victoria the SUPA chapter at the University of Victoria along with the Citizens' Committee to End the War in Vietnam sponsored a rally at the university attended by eighty students and others. Speakers included the SUPA chapter president, a high school student, a Unitarian minister, an Anglican priest, and a representative of FOR.⁴⁵ Although Canadian participation in the second march on Washington was fairly limited in numbers, it was again significant in that Canadians participated in at least three provinces as well as Washington itself.

Most significant about these solidarity demonstrations was the spread of the antiwar movement to Alberta. On 18 November antiwar activists established Edmonton CEWV under the leadership of Dr. Maurice Cohen of the University of Alberta. The Committee decided the best way to make its debut was to march on the US Consulate in Calgary (there was no consulate in Edmonton). In addition to the protest value, it would be an opportunity to energize activists in Southern Alberta and help organize them. On the day of the protest a chartered bus departed Edmonton bright and early with about forty members of the Committee, stopping in Red Deer to pick up four more. They were met at the bus station by an equal number of Calgary-based protesters. As it was a Saturday, the Consulate was closed, so Cohen and Robert Carlisle of Red Deer met the Consul General at his residence while the others marched on the Consulate where they were met by Alice Tyler, a local high school art teacher, and six of her students holding

⁴⁴ "Join Washington Peace March, *The Varsity*, 26 November 1965, 21. Although the Toronto demonstration was announced, it is not clear if it actually proceeded, though there is nothing to suggest it did not.

⁴⁵ Charles Haynes, "Respect for the Dead – Concern for the Living," *The Martlet*, 2 December 1965. Clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00318, Vancouver Peace Action League. Also, Ian Arrol, "Fear of Reds Irrational, says Minister," *Victoria Colonist*, nd. Clipping in VOW, Vol. 9, File 1.

signs reading “Down with these Communists” and “Three Cheers for the USA.” There were no incidents.⁴⁶

There was validity to Tyler’s accusations. While little is known of the beginnings of Edmonton CEWV, privately the Alberta branch of the Communist Party of Canada took much credit for the success of the 27 November protest on the Calgary end. “The Saturday demonstration was a fine one ... Our comrades deserve congratulations,” boasted William Tuomi, Provincial Chairman of the Party. The Calgary demonstrators made a deep impression on the Edmonton group, he suggested, going on to advise that the CPC could do much to enlarge antiwar efforts in Alberta: “We could help make it province-wide and thus strengthen the Vietnam campaign considerably.”⁴⁷ But first, antiwar activists in Calgary would have to be organized.

Organizing a Calgary CEWV was a priority for Communists in that city. In a discussion paper circulated to the members of the Calgary City Committee of the CPC in early December, Party leaders noted that there had been a considerable change in the world situation since they last met two years earlier. Party members were enjoined, in no uncertain terms, to play a leading role in the antiwar movement. Indeed, it was their job to shape the movement:

There is a need for our deeper understanding of the paramount importance of our fight for peace and the involvement of a larger participation of

⁴⁶ “Viet Nam Protest at the US Consulate in Calgary,” SUPA Newsletter, Vol. 1, No. 13, 21 December 1965; RCMP Memo, SECRET, 1 March 1966; RCMP Report, “Protests and Demonstrations Re; US Action in Viet Nam – Canada,” 2 December 1965; Correspondence, Maurice Cohen, Chairman, Edmonton Committee to End the War in Vietnam, to US Consul, Calgary, Alberta, 22 November 1965; “US Viet Action Protested Here: Calgary-Edmonton-Red Deer Group Branded Communists By Opposition, *Calgary Herald*, 29 November 1965; RCMP Report, “Protests and Demonstrations Re: US Action in Viet Nam,” 14 December 1965. All found in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00299, Part 2, Calgary Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

⁴⁷ Correspondence, William Tuomi, Communist Party of Canada, Edmonton, to (exempted) 1 December 1965, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00299, Part 2, Calgary Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

Canadian people in this primary task, with us being in the vanguard of this movement.

The document went on to clarify that this was not merely a local initiative, but established that antiwar activism was being advocated directly from Moscow:

It should not be necessary to point out to our members that our Party internationally (leads) the world in the fight for peace, therefore peace is the basic foundation upon which we can build our future. We should divine concrete ways and means to influence all groups and organizations to enter the peace field. An excellent example of this came to light recently in Calgary with the visit to this city of the Edmonton Committee to End the War in Vietnam. At the present, steps are being taken to form a similar group in this locality, and every effort should be made by the membership to become involved in some form of the peace movement.

The discussion paper went on to remind members of the existence of the Calgary Peace Council, suggesting it as one way of participating in opposition to the war. It also encouraged union members to use their influence with labour to shape NDP policy with regards to Vietnam.⁴⁸ Thus, by December 1965 it was clear that antiwar work was now a priority of the Communist Party, not just in Calgary, but internationally. On a local level, the comrades had their work cut out for them.

On Sunday, 5 December, a meeting was held at the local Labour Temple to organize a CEWV. Twenty eight people attended. From the start it was clear that no one group was responsible for organizing the Calgary CEWV. A three-point program was developed consisting of opposition to the war, promotion of a bombing halt, and encouragement of the Canadian government to put pressure on the US. Those participating elected an executive with the Reverend Robert Gay of the United Church as President, and Leonard Barry Pashak, a teacher at Mount Royal College, elected Vice-

⁴⁸ Discussion Paper, Calgary City Committee, Communist Party of Canada, December 1965, for discussion at meeting 23 January 1966, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00299, Part 2, Calgary Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

President.⁴⁹ One of their first actions was to hold a Christmas Eve vigil at the cenotaph in Central Park where thirty five members huddled in sub-zero (Fahrenheit) temperatures. It was believed to be the only such protest of its kind in Canada that night.⁵⁰

Not all antiwar protest in Canada was linked with larger campaigns in the United States (or the Soviet Union). Two of the most prominent independent protests were held in Montreal and Ottawa in early 1966. The first, spearheaded by a vast coalition of antiwar groups, represents not only a model of mass mobilization, but also of French-English-solidarity. The second, initiated by SUPA, is illustrative of protest by a self-styled activist elite. The two are worthy of study.

In early January 1966 President Johnson augmented his “peace offensive” with a full-scale assault on the Mekong River Delta region of the Republic of Vietnam. The attack began with massive bombing raids. Villages that had been under NLF control for years were destroyed. B52s, diverted from their usual northern targets by Johnson’s bombing pause on the DRV, threw all their force against the region. By 9 January it had become the largest ground operation of the war.⁵¹

In response, UGEQ announced it would lead a demonstration on 11 February in Montreal. UGEQ was joined by thirty other organizations including the Quakers, the Montreal Peace Council, the NDY and SUPA, as well as various student governments representing French-speaking universities and classical colleges. Organizers’ demands included the cessation of US attacks against North and South Vietnam, an immediate

⁴⁹ “Viet Unanimity Fails: ‘End War’ Group Forms,” *Calgary Herald*, 6 December 1965; RCMP Memo, SECRET, 1 March 1966; RCMP Report, “Calgary Committee to End the War in Vietnam,” 8 December 1965; “US Viet Action Protested Here: Calgary-Edmonton-Red Deer Group Branded Communists By Opposition,” *Calgary Herald*, 29 November 1965. All in CSIS, RG 146, A2006-00299 Part 2, Calgary Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

⁵⁰ “35 Attend Yule Eve Peace Vigil,” *Calgary Herald*, 27 December 1965. Clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00299, Part 2, Calgary Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

⁵¹ Halstead, *Out Now*, 156.

cease-fire, a return to the terms of the Geneva Accords, and recognition of the NLF as a principal in negotiations. They also called on the Canadian government to end the supply of Caribou aircraft and police forces to the Republic of Vietnam. The protest was planned to take part in two phases. Marchers would rally at Dominion Square and proceed to the US Consulate. Later, a mass meeting would follow at Plateau Hall in Lafontaine Park. Speakers were to include Robert Cliche, President of the Quebec NDP; Daniel Latouche, Vice-President External for UGEQ; Thérèse Casgrain, past-president of VOW; and others.⁵²

Response to the protest call by Montreal's two English-speaking universities was confused, but indicated that a majority of students opposed their student unions taking an active part in protesting the war. At Sir George Williams, where the student government was affiliated to UGEQ, an open vote was held on whether the student body should officially participate. Of 250 students voting, 203 cast their ballot against participation.⁵³ At McGill, where students had only two weeks earlier voted against becoming members of UGEQ, the student council voted 9-7 to join the march.⁵⁴ This was in spite of a recent poll conducted by the student council that showed 56% of the student body at McGill supported US policy in Vietnam.⁵⁵ In response to protest over the decision, the McGill student council hosted an open meeting where students could voice their concerns one way or the other. As a result the McGill student council withdrew its support of the march. Two weeks later student activists at McGill were swept from the student council

⁵² "SC decides McGill to join UGEQ march," *McGill Daily*, 3 February 1966, 1; "Plan mass demonstration in Quebec," *The Varsity*, 9 February 1966, 9.

⁵³ "SGWU vetoes demonstration," *McGill Daily*, Thursday, 3 February 1966, 1.

⁵⁴ "SGWU vetoes," *McGill Daily*.

⁵⁵ Robert Chodos and Judy Rebick, "56% for Viet policy: American stand supported," *McGill Daily*, Friday, 28 January 1966, 13.

executive when in some of the heaviest voting in student memory a slate of conservative candidates headed by the organizer of the Inter-Fraternity Council was elected. Arnold Aberman, the new Vice-President External, interpreted his mandate as direction from the student body to refrain from taking political stands on behalf of the student body.⁵⁶

In early February UGEQ rescheduled the march for a week later.⁵⁷ A week prior to the scheduled march, the various organizations that had joined with UGEQ in organizing the protest announced the formation of an Emergency Committee for Peace and Self-Determination in Viet Nam.⁵⁸ This wide assortment of groups represented not only an entire range of reform, revolutionary, and new left approaches, but also English and French-speaking activists.

The march was a huge success. In spite of sub-zero (Fahrenheit) temperatures, 2,000 turned out. Traffic on parts of Côte-des-Neiges, Sherbrooke and McGregor Streets was brought to a standstill. Students shouted “Johnson the Assassin,” and in a rare case of overt anti-Americanism, “Yankee Go Home.” Perhaps in an effort not to antagonize the anticipated large crowd, the US Consulate chose not to fly the American flag that day.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Clara Mian, “Reps back march decision,” *McGill Daily*, 16 February 1966, 3. The only reason we know that McGill withdrew its support was Sharon Scholzberg, President of the McGill Student Society, was a speaker at the mass meeting following the march. At that time she apologized that McGill’s presence was not official. See Robert Chodos and Judy Rebick, “1,300 pack protest meeting; Lynd attacks war crimes,” *McGill Daily*, 21 February 1966, 1,2; RCMP Report, “Protests and Demonstrations, Re: US Action in Vietnam, Montreal, Quebec,” 21 February 1966, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00427, Stack 2 Students for a Democratic Society-USA. Marty Freeman, “Activism stomped in SC elections,” *McGill Daily*, 4 March 1966, 1, 4; “The new slate,” *McGill Daily*, 4 March 1966, 4; Irwin Block, “UGEQ affirms support for Viet Nam protest,” *McGill Daily*, 8 February 1966, 1, 4.

⁵⁷In addition to the member groups already named the coalition included Les Copains de St. Henri, the Alexander Defense Committee, Jeunesse Démocratique du Canada, Ligue des Femmes Canadiennes, Friends of the People of Latin America, Mouvement de Libération Populaire, the McGill Socialist Society, Parti Communiste du Quebec, the Sir George Williams Socialist Alliance, Ligue Socialist Ouvrier, the Quebec branch of the Young Communist League, the Parti Socialist du Québec, the United Jewish People’s Order, the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians and les Chevaliers de l’Indépendance. Later the provincial NDP added its name. See “Thousands to protest,” *McGill Daily*, 16 February 1966, 3.

⁵⁸ Irwin Block, “UGEQ affirms support for Viet Nam protest,” *McGill Daily*, 8 February 1966, 1, 4.

⁵⁹ “2,000 demonstrate against Viet War,” *McGill Daily*, 21 February 1966, 1, 2.

Following the march, 1,300 attended the mass meeting at Plateau Hall where Staughton Lynd accused the US of war crimes. Lynd received a standing ovation. The audience was composed of all ages and both language groups. What is striking, however, was the strength of the Quebec nationalist presence. At the conclusion of the meeting, chair Thérèse Casgrain attempted to close proceedings with a singing of “O Canada.” She was met with a chorus of boos and only “a few brave souls” sang along with her.⁶⁰ Some might see the irony that so many people could agree on issues of Canadian and American foreign policy in Vietnam, but could not agree on the very nature of their own country; the significance here, however, is the unity that Vietnam brought out among Montrealers.

Contrasting sharply with the successful demonstration in Montreal was the SUPA-organized Canada-Vietnam Week that followed a week later in the nation’s capital. The original intention was a sit-in at the Parliament Buildings.⁶¹ From its earliest planning stages the project was a source of contention within SUPA. Concerns regarding acts of civil disobedience, decision-making, and membership of the planning committee all added to friction within the organization.⁶² Jim Harding complained of being shut out of a committee meeting, despite being a committee member. He also protested that contrary to certain statements that had been mailed to members in the form of a work list, no full committee meeting was ever held. In addition, he raised concerns as to whether SUPA had the resources to pull off the action. Although in principle he was in favour of

⁶⁰ Chodos and Rebeck, “1,300 pack,” *McGill Daily*, 1, 2.

⁶¹ “SUPA considering an Ottawa sit-in,” *The Varsity*, 3 January 1966, 3. Roussopoulos is alternately identified as Dimitri and Dimitrios. I use both, determined by which name is used by a given source.

⁶² “Viet Nam Action Committee Report #3,” nd, CUCND, Box 13, Ottawa Vietnam Action, 1966; “How the Canada-Vietnam Action Got Organized.” *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. II, No. 3, 21 February 1966.

it, he did not think it had been well thought out.⁶³ Joan Newman, writing from Kingston, also expressed concern with the process:

The work list mailing on the Vietnam action and the work list ballot are both slanted to an extent that seriously distorts the truth. If we can't learn to deal democratically with a simple thing like a work list, I have little hope for the future of SUPA.⁶⁴

Newman opposed the Ottawa action for three reasons. She felt that its sheer size would turn SUPA into a bureaucracy, its nature was more cathartic than movement-building, and it would take time and energy away from other priorities. Joan Levenson, writing from NCC headquarters in Madison, Wisconsin, raised concerns about the level of cynicism among proponents of the action. On the one hand they were attempting to take on the action alone, without partners, but on the other they were attempting to build a movement. "It seems anti-climactic to plan such a big smash [sic] action," said Levenson, "and then be defeatist about it and say that there is no possibility of having an effect, and yet we want to build our group larger." Levenson continued her opposition to the plan:

Another disturbing thing about the Ottawa demo was that you sounded very bitter about the liberal population. From our own recent experience, and that of SDS, duBois, etc, they can help tremendously, without – and we regard this as very important too – diminishing the demands of your position or sacrificing your principle through compromise.⁶⁵

Plans were further complicated when Professor George Grant withdrew from the entire affair over the issue of civil disobedience, though publicly citing his own health issues as his reason. Several other academics agreed to participate in the Canada-Vietnam Week with the understanding that their participation in the overall project did not necessarily

⁶³ Worklist Response to Vietnam Letters, 1966, CUCND, Box 13.

⁶⁴ Worklist Response to Vietnam Letters, 1966, CUCND, Box 13.

⁶⁵ Worklist Response to Vietnam Letters, 1966, CUCND, Box 13.

include their endorsement of the planned civil disobedience.⁶⁶ In sum, there was a marked absence of consensus among the Federal Council and others, not just for the civil disobedience component, but the Ottawa action itself. Regardless, plans moved ahead.

The action was scheduled to begin Thursday, 2 March with a press conference and presentation of an open letter to the leaders of the political parties. A teach-in was scheduled for that afternoon at the University of Ottawa, co-sponsored by the Canadian Union of Students, the International Affairs Club and the SUPA Vietnam Project. Among the speakers was Staughton Lynd. On Friday the focus was to move back to Parliament Hill where a vigil was to be held at 10:00 a.m.. This was to be followed by the planned sit-in in the Rotunda of the Centre Block based on the assumption that Parliament would not debate the contents of their letter and that they could get at least one hundred people to participate. The intent of the civil disobedience was to “maximize the obstruction of the daily routine of Parliamentarians, demanding that they shift from this normal routine to recognition of the urgent priority involved in the Vietnam issue.” The climax of the action, if Parliament had still not met their demands, would be a demonstration on Saturday afternoon that would involve the House of Commons, the US Embassy, and the Rideau Club. Demonstrators would then return to the University of Ottawa for a conference to plan future actions. By 21 February Louise Casselman of the Vietnam Action Committee was already in Ottawa coordinating plans on a full-time basis.⁶⁷ In the meantime, University of Toronto historian Kenneth McNaught assisted SUPA by

⁶⁶ “Description of the Ottawa Action,” *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. II, No. 3, 21 February 1966, 16-21; “Grant bows out of teach-in,” *The Varsity*, 2 March 1966, 2.

⁶⁷ “How the Canada-Vietnam Action Got Organized.” *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. II, No. 3, 21 February 1966. The Vietnam Action Committee was the committee set up by SUPA to coordinate the Ottawa actions. It should not be confused with Vietnam Action Committees set up by the Trotskyists in Western Canada in later years.

circulating the letter to be distributed to federal party leaders at the start of the action. The focus was on securing signatures from academics, and by the week prior to the action seventy five signatures had been garnered from faculty members at the University of British Columbia, Sir George Williams, McMaster, Trent and the University of Toronto.⁶⁸

The action began ahead of schedule at 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday, 28 February when twelve people held a six-hour vigil on Parliament Hill in the rain.⁶⁹ On Wednesday morning delegations met with all federal party leaders to discuss the open letter.⁷⁰ A lengthy press conference at the Parliamentary Press Gallery followed the vigil. Then commenced the teach-in at Carleton University where 500 turned out to hear Staughton Lynd speak on “The Big Lie in America’s Peace Offensive.” The teach-in continued on Thursday morning with Donald Forsyth giving an accounting of Canadian foreign policy since 1945. Dr. James Steele discussed the legal aspects of Canada’s role on the ICC. The teach-in concluded that evening. In addition to local participants, many came from Kingston, Montreal, Toronto, Hamilton, Regina, and Saskatoon. Most of them stayed at

⁶⁸ Some of the signatories included Northrop Frye, Donald Wilmott, Chandler Davis, Melville Watkins, Donald Creighton, C.B. Macpherson and George Grant. “Ask faculty to sign Viet Nam letter,” *The Varsity*, 25 February 1966, 22. Also, “Grant bows,” *The Varsity*.”

⁶⁹ While the vigil had been originally scheduled for this time, organizers had rescheduled it to the Friday. However, when the twelve showed up and were informed of the changes they decided to proceed regardless. They were joined by others with their number varying between twenty five and fifty. The vigil lasted until midnight and resumed at 7:30 the next morning. “Grant bows,” *The Varsity*; also Malcolm Fast and Arthur Pape, “Canada Vietnam Week,” *SUPA Newsletter*, 15 March 1966, Vol. II, No. 5, 30-34.

⁷⁰ Titled “On the Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War – An Open Letter to the 27th Parliament and the Government of Canada,” the letter was a six-page treatise outlining the history of the current war in Vietnam and Canada’s role in it. It called for six recommendations, including an end to US bombing of the DRV, as well as the “scorched earth” policy in the South, a halt to Canadian weapons exports to the United States, support for NLF participation in any negotiations, recognition of the failure of the ICC, and a declaration of support for the principles of the 1954 Geneva Agreement. In addition to the signatures of many of Canada’s leading academics, it was also signed by prominent SUPA members as well as popular folk artist Phil Ochs. Fast and Pape, “Canada Vietnam,” *SUPA Newsletter*; “On the Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War – An Open Letter to the 27th Parliament and the Government of Canada, 15 February 1966,” in VOW, Vol. 5, File 7; also reprinted in *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. II, No. 3, 21 February 1966, 5-12; “Sit-in gets last-minute go-ahead,” *The Varsity*, 4 March 1966, 1,17; “The Fact of Complicity,” *The Varsity*, 2 March 1966, 10.

St. George's Anglican Church. Throughout the week VOW and the Ottawa chapter of CCND provided food, transportation and other services.⁷¹

After the Thursday sessions discussion began on the subject of a civil disobedience action. Talks lasted until 3:30 a.m. An article in *The Varsity* described the dialogue as containing "considerable disagreement" on whether to proceed with the planned sit-in. According to the article a decision was finally made at 2:30 a.m.⁷² The legitimacy of the decision-making process, however, cannot be accepted at face value. In fact, leading SUPA members had effectively decided there would be a civil disobedience action two months earlier, if not formally at the Federal Council meeting of 3 January, then informally by the leading members of the Vietnam Action Committee – James Laxer, Dimitri Roussopoulos, Art Pape and Doug Ward. While discussion of the civil disobedience action gave the appearance of participatory democracy, the exercise simply ratified a decision that had already been made by the leadership. Participatory democracy became decision-making by attrition. By extending the debate until the wee hours of the morning, those strongly in favour of taking such action would be more inclined to remain until a final decision they agreed with was made. Those opposing the action would simply choose not to participate in the action and go to bed. Because SUPA, emulating SNCC and SDS, was committed to the principles of participatory democracy, there were no rules of procedure. The side that had the most committed partisans would always win because they would outlast their opposition.⁷³

⁷¹ Fast and Pape, "Canada Vietnam," *SUPA Newsletter*.

⁷² Fast and Pape, "Canada Vietnam," *SUPA Newsletter*.; also "Sit-in gets," *The Varsity*.

⁷³ To give an example from SNCC, that this is how John Lewis was unelected as Chairman and replaced by Stokely Carmichael in 1966. Having been elected, Lewis' supporters left the meeting, only to find out later that the remaining participants had decided to run the election again in their absence. Not surprisingly, Carmichael won. See David Halberstam, *The Children*, (New York: Random House, 1998), 523-524. See also Carson, *In Struggle*, 203-204.

The vigil resumed on Friday with about sixty people in pouring rain and a temperature of 37° F. Organizers held a training session at St. George's for those planning to participate in the civil disobedience action. At 1:20 they joined with the vigil. When the Peace Tower clock struck 2:00, the civil disobedience group broke away from the vigil, and forming four ranks in front of the Centre Block, slowly walked to the main doors singing "Oh Freedom." When they reached the central stairway a row of RCMP officers blocked their path. Upon being touched by the RCMP the demonstrators in front sat down. The rest followed suit. Hot soup and sandwiches arrived and a sympathetic Tommy Douglas sent out for hot coffee for the demonstrators as they huddled near the steps of the Centre Block to stay out of the rain. At 4:30 a second group appeared at the start of the walkway carrying a banner that read "Vietnam for the Vietnamese." Twenty five people from this group attempted to walk up the left side of the steps while thirty from the original group attempted to go up the right side. Both groups were blocked by the RCMP, whereupon they sat down again. Police began dragging people off the steps and onto the sidewalk, but without arresting them. Demonstrators attempted to move back – six times. Police then warned that arrests would follow if the steps were not cleared but the protesters were not deterred. Paddy wagons arrived and police started heaving limp bodies into them. By 6:30 sixty one people had been charged and were being held at Ottawa Police Station Number One.⁷⁴

Most of those arrested were students from Ottawa, Kingston, Montreal and Toronto. Many were veterans of the Toronto Selma demonstrations a year earlier. Some were high school students; some were older non-students including a fifty four year old grandmother. All were released on their own recognizance. Two students from McGill –

⁷⁴ Fast and Pape, "Canada-Vietnam," *SUPA Newsletter*.

Paul Berkowitz and Julius Grey – both pleaded guilty to causing a disturbance and were fined \$15 each. The others were remanded until 19 May so, the judge said, they could write their exams. Two were to appear in juvenile court.⁷⁵

The Canada Vietnam Week did not end with the arrests on Parliament Hill. Upon their release the protesters returned to St. George's for "a hot meal and heavy discussion." Back on Parliament Hill two people continued the vigil through the night. Saturday's program was a packed one, with discussions, sing-songs, meetings and strategy sessions. In mid-afternoon four young women went to the Prime Minister's residence to deliver a letter to him drafted that morning and distributed at fifteen churches. After being stopped at the gate they sat-in in the driveway, remaining there until 10:00 p.m., with a supporting vigil across the road. The actions at 24 Sussex represented the final acts of the Canada Vietnam Week.⁷⁶

The actions in Ottawa took up most of the energies of SUPA activists in Ontario and Quebec. Outside of Ottawa the only significant parallel demonstrations took place in Edmonton. On Monday, 28 February antiwar activists gave soapbox speeches at the University of Alberta to an undetermined number of observers. Also that week activist Patrick Connell attempted to present a brief to city council on Vietnam but was unsuccessful. City Councillor Julia Kiniski – one of the two aldermen to support Connell's attempts – invited him to talk to one of her meetings on 15 March. Two other activists – Mort Newman and Mary Ann Alexander – attempted to present a brief to Premier Ernest Manning on 2 March. They had phoned the previous day to arrange an

⁷⁵ Fast and Pape, "Canada-Vietnam," *SUPA Newsletter*; also "In Ottawa: Two demonstrators fined: others await trial," *The Varsity*, 9 March 1966, 1; also Volkmar Richter, "61 arrested at SUPA sit-in on Parliament Hill," *The Varsity*, 7 March 1966, 1, 5.

⁷⁶ Fast and Pape, *SUPA Newsletter*.

appointment. Prior to the meeting, however, they encountered Manning in the hallway of the legislature. The Premier angrily inquired if the papers they had in hand had anything to do with Vietnam. Newman and Alexander acknowledged as much. With that the premier refused to see them and entered his office, leaving them in the hallway.⁷⁷

Protest activities continued the next day when forty people marched from the university to the legislature. Thirty more joined them there. Organizers had previously prepared a brief to present to representatives of the Manning government, but upon their arrival at the legislature no one was there to accept it. One of the leaders took it upon himself to enter the legislature and find Manning's representatives. When he did, he presented them with the brief which they said would be considered; so ended the Alberta protest.⁷⁸

SUPA's Canada Vietnam Week was a major undertaking for the organization. While no financial records survive, it certainly must have cost the organization substantially in terms of keeping a full-time staff person in Ottawa for close to two months, office rental in Ottawa and associated costs, as well as the costs of transporting their various activists from locations across the country. That SUPA failed to start fundraising for the project until less than a week prior to the event must have further aggravated the organization's financial situation.⁷⁹ Certainly some of these costs were picked up by individual members, as well as offset by contributions from SUPA's allies in the project, specifically VOW, CCND, and St. George's. The Ottawa action

⁷⁷ "Notes from Edmonton," *SUPA Newsletter*, 19 April 1966, Vol. II, No. 6, 6.

⁷⁸ "Notes," *SUPA Newsletter*.

⁷⁹ Arthur Pape and Louise Casselman, Form Letter, 25 February 1966, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312, Stack 5, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA. Pape and Casselman admitted their appeal for funding was late and that in all probability recipients would not receive it until Canada-Vietnam Week was underway.

represented an attempt to go beyond lobbying and demonstrating and to draw attention to Canada's role in the Vietnam War through direct action. It is difficult to gauge its success, as it is for any kind of protest. Certainly it did not lead to any change in Canadian government policy, but the same can be said of any anti-Vietnam War protest. How much SUPA's actions, in particular its civil disobedience component, contributed to informing Canadians in general and their Members of Parliament specifically regarding Canadian complicity in the war is impossible to quantify. If coverage in the *Globe and Mail* is any indicator it had none. A short article on page four of the 4 March issue concentrated on the civil disobedience and subsequent arrests. No mention of Canadian complicity was made.⁸⁰ The letter distributed to 15 Ottawa-area churches likely had more impact. In terms of movement-building the project was counterproductive. It divided SUPA from the start. The civil disobedience component, which ultimately was intended all along to be the highlight of the exercise, was a major source of contention right until the decision was finally implemented on 4 March. Leading elements within SUPA were obsessed with civil disobedience, likely the result of their love affair with SNCC. SUPA, however, was not SNCC. SNCC was able to capitalize on civil disobedience because its activists were most often breaking laws that only applied to African Americans. They were largely arrested for actions which were perfectly legal for whites to perform. Again, to reference Sasha Torres, the issues really were black and white. SUPA's actions on Parliament Hill, however, were more symbolic. There was no perception of atrocity when people were arrested for blocking access to Parliament or generally being a nuisance. Also, the absence of police or vigilante violence, something almost always present in SNCC actions, did not move the general populace to sympathize with SUPA and its aims.

⁸⁰ "RCMP arrest 40 student demonstrators," *The Globe and Mail*, (CP), 4 March 1966, 4.

Rather than mobilizing large numbers of people, the civil disobedience action represented an elitist approach to protest, a core group risking arrest in order to be heard. Just as SNCC promoted itself at the time as “the shock troops of the civil rights movement,”⁸¹ SUPA attempted to present a similar image of itself. It stands in stark contrast to the protest a week earlier in Montreal which involved numerous organizations and brought thousands into the street. UGEQ was able to mobilize such large numbers by building alliances and working cooperatively with other groups. Although SUPA received support from the local chapters of VOW and CCND, as well as St. George’s Church, and despite its rhetoric about movement building, Canada-Vietnam Week was never intended to mobilize those outside of its own ranks.

Volkmar Richter, writing in the *Varsity*, indicated that the sit-in was the first ever in the history of Canada’s parliament. In this he was likely correct. Claiming it received generally sympathetic coverage in the press (although not citing which press), Richter asserted that the sit-in represented a victory for SUPA.⁸² As much of a victory it might have been for SUPA, it was a pyrrhic one. The Ottawa action had created much dissension within SUPA, compounding existing divisions. Within a year SUPA would cease to exist. The Canada-Vietnam Week would be the first and last attempt on SUPA’s part at antiwar activism on a national scale, although it would give its reluctant support to antiwar actions sponsored by other groups, such as the second International Days to End the War in Vietnam later that month.

In the United States, and internationally, the first International Days of Protest proved so successful that the NCC scheduled a second International Days of Protest for

⁸¹ Carson, *In Struggle*, 3, 45, 136.

⁸² Volkmar Richter, “Sit-in Ottawa,” *The Varsity*, 9 March 1966, 6-7.

25-26 March, attracting twice as many participants as the first. Fifty thousand protesters marched in New York; 7,000 in San Francisco. Significant demonstrations also took place in Australia and New Zealand, as well as in the Philippines, Japan, Brussels, all of the Scandinavian countries, Guinea, Kenya, Syria, England and Mexico.⁸³ Canada was no exception.

The antiwar movement in Canada had continued to build following the first International Days of Protest. On 19 February numerous organizations co-sponsored a conference at the Carpenters' Hall in Toronto. The location epitomized the increasing involvement of organized labour in the antiwar movement. Sponsored by eight organizations and attended by 500 activists, sixty of those attending were workers representing fourteen labour organizations.⁸⁴ Titled "Canada Speaks Out," the conference featured speakers including NDP MP Bert Herridge, UGEQ Vice-President Daniel Latouche, former Canadian representatives on the International Control Commission John Powell and Hugh Campbell, as well as Ontario labour leaders, journalists and more than thirty clergy from all major denominations. From Newfoundland novelist Farley Mowat sent his endorsement of the conference in a 12-page letter to participants. Eschewing the by-then bastardized term "teach-in," organizers were adamant that this was not to be simply educational. Rather, the conference's purpose was to spur further

⁸³ Halstead, *Out Now*, 167, 172-173.

⁸⁴ These included the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks; the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers; the Toronto District Labour Council; the United Steel Workers of America; the Labourers' Union; the United Auto Workers; the United Electrical Workers, Mine Mill, and the Moulders' Union. See Program, "All-Day Conference: Canada's Role in Vietnam," Kenny, Box 54, File 1. Also listed among unions present was the H. C. & M. International Union. Only the abbreviation was given. See also Form Letter, Gerry Gallagher, Chairman, Labour Committee Against the War in Vietnam, 3 March 1966, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312, Stack 5, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA.

protest action.⁸⁵ Numerous peace groups attended. The most prominent was the Toronto International Vietnam Day Committee.⁸⁶ A writer for the *Varsity* covering the event described the politics of those in attendance as ranging from moderate liberal to far left and encompassing a range of age groups. The most significant result of the highly successful conference was the establishment of a committee to coordinate the actions of the various Toronto groups opposed to the war – the Toronto Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam (TCC). Participants mandated the committee to focus its actions on building support for a march on Ottawa as part of the second International Days of Protest sponsored by the NDY and other organizations. It also gave its support to SUPA's planned vigil and teach-in slated for Ottawa in early March, though no mention was made of a planned civil disobedience action.⁸⁷ The conference's support for SUPA's planned activities was ironic given SUPA's failure to sponsor or formally participate in the Toronto conference, although some individual members participated. One SUPA member present was Tony Hyde, an activist involved with SUPA's Vietnam project. Hyde criticized the decision to establish a coordinating committee. "With a toss of his shoulder-long hair," one writer remarked of him, he "informed the assembly that a coordinating committee would be 'hilarious,' that all it would achieve would be "more talk and more ineffective protests." Other SUPA members expressed similar views as to the futility of

⁸⁵ David Hemblen, "A hard look at Canada and Viet Nam," *The Varsity*, 11 February 1966, 4. It is significant to note that in response to increasing accusations of bias *The Varsity* not only made it more than clear that this was an opinion piece, but the editors also put a disclaimer across the top of the article stating that the piece did not necessarily state the views of *The Varsity's* editorial board. Such disclaimers were to become common on such articles.

⁸⁶ Participating groups included the Toronto Peace Centre, the Toronto Association for Peace, Students Against War, Canadian Action for Peace, FOR, the Toronto chapter of the WILPF, and the Toronto Committee for Nuclear Disarmament. RCMP Report, Protests and Demonstrations Re: US Action in Vietnam, 8 March 1966, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA.

⁸⁷ "The Toronto Peace Movement Confers on Vietnam," *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 9, 6-8. Also participating but declining to sponsor the event was the Voice of Women.

present methods, but others were more inclined to argue that raising money for a pamphlet and organizing a march for the International Days of Protest were suitable immediate tasks for such a committee. Commenting in the *SUPA Newsletter*, one member indicated that the conference's decision to support the International Days of Protest march in Ottawa and other centres constituted a victory for the Trotskyists, who, he claimed, controlled the Ontario New Democratic Youth, the main organization advancing the International Days of Protest and who at the time were engaged in attempting to get the National NDY to change their planned peace demonstration from Easter to March 26. The SUPA writer credited University of Toronto mathematician Chandler Davis with effectively chairing the event and enabling the meeting to get down to the business of building the movement with a minimum of procedural wrangling. No attempts were made to monopolize the floor. In addition to the establishment of a permanent coordinating committee and the publication of a pamphlet, two working committees emerged from the conference. The first, the Labour Committee to End the War in Vietnam, was composed of union activists and under the leadership of Gerry Gallagher of the Labourers' International Union. The other, the Church Ecumenical Committee for Peace in Vietnam, was composed of clergy. The conference closed with a dance that evening featuring the music of Tommy Hunter and the humour of David Broadfoot.⁸⁸

The 19 February meeting illustrated the new directions the antiwar movement in Canada was going. Clearly SUPA was on the sidelines while radical left groups such as

⁸⁸ "Toronto Peace," *SUPA Newsletter*; "Overflow crowd plans for two Viet Nam marches," *The Varsity*, 21 February 1966, 8; "'Room for 1,000:' Charter peace train for Ottawa protest," *Canadian Tribune*, 7 March 1966. Clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312, Stack 4, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

Trotskyists and Communists temporarily put aside their differences to help build a mass movement. In this effort they were joined by more moderate left groups as well. The NDY would play a leading role in organizing the 26 March actions. But the addition of labour to the growing movement did much to break down the public perception of the antiwar movement as the sole purview of radicals and youth.

Following the conference the newly-established TCC began organizing for 26 March. The Toronto chapter of SUPA, having had a change of heart, joined the coalition.⁸⁹ Ian Angus, who had recently dropped out of Carleton, had moved to Toronto where he worked and did volunteer work for the University of Toronto CEWV, one of the member groups of the TCC. Angus credits the League for Socialist Action and its youth wing, the Young Socialists for playing a major role in the various CEWVs, but at the same time always trying to draw others in. “The Communists were always involved,” says Angus, ‘and if there were fights it was almost always between us (the LSA) and them.’ The goal of the Trotskyists, asserts Angus, was to build the largest antiwar movement possible. The Communist Party in contrast, he states, tended to want to influence politicians. According to Angus the Communists represented the conservative wing of the antiwar movement.⁹⁰ This is not an entirely accurate representation of the Communist Party’s efforts. As we have seen with the example of the Calgary CEWV, the Communist Party worked hard at building an inclusive, mass movement, receiving its direction from the top echelons of the Party. The Communist Party immediately perceived the importance of the second International Days of Protest and ordered its members into action. Party headquarters directed all members into the streets for 26

⁸⁹ Dorn Bohnen, “SUPA votes to join Co-ord Committee, *The Varsity*, 7 March 1966, 10.

⁹⁰ Angus, Interview.

March. The word from party headquarters was “(w)e want as large a group of Communists and Communist supporters [as possible] to take part in this demonstration.”⁹¹ Other groups, such as the Maoist-oriented Progressive Workers’ Movement, presented themselves as champions of the NLF. All of these dynamics were mirrored by the larger movement in the United States, with the exception of the NDY, which did not have a US equivalent. Groups like VOW, the Quakers, and others were prominent in the early period of the war, but by March 1966 were quickly becoming overwhelmed by the numbers of youth coming into the movement.⁹²

People had varied reasons for opposing the war in Vietnam. According to Ian Angus some were motivated by the sheer horror of the war. Others felt the Vietnamese had a right to decide their own future. Some, like Angus, had the view “What’s going on in Vietnam is a revolution and I am in favour of them having a revolution ... you build solidarity with that by helping stop the war.” This was best accomplished, Angus believed, by finding a way to build a movement that was big enough to encompass a wide range of opinion.

This included pacifists, people who basically saw it was a democratic issue or a religious issue or whatever so that we could all work together to lead towards our common goal which was ending the war and getting the US out. So that’s why we tended to have slogans like “Withdraw US Troops Now,” and “End Canadian Complicity,” things that were clear and concrete and we all had agreed on.

One idea Angus takes credit for is chartering a train from Toronto to Ottawa as part of the March protests. He remembers sitting in a meeting and saying, “Why don’t we rent a train and take everybody to Ottawa for a demonstration?” They did just that. The

⁹¹ Form letter, Phyllis Clarke, Communist Party of Canada (Headquarters) to membership. In CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312, Stack 5, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA.

⁹² Angus, interview.

chartered train from Toronto to Ottawa for the International Days of Protest is one of the most remembered aspects of the 26 March protest.⁹³

Organized labour was particularly enthusiastic in promoting the International Days of Protest. On 3 March Gerry Gallagher, chair of Labour CEWV, sent a letter to union members encouraging participation. Mine Mill was particularly visible in recruiting workers to demonstrate, especially in British Columbia.⁹⁴ Mine Mill's leaders, however, was guarded in their approach to the March 26 actions. On 8 March Secretary-Treasurer William Longridge wrote to all locals and auxiliaries, enclosing a copy of Gallagher's letter of 3 March as well as a copy of the call to action issued by the Toronto conference of 19 February. Longridge felt he had to justify to the membership his attendance at the 19 February conference in Toronto, along with that of Mine Mill's Press and Education Director, by citing a resolution passed at a previous convention calling for union action on Vietnam – specifically the withdrawal of foreign troops, an immediate cease-fire, a return to the terms of the Geneva Accords, and free elections in South Vietnam.⁹⁵ The curious aspect of Longridge's letter is its neutral tone. It did not actually encourage members to participate in the 26 March activities; it simply informed them that the actions were taking part. One can only speculate on the union leadership's lack of enthusiasm. Perhaps the leadership wanted locals or individual members to decide for

⁹³ Angus, interview. In addition to Angus, both George Addison and Judith Pocock both have vivid memories of the train ride to Ottawa (See Addison and Pocock interviews.) Whether Angus can take credit for the idea, the decision was made at a meeting on 28 February 1966 of the Toronto CEWV, Labour CEWV, the Church Ecumenical Committee for Peace in Vietnam, the NDY and a number of other peace organizations. See "'Room for 1,000,'" *Canadian Tribune*.

⁹⁴ RCMP Report, "International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union – Canada," 12 April 1966, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312, Stack 10, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

⁹⁵ Correspondence, William Longridge, Secretary-Treasurer, International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, to all Locals and Auxiliaries, 8 March 1966, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312, Stack 10, National Coordinating [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA.

themselves. Or maybe the leadership did not to be perceived as forcing the issue on the rank and file. Likely the answer lies in more pragmatic issues. Mine Mill was in its death throes. Having been in an open state of war with the United Steelworkers since their expulsion from the Canadian Congress of Labour in the 1950s, Mine Mill was preparing to pack it in. By the end of the year they would merge with the United Steelworkers of America.⁹⁶

Another union active in drumming up support for the 26 March actions was the United Electrical Workers (UE). In one instance they drew the attention of the RCMP when members of Local 504 stood at the gates of the Stelco steel mills in Hamilton and distributed Labour CEWV leaflets to the workers there, encouraging them to ride the train to Ottawa. Their literature indicated that the Canadian Labour Congress, the Toronto and District Labour Council, and the federations of labour for both Ontario and British Columbia all opposed the war. Quoting Paddy Neale, Secretary-Treasurer of the BCFL, the pamphlet exhorted workers to “raise hell over Vietnam.”⁹⁷

When the day of the protest arrived, the peace train carried between 800 and 1,000 marchers from Toronto to Ottawa. Many of them were union members. Judith Pocock, one of the student activists who took the train, was particularly struck by this:

We went up in the train and I remember there were all these union guys! I didn't know working-class people; my parents weren't working-class. The movement that I was a part of was not working-class, and here were all these working guys... I remember that and I'm sure there were many others, but I was oblivious at that point in time to the trade union movement.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ For an in depth account of the demise of Mine Mill, see the chapter in Ellen Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

⁹⁷ RCMP Report, “United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers’ Union of America, Hamilton, Ontario,” 17 March 1966 in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312. Also see leaflet in same file.

⁹⁸ Pocock, Interview.

In addition to those riding the train, between 1,700 and 2,000 more from Hamilton, Montreal, Quebec City and other locales found their way to Ottawa by other means. Four busloads came from Montreal alone.⁹⁹

Braving 19° F temperatures and the presence of fifty student counter-demonstrators, the peace marchers assembled at the Supreme Court, and carrying signs reading “Withdraw Troops Now,” “Free Elections in Viet Nam,” and “La Complicité à Cette Guerre est Criminelle,” marched past the US Embassy and up Parliament Hill. There they listened to speeches by former VOW President Thérèse Casgrain, Gerry Gallagher of Labour CEWV, NDP MP Colin Cameron, and SUPA activist Arthur Pape.¹⁰⁰ In many ways the speakers were representative of those marching that day: women, workers, socialists and students. The Ottawa International Days of Protest march represented a new peak for the antiwar movement in Canada.

It was not simply the Ottawa demonstration that indicated an increased popularity of the cause. The March International Days of Protest – as manifested in Canada – was truly national in scope. Ottawa represented only one, and not the largest, of Canadian demonstrations against the war in Vietnam that day. The largest took place in Vancouver, where antiwar activism had been growing since the previous August when about forty students protested the war by conducting a sit-down strike at Prime Minister Pearson’s opening of the Pacific National Exhibition. Much, though by no means all, of Vancouver’s antiwar sentiment emanated from the University of British Columbia. In February the *Vancouver Province* reported that out of a student population of 16,000,

⁹⁹ “Marchers show war opposition,” *Regina Leader-Post*, 28 March 1966, 1, 8.

¹⁰⁰ “Marchers show,” *Regina Leader-Post*; “Thousands Rally Round Peace Flag,” *Victoria Daily Colonist*, 27 March 1966, 1, 3, clipping in CPC, Box 49, File 01; “Canada A Growing Protest Movement,” *Sanity*, Spring 1966, 7; “Protest Viet War: 2,000 March at Ottawa,” *Montreal Star* (CP), 28 March 1966, 33.

about three hundred of them could be considered “radicals,” roughly two percent of the student population. The article described them as “unlike the popular image of slovenliness and beatnik association,” but rather as “clean, beardless, neatly-dressed students from middle-income families.” About one third of them were members of UBC CEWV. The overwhelming majority of all left-leaning students, however – be they members of the Communist Club, the Socialist Club, the Student Committee on Cuban Affairs, or other groups – all agreed that Vietnam was the most pressing issue of the day. Being much closer to Berkeley than any other Canadian city, ties were stronger between the antiwar movement in the Bay area and the movement in Vancouver. In January 1966 several UBC students travelled to Berkeley for a radical conference titled “Education and Beyond.” It was the issue of Vietnam more than anything that brought the Vancouver and Berkeley students together.¹⁰¹

Vancouver planning got underway on 16 February when a Vancouver Vietnam March Committee was formed at a meeting of seventy five delegates at the Vancouver Labour Temple. The meeting, sponsored by the University of British Columbia Vietnam Day Committee (UBC VDC), included three members of the provincial executive of the NDP. Also, as with the Ottawa march, union support was strong with many leading trade unionists present as well as representatives of several peace groups.¹⁰² An RCMP report on the new coalition described it as characterized by confusion and disruption due to attempts by the UBC VDC to control the founding meeting and the resultant coordinating

¹⁰¹ Kathy Tait, “Student Radicals,” *Vancouver Province*, 8 February 1966. Clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00327, Disc 1, Stack 4, Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee.

¹⁰² Ray Burns, “Anti-War Activity in British Columbia, UBC CEWV, *Bring the Troops Home Now Newsletter*, 7 March 1966. In CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00327, Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee, Disc 1, Stack 4; also Art Young, “Cross-Canada Mobilization Against the Genocidal War in Vietnam on March 26”: also “End Canadian Complicity! Stop the War Now! Remove US Troops,” *Workers’ Vanguard*, March 1966, in same file.

committee.¹⁰³ In the days leading up to the march the UBC VDC mobilized support by hosting films and lectures on the subject of the war in Vietnam. Among their featured speakers were Dr. William Willmott of the Department of Asian Studies at UBC, and Staughton Lynd. As well, the committee began publishing the *Canada-Vietnam Newsletter*, in order to further disseminate the antiwar message. On 25 March, the day prior to the main protests planned, 4,000 turned out to a campus rally at UBC.¹⁰⁴

The numbers reported for the actual International Day of Protest the following day vary between 2,000 and 5,000. In addition to the VDC, numerous other groups sponsored the event.¹⁰⁵ An RCMP informant present reported that many members of the Communist Party, the Progressive Workers Movement, and the League for Socialist Action had a hand in the organizing. The United Fishermen and Allied Workers were also prominent.¹⁰⁶ Significantly, despite the previous pronouncements of Paddy Neale, the BCFL refused to participate.¹⁰⁷ While the reasons for this are unclear, it was likely the presence of Communists in the organizing committee that made them balk.

The march began at 1:00 at City Hall. Rather than marching to the US Consulate, demonstrators rallied at the Courthouse where police had cordoned off an entire city block for them. The crowd consisted of students, elderly, men and women, and in some

¹⁰³ RCMP Report, Peace Coordinating Committee, Vancouver, BC, 4 April 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Box 39, File 94-A-00130, Part 1.

¹⁰⁴ Ray Burns, "UBC Leads West Coast Anti-war Movement," *Canada-Vietnam Newsletter*, June 1966, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00327, Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee, Disc 1, Stack 5. See also "Quality Publication Considered for Van VDC," Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee Newsletter, 4 May 1966. Clipping in same file as above; also Sandy Read, BC SUPA, "3,000 March at UBC," *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 2, No. 6, 19 April 1966, 15.

¹⁰⁵ These included WILPF, FOR, VOW, the British Columbia Peace Council, CCND, the Quakers, the Canada-China Friendship Association, and the Ad Hoc Committee to End the War in Vietnam (likely the group formed at the meeting at the Labour Temple on 16 February).

¹⁰⁶ RCMP Report, "National Co-Ordination Committee to End the War in Vietnam – USA," CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00327, Disc 1, Stack 4, Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee.

¹⁰⁷ RCMP Report, "National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA," 30 March 1966, Access to Information Application A2006-00312.

cases whole families. Slogans included “End Canadian Complicity” and “Withdraw US Troops Now.” Speakers included representatives from the University of British Columbia, the NDP, the Unitarian and Anglican churches, and well as the local CEWV. In addition, local fraternities supplied a nominal number of counter-demonstrators who sat on the courthouse steps with signs reading “Support the US” and “Bomb the Cong.” Nearby a substantially smaller rally sponsored by the Maoist Progressive Workers raised \$125 for the NLF.¹⁰⁸ Given the tremendous success of the Vancouver protest, a few days later the UBC VDC held a meeting to establish an off-campus version of the VDC simply known as the Vancouver VDC. It was assisted by members of the NDY, the NDP, students from both Vancouver City College and Simon Fraser University, as well as others.¹⁰⁹

In the provincial capital, the Victoria Peace Action League (VPAL) – an organization of about thirty members established by the Communist Party, most of them members of the Communist Party, the Young Communist League, and the Canada-China Friendship Association – took the lead in organizing a rally of 200. VPAL’s spokesperson was Bob Munro, a prominent local Communist.¹¹⁰ Supporting their efforts was VOW. As well, showing the increasing role of organized labour in the Canadian antiwar movement, the district labour council endorsed the rally. Speakers included a

¹⁰⁸ “Babes-in-arms join city peace parade,” *Vancouver Province*, Monday, 28 March 1966. Clipping in CPC, Box 49, File 1; “Viet Protesters Halted by Police: Main Body of City Marchers Kept Away from US Consulate,” *Vancouver Sun*, 28 March 1966, 1; “Canada Growing,” *Sanity*.

¹⁰⁹ “Anti-war Activists Establish Vietnam Group, Vancouver,” *Workers’ Vanguard*, April 1966, 1, 2. Clipping in CSIS, RG-146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00327, Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee, Disc 1, Stack 5.

¹¹⁰ For information on the Victoria Peace Action League see “Anti-Viet Nam War Protests: New Peace Group Proposes to Attend Election Rallies,” *Victoria Daily Colonist*, 26 September 1965; RCMP Headquarters Transit Slip, 13 October 1965, and RCMP Report, “Peace Action League, Victoria,” 17 September 1965; untitled RCMP document, 20 February 1969. All items in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00318, Vancouver Peace Action League, 1Vic1.

Unitarian minister, a city social worker, and representatives from the local NDP riding association, VOW, and Canadian Aid for Vietnam.¹¹¹

While most prospective antiwar marchers in Toronto had taken the train to Ottawa, one group remained in town. Over the course of the 25-26 March weekend the Canadian section of UE was holding its convention in Toronto. Unable to ride the peace train, one hundred delegates showed their support for the International Day of Protest by recessing to picket at the US Consulate. They were joined by 250 others and addressed by Chandler Davis and UE President C.S. Jackson.¹¹²

Since the establishment of Calgary CEWV in December, organizing of the antiwar movement in Alberta had continued to move forward. On 12 March the executive committees of the Edmonton and Calgary CEWVs met in Red Deer with antiwar activists in that city. The result of the meeting was the establishment of Alberta CEWV with Dick Fidler of Edmonton as its chair. Its purpose was to liaise between the Calgary, Edmonton and Red Deer groups and to provide provincial representation at any prospective antiwar gatherings that were national in scope. Its first decision was to send two representatives to Ottawa for the 26 March protest. Although its subsequent newsletter reported that the meeting included the executive of Red Deer CEWV, such an organization did not exist at the time. Rather, the Red Deer CEWV was conceived at the 12 March meeting and first met two weeks later. Bob Carlisle and Peter Anderson were its chief organizers. According to *Sanity* it was attended by farmers, ranchers and townspeople. While Red

¹¹¹ "Rally to Rap Viet Nam War," *Victoria Colonist*, 10 March 1966, 1; "Babes-in-arms join city peace parade," *Vancouver Province*, Monday, 28 March 1966. Both clippings in CPC, Box 49, File 1.

¹¹² "Protest Viet War," *Montreal Star*; "Marchers show," *Regina Leader-Post*; form letter, William Spira, Secretary, Toronto Committee to End the War in Vietnam, nd, in Kenny, Box 54, File 1; also RCMP Report, 30 March 1966 in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312, Stack 7, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

Deer functioned as a convenient half-way point for Calgary and Edmonton activists to get together, the local CEWV did not take hold. Closing its file on the organization in June 1970 the RCMP reported that Red Deer CEWV had not met since June 1966 and that the organization was “sort of bust.”¹¹³

There is some debate as to which organization played the lead in organizing the 26 March protest in Edmonton. While the RCMP credited the NDY, a report in *Sanity* gave the credit to Alberta CEWV. The truth is likely somewhere in the middle. The RCMP was certainly in a position to know, having infiltrated or observed most of the organizations involved in the Alberta antiwar movement. Given the energy and organization behind Alberta CEWV, however, that organization should not be underrated. In preparation for the march, both organizations co-sponsored an appearance by Staughton Lynd at the University of Alberta on 19 March.¹¹⁴ The following week 300 marched on the provincial legislature. In a reversal of the November demonstration in Calgary, a chartered bus took protesters from that city to the provincial capital where they joined their Edmonton counterparts and others who had travelled from hundreds of miles away. Again showing labour’s support for the antiwar movement, Doug Murdock, President of the Alberta Federation of Labour addressed the demonstrators. He was joined by John Burk, Vice-President of the Alberta New Democratic Youth. Professor E.

¹¹³ RCMP Report, “Alberta Committee to End the War in Vietnam,” 16 May 1966; RCMP Report, “Red Deer Committee to End the War in Vietnam,” 23 June 1970; “Albertans Spearhead Viet Drive,” *Edmonton Journal*, 16 March 1966; “Alberta,” *Sanity*, April 1966; “From the Editor,” *Newsletter* (Alberta Committee to End the War in Vietnam), 30 April 1966. All in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00299, Parts 1, 2 & 3, Alberta Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

¹¹⁴ “Alberta,” *Sanity*, April 1966.

Kemp of the University of Alberta also addressed the crowd.¹¹⁵ Maurice Cohen, speaking on behalf of Edmonton CEWV, advocated the development of a larger antiwar structure:

We in Alberta believe that the time is right for extensive and systematic discussions with individuals and groups from all over Canada and we look forward to participating on a national and international basis in efforts to end the war in Vietnam.¹¹⁶

Despite Cohen's hopes, no such organization would ever develop in Canada.

Following the 26 March protest, some unknown persons within Calgary CEWV raised concerns regarding the presence of Communists within the group. The Reverend Robert Gay, president of the group, responded that Calgary CEWV was made up of many groups, including Communists, and that all members had to work together for the collective goals. Partly to encourage other groups to work harder, and partly to give credit where credit was due, he emphasized that Communist organizations were contributing more to the cause than any other groups.¹¹⁷ Likely in partial response to these concerns, but more in an effort to draw more people into the Alberta antiwar movement, the Provincial Executive Committee of the Communist Party appealed to members to organize a civilian aid campaign in order to draw in those who were sympathetic to the antiwar movement, but were not comfortable with demonstrations, petitions, and the like. "It has a wide appeal," wrote provincial leader William Tuomi, "and overcomes the argument of 'where are communists in all this in Vietnam.'" Tuomi went on to advocate the establishment of a medical aid committee in Calgary. He ended his report by

¹¹⁵ "Canada a Growing Protest Movement, *Sanity*, Spring 1966, 7; "Cross-Canada Mobilization," *Workers' Vanguard*."

¹¹⁶ "Alberta," *Sanity*, April 1966; also RCMP Report, "National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA," 6 April 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00299, Part 2.

¹¹⁷ RCMP Report, "Calgary Committee to End the War in Vietnam," 4 May 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00299, Part 3, Calgary Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

informing members that “Our united front work continues in the Edmonton Committee to End the War in Vietnam.”¹¹⁸

In Regina, leadership for the International Day of Protest came from the Vietnam Action Committee, a group formed following the New Democratic Youth convention there earlier. The 400 delegates attending had unanimously endorsed the federal NDY call for marches protesting Canadian government policy on Vietnam. According to SUPA activist James Harding, although the initiative came from the NDY, it was clear from the start that the VAC was to be a broad, non-partisan committee. The provincial NDY executive called a meeting for early March. Over forty organizations were contacted, but only eight sponsored the committee and worked with them to bring off the 26 March action.¹¹⁹

When the day of the march arrived, the VAC, in many ways, outdid all other antiwar groups in Canada by sponsoring a full-day program. Events began that morning at 10:00 at the Regina Labour Temple, with proceedings chaired by W. Gilbey of the Saskatchewan Federation of Labour. Morning speakers included representatives from the provincial NDY, the local chapter of CCND; VOW; and I.C. Nollet, NDP MP. The Reverend Ben Smillie of Saskatoon chaired the afternoon session, which featured the Reverend Ray Hord, Secretary of Evangelism and Social Service for the United Church of Canada; and W. Sherstobitoff, who gave a Doukhobor perspective on the Vietnam War. Hord in particular had distinguished himself both in and outside of the United

¹¹⁸ Internal Memo, (W.A.) Tuomi to (Exempted), 27 April 1966.; also RCMP Report, “Communist Party of Canada, Calgary,” 16 May 1966, both documents in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00299, Part 1, Alberta Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

¹¹⁹ These included the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Voice of Women, the Canadian Congress of Women, SUPA, along with that organization’s Neestow Project, the NDY, the Communist Party and the Saskatchewan Peace Council, this last organization having cancelled its plans for its annual Easter Peace vigil at the provincial legislature, an activity it had sponsored annually for 17 years, in order to devote all of its energies to 26 March.

Church for his outspokenness on the war in Vietnam. Over four hundred people participated in discussions of the war, foreign policy, colonialism, and other topics.¹²⁰

Following the afternoon session, about two hundred marched several blocks to the Legislature. Local police delayed the march from starting for forty five minutes by enforcing a bylaw that stated all parades had to display a Canadian flag. Organizers searched about for one until someone finally bought one for \$15. According to a report in the *Regina Leader-Post*, Saturday shoppers generally greeted the demonstrators with laughs and puzzled glances, and the occasional taunts of “Go back to Russia you bunch of bums.” One counter-demonstrator, in reference to the self-immolating Buddhist monks in Vietnam, held a picket sign reading “Free Gas and Matches.”

The demonstrators were addressed by University of Saskatchewan (Regina Campus) Students’ Representative Council President Don Mitchell, as well as Spanish Civil War veteran and Saskatchewan Communist Party leader William Beeching. Also speaking was the Reverend Ray Hord, who prefaced his commentary by stating he was speaking on behalf of himself only.

Demonstrators passed a resolution making the VAC a permanent committee in order to plan further actions. As well, they presented a brief to the provincial government requesting it to call publicly for an end to America’s “scorched earth policy,” the end of exports of Canadian war material to the US for use in Vietnam, recognition of the NLF for the purposes of negotiations, and reconvening of the Geneva Conference.¹²¹

¹²⁰ “A Call to Action – Stop the War in Vietnam,” Flyer, Saskatchewan Peace Council, 2 March 1966; RCMP Report, “National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA,” 18 April 1966. Both documents in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312, Stack 10.

¹²¹ Katie Fitzrandolph, “200 marchers protest actions on Viet Nam,” *Regina Leader-Post*, 28 March 1966, 37; also James Harding, “Notes on the Days of Protest,” *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 2, No. 6, 19 April 1966; also RCMP Report, “National Coordination,” 18 April 1966; “Regina rally, march protest Vietnam war,”

The March 26 actions in Regina marked the first time that the provincial NDY had been involved with peace activism. Yet its participation was limited. Of 1,200 members, only fifty participated. Support from the senior party was even less forthcoming, prompting the youth wing to send a letter expressing concern that the NDP had not given more support to the march.¹²²

As during the first International Days of Protest, not much is known of activities in Manitoba, other than an antiwar demonstration that was scheduled to take place on the steps of the provincial legislature on 21 March. The sponsor of the action was the Winnipeg Peace Council.¹²³ Why a date one week prior to the international event was chosen is also unclear.

In contrast, antiwar protests occurred throughout Ontario. In what is today Thunder Bay the Lakehead University NDY staged protest rallies in the twin cities of Fort William and Port Arthur on 26 March. Despite cold weather approximately two hundred and twenty five people came out to hear about twenty speakers, including the university's Dean of Arts Gordon Rothney and local NDP MPP Ted Freeman. Also speaking were members of the clergy, as well as C.J. Martin, speaking on behalf of the Lakehead Trades and Labour Council. While local Communists were not involved in the organizing of the demonstration, members were instructed by their leadership to support it.¹²⁴ In Kitchener-Waterloo between sixty and eighty people chose not to make the trip to

Canadian Tribune, 11 April 1966; both in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312, Stacks 10 and 7 respectively.

¹²² Harding, "Notes," *SUPA Newsletter*.

¹²³ Maurice Rush, "International Days of Protest: Peace Marches Across Canada," *Canadian Tribune*, Clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312, Stack 5, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

¹²⁴ Russ Rothney, "Notes from the Lakehead," *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 2, No. 6, 19 April 1966, 15; RCMP Memo, R. McKiman, S/Insp, 12 May 1966, Winnipeg. In CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information

Ottawa and staged their own local protest, marching from the Waterloo Public Library to Kitchener City Hall. Those participating included students and faculty from local universities, Mennonites and Quakers.¹²⁵ In St. Catharines United Church minister and former Welland NDP candidate Robert Wright joined with Bill Cousintine, an NDP activist and member of UAW Local 199, in establishing a local Vietnam Day Committee in early March. Cousintine led the committee. He had attended the 19 February conference in Toronto on behalf of his union local, which had subsequently pledged \$200 to assist in travel to the Ottawa march. In addition, the St. Catharines and District Labour Council had pledged \$100. The VDC planned on sending three buses. Representatives from two locals of the UAW, as well as their women's auxiliaries planned to attend. Labour's support for the St. Catharines VDC, however, was divided. The Committee had experienced significant local opposition to their activism. Earlier in the month it had been forced to cancel a speaking engagement of Staughton Lynd for fear of the building being picketed, though later it was claimed that Lynd was simply unable to make the engagement. Similarly, fear of pickets forced the VDC to keep secret the point of departure of its buses heading for Ottawa. Several disgruntled members of Local 199, as well as some of the executive members of the labour council, wrote letters protesting the support for the VDC, stating that the Ottawa march was Communist-inspired. When the proposal to fund the buses going to Ottawa was taken to the members of Local 199, they voted it down. Similarly, when a motion to rescind the previous pledge to the VDC went before the labour council the majority voted in favour. However, because a motion to

Application A2006-0312, Stack 12, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA.

¹²⁵ "Canada a Growing," *Sanity*, 7; "Police out in force as demonstrators march on Hill to protest Vietnam War," *The Globe and Mail*, March 28, 1966. Clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312, Stack 7, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA.

rescind requires a two thirds majority, the resolution failed by one vote. The acrimony was fed by division within the NDP federal caucus where half the members opposed the march because Communists were allowed to participate. The St. Catharines and District Labour Council was not unique in its failure to support the 26 March protest. The Metro Toronto Labour Council also narrowly defeated a motion to support the demonstrations. In contrast, district labour councils in Vancouver, Oakville and Sarnia all passed resolutions in support of the protest.¹²⁶ But it is important to note that the 26 March protests were not limited to Ontario and western Canada.

The second International Days of Protest to End the War in Vietnam provided an entry point for antiwar activism in Maritime Canada. On 18 January the University of New Brunswick Saint John's campus student union sponsored a public panel on Vietnam at St. Malachy's High School. Three hundred attended. The panellists' opinions ranged from advocating sending Canadian troops to assist their American cousins, to complete withdrawal of all foreign troops. Advocating the latter position was Barry Lord, an art curator at a local museum. He had moved to Saint John from Hamilton, Ontario, in 1964. Lord had graduated from McMaster University with a degree in philosophy and had later studied art in Europe on a Canada Council grant, winning numerous distinctions including a Governor General's Gold Medal and a Woodrow Wilson Scholarship at Harvard. In addition to advocating the withdrawal of troops at the panel, Lord also volunteered to help establish a local group to oppose the war. He received enough

¹²⁶“Canada a Growing,” *Sanity*, 7; “Cross-Canada Mobilization,” *Workers' Vanguard*; “Lynd's visit is cancelled after threats,” *The Globe and Mail*, 21 March 1966. Clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00327, Disc 1, Stack 1, Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee; also, “Viet Nam Protest Denied UAW Aid,” *St. Catharines Standard*, 10 March 1966; Tony Hodgkinson, “Viet Nam Peace Promoter For March Sabotaged, Says Support By Red-Baiting,” *St. Catharines Standard*, 11 March 1966; “Labor Council Still Supports Viet Nam Protest in Ottawa,” *St. Catharines Standard*, 15 March 1966. All clippings in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00312, Stacks 4 & 5, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA. See also Moffat, *History*, 180.

support that on 18 March he presided over a meeting of thirty people to found Saint John CEWV.

From its start Saint John CEWV was largely a one-man show featuring Lord. Most of the work involved a series of letters to the editor in the local press responding to his detractors. The first project Saint John CEWV took on was the March International Days of Protest. As part of the lead up to the event Saint John CEWV distributed copies of "Farley Mowat Speaks Out on Canada's Role in Vietnam." The 12-page document contained the text of Mowat's address to the 19 February conference in Toronto, which Toronto CEWV had published. Rather than organize a protest, the group hosted a public meeting on the evening of Friday, 25 March in the Main Ballroom of the Holiday Inn on Market Square. Between fifty and seventy people attended, thirty of them students, and at least one of them an RCMP agent. The meeting featured six people speaking against the war. Afterwards eighteen of those in attendance chose to sign a petition; so ended the International Days of Protest in the Maritimes.

As a footnote to the International Days of Protest, Saint John CEWV began planning for the next international protests to be held 6 August on the anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima. Saint John CEWV's contribution involved placing posters on the highway between Saint John and the US border crossing at St. Stephen. In addition, they placed handbills in the windshields of cars. Lord left Saint John in September, moving to Toronto. With his departure Saint John CEWV became inactive. While others attempted to re-start the organization in March 1968, it failed within a couple of months. In closing

the file on Saint John CEWV, an RCMP staff member noted that he was unaware of any “Communist penetration” of the group.¹²⁷

The International Days of Protest, in particular the March 1966 ones, represented a new phase in the Canadian movement. First, they demonstrated that a national campaign against the war could be launched in Canada. While admittedly this was largely an urban phenomenon, many smaller communities participated from coast to coast. Second, the International Days of Protest witnessed the entry of organized labour into the antiwar movement in Canada. In addition to providing meeting places for antiwar gatherings to take place, the labour movement often provided speakers for meetings and rallies. It also provided bodies at such events. Union activists began to take an active role in organizing the movement in Canada, which previously had been the purview of leftists, academics and students. Finally, the International Days of Protest showed that a wide range of groups of varying ideologies could work together in such a project. While many of these groups were sworn enemies, they were able, at least temporarily, to put aside differences for the larger goal. Perhaps this is best illustrated with the praise the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the Communist Party had for the NDY for the leadership role it played in the campaign. In a letter to its provincial and regional offices the NEC asserted that due to NDY efforts:

¹²⁷ RCMP Report, “Protests and Demonstrations Re: US Actions in Vietnam, Canada – Saint John, New Brunswick,” 20 January 1966; “Local Man Forming War Protest Committee,” *Evening Times Globe*, 12 February 1966; “Speakers Express Views Against Vietnamese War,” *Evening Times Globe*, 26 March 1966; Barry Lord, “CEWV Formed in Saint John,” *Canada-Vietnam Newsletter*, July 1966; RCMP Report, “National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA,” 28 March 1966; “Farley Mowat Speaks Out on Canada’s Role in Vietnam,” carded 17 March 1966; RCMP Organizational Assessment Form, 24 January 1972; RCMP Report, “Protests and Demonstrations Re: US Action in Viet Nam – New Brunswick, 8 August 1966. All documents in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00309, Part” 7, Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Saint John, NB. Lord would later distinguish himself at Expo 67 in Montreal during an appearance there by US President Lyndon Johnson. Lord shouted at him “Murderer” and “Bloody butcher.” He was immediately pounced upon by security personnel, evicted from the grounds, and subsequently fined \$100 for disturbing the peace. See Palmer, *Canada’s 1960s*, 428.

Vietnam is firmly established as an issue in Canadian politics, and one that is being carried forward by forces reaching far beyond us, while we ourselves are able to play an increasing role in the (broad) movement.¹²⁸

The NEC letter, however, went on to caution Party members on the differences between Communists and others. On the right it warned of those in the NDP who were “fighting, at times desperately, to stem the tides running to united action.” It also made mention of the “ultra-left,” which, while not indicating who that was (likely the Maoist Progressive Labour), advised of their divisive activities. Finally, the NEC warned of the Trotskyists, whom they accused of seeking to turn the antiwar movement away from its broad, flexible basis towards a rigidly structured membership organization. The letter gave clear direction to its comrades in the antiwar movement: “These elements will have to be defeated and isolated through the exposure of their false arguments, and in this the exemplary work of our party members can be a key factor.”¹²⁹ The NEC’s arguments represent a recurring tension within the antiwar movement, and not just one experienced by the Communists. On the one hand NEC members were committed to building as broad and inclusive an antiwar coalition as possible. On the other, they were committed to acting as the vanguard of this movement.

The NEC insisted on singleness of purpose on Vietnam. Party members were directed not to complicate the antiwar cause by attempting to bring other issues such as NATO or West German militarism into the debate. “It is important in this connection,” the letter continued, “to appreciate the vital role of an organization like the Canadian Peace Congress, which maintains its independent work while striving to build unity

¹²⁸ Correspondence, National Executive Committee, Communist Party of Canada, to Provinces and Regions, April 1966. In CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application a2006-00312, Stack 10, National Coordination [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam, USA.

¹²⁹ Correspondence, National Executive Committee, Communist Party of Canada, to Provinces and Regions, April 1966.

around Vietnam.” The NEC was hesitant to pursue a national antiwar committee for fear it would weaken the work being done on the local level. With regards to labour, it recognized a need to develop and formalize ties, especially outside of Toronto. Finally, taking a page from Norman Bethune’s work in Spain and China a generation earlier, the NEC recognized and encouraged the development of medical aid to Vietnam committees.¹³⁰ This was an area where churches in particular would play a significant role.

Our discussion so far has focussed on the overwhelmingly secular aspects of the movement, but as we have seen, clergy were often prominent in antiwar rallies and marches. Several faith communities played varying roles. Again, this paralleled the movement in the United States. As early as 1963 the Ministers’ Committee on Vietnam placed an ad in the *New York Times* protesting the sacrifice of American lives for a “regime universally regarded as unjust, undemocratic, and unstable.” The committee included America’s two leading Protestant theologians, Reinhold Niebuhr and Harry Emerson Fosdick. The twelve clergy signing the letter claimed to represent the support of 17,000 priests, pastors and rabbis. During the 1964 presidential election several religious journals, fearing a Goldwater victory would lead to a major war in Indochina, broke from their established practice of non-partisanship and openly endorsed Johnson. In May of 1965 the Interreligious Committee on Vietnam held a silent vigil at the Pentagon. That summer the General Synod of the United Church of Christ passed a resolution supporting UN Secretary General U Thant’s call for a political and diplomatic solution to the crisis in Vietnam. By the end of the year the National Council of Churches, the Catholic Peace

¹³⁰ Correspondence, National Executive Committee, Communist Party of Canada, to Provinces and Regions, April 1966.

Fellowship, FOR, and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations had all passed resolutions critical of US policy in Vietnam. Further, throughout 1965 several individuals claiming religious motivations took their own lives to protest the war. In response to increasing attacks on antiwar protesters by the administration, one hundred New York clergy signed a declaration in the fall of 1965 lambasting the administration's actions. Composed of Protestant, Catholic and Jewish clerics, the group signed the declaration Clergy Concerned about Vietnam. By January 1966 the group had grown beyond the confines of New York and become the National Emergency Committee of Clergy Concerned about Vietnam. Later it would include other religious members and become Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV) and would play a significant role in the overall antiwar movement in the United States.¹³¹

In Canada, no equivalent of CALCAV emerged, but there was no lack of religious opposition to the war. One of the first religious organizations to become active in the antiwar movement was the Student Christian Movement (SCM). The SCM was established over the Christmas holidays at a conference in Guelph, Ontario, in 1920-1921, largely through the efforts of the YMCA and the YWCA. Actually, to refer to the organization as religious is not entirely accurate. A campus-based organization, from its start it was coeducational and ecumenical, and open as well to those simply "curious." The CSM was committed to a fellowship based on Christian convictions and concerns and community action with a world-wide fellowship. As early as 1923, peace was an important issue for SCM. In 1961 its National Council recommended to its local branches to support the work of CUCND on their respective campuses. In 1963 SCM limited its

¹³¹ Mitchell Hall, *Because of their Faith: CALCAV and Religious Opposition to the Vietnam War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 1-13.

peace activity to exclusively working with CUCND.¹³² Following the transition of CUCND into SUPA, and the escalation of the American war in Vietnam, SCM chapters frequently involved themselves with antiwar activities, usually by co-sponsoring local demonstrations. The SCM was one of the first organizations to condemn the war and Canada's complicity in it. In February 1965, as US bombers pulverized targets in the DRV, the National Council of SCM voted to send a letter to Parliament calling on it to support a call to halt the bombing, end the sale of Canadian arms to the United States, recognize the NLF, and reconvene the Geneva Conference. As with other constituencies beginning to involve themselves in the antiwar movement – notably labour and the democratic left – SCM was divided over Vietnam. The motion only carried by a margin of 18:13.¹³³

Activism by non-student religious groups began in earnest in spring 1965. On 25 April activists held a public meeting at Don Heights Unitarian Church in Toronto. Representatives of local Quaker, Unitarian, United and Anglican churches attended. In addition, representatives of Voice of Women, the World Federalists and various (but unspecified) peace groups were present. The meeting resulted in the establishment of the Canadian Committee on Vietnam (CCV) with the Reverend Alfred H. Fowlie as its chair and Helen Constance Wilks its secretary. The organization condemned on humanitarian grounds the bombing of the DRV and called for a silent vigil to be held on Parliament Hill 15 May to protest US policy in Vietnam.¹³⁴ The vigil attracted eighty participants and, according to the RCMP, the attention of suspected underground members of the

¹³² Margaret Beattie, *A Brief History of the Student Christian Movement in Canada, 1921-1974* (Toronto: Student Christian Movement, 1975), 8-9, 15-19.

¹³³ Beattie, *Brief History*, 32-35.

¹³⁴ RCMP Headquarters Transit Slip, Secret, to S/Sgt. Leask, 16 September 1965, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00300, Canadian Committee on Vietnam, Part 1.

Ottawa area Communist Party. (Despite the initial fears of the RCMP, the force later concluded that the CCV was primarily a Quaker and Unitarian-led group with no ties to subversive organizations.) Leaders handed External Affairs Minister Martin a petition demanding government debate on Vietnam. Martin responded by accusing the DRV of aggression and refused to condemn US bombings. Following the demonstration Ottawa activists established a branch of the CCV in that city. Later a Victoria branch was added.¹³⁵

The Society of Friends, commonly known as Quakers, was visible in the early days of the antiwar movement in Canada, specifically its political action arm, the Canadian Friends Service Committee (CFSC). In June 1965 it sponsored a public conference at Carleton University to explore, “concern for the people of Vietnam and to consider what Canadians can do to achieve peace in Vietnam.” The program outlined three areas for discussion: foreign policy, new kinds of direct action, and direct aid to Vietnam. As part of the lead up to the conference CFSC sponsored a public presentation at Carleton on 2 June entitled “Report on Vietnam.” Between 300 and 600 people attended. The conference itself was attended by 150 individuals from twenty three Canadian towns and cities representing as many organizations. The conference adopted five key recommendations: that Canada adopt an independent foreign policy and stop supplying weapons to the United States, that Canada urge the United States to start unconditional negotiations with the NLF, that all parties return to the principles of the Geneva Accords, and that Canada increase aid to Southeast Asia and recognize the

¹³⁵ “Stop the escalation is call of vigil on Parliament Hill,” *Canadian Tribune*, 24 May 1965, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00300, Canadian Committee on Vietnam, Part 1; “Demonstrations in Ottawa,” *Unity (Jedinstvo)*, 21 May 1965, clipping in same file; RCMP Report, Re: 15 May 1965 Ottawa Demonstration, in same file; RCMP Transit Slip, 16 September.

People's Republic of China. Such aid would be direct aid to all parts of Vietnam – North, South, as well as those areas of the Republic of Vietnam controlled by the NLF. The conference's final recommendation was to establish a national coordinating committee to end the war in Vietnam.¹³⁶ As we shall see, such an organization never did come about in Canada. Throughout the duration of the Vietnam War opposition in Canada remained locally driven.

Another result of the conference was the establishment of the Vo Thanh Minh Peace Committee. Its purpose was to foster and promote a peace mission to both North and South Vietnam. The committee was composed of nine members from three cities and chaired by the Reverend Donald Heap, an Anglican priest from Toronto. Dr. Vo, from whom the committee took its name, was a former professor of Far Eastern culture in Vietnam. Vo had left his homeland in 1949 during the war with France to advocate neutrality and independence for his country. Upon the withdrawal of the French he was offered cabinet positions in the governments of both Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai, both of which he declined.¹³⁷

The fate of the committee, and Dr. Vo's mission to Vietnam, is not known, but the CFSC continued in its humanitarian efforts towards Vietnam. The Quakers worked with their US counterpart, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). The AFSC raised funds in the US for medical aid to Vietnam, a cause, we have seen, championed by the Communist Party. In order to circumvent US restrictions on trading with the enemy, the AFSC would send the money to the CFSC to purchase and ship supplies to Vietnam.

¹³⁶ "Public Conference on Vietnam," *Sanity*, Vol. 2, No. 9, June 1965, 1; also "Canadian Initiative," *Sanity*, Vol. 2, No. 10, July 1965, 7.

¹³⁷ "Canadian Peace Mission to Vietnam," *Sanity*, Vol. 2, No. 10, July 1965, 7. This article gives Heap's first name as Donald. Heap would later go by the first name Dan and be elected to be a long-serving NDP MP for the riding of Spadina.

The US government warned Canadian banks with branches south of the border that they would be charged with trading with the enemy if US cheques for such purposes were cashed. Still, the first shipment of medical supplies, valued at \$3,600 left Montreal on 9 September 1966 aboard the USSR-registered Alexander Pushkin. Aid was distributed in South Vietnam by the Quakers themselves, and by the Red Cross in the DRV and NLF-held areas of the South. A subsequent voyage of the Pushkin was scheduled for 12 October.¹³⁸ The Quakers' efforts increased through the course of the war, becoming part of an international effort titled Medical Aid for Vietnam. Despite such efforts, it should be noted that humanitarian aid for the war's victims in and of itself does not constitute opposition to the war.

One of the most prominent clerics in Canada to come out early against the war was the Reverend J. R. Hord, Secretary of the Board of Evangelism and Social Service of the United Church of Canada. While the United Church as a body had not yet taken a stand on the war in August 1965, Hord issued a personal statement condemning the war and America's role in it. Titled "The Christian Conscience and the War in Viet Nam: A Personal Statement," Hord asserted:

The most urgent crisis facing the Christian conscience at the present time is the war in Viet Nam. Personally, I believe it is an unnecessary war; it is a particularly evil war; it is a war that should stop.¹³⁹

¹³⁸ "Friends Continue to Aid Vietnam," *Sanity*, Vol. 4, No. 1, October 1966, 8; "Quakers continue to send medical supplies to Viet Nam, *The Varsity*, 14 October 1966, 1.

¹³⁹ "The Christian Conscience and the War in Viet Nam: A Personal Statement by Reverend J.R. Hord, Secretary, Board of Evangelism and Social Service, United Church of Canada, 9 August 1965," in Ann Buttrick Papers, MS Coll 385, Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto, Box 8, File 7; also in VOW, Vol. 6, File 2, Vietnam General, 1965-1968.

While Hord's statement may not have made an impact on the Government of Canada, it most likely did on the United Church of Canada which soon after adopted a similar position.¹⁴⁰

Although the Roman Catholic Church in Canada did not join in opposition to the war, a group calling itself Canadian Catholic Educators did. In 1966 it sent "An Appeal to End the War in Vietnam" to the Canadian Government. Joining other organizations, it called for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference and a cease-fire leading to a negotiated peace among all participants. Attempting to be more objective, it called for both a bombing halt of the North and for the DRV to refrain from infiltrating soldiers into the South. Finally, it called for an undertaking by all sides in favour of self-determination for the Vietnamese people, the eventual withdrawal of all foreign troops, followed by neutralization of an area agreed upon by the concerned parties.¹⁴¹

Likewise, the Anglican Church of Canada took a moderate approach.¹⁴²

Of mainstream churches in Canada, the United Church was by far the most steadfast in opposition to the war. In 1966 it passed a resolution calling on the Government of Canada to use its influence on the ICC to seek a cease-fire, not to support the United States' war effort with men, material or statements of support, and that civilian aid be sent to both the DRV and the South. The resolution was forwarded to the Canadian

¹⁴⁰ Hord, "Christian Conscience." It is curious that Hord used the phrase "Viet Cong," a pejorative term used by the South Vietnamese government for the NLF and widely used by the Americans. Perhaps Hord felt it was the more familiar term that the Canadian public would recognize.

¹⁴¹ "A Memorandum to the Canadian Government by Canadian Catholic Educators – An Appeal to End the War in Vietnam," ca. 1966, published by Canadian Peace Congress, VOW, MG-28, I-218, Vol. 6, File 10, Vietnam Resources Material, 1965-1966. Other than this source, nothing is known of this group.

¹⁴² "Anglican Executive Takes Action," *United Church of Canada Newsletter*, Vol. 9, No. 4, April 1966, clipping in VOW, Vol. 6, File 10; Vietnam Resources Material, 1965-1966, VOW, Vol. 8, File 14.

Council of Churches where it was adopted.¹⁴³ Continuing his leadership role on Vietnam within the United Church, the Reverend J.R. Hord published an even more scathing critique of Canadian complicity in Vietnam than his earlier “Personal Statement.” Titled “The American Rape of Vietnam,” Hord reiterated most of the recommendations of the Canadian Council of Churches. Responding to Minister of External Affairs Paul Martin’s claims that Canada was powerless to limit arms sales to the United States due to the Defence Production Sharing Agreement between the two countries, Hord called for a review of the agreement. He also cited the recent convention decision of the Canadian Labour Congress calling for an end to the war. “The United States, and also Canada by our silence and complicity,” he stated, “is losing the respect of the world and is forfeiting her right to leadership among nations.”¹⁴⁴

So far our discussion of Canadian religious opposition to the Vietnam War has centered on Christian denominations. This is largely due to the fact that in 1965-1966 Canada was an overwhelmingly Christian country. Canada’s new policy of multiculturalism was still several years away. In addition to Christians, Unitarians were often present in local demonstrations. Canada’s second largest religion – Judaism – was markedly absent from the antiwar movement. While many rabbis were prominent in the antiwar movement in the United States, the only one who rose to prominence in Canada was Abraham Feinberg of Holy Blossom Temple in Toronto. This was pointed out in a

¹⁴³ “Vietnam War Condemned by Canadian Council and Member Denominations,” *United Church of Canada Newsletter*, Vol. 9, No. 4, April 1966, 1, clipping in VOW, Vol. 8, File 14; “The World Council of Churches (Resolution passed 16 February 1966),” in same issue; also “Canada and Vietnam,” pamphlet published by Victoria Committee on Canadian Responsibility in Vietnam, Victoria, BC, in VOW, Vol. 6, File 3, Vietnam General (3) 1965-1968. Also pamphlet, “What the United Church Said – War in Vietnam,” VOW, Vol. 6, File 2, Vietnam General (2) – 1965-1968.

¹⁴⁴ “The American Rape of Vietnam,” by Reverend J. Ray Hord, Secretary, Board of Evangelism and Social Service, United Church of Canada, Ottawa, 29 June 1966. Published by Enduring Peace, Inc, Woodmont, Connecticut, in VOW, Vol. 6, File 2, Vietnam General, (2) – 1965-1968.

pamphlet published by the United Jewish People's Order. The UJPO, in addition to being a secular Jewish organization, had historic ties to CPC. Although the two organizations had parted ways after 1956, the UJPO remained solidly left in its political orientation and could be expected to follow the party line on Vietnam. Regardless, their points were valid. "The 'official' attitude in Canada," the UJPO complained, "seems to be that 'Peace' is not a concern of organized Canadian Jewry." Pointing out the antiwar efforts of peace and fraternal organizations, the labour movement and journalists, the group called upon all Jewish Canadians "to take part in this campaign for an end to the Vietnamese holocaust." They commended Tommy Douglas for his "fighting reply" to Paul Martin in the House of Commons debates of 28 March 1965, and urged readers that the speech should be required reading for all Canadians. Joining with other voices, the UJPO called on the Prime Minister to stop the export of all military equipment to the United States for use in Vietnam and to urge the US to de-escalate the attack on Vietnam, withdraw its forces, and stop the bombing of the DRV. They also called upon the Canadian Jewish Congress to take appropriate action. "Let not history say of us, as it does of the German people, that we allowed this crime to continue because we were silent when we should have protested."¹⁴⁵

By the summer of 1966 the antiwar movement in Canada had developed into a national movement. Canadians took active, concrete measures to oppose the war from Vancouver Island to New Brunswick, speaking against the war in both English and French. Retaining its support from radical left organizations such as the Communist Party and the League for Socialist Action, it also continued to receive support from established

¹⁴⁵ Jack Cowan, "The World Speaks Out for Peace," Pamphlet put out by the National Committee of the United Jewish People's Order, Toronto, in VOW, Vol. 6, File 2, Vietnam General (2), 1965-1968.

peace groups in Canada, as well as the new left. Increasingly the antiwar message was being preached from pulpits. Among social democrats there was more of a waffling on Vietnam. While the leader of the NDP opposed American intervention in Vietnam, only half of his caucus was behind him on this position. The youth wing of the party was more solidly in support of the antiwar movement, but often lacked the discipline and organizational skills to get their members into the streets. While displaying notable leadership in the March International Days of Protest to End the War in Vietnam, it was by no means the sole proprietor of the campaign in Canada. Of particular note during this period, and especially with regard to the International Days of Protest, was the increasing role taken on by organized labour. Most significant about this growing national movement was that it was part of a much larger international one. The International Days of Protest, particularly those held in March 1966, not only enlarged the antiwar movement beyond all previous levels, but established Canada as a member of the international community in opposition to American intervention in Vietnam. Accompanying such growth were significant growing pains.

Chapter Four: Mobilization

On 25 July 1966 an unnamed RCMP officer filed a report on a meeting of the Toronto branch of the League for Socialist Action held at its headquarters on Cumberland Street five days earlier. Ian Angus chaired. Regula Modlich conducted an educational session on the topic “The Need for a Vanguard Party.” While there were many items on the agenda, the most significant was the antiwar movement. Bea Bryant reported that she had formed a York (University) CEWV. The Trotskyists now controlled at least seven member groups on the TCC. In addition to the LSA itself, these included the CEWVs at York and the University of Toronto, the East, Midtown, and West Toronto CEWVs, as well as the local Student Association to End the War in Vietnam. As the TCC functioned as a coalition on a one vote per member organization basis, the Trotskyists controlled a sizable bloc of votes. Gus Tolentino, a local radiologist who would travel to the DRV later that year as part of the Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal, also spoke on the party’s antiwar work. He reported that the executive had decided that the peace fraction – LSA members who functioned within the larger antiwar movement as an organized, but secret, caucus – must have a set time to meet every week.¹ The LSA peace fraction is a good illustration of the vanguardist nature of the LSA’s antiwar work. Peace fraction meetings – group meetings where the correct party line would be determined in advance of such conferences – would take place at Youth House, the headquarters for the Toronto Youth Local, the local youth wing of the LSA. Ironically, Youth House was located at 22 Cecil Street, next door to 24, the headquarters of their sworn enemies, the Communist

¹ RCMP Report, “League for Socialist Action,” Toronto, 25 July 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00313, Stack 13, Toronto Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, Ontario; RCMP Report, “League for Socialist Action,” 27 October 1966 in same file, stack 8.

Party of Canada. The importance of the peace fraction was driven home by Joan Newbigging who reported on the Ontario Youth Conference held at Hart House at the University of Toronto on 16 July. Entitled “Vietnam and the Antiwar Movement,” the 160 participants heard from two prominent American antiwar activists – Dorothy Day of the Catholic Workers’ Movement and Gus Horowitz of the Socialist Workers’ Party. On the positive side Newbigging indicated that the Trotskyist movement was able to successfully obscure its role in organizing the conference. On the negative side LSA members had not been attending their fraction meetings. The result was that party members were unaware of the correct line to support and ended up arguing against each other. Newbigging further indicated that the University of Toronto CEWV was a potential pool of recruits for the LSA. One of the results of the conference was the establishment of a committee to look into a national students’ day against the war in Vietnam.²

Notable about this report is that it gives a clear view as to how the LSA operated within the larger antiwar movement. While such tactics appear to be common knowledge among antiwar activists, rarely is documentary evidence available that confirms such practices. We saw in the previous chapter that the Communist Party operated in a similarly secretive way. The LSA’s contribution to the antiwar movement was complex, demonstrating both positive and negative qualities. In addition to its secretiveness was its penchant for attempting to take over coalitions by merely creating more member organizations (and therefore votes). Also, it upset more legitimate coalition partners by distributing Trotskyist literature at antiwar events despite previously promising not to.

² RCMP Report, “League for Socialist Action,” Toronto, 25 July 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00313, Stack 13, Toronto Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, Ontario.

According to Gary Moffat the Trotskyists were the only organization guilty of such practices.³ But these qualities must be balanced against their firm discipline, strong work ethic, and unquestionable commitment to the cause of peace in Vietnam. Recognizing only their negative qualities, the Toronto and Vancouver antiwar coalitions expelled the main Trotskyist groups in the summer of 1966.

In the spring of that year the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade in New York called for national and international actions for 6-9 August to commemorate the 1945 nuclear attack on Hiroshima and to protest the war in Vietnam.⁴ In Toronto the TCC began preparations for actions at border crossings along the Niagara River, while in Vancouver the Peace Action League⁵ began preparations for a rally at the Peace Arch Park on the Canada-US border near Blaine, Washington.⁶ Expecting to work with the PAL under the umbrella of the Peace Coordinating Committee, the Vietnam Day Committee, a Trotskyist-dominated group of about one hundred and sixty members, found itself excluded from preparations. According to the VDC they were excluded due to rumours and petty gossip to the effect that they were “impolite, unreliable, and hard to work with.” Also there were accusations that they had set up a literature table at a recent event sponsored by the coalition where it had been previously agreed by the partners that this would not be done. Another accusation was that the VDC had been involved in a flag-burning incident at the US

³ Moffat, *History*, 185.

⁴ “Notices,” *SUPA Newsletter*, Vol. 2, No. 9, 15 June 1966, 2.

⁵ Not to be confused with the Victoria PAL, the Vancouver Peace Action League was an antiwar coalition made up of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Voice of Women, the British Columbia Peace Council, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, and the Society of Friends. See leaflet dated 28 November 1966 in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-99318, Peace Action League, Vancouver, BC.

⁶ The protest at the Peace Arch Park became something of an annual affair, with anti-Vietnam demonstrations taking place there during the week of 6 August in 1966, 1967 and 1968. See RCMP Report “British Columbia Peace Council,” British Columbia, 9 August 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00318, Peace Action League, Vancouver, BC; also Poster, “Canadian-American Rally: No More Hiroshimas: Stop the War in Vietnam, Sunday, August 6, 1967,” in same file, and RCMP Report, “Protests and Demonstrations – British Columbia,” 19 August 1968 also in same file.

Consulate in April. The VDC pleaded ignorance on the first charge, and denied any involvement with the second.⁷

Similarly in Toronto Trotskyist groups were excluded from preparations for border actions around the 6 August actions. A few weeks later the TCC formally expelled the University of Toronto CEWV, the Student Association to End the War in Vietnam, the Toronto International Vietnam Day Committee and the Committee of Concerned New Democrats from the coalition. This was the result of a motion brought forward by the Toronto Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, the Toronto Peace Centre and Canadian Action for Peace. According to an article in *World Outlook*, likely a Trotskyist journal, the groups marked for exclusion were labelled as Trotskyist (implying they were not). The article went on to state that the actions taken against the excluded groups were “backed to the hilt, if not actually inspired, by the Communist Party.”⁸ Given previous internal Party pronouncements, they likely were, but proving such is near to impossible. Also, given the right-wing nature of the Toronto Committee for Nuclear Disarmament – one of the belligerents leading the charge for expulsion – it would appear that it was not only the Communist Party that wanted the Trotskyists out of the coalition. Gary Moffat described the TCND as philosophically inclined to oligarchy, virulently anti-Communist, and fully committed to Canadian membership in NATO.⁹ The antiwar movement seemed to make for strange bedfellows.

⁷ RCMP Headquarters Transit Slip, 13 September 1966, CSIS, RG 146 Access to Information Request A-2006-00327, Stack 6, Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee; *Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee Newsletter*, 9 July 1966 in same file, stack 5.

⁸ P. Kent, “‘Multi-Issue’ Advocates Split Antiwar Movement in Canada,” *World Outlook*, 30 September 1966. While the article also asserts that Trotskyist organizations were also expelled from other antiwar coalitions across Canada, it does not specify where. It is hard to imagine where else in Canada they might have been expelled as coalitions outside of Vancouver and Montreal were fairly small affairs and the League for Socialist Action did not appear to be very strong in Montreal.

⁹ See Moffat, *History*, 99.

The Trotskyists' interpretation of their expulsion was based on the program that they pursued regarding the antiwar movement. Their slogans "Withdraw Troops Now" and "End Canadian Complicity" accurately summed up the line of the LSA. The program pursued by the Communist Party and their pacifist allies included calls for negotiations, a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam, and a return to the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords. It was these differences, the LSA newspaper *Labor Challenge* asserted, that were at the root of the expulsion of the Trotskyists from the antiwar movement: "Unable to carry their position in honest, open debate, they resorted to arbitrary expulsions, which set back the struggle."¹⁰

An article in the Maoist *Progressive Worker*, however, helps explain the sudden antagonism towards Trotskyists by the larger antiwar movement. While crediting the (Vancouver) VDC for its excellent work in the 26 March demonstrations, the Progressive Workers Movement accused the League for Socialist Action of subsequently stacking a membership meeting of the VDC and effectively "capturing" the organization for the LSA. The VDC was now nothing more than a mouthpiece for the LSA, claimed the Maoists. The PWM asserted the proposals advanced by the VDC "are in fact those decided on by the League for Socialist Action and only formally proposed by the Vietnam Day Committee." The Maoists complained that they had had similar experiences with the LSA in their involvement with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.¹¹ In short, the

¹⁰ Carl Fleming and Joe Young, "Seven Years of Struggle to End the War," *Labor Challenge*, 9 August 1971. Reproduced in *The Canadian Antiwar Movement, 1965-1971*, in Socialist History Project, <http://www.socialisthistoryproject.ca/Docs/1961-/Vietnam/SevenYears.htm>, 3-4, accessed 16 October 2006. Note: Carl Fleming was the nom de plume for George Addison.

¹¹ "Reply to V.D.C. Open Letter," *Progressive Worker*, October 1966, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Request A-2006-00327, Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee, Stack 6.

Trotskyist groups were expelled by the other member groups of Canada's two largest antiwar coalitions for fear of being entirely taken over by them.

The 6 August border rallies went ahead despite the absence of Trotskyist participation. At the Peace Arch Park on the Washington-British Columbia border 800 turned up to hear recently elected NDP MP Grace MacInnis speak against the war. MacInnis, daughter of CCF founding leader J.S. Woodsworth and widow of CCF/NDP party stalwart Angus MacInnis, was well-known in her own right as both an activist in women's issues and as a former British Columbia MLA. In addition, a telegram from NDP leader Tommy Douglas was read. Paddy Neale, Secretary-Treasurer of the Vancouver Labour Council, chaired the event.¹² In Ontario, the TCC, in cooperation with antiwar groups in Toronto, St. Catharines, Hamilton and London, as well as several individuals from the US, launched a coordinated assault of 600 demonstrators, picketing border crossings at Fort Erie, Niagara Falls, and Queenston, as well as the Cyanamid plant, a chemical factory in Niagara Falls involved in production of war materials for use in Vietnam. Afterwards the four groups converged for a rally at a local school where Rabbi Abraham Feinberg and former Voice of Women president Thérèse Casgrain addressed them before remounting their buses and returning home.¹³

Having been excluded from the activities, Trotskyists in the antiwar movement did not remain idle. The University of Toronto CEWV designated 11-12 November as

¹² RCMP Report, "B.C. Peace Council," British Columbia, 9 August 1966, CSIS, RG 146 Access to Information Application A-2006-00318, Peace Action League, Victoria; poster, "Canadian-American Rally to Stop the War in Vietnam Now and Memorial to the Victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki," CPC, Box 49, File 10.

¹³ RCMP Report, "Protests and Demonstrations Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam – Ontario," Niagara Falls, 9 August 1966, CSIS, RG 146 A-2006-00313, University of Toronto Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, ON, Stack 4; brochure, "All Out to End the War! Saturday, 6 August 1966," Kenny, Box 54, File 1.

Canadian Student Days of Protest to End the War in Vietnam.¹⁴ Not surprisingly the Vancouver VDC was one of the many organizations that endorsed the campaign. In all, nineteen antiwar groups, mostly student in nature and almost all of them under Trotskyist control, joined the November protests across Canada.¹⁵

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Canadian Student Days of Protest to End the War in Vietnam was the role of women in leadership positions. Outside of the Voice of Women this was rare in the antiwar movement at the time. In Toronto Judy Oleniuk co-chaired the University of Toronto CEWV. In Vancouver Sharon Hagar chaired the VDC.¹⁶ This could be interpreted in one of several ways. To give the LSA credit, we could see it as quite progressive on their part to engineer the election of women to these positions. To be less cynical, we can credit the open-mindedness of the membership of these organizations in 1966 to elect women. To be particularly cynical, one could assert that it did not matter who chaired these organizations because any decisions they made had already been decided upon by the LSA. The fact remains that two of the most important antiwar organizations in Canada in 1966 were led by women.

¹⁴ "Days of Protest," *Brunswickan*, 6 October 1966, 7. Although not all members of the University of Toronto CEWV were members of the LSA, the leadership of the organization was controlled by a core of LSA members including Gordon Doctorow, Karen Kopperud, Judy Oleniuk, Mitch Podolak (Podoluk?) and Colleen Levis. See RCMP Organizational Assessment Form, University of Toronto Committee to End the War in Vietnam, 22 February 1967, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00131, Toronto Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, Ontario, Stack 7.

¹⁵ These included Sir George Williams CEWV, Carleton CEWV, Ottawa CEWV, McGill CEWV, York CEWV, East, West and Mid-town (Toronto) CEWVs; London CEWV, London SAWV, Ottawa SAWV, University of Western Ontario CEWV, Winnipeg Committee for Peace in Vietnam, Edmonton CEWV, Saskatoon Student CEWV, Vancouver VDC, University of British Columbia VDC, University of Edmonton [sic] New Democratic Youth, and the British Columbia Young New Democrats. In addition, actions were anticipated at Queen's University, Brock University, Fort William/Port Arthur, Regina and Calgary. See "Progress Report Number 3," in *Canadian Student Days of Protest, November 11-12*, 18 October 1966 in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00327, Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee, Stack 6.

¹⁶ "Progress Report Number 3," in *Canadian Student Days of Protest, November 11-12*, 18 October 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00327, Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee, Stack 6.

The demonstrations themselves were limited in their appeal. This might be due to the possibility of perceived irreverence towards Remembrance Day. As a student-focused campaign, it should be kept in mind that many within the target audience were the sons and daughters of those who two short decades earlier had been serving in World War Two. It would be one thing to protest against the war in Vietnam, but choosing to do so, on such a solemn occasion, ran the risk of alienating family members more than building the antiwar movement. Related to this was the dilemma faced by some students of which Remembrance Day activity to choose from – an antiwar protest or formal Remembrance Day services. For example, the previous year at the University of Toronto three separate Remembrance Day events were held – one by the University, one by the Student Administrative Council, and one by SUPA.¹⁷ One left-leaning publication, *The Conference Table*, in Kitchener, boasted that protests took place at every university in Canada. The evidence, however, does not bear this out. In locations where protests did take place numbers were most often low. A demonstration at the US Consulate in Toronto attracted only 200.¹⁸ This was in spite of tremendous mobilizing efforts on the part of the University of Toronto CEWV in the weeks leading up to the event. The organization printed thousands of leaflets, and boasted that every freshman and most other students received one. It staffed weekly literature tables every Wednesday. On Fridays it organized soap-box speeches on campus. CEWVs at Ryerson and York joined U of T CEWV in its efforts. The highlight of the mobilizing campaign leading up to the Toronto action was a featured talk by A.J. Muste, founder of the Fellowship of Reconciliation and considered the Grand Old Man of the American peace movement.

¹⁷ “U of T remembrances vary,” *The Varsity*, 12 November 1965

¹⁸ “Remembrance Day Activities,” *The Conference Table*, (Kitchener) December 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00314, Vietnam Action Committee, Stack 1.

Despite Muste drawing a crowd of 200, only that many attended the rally at the US Consulate.¹⁹

In comparison, protest activities in smaller communities often attracted a proportionally great number of protesters. One hundred and twenty five marched in London, at Lakehead 150. At Waterloo, instead of rallying, organizers hosted a screening of an antiwar film, attracting 250.²⁰ A vigil at Guelph was attended by six students and two faculty members. In Edmonton a demonstration at the cenotaph attracted less than ten and a threat of a “kick in the pants” from a woman attending the Remembrance Day ceremonies.²¹ In Vancouver the VDC hosted three days of activities, with an antiwar film on the Tuesday, a speaker on the Wednesday, and a “Bitch-In” or rally on the Friday. Although not formally joining in the VDC activities, the Communist Party-oriented Peace Action League sponsored a march on the cenotaph on Friday, 11 November.²² The only location that garnered a substantial number of demonstrators was Montreal where UGEQ embraced the 11 November demonstration. Six hundred students from McGill, Sir George, and the l’Université de Montréal joined with the Trotskyists and the UGEQ executive for a demonstration at Canadian Industries Limited (CIL), a

¹⁹ Judy Oleniuk, Co-Chairman, U of T CEWV, “Organizing and Acting Against the War – A Report from U of T,” *Canadian Student Days of Protest, November 11-12*, 18 October 1966, CSIS, RG 146 A-2006-00327, Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee, Disc 1, Stack 6; “Remembrance Day Activities,” *The Conference Table*.

²⁰ The film title was not indicated in the available sources. It is possible it was Canadian film maker Beryl Fox’s award-winning *Mills of the Gods*, which had been released the previous year. It is just as likely it was one of many independent films that were coming out of Vietnam at the time.

²¹ “Remembrance Day Activities,” *The Conference Table*, (Kitchener) December 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00314, Vietnam Action Committee, Stack 1; “No one listened: Remembrance Day protest fails,” *Gateway*, 16 November 1966, 1.

²² RCMP Report, “Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee,” Vancouver, BC, 3 November 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00327, Disc 1, Stack 6; ad, “Vietnam Week,” *Ubysssey*, 8 November 1966; RCMP Report, “Vancouver Peace Action League,” Vancouver, BC, 28 November 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00318. No numbers are available for demonstrations in Vancouver.

firm that produced ammunition and explosives for use in Vietnam.²³ Once again Montreal demonstrated a more intense opposition to the war as well as a unity of anglophone and francophone on the issue. There was no activity reported east of Montreal.²⁴

Disunity within the antiwar movement led to the relatively small numbers for the August and November actions. The reality was there were not enough activists to divide between two separate antiwar factions. Unity was necessary to mobilize mass actions – nationally and internationally. Divisiveness was evident in the larger movement in the United States. While many antiwar organizations there had supported a US version of the 6-9 August actions, the NCC, on the verge of collapse, had opposed the actions. In addition, the Berkeley VDC was itself coming apart at this time. When plans were finally formalized for the August actions they were local in scale. The New York-based Fifth Avenue Peace Parade, the main organizer of the August actions in the US deliberately chose not to employ the term International Days of Protest,²⁵ instead concentrating on domestic protest. The absence of international leadership combined with factionalism left Canadian antiwar protesters alone and divided. Compared to the mass outpouring of opposition to the war in Vietnam demonstrated across Canada in March, the August and November actions were anticlimactic, demonstrating an acute need for reconciliation.

²³ Kathy Houser and Danny Freedman, "Demonstrators march to Dominion Square," *McGill Daily*, 14 November 1966, 1,2.

²⁴ In addition to a review of RCMP files, no evidence of activism in Atlantic Canada at this time is revealed in a review of the student newspapers at Memorial, Dalhousie or the University of New Brunswick. The Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee published a list of participating antiwar organizations across the country. While the list included nineteen such organizations, all were from communities west of Montreal. See "Progress Report # 3," *Canadian Student Days of Protest, November 11-12*, 18 October 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00327, Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee, Disc 1, Stack 6.

²⁵ Halstead, *Out Now*, 200-201.

At a conference that December the TCC readmitted the Trotskyists to the coalition. *Labor Challenge* implied that the reason for the change of heart had to do with the impressive work done by the Trotskyists for the Canadian Student Days of Protest.²⁶ It was, however, more the self-interest of the TCC that led to the decision. Although the effectiveness of the Remembrance Day protests was questionable, what was not in question was the work ethic that the Trotskyists brought with them to the antiwar movement. Commenting on reunification of the TCC in December 1966, an RCMP investigator indicated that it was to the advantage of the TCC to readmit the Trotskyists:

With the admission of the Trots to the T.C.C., it is felt the Committee will begin to function on the same plan of activity and size as before the expulsion in late August, 1966. It is believed the readmission is an effort to save the T.C.C., as its effectiveness had declined following the removal of the Trots, who carried the greatest bulk of the work.²⁷

Indeed, this was high praise for the Trotskyists from the RCMP.

Following the implosion of the National Coordinating Committee in the United States, various antiwar groups attempted to bring about a new national antiwar organization at a conference at Western Reserve University in Cleveland in November 1966. An aging A. J. Muste, recently returned from his speaking engagement in Toronto, chaired the conference.²⁸ Although delegates to the Cleveland conference came from a wide variety of antiwar organizations, Trotskyists made up a near majority. The primary result of the conference was the establishment of the Spring Mobilization Committee to

²⁶ Carl Fleming and Joe Young, "Seven Years of Struggle to End the War," *Labor Challenge*, 9 August 1971, 4.

²⁷ RCMP Report, "Protests and Demonstrations Re: United States Action in Vietnam – Ontario," 9 December 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00313, Neighbourhood Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 8.

²⁸ Halstead, *Out Now*, 252-257; "Progress Report # 3," *Canadian Student Days of Protest*, November 11-12, 18 October 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00327, Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee, Disc 1, Stack 6. Although not a Trotskyist himself, Muste had a long working relationship with the American Trotskyist movement dating back to the 1930s. See Halstead, *Out Now*, 289-290.

End the War in Vietnam. The organization took its name from the project it was about to embark upon – two massive demonstrations, one in New York, the other in San Francisco scheduled for 15 April 1967. Designated as international in scope, activists from beyond the confines of the United States were encouraged to attend. The march in San Francisco drew 75,000, of whom 7,000 alone came from the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union. Among the speakers was Toronto's Rabbi Abraham Feinberg, recently returned from Hanoi where he had met with Ho Chi Minh and other DRV leaders. The New York march attracted 400,000 people – the largest peace demonstration in US history to that time. Speaking there was Martin Luther King, who had recently come out publicly against the war.²⁹

In Canada support for the Spring Mobilization tended to emanate from groups associated with the Communist Party, although Trotskyist participation was evident. In March the Canadian Peace Congress issued an appeal to support the activities associated with the Mobilization. While some demonstrations were planned in Canada, the emphasis was as much on getting Canadians to New York as it was to protest in Canada. In Toronto a crowd turned out to a send-off demonstration on 14 April for buses carrying 200 demonstrators from Southern and South-western Ontario to New York.³⁰ In Vancouver the district labour council established a committee to work for peace and to

²⁹ Halstead, *Out Now*, 252-257, 336-337, 339. For more on Feinberg's trip to Hanoi see his account in *Hanoi Diary*.

³⁰ Press Release, Hamilton and District Committee to End the War in Vietnam, 23 March 1967, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00305, Hamilton and District Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 4; RCMP Report, "Hamilton and District Committee to End the War in Vietnam," May 10, 1967 in same file, Stack 4; RCMP Report, "Protests and Demonstrations Re: United States Action in Vietnam – April 14-15, 1967, Ontario," 21 April 1967, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00309, Sarnia Citizens' Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Sarnia, Ontario, Part 02; Mac Campbell, "Sarnia Group Holds Local Meeting, Goes to New York," *The Conference Table*, May 1967, in same file. RCMP Report, "Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, U.S.A.," 31 May 1967, also in same file.

support the 15 April demonstration. A march was planned in Vancouver to coincide with those in New York and San Francisco.³¹ In Edmonton the local CEWV organized a protest of 200.³²

Perhaps most significant from a Canadian perspective was that the Spring Mobilization generated the first anti-Vietnam War demonstration in Atlantic Canada.³³ While Saint John CEWV had hosted presentations and put up antiwar posters the previous year, no public antiwar demonstration took place in the Maritimes until Friday, 14 April 1967 when the Halifax Ad Hoc Committee for Peace in Vietnam organized a demonstration of 125 in that city's downtown. Protesters presented the US Consul General with a petition opposing the American war in Vietnam. The demonstrators had a bit of the wind taken out of their sails when the Consul General shared with them another petition he had already received signed by 250 Dalhousie University students – twice the number of demonstrators that day – expressing their support for US actions in Indochina.³⁴ Regardless, the significance of the Halifax demonstration was in its geography. Canadians for the first time were marching coast to coast against the war in Vietnam. The antiwar movement in Canada was now truly national in scope.

³¹ The march was sponsored by VOW, FOR, the Quakers, CCND, WILPF, the BC Peace Council, and the Ad Hoc Committee of Youth for Peace in Vietnam. Conspicuously absent was the Vietnam Day Committee. See "Labor backs April 15 demo," *Canadian Tribune*, Carding date 3 April 1967, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00305, Hamilton and District Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 4.

³² RCMP Report, "Protests and Demonstrations Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam – Alberta," CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00314, Vietnam Action Committee, University of Alberta, Stack 8. While the University of Alberta Vietnam Action Committee (UACEWV) was solidly under the control of Trotskyists, the leadership of Edmonton CEWV, of which UACEWV was a member, tended to alternate between the CPC and the LSA. See RCMP Report, "Edmonton Committee to End the War in Vietnam," 11 January 1967, in same file as above, Stack 7.

³³ Again, this assertion is made after reviewing RCMP files as well as the student newspapers for Dalhousie, Memorial and UNB.

³⁴ "Vietnam Protesters: Thunder Stolen By Dal Student Counter Petition," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 15 April 1967, 8.

The pro-war petition raises another significant issue, that of the overall role of students in the Canadian antiwar movement. Roughly speaking, for most of the war university students composed about half of the people demonstrating against the war. This should not be interpreted as meaning university students opposed the war. Many supported it and expressed their support in various ways, the example in Halifax being one. Student governments played a significant role on both sides of the issue. As we saw in the previous chapter, during February 1966 the student associations at both McGill and Sir George Williams refused to give their formal endorsements of antiwar demonstrations organized by UGEQ. Despite this, opposition to the war was strongest in Montreal. According to a *Maclean's* poll in 1967, while just over half of respondents in Toronto supported US actions in Vietnam, only 37 percent of those in Montreal did. Furthermore, 28 percent of Torontonians supported an expanded US war effort while only 11 percent of Montrealers did.³⁵ The article did not distinguish between English and French-speaking respondents' opinions.

One incident at McGill University shows how the student government there was not particularly enamoured with the antiwar movement. In November 1966 the student council bowed to pressure from engineering students and fired Sandy Gage, editor of the *McGill Daily*, because of an article Gage had written about US military research being done on campus. A mass outpouring of student support for Gage, and a subsequent inquiry by Canadian University Press (CUP) exonerating Gage, forced the student

³⁵ Alexander Ross, "The Vietnam war: what Canadians really think," *Maclean's*, October 1967, Vol. 80, No. 10, 1. Of note, the article also indicated that most Canadians felt they could do nothing to influence the war in Vietnam.

council to reinstate him.³⁶ Support for Gage by the student body, however, should not necessarily be interpreted as opposition to the war. Students were angered because of the student council's unfair process in firing Gage. Also, students correctly perceived that their student government was muzzling the campus press.

Surprisingly, student opinion on the war in Vietnam was rarely directly solicited. In two rare cases at the University of Winnipeg and the University of Manitoba the antiwar movement was in for a rude awakening. At the University of Winnipeg the Winnipeg Committee for Peace in Vietnam sponsored a referendum on support for the war. With 9.13 percent of the student body voting, 149 supported the US war effort while only 127 opposed it. At the University of Manitoba another referendum was held, this one at the request of the University of Manitoba Vietnam Action Committee. Students were asked to condemn the Canadian government's political and material support for the US war in Vietnam. Of a student body of 12,800, 3,758 voted. Of those, 2,670 refused to condemn Canadian complicity whereas only 1,088 supported the question. A second question on prohibiting Vietnam-related military research on campus yielded similar results. The two referenda were a disaster for the antiwar movement in Winnipeg. A similar vote at Simon Fraser University, however, resulted in a six to one margin opposing the war, with 570 voting for a negotiated withdrawal of US forces from

³⁶ The amount of coverage the *McGill Daily* Incident generated was voluminous. Below are the most pertinent pieces. Peter Allnut, Marc Raboy and Ellen Roseman, "Soil analysis at McGill: Researcher aid Viet war," *McGill Daily*, 11 November 1966, 1; "'Anti' meeting today," *McGill Daily*, 15 November 1966, 1; "SC Open Meeting," *McGill Daily*, 15 November 1966, 1; Elly Alboim, "Viet report voted down by 200-4: 'Engineers censure Daily,'" *McGill Daily*, 16 November 1966, 1; "Gage submits new policy tonight at SC meeting," *McGill Daily*, 16 November 1966, 1; "Editorial," *McGill Daily*, 18 November 1966, 1; Judy Rebick and Robert Chodos, "Council Fires Gage; Daily staff resigns," *McGill Daily*, 18 November 1966, 1; Gerald Haslan, "Feifer Interim Editor: CUP Commission Called: Volunteer support revives Daily, investigation under way," *McGill Daily*, 1; Danny Levinson, "Backed by campus, CUP and Council: Gage reinstated," *McGill Daily*, 2 December 1966, 1.

Vietnam and only ninety nine opposing the proposition.³⁷ It is possible the vote would have been higher had the wording been different. Many in the antiwar movement, especially those associated with the Trotskyist wing, opposed a negotiated withdrawal, their position being the immediate withdrawal of troops. If anything can be discerned from these three referenda it is simply that students were neither overwhelmingly opposed to the war nor supportive of it.

One aspect of the relationship of university students and the antiwar movement in Canada that merits discussion is the role of the Canadian Union of Students (CUS), Canada's national student organization during the 1960s. CUS was much more antiwar than the students it represented. Its position on the war in Vietnam became progressively more radical throughout the 1960s. To some extent this would have been influenced by their contacts with the Prague-based International Union of Students, of which CUS was an affiliate, but this is not to suggest that CUS was acting as a "front" group for Soviet foreign policy. In 1966 CUS debated several resolutions on Vietnam on topics including the development of direct contacts with the Vietnamese, establishment of Vietnam committees on member campuses, and research on the extent of Canada's involvement in the war. CUS urged the Canadian government to take a more independent role on the International Control Commission. In 1967 CUS became more aggressive. It called for a bombing halt, urged the Canadian government to abandon its policy of "quiet diplomacy," and voted aid to draft dodgers in Canada. In 1968 CUS went further by openly supporting the NLF against "the imperialist and genocidal war being waged

³⁷ "Peg campus supports war, slim majority," *Ubysey*, (CUP), 31 October 1968, 3; "Vietnam Proposals Rejected," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 25 October 1968. Clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00314, Vietnam Action Committee, University of Manitoba, Stack 10; "SFU vote result raps Viet War," *Brunswickan*, (CUP), 8 February 1968, 1.

against Vietnam by the United States of America and its allies.”³⁸ Despite its ever bolder statements on the war, CUS played an insignificant role in the overall antiwar movement. Unlike UGEQ, which brought thousands of people into the streets of Montreal in opposition to the war, when it came to mobilizing people CUS’s record was minimal. Still, the more radical CUS’s pronouncements became, the more alienated its membership became, leading more and more member schools to disaffiliate. This was compounded by student new left groups organizing activities outside of established student organizations. While no direct cause and effect relationship can be drawn between CUS’s position on Vietnam and the organization’s decline, CUS disbanded in 1969.

While the focus of antiwar forces, both in the United States and internationally, was on the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, there was also within the movement a parallel, albeit much smaller, drive against the corporations that contributed to the war effort. No corporation was more visible than Dow Chemical, the primary producer of napalm, a jellied gasoline that stuck to objects and burned at extremely high temperatures. The United States used napalm in Vietnam largely as a tactical weapon to deny cover to the enemy. Beginning in 1966 activists in the United States began to protest against Dow. The most popular form of protest was a boycott of Dow’s most common household product – Saran Wrap. But demonstrations took place at universities

³⁸ Students to debate Viet Nam proposals,” *Dalhousie Gazette*, 8 September 1966, 1; “CUS formulates Vietnam policy,” *Ubysey*, (CUP), 9 September 1967, 8; “CUS on Vietnam,” *Dalhousie Gazette*, 20 September 1968, 5; “Union supports NLF,” *Ubysey*, 10 September 1968, 16.

across the United States, the most significant in October 1967 at the University of Wisconsin at Madison where police viciously beat protesters.³⁹

In Canada ending the sale of war materials to the United States for use in Vietnam was considered part of the larger challenge of ending Canadian complicity. The movement's first target was not Dow, but Canadian Industries Limited (CIL), manufacturer of ammunition and explosives. As part of the Canadian Student Days of Protest to End the War in Vietnam held during the week of 11 November 1966, between three hundred and six hundred students from McGill, Sir George Williams and l'Université de Montréal, as well as members of La Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière (the Quebec wing of the LSA) picketed the CIL plant in Montreal.⁴⁰ It was only in February 1967 – over eight months before the Dow protests in Madison – that the Sarnia Citizens' CEWV began organizing a boycott of Dow Canada. Sarnia, Ontario, was home of the company's Canadian headquarters.⁴¹ While Dow did not produce napalm in Canada, it did produce the polystyrene (the agent that made it stick) at its Sarnia plant for export to the US.

In that same month NDP Leader Tommy Douglas drew the attention of the Canadian people to the issue of Canadian complicity. In a speech in the House of Commons he exposed the sale of \$300 million in sales of war materials to the US in “an

³⁹ Tom Wells, *The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam* (Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1994) 84, 193-194; Halstead, *Out Now*, 429.

⁴⁰ Kathy Houser and Danny Freedman, “Demonstrators march to Dominion Square,” *McGill Daily*, 14 November 1966, 1,2; RCMP Report, “Protests and Demonstrations Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam,” 18 November 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00309, Committee to End the War in Vietnam – Sir George Williams University, Montreal, Part 01.

⁴¹ *The Conference Table*, February, 1967, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00309, Sarnia Citizens' Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Sarnia, ON, Part 02.

undeclared war,” which he described as “bloody and barbaric.” “(T)he time for quiet diplomacy is over,” argued Douglas, “and the time for speaking out is here.”⁴²

The first actual protest against Dow Canada took place at the University of Waterloo on 8 November 1967, two weeks after the highly publicized attack on anti-Dow protesters in Madison. A group of twenty six protesters – mostly members of the newly-formed Students for a Democratic University (SDU) along with some faculty members – protested at the library where Dow was interviewing students for their co-op semester. Although the focus of the protest was on Dow, the leaflet they distributed also named other Canadian companies engaged in supplying war materials to the US for use in Vietnam. These included Litton Systems, Marcom Limited, Valcartier Industries, and United Aircraft of Canada. Prospective co-op students pelted the demonstrators with snowballs and mounted their own counterdemonstration. According to an article run by CUP, “(m)ost students were too busy going to and from classes to pay much attention to the protest.”⁴³ A week later about three hundred students at the University of British Columbia blocked the doorway to prevent students from attending interviews with the Dow recruiter on campus. A smaller anti-Dow protest took place the following week at the Universities of Windsor, Western Ontario and McMaster.

The most dramatic anti-Dow protest in Canada took place at the University of Toronto. There, U of T CEWV led eighty students and five faculty in a sit-in blocking interested students – largely engineers – from meeting with Dow’s recruiter. When a university vice-president attempted to end the protest, demonstrators held him hostage for

⁴² *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, 13 February 1967, 12988-12990.

⁴³ “Waterloo Students Protest War Materials Company Manufacturing,” *Carillon*, (CUP) 17 November 1967, 4.

three and a half hours in the campus placement office.⁴⁴ Other, larger DOW protests followed at the University of Toronto, drawing wide attention. CEWV's actions drew the ire of many, most notably the Engineering Society, which saw the sit-in as depriving them of the right to make their own career decisions. It condemned the sit-in and demanded the University to bring back the Dow recruiter so its members could meet with him. The student council of St. Michael's College also condemned the sit-in on the grounds that it restricted the rights of other students. Despite the protests of the two student organizations, the Students' Administrative Council (SAC), which represented all University of Toronto students, supported CEWV's goals and called for an immediate meeting of the advisory board on campus employment services to amend its procedures so that in future companies supplying war materials for use in Vietnam would be prevented from recruiting on campus. Reacting to this decision, a group calling itself the Ad Hoc Committee for Representative Student Government circulated a petition demanding the impeachment of SAC President Tom Faulkner. The petition received 1,600 signatures, mostly from engineering and law students. Faulkner responded by resigning and calling an election for his position in which he ran for it a second time. His candidacy, he explained, would in effect be a referendum on whether SAC could make decisions on controversial issues. Opposing Faulkner was law student Bill Charlton.

⁴⁴ "Dow interviews result in protests on two campuses," *Gateway*, (CUP) 23 November 1967, 1; D. John Lynn, "The Dow protest; a question of morality," *Gateway*, (CUP) 1 December 1967, 9; "15 Students Seen By Dow," *Hamilton Spectator*, 5 December 1967, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00305, Committee on Vietnam, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Stack 1; "Mac Will Protest Recruiting by Dow," *Hamilton Spectator*, 22 November 1967, clipping in same file; "Thirty Silent Pickets Protest Dow Interviews," *Hamilton Spectator*, 4 December 1967, clipping in same file. Paul McRae, "Dow job interviews provoke protest," *The Varsity*, 20 November 1967, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00313, University of Toronto Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 6.

Students returned Faulkner to office with a plurality of over 5,000 votes.⁴⁵ Faulkner's victory over Charlton, however, cannot be interpreted as unqualified support for SAC's right to take stances on controversial issues in general, nor as opposition to war contractors on campus specifically. Had Faulkner wanted such a referendum, he and his supporters in SAC could have easily arranged one and students could have voted on the issues. Rather, by responding to his detractors by running in a second election the issue remained Faulkner himself, and not the events that led to his resignation. As in any election, there is always the element of the popularity contest. Faulkner did not need to win the debate over Dow, CEWV or controversial issues in general, he merely had to beat his opponent, which he did.

Protests against war suppliers in Canada continued throughout 1968.

Demonstrations took place at Carleton against CIL, at the University of British Columbia against Dow as well as Boeing, at the University of Saskatchewan against Dow, at Toronto's Litton plant, at York against Hawker Siddeley, and at the University of Toronto against virtually all of them.⁴⁶ At Sir George Williams University the president of the student council resigned when that body passed a resolution condemning recruiting

⁴⁵ Roberta Lexier, "'The Backdrop Against Which Everything Happened': English-Canadian Student Movements and Off-Campus Movements for Change," *History of Intellectual Culture*, 1:7, 13-14, <http://www.ucalgary.ca/hic/issues/vol7/3>, accessed 24 February 2010.

⁴⁶ "Carleton Group Stages Protest During Interview," *Montreal Gazette*, (CP) 8 December 1967, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application 00303, Carleton Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Disc 2, Part 14; "Boeing official forced out: interviews go despite sit-in," *Ubysey*, 18 January 1968, 3; correspondence, E.S. Perkin, Director of Industrial Security, Dept. of Defense Production, to Supt. Howard Draper, Directorate of Security and Intelligence, 29 March 1968, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00313, University of Toronto Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 7; "Com students invade quiet Dow protest," *Gateway* (CUP) 8 November 1968, 8; "Dow interviewer exits in face of violence," *Ubysey*, (CUP) 13 November 1968, 6; RCMP Report, "University of Toronto," 20 December 1968, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 4; "Hawker-Siddeley banned from campus - students to decide", *Excalibur*, nd., clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00313, York University Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 1.

on campus by companies whose products were exported to the US for use in Vietnam.⁴⁷ Unlike at Toronto, he did not seek re-election. At York, the CEWV there was able to convince the university to halt recruitment by war contractors on campus for three weeks until a student referendum could be held. When voting took place, however, the question on the ballot was to ban all recruiting on campus, not just that of military contractors. Needless to say students voted overwhelmingly against the question. Understandably, York CEWV did not feel bound to respect the results of the ballot.⁴⁸

While protests against Dow and other corporations were important, they did not build the antiwar movement. They often had the opposite effect. What differentiated campus protests against corporate recruiters most from the larger antiwar movement was that they were small, local affairs, without any larger coordination beyond the campus. While they kept the issue of Canadian complicity alive, they did little in terms of mobilizing people around the larger issue of the war in Vietnam. In most cases they were marginal events that often got in the way of their fellow students' career plans for a few hours. Larger events like those at the University of Toronto were the exception.

In addition to campus protests against military contractors, the year 1967 was significant for students and the antiwar movement in that it marked the dissolution of SUPA. In existence for little over two and a half years, many factors led to its demise. Unlike its predecessor, the CUCND, SUPA was a highly decentralized, multi-issue organization. Given its activities among Nova Scotia African Canadians, Saskatchewan First Nations, Doukhobors in British Columbia, and the poor in Kingston, pursuing issues

⁴⁷ "President quits over Vietnam supplies issue," *Gateway*, (CUP) 23 January 1968, 1.

⁴⁸ "York Students threaten force," *Toronto Telegram*, 11 December 1968. Clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00313, York University Committee to End the War in Vietnam; "Recruiters to face pickets at York U," *Toronto Daily Star*, 12 December 1968. Clipping in same file.

directly related to peace was simply one of many priorities of the organizations. Compounding the absence of a primacy of purpose was the federal government's recruitment of many of the organization's most effective organizers into the Company of Young Canadians.⁴⁹ The writing was on the wall for SUPA at its penultimate conference at Waterloo over the Christmas holidays of 1966-1967. By all appearances the conference was a disaster. One member described the event as "a SUPA concentration camp."⁵⁰ Another observed of the conference "a remarkable lack of perspective." In almost prophetic style, Wilson Head opined that SUPA was unwilling to learn from the past: "There seems to be the implicit assumption that history doesn't exist, and that nothing can be learned from it." Head continued:

My fear is that it (SUPA) will become frustrated and sink into despair and apathy unless it handles internal problems and frees itself to be a vitally constructive force in building a humane and satisfying world fit for human beings.⁵¹

Another member expressed the fear that "SUPA is having great difficulties defining exactly [or even inexactly] what it exists for."⁵² Amidst failing community projects (only the Halifax project and the Toronto anti-draft project were described as successful) and weak campus branches, the conference decided to take an eight month "deep breath" and start all over again. In the meantime a seven-man (and it was all men) committee was appointed to draft a major document outlining SUPA's values, analysis and strategy for

⁴⁹ Interview, Jim Harding, 25 November 2008. For more on the Company of Young Canadian see Margaret Daly, *The Revolution Game: The Short, Unhappy Life of the Company of Young Canadians* (Toronto: New Press, 1970). Also James Littleton, "The Company of Young Canadians, The New Left and the Improved Plastic Mousetrap," *Saturday Night*, November 1969, 84:11, 31-33.

⁵⁰ Mary Bachman, "A SUPA Concentration Camp," *SUPA Newsletter*, n.d. (received by VOW 13 February 1967), 12-13.

⁵¹ Wilson Head, untitled, *SUPA Newsletter*, n.d. (received by VOW 13 February 1967), 14-15.

⁵² Lynn Curtis, untitled, *SUPA Newsletter*, n.d. (received by VOW 13 February 1967), 12-13.

social change.⁵³ The National Council met in Toronto immediately following the adjournment of the conference. As was their practice, following the completion of business the NC held a picket at the US Consulate. But this was not a typical antiwar picket. According to a writer for the *Varsity*, some of those who came out in solidarity were left “shaking their heads in disbelief.” SUPA demonstrators arrived with placards not with antiwar slogans on them, but with

kindergarten-like pictures of birds, flowers and little animals. They carried balloons. They wore big paper flowers in their lapels. They sang happy songs and played ring around the rosie. Then they burst the balloons and painted the signs black.

This last action was to symbolize how US policy in Vietnam “negates the kind of creative, joyous world they are trying to build.” The *Varsity* writer had difficulty taking the protesters seriously.⁵⁴ It would be one of SUPA’s last antiwar demonstrations.

When SUPA reconvened in Goderich, Ontario, in September 1967 only thirty five people attended, down from the 120 at Waterloo. The two most viable campus groups – the one at Simon Fraser University and the anti-draft group in Toronto were functioning with little help from the central office. When the motion was put to the floor to dissolve the organization it was merely recognition of an established fact: SUPA had ceased to exist. In its place a twelve-person New Left Committee (NLC) was organized, which offered its own explanation as to why SUPA failed:

Key to SUPA’s failure was its inability to develop a coherent analysis of the structure of modern capitalism and of its specific characteristics in Canada. Instead, SUPA remained ideologically confused and uncritically eclectic. It drew on various elements of the pacifist-direct action approach

⁵³ Mary Bachman, “A SUPA Concentration Camp,” *SUPA Newsletter*, nd (received by VOW 13 February 1967), 12-13; “SUPA plans organizational overhaul,” *The Varsity*, 4 January 1967, 11. The committee consisted of James Laxer, Anthony Hyde, Donald McKelvey, James Harding, Jon Bordo, Ted Folkman, and James Russell.

⁵⁴ “SUPA plans,” *The Varsity*.

and ill-defined SDS (notions) of “participatory democracy.” But the war in Vietnam, the powerlessness of the poor, the authoritarian governing of universities, were never traced to their structural roots in the political economy of monopoly capitalism, and the constituencies essential to revolutionary change were only vaguely defined and analysed.⁵⁵

This is an overly theoretical, neo-Marxist analysis of SUPA’s failure. Their underlying assumption was that students wanted such an organization. The work that SUPA did in its various projects drew significant numbers of students into community activism, but very few into the peace movement. In contrast, Marxist organizations such as the LSA and the CPC reserved issues of ideology for internal party discussions while they worked with other groups to build an effective antiwar movement. SUPA, theoretically a peace organization, failed due to a combination of ideological infighting and an absence of a primary purpose. Although all of its projects were firmly rooted in a belief in social justice, there was nothing else holding SUPA together during its brief existence. Like SDS in the United States, SUPA failed to grasp that the single most important political issue facing youth in the 1960s was the war in Vietnam. From an organization that had played a pivotal role in organizing antiwar activities in the early days of the war, the Student Union for Peace Action, or what remained of it by September 1967, had become an angry debating society. Those who were engaged in peace action were engaged in mobilizing people against the war in Vietnam.

If SUPA failed to grasp the full significance of the war in Vietnam as a vehicle for mobilizing students, the Union Générale des Étudiants du Québec certainly did not.

Unlike its counterpart in English-Canada, CUS, UGEQ had been organizing mass antiwar

⁵⁵ Harvey Shepherd, “SUPA Dissolved; New Left Comm. Formed,” *New Left Committee Bulletin*, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 1967; “Statement of the New Left Committee – October 1967,” 6A-6C, in same issue. Members of the New Left Committee included Linda Seese, Peggy Morton, Myrna Wood, Laurel Limpus, Mike Rowan, Don Roebuck, Danny Drache, Harvey Shepherd, Gray and Mickey Pelsuns [sic], Jon Bordo, and Ken Fisher.

protests since the early days of the war. In the fall of 1967 UGEQ embarked on a project intended to develop solidarity between the students of Quebec and Vietnam. The plan was to sponsor a speaking tour of Quebec by three members of the Central Union of Students of South Vietnam, the NLF-affiliated student organization.⁵⁶ The tour, composed of two men and one woman, made its first public appearance to an overflow crowd of 900 at Sir George Williams University on 28 September. Organizers had miscalculated the appeal of the speakers to the Sir George audience. As the speakers entered the auditorium they were greeted with a resounding chorus of boos. Hundreds of students heckled the speakers throughout the engagement, yelling “Kill a commie for Christ,” “you red bastards,” and “Go back home.” The first speaker was effectively shouted down. Curiously, the second speaker, Nguen [sic] Ngo Eung, was allowed to speak. This might have been because she was the only woman on the platform, or because she spoke in French (the other two spoke through an interpreter). Regardless, both speakers and organizers were so thrown off by the behaviour of the Sir George crowd that the scheduled question and answer session, as well as a planned press conference, were cancelled. UGEQ’s International Vice-President Victor Rabinovitch responded to the incident, saying it was an “international insult... You don’t invite people to come across a continent to tell you their point of view and then insult them like this.” Jean Sicotte, Vice-President External for the Sir George student council added: “Freedom of speech is a basic human right in a democratic society... Students at Sir George have

⁵⁶ Initially there was some dispute between UGEQ and CUS. At the same time UGEQ sent its invitation, CUS and the Student Christian Movement also invited the Central Union of Students of South Vietnam to tour their member campuses. However, when the three students arrived here from Vietnam they made it clear they were in Canada at the invitation of UGEQ. It is not clear if they did not receive the invitation from CUS or that they understood the two organizations to be one and the same. See “Local Protest Action Grows,” *Georgian*, 26 September 1967, 1; “CUS-UGEQ clash over student visitors,” *Gateway* (CUP), 29 September 1967, 13; “Viet liberationists begin tour of Quebec,” *Ubysses* (CUP) 28 September 1967, 10.

denied that right in the name of democracy. I am ashamed.” The Sir George student council subsequently voted to issue a public apology on behalf of the student body.⁵⁷

The incident at Sir George was partly a case of poor organizing. In an analysis of the incident in the Sir George student paper, the *Georgian*, it was revealed that UGEQ had only five days advance notice of the arrival of the three Vietnamese students and that Sir George might not have been the best school to start the tour. Also, it was indicated that the individual chairing the event was lacking in such skills. Most significant, it was revealed that a right-wing student group calling itself the Committee Opposed to Leftist Demonstrations (COLD) had actually orchestrated the incident.⁵⁸ Although COLD was the instigator, that so many would join in the disruption indicated the degree to which the student council and UGEQ were out of touch with the opinions of many of their members at Sir George. It was one thing to oppose the war in Vietnam and American military intervention. It was, however, something quite different to provide the platform and pay the expenses of three representatives of those fighting against the Americans. To want peace in Vietnam was acceptable; it was something altogether different to want victory for the NLF. Still, two nights later, at McGill University, events reversed themselves. When the three speakers entered the hall they were loudly cheered, again by a crowd of 900. Throughout their talk, students listened quietly and politely. Many credited the

⁵⁷ “UGEQ’s Rabinovitch: ‘An International Insult:’ Viet Students greeted by rowdy audience,” *Georgian*, 29 September 1967, 3; “NLF spokesmen brave rowdy Montreal crowd,” *Ubysey*, (CUP), 29 September 1967, 3; “Council condemns Viet War,” *Georgian*, 3 October 1967, 1.

⁵⁸ Ursula Lingies, “Analysis: the September 28th Debacle,” 6 October 1967, 5, 7. COLD was first formed by Harvey Oberfeld and Howard Korzenstein to organize a counterdemonstration at the CIL plant demonstration on 11 November 1966. For more on this organization see CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00306, Committee Opposed to Leftist Demonstrations, Montreal, QC.

polite decorum to the presence of history professor and television broadcaster Laurier LaPierre in the chair.⁵⁹

The three Vietnamese students continued their Quebec tour, speaking at classical colleges throughout the province. Their final engagement was at the Université de Montréal before departing Canada on 11 October. There they spoke to a crowd of 1,500 and were warmly received by the majority of students. A group of 50 South Vietnamese students, however, pelted the three with eggs and tomatoes.⁶⁰ It would appear the tour for the three Vietnamese began and ended on a bad note. Despite this the Vietnamese tour showed that Canadian students were by no means of one opinion with regards to the war in Vietnam. While the ill treatment by fellow South Vietnamese nationals was understandable given the civil war in their own country, the reception by Canadians was indeed mixed. Even by late 1967 there was no consensus among Quebec students.

Less than two weeks later the antiwar movement reached a new global peak in citizen participation. Following the April demonstrations in New York and San Francisco, the Spring Mobilization Committee called for a march on Washington as well as accompanying international actions for 21 October. The theme was “Support Our Boys in Vietnam: Bring them Home.” In addition to the United States, antiwar organizations in England, France, Italy and the Scandinavian countries immediately began preparations. Activists in Canada did so as well.⁶¹ The Communist Party made the 21 October demonstrations a priority, advising its Ontario regions of the upcoming TCC-sponsored

⁵⁹ “McGill students listen quietly as Viets talk,” *Georgian*, 3 October 1967, 1; Viets evade questions after rousing welcome,” *Ubysey* (CUP), 3 October 1967, 6; Visiting students explain Vietnam war,” *Gateway* (CUP) 3 October 1967, 1.

⁶⁰ “Tomatoes Too: Eggs greet NLF reps,” *Ubysey*, (CUP) 13 October 1967, 13.

⁶¹ Information Call to October 21 International Day of Protest,” in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00314, Vietnam Action Committee, Regina, Stack 4.

conference in September at which time actions would be planned for the international day of protest. Provincial Party leader Bruce Magnuson encouraged as much Party representation from Southern, South-eastern and South-western Ontario as possible.⁶²

The TCC was indeed a fragile coalition going into the fall of 1967. The Communist Party and its allies were having difficulties maintaining control of the coalition. At a meeting of the TCC on 21 August five of the six members of its executive threatened to resign if a previous decision to make an upcoming planning meeting open to the public was not reversed. The only member of the executive to not threaten to resign was Gus Tolentino, the only LSA member on the executive. LSA leader Ross Dowson, who was also at the meeting, stated that the decision, which was reversed, was the result of Communist fears that the LSA would stack such a meeting. Accusing the CP of attempting to split the TCC by excluding the Trotskyists, Dowson reported to the subsequent meeting of the Toronto LSA chapter that they would go along so as not to split the coalition, but that they (the LSA) would overwhelm them via their control of the SAWV and the neighbourhood CEWVs.⁶³

The subsequent planning conference, which took place at Bathurst Street United Church in Toronto, was, as decided, not open to the public, but only to accredited representatives of bona fide antiwar groups. Delegates attending had to present a letter of introduction from their sponsoring organization to register. Communist Jim Bridgewood was in charge of checking credentials. The conference was attended by eighty individuals

⁶² Letter, Bruce Magnuson, Communist Party of Canada – Ontario, to Ontario Regions, 4 August 1967, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00313, Toronto Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 2.

⁶³ RCMP Report, “League for Socialist Action, Toronto, Ontario, 20 September 1967,” in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00313, Toronto Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 2.

representing thirty seven organizations. The sectarian left was well represented. In the CP corner was the Canadian Peace Congress represented by James Endicott, the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians, and the United Jewish People's Order. With the LSA were the (Toronto) neighbourhood CEWVs and the SAWV represented by Joe Young. In addition, the conference showed how much the antiwar movement had expanded beyond the confines of Toronto. Also attending were representatives of CEWVs from Sarnia, Ottawa, and Hamilton. Discussions included the international dimension of 21 October and the possibility of sending buses to Washington. Among the more conclusive decisions was the establishment of the Ontario October 21st Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam under the leadership of three co-chairs: Dr. Gus Tolentino of the Trotskyist faction, Jim Bridgewood of the CP, and a third neutral, Dr. Jerry Bain.⁶⁴ Further illustrating the antiwar movement's expansion outside Toronto, the three co-chairs invited representatives from CEWVs in London, Ottawa, Welland – St. Catharines, Windsor, Oshawa, and Sarnia, to join the committee, as well as representatives of Voice of Women, McMaster University faculty, and the Quaker and Unitarian churches.⁶⁵ Also invited was the Hamilton and District Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam (HDCCEWV).

The example of the HDCCEWV perhaps best shows the suburbanization of the antiwar movement outside of Toronto. It also attests to the fact that not all CEWVs were dominated by Trotskyists. Under the leadership of Jim Bridgewood, the HDCCEWV

⁶⁴ RCMP Report, "Hamilton and District Committee to End the War in Vietnam," CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00305, Hamilton and District Committee to End the War in Vietnam; "Minutes of the Anti-War Conference Held September 9, 1967 at Bathurst Street United Church," in same file. Note there are two documents with this title with minor variations in this file.

⁶⁵ Form letter, Ken Warren, Executive Secretary, Ontario October 21 Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam, 14 September 1967, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00305, Hamilton and District Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 5.

worked to mobilize antiwar sentiment not only in Hamilton, but in Ancaster and Aldershot, and as far east as Burlington and Oakville. Bridgewood himself was an autoworker at the Ford assembly plant in Oakville where he lived. In addition to being chair of the Hamilton committee, he was also a union activist and an open member of the Communist Party. Reporting to the Provincial Party Conference of 25 September 1966, Bridgewood described the HDCCEWV as made up of members of the NDP, VOW, people from McMaster University, and “known communists.” The RCMP described the antiwar group as CP-controlled at the executive level. Bridgewood himself expressed surprise at being elected chair of the HDCCEWV “when it was known full well that he was a communist.”⁶⁶ The openness of Communists in the Hamilton and District CEWV is significant in that no attempt was made to obscure the role of Party activists or influence. This might indicate that the CP no longer felt a need for such secrecy. Likely it was more an indication of the importance the Party placed on the 21 October actions given their global dimension.

From the start, the actions planned for 21 October emphasized the international aspects of the protests. The TCC and the University of Toronto CEWV furthered this by sponsoring Linda Morse, National Coordinator of the New York-based Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, to speak at the Ontario College of Education on 9 September in an effort to build support.⁶⁷ Planners eschewed radical pronouncements on the war, attempting to gain support among more “respectable”

⁶⁶ RCMP Report, “Communist Party of Canada Provincial Conferences and Conventions, Ontario,” 7 October 1967, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application, A-2006-00305, Hamilton and District Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 4; Form letter, Bonnie Robichaud, Corresponding Secretary, Hamilton and District Committee to End the War in Vietnam, nd, in same file, Stack 5; RCMP Organizational Assessment Form for HDCCEWV in same file, Stack 6.

⁶⁷ RCMP Report, “Toronto Co-Ordinating [sic] Committee to End the War in Vietnam,” Toronto, Ontario, 13 October 1967, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00313, Toronto Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 2.

citizens. This popular front left liberalism was reflected in the list of sponsors/speakers recruited for the Toronto protest. The list included journalist and television host Pierre Berton, social activist and author June Callwood, and philosophy professor Ed Broadbent. Broadbent would be elected to the House of Commons the following year on the NDP ticket.⁶⁸ Despite efforts to make the 21 October actions as representative of a broad coalition as possible, RCMP agents reported that “much of the actual physical work was left to the ever-willing Trotskyists.”⁶⁹

Ontario was not the only area planning for 21 October. Plans were also afoot for demonstrations in Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton and other cities.⁷⁰ In Welland and St. Catharines organizers worked with Ukrainian, Polish, Russian and other Slavic groups to build support.⁷¹ In Vancouver the October 21 Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, an ad hoc group composed of the CPC, the Progressive Workers’ Movement and the Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee forged ahead with plans for the big day. This would be the last action the three would work on together. In December the coalition would change its name to simply the Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam (CCEWV). In April 1968 the CPC would withdraw completely, leaving the organization firmly in the hands of the Trotskyists with some PWM participation. The CCEWV merged with the VVDC in June 1969 to form

⁶⁸ Leaflet, “Ontario October 21 Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam,” CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00305, Hamilton and District Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 5. Other sponsors included Chandler Davis, Rabbi Abraham Feinberg, Jerry Gallagher, C.B. Macpherson, Kenneth McNaught, Gustavo Tolentino, Joe Young and Reverend James Endicott.

⁶⁹ RCMP Report, “International Day of Protest, October 21, 1967,” Toronto, Ontario, 1 November 1967, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00309, Sarnia Citizens’s Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Sarnia, Ontario, Part 02.

⁷⁰ “International Solidarity: Vietniks demonstrate,” *Ubysses*, (CUP) 20 October 1967, 15.

⁷¹ Form letter, Mrs. Bonnie Robichaud, Corresponding Secretary, Hamilton and District Committee to End the War in Vietnam, nd, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006- 00305, Hamilton and District Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 5.

Vancouver CEWV, changing its name yet again in October 1969 to the Vietnam Action Committee (VAC).⁷² It would remain the VAC until the end of the war.

The October 21 Mobilization to End the War was a success, both internationally and domestically. Canadian participation demonstrated that the antiwar movement was unquestionably now a national movement. Record numbers of demonstrators came out in a record number of communities. One hundred marched in Hamilton from a park on King Street to City Hall where they were joined by fifty more.⁷³ In Edmonton Laurier LaPierre chaired a rally in Winston Churchill Square sponsored by the University of Alberta CEWV and the New Democratic Youth. Six hundred attended. In the spirit of the day's international dimensions the Edmonton October 21 Mobilization Committee called not only for the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam, but also those of Australia, New Zealand and South Korea.⁷⁴ In Regina seventy people attended a different kind of protest held at the Oddfellows Hall: a pray in. Clergy from the Anglican, Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Quaker and Baptist churches participated in the event sponsored by the Regina chapter of Voice of Women.⁷⁵ One hundred marched in Saskatoon, 700 in Winnipeg, in Calgary another 200. Marches took place in Kingston, Kitchener-Waterloo and other

⁷² RCMP Organizational Assessment Form for Vietnam Action Committee, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00425, Vietnam Action Committee, Vancouver, British Columbia; RCMP Organizational Assessment Form for Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00424, Vancouver Vietnam Day Committee, Stack 4.

⁷³ "Vietnam Protest support less than Half Expected," *Spectator*, 23 October 1967, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00305, Hamilton and District Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 5; RCMP Report, "International Day of Protest, October 21, 1967," Toronto, Ontario, 1 November 1967 in same file, Stack 1; RCMP Report, "Hamilton and District Committee to End the War in Vietnam," 7 November 1967 also in same file, Stack 5.

⁷⁴ Mark Priegert, "Laurier LaPierre participates in Saturday's anti-war rally," *Gateway*, 24 October 1967, 1 Press Release – Open Letter to Paul Martin, 17 January 1968, University of Alberta Vietnam Action Committee, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00314, Vietnam Action Committee, University of Alberta, Stack 7.

⁷⁵ RCMP Report, "Protests and Demonstrations Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam – Saskatchewan," 17 November 1967, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00314, Vietnam Action Committee, Regina, Stack 4; "City pray-in hears ministers," *Leader-Post*, 23 October 1967, clipping in same file.

cities.⁷⁶ In the nation's capital 1,000 rallied on Parliament Hill chanting "Pearson, Martin, LBJ, How Many Kids did You Kill Today?" Addressing them from the back of a flatbed truck was Tommy Douglas.⁷⁷ In Montreal close to 1,000 marched from Phillips Square to Dominion Square, making a short stop at the US Consulate en route for speeches. Although many were members of the Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN), the sponsors of the march represented a wide coalition of antiwar groups. RCMP reports on the march acknowledged it could have been much larger if many Montrealers had not attended marches in other cities in the United States and Canada.⁷⁸ The two largest demonstrations in Canada took place in Vancouver and Toronto. In Vancouver between 1,000 and 1,500 marched from City Hall to the Court House where they were addressed by Communist Alderman Harry Rankin and Dr. James Steele.⁷⁹ In Toronto 4,000 marched against the war: a new record.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ "Protests testimony to growing concern," *Ubysssey*, (CUP) 24 October 1967, 1, 2.

⁷⁷ Geoffrey Stevens, "Government, RCMP watches as protesters defy," *The Globe and Mail*, 23 October 1967 clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00303, Ottawa Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Disc 1; RCMP Report, "International Day of Protest – October 21, 1967," 27 October 1967, in same file.

⁷⁸ RCMP Report, "International Day of Protest – October 21, 1967, Province of Quebec," 25 October 1967, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00309, Committee to End the War in Vietnam – Sir George Williams University, Montreal, Quebec, Part 01. Sponsors of the march included La Voix du Québec sur le Vietnam, La revue "Mairment," RIN, McGill NDP, Le Comité Universitaire pour l'Action la Paix (Université de Montréal), LSA, Sir George Williams CEWV, Montreal Committee for Peace, and Les Associations Générales des Etudiants de Colleges Ste-Marie et St. Ignace. A month later Montreal was the scene of a violent antiwar demonstration sponsored by UGEQ. Eighteen hundred, mostly students from Sir George, McGill, l'Université de Montréal and local classical colleges marched on the US Consulate. When protesters splashed red paint on the Consulate wall and broke two windows regular and mounted police charged the crowd resulting in repeated violence. Police arrested 48 students. See "Monteal riot hits U.S. rep," *Ubysssey*, (CUP) 21 November 1967.

⁷⁹ RCMP Report, "International Day of Protest – October 21, 1967 – British Columbia," in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00425, Vietnam Action Committee, Vancouver. Other reports indicated as few as 600 and as many as 4,000. See photo and caption only, *Ubysssey*, 24 October 1967, 1; and Press Release, Open Letter to Paul Martin, University of Alberta Vietnam Action Committee, 17 January 1968, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00314, Vietnam Action Committee, University of Alberta, Stack 7.

⁸⁰ Press Release, Open Letter to Paul Martin, University of Alberta Vietnam Action Committee, 17 January 1968, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00314, Vietnam Action Committee, University of Alberta, Stack 7. Other reports indicate as many as 6,000 demonstrators in Toronto.

The 21 October mobilization also brought out significant demonstrations in Atlantic Canada. Following up on the April demonstrations, the Halifax CEWW organized a march of over 300 people to Victoria Park where they were joined by an additional 300, making the event the first mass antiwar protest in the Maritimes. Key to organizing the student component of the demonstration was the recently-formed Dalhousie-King's College chapter of the Student Association to End the War in Vietnam.⁸¹ The 21 October demonstrations also provided the University of New Brunswick's Fredericton campus an entry point into the antiwar movement. Under the leadership of physicist Norman Strax, an organization calling itself the Mobilization organized several buses to take 150 students from the University of New Brunswick, St. Thomas University, New Brunswick Teachers' College, Mount Allison University, Fredericton High School and others to join with 100,000 protesters in the march on the Pentagon. The Fredericton complement included a cross-section of UNB international students from India, Germany, England, Belgium and the West Indies. Organizers of the march on the Pentagon divided demonstrators into contingents, with foreign nationals marching last as the Nationalities Contingent. New Brunswickers made up the single largest delegation of Canadians at the Pentagon that day. Eight of them were arrested.⁸²

⁸¹ Nick Pittas, "300 demonstrate against American war in Vietnam," *Dalhousie Gazette*, 2 November 1967, 5; "Protests testimony to growing concern," *Ubysey*, (CUP) 24 October 1967 1, 2; "Vietnam: Dal SAEWV Preparing for October 21," *Dalhousie Gazette*, 28 September 1967, 8; "SAEWV petitions Canadian Gov't on Oct 21st," *Dalhousie Gazette*, 12 October 1967, 1. A month later in St. John's, Newfoundland the only antiwar protest prior to May 1970 took place at the US Consulate where 50 students and faculty demonstrated against the war.

⁸² Ad, "Come to Washington," *Brunswickan*, 5 October 1967, 6; Gary Davis, "Burn, Baby, Burn! Or What Really Happened in Washington on October 21, In Spite of the Words of Time, The Gleaner, and the American Legion," *Plus One* (insert) *Brunswickan*, 2 November 1967; Dr. Norman Strax, "The Washington March," *Brunswickan*, 12 October 1967, 1, 2; "Mobilization mobilizes," *Brunswickan*, 17 September 1968, 12; "Mobilization Meeting Disrupted By Violence," *Brunswickan*, 7 December 1967, 2. For the march on the Pentagon see Halstead, *Out Now*, 393.

The march on the Pentagon marked the start of antiwar activism at the University of New Brunswick. For a short while the Mobilization (which following the Pentagon march changed its name to Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam University of New Brunswick) continued its antiwar activism, showing films, hosting speakers, leafleting, fund raising and signing up new members.⁸³ The presence of the Mobilization on campus also allowed the university's more hawkish students to demonstrate their thuggish nature in opposing the Mobilization. On 28 November a mob of eighty to ninety students, almost all of them wearing red University of New Brunswick jackets, disrupted a meeting of the Mobilization. Marching through the Student Centre with picket signs reading "Make Love and War," "Fight VC as well as VD," and "Down with Strax," they then proceeded to Loring Bailey Hall where the Mobilization meeting was taking place. Upon their arrival they beat up the students who attempted to prevent their entry to the meeting. Finally Strax went out to talk with the mob and was greeted with shouts of "Communist" and scattered obscenities. Commissionaires finally arrived and escorted the unruly students out of the building. The meeting proceeded with fifty people in attendance.⁸⁴

Despite the potential for a viable antiwar movement at the Fredericton campus, the issue of Vietnam quickly disappeared. In the fall of 1968 the Mobilization changed its name yet again to Students for a Democratic Society Mobilization. When the university enacted a policy requiring students to show their identity cards to sign books out of the library, Mobilization chose this issue to organize around. The resulting protests and ultimately the firing of Strax, who had played a leadership role in organizing student

⁸³ "Mobilization mobilizes," *Brunswickan*, 17 September 1968, 12; "Mobilization Takes Campaign to City," *Brunswickan*, 25 January 1968, 1.

⁸⁴ "Mobilization Meeting Disrupted By Violence," *Brunswickan*, 7 December 1967, 2.

protest, led to more protests to reinstate Strax. The Strax Affair, as it came to be called, became the focus of student activism, effectively ending antiwar dissent at UNB for the foreseeable future.⁸⁵

As had become the pattern following international antiwar campaigns, the movement entered a lull after October. This was as true in Canada as in the United States where factionalism led to a split in the Spring Mobilization Committee. In December, at its National Council meeting in Bloomington, Indiana, Students for a Democratic Society decided to re-enter the antiwar movement on a national scale and called for “Ten Days to Shake the Empire” in late April, a series of demonstrations against the war. This was to precede mass demonstrations scheduled for 27 April by the Spring Mobilization Committee. SDS, however, ultimately abandoned its plans. The April demonstrations drew significant crowds with 200,000 in New York, 30,000 in San Francisco, and 7,000 in Chicago. Marches also took place in other US cities as well as Mexico, Puerto Rico, Japan, Italy, France, Germany, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, and other countries.⁸⁶

In Canada, the period leading up to the April protests saw the complete coming apart and reconstitution of the antiwar movement. In January the Student Association to End the War in Vietnam hosted a conference with one hundred delegates attending from across the country. Although some Communists were present, discussion focused on the establishment of a new antiwar group in which Trotskyists would have a majority. Such an organization would likely replace the TCC. Also proposed was a mass demonstration

⁸⁵ “SDS OPENS FIRE: Mobilization refused to show ID cards, confronts Dean MacNutt,” *Brunswickan*, 24 September 1968, 1. For more on the Strax Affair see John Braddock, “The Strax Affair: University of New Brunswick,” in Tim and Julian Reid, eds., *Student Power and the Canadian Campus* (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1969) 15-25; also Peter Kent, “The Local, National and International Contexts of UNB’s Strax Affair,” *The Officers’ Quarters*, 23:2, Autumn and Winter 2005-2006.

⁸⁶ Halstead, *Out Now*, 429-453.

at the Liberal Party convention 6 April.⁸⁷ In March 156 activists met at Toronto's Queen Street United Church to organize the Spring Mobilization Committee.⁸⁸ In response to a resolution put forward by George Addison, a member of both the LSA and Ottawa CEWV, the new organization voted to demonstrate on 6 April at the Liberal Party leadership convention in Ottawa, and again on the 27th as part of the international demonstrations.⁸⁹ The convention demonstration was quite successful, with seven busloads of demonstrators coming from Toronto, one from Montreal, and several carloads from Fredericton. While Ottawa CEWV was ostensibly the organizer of the event, the Trotskyists, who controlled the leadership of Ottawa CEWV, were firmly in charge. Departing from the mainstream antiwar line, the tone of the march was decidedly pro-NLF, doing much to alienate the NDY and CP who saw the change coming and chose not to participate in the convention demonstration. The non-Trotskyist members of Ottawa CEWV, unaware of who was calling the shots, complained afterwards of "losing control" and "lack of communication." The militant tone did much to alienate Ottawa CEWV from the mainstream peace movement. When protests were mounted a few weeks later as part of the SMC-called 27 April protests, Ottawa CEWV chose not to participate.⁹⁰ This increasing fracturing of the Canadian antiwar movement was more

⁸⁷ RCMP Report, "Student Association to End the War in Vietnam," 1 February 1968, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00313, University of Toronto Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 6.

⁸⁸ Although not to be confused with the organization of the same name in the United States, Trotskyists played a leading role in both organizations.

⁸⁹ "March 2nd Conference," *Dissent*, 24 April 1968. Clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00303 Ottawa Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Disc 1, Stack 9.

⁹⁰ RCMP Report, "Protests and Demonstrations re: U.S. Action in Vietnam – April 4-6, 1968 – Canada," 2 May 1968 in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00303 Ottawa Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Disc 1, Stack 9; "Protest here Saturday," *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 April 1968. Clipping in same file.

evident in Toronto during the 27 April demonstrations. Rather than mounting one mass protest, various organizations mounted seven separate ones.⁹¹

The coming apart of the antiwar movement in Canada had been noticed long before April. In a January article in the Toronto *Telegram* right-wing journalist Peter Worthington ran a series on the movement and its state of disorder. “No longer is it unified and cohesive as it has been for the past 18 months or so,” Worthington stated. “It is split wide open and in a mild state of disarray.” Worthington credited the split over tactics and the use of violence, but it would be more accurate to say the ultimate issue was control of the movement. The article went on to report that the TCC “has begun to disintegrate at the top.”⁹² In a follow up article Worthington quoted Lukin Robinson, a former Communist and chair of the TCC, as saying the organization had “sort of dissolved” for personal, not political reasons. James Endicott, also quoted in the article, indicated that there was a new line in the peace movement and that was to support the NLF. Endicott also stated that the Trotskyists and intellectual leftists seemed to have taken control of the antiwar movement.⁹³

Trotskyist control was further consolidated at a conference of the Spring Mobilization Committee held 18 May, again at the Queen Street United Church. At this gathering the SMC changed its name to the Vietnam Mobilization Committee (VMC) and

⁹¹ RCMP Report, “International Day of Protest Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam, April 27, 1968,” in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam [sic], Toronto, Stack 1.

⁹² Peter Worthington, “What the anti-war movement is all about: Metro Peace Establishment,” *Telegram*, 27 January 1968. Clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-206-00313, Toronto Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 3. Despite Worthington being a virulent anti-Communist and red baiter, Ian Angus confirmed that most of what he wrote in his series was for the most part accurate. See Angus, interview. Gary Moffat reports that the TCC collapsed in the summer of 1968 with the Trotskyists taking over the leadership of the antiwar movement. This assertion is not entirely correct, however, as the TCC continued into 1968. See Moffat, *History*, 185.

⁹³ Peter Worthington, “Metro Peace Establishment: Extremists bid for control,” *Telegram*, 29 January 1968. Clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-206-00313, Toronto Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 3.

elected a new executive with LSA members Joe Young as chair and Naomi Riddell also on the executive. Reporting on the conference, RCMP predicted that half of those attending could be expected to follow the Trotskyist line. Only one Communist was in attendance,⁹⁴ likely to observe and report back. John Riddell, reporting to the annual conference of the LSA on 8 September, indicated that all Trotskyist antiwar efforts would henceforth go into building the VMC.⁹⁵

One of the VMC's first actions was to organize demonstrations for the International Day of Protest called by the Student Mobilization Committee in the United States for 26 October. Demonstrations south of the border were not highly successful. Fred Halstead attributed this to the disarray in the wake of the Democratic National Convention in Chicago and the ongoing presidential election, which acted to drain activists away from the antiwar movement. But internationally there was notable support. In London 100,000 marched, in Japan, 800,000.⁹⁶

In Toronto, at the end of September, VMC leader Joe Young reported to the local branch of the LSA that it was evident from the most recent VMC meeting that neither the Communist Party nor the traditional "Pacifist Groups" would be participating in the International Day of Protest,⁹⁷ leaving the VMC as the undisputed leader of the event in Toronto. It also left the VMC and its Trotskyist allies, however, mostly alone. This was

⁹⁴ RCMP Report, "Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, Ontario," 21 June 1968, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-206-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 2; "Summary of the May 18 Conference," in same stack. Note: Although the RCMP reported the name of the Organization as the Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, the actual name it went by was simply Vietnam Mobilization Committee, or more commonly, VMC.

⁹⁵ RCMP Report, "League for Socialist Action, Toronto, Ontario," 1 October 1968, CSIS, RG 146 Access to Information Application A-2006-00313 Neighbourhood Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 8.

⁹⁶ Halstead, *Out Now*, 503-504.

⁹⁷ RCMP Report, "League for Socialist Action," 22 October 1968, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 3.

evident in the turnout at marches around the country: 180 in Montreal, 250 in Winnipeg, 125 in Ottawa, 75 in Calgary. Only in Vancouver and Toronto did substantial numbers march, but still it was lacking in comparison to more recent International Days of Protest. About 1,500 marched in each city. In Toronto, where marchers had been denied a parade permit that would allow them to march on the streets – as opposed to remaining on the sidewalks – Joe Young disregarded the absence of a permit and led the group down the middle of Yonge Street, proclaiming “because the streets of Toronto belong to the people of Toronto, not the police.” The marchers were met by hundreds of Metro Toronto Police on horseback, motorcycles, and foot as well as a special anti-riot squad. Twenty eight of the marchers including Young were arrested.⁹⁸ The arrests were significant in that other than the 1966 SUPA civil disobedience action in Ottawa, where protesters were trying to get arrested, confrontations with police were not an element of Canadian antiwar marches. The VMC learned from the experience.

Following the October march the VMC made great efforts to cultivate more favourable public opinion. One way it did so was with an art show – definitely a step in a new direction. Various artists contributed 125 works of art that were put on display at the Toronto Workshop Productions theatre between 18 and 25 November. The pieces were auctioned off on the last day to raise money for the VMC’s new peace centre.

Contributing artists included Dennis Burton, Robert Markle, Arthur Handy, Eleanor Mackey and others. Illustrating the VMC’s attempt at respectability was its appointment of Pierre Berton and Farley Mowat as co-chairs of the VMC Art Committee. Also on the

⁹⁸ “Canadian Peace Protests Peaceful,” *Ottawa Journal*, (CP) 28 October 1968, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 3; “Police block Yonge St. march,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 28 October 1968. Clipping in same stack.

committee was the Reverend Arch McCurdy, Secretary of the Board of Evangelism and Social Service of the United Church of Canada (he had replaced Ray Hord upon his death). Sponsors of the event included Adrienne Clarkson, June Callwood, Bruno Gerussi and Stephen Lewis. The event was believed to be the first major political event in the post-war era involving Canadian artists.⁹⁹

Despite such activity, the VMC did not have its first official, public meeting until 11 February 1969. During the intervening period the organization had developed its membership to include Dan and Alice Heap, Gerry Gallagher, and delegates from the Spadina, St. George, St. David's, and York North NDP Riding Associations.¹⁰⁰ Even if the Communists were now gone from the antiwar coalition, the LSA was showing that it could work with others, namely those in the NDP.

The Communist Party, however, had not entirely abandoned the antiwar movement. In the late fall of 1968 it made a concerted effort to court the new left by organizing the Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam. The idea was to bring antiwar activists from throughout the Americas together for the purpose of opposing the war. Although publicly the idea was attributed to Edward Martin Sloan, a Montreal engineer and a member of Quebec Medical Aid to Vietnam, the conference was in fact sponsored by the Communist Parties of Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union, with the funding coming from Moscow. W. L. Higgit, Assistant Commissioner and Director of Security and Intelligence for the RCMP, considered the conference

⁹⁹ Press Release, "VMC Art Committee," 16 November 1968, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 4; RCMP Report, "Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam – Toronto, Ontario," 19 December 1968 in same stack.

¹⁰⁰ Leaflet, Vietnam Mobilization Committee, "First Meeting of the New Vietnam Mobilization Committee," CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 4.

“probably one of the most impressive undertakings by the Communist Parties of Canada and the United States in recent years.”¹⁰¹ The primary reason for it taking place in Canada, rather than the United States where most of the delegates would be coming from, was that many delegates were representing the Communist Parties of their respective countries and would therefore not be allowed entry to the US. For instance, one of the most substantial delegations coming from South America was from the Communist Party of Chile.¹⁰² The list of anticipated dignitaries included Cheddi Jagan of Guyana, Salvador Allende of Chile, and a veritable who’s who of the American peace and civil rights movement. In all, two hundred people were expected. Canadian sponsors included La Voix des Femmes du Québec, the Quebec NDP, UGEQ, and others. Noticeably absent were the LSA and its affiliates. Although invited to participate in the conference, they were not invited to join in the planning. Among the American sponsors were Businessmen Against the War in Vietnam, CALCAV, the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s Union, the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, the Quakers, Women Strike for Peace, and others. Also sponsoring the event were left and workers’ organizations in Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Guyana, Peru, Costa Rica, Mexico, Argentina, Panama and Bermuda.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Andrew Salwyn, “Viet Nam bombing halt won’t stop Montreal’s end-the-war rally,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 23 October 1968, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00474, Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 1; Correspondence, W. H. Kelly, Deputy Commissioner, RCMP, to George J. McIlraith, Solicitor General, 25 February 1969, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00427, Students for a Democratic Society – U.S.A., Stack 6; Correspondence, W. L. Higgitt, Assistant Commissioner, Director, Security and Intelligence, (RCMP) to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 25 July 1968, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00474, Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 1.

¹⁰² Walter Poronovitch, “Viet meet set for Longueuil,” *Montreal Star*, 29 July 1968. Clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00474, Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 1.

¹⁰³ RCMP Report, “Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam, Montreal, Quebec, from November 28 to December 1, 1968,” 17 October 1968, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information

Despite the impressive array of guests and speakers, the conference was an absolute calamity for the Communist Party and its friends. In a post-mortem happily conducted by the *Workers' Vanguard*, the Trotskyist newspaper credited “the conservative wing” of the antiwar movement with organizing the event and that it failed to meet the expectations of the organizers or “the indignant participants who wanted so much more than ‘just a peace conference.’” The *Workers' Vanguard* went on to accuse the Communist Party, not incorrectly, of using the conference and its participants as part of a “regroupment of right-wing forces within the North American antiwar movement.” The article pointed out the exclusion of the VMC and the Voix du Québec sur le Vietnam – “the only active antiwar organizations in Canada” – as evidence of this.¹⁰⁴

The conference consisted of one disruption after another. Early in the meeting members of the Black Panther Party took the microphone and forced an explanation as to why featured speaker Bobby Seale was not there. The answer was that organizers had refused to pay for the costs of the two bodyguards that Seale insisted travel with him. A collection was taken up and half the costs were raised and organizers were begrudgingly forced to cover the difference.¹⁰⁵ When Seale ultimately appeared his speech was embarrassingly violent for the Communists. Seale enjoined his audience to take violent action, asserting “You are either part of the problem or part of the solution... Being part of the solution means you’re willing to grab a shotgun and take to the barricades, killing

Application A-2006-00305, Hamilton and District Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 5.

¹⁰⁴ “Hemispheric Achieves Nothing: Blowup at Peace Rally,” *Workers' Vanguard*, 16 December 1968. Clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 4.

¹⁰⁵ “Hemispheric Achieves,” *Workers' Vanguard*.

if necessary ... We will take any steps ... to eliminate the problem.” While organizers “sat on their hands,” the majority of delegates gave Seale a standing ovation.¹⁰⁶

To a large degree the Panthers controlled the conference through sheer intimidation. “No caucus – radical, student, Vietnamese, or even Quebecois,” read an article in the *Montreal Star*, “made a decision without worrying what the Panthers were thinking.”¹⁰⁷ Two examples of Panther behaviour illustrate their contempt for anything remotely resembling a democratic process. The first occurred when it first appeared that Seale would not be attending. Panthers demanded the 2:00 time slot that would have been left vacant by Seale. In demanding the time slot Panthers indicated that they were prepared to take any actions “that become necessary.” They continued that their demands were not negotiable. The second example occurred when a representative of the “anti-imperialist caucus” attempted twice to go to the microphone and condemn the recent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The delegates from the NLF and DRV had indicated earlier to the Panthers that such a resolution would not be helpful to their cause. In an effort to oblige their Vietnamese comrades the Panthers simply blocked the delegate’s access to the microphone and suggested that continuing with his intentions would be “very unwise.”¹⁰⁸

The complete failure of the conference, however, cannot be solely attributed to the Panthers. The root of the matter was conflicting agendas. The organizers attempted to put together an anti-Vietnam War assembly and invited delegates who wanted an anti-

¹⁰⁶ Brian McKenna, “Panther power prevails,” *Montreal Star*, 2 December 1968. Clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00474, Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 2; “Hemispheric Achieves,” *Workers’ Vanguard*.

¹⁰⁷ Brian McKenna, “Panther power prevails.”

¹⁰⁸ “Liberation Not Rhetoric: Demands of the Radical Caucus,” 29 November 1968, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00474, Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 2; Ross H. Munro, “The violent death of a peace meeting,” *The Globe and Mail*, 5 December 1968, 7. Clipping in same stack.

imperialist conference. Many of the delegates formed their own caucuses. These included a caucus composed of the black delegates, another for white radicals (mostly from the United States), a Latin American caucus and a Québécois caucus. Many within these caucuses joined together in the Anti-Imperialist Caucus. An RCMP report on the conference described it as a “total state of confusion,” with each delegation seeking priority to speak first. The Québécois caucus was particularly disruptive, continually interrupting proceedings by insisting that French should always be spoken first regardless of the language of the speaker, and continuously interjecting shouts of “Vive la Quebec,” [sic].¹⁰⁹

The Globe and Mail provided the most accurate analysis of the conference. By inviting such a broad spectrum of the left, it said, the conference backfired on the Communist-oriented organizers. “(R)adicals” hijacked the conference and the Communists were forced to go along with their demands.¹¹⁰ The *Workers’ Vanguard* was more succinct: “(N)othing was really accomplished.”¹¹¹ The Communist organizers had no one to blame but themselves for the fiasco. That an avowedly Leninist party could display such poor organization and control must have been an acute embarrassment to old party members used to the rigours of iron discipline and democratic centralism. But the roots of their failure were in the belief that they could succeed by applying the rules of democratic procedure in an environment where so many participants had no intention of playing by any rules.

¹⁰⁹ RCMP Report, “Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam – Montreal, Quebec, November 28 – December 1, 1968,” CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00303, Ottawa Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Disc 1, Stack 11.

¹¹⁰ Ross H. Munro, “The violent death,” *Globe and Mail*.

¹¹¹ “Hemispheric Achieves,” *Workers’ Vanguard*.

The Hemispheric Conference marked the last attempt by the Communist Party to play a leading role in the antiwar movement. While the CP had been pivotal in mobilizing forces in opposition to the war since the American build-up in 1964, Trotskyists in the form of the Vietnam Mobilization Committee now took centre stage. The period between the expulsion of the Trotskyists from the Toronto Coordinating Committee and the Vancouver Peace Action League in the late summer of 1966 marked the start of an increasingly fractious internal dynamic within the antiwar movement in Canada, with Communists and Trotskyists representing two opposing poles. Between these poles were other actors, primarily student organizations. While these groups played their part in carrying on the fight against Canadian complicity, and in the case of UGEQ continuing to mobilize mass demonstrations, the struggle was primarily one between the two old Leninist groups. By the end of 1968 the Trotskyist movement had unquestionably become the leader of the antiwar movement in Canada.

Chapter Five: Moratorium

The year 1969 was a turning point in the antiwar movement. On Monday, 20 January, Richard Nixon was inaugurated President of the United States. Although elected on the platform of ending the war in Vietnam, such a promise was not to be fulfilled during his presidency. Nixon would take credit for the withdrawal of US forces from Indochina in 1973, but that was four years away, and the war would only come to an end in the spring of 1975 with a Communist victory. Many more Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians, Americans, South Koreans, Philipinos, Australians and New Zealanders would die or suffer wounds before the United States and its allies went home. But in 1969 the nature of the antiwar movement experienced a profound change. The previous winter, for the first time, a majority of Americans were reported as favouring a withdrawal of troops from Vietnam.¹ As that percentage climbed, the nature of antiwar demonstrators grew to include an ever-increasing number of “average Americans.” Certainly the radical stalwarts were still active in opposing the war, but more and more people who had not previously been associated with the antiwar movement were becoming involved. Indeed, 1969 marked the highpoint in antiwar activism. More people marched, petitioned, attended teach-ins, and conducted a myriad of other activities in opposition to the war than ever before or since.

This was also the case north of the border, where Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was still in his first year of power. Before entering politics, Trudeau was an early critic of the war. In fact he had visited Indochina twice in the 1940s and 1950s.² Although both a large and small l liberal, Trudeau continued to allow the sale of Canadian-made

¹ DeBenedetti, *American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era*, 211, 213.

² John English, *Citizen of the World: The Life of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Volume One: 1919-1968* (Toronto: Vintage, 2007), 402, 437.

weaponry to the United States, much of it for use in Vietnam. While Trudeau, like his predecessor Pearson, had gone on record as opposing the US bombing of the DRV, Canada continued to publicly support the war aims of the United States in Vietnam. Despite Pearson's timid critique of US aggression against the North in 1965, after 1968 Canada was generally quiet on the topic of Vietnam. According to political scientist Douglas Ross, the issue was considered "too hot." Also, Canada had no pressing need to oppose the war.³ The Trudeau government was loathe to comment on American aggression in Indochina, despite the record number of Canadians actively opposing the war and Canada's part in it.

The Trotskyist movement continued to exercise leadership over the movement, especially in Vancouver and Toronto through its control of the Vietnam Action Committee and the Vietnam Mobilization Committee respectively. A tremendous grassroots activism, however, sprang up in communities throughout the country, often independent of Trotskyist leadership. Most notable was Montreal, where the Montreal Moratorium Committee emerged that fall. Taking its name and its inspiration from the highly successful international antiwar initiative that had emerged in the United States, the Montreal Moratorium Committee was the focal point of antiwar activism in Quebec for the last half of 1969 and well into 1970. The moratorium movement, though, was by no means limited to Montreal; rather, it was another example of how an international antiwar initiative would give impetus to a national antiwar movement in Canada.

Trotskyists and Communists began the year with a rapprochement regarding the war. This was best illustrated when Canadian Peace Congress leader James Endicott

³ Ross, *In the Interests*, 23, 324-325.

joined the VMC.⁴ The League for Socialist Action acknowledged this in an historical piece on the antiwar movement in Canada in their newspaper *Labor Challenge*, in 1971. Refusing to actually name the Communist Party (as was their style when something the CP did might be construed as positive), the article referred to the Communists and their allies as “those who previously held the negotiations position” and indicated they had re-entered the Vietnam Mobilization Committee from which they had previously walked out.⁵ This was illustrated in early March with a somewhat impromptu demonstration against Canadian complicity at the Royal York Hotel in Toronto to protest the arrival there of Prime Minister Trudeau. Of the one hundreded or so demonstrators most were from the Trotskyist-led Vietnam Mobilization Committee, but a large component from the Communist Party attended as well.⁶

Vietnam, however, was a limited priority at best for the Communist Party. Its Hemispheric Conference to End the War a few months earlier had been its last stab at meaningful antiwar work.⁷ At the Party’s 20th National Convention on 4-6 April no resolutions concerning Vietnam were put forward. The only discussion of the war was a statement in the convention’s draft resolutions on peace to the effect that an independent Canadian foreign policy would mean stepped up efforts in calling for the US to conduct meaningful negotiations, unconditional withdrawal of American and allied troops, and to permit Vietnam to determine its own affairs. The document, however, was far more

⁴ Form letter, “Vietnam Mobilization Committee,” n.d., Kenny, Box 54, File 2.

⁵ Carl Fleming and Joe Young, “Seven Years of Struggle to End the War,” *Labor Challenge*, 9 April 1971, reprinted in Socialist History Project, [http:// www.socialisthistory.ca](http://www.socialisthistory.ca), accessed 9 January 2009. Note: Carl Fleming is a pseudonym for George Addison.

⁶ RCMP Report, “Protests and Demonstrations, Ontario,” Toronto, 14 March 1969, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00315, Stack 5, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, Ontario.

⁷ Although the Communist Party was involved in establishing the Montreal Moratorium Committee following the Hemispheric conference, there is no evidence that the Committee did anything until almost the day of the first Moratorium. See below.

concerned with justifying the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia the previous summer than it was in planning action around the antiwar movement.⁸

The first major antiwar action of 1969, in Canada and internationally, was the International Days of Protest scheduled for Easter Weekend, 5-6 April. Following the violence-ridden Democratic National Convention in Chicago the previous August, what was left of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam dissolved into what became known as the “Conspiracy,” a group established by Dave Dellinger, one of the eight indicted on conspiracy charges following the convention. As the focus shifted to the conspiracy trial, leadership of the antiwar movement in the United States largely fell to the Student Mobilization Committee, a group strongly influenced by the Socialist Workers’ Party and their youth wing the Young Socialist Alliance. It was this organization that played the leading role in organizing the Easter demonstrations in the United States. The “Student Mobe” as it was called was highly successful in this regard, drawing 100,000 and 30,000 to demonstrations in New York and Chicago respectively on 5 April, and another 40,000 in San Francisco the following day.⁹

Planning for the Easter demonstrations in Canada focussed on Toronto and Vancouver and began with a conference organized by the VMC at Queen Street United Church in Toronto on 1 February. One hundred attended. The featured speaker was

⁸ “Draft Convention Resolution,” *Convention 69*, Vol. 1, 20 January 1969; see also *Convention 69*, No. 2, 26 February 1969; all found in Kenny, Box 5, Files 6 & 7. The discussion of the war in Vietnam is noticeable in its absence. The Communist Party must have lost considerable credibility within the antiwar movement over its stand on the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Certainly the same principles of sovereignty and freedom from foreign military aggression were as much at play in Europe as they were in Asia. The Party’s position on the Warsaw Pact invasion is articulated in the section on peace in its draft convention resolution. It is nothing short of Orwellian: “U.S. and West German imperialism were thwarted by the five Warsaw Treaty countries in their sinister plan to sever the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia from the socialist community of states. This constituted a victory for the independence and sovereignty of Socialist Czechoslovakia, for peace and security in Europe and the world.”

⁹ Halstead, *Out Now*, 522-525.

Gordon Vichert, President of the Ontario NDP. Joe Young was re-elected chair of the VMC and Trotskyists continued to control the executive, although non-Trotskyists were made a part of the planning process. Commenting on this, an RCMP agent reporting on the meeting indicated that it was necessary if the Trotskyists did not want to alienate liberal elements.¹⁰

In Vancouver the challenge of unity came not from liberals, but rather the ultra left. A planning conference addressed by Joe Young in his capacity as chair of the Student Association to End the War in Vietnam (SAEWV) took place on 23 February at the local hall of the International Woodworkers. Participants grouped around two opposing camps. In one corner was the League for Socialist Action and its allies in the Vancouver Coordinating Committee (VCC). Opposition centred around the Simon Fraser University chapter of Students for a Democratic University. Debate focused on a resolution put forward by the VCC that the demands of the Easter demonstration include the withdrawal of foreign troops from Vietnam and self-determination for the Vietnamese. SDU put forth an amendment that would change the demonstration into one opposed to US imperialism in general. The ensuing debate mirrored the Montreal Hemispheric Conference of the previous year, this time with the Trotskyists attempting to keep the focus on Vietnam. The LSA did not argue with the rationale of the amendment, but opposed it because they feared it would alienate and limit their support, especially with the NDP and the unions. When the amendment passed by a narrow margin, those supporting the VCC position broke off from the larger group and proceeded to plan for their own march. It would take place Sunday, 6 April. Those supporting SDU planned a

¹⁰ RCMP Report, "Protests and Demonstrations Re: United States Action in Vietnam - Ontario," 19 February 1969, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00315, Stack 4, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, Ontario.

march for the Saturday. While losing the support of the ultra-left SFU students, the Trotskyists gained not only the endorsement but financial contributions from both the Vancouver Labor Council and the provincial NDP. They were also supported by the president of the student union at SFU, who was one of the speakers at the Sunday rally.¹¹

When the Easter weekend arrived, the two demonstrations made clear two vital issues: which group was capable of doing the work to organize a successful demonstration, and which organization enjoyed the most support. On the Saturday the SDU group marched from the CNR station to the US Consulate. The group took the name the Mobilization Committee, likely an effort to draw support away from those who would be inclined to support the initiatives of the Student Mobilization in the United States and the various Vietnam Mobilization Committees in Canada, all of whom articulated the “Out Now” position. Attracting 400 supporters they chanted slogans such as “Victory to the NLF,” and “Two, Four, Six, Eight, Organize to Smash the State.” The Sunday march, in contrast, drew 1,500 marchers and an additional 1,000 to the rally at the Vancouver Court House. With the exception of the ultra-left SFU students, it was a showcase of unity in opposing the war, with representatives from the Trotskyists, Communists, NDP, labour and students. Speakers included UBC professor Bill Wilmott, SFU student body president Rob Walsh, UBC grad student Bob McKee and the Peace Action League’s Bob Munro. Bob Clair of the IWA chaired the rally and Vancouver NDP MP Grace MacInnis gave the keynote address.¹²

¹¹ Brian Slocock, “Vietnam Mobilization,” *Ubysey*, 28 February 1969, 4; Bob McKee, “Year of the Anti-War G.I.,” *Ubysey*, 28 February 1969, 4; “5,000 Marchers Expected,” *Vancouver Sun*, 5 April 1969, 70.

¹² “5,000 Marchers Expected,” *Vancouver Sun*, 5 April 1969, 70; “MP Raps Canada Viet Role,” *Vancouver Sun*, 7 April 1969, 9; “Vietnam sparks rival rallies, with U.S. as friend or ogre,” *Vancouver Province*, 7 April 1969, 1,2; “Thousands Protest War, Support American G.I.s,” *Workers’ Vanguard*, 21 April 1969, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00315, Stack 5, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, Ontario.

Similar unity was displayed in Toronto in an even bigger march and rally. Under the leadership of the VMC, approximately 3,700 people marched from Queen's Park and between 5,000 and 10,000, depending on whose numbers are believed, participated in the rally that followed at Nathan Phillips Square. *The Globe and Mail* stated it was Toronto's largest peace march ever. The march itself showed a higher degree of organization than its counterpart in Vancouver. Taking a page out of the 1967 march on the Pentagon, participants marched in clearly identifiable contingents. Leading the march was the VMC executive and a few other members. Behind them was the trade union section, clearly the largest group, demonstrating an increasing willingness on the part of organized labour to actively protest against the war. Between 200 and 250 marched in the high school contingent, although many of them appeared to be in their twenties and thirties. Perhaps they were teachers. The NDP and other political groups made up the fourth contingent. Led by a Young Socialists float, the only other identifiable group within this contingent was the Communist Party with about one hundred and fifty members present. Following them was the university section, including students and faculty. This was the group which contained the hippies, a substantial proportion of those protesting that day. According to an RCMP report hippies made up about one third of the parade. Students (and non-students) from Rochdale College, a counter-cultural experiment in education that had opened the previous year, were particularly well represented.¹³ Minimizing the

¹³Rochdale, or as some called it Roachdale, was an experimental college where residents were encouraged to "do their own thing." It quickly became a Mecca for the counterculture and a virtual supermarket for illegal drugs. One chronicler of the college asserts that when the police entered Rochdale a thousand toilets flushed. Not everything about the college, however, was negative. Among its many claims to fame, Rochdale birthed two successful publishing houses and one of Canada's most successful alternative theatre companies. See David Sharpe, *Rochdale: The Runaway College* (Toronto: Anansi, 1987); also Howard Adelman, "Rochdale College: Power and Performance," in *Canadian Literature*, Spring 1997; Dennis Lee, "Getting to Rochdale," in Dennis Lee and Howard Adelman, eds., *The University Game* (Toronto: Anansi, 1968), 69-94.

conviction of the Rochdale students and most of the other participants, the RCMP agent asserted that most were simply there to enjoy the first nice day of spring. Next in line was the national groups section, with the United Jewish People's Order and the Afro-Americans Against the War represented. Also participating that day was a contingent of Australians and New Zealanders Against the War. Trailing them was a collection of groups who had travelled from outside of Toronto to take part. Next was the silent contingent: Unitarians, Quakers and other religious groups. Finally were the unaffiliated individuals.¹⁴

Among those addressing the rally were Rabbi Abraham Feinberg and Pierre Berton. Berton gave a scathing attack on the US war effort. "I'm against this war for two reasons," he declared. "It's an immoral war because it's a colonial war. And it's an inhuman war in which inhuman devices are used that no one would dream of using before."¹⁵

The hippies gave the march a festive atmosphere. Contributing to this was a float entered by the local underground newspaper *Harbinger* with a banner reading "Freaks for Peace." From the float hippies distributed "goodies" to the crowd, including 35 pounds of Easter eggs, Uncle Sam hats, poems, posters, and copies of their newspaper. Accompanying the float was "a groovy old hearse" painted gold with orange lettering and Canadian flags on the roof and a coffin inside covered with a US flag. The hearse lost a

¹⁴ RCMP Report, "Protests and Demonstrations Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam – Ontario," 10 April 1969, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00315, Stack 5, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, Ontario; Form letter signed by Joe Young, Executive Secretary, Vietnam Mobilization Committee, 28 April 1969, in same file; also "2,400 join Toronto's biggest peace march," *The Globe and Mail*, 7 April 1969, clipping in same file. One city official estimated the crowd in Toronto at 20,000. See "Thousands Protest," *Workers' Vanguard*.

¹⁵ Ronald Bull, "Che flags and free signs: Peace march had festive air," *Toronto Telegram*, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00315, Stack 5, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, Ontario.

clutch on Bloor Street and was unable to finish the parade, but as Joe Young was finishing up his closing speech, one of the women from *Harbinger* attempted to give him a giant mushroom but only succeeded in dumping a bag of popcorn on him. The “freaks” request to use the microphone for an announcement was denied. Following the rally the “freaks” initiated an impromptu pro-marijuana rally and attempted to give their mushroom to the mayor, but police charged them numerous times and five of their number was arrested. The mushroom was toppled but pieces of it were rescued and given refuge at Rochdale.¹⁶

Demonstrations took place in other cities. In Calgary a march to the US Consulate organized by Calgary CEWV drew forty demonstrators. Their numbers swelled to 200 upon reaching their destination. Among their ranks were high school and university students, a sizable contingent of draft dodgers, and others. The RCMP was aggressive in their monitoring of the event, taking forty six photographs of the marchers and making all efforts to identify them. (This would prove to be one of Calgary CEWV’s final actions before lapsing into dormancy by the end of the year.)¹⁷ In Edmonton 700 participated in a demonstration organized by the Edmonton Vietnam Coordinating Committee and was supported by a broad cross-section of the local left. Speakers included provincial NDP leader Grant Notley and Linda Blackwood, chair of Edmonton CEWV.¹⁸ In Hamilton

¹⁶ Shortstumps, “Freaks for Peace,” *Harbinger*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 10 April 1969.

¹⁷ RCMP Report, “Protests and Demonstrations Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam – Alberta,” 12 May 1969, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Request A2006-00299, Part 5, Calgary Committee to End the War in Vietnam; RCMP Report, “Protests and Demonstrations Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam – Alberta,” 23 December 1969, Calgary Committee to End the War in Vietnam, in same file. Also in same file: “Burning of flag in city,” *The Albertan*, 7 April 1969 and “Calgary Anti-War March Peaceful,” *The Gauntlet*, nd.

¹⁸ Sponsors included the local NDP Riding Association, the NDY, the Student Defense Committee of the University of Alberta, CPC, VOW, YS and the LSA. See “Thousands Protest,” *Workers’ Vanguard*.

Gus Tolentino of the LSA addressed a rally of 125 at Gore Park.¹⁹ In Regina 100 marched, with eighty of them coming from Saskatoon. Five hundred marched in Ottawa where NDP MP Lorne Nystrom and VMC Chair Joe Young addressed them. Three hundred marched in Montreal; in Niagara Falls 150. Noticeably absent was any participation in Atlantic Canada. The VMC reported that participation from the NDP and trade unions was the best ever.²⁰

The Easter 1969 International Days of Protest in Canada are significant for several reasons. First, they show that the same pattern of antiwar sentiment was evident in Canada as in the United States. Just as April 1969 represented a new peak of antiwar activity in the United States, so too did it in Canada. The Easter demonstration witnessed more Canadians marching against the war than at any time previously. This was in spite of the precipitous decline in antiwar protesters in Quebec; where the previous years had seen thousands in the streets, numbers were now reduced to hundreds. Most likely this was a function of the growing Québécois nationalist movement, acting to draw away activists from the cause of Vietnam. For the first time the antiwar movement in Quebec was increasingly beginning to speak in only one language.

In May, John Lennon and Yoko Ono travelled to Montreal. Having been denied entry to the United States, they settled on Canada as a close substitute from where they could conduct their second bed-in for peace. During their stay at the Queen Elizabeth Hotel they conducted over sixty radio interviews. Mistaking Montreal as the capital of Canada, Lennon believed he might have an opportunity to meet with the Prime Minister,

¹⁹ RCMP Report, "Protests and Demonstrations Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam – Ontario," 17 April 1969, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Request A2006-00305, Stack 1, Committee on Vietnam – McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. The VMC reported 200 taking part. See Form letter, Joe Young, VMC, 28 April 1969; also "Thousands Protest," *Workers' Vanguard*.

²⁰ Form letter, Joe Young, VMC, 28 April 1969.

but this would not happen during this visit. Near the end of their stay the couple recorded Lennon's first post-Beatles song on a portable eight-track recorder. Accompanied by Yoko Ono, Dick Gregory, Timothy Leary, Tommy Smothers, and others, Lennon's "Give Peace a Chance" would become an anthem of the movement. The following November Pete Seeger would lead hundreds of thousands in singing it at the Moratorium demonstration in Washington.²¹ The following month John and Yoko finally got an opportunity to meet Prime Minister Trudeau in Ottawa.²² Presumably Lennon had since learned the capital of Canada.

During the late spring and summer of 1969 Canadian antiwar activity was largely focused in Ottawa. With the consolidation of the Ottawa Vietnam Mobilization Committee, the Trotskyists abandoned the Ottawa CEWV which would soon change its name to the Ottawa Committee for Peace and Liberation. It would also change its focus from an exclusively anti-Vietnam War organization to one with "a broader concern with issues of peace and freedom." While it would continue antiwar work, it felt that now that the United States had begun negotiations with Hanoi that it could expand its work to other issues, in particular pursuing an independent Canadian foreign policy and making Canada a society "free in every sense of the word."²³

The Ottawa VMC in contrast was committed to remaining a single-issue organization devoted to ending the war in Vietnam. As part of that mandate it partnered with the Voice of Women in organizing a demonstration at the United States Embassy on

²¹ Jon Wiener, *Come Together: John Lennon in His Time* (New York: Random House, 1984), 92-97.

²² "PM -- 'a beautiful person,'" *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 December 1969, 1; "Lennons came for 5 Minutes; Stayed With PM an Hour," *Ottawa Journal*, 23 December 1969, 1.

²³ RCMP Report, "Ottawa Committee to End the War in Vietnam – Ottawa, Ontario," 7 May 1969, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00303, Ottawa Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 12; "Vietnam war group adopt a new name," *Ottawa Citizen*, 4 June 1969, clipping in same file. Also "Vietnam Group Changes Name, Alters Aim," *Ottawa Journal*, 4 June 1969, clipping in same file.

19 July. Commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Accords that ended the French Indochina War and paved the way for Vietnamese independence, the rally attracted between thirty and fifty people.²⁴

The summer of 1969 was a time of festivals. Of course the most significant was the Woodstock festival in upstate New York. In Toronto young people and people young in spirit enjoyed the cultural cuisine offered by such events as the Mariposa Folk Festival and Caribana.²⁵ The Toronto VMC attempted to take advantage of this festive spirit by commemorating the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki with a peace rally in the guise of a music festival in Nathan Phillips Square on 9 August. The event was intended as a building action for a mass rally planned for 15 November. Both the RCMP and the underground paper *Harbinger* agreed that most of the 4,000 to 5,000 people who attended the festival did so to hear the music and that they were least interested in the speeches given by the VMC and their supporters.²⁶

In Ottawa the VMC there made a similar attempt at turning protest into a cultural event with a festival/rally at the National Arts Centre on 11 August. Depending on whose numbers are believed, the rally attracted anywhere between 300 and 1,000. As in Toronto, the RCMP brushed off the event, claiming that 95 percent of those attending were strictly there to listen and dance to the music of the group Renaissance. The reporting agent described the Ottawa VMC as “wholly a Trotskyist operated committee”

²⁴ RCMP Report, “Protests and Demonstrations Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam – Ontario,” 21 August 1969, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00423, Vietnam Mobilization Committee, Ottawa, Ontario, Stack 1; “U.S. Embassy scene of war protest,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 July 1969, clipping in same file.

²⁵ The first Mariposa festival was held in 1961. Caribana began in 1967.

²⁶ RCMP Report, “Protests and Demonstrations Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam – Ontario,” 22 August 1969, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, Ontario, Stack 6; Telegram, Inspector Madill to Superintendent Draper, Secret, Re: Protests and Demonstrations Re: United States Action in Vietnam – Ontario, in same file. Also, DGB, “Peace Festival,” *Harbinger*, Vol. 2, No. 8, 10 August 1969.

with Ian Angus as its chair. The Trotskyists countered that the event was the largest locally-organized antiwar action ever held in Ottawa. It too was intended as a building action for a mass march planned for November.²⁷

The protests planned for November 1969 were part of a much larger protest movement that internationally re-defined the antiwar movement that year – the Moratorium to End the War. A year in the planning, the Moratorium movement emerged from a 1968 American political landscape in which both major political parties had endorsed hawk candidates for the presidency. It was apparent that peace would not be decided within the electoral framework. The idea originated with Jerome Grossman, a liberal, Jewish, Boston area businessperson. His idea was a general strike against the war. Given the moderate nature of the targeted audience, however, Grossman softened the language from a general strike to a moratorium. Originally scheduled to begin in September, it had to be postponed a month. The idea was straightforward enough: a single day in October would be set aside in which all Americans would be encouraged to participate in some sort of antiwar activity. If the government had not taken significant steps to end the war by the following month, two days would be set aside in November for similar activities. An additional day of protest activities would be added each month the war continued. The project had special appeal to those who had worked on the McCarthy presidential campaign and from the start was dominated by the left of the Democratic Party. By October it had a paid staff of thirty one and 7,500 volunteer adult

²⁷ Their claim was only slightly misleading. The March 1966 International Day of Protest action in Ottawa was over three times larger, however, it had been a nationally-organized effort. RCMP Report, "Protests and Demonstrations Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam – Ontario," 20 August 1969, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00423, Vietnam Mobilization Committee, Ottawa, Ontario, Stack 1; David Porter, "Biggest anti-war march action ever held in Ottawa," *Workers' Vanguard*, 25 August 1969. Clipping in same file.

organizers. As Paul Hoffman, author of *Moratorium*, states, "Opposition to the war had become respectable."²⁸

The first Moratorium, held 15 October, was a huge success. What made it particularly successful was that the majority of participants had never participated in politics before, let alone a peace march. It also included many who had previously supported the war. According to Fred Halstead, the October Moratorium was the first time that the antiwar movement reached the level of a full-fledged mass movement. Millions of Americans participated: 30,000 in Washington, 25,000 each in Ann Arbor and Madison, 20,000 each in Philadelphia and Minneapolis. Part of the success stemmed from the participation of so many communities ranging from Lewiston, Maine to Anaheim, California. Twenty five hundred marched in South Bend, Indiana; 7,000 in Evanston, Illinois. Even in southern states, where support for the war was more apparent, many participated in antiwar activities, although in the South such actions were largely limited to churches and universities. The exception was Austin where 11,000 marched. The largest protest that day was in Boston where 100,000 marched. Amongst their number was a contingent of students from Loyola College in Montreal.²⁹

Internationally the October Moratorium was largely limited to small affairs, usually involving Americans abroad in such cities as Copenhagen, London, Rome, Dublin, Bogota and Saigon.³⁰ Although none of the literature covering the Moratorium makes any mention of October protests in Canada, there were several. And unlike other

²⁸ Paul Hoffman, *Moratorium* (New York: Tower Publications, 1970) 11-30. See also William E. Jurma, "Moderate Movement Leadership and The Vietnam Moratorium Committee," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 68 (1982), 262-272.

²⁹ Hoffman, *Moratorium*, 81-116, 122-123; Halstead, *Out Now*, 565-566; Michael Patrick Moran, "Boston – Moratorium: What it was all about," *Agape*, (insert to *Loyola News*) 31 October 1969, 4-5.

³⁰ Hoffman, *Moratorium*, 120-121.

international Moratorium activities, actions in Canada were not the work of American nationals. The October Moratorium in Canada was, however, diminished by national student demonstrations earlier in the month against the United States' planned nuclear test on the island of Amchitka in the Aleutians. On 1-2 October approximately 14,000 students from Quebec to British Columbia protested the planned test with less than twenty four hours notice.³¹ Many involved in the Amchitka protests came from the antiwar movement. The greater contribution of the antiwar movement to the Amchitka protests was that – given the decline of anti-nuclear weapons activism with the escalation of the Vietnam War starting in the mid 1960s – it had engendered a spirit of dissent. The antiwar movement enabled the anti-nuclear weapons test campaign by normalizing protest. While taking away steam from the October Moratorium, the Amchitka demonstrations also served as a dress rehearsal for future anti-Vietnam War protests.

Canadian participation in the October Moratorium was minimal, though with some notable exceptions. The only university in Canada to officially endorse the October Moratorium was Waterloo, where overwhelming support from faculty and students led to the cancellation of all classes on 15 October. One thousand students and faculty participated in a teach-in that ran the entire day and went well into the evening. In Montreal a Moratorium Committee had been established following the Hemispheric Conference and chaired by local attorney and Communist Edward M. Sloan. The Montreal Moratorium Committee's contribution to the October activities was a march to the US Consulate.³² At McGill ten professors in the philosophy department gave their

³¹ Howard Chodos, "Anti-Bomb Protest Across Nation," *Georgian*, 3 October 1969, 3; David Saskin, "Protest!" *Georgian*, 3 October 1969, 1.

³² "Anti-war campaign halts classes," *Ubysey*, 10 October 1969, 1; Memo, J. P. Seguin, Field Intelligence Officer (RCMP) to Officer in Charge, Intelligence Unit, Montreal, 17 April 1970, CSIS, RG 146, Access to

support and planned to organize a teach-in for the occasion. Lack of support within their department and amongst faculty in general, however, led to the student union taking over the initiative. In addition, the student union sent out a telegram to other student associations across the country encouraging their participation in the Moratorium, but to little avail. Ultimately the teach-in attracted about 1,200 participants. Speaking as an individual was the university's Vice-President Academic, Dr. Michael Oliver who praised the initiative of the faculty and students, in spite of McGill's refusal to officially participate. This prompted Laurier LaPierre to launch a scathing attack on Oliver, accusing him of "mental masturbation." Oliver insisted it was not the place of a university to take political stands. That night about 500 McGill and Sir George students marched to the US Consulate for a protest organized by the executive of the McGill Student Society. Along the way students handed out posies to police officers. Although the rally at the Consulate was generally peaceful, a few bricks were thrown at the building.³³

Elsewhere in Montreal universities went silent. At Sir George Williams student union president Bill Schwartz stated that students there had a negative attitude towards the Moratorium due to a fear of protest left over from the occupation and trashing of the

Information Application A2006-00475, Montreal Viet Nam Moratorium Committee, file 4; "Moratorium Plan Outlined," *McGill Daily*, 27 October 1969, 1; Letter, National Executive Committee, Canadian Peace Congress, to all members of the National Committee and Participating Organizations of the Canadian Peace Congress, nd, Kenny, Box 53, File 10.

³³ "It was America's biggest protest: While a sprinkling of Canadians demonstrated against Viet war," *Gateway* (CUP) 16 October 1969, 1; Naomi Lyons and Leo Beinglas, "1,200 for peace join teach-in," *McGill Daily*, 16 October 1969, 1, 5, 6; "We support Oct. 15," (full page ad urging faculty to sign protest statement) *McGill Daily*, 14 October 1969, 5; "We support Oct. 15," *McGill Daily*, (statement of support for Moratorium signed by 52 faculty members) 15 October 1969, 5; "McGill joins it," *Gateway* (CUP) 15 October 1969, 3; "Philosophers back Vietnam Moratorium," *Georgian*, 15 October 1969; "Hundreds of campuses close down Wednesday," *McGill Daily*, 10 October 1969, 1,2; Dana Kerbelis, "Vietnam has its day," *Georgian*, 17 October 1969, 1; Peter Whelan, "U.S. Consulate-General picketed by 150," *The Globe and Mail*, 16 October 1969, 39; Peter Whelan, "Consulate picketed, Maoists stay away," *The Globe and Mail*, 16 October 1969, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, Ontario, Stack 7.

university's computer centre the previous February.³⁴ Likewise at Loyola College the campus remained inactive due to an ongoing labour dispute. Things were also quiet at the Université de Montréal. Also declining to participate was the Maoist-oriented McGill Student Movement. Most conspicuous in their absence were the Trotskyists.³⁵ In the case of Montreal this is explained largely by the fact that the Trotskyist movement did not have the kind of support there that it did in Toronto and Vancouver, and to a lesser extent other cities in central and western Canada. But more significant was the fact that the VMC ignored the October Moratorium until the last minute. One tangible result of the Moratorium at McGill was that it led to the establishment of a permanent committee to coordinate future Moratorium activities, the McGill Moratorium Day Committee.³⁶

At least one Montreal high school participated in the October Moratorium. At West Hill High School five US Army deserters spoke to thirty five students. The event did not have the support of the principal and the students and soldiers had to meet in nearby Somerled Park. Student organizers blamed the school administration for the low turnout. Throughout the week school staff had been seen tearing down posters advertising the event.³⁷

Participation in Toronto was minimal. At the University of Toronto the only indication of support for the Moratorium was at its suburban Erindale College campus where the student council voted to endorse it. At York University a teach-in was

³⁴ "Moratorium teach-in at McGill," *McGill Daily*, 15 October 1969, 1; "SGWU occupation ends with fire, 79 arrests," *The Varsity* (CUP) 12 February 1969, 1, 14. For a thorough analysis of the 1968 events at Sir George see Marcel Martel, "'Riots' at Sir George Williams: Giving Meaning to Student Unrest," an unpublished paper presented at the workshop "Debating Dissent: Canada and the Sixties," University of New Brunswick, 21-22 August 2008, Fredericton.

³⁵ "Vietnam has its day," *Georgian*; "Moratorium teach-in at McGill"; "Moratorium," (editorial) *Georgian*, 17 October 1969, 4.

³⁶ "Standing committee formed for November moratorium," *McGill Daily*, 17 October 1969, 1, 3.

³⁷ "West Hill students talk to deserters on Moratorium Day," *Montreal Star*, 13 October 1969, 63.

scheduled. Only at the last minute did the VMC decide to support the Moratorium. This was likely the result of the realization that the event would be big in the United States. Also, no doubt, the League for Socialist Action and their allies in the VMC took note of the critical support the Moratorium was receiving in the United States from their cousins in the SWP. Using telephones the VMC hastily organized a rally at the US Consulate. It also distributed pamphlets at the University of Toronto. Although invited, the local Maoists stayed away.³⁸ According to VMC Executive Secretary George Addison the idea was too liberal for them. He neglected to point out that until 24 hours earlier it was too liberal for the VMC. The VMC's last minute efforts succeeded in getting 200 people out to the event, including members of the Canadian Peace Congress, together with its leader James Endicott, as well as members of the Communist Party and the Voice of Women. According to the RCMP agent who reported on the event, its purpose was more to build support for the demonstration the VMC was planning for November. The agent believed the rally was successful in that it drew a lot of observers who were on their lunch hour.³⁹

Other minor actions took place in communities elsewhere in Ontario. In Ottawa fifty demonstrated at the US Embassy in a protest jointly organized by the Ottawa VMC and the Ottawa Committee for Peace and Liberation. At McMaster University many students and faculty wore black armbands and attended a meeting on 15 October sponsored by the Hamilton Area Committee on Vietnam, the Young Socialists, and the

³⁸ While Progressive Labor was Maoist in its orientation, so was the Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist) (CPC-ML) at this time. Newspaper coverage of the Moratorium movement in Canada is filled with reference to Maoists. They are referring to the CPC-ML.

³⁹ Whelan, "U.S. Consulate-General," *The Globe and Mail*; Whelan, "Consulate picketed," *The Globe and Mail*; "Canada catches spillover from million-man moratorium today," *The Varsity*, 15 October 1969, 3; telegram, Inspector Madill to Chief Superintendent Draper, Secret, 15 October 1969, Re: Protests and Demonstrations Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, Ontario, Stack 7; also, RCMP Report, "Protests and Demonstrations Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam – Ontario," 6 November 1969 in same file.

McMaster Student Movement. At the University of Western Ontario 225 attended a lecture given by a Vietnamese-born political scientist. At the University of Windsor students attended a teach-in. The only activity west of Ontario was at the University of British Columbia where 500 gathered in the Student Union Building for music and speeches while both the university and the student union there remained silent.⁴⁰

Despite the record-breaking nature of the October Moratorium in the US, participation in Canada was minimal. There was likely a degree of embarrassment at the limited-at-best support within the Canadian antiwar movement when following the big day media coverage indicated the real extent of participation in the United States. In fairness, the National Moratorium Committee in the US had not called for international participation. Unlike earlier antiwar organizations such as the Vietnam Day Committee and its successor organizations, the October Moratorium was intended as a domestic protest. The second Moratorium, scheduled for mid-November, was much more internationalist in scope, likely owing to the participation of both the Student Mobe and the New Mobe, both Trotskyist-influenced national antiwar organizations in the US.

As planning in the United States proceeded for the October Moratorium, a new national antiwar organization arose out of the ashes of the National Mobilization. At a conference at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland on 4-5 July, antiwar activists established the New Mobilization. It was the first antiwar conference in the US

⁴⁰ Whelan, "Consulate picketed," *The Globe and Mail*; "Patrol U.S. Embassy," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 16 October 1969, 10; Bob Mills, (untitled) *Silhouette*, 31 October 1969, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Application A2006-00305, Hamilton Area Committee on Vietnam, Hamilton, Ontario; RCMP Report, "Hamilton Area Committee on Vietnam, Hamilton, Ontario," 22 October 1969, in same file. Whelan, "U.S. Consulate-General," *The Globe and Mail*; "It was America's," *Gateway*. In November there was an article published in the *Gateway*, the student newspaper at the University of Alberta, referring to Moratorium activity in Edmonton, (Dale Rogers, "Vietnam moratorium returns to city," *Gateway*, 18 November 1969, 1.) however, to date no evidence has been uncovered to indicate there was any observance of the October Moratorium in that city.

with significant participation from organized labour. Hoffman describes the New Mobe as a mixed bag of old left and religious pacifists with much youth support, but that it “somehow retained a Trotskyite tinge.” While supporting the Moratorium, the New Mobe did so unenthusiastically, recognizing it, correctly, as a project of the Democratic Party. As the Moratorium proceeded with its plans, the New Mobe scheduled a mass demonstration for Washington, DC, for 15 November, calling it simply The Mobilization. It was in solidarity with these actions that the VMC in Ottawa and Toronto were building towards. The Mobilization was to follow the two-day Moratorium scheduled for November 13-14. Amidst much hostility and suspicion, the two groups agreed to work together around these dates. As a result, unlike the October protests where the emphasis was national, the November Moratorium would have a dual focus. On one hand it would concentrate domestic protest on Washington, with a secondary march in San Francisco. At the same time it encouraged international support. For all intents and purposes the two November initiatives became very much entwined with each other. The November march on Washington attracted 300,000, with an additional 100,000 only attending the rally at the Washington Monument for a total of 400,000. Again, up to that time, the Washington protest was the largest antiwar demonstration in US history. For comparison, the 1963 March on Washington in which Martin Luther King gave his iconic “I Have a Dream” speech attracted 250,000. The parallel march in San Francisco drew 125,000.⁴¹

Among the ranks of those marching in Washington were at least 200 Canadians. Carla Calhoun was one of them. She drove 12 hours from Simcoe, Ontario, with four friends. When asked why she was in Washington, she responded: “I think Canada is just

⁴¹ Hoffman, *Moratorium*, 141, 171, 182; Halstead, *Out Now*, 542-549, 574-579. DeBenedetti and Chatfield estimate the number in Washington at over half a million. See DeBenedetti, *American Ordeal*, 262; Wells, *The War Within*, 392.

as guilty as the United States through the production of war materials.” Another was Stephanie Williams of Ottawa who was attending Wellesley College in Massachusetts. “This is not a case of nationality,” she stated. “It concerns everyone in America ... and in the world.” Forty of the Canadians in Washington that day had travelled by bus from McGill and were given accommodations at Georgetown University.⁴²

Undoubtedly feeding the November Moratorium in the US, Canada, and internationally was the revelation of the My Lai Massacre, the most notorious war crime of the Vietnam War. The *New York Times* and other papers, including all major Canadian papers, published the first instalment of Seymour Hersh’s award-winning story on 13 November, day one of the Moratorium. It revealed that on 16 March 1968 a platoon of American soldiers entered the hamlet of My Lai and massacred almost five hundred unarmed old men, women and children. Further, for the next year and a half the Army had covered it up. At the Washington march several protesters carried a picket sign – a rather large one – with a blown up photo of a ditch in My Lai filled with the bodies of massacre victims. At the centre of the pile of corpses is that of an infant. The caption on the sign simply said: “Q: And babies? A: And Babies.”⁴³

The November Moratorium actively encouraged international participation – and it got it. In Paris, under the leadership of the Communist Party, 20,000 marched in solidarity, 10,000 in Copenhagen, 15,000 in London. Several thousand marched in

⁴² Paul Kidd, “Moratorium: Canada Guilty as U.S. – student,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 November 1969, 2; George Beilor, “In Washington,” *McGill Daily*, 17 November 1969, 5; Wayne MacDonald, “Splinter Group Rampages in Washington: Radical Protesters Create a Miniature Chicago,” *Vancouver Sun*, 15 November 1969, 35.

⁴³ Halstead, *Out Now*, 586-588; Arnold Bennett, “With My Lai Massacre, Frelighsburg takes on new relevance,” *McGill Daily*, 12 December 1969, 9, 20.

Berlin, Stuttgart, and Frankfurt. Even in Addis Ababa seventy five American expatriates marched.⁴⁴ And this time, Canada rose to the occasion.

In British Columbia there was widespread Moratorium support. In Victoria 200 marched by torchlight from the Legislature to City Hall on the Friday night, capping off a day-long teach-in at the University of Victoria on the theme of “Canada’s Role in Ending the Vietnam War.” It was to be followed by a silent vigil at the cenotaph on Saturday.⁴⁵ In Vancouver, at the University of British Columbia, the UBC Vietnam Moratorium Committee was busy planning activities throughout early November. The Committee secured an advertising grant as well as support for various activities it had planned, including a teach-in, from the Alma Mater Society (AMS), the UBC student council. It was unsuccessful, however, in securing a commitment from the AMS to organize a contingent for one of the marches planned for that week. The Committee got even less from the University administration. When it petitioned the University Senate to endorse discussions of the war, members of that body conveniently tabled the motion.⁴⁶ Despite the absence of UBC’s official participation, 1,000 faculty and students participated in the teach-in. In addition to the Moratorium Committee, various campus groups were a part of the activities.⁴⁷ Arising out of the teach-in was a petition signed by 450 students and faculty and sent to President Nixon demanding US withdrawal from Vietnam. In

⁴⁴ Hoffman, *Moratorium*, 173.

⁴⁵ “Procession Ends Vietnam Teach-In: ‘International Anarchy Disease’ Blamed by History Professor,” *Vancouver Sun*, (CP) 15 November 1969, 17; “Thousands To March in Vietnam War Protest,” *The Fisherman*, 14 November 1969, 1. Again, as is common in such cases, while plans for the vigil at the cenotaph were publicized in advance, no coverage was given to the actual event.

⁴⁶ Brian McWatters, “Round 2 of moratorium underway,” *Ubysey*, 7 November 1969, 1; Dave Hill, Tom Perry, Rita Chud and Jennifer Kline, “Marches,” (letter) *Ubysey*, 7 November 1969, 4; John Anderson, “Senate procrastinates, tables moratorium vote,” *Ubysey*, 14 November 1969, 1.

⁴⁷ These included Campus Left Action, Quakers, Women’s Caucus, Young Socialists, Canadian Medical Aid for Vietnam Civilians, and the Vancouver Student Movement. Mike Graham, “Protest War Lesson in War,” *Vancouver Sun Weekend Magazine*, 15 November 1969, 10; Brian McWatters, “Films, teach-ins slated in Vietnam moratorium,” *Ubysey*, 14 November 1969, 1.

addition, a telegram with 483 signatures was sent to the Prime Minister expressing similar sentiments. Also emanating from the activities at UBC was the establishment of a chapter of Australians and New Zealanders Against the War. One of the less academic activities was a guerrilla theatre mock trial of “Joe Apathy,” who was tried for “failure to speak or act against the war and looking out for number one.”⁴⁸ It is assumed he was found guilty. Moratorium activities also took place at Simon Fraser University and the Vancouver School of Art. Rock bands drew 1,500 students to Vancouver City College to hear talks by conscientious objectors. As well, Moratorium activities took place at four local high schools, with three other schools expressing an interest. In all cases the Trotskyist-led antiwar forces, now calling themselves the November 15 Vietnam Action Committee, could take credit for these activities with their dogged preparation and organization. Following 15 November the organization would be known simply as the Vietnam Action Committee (VAC).⁴⁹ But by no means did the VAC have a monopoly over Moratorium activities in Vancouver. On the Friday night 1,000 marched two to three abreast from the court house to Christ Church Cathedral at Georgia and Burrard Streets (the same intersection where the US Consulate was located). Organized by the Vancouver chapter of Voice of Women, marchers held black candles as they walked the nine blocks in silence. VOW spokesperson Irene Foulks indicated that the turnout was double what had been expected; every pew in the cathedral was filled. Among those

⁴⁸ McWatters, “Films, teach-ins,” *Ubysssey*; “Down unders against the war,” *Ubysssey*, 7 November 1969, 16; “War Petition Sent to Nixon,” *Vancouver Sun*, 17 November 1969, 11.

⁴⁹ High schools where Moratorium activities took place include New Westminster High School, Windermere Secondary School, Handsworth Secondary School, and Winston Churchill Secondary School. Schools expressing an interest were North Vancouver Secondary School, Point Gray High School, and Prince of Wales High School. See RCMP Report, “International Day of Protest Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam – November 15, 1969 – Vancouver, British Columbia,” 2 December 1969, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, Ontario, Stack 8; Stephen Jackson, “Black Candles Flicker for Peace,” *Vancouver Sun Weekend Magazine*, 15 November 1969, 10.

present were NDP MLAs Dave Barrett and Eileen Daily, and Liberal MLA Barrie Clark. Daily gave the keynote address when scheduled speaker MP Grace MacInnis's plane from Ottawa was delayed.⁵⁰ The Quakers organized a march of 2,400 on Saturday across the Granville Street Bridge. Like the one organized by VOW the previous night, it was silent and devoid of banners and picket signs. Participants were mostly middle-aged. Carrying three black coffins, they marched to the Court House where they joined a second, larger and louder march that had started at Thornton Park in front of the CNR Station. Few of the Quakers and their friends stayed for the rally that was about to commence.⁵¹ The second march, and the subsequent rally, was organized by the VAC. Again, it had done its work. The action was supported by a broad cross-section of the Vancouver left and other organizations.⁵² Chairing the rally of 3,000 was George Johnson, Vice-Chair of the British Columbia Federation of Labour (BCFL). Speakers included professors, MLAs, clergy and others, including Gary Porter of the League for Socialist Action and Richard Hughes of SAWV. Reporting on the action, an RCMP agent recorded that "at all times the Trotskyists were in charge of the proceedings, both in the park in front of the CNR and at the Court House."⁵³

Moratorium activities in Alberta took place in Edmonton on Friday and Saturday.

On Friday a capacity crowd attended a rally organized by the Edmonton Mobilization

⁵⁰ Jackson, "Black Candles," *Vancouver Sun Weekend Magazine*.

⁵¹ RCMP Report, "International Day of Protest Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam – November 15, 1969 – Vancouver, British Columbia," 2 December 1969; "10,000 March in Canada," *Winnipeg Free Press*, (CP) 17 November 1969, 1, 14.

⁵² Sponsors of the march included both the national and provincial offices of VOW, BCFL, Vancouver Labor Council, Vancouver Inter High School Student Union, Burnaby High School Student Union, FOR, Vancouver City College Student Council, BC University Teachers' Committee on Vietnam, Burnaby North NDP Riding Association, International Affairs Committee of the BC Conference of the United Church of Canada, Burnaby YMCA Youth Council and the Vancouver Art School Student Council. RCMP Report, "International Day of Protest Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam – November 15, 1969 – Vancouver, British Columbia," 2 December 1969; "Thousands to March," *The Fisherman*.

⁵³ Robert Sart, "3,000 in Peace Rally: Tame Affair for Wobblies," *Vancouver Sun*, 17 November 1969, 10; RCMP Report, "International Day of Protest Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam – November 15, 1969."

Committee at the Student Union Building theatre for a film on Vietnam titled *Time of the Locust*. Following it was a panel discussion with a question and answer session. The panel was composed of local publisher Mel Hurtig, Effie Woloshyn of Edmonton CEWV, and Professor Richard Frucht of the University of Alberta anthropology department. Edmonton CEWV distributed black armbands for people to wear as a sign of protest against the war. On Saturday 600 demonstrators braved 15° F temperatures for a rally at the provincial legislature followed by a march to Churchill Square. Also that day the Communist Party organized a car cavalcade through the city, which was followed by a meeting at the Corona Hotel.⁵⁴ Elsewhere in the province, students at the University of Calgary held a teach-in and Calgary VOW organized a vigil on the Friday night. Participants wore black and held candles in silence for an hour.⁵⁵

Moratorium activities were also widespread in Saskatchewan where activities began on Thursday with a teach-in at the Regina campus of the University of Saskatchewan on the theme of "Canada and the American Empire." It was organized by the Student Ad Hoc Committee on Vietnam. On Saturday evening a crowd of 400 gathered at the Labour Temple for a torch-lit march. Organized by the local chapter of VOW, the group consisted of students, members of the Regina Committee of American Deserters, and a large number of older working people. After the march a meeting was

⁵⁴ Although accounts in both the *Gateway* and the *Edmonton Journal* report Effie Woloshyn as Chair of Edmonton CEWV, other reports list Linda Blackwood as the organization's chair. "the action at U of A," *Gateway*, 13 November 1969, 1; Dale Rogers, "Vietnam moratorium returns to city," *Gateway*, 18 November 1969, 1; "Anti-war activities scheduled," *Edmonton Journal*, 12 November 1969, 52; "Moratorium: U students rap U.S. role in Vietnam," *Edmonton Journal*, 15 November 1969, 6; "300 march in city protest against war in Vietnam," *Edmonton Journal*, 17 November 1969, 25.

⁵⁵ "War Teach-In Held," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 14 November 1969, 1, 9; "Protests Planned," *Vancouver Sun*, 14 November 1969, 2.

held in the Labour Temple.⁵⁶ In Saskatoon 1,000 attended a campus rally and a march downtown followed by a smaller torch-light demonstration in front of the local newspaper to protest the paper's coverage of the war in Vietnam.⁵⁷

On Thursday, 13 November the Moratorium in Canada was given a boost by the New Democratic Youth when its Federal Secretary, Gordon Flowers, called on its membership to participate in Moratorium activities. Flowers stated that as socialists, it was the duty of NDY members to participate. He further stated that the NDY had been in the vanguard of the antiwar movement.⁵⁸ Such a statement begs the question: Since when? While the NDY had certainly been pivotal in their role in organizing the March 1966 International Day of Protest, they had been less than prominent since. If the NDY was sincere in its support of the Moratorium it must be asked why they did not play a role in organizing it. This is partially explained by the liberal nature of the Moratorium movement. From its first inception its intent had been to appeal to the moderate and uninvolved. The Moratorium was successful in this respect in that it was able to draw in wide support from both the NDY and its parent body, even if much of it was at the last minute. NDP speakers featured prominently at Moratorium activities across Canada, particularly in Vancouver, Montreal and Winnipeg.

Winnipeg offered a variety of Moratorium activities. On Thursday two members of the National Liberation Front spoke to a rally at the Winnipeg Auditorium organized by the newly-formed Vietnam Moratorium Committee. Le Phong and Huynh Van Ba, both members of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) were on a cross-

⁵⁶ "Support The International Day of Protest Against The War In Vietnam," (full-page ad), *Carillon*, 13 November 1969, 1; Keith Reynolds, "The Moratorium," *Carillon*, 21 November 1969, 3.

⁵⁷ "... and across the nation," *Gateway*, (CUP) 18 November 1969, 1, 8.

⁵⁸ "Vietnam War NDY Target," *Winnipeg Free Press* (CP) 14 November 1969, 4.

Canada tour sponsored by the Vancouver Aid for Vietnamese Civilians Committee.⁵⁹ On Saturday the Manitoba Theatre Centre joined the antiwar movement with a production entitled "Moratorium in Three Scenes." The program included the use of rock music, film, and improvisational theatre with a cast of over two hundred Winnipeg students. The theatre was later lambasted by the *Winnipeg Free Press* for its action.⁶⁰ Also on Saturday, 200 students from the Universities of Winnipeg and Manitoba attended a meeting at the University of Winnipeg gym. Addressing them were Communist Alderman Joe Zuken, provincial Health Minister Sydney Green, and MLA Cy Gonick. (Gonick was also the publisher of the new left magazine *Canadian Dimension*.) NDP Premier Ed Schreyer had previously indicated that the two members of his caucus were speaking solely as individuals. After the meeting the students marched to the US Consulate.⁶¹

As can be expected, November Moratorium protests were most numerous in Ontario. Universities across the province scheduled teach-ins. Most notable were those at the Universities of Western Ontario and Waterloo. At Waterloo students symbolically burned an effigy of a bomber on Friday night, capping off two days of protest involving a boycott of classes, a teach-in and a torch-lit parade.⁶²

It was in Hamilton, however, that one gains a sense of the precarious unity of antiwar forces in the fall of 1969. On 5 November Bill Thompson, a member of the Hamilton and District CEWV as well as president of McMaster CEWV, was cited at

⁵⁹ "Viet Cong Speaker Says U.S. Losing," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 14 November 1969, 6. In 1969 the NLF established the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) as a parallel government to the Republic of Vietnam. In effect it was a name change from NLF. See Herring, *America's Longest War*, 311.

⁶⁰ "Theatre Centre Joins Dissent on Vietnam," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 14 November 1969, 12; "Moratorium Theatre Centre," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 14 November 1969, 45.

⁶¹ "2 Pro- U.S. Demonstrators Stand Up To Picketers," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 17 November 1969, 13; "Protest Personal: Schreyer," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 14 November 1969, 3; "... and across the nation," *Gateway*.

⁶² "War Teach-In Held," *Winnipeg Free Press*; "Moratorium Mobilized: McGill Troops March" *Gateway* (CUP) 13 November 1969, 1.

great length in an article in the *Hamilton Spectator* about apathy regarding the antiwar movement in his city. Still, the 23-year-old philosophy student sent letters to faculty members asking them to devote time during their Friday lectures to discussion of the war. The same article indicated that a demonstration was planned for Saturday at Gore Park.⁶³ The rally attracted between 125 and 150 participants including members of VOW, the Young Socialists, the McMaster Student Movement (MSM), the Committee in Support of the Liberation of Palestine, and the Hamilton Area Committee on Vietnam. This last organization was the new Trotskyist-dominated antiwar group in the city. According to the RCMP the demonstration attracted little if any public attention. What was noticeable, however, was the heated argument between Ken Stone of the MSM and John Lejderman of the Trotskyists regarding the purpose and leadership of the rally. Given that the Trotskyists were the only group armed with a megaphone, it might be assumed they were in charge. Their refusal to allow Stone to use it to make a speech would indicate that they were intent on keeping the rally focused on their antiwar message and not to give a voice to other groups who would likely detract the focus from the war in Vietnam.⁶⁴ What is perhaps more significant about the Hamilton protest is the complete absence of the Communist Party and its allies. The CP, it will be remembered, had been the moving force behind antiwar work in the Hamilton area. In an organizational assessment of the Hamilton and District CEWV, the RCMP concluded that the organization had been

⁶³ "For demonstrators ... Apathy is their greatest foe," *Hamilton Spectator*, 5 November 1969, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006- 00305, Hamilton and District Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 1.

⁶⁴ RCMP Report, "International Day of Protest Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam, November 15th, 1969 – Canada," 5 December 1969, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006- 00305, Hamilton Area Committee on Vietnam, Hamilton, Ontario, Stack 2.

controlled by the CP from its birth until it ceased to exist in 1969.⁶⁵ Indeed, the reference above to Bill Thompson as a member of the Hamilton and District CEWV is the last reference to the organization. It appears that the Communist Party, for reasons unclear, pulled its support from the organization at this time. Gone too was any trace of the Canadian Peace Congress or the United Electrical Workers, both of which had been staunch partners of the CPC in conducting antiwar work in Hamilton. One can only speculate as to the reasons for this, but the result was the ascendance of the Trotskyists in the Hamilton area antiwar movement in the form of the Hamilton Area Committee on Vietnam. This, by no means, indicated that the CPC had entirely abandoned antiwar work – just that it was no longer a priority. At a meeting of the Hamilton Club of the CPC on 7 December there was no mention at all of the Hamilton and Area CEWV. Indeed the only mention of antiwar work at all was reported by an RCMP agent: “In the matter of the peace movement, the Club will pursue the aims of the party with greater effort, so that the Trotskyists will be isolated, leaving John Lejderman ... and his group (the Hamilton Area Committee on Vietnam) ... without support or influence.” The only reference to Jim Bridgewood, the Oakville Communist autoworker who had played such a pivotal role in the organization, was a reference to his successful appeal after having been removed as chair of UAW Local 707’s Human Rights Committee on the grounds of his Communist Party membership.⁶⁶ It would appear that the rapprochement within the antiwar movement between Trotskyists and Communists was not taking root in Hamilton.

⁶⁵ (RCMP) Organizational Assessment Form, Hamilton and District Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Hamilton, Ontario, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00305, Hamilton and District Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Hamilton, Ontario, Stack 6.

⁶⁶ RCMP Report, “Communist Party of Canada, Hamilton Club, Hamilton, Ontario,” 22 December 1969, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00305, Hamilton Area Committee on Vietnam, Hamilton, Ontario, Stack 2.

The Communist Party also appeared to be absent from protest activities in the nation's capital. There, on Saturday, 1,000 marched as part of the Moratorium. The press gave specific mention to Unitarians, Quakers, Trotskyists and others. Perhaps they were counted among the others. After the protest, 500 of the demonstrators assembled at the University of Ottawa for a meeting where they were addressed by NDP MP Ed Broadbent.⁶⁷

The largest demonstrations in Ontario, and nationally, took place in Toronto. Planning began with a conference sponsored by the VMC at Queen Street United Church on 20 September. At that point the term Moratorium was not used, as the Mobilization and Moratorium movements in the United States were still operating separately. Just over one hundred attended the conference, which represented a broad cross-section of the left from Toronto and other Ontario communities. Speakers included Norman Brudy of the Communist Party and Abie Weisfeld and Bill Dyer of the NDP. All of the Trotskyists present, including Weisfeld, identified themselves as NDP members. This was not deceptive in a technical sense as they were in fact members of the NDP. They simply chose not to explain that they were also members of the League for Socialist Action engaging in their practice of entryism – dual membership in the two organizations with the intent of taking control of or at least exerting influence on the NDP. The Trotskyist movement had first begun this practice with regard to the CCF in 1937.⁶⁸ Great efforts were made to build, or at least give the impression of, a broad, inclusive coalition. Those elected to the VMC at the conference included Dr. James Endicott of the Canadian Peace Congress, Arch McCurdy, Secretary of the Board of Evangelism and Social Service of

⁶⁷ Tracy Morey, "Nixon is a liar, MP tells local protest," *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 November 1969, 2; "10,000 March in Canada," *Winnipeg Free Press* (CP) 17 November 1969, 1, 14.

⁶⁸ Isitt, "Tug-of-War," 255-266.

the United Church of Canada, Anglican worker-priest and community activist Dan Heap, Norman Brudy of the Communist Party, Linda Blackwood of Edmonton CEWV, Murray Thompson of the Quakers, and others. Of particular note was the resignation of Joe Young as Executive Secretary of the VMC. His reasons for stepping down are not clear. It is possible that his arrests the previous year at both the Liberal Convention and the November demonstration in Toronto were causing concern for some. Elected to replace him was George Addison.⁶⁹

Organizing also took place on campus at Toronto's two universities. In late October students and faculty organized the University of Toronto Moratorium Committee. Dr. Elliot Rose of the history department chaired a ten-person executive. The Committee's first action was to send a delegation to University President Claude Bissell, requesting that he cancel classes on 14 November in observation of the Moratorium. Bissell forwarded the request to the University Senate which voted it down. The university administration was not alone in its refusal to cancel classes. Although supporting the Moratorium in principle, the Victoria College Union Council also quashed a motion calling upon the administration of Victoria College to cancel classes on the 14th. The Moratorium Committee proceeded to call for a boycott of classes on that day to be accompanied by a rally in Convocation Hall. Elsewhere, activists at York University's Glendon College experienced a limited victory when the faculty council voted to cancel Thursday's classes. It was a tight vote, with Principal Escott Reid as chair casting the deciding ballot in a vote of 23 to 22. Of the ten student members of the council, only five

⁶⁹ RCMP Report, "International Day of Protest Re: United States Action in Vietnam, November 15th, 1969, Canada," 3 October 1969, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, Ontario, Stack 7; George Addison, "Report from VMC: Mass Anti-war protest set for November 15," *Workers' Vanguard*, 6 October 1969, clipping in same file.

of them voted to cancel classes. The victory was short-lived, however, as the Glendon College Senate, which had to ratify the decision, refused to do so.⁷⁰

Ultimately the main Moratorium activity on campus in Toronto was the rally at Convocation Hall on Friday, 14 November attended by 1,000. Including a program of music, speeches, theatre and a question and answer session, the proceedings were interrupted mid way by a bomb threat resulting in the evacuation of the building. Students and faculty continued the program outside until allowed to re-enter the building. Elsewhere on campus a vigil was held at St. Basil's Church at St. Michael's College from noon on Friday until noon the next day. As well, the Union of American Exiles (UAE) held a mass rally on Friday night lasting until noon the next day at the Medical College Auditorium. The UAE also planned to join other groups at Nathan Phillips Square for a mass protest on Saturday, as well as to hold a vigil at the US Consulate.⁷¹

The VMC organized the main event of Moratorium weekend – a mass protest at Nathan Phillips Square. The march was not advertised as much as previous such marches had been. According to the underground newspaper *Harbinger*, it did not need to be. Media coverage of the Moratorium in the United States was massive and effectively did the job of advertising local actions. The VMC, however, did not think so, expressing disappointment at the number that turned out. Estimates vary from a low of 3,000 to a high of 10,000. In addition to groups such as the YS, the CPC and VOW, numerous third world solidarity organizations were present. Commenting on the turnout, an RCMP agent

⁷⁰ "Moratorium launched," *The Varsity*, 30 October 1969, 3; "Moratorium'ers launch petition," *The Varsity*, 3 November 1969, 12; Cecelia Viggo, "Senate says it's business as usual on Moratorium Day," *The Varsity*, 12 November 1969, 1; "Glendon decides to cancel classes for moratorium," *The Varsity*, 9 November 1969, 25.

⁷¹ "VMC hoping to close down U of T for day of protest," *The Varsity*, 7 November 1969, 25; Viggo, "Senate says," *The Varsity*; Jim Karamitanis, "Bomb threat highlights Moratorium Day at U of T," *The Varsity*, 17 November 1969, 7.

indicated that participation by non-Communist groups was fairly broad, with significant support from the NDP and church groups. The presence of several unions was also felt, especially that of the United Auto Workers. Dennis McDermott, Canadian Director of the UAW, joined other speakers in addressing the crowd.⁷² Speeches were cut short when someone, likely one of members of the right-wing Edmond Burke Society which had shown up to disrupt the event, cut the wires on the sound system. Still, no sound system was required to appreciate the three-ton truck sporting a caricature of Prime Minister Trudeau, compliments of the Communist Party. The float denounced Trudeau's complicity in the war. One bystander, presumably not in sympathy with the Moratorium, commented that the Santa Claus Parade, which had passed by earlier in the day was more interesting.⁷³ With no sound system, about a third of the protesters proceeded on to the US Consulate where the UAE vigil was still in progress. There they were met again by a contingent of about fifty members of the Edmond Burke Society as well as about thirty police officers. The Burkers disrupted activities by blowing whistles and waving their picket signs. Some scuffles broke out and some arrests were made, but for all intents and purposes the day's activities were peaceful.⁷⁴

In Montreal Moratorium activity largely emanated from the campus of McGill University. After prodding from the Montreal chapter of VOW, a meeting took place on campus 21 October establishing the McGill Moratorium Committee, a component of the

⁷² Dave Bush, "Moratorium March," *Harbinger*, Vol. 1, No. 12, December 1969; "Marchers Peaceful In Other Cities," *Vancouver Sun* (CP) 17 November 1969, 2; RCMP Report, "International Day of Protest Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam, November 15, 1969 – Canada," CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, Ontario, Stack 8; "... and across the nation," *Gateway* (CUP), 18 November 1969, 1, 8.

⁷³ "3,000 march in Toronto, protesting war in Vietnam," *The Globe and Mail*, 17 November 1969, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Toronto, Ontario, Stack 7;

⁷⁴ Laura Kelly, "3,000 protest Vietnam in Toronto's Moratorium," *The Varsity*, 17 November 1969, 3; Bush, "Moratorium March," *Harbinger*; "10,000 March" *Winnipeg Free Press*.

larger Montreal Moratorium Committee. Its officers included Bruce Timbres as Secretary-Treasurer, Rick Deaton, Vice-Chair, and Stephen Wohl, Chair. Soon afterwards the McGill Committee organized a meeting on the campus of Sir George Williams University and joined forces with activists there in planning for the November Moratorium activities.⁷⁵

By far the most creative Moratorium activity carried out by the McGill committee was the “pacification” of a small Quebec village to draw attention to the violence involved in the pacification of villages in South Vietnam. Perhaps inspired by the theatricality of Arlo Guthrie, who performed his iconic “Alice’s Restaurant Massacree” [sic] at the Place des Arts on 8 November, the Committee went all out for what it called Operation Pacification. Armed with a letter of introduction from the chaplain at McGill, representatives of the Committee first approached the curé of the small community of Frelighsburg in the Eastern Townships for his support. Their idea was a classic piece of guerrilla theatre. First they would leaflet the community from the air. The leaflets would explain that the area had been declared a free-fire zone and that residents had twenty four hours to evacuate. After that point they would be considered the enemy. The curé gave his blessing and took the students to see the Mayor, who also approved. The Committee then put out a press release announcing their intentions, but keeping the name of the community secret until the last minute.⁷⁶

The operation was plagued by technical difficulties. Participants were not confident of the chances of success. The night before the action four votes were

⁷⁵ “Moratorium Plan Outlined,” *McGill Daily*, 27 October 1969, 1; “Moratorium Plans,” *Georgian*, 5 November 1969, 3; Bennett, “With My Lai,” *McGill Daily*.

⁷⁶ “Bring the war home,” *Gateway (CUP)* 7 November 1969, 16; Ken Waxman, “Arlo Guthrie,” *Georgian*, 12 November 1969, 6; “Commandos set for pacification,” *McGill Daily*, 10 November 1969, 3

conducted before the Committee finally agreed to proceed. On the day of the action the plane that had been hired to drop the leaflets could not fly due to fog. As a result the leaflets had to be distributed by hand. Also, due to a Teamsters strike, the green, military-looking “troop trucks” could not be secured. The Committee had to settle for a van and a yellow school bus. As well, funds promised by the McGill student council were not timely in arriving and participants had to pawn their watches to pay for the rental of uniforms and other equipment. On the day of the operation actors had to be drafted at the last minute in McGill’s Student Union Building. Still, according to the *McGill Daily*, the operation was saved by a “superb last-ditch effort at coordination.”⁷⁷

Early on the morning of 12 November students dressed in black pyjamas and conical hats “infiltrated” Frelighsburg. Shortly afterwards two platoons of “American troops” entered the community from both ends armed with toy weapons and accompanied by sounds of mortar fire, exploding bombs and wailing aircraft sounds. Combatants fought a pitched battle on a local bridge resulting in one fatality and one NLF soldier being taken prisoner. He was summarily executed. As the Americans went on to occupy the town they proceeded to round up “civilians,” one of whom was tortured. Another, a woman, was the near victim of a mock rape that was thwarted by actual members of Montreal’s Union des Vietnamiens Patriotiques dressed as NLF guerrillas. Many of the community’s 371 inhabitants, as well as members of the Montreal press turned out for the performance. The townsfolk welcomed Operation Pacification for the attention as well as the business it generated. Although impressed with the realism, many of the residents did

⁷⁷ Arnold Bennett, “Operation Pacification,” *McGill Daily*, 13 November 1969, 10, 11.

not appear to understand the issues involved. Committee members were able to address this at a reception held following the performance hosted by the mayor.⁷⁸

Most significant about Operation Pacification was its boldness. No such piece of guerrilla theatre had ever been attempted in Canada before or since. Even in the United States, the occupation of an entire community had not been attempted. The most notable example of such theatre followed the US-supported South Vietnamese invasion of Laos in 1971 when members of Vietnam Veterans Against the War launched their assault on Washington, DC, in their Operation Dewey Canyon III.⁷⁹ The occupation of Frelighsburg predated the exercise by a year and a half.

Operation Pacification was only the first action that the McGill Moratorium Committee had planned for November. On Thursday the Committee mounted a teach-in at McGill attracting 600 students. Although it was supposed to include Hans Morgenthau and Mel Watkins of the Universities of Chicago and Toronto respectively, both withdrew at the last minute citing illness. Funding was provided by the student council, the Arts and Science Undergraduate Society, the McGill Debating Union and the McGill chapter of Hillel. On Friday, the Committee hired three buses to take students to the border to block two trains reported to be carrying war materials from Canada into the United States. One of the buses was scheduled to continue on after the action to Washington, DC, for the march there the following day, but the driver was uninformed of his stop at the border and proceeded directly to Washington. In all about one hundred and twenty students held up one of the trains for two hours. Students delayed a second train for an

⁷⁸ "Bring the war home," *Gateway*; "Commandos set," *McGill Daily*; "Moratorium mobilized, McGill troops march," *Gateway* (CUP) 13 November 1969, 1; Bennett, "Operation Pacification," *McGill Daily*; Daina Kerbelis, "Comment – Vietnam Moratorium is one-sided," *Georgian*, 19 November 1969, 3.

⁷⁹ Wells, *War Within*, 480-484. See also the chapter on Dewey Canyon III in Hunt, *The Turning*, 120-142.

hour before they returned to Montreal.⁸⁰ The McGill Committee also mounted a campaign to tie up the phone lines of the US Consulate in Montreal throughout the Moratorium. They encouraged anyone they could to call the Consulate and ask when the United States was planning on leaving Vietnam. At least one person was given the reply “As soon as possible.” The campaign appeared fairly successful, with the committee boasting that the lines were “well tied up.” The Committee also encouraged callers to phone the offices of CIL and ask if they were still in the business of destroying Vietnam.⁸¹ Also, a delegation from the McGill Committee travelled to Ottawa to present a petition to Prime Minister Trudeau. The group had garnered the signatures of 3,000 students demanding an end to Canadian complicity. They were unable to see Trudeau, however, and had to settle for the former High Commissioner to Tanzania.⁸² The McGill Moratorium Committee was certainly the most energetic of any Moratorium groups in Canada. Operation Pacification, stopping trains at the border, a teach-in, a phone-in campaign, and a delegation to Ottawa all within the span of four days was impressive for any student group. It was somewhat curious, therefore, that immediately following the November actions the Committee impeached its leader, Steve Wohl. The reasons were not for any failing of the group, far from it; the McGill Moratorium Committee’s actions had been a huge success. Rather, in a vote of 20-2, the Committee impeached Wohl for poor leadership – specifically: not delegating authority (Wohl ran all the sub-

⁸⁰ Arnold Bennett, “Moratorium mobilizing,” *McGill Daily* 11 November 1969, 3; Arnold Bennett, “Teach-in message: War trial demanded,” *McGill Daily*, 14 November 1969, 1; Arnold Bennett, “Train stopped by protesters,” *McGill Daily*, 7 November 1969 1, 4; “Student stop train,” *Montreal Star*, 14 November 1969, 31; Marc Raboy, “McGill students stop freight train,” *Montreal Star*, 15 November 1969, 1; “Students Block Train,” *Vancouver Sun* (CP) 15 November 1969, 35; “Teach-in speakers ill,” *McGill Daily*, 13 November 1969, 3.

⁸¹ Bennett, “Moratorium mobilizing,” *McGill Daily*; Arnold Bennett, “With My Lai Massacre, Frelighsburg takes on new relevance,” *McGill Daily*, 12 December 1969, 9, 20.

⁸² Bennett, “With My Lai,” *McGill Daily*.

committees), failing to project the desired public image of the Committee, rudeness, and generally being incapable of change. Following Wohl's impeachment, the group amended its constitution, replacing a three-person executive with one of five. Further adding to Wohl's problems, a few weeks following the November Moratorium, he was cornered in the Student Union Building at McGill and beaten up by three assailants associated with the Maoist McGill Student Movement. Frank Costi, the building manager reported that the assault was politically motivated.⁸³

Moratorium activities in Montreal were not limited to university students. Participating in the train stoppage were several students from Montreal secondary and elementary schools.⁸⁴ In addition, on Friday, Westmount's St. George's School provided a study session after an opinion poll of the students indicated that they desired such an event. The session featured Robert Vogel, Chair of McGill's Department of History; Dimitri Roussopoulos, editor of *Our Generation*; and B.C. Bhatla, a teacher at St. George's. The principal, Robert Leicester, himself an American, gave the event his full blessing.⁸⁵

Voice of Women was also active in Montreal during the November Moratorium. Attempting to organize a candle-lit procession, they were prohibited from doing so by a new by-law passed by the administration of Mayor Jean Drapeau which banned demonstrations where there was a possibility of violence. The by-law had been put in place largely because of the increasing frequency of violence at nationalist

⁸³ Ellen Beck, "Moratorium head fired," *McGill Daily*, 19 November 1969, 1; Rick Deaton, Guy Lowry, Joel Kreps, Lee Roth, and Jack Siematycki (Executive of McGill Moratorium Committee) "Not assassinated, merely sacked," (letter) *McGill Daily*, 20 November 1969, 6; "McGill students assaulted," *McGill Daily*, 12 December 1969, 3.

⁸⁴ "Students stop train," *Montreal Star*; Bennett, "Train stopped," *McGill Daily*.

⁸⁵ Mark Daly, "Classroom-bound students don't march - study Vietnam," *Montreal Star*, 15 November 1969, 6.

demonstrations. Although there was provision for exemptions under the legislation, when VOW applied for such it was denied. In response, the Ligue des Jeunes Socialistes, the Quebec wing of the Trotskyist Young Socialists, mounted a march on the family home of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in Outremont, outside the city limits of Montreal proper and therefore unaffected by Drapeau's egregious statute.⁸⁶

The American Deserters' Committee (ADC) of Montreal also attempted to participate in the Moratorium. They had planned to plant 120 crosses, in the style of a military cemetery, on the McGill campus. The crosses, however, were delivered to the wrong location and the ADC was unable to proceed.⁸⁷

With the ban on demonstrations, the Montreal Moratorium Committee staged a teach-in of its own that Saturday at Paul Sauvé Arena. Featured speakers included two representatives of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG), Nguyen Van Ba, Chargé d'Affaires in Havana, and Le Phuong, Ambassador to Sweden. Also speaking were Clare Culhane, President of Quebec VOW; Julius Grey, President of the McGill Student Society; and Fernand Daoust, Vice-President of the Quebec Federation of Labour and Quebec director for the Canadian Union of Public Employees. Daoust decried the recent Montreal by-law banning demonstrations. Most significant of all speakers, however, was NDP Deputy Leader David Lewis, who condemned "this imperialist war." Lewis had come a long way in his pronouncements on the war. Only a few short years earlier he had equally blamed China and the DRV for the tragedy unfolding in Vietnam. On this day he told those assembled that "(T)he conscience of the

⁸⁶ Bennett, "With My Lai," *McGill Daily*; Quebec Parade Ban," *Globe and Mail* (CP) November 14, 1969, 3; Marc Raboy, "Students condemn Montreal ban on protest," *Montreal Star*, 14 November 1969, 31; "Marches Peaceful In Other Cities," *Vancouver Sun* (CP) 17 November 1969, 2.

⁸⁷ Ellen Beck, "McGill to protest in DC," *McGill Daily*, 14 November 1969, 3; Bennett, "With My Lai," *McGill Daily*.

world has been murdered by the abjectness displayed by the world concerning U.S. involvement in Vietnam.”⁸⁸

Also occurring on Saturday was another action at the US border. This involved a group of about one hundred Quakers from Massachusetts and New Hampshire traveling to Stanstead, Quebec, to deliver \$3,175 to VOW’s Clare Culhane. The money was to be forwarded to Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians (CAVC), an agency that provided aid to civilians in both North and South Vietnam, as well as in areas of South Vietnam under PRG control. As such donations contravened the US Trading with the Enemy Act, the Americans made their contributions through Canada. This was their fourth such border crossing in the past three years, having contributed over \$50,000 during that time. The Quakers were greeted by a group of about sixty Canadians, mostly students from Bishop’s University and nearby Stanstead College. Also present were representatives of VOW as well as the Canadian Friends Service Committee. In addition to their picket signs including peace symbols and Moratorium messages, they had erected a banner reading “Welcome to Canada.” Also present were the two PRG representatives who spoke at the Paul Sauvé Arena that day.⁸⁹

Quebec had seemed to have made something of a comeback in terms of participation in the antiwar movement. Having experienced a lull for most of 1969 following the disastrous Hemispheric Conference, people were returning to the

⁸⁸ Peter Rochon, “U.S. pull-out demanded,” *McGill Daily*, 17 November 1969, 3; “Total liberation seen for Vietnam,” *Montreal Star*, 15 November 1969, 6.

⁸⁹ “Hands-across the border protest,” (publication title exempted under Access to Information legislation), 17 November 17, 1969, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00302, Canadian Friends Service Committee, Volume 18; Pat Hunt, “100 Quakers Cross Border Again This Year,” (publication title and date exempted under Access to Information legislation) in same file. “Break U.S. Law: Quakers bring Viet aid here,” *Montreal Gazette* (CP) 17 November 1969, clipping in same file, Volume 1; “Anti-war team to Quebec,” *Montreal Gazette* (AP) 15 November 1969, clipping in same file, Volume 18; “Quakers turn over cash without trouble,” *Montreal Star*, (date exempted under Access to Information legislation). Clipping in same file, Volume 18.

movement. Still, the movement was focussed on Montreal. Although the November Moratorium spotlighted several border towns, the activists that were drawn to them came primarily from Montreal. It was noticeable, however, that despite the increase in numbers, the trend within the Quebec movement was towards a more and more English-speaking one. This trend would continue into 1970.

Although notable for its diversity of antiwar activities during the November Moratorium, Quebec was not the eastern-most terminus of the antiwar movement in Canada. Although small in comparison to their western counterparts, there was scattered Moratorium activity in Maritime Canada. In Fredericton the first antiwar activity was seen since the infamous Strax Affair had derailed antiwar activity at the University of New Brunswick. There, an organization calling itself the Ad-Hoc Committee to Support Mobilization Against U.S. Troops in Vietnam scheduled a teach-in in Head Hall followed by a march from the Student Union Building to the Centennial Building downtown. Speakers included John Earl from the Department of Economics, Eustace Mendis from Physics, Dan Weston and Father Dick Renshaw. While there is no reason to doubt the activities took place, it is unfortunate for the historian that neither the local newspaper nor the student newspaper covered either of the events.⁹⁰ Elsewhere in New Brunswick, fifty students at Mount Allison University attended a 7:30 chapel service on Friday morning as part of Moratorium activities. Some stayed on for a prayer vigil lasting until midnight. Ten percent of Mount Allison's students boycotted classes that day⁹¹ (although a boycott of classes on any Friday is likely popular with ten percent of any undergraduate population). In Halifax Moratorium activities were carried out by an ad hoc coalition of

⁹⁰ "War Teach-In Held," *Winnipeg Free Press* (CP) 14 November 1969, 1, 9; "UNB March Planned For Moratorium," *Brunswickan*, 14 November 1969, 3.

⁹¹ "... and across the nation," *Gateway*.

the Dalhousie Graduate Student Association, the Voice of Women, Quakers, as well as other student groups and individuals calling itself the Mobilization Committee. Their slogan was “Vietnam – It’s Our War Too!” Their focus was Canadian complicity. Enlisting the support of the *Dalhousie Gazette*, they printed a full-page ad on the front page of the 14 November edition with the banner headline: “VIETNAM WAR MORATORIUM.” The ad featured a full-page photo shot of a napalm burn victim from the waist up. The following day, Friday, between 200 and 300 students, clergy and others marched from Victoria Park to the US Consulate at noon. There, Gordon Stewart, the group’s chairperson, presented a two-page paper to the Consul urging American withdrawal from Vietnam. On Sunday about 200 braved the rain for a rally in Victoria Park. There they listened to speeches by Mayor Allen O’Brien, labour leader J.K. Bell, former CUS field worker and NDY activist Barry McPeake, and Muriel Duckworth, past national president of VOW.⁹²

As in the United States, the November Moratorium in Canada was the most significant, comprehensive, national antiwar campaign against the Vietnam War. Neither before nor since would so many communities draw out so many individuals for such a variety of antiwar activities over a period of a few days. While Moratorium activities both in Canada and the United States would continue past November, they quickly collapsed, with little activity in December. Part of this was the result of the withdrawal of the New Mobilization Committee in the United States. But this was to be expected. The

⁹² “Vietnam: It’s Our War Too,” *Dalhousie Gazette*, 7 November 1969, 13; “VIETNAM WAR MORATORIUM: NOVEMBER 14-15,” (ad) *Dalhousie Gazette*, 14 November 1969, 1; “MORATORIUM DAY: NOVEMBER 14-15,” (ad) *Dalhousie Gazette*, 14 November 1969, 2; Barry Conrod, “Consul Will Forward Groups Presentation,” *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 15 November 1969, 3; “Vietnam Protest: Can Millions Be Wrong?” *Dalhousie Gazette*, 21 November 1969, 5. Also identified among the speakers was a Kim Cameron, but no affiliations were given for this person. It is possible that this was a King’s College student of that name who later became known for his work with Microsoft, or it could be another person by that name.

New Mobe had cooperated with the National Moratorium Committee in order to launch a massive rally in November. That had been accomplished and they could now move on to other projects. In his study of the Moratorium movement in the United States, Paul Hoffman offers several reasons for the collapse of the movement after November 1969. The first was that peace activists eschewed another mass rally for fear of falling into a numbers game. If the same number of participants could not be brought into the streets in December, would that be interpreted as a failing of the antiwar movement? Other factors had to be considered regarding possible December actions. Students would be focused on exams, others would be preparing for the holidays. Then there was the weather to consider. Also there was the fear of violence. Two successful, peaceful, national campaigns were a great accomplishment, but as Hoffman states:

There can only be so much emotion, so much frustration before it becomes “the fire next time.” Violence was the last thing the leaders of the Moratorium wanted – not alone for its own sake, but because bloodshed would destroy the cause. It would produce polarization, invite repression and launch a massive swing to the right.⁹³

December Moratorium activities in the United States, therefore, were devoted to local activities including the distribution of leaflets, quiet meetings in schools and churches and similar pursuits. Carolling and peace vigils were commonly planned for Christmas Eve to link the philosophy of the antiwar movement with the universal theme of “Peace on Earth.” Officially the December Moratorium was held Saturday, 13 December. Town meetings to discuss the war were held in thirty six American cities, all fairly low key. The original plan of escalating each monthly Moratorium by a day was abandoned.⁹⁴

⁹³ Hoffman, *Moratorium*, 202-203.

⁹⁴ Hoffman, *Moratorium*, 204-205.

In Canada the December Moratorium was minimal. Surviving records indicate activity only in Quebec and British Columbia. In Vancouver organized labour took the lead. The Vancouver Labour Council unanimously passed a resolution denouncing the Trudeau government for continuing to sell arms to the United States for use in Vietnam. It also placed an ad in local papers on 13 December expressing support for the Moratorium. Unions including the Marine Workers, Electrical Workers, Carpenters, and Amalgamated Clothing Workers indicated they planned to participate in a vigil organized by the Peace Action League at City Hall on the day of the Moratorium and urged their members to participate.⁹⁵ Also in Vancouver, the VAC led about fifty people in distributing 10,000 leaflets in the downtown core, taking advantage of the busy shopping season. In addition, an art auction was held of works donated by BC artists to raise funds for the antiwar movement. Later in the evening about one hundred VAC members and others gathered outside City Hall for a folk music concert accompanied by speakers, including Hilda Thomas, Chair of VAC. Elsewhere in the city, about 50 people turned out to West Point Grey United Church to hear a speaker from the YMCA who had just returned from a stint in Vietnam with that organization.⁹⁶ Elsewhere in the province a rally was held in Trail at the local cenotaph sponsored by the Ad Hoc Moratorium Committee composed of the executive of Local 480 of the United Steelworkers (formerly a Mine Mill local with strong ties to the Communist Party) as well as the local's Ladies' Auxiliary, the Selkirk College Student Council and others. Unique for Canadian union leaders was a statement from Local 480 lambasting the North American labour

⁹⁵ "Canadian Complicity in Vietnam Blasted," *The Fisherman*, 8 December 1969. 1.

⁹⁶ John Gibbs, "Shoppers Given Viet Leaflets," *Vancouver Sun*, 13 December 1969, 72.

movement for its support of the war and its aiding in the “genocide.”⁹⁷ In Montreal the main feature of the December Moratorium was Operation Obstruction – the picketing of Aviation Electric, a company that sold war material to the US. Approximately thirty protesters showed up carrying placards and wearing black armbands. The action was organized by the McGill Moratorium Committee which also conducted a 24-hour fast at Christ Church Cathedral.⁹⁸

The Moratorium movement continued to die a slow death in Canada throughout January. No activity was reported in that month except for a notice from the McGill Moratorium Committee stating that it was suspending operations in order to plan for a nation-wide march on Ottawa on 13-14 February. The date was later changed to the 27-28.⁹⁹ The only other Moratorium activity in February was a talk given by Martin Neimöller and Krishna Menon at John Oliver High School in Vancouver.¹⁰⁰

The demands of the McGill Committee’s Ottawa march were the same as had been present since the birth of the antiwar movement. But they were accompanied by new ones. Instead of simply calling for an end to Canadian complicity, the Committee had specific suggestions on how to accomplish this. In addition to calling for an embargo of all war materials to the US, the Committee called specifically for an embargo of nickel shipments, a move that would hamper weapons production. It also called for the

⁹⁷ Other sponsors included James Endicott; R. Kelves, President of the Trail Labor Council; Mayor F.E. De Vito; Kootenay West MP Randolph Harding; Reverend G. Hernason; Castlegar-Kinnaird Young New Democrats and Rossland-Trail Young New Democrats. See “Are You for Peace? Moratorium,” (ad) *Trail Times* and *Nelson News*, 13 December 1969, clipping in CPC, Box 49, File 01. Also, “Little Militancy Marks Anti-War Moratorium,” *Trail Times*, 13 December 1969, clipping in same file. For more on Local 480 see Al King, *Red Bait: Struggles of a Mine Mill Local* (Vancouver: Kingbird Publishers, 1998).

⁹⁸ “Moratorium fingers US war contractors,” *McGill Daily*, 12 December 1969, 3; Arnold Bennett, “December Moratorium: Attacking at the roots,” *McGill Daily*, 12 January 1970, 4.

⁹⁹ Arnold Bennett, “Ottawa March planned,” *McGill Daily*, 16 January 1970, 3; Arnold Bennett, “Moratorium march delayed,” *McGill Daily*, 28 January 1970, 1.

¹⁰⁰ Press Release, “Vancouver Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam,” 24 January 1970, CPC, Box 49, File 11.

withdrawal of Canada from the ICC given its role in collecting intelligence for the United States. As well, it demanded more lenient treatment of Americans attempting to enter Canada to escape military service in Vietnam.

In Montreal, the Association des Vietnamiens was busy with antiwar work, but had to be careful as the Government of the Republic of Vietnam could easily revoke their passports and order them home to certain incarceration. In addition, a new antiwar organization had emerged in the city – Students for Vietnam Mobilization – that had recruited students from eight local high schools. They would press for student assemblies to discuss the war and if refused they would petition local school boards. As well, they would attempt to get the support of teachers and parents.¹⁰¹

The actions in Ottawa took place in two parts. On the Friday between four hundred and one thousand turned out to a folk festival and a screening of Emil De Antonio's signature antiwar film *In the Year of the Pig* at the University of Ottawa. Students came from at least twelve universities across Ontario and Quebec. Performers included Jesse Winchester (himself a draft dodger) and Bruce Cockburn.¹⁰² Despite the predictions of organizers that between 10,000 and 20,000 would turn out for the Saturday march on Parliament, between 2,000 and 3,500 actually showed. Low numbers, however, were not the biggest concern. About one hundred Montreal Maoists (members of the cultish group the Internationalists led by Hardial Bains, which the following year became

¹⁰¹ Bennett, "Ottawa March," *McGill Daily*; Arnold Bennett, "Thousands to March in Ottawa protest" *McGill Daily*, 16 February 1970.

¹⁰² Bennett, "Thousands to March," *McGill Daily*; Chris Vernell, "Protest has ho-hum beginnings," *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 February 1970, 15; George Beiler, "Peace Weekend," *McGill Daily*, 2 March 1970, 9. Participating universities specifically mentioned include Trent, York, McGill, Sir George Williams, Mount Allison, Bishop's, Queen's, Carleton, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal and Loyola. See "Massive Moratorium march next week," *Loyola News* (CUP) 20 February 1970, 6.

the Communist Party of Canada [Marxist Leninist])¹⁰³ – turned out to disrupt the proceedings. They had taken advantage of the buses that the McGill Committee had hired to bring protesters to the event. In spite of an impressive array of speakers, the Maoists attempted to shout down every one of them. They were quite effective at it too, as they had concentrated themselves around the podium. Brandishing portraits of Mao and Stalin and waving red flags at the speakers, the Maoists were determined that the demonstration would be a failure. According to their spokesperson, “There is no peace march. The people are struggling to liberate themselves by escalating people’s war.” Police did nothing as the Maoists did all they could to disrupt, including vandalizing the PA system and engaging in scuffles with antiwar protesters. Several members of the NDP and American Deserters’ Committee (ADC) were assaulted with fists and sticks. Among the ranks of the Maoists was Eric Hoffman, one of those involved with the assault on Steve Wohl six weeks earlier. Speakers included Clare Culhane, Tommy Douglas and Laurier LaPierre. A ten minute-melee broke out when LaPierre, exasperated trying to give his speech in front of the mob of placard and flag-waving screaming Maoists, finally swore at the group, telling them, “Get the fuck out of my way!” Stephen Queller, leader of the Maoists, grabbed the microphone from LaPierre and got a few words in before someone turned off the mike. Tommy Douglas, a boxer by training, got a few licks in on a Maoist he saw manhandling a woman protester. The Maoists later denounced Douglas as a “social fascist” and an “agent of Zionism.” One protester accused the Maoists of being in

¹⁰³ Hardial Bains, *Thinking About the Sixties: 1960-1967* (Toronto: New Magazine Publishing Company, 2005), n.p.; Avakumovic, *Communist Party in Canada*, 261.

the pay of the CIA. Richard Acien, a McGill graduate student, gave his assessment of the Maoists: "They are idiots."¹⁰⁴

The McGill Moratorium Committee struggled on for another few months, but the larger Moratorium movement had effectively ended by December 1969. On 19 April 1970 the national Moratorium Committee in the US announced its disbanding,¹⁰⁵ but the McGill Committee continued on. Between February and September 1970 the Committee must have experienced either a profound change in its membership or its thinking – possibly both. In perhaps the most painful irony of the antiwar movement in Canada, at a meeting held 29 September the Committee evaluated whether to continue on as an organization. Several members opposed the idea of being an advocate for peace, preferring to support the NLF. One suggestion that was considered was affiliation with the Maoists.¹⁰⁶

If 1969 began with a rapprochement between the Communist Party and the Trotskyists, it did not limit the continued ascendancy of the Trotskyist-led antiwar groups such as the Vietnam Action Committee in Vancouver and the Vietnam Mobilization Committee in Toronto. Although the Communist Party was certainly a participating partner in the antiwar movement, it was no longer the leader it had been in 1964-1965. Taking its lead from Trotskyist-influenced antiwar organizations in the United States, the League for Socialist Action continued to exert a growing influence on the antiwar movement in Canada. This was demonstrated in the Easter 1969 International Days of

¹⁰⁴ Bennett, "Thousands to March," *McGill Daily*; Arnold Bennett and Krishna Nirmel, "Disruption mars rally during Ottawa weekend," *McGill Daily*, 2 March 1970, 1, 8; Dennis Foley, "Peace marchers vs. Maoists: Vietnam protest ends in violence," *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 March 1970, 1, 19; "'CIA's Maoists blamed for violence," *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 March 1970, 19.

¹⁰⁵ Jurma, "Moderate Movement," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 272.

¹⁰⁶ "Moratorium people argue group's fate," *McGill Daily*, 30 September 1970, 1.

Protest. The threat of disunity to the antiwar movement did not come from rivalries between the LSA and the CPC at this time, but rather other left groups; first from ultra-left student groups, best illustrated by the Students for a Democratic University at Simon Fraser University who attempted to derail the anti-Vietnam War movement and turn it into a catch-all organization against all forms of imperialism. Such efforts would certainly have watered down the focus of the antiwar movement and alienated more liberal elements specifically concerned about Vietnam. This is best demonstrated by the tremendous support given by labour and the NDP to the VAC-led Easter demonstration in Vancouver as opposed to the one led by SDU. The Moratorium movement which emerged in the fall of 1969 was in a sense the pinnacle of liberal activism in the antiwar movement. Starting slowly in October, it was energized by the huge support it received in the United States. November actions across Canada, the United States, and internationally were unparalleled. The Moratorium initiative imploded in December, largely because it could not continue to escalate its actions beyond what it had already accomplished, but also due to a fear of violence from the right. In Canada, the Montreal Moratorium Committee was able to continue its work into 1970, but it was violence from the left that marred its last major action. Violence from the right had been endemic to the antiwar movement in the United States from its earliest days. However, a single act of violence at a previously little-known university in Northeast Ohio would shape the nature of the antiwar movement in Canada for much of 1970.

Chapter Six: Kent State

On 29 April 1970 US forces invaded Cambodia. President Richard Nixon, who had been elected largely on a platform of ending the war, had just expanded the conflict. The Vietnam War was now the Indochina War.¹ Protests erupted immediately across the United States and around the world. On 4 May 1970 at Kent State University the Ohio National Guard, in suppressing one of these demonstrations, shot thirteen students, killing four of them.² The resultant outrage exacerbated an already volatile situation and ushered in a national student strike that mobilized millions of post-secondary students across the United States. May 1970 also saw the largest spontaneous antiwar demonstration in Washington, DC. One scholar has compared May 1970 in the United States with Paris in 1968.³ Like its American counterpart, the antiwar movement in Canada responded to the invasion of Cambodia and the killings in Ohio with anger, energy and diversity.

In the months following the highly successful Moratorium, the antiwar movement waned. Implementation of the draft lottery, troop reductions, and Nixon's policy of Vietnamization all led many to believe that the war was winding down. Protests, when they occurred, were markedly smaller. In addition, the two largest antiwar coalitions in the United States – the New Mobe, which had organized the November demonstration, and the Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam – were, according to Fred Halstead, “critically ill.”⁴ The invasion of Cambodia breathed new energy into the antiwar movement. As American troops poured across the Cambodian border, the coordinating

¹ While the United States had been secretly bombing Cambodia since Nixon first came to power (it was no secret to the Cambodians being bombed), the invasion of April 1970 was the first publicly admitted aggression by the United States against Cambodia. See Herring, *America's Longest War*, 276-281.

² Halstead, *Out Now*, 621-629.

³ See George Kastafikas, *The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968* (Boston: South End Press, 1987).

⁴ Wells, *War Within*, 403-404; Halstead, *Out Now*, 611-617.

committee of the New Mobe immediately began planning for another national demonstration in Washington scheduled for 9 May, ten days away.⁵ Meanwhile, on the campuses, students vented their outrage over Nixon's expansion of the war. The night following the President's announcement of the incursion, 2,500 students and faculty at Princeton held a mass meeting and voted to go on strike. At Yale, an ongoing student strike over the upcoming trial of twenty one Black Panthers had already brought out a majority of students. Following the invasion of Cambodia the strike took on a decidedly antiwar flavour. Demonstrations also occurred that night at Oberlin and Rutgers. The next day hundreds of demonstrations and public meetings took place across the country. Twenty more campuses went out on strike. On 2 May another twenty campuses joined. An equal number joined on the third. Although at the time no organization came forward to lead a national strike, calls for such actions had been springing up at scores of campuses across the country. Already, eleven editors of student newspapers had agreed to run a joint editorial calling for a strike.⁶ With the killings at Kent State support for a national student strike exploded.⁷ Following the news of the four deaths in Ohio, the

⁵ Halstead, *Out Now*, 620-621; Wells, *War Within*, 419-421.

⁶ Paul Kidd, "'Strike, strike:' Cry raised for mass boycott of college classes," *Ottawa Citizen*, 4 May 1970, 1; "US anger swells at student deaths," *Ottawa Citizen*, 5 May 1970, 1; Urban Research Corporation, *On Strike: Shut it Down! A Report on the First National Student Strike in US History, May 1970*, (Chicago: Urban Research Corporation, 1970), 1-2, 8, 15. The national student strike was overwhelmingly a white student phenomenon. On what is considered the last day of the strike, however fourteen African American students were shot, 2 fatally, by members of the Mississippi Highway Patrol at Jackson State College. See Scranton, *Report*; also Tim Spofford, *Lynch Street: The May 1970 Slayings at Jackson State College*, (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1988).

⁷ No one incident regarding the history of the antiwar movement in the United States during this time has generated as many books and articles as the events at Kent State on 4 May 1970. While it would be superfluous to mention all of these works, some of the more significant ones are listed here. The singularly most important of these is William Scranton's *The Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest* (New York: Avon, 1971). Appointed by President Nixon following the shootings at Jackson State College a week after the events at Kent State, former Pennsylvania Governor Scranton's *Report* gives a comprehensive narrative of the events leading up to and following the shooting. He concludes that the shootings at Kent State were "unnecessary, unwarranted, and inexcusable" (p.289). James Michener's, *Kent State: What Happened and Why* (New York: Random House, 1971); and William Gordon's *Four Dead in Ohio: Was There a Conspiracy at Kent State?* (El Toro, CA: North Ridge Books, 1995) [originally

National Student Association (NSA)⁸ announced that it was going ahead with plans for a nationwide strike effective Tuesday, 5 May. The NSA stated that memorial services for the slain students would be held on campuses and towns across the country. One hundred more campuses joined the strike each day for the next four days. By 14 May it was virtually over.⁹ According to Kirkpatrick Sale, the invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State led directly to student strikes at 350 campuses, with 536 schools shutting down for some period of time during the first two weeks of May 1970, fifty one for the remainder of the academic year.¹⁰ More than half of all colleges in the United States saw demonstrations – twenty six of them violent. In May 1970, National Guard units were called out twenty four times to twenty one campuses in sixteen states. Sixty percent of the US student body was affected.¹¹

Reactions in Canada to Cambodia and Kent State were inseparable, as one event followed so closely upon the other. In Canada there was no call for a national student strike – it would have been redundant given that many, if not most Canadian universities had already completed their academic year. Still, Canadian response was indeed national.

published as *The Fourth of May*, (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990)] together represent the most journalistic works on the subject. The two most analytical on the subject are Peter Davies and the Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church, *The Truth About Kent State: A Challenge to the American Conscience*, (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1973); and Joseph Kelner and James Munves, *The Kent State Coverup*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1980). Both pay particular attention to the political and legal battles that followed the killings.

⁸ Established in 1947, the NSA was a confederation of college and university student associations. Involved with civil rights in the late 1950s and 1960s, its reputation was somewhat tarnished in 1967 when it was revealed that some of its activities, particularly international ones, had been underwritten by the Central Intelligence Agency. In 1971 it authored a document entitled "The People's Peace Treaty," published by *The New York Review of Books*. It was a proposal for what it believed to be a just peace between the United States and the People of Indochina. The NSA merged with the National Student Lobby in 1978 to form the United States Student Association.

⁹ Kidd, "Strike, strike," *Ottawa Citizen*, 1; "US anger," *Ottawa Citizen*, 1; Urban Research, *On Strike*, 1-2, 8, 15.

¹⁰ The discrepancy between campus strikes and schools shut down is likely explained by administrations choosing to close rather than risk violence and unrest.

¹¹ Kirkpatrick Sale, *SDS*, (New York: Vintage, 1973), 632-641; Scranton, *Report*, 174.

From Newfoundland to British Columbia Canadians expressed their outrage. This chapter explores several themes. First is the national dimension of Canadian response to Cambodia and Kent State. Second is the role American émigrés played in protest activities during this specific period. Third is the diversity of reaction in Canada; unlike in the United States, the response was by no means an overwhelmingly student phenomenon. Finally, we look at the role of the left in organizing this dissent. Most pertinent is the connection between the antiwar movements in the US and Canada. While palling in comparison to events in the United States, protest in Canada reflected not only increasing Canadian concern about the war in Southeast Asia, but increasing repression in the United States. Canadians had been protesting against the war in Vietnam for as long as Americans. Indeed, it is impossible to entirely separate the antiwar movements in these two countries along national lines. Canadian response to Cambodia and Kent State demonstrates that these issues not only affected Americans – and of course the people of Indochina – but were also of importance to America’s northern neighbour.

International reaction to the invasion of Cambodia was mixed. The government of France, Cambodia’s former colonial master, deplored the actions, as did the government of West Germany. Sweden’s Prime Minister, Olaf Palme, also condemned the invasion. So did Pope Paul VI. The World Council of Churches, representing 235 religious bodies in ninety countries, called for the reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference and withdrawal of all foreign troops. The Soviet Union warned that such actions could lead to “complications.” Great Britain was silent on the issue, stating that it did not think it appropriate to comment on the matter.¹²

¹² “Criticism hurled at US,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 1 May 1970, 4; “Churches condemn US actions,” *Toronto Daily Star*, (Reuters), 4 May 1970, 49.

In the days immediately following the invasion of Cambodia, it was VOW and the NDP that distinguished themselves in speaking out against America's widening of the war. VOW was perhaps the first Canadian organization to issue a statement regarding the invasion of Cambodia. Alluding to the secret bombings that the US had undertaken prior to its invasion, former VOW president Kay Macpherson said that the invasion came as no surprise. She also criticized the press for failing to adequately report the secret bombings. Macpherson had been in Phnom Penh two years earlier and had compared the city to Fredericton or Regina.¹³ Not any more. VOW followed up with a more formal statement the following day:

Voice of Women Canada protests vehemently President Nixon's order to invade Cambodia. Cambodia now faces massacres and devastation such as have been perpetrated by the United States on Vietnam... Our horror at this total disregard for world opinion and for human life, and this appalling misuse of power, demands that we seek new ways to a halt to this monstrous war.¹⁴

While VOW was unequivocal in its condemnation of the invasion of Cambodia, the Government of Canada refused to condemn US actions.

Canada's response to the invasion of Cambodia mirrored that of Great Britain. At the request of NDP Deputy Leader David Lewis, the Commons conducted an emergency debate on the subject on 1 May. The debate was attended by approximately forty members of the House. Lewis attacked the invasion of Cambodia as "legally and morally indefensible." The Trudeau government guardedly justified US actions. Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp cited Canadian knowledge of a long history of abuses of Cambodian territory by North Vietnam prior to the departure of the International

¹³ Statement by Kay Macpherson, Voice of Women, 30 April 1970. Library and Archives Canada, Voice of Women Collection, MG 28 I-218 (hereinafter referred to as VOW), Box 3, File 10.

¹⁴ Press Release, VOW, 1 May 1970. VOW, Box 42, File 25.

Commission of Control in 1968. Since the conflict in South Vietnam began, Sharp informed the House, it had been a Canadian objective to insulate Cambodia from the conflict. Unsuccessful attempts had been made to have the ICC control Cambodian ports and borders in 1966 and 1967. Canada had also attempted to investigate violations of Cambodian neutrality by units of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) as well as units of the National Liberation Front. Lack of cooperation on the part of the other commission members, however, led to no action being taken. "Had we been successful in persuading our Commission colleagues to take these measures," Sharp lamented, referring to India and Poland:

the ICC might at least have been able to provide some warning of the magnitude of the Vietnamese Communist intervention in Cambodia which has elicited the present United States and South Vietnamese response and might even have helped avoid the situation developing at the present stage.

In the afternoon Sharp provided an in-depth history of Cambodia since 1954 and Canada's role on the International Commission of Control for that country. He also provided a history of PAVN and NLF violations of Cambodian neutrality. When referring to American violations of Cambodian neutrality prior to 29 April 1970, Sharp always prefaced such incidents with the word "alleged." He did not use this word when referring to Communist incursions. Nor did Sharp make any reference to the US-backed coup the previous March that had deposed neutralist Norodom Sihanouk, replacing him with the dictator Lon Nol, who was much more sympathetic to US military goals. While stating that US actions in Cambodia were unfortunate, Sharp at no time criticized the invasion. Expressing "deep regret" over the US decision to intervene militarily in Cambodia, he said that he was reassured that President Nixon had given his assurance as to the limited nature of the incursion and that troops would be withdrawn once the

immediate objective had been obtained. NDP Leader Tommy Douglas commented: “Now we face the prospect of a major war in Asia that could have disastrous consequences for the whole world.”¹⁵

The NDP called for Canada to demand an emergency session of the United Nations to address the matter. Like the World Council of Churches, as well as United Nations Secretary General U Thant, the NDP also called for a re-convening of the Geneva Conference on Indochina. Although this position was supported by the Progressive Conservative Party, it was attacked by former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, who refused to be a party to anything that might embarrass the United States, which he referred to as “that bulwark of freedom.”¹⁶

Meanwhile, VOW continued to criticize the Government for its refusal to condemn the US attack on Cambodia. The day following the House debate, VOW National Vice-President Lydia Sayle wrote Sharp, deploring and condemning the invasion: “We also deplore that Canada has stood by silently,” wrote Sayle, “unable to give its citizens a true picture of this escalation, or to express its disapproval, as so many other countries have done.” Sayle went on to clarify some glaring omissions in Sharp’s address to the House. These included previous violations of Cambodian neutrality by US troops, as well as bombing raids and defoliation flights against Cambodia conducted by US planes. She also cited the presence of US Special Forces operating in neutral Laos. Sayle urged Parliament to hear witnesses testify, specifically Dr. Pfeiffer and Mr. Cyrus

¹⁵ Statements and Speeches: Information Division, Department of External Affairs, No. 70/8, Cambodia – Statements of the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the House of Commons on 1 May 1970. VOW, Box4 2, File 25; Greg Connolly, “Canada ‘regrets’ invasion by US,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 1 May 1970, 1; John R. Walker, “Dief pours scorn on Stanfield, Lewis Cambodia proposals,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 May 1970, 11.

¹⁶ Walker, “Dief pours,” 11.

Eaton, who had recently returned from Cambodia. Echoing the NDP request, she urged Canada to request UN action and to support a reconvening of the Geneva Conference to take appropriate action “to contain and stop this pernicious war in Indochina.” She continued:

We would wish Canada to join her voice to other nations who are not only deploring, but condemning the escalation of the war in Vietnam under the pretense of seeking a “just peace” and to take measures to bring this war to a truly just end by the total withdrawal of all US troops from the area of Indochina, in order that these countries may exercise the independence that has been denied them at such a dreadful cost to all.¹⁷

Also adding his voice to the chorus was Chester Ronning, the seventy-five year old former Canadian envoy to China and former High Commissioner to India. Ronning had also been a peace emissary to both the DRV and the Republic of Vietnam. “It’s sad and tragic,” he stated, “that the United States is continuing to flout the rule of law and resorting to unilateral action regardless of the decisions of the United Nations.” Ronning advocated that all of the nations of Southeast Asia should be made neutral and allowed to work out their own destiny.¹⁸

The following week, realizing the overwhelming opposition in Canada to the US intervention in Cambodia, Sharp curbed his apologia for the United States and began to pay lip service to the concerns of the opposition. He indicated that the Canadian government was working with feverish haste to prevent the US intervention in Cambodia from mushrooming into a full-fledged war. According to the *Montreal Gazette*, Sharp made no attempt to conceal his anxiety, especially regarding the reaction of the People’s Republic of China. “Everything possible is being done here,” stated Sharp, “to impress on

¹⁷ Correspondence, Lydia Sayle, National Vice-President, VOW, to Mitchell Sharp, 2 May 1970, VOW, Box 42, File 25.

¹⁸ “Former diplomat raps Nixon over expansion,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 May 1970, 11.

Washington the danger of the escalation.”¹⁹ No indication was given as to what those efforts included, if indeed any were actually taken. If nothing else, opposition in Canada to the invasion of Cambodia had tempered the Liberal Government’s pro-American rhetoric.

Thus, unlike in the United States, there was a tremendous outpouring of indignation to America’s invasion of Cambodia within the political establishment. In addition to a respected former diplomat, two major political parties, as well as a national women’s organization, had made the issue a Canadian one within the first few days following the United States’ formal entry into Cambodia. As in the United States, however, the issue was partially eclipsed by the killings at Kent State.

On Tuesday, 5 May, Canadians read the banner headline in the *Globe and Mail*: “Nine students wounded at antiwar rally: Guardsmen kill 4 in Ohio protest.” Below the headline was John Filo’s now iconic Pulitzer Prize-winning photo of a young woman, arms outstretched, kneeling behind the corpse of Jeffrey Miller. The article gave a reasonably accurate account of what had transpired the previous day at Kent State.²⁰ The following day, the *Ottawa Citizen* ran a cartoon of a lone soldier firing an automatic weapon into a crowd of students at Kent State University. Satirizing a phrase Nixon had used to justify the invasion of Cambodia, the caption underneath read: “The US will not allow itself to be humiliated.”²¹ The issue, however, now shifted from political parties and press statements to street actions.

¹⁹ Arthur Blakely, “Cambodia escalation worry to Canada,” *Montreal Gazette*, 5 May 1970, 1.

²⁰ “Nine students wounded at anti-war rally: Guardsmen kill 4 in Ohio protest,” *The Globe and Mail*, 5 May 1970, 1. Most major Canadian papers published the Filo photo.

²¹ *Ottawa Citizen*, 6 May 1970, 6.

Montreal distinguished itself by organizing a major protest in record time – fast enough to get a notice into the 5 May issue of the *Montreal Star*. With the McGill University Student Society taking the lead, a memorial service and march were set for 7:30 that evening. The service was held at the McGill University Centre Ballroom. From there participants marched to the US Consulate where they left four caskets draped in US flags to symbolize the four students slain in Ohio.²²

Accounts of what transpired that night in Montreal vary. Mark Daly, writing for the *Montreal Star*, presented a somewhat contradictory account. At times he portrayed an angry, violent mob bent on destruction, at another point he illustrated a group largely willing to cooperate with police. According to Daly, approximately three hundred demonstrators left McGill about 8:30 and moved along McGregor Street, causing a traffic jam. The protesters had acquired a permit to demonstrate beforehand, but initially only two constables on motorcycles were on hand to manage the crowd. By the time they arrived at the Consulate, their numbers had swollen to between 500 and 600. According to Daly, most were prepared to comply with police directions. They placed the coffins on the steps of the Consulate. Students and professors called on marchers to act with sincerity to honour the memory of the four slain students. One speaker called for Canadian universities to open their doors to Americans who had come to Canada rather than fight in Southeast Asia. “Then,” according to Daly, “the first rock was hurled.” More followed and several Consulate windows were broken. Shortly after the arrival of more police, a high-ranking plainclothes officer called for the complete removal of the crowd. Demonstrators refused to disperse and police then moved in. Again, according to Daly, police used no excessive force, although several people were knocked over when police

²² “Memorial set for tonight,” *Montreal Star*, 5 May 1970, 2.

advanced into the crowds in wedges on foot and on motorcycle. Police mounted on motorcycles sped headlong into the crowd, forcing them to split into two groups and onto the sidewalks. By this time demonstrators had broken some windows and police had extinguished one fire.²³ Daly further stated that after leaving the Consulate, demonstrators took garbage cans from nearby houses and buildings, and set them ablaze in the streets. Similar fires were set and stones were thrown at every intersection between McGill and the Consulate. Eight demonstrators, including two juveniles and a draft dodger, were arrested. Three officers were injured by rocks and other objects thrown by protesters. Police and demonstrators skirmished several times at intervals throughout the night. The disturbances finally ended when the group returned to McGill, about the same time as the riot squad arrived.²⁴ Danny Roden's account in the *Montreal Gazette*, however, differed in some important respects. Roden estimated the group's size departing the University at about one thousand, but stated that police prevented about half of the marchers from reaching the Consulate. It is possible that police interference angered the crowd and contributed to the rock throwing that broke five windows and led to ten arrests. The hastiness with which the demonstration had been called could also have been a factor contributing to the vandalism. While the McGill Student Society played the lead role in organizing the event, there was little actual organization, let alone leadership to the event. Roden is unclear as to when the rock throwing began, but he does state that the march itself was mostly peaceful.²⁵ The program was presided over by the McGill chaplaincy.²⁶ During the speeches, Reverend Roger Balk of the Student Christian

²³ .Mark Daly, "Memorial march erupts in violence," *Montreal Star*, 5 May 1970, 1,2.

²⁴ Daly, "Memorial," 1, 2.

²⁵ Danny Roden, "Local students protest killings," *Montreal Gazette*, 5 May 1970, 3.

²⁶ Steve Scheinberg, personal correspondence with author, 8 April 2007.

Movement asked the crowd to “Share the silence of these four and of countless Vietnamese.” But Roden states that the crowd was not feeling very peaceful. Speakers were often interrupted. Vita Lang, a Vietnamese student who spoke, was given prolonged applause when she cried out “Vive la revolution!”²⁷ Noteworthy is that Lang’s words were quite possibly the only French spoken from the podium that night. According to Roden’s account, trouble started when the police ordered the group to disperse. The majority of the demonstrators did so, but a group of about two hundred and fifty remained. Police charged the group, first on foot, then on motorcycle. Professor Sam Noumoff of McGill’s East Asian Studies Institute, one of the event’s speakers, said the police tactics were provocative, that they were simply trying to infuriate the crowd. He accused the police of enjoying the role of provocateur.²⁸

Police moved the crowd to the intersection of Redpath and McGregor, where they faced each other for twenty minutes. Protesters held a Canadian flag and sang “O Canada.”²⁹ Although appearing redundant, this small act of theatre indicates that those who chose to confront the police, if only in a limited way, were by no means Quebec nationalists and were likely anglophones. Indeed, the entire event appears to have been an English-speaking one. Organized by the student association of an English-speaking university, there is no indication that any of the speakers spoke in French. When questioned on this, one of the faculty participants from Sir George Williams University recalled no French being spoken at all during the event.³⁰ This is telling in that francophones, and in particular Quebec nationalists, had been active in the antiwar

²⁷ Roden, “Local students,” *Montreal Gazette*, 3.

²⁸ Roden, “Local students,” *Montreal Gazette*, 3.

²⁹ Roden, “Local students,” *Montreal Gazette*, 3.

³⁰ Scheinberg, correspondence with author, 8 April 2007.

movement throughout the 1960s. The absence of francophones from the speakers' roster at the Montreal rally should not be interpreted as a decline in antiwar sentiment among French-speaking Quebecois. The rise of Quebecois nationalism suggests a broadening of analysis among many Quebecois, seeing themselves, like the Vietnamese, as victims of imperialism.³¹ At the same time a decline in francophone participation in organized antiwar protests suggest more energies being diverted increasingly to the cause of Quebec. Quebec nationalists would return to the antiwar movement in 1971 with a vengeance.

Among the demonstrators that night was historian Steven Scheinberg of Sir George Williams University. He does not remember the event fondly, and not because of any actions on the part of the police. "(I)t was a candlelight march and it was really orderly," he recalls. He continues:

The police were there in the background; there was a motorcycle group. They had accompanied us and were fine. Nothing was done by them. And then some of the kids started putting their candles into the garbage cans. As soon as they started setting their garbage cans on fire the police naturally moved in. There was no tear gas. They tried to disperse the crowd by cutting the crowd into segments and going in and out on their motorcycles and pushing a little. I heard and saw one of my students say, "The pigs are getting us!" and I thought, "The pigs; my ass!" The police were doing what they should have been doing. I was in it for a peaceful demonstration. I really deplored people who would lead a demonstration and not know how to disperse it. Then it can lead to that kind of thing.³²

Following the demonstration at the Consulate that night Scheinberg was hesitant to get involved in future demonstrations.

Another account of the events in Montreal is found in the pages of *AMEX*, a magazine that originated as the journal of the Union of American Exiles (UAE). While

³¹ For an example of such analysis see Pierre Vallières, *White Niggers of America*, translated by Joan Pinkham (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971).

³² Interview, Steve Scheinberg, 25 November 2006.

grossly inflating the number of demonstrators that night, and misspelling the names of the slain Ohio students,³³ the *AMEX* article makes clear that not all of the demonstrators were students and faculty members. It describes the march as also including draft dodgers, deserters, and women's liberationists. It gives the number of draft dodgers and deserters involved at forty, also indicating that two of the ten arrested were from among their ranks.³⁴ American émigrés played a significant part. A substantial community of exiles who had fled the US to avoid military service lived in Montreal at the time. The Montreal American Deserters' Committee (ADC) represented one of many organizations across Canada that American exiles joined upon arriving in Canada. Renée Kasinsky, in her study of US exiles in Canada, confirms that the ADC marched with Canadian students that night.³⁵ Among the Americans was Larry Swartz.

Originally from California, Swartz had deserted from Fort Lewis, Washington, prior to deployment to Vietnam. He describes the reactions of Americans in Montreal to the killings at Kent State as "horrified, angered, and really sad." The political types were especially angry. Reflecting on the event over three decades later, Swartz says that the killings at Kent State made him feel "ashamed to be an American." He continues:

After Kent State, and the assassinations of the Kennedys and Martin Luther King, it just seemed that the powers that be there [in the United States] would do anything to maintain their power. Democracy wasn't working anymore. These guys were more or less dictators, and if they didn't like what the opposition was saying, then they would shoot you.³⁶

³³ Two of the four names were misspelled. Scheuer's name was spelled Shever, and Schroeder's was spelled Scheider. It is not clear if this error was on the original sign or if the spelling mistakes were only in the article itself. See "P.Q. Montreal," *AMEX*, 21.

³⁴ "P.Q. Montreal," *AMEX*, 21.

³⁵ Renée Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism: Draft-Age Americans in Canada* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1976), 130; Larry Schwartz, interview with author, 21 June 2002.

³⁶ Interview, Schwartz.

As cynical as Swartz's comments might appear, they likely represent the feelings of not only a substantial number of Americans, but Canadians as well.

What is truly striking about the Montreal march was its immediacy, something that only the *AMEX* article pointed out. Although not as sustained in Montreal as protest in some other cities, it was near instantaneous. That organizers could get between 600 and 1,000 people into the street with little more than twenty four hours notice in a city such as Montreal is testament to either how well-organized the activists were or how strongly people in Montreal felt about the deaths at Kent State. Given how events transpired at the Consulate, it was probably more the latter. That the Montreal demonstration was able to attract as many as it did with such short notice was remarkable. That it arose in response to an incident taking place in the United States, shows that the movement was not strictly limited by political developments in Canada. That a significant portion of those demonstrating were Americans themselves further shows another dimension of the transnational character of the antiwar movement in Canada.

A second demonstration took place in Montreal on Saturday, 9 May. This was the day when major demonstrations had been planned worldwide. Most of the energies of Montreal's antiwar community had been divided between the Tuesday night march, and getting people to the Saturday march in Washington. An unidentified group of fifty demonstrated at the US Consulate. Police ordered the crowd to disperse. When demonstrators refused, they promptly arrested twenty of their number, ending the protest.

Montreal law enforcement took no chances on the risk of a repeat performance of the Tuesday protest.³⁷

But the rock throwing and trash can fires of the Tuesday night were nothing compared to the violence that prevailed at similar demonstrations worldwide. Manifestations of outrage erupted across the globe. In West Berlin 234 police were injured in a demonstration involving 10,000 demonstrators. In London, 5,000 marched, hurling bottles, rocks and other assorted missiles. Paris hosted a massive, albeit peaceful demonstration, with police claiming 50,000 participants and the French Communist Party claiming four times that number. Many, attending the Cannes screening of the film *Woodstock*, rallied outside the cinema and wore black armbands. Demonstrations also took place in Turin, Barcelona, Geneva, and Copenhagen. Nor was international protest limited to Europe. Police moved in to prevent a demonstration from occurring at the US Embassy in Tel Aviv. Seven hundred marched in Johannesburg, seven thousand in Tokyo. In Australia a three-day moratorium was declared during which time a demonstration in Adelaide was attacked by Vietnam veterans of that country's armed forces.³⁸ By far, though, the largest demonstration in response to Cambodia and Kent State took place that day in Washington, DC.

³⁷ "Weekend of Demonstrations: Several Cut and Bruised in Protests Against the War," (Guelph) *Daily Mercury*, (CP), 11 May 1970, 1.

³⁸ "Hundreds injured in anti-war rioting around the world," *Toronto Daily Star*, (UPI-Reuters), 11 May 1970, 4. It should be pointed out that the Australian Moratorium had been planned months in advance and represented the apex of that country's antiwar movement. See Malcolm Saunders and Ralph Summy, "Salient Themes of the Australian Peace Movement: An Historical Perspective," *Social Alternatives*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1982, 23-32; Ann Curtheys, "Mobilizing Dissent: The Later Stages of Protest," in Gregory Pemberton, ed, *Vietnam Remembered* (Sydney: Weldon, 1990), (138-163) 155-160; Peter Pierce, "'Never Glad Confident Morning Again: Australia, the Sixties and the Vietnam War,'" in Jeffrey Grey and Jeff Doyle, eds., *Vietnam: War, Myth, and Memory: Comparative Perspectives on Australia's War in Vietnam* (St Leonards, Aus: Allen and Unwin, 1992) (69-80) 72.

Again, with less than a week to prepare, the Washington demonstration was testament to both the skills of the organizers and the motivation of the demonstrators. A crowd estimated at 100,000 listened to speakers including Dr. Benjamin Spock, Dave Dellinger, and Jane Fonda, and were entertained by the music of Judy Collins.³⁹ From Montreal, the McGill Students' Society chartered buses to attend the impromptu demonstration. McGill organizer Steve Wohl, former chair of the campus Moratorium Committee, expected at least one hundred students to take part.⁴⁰ How many actually attended from McGill is unclear, but noteworthy is that fact that the Canadian Embassy in Washington assured prospective Canadian protesters in advance that the Embassy would remain open that Saturday in the event that legal or medical assistance was required.⁴¹ While it is not clear if anyone took advantage of the Embassy's services, that such an offer was publicly made marked at least a minimal break with the US over Canada's practice of not protesting the war. (But the Embassy could rightly support such a decision in that it was not partisan as such, but merely anticipating the needs of Canadians abroad.) The following Monday a photo appeared in the *Toronto Star* of the demonstration in Washington featuring some of the students from McGill carrying a banner reading "Canada is Here."⁴²

Indignation in Montreal regarding the killings was not limited to protesters. The press was vocal, though not unanimous, in its interpretation of the events of 4 May 1970. The *Montreal Star* ran a column stating that the shootings at Kent State had effectively

³⁹ George Radwanski, "Washington peace protest: Youthful bitterness was evident," *Montreal Gazette*, 11 May 1970, 1; Terrance Wills and Warren Gerard, "US rally urged to foment revolution," *The Globe and Mail*, 11 May 1970, 1.

⁴⁰ "Off to Washington: McGill joins protest," *Montreal Gazette*, 7 May 1970, 1.

⁴¹ "Off to Washington," *Gazette*, 1.

⁴² Photo and caption only, *Toronto Daily Star*, Monday, 11 May 1970, 4.

lost the United States the war in Indochina. “If the Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton,” the *Star* editorialized, “it may well be that the Battle of Southeast Asia has been lost on the campus green of Kent State University in the quiet heartland of America.”⁴³ The *Star*’s English language opposition, the *Gazette*, echoed Richard Nixon’s comments on the event, stating that when dissent turns violent it invites tragedy. Concerning itself more with student violence, the fact that thirteen unarmed students had been shot – four fatally – seemed to be lost on the *Gazette*. “Student violence, even when put down brutally,” the paper stated, “is unlikely to do anything in Middle America but help discredit those young people whose opposition to the war is sincere and rational.”⁴⁴ Although the two papers disagreed on the significance of Kent State, both papers felt compelled to comment on the subject. Curiously, the so-called “radical” underground press in Montreal, *Logos*, had nothing to say on the subject. The only reference to Kent State within its pages was a photo in its June 1970 issue of protesters holding up a banner that simply read “Kent” at an unspecified rally. It appeared on the same page as an article on the national student strike that had taken place the previous month in the United States. Like the *Gazette*, *Logos* emphasized the violence of the strike, rather than the issues behind it.⁴⁵

Montreal, in sum, displayed a significant response to Kent State. The most dramatic manifestation of this response was the march of 5 May, which demonstrated the immediacy of the issue to many Montrealers. Although students and US exiles played significant roles, activists from other causes were also present. The response of others outside of student and left circles – professors and journalists – showed that the issue was

⁴³ “American tragedy,” *Montreal Star*, 6 May 1970, 12.

⁴⁴ “The tragedy of Kent State,” *Montreal Gazette*, 7 May 1970, 6.

⁴⁵ “Strike,” *Logos*, Vol. 3, No. 3, June 1970, 16.

not limited to youth. The cooperation of the Canadian Embassy in Washington and its willingness to open on a Saturday for the benefit of Canadians protesting in that city indicated the willingness of the state to facilitate such dissent, albeit in a limited way. For many Montreal residents Kent State was very much a Canadian issue. Events in Toronto would reflect similarly on its residents.

Today George Addison is a chaplain for the United Church of Canada at Brock University. In May 1970 he was an activist with the LSA and executive secretary of the Toronto chapter of the VMC. Immediately following the shootings at Kent State, Addison traveled to Washington, DC, to participate in a press conference by the New Mobe.⁴⁶ It called for a march on Washington on Saturday, 9 May.⁴⁷ This is important as it shows how closely the New Mobe and the VMC worked together. Clearly the New Mobe valued Canadian participation in the Washington demonstration.

The VMC also began making plans for a demonstration in Toronto for the same day. The Committee planned to rally at city hall and then march to the US Consulate. Denouncing Mitchell Sharp's apologia for US intervention in Cambodia, the VMC employed three slogans: 1) "End Canada's Complicity," 2) "Solidarity with the US Antiwar Movement," and, 3) "Withdraw US Troops from Southeast Asia Now." In the meantime, the VMC held actions at the US Consulate every day.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ The New Mobe was the common abbreviation for the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, the major antiwar coalition in the US in which the Trotskyist movement participated. Its youth wing was the Student Mobilization Committee.

⁴⁷ Addison, interview; Angus, interview; Ian Angus, correspondence with author, 10 April 2007; See also Carl Fleming and Joe Young, "Seven Years of Struggle to End the War." Originally published in *Labor Challenge*, 9 August 1971, reprinted in Socialist History Project, <http://www.socialisthistory.ca/Docs/1961-Vietnam/SevenYears.htm>, 4. Accessed 16 October 2006.

⁴⁸ Addison, interview; poster, "Protest Cambodia Invasion, Four Murders in Ohio," Kenny, Box 54, File 1; "Stop Spadina will still hold demonstration," *The Globe and Mail*, 8 May 1970, 5.

As in the case of Montreal, the number of people that were mobilized in Toronto within twenty four hours of Monday's shooting at Kent State was impressive. At about 8:00 on Tuesday night, approximately five hundred people showed up at the US Consulate on University Avenue. Most were students from the nearby University of Toronto. Despite someone smashing a bottle of red paint against the Consulate door, the demonstration remained peaceful for the first hour. Many carried pictures of Ohio National Guardsmen, armed with M1 rifles and wearing gas masks moving across the Kent State commons. A caption read "Serve your country?" Others carried pictures of slain students with the caption "Nixon's silent majority." Many of the young men wore black armbands to indicate mourning. Young women carried lit candles to add to the sombreness of the occasion. Other, more cynical, students, had paper targets pinned to their jackets. One carried a sign that said: "I am a student: shoot me." Around 9:00 nearly two hundred sat down on the sidewalk and refused to move. This was at the south end of the building. The remainder of the group moved to the north end of the building and continued to parade peacefully. The group sitting shouted "Pigs" at the police.⁴⁹ Police moved in when the group attempted to burn an American flag. A melee ensued with some chanting "Kill the pigs!" while others screamed "Peace." The crowd was finally dispersed around 11:00. No injuries were reported, but three people were arrested.⁵⁰

The following day demonstrations continued at the Consulate. Picketing began at 11:00 that morning when about twenty high school students from Vincent Massey Collegiate arrived. They were shortly joined by Humber College students. Also joining

⁴⁹ Likely the group sitting and shouting "Pigs" was the May 4 Movement, or the core of the activists that would make up its ranks. It is not clear at which point between the shootings in Ohio and the 9 May demonstration that the group formally coalesced.

⁵⁰ Lisa Hobbs, "Students clash with Metro police in demonstration at US Consulate," *The Globe and Mail*, 6 May 1970, 1, 2; "Toronto protesters clash with police," *Toronto Daily Star*, 6 May 1970, 3.

them was a group of Yippies under the leadership of a man calling himself “Mad John Free” and claiming to be from New York City. Earlier, Free had attempted to prevent reporters from photographing the demonstration. Numbers eventually reached 500. Two youths, one of them wearing a shirt styled out of an American flag and referred to as “Captain America,” broke through police lines and into the Consulate. Police waiting inside ejected them. The cover of the *Globe and Mail* the following day featured a photo of an angry Captain America launching a bottle of red ink at the Consulate.⁵¹

The rally overlapped with another one down the street at Trinity Square advocating free and legal abortions and promoting the National Abortion Caravan that would be protesting that weekend on Parliament Hill. VMC members conferred with other groups and agreed on a major demonstration that night at 5:00 at the Consulate. Ultimately a group of 200 materialized, consisting of Maoists, Communists, Trotskyists, and a group opposed to the development of an expressway on Spadina Avenue known informally as “Stop Spadinaers.” Others also attended. The VMC posted ten marshals in front of the Consulate to keep order; however, another group down the street began to cause a disturbance. This was touched off when someone threw a bottle of red paint at a police cruiser that was parked at the intersection and demonstrators sat in a circle around the car. When Inspector Michael Coulis, the occupant of the car, attempted to exit the vehicle, members of the crowd knocked him to the ground. When he got up he was

⁵¹ Don Delaplante, “Metro police arrest eight demonstrators after anti-war clash outside US Consulate,” *The Globe and Mail*, 7 May 1970, 1, 2. Delaplante did not catch the allusion to the character played by Peter Fonda in the popular film *Easy Rider*, which had been released the previous summer. In the film Fonda wears an American flag-styled motorcycle helmet and is called Captain America by his traveling companion Billy, played by Dennis Hopper. Also, “A Front Line View of War Protests – In Toronto and Cambodia: 75 in Toronto picket Consulate,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 6 May 1970, 3.

covered in red paint. Police ultimately arrested eight members of the group. Others yelled “Pig!” and “Fascist!” as the eight were led away to the patrol wagon.⁵²

A group from the notorious Rochdale College promised to take possession of the building by 9:30. According to *Globe and Mail* reporter Don Delaplante the assault never materialized. Still, fearing arson attempts, police maintained a guard on the building throughout the night.⁵³ The group referred to by Delaplante was likely an embryonic version of the May Fourth Movement (M4M), an organization formed following the shootings at Kent State. It took its name from both the date of the shootings as well as the date in 1919 when Chinese students and intellectuals mounted a mass protest movement which culminated in the formation of the Chinese Communist Party. Myrna Kostash, in her book *Long Way from Home*, describes the group as an “*ad hoc* coalition of new leftists, radicals and student activists.” Judith Pocock, a member of M4M, described it as “ultra left.”⁵⁴ M4M illustrates best the links between the Toronto counterculture scene and the antiwar movement. Figuring prominently in this was Rochdale College. According to David Sharpe, author of *Rochdale: The Runaway College*, M4M was formed outside the College, but quickly applied for, and was granted, a room in the building as a base of operations. Rochdale also granted M4M temporary use of its publications office to produce leaflets for the upcoming mass protest at the US Consulate scheduled for 9 May. Like the M4M itself, its relationship with Rochdale was short-lived. By June of 1970 M4M was no longer welcome at Rochdale, the College seeing the radical group as too political for its more countercultural orientation. In the fall of 1970,

⁵² Delaplante, “Metro police,” *The Globe and Mail*, 1, 2; “8 Held in Toronto protest Against Killings,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 7 May 1970, 3.

⁵³ Delaplante, “Metro police,” *The Globe and Mail*, 1, 2; Greg Kealey, interview with author, 7 April 2007.

⁵⁴ Kostash, *Long Way*, 224; Pocock, interview.

amidst the backdrop of the October Crisis, Rochdale finally expelled M4M, likely seeing it as attracting more attention than it was worth. Sometime later M4M morphed into a new organization: Rising Up Angry. Later it changed its name to Red Morning. Little is known of these subsequent organizations.⁵⁵

Protest activities surrounding Cambodia and Kent State continued in Toronto on Thursday, 7 May. Returning to the Consulate was Mad John Free, who now denied being from New York, claiming Toronto as his home. A photo in the *Globe and Mail* has him marching in front of a dozen picketers, and carrying a large American flag that included a dollar sign among the field of stars. The small number of protesters represented something of a lull in protest activity at the Consulate. Police Superintendent Harold Genno expected a much larger crowd on the coming Saturday.⁵⁶ The local labour movement also waded in on the issue on Thursday. That night the Metro Toronto Labour Council passed a resolution condemning the invasion of Cambodia, calling for its parent body, the Canadian Labour Congress, to ask Ottawa to suspend its participation in the Defence Production Sharing Agreement with the US.⁵⁷ Also on Thursday, Students Against the War in Vietnam (SAWV), essentially the youth affiliate of the VMC representing high school students, announced it would be undertaking actions the following day to mourn the four students slain at Kent State. Seventeen-year old Martin Schulman, a student at William Lyon Mackenzie Collegiate Institute and president of SAWV, declared Friday, 8 May a day of mourning. He urged students to wear black armbands, forego lunch hour to hold memorial services, observe a one-minute silence in

⁵⁵ Sharpe, *Rochdale: The Runaway College*, 191-193, 214; interview, Pocock; Verzuh, *Underground Times*, 153.

⁵⁶ "Marching Mad John Free," *The Globe and Mail*, 8 May 1970, 5; "US Consulate Picketed for 3rd Straight Night," *Toronto Daily Star*, 8 May 1970, 2.

⁵⁷ "US move condemned," *The Globe and Mail*, 8 May 1970, 5.

the classroom, and, where possible, hold assemblies.⁵⁸ It is unclear how many high school students SAWV was able to engage in its planned activities, but the fact that its plans were reported in the *Globe and Mail* would indicate it was being taken quite seriously, at least by the establishment press. SAWV met with some resistance from school officials in mounting some of its planned activities. It petitioned the North York Board of Education for permission to host a debate on the Vietnam War during school hours. Attendance, it hoped, would be mandatory. Schulman argued that such assemblies would make school more relevant. He experienced limited success in that SAWV was allowed their debate on school time, but the council would only agree to voluntary attendance. Ironically, a similar motion was put to the Intercollegiate Student Council representing 24,000 North York high school students and was voted down. Eighteen-year old David Medhurst, the organization's chair stated: "I don't think the Vietnam War is a burning issue in the schools."⁵⁹

On Friday an organization of American exiles added its voice to the protests concerning Cambodia and Kent State. The group was fairly new. Red, White and Black, formed two months earlier, acted as both a service and a political organization for US exiles. Among some of its plans were French courses and seminars on Canadian affairs, an exile news show on Toronto's underground FM station, and pickets at the US

⁵⁸ "High schools to mark Kent deaths," *The Globe and Mail*, 8 May 1970, 8. It is likely that SAWV was the same organization known as SAEWV – Student Association to End the War in Vietnam. This was an organization set up by the Young Socialists/Ligue Socialiste Jeunesse. Established in 1967, SAEWV was a priority of the YS/LSJ, but had only a limited appeal in Eastern Canada. See "Canadian Universities and Our Student Work," submitted as a resolution by the Central Executive Committee, *Young Socialist/Ligue Jeunesse Socialiste Discussion Bulletin*, Vol. 4, No. 1, June 1968, 1-10, RDF, Box19, File 14; Fleming and Young, "Seven Years," 4.

⁵⁹ "Trustees approve Vietnam debates in North York," *Toronto Daily Star*, 14 May 1970, 43.

Consulate.⁶⁰ In response to Kent State, Red, White and Black worked with local clergy in organizing a memorial service to commemorate the four slain students “and all other casualties in the war in Indo-China.” The service commenced at dawn at Queen’s Park. Former CBC news anchor Stanley Burke acted as master of ceremonies. Joining him were twelve clergymen and others who addressed the seventy five early risers who attended. Among the speakers was Rabbi Abraham Feinberg, who compared US Vice-President Spiro Agnew’s bombastic affronts to American youth to the carnage he had witnessed in Hanoi. Another speaker, the Reverend Edgar Bull of St Thomas Anglican Church, reluctantly concluded that it was time for violent revolution. John Pocock, of the Canadian Friends Service Committee,⁶¹ also talked of revolutionary lessons to be learned from the DRV. Reverend Stephen Fritchman of First Unitarian Church attacked Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp for refusing to condemn the US invasion of Cambodia. Fritchman, an American, echoed Larry Swartz in Montreal: “These days,” he opined, “the thought of being an American is all but unendurable. Churches, as well as students, must become totally involved in helping a very sick nation find its health.”⁶²

Unlike in Montreal, however, demonstrators in Toronto took to the streets every day in the week following the shootings in Ohio. But the protests that occurred between Tuesday and Friday paled in comparison to what awaited the city that Saturday.

⁶⁰ “In Toronto ... At the Red, White and Black you can get almost anything you want,” *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 3, April/May 1970, 24. *AMEX* suspected that Red, White and Black was a front group for the Toronto Anti-Draft Program. This would make sense as TADP received funding from various agencies specifically to aid American citizens evading military service. The bulk of this funding came from religious organizations, in particular Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV). Such monies were to be specifically used for assisting American Exiles. As such, to undertake political activities, TADP would have to do so under a different name. For information on CALCAV see Hall, *Because of Their Faith*.

⁶¹ Pocock was also the father of SUPA activist Judith Pocock, and husband of former VOW President Nancy Pocock.

⁶² Oliver Clausen, “Memorial service at Queen’s Park: Clergymen assail US acts in Asia,” *The Globe and Mail*, 9 May 1970, 5; “US Consulate,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 8 May 1970, 2. Although Feinberg, too, was an American citizen, he had been in Canada since the 1940s and was generally perceived as Canadian.

Throughout the week the VMC had been planning a major demonstration at the US Consulate. This was in concert with the New Mobe's planned actions in Washington that day, as well as with antiwar groups internationally. Also participating in the Toronto protest were the Canadian Party of Labour and the M4M.⁶³ Complicating their plans was the fact that there were several other organizations planning events for that day that had the potential to draw people away. One was the Stop Spadina Committee, a community organization that had formed to stop the development of the Spadina Expressway. They had already planned a demonstration for the same day at Nathan Phillips Square.⁶⁴ Secondly, approximately sixty community organizations, including the Stop Spadina Committee, had declared Saturday, 9 May as "The City is for the People Day" and planned to come together for a festival in Nathan Phillips Square.⁶⁵ Finally, women's groups from across Canada were en route to Ottawa that week for a major demonstration on Parliament Hill to protest for abortion rights.⁶⁶ According to Judith Pocock, most of M4M's women members were in Ottawa that weekend, leaving the men behind to protest

⁶³ The Canadian Party of Labour was a Marxist-Leninist party affiliated with the Progressive Labor Party in the United States. There is some debate as to which organization played the leading role in organizing the Saturday demonstration. Myrna Kostash, in her study of the 1960s in Canada asserts that M4M spearheaded the 9 May 1970 rally and march in Toronto. See Myrna Kostash, *Long Way from Home: The Story of the Sixties Generation in Canada*, (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1980), 224. This is corroborated by articles in the *Toronto Daily Star*. For instance see "91 arrested in Toronto: What went wrong?" 11 May 1970, 1, 2. However, posters that advertised the event credited the Vietnam Mobilization Committee as the organizing agent. See the poster "Protest Cambodia Invasion, Four Murders in Ohio," Kenny, Box 54, File 1. Also, articles in *The Globe and Mail* indicated the VMC as the primary organization behind the demonstration. See "Stop Spadina will still hold demonstration," *The Globe and Mail*, 8 May 1970, 5; "Timetable of an angry confrontation," *The Globe and Mail*, 11 May 1970, 15; Peter Churchill, Don Delaplante, Neil Loutit and Robert Waller, "91 arrested at antiwar rally: Protesters fight, shatter windows during downtown Toronto chase," *The Globe and Mail*, 11 May 1970, 1, 2. Overall, the evidence suggests that the VMC played the leading role in this with the M4M joining in. For information on the Canadian Party of Labour see "Canadian Party of Labour Handbook," (1975), Socialist History Project, <http://socialisthistoryproject.ca/Docs/CPL/CPLHandbook.htm> accessed 21 January 2007.

⁶⁴ "Stop Spadina," *The Globe and Mail*, 5.

⁶⁵ "Timetable," *The Globe and Mail*, 15; Chris Dennett, "Before the protest got started it was City is for the People Day," *Toronto Daily Star*, 11 May 1970, 2.

⁶⁶ Pocock, interview; Angus, interview. An article in the underground paper the *Harbinger* stated that the abortion caravan did, indeed, significantly reduce the number of Torontonians at Nathan Phillips Square that day. See DGB, "Peace City is Dead," *Harbinger*, Vol. 3, No. 5, 8 May 1970, 14.

at the Consulate.⁶⁷ In the end, the festival at Nathan Phillips Square likely did more to strengthen the march on the Consulate.

The festival went ahead as scheduled, doubling as a staging area for the march to the Consulate. People enjoyed the spring weather as they sauntered around Nathan Phillips Square. Groups such as the Travellers and the Carleton Show Band performed. Lesser known groups such as the local jazz band The Metro Stompers played. The cast of the ongoing production of *Hair* sang “Age of Aquarius.” Toronto Mayor William Dennison showed up, as did Conservative Opposition leader Robert Stanfield, although he conspicuously avoided the group that was assembling to march. The May Four Movement paraded red flags around the square. The final performance before the march was by the People’s Revolutionary Concert Band. Audience members cheered and thrust their fists in the air.⁶⁸

Even before the march set off, other groups began to gather at the Consulate. One was a group of about two dozen Maoists shouting “Escalate People’s War.” Another was a less militant group of about thirty five singing “Give Peace a Chance.” A shouting match ensued between the two groups, but the Maoists soon gave way to the larger which continued to grow, moving onto the boulevard where they distributed handbills. By 4:30 there were about two hundred people in front of the Consulate, including about fifty members of the far-right Edmond Burke Society carrying signs reading “Let Spiro Speak,” “Reds Go Home,” and “Wash a Hippie Today.” Just before 5:00 an EBS member was involved in a scuffle. Another hit a police officer with his placard and was arrested. It was about this time that the march from Nathan Phillips Square got underway.

⁶⁷ Pocock, interview.

⁶⁸ David Crane, “Button fights pollution: Tory talks to protesters,” *The Globe and Mail*, 11 May 1970, 5; “Before the protest,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 11 May 1970, 2.

It was the largest antiwar demonstration in Canada throughout the entire Vietnam War. Anywhere from 5,000 and 15,000 demonstrators marched.⁶⁹ The two main groups involved were the M4M and the VMC.⁷⁰ The VMC led a significantly larger portion of the demonstrators, including members of unions and churches, Communists, Trotskyists and others. When the march arrived at the Consulate VMC marshals presciently separated their group off from the M4M-led people and peacefully remained across the street from the Consulate. Initially the M4M group was for the most part orderly, although some demonstrators threw a few bottles of red paint at the building and broke some windows. Police moved in around 6:00 when protesters in front of the Consulate attempted to block traffic. According to one participant, it happened so fast that she did not know what was going on. Some members of the crowd responded by throwing anything they could get their hands on: lumps of dirt from nearby flower beds, bricks pried from the boulevard, firecrackers. According to another participant, there had been ongoing roadwork in progress and quantities of paving stones were invitingly sitting in piles outside the Consulate. When police moved in many in the crowd moved south on University Avenue and began a pre-planned campaign of smashing the windows of local businesses. Police caught up with them at the intersection of College and Yonge Streets where it took from between 8:00 and 9:00 to clear the intersection. Deputy Chief of

⁶⁹ There is some argument as to the number of demonstrators. Kostash asserts there were 15,000 present. See Kostash, *Long Way*, 224-225. *AMEX* reported between 5,000 and 10,000. See "Toronto," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 4, June 1970, 18-20. Articles in *The Globe and Mail*, however, place the number at 5,000. See "Timetable," *The Globe and Mail*, 15; as well as Churchill et al, "91 Arrested," *The Globe and Mail*, 1,2; also Michael Valpy, "They Brought in Horses for No Reason at all lawyer charges," *The Globe and Mail*, 11 May 1970, 5.

⁷⁰ Kostash, *Long Way*, 224; "91 arrested in Toronto: What went wrong?" May 11, 1970, 1, 2; poster "Protest Cambodia Invasion, Four Murders in Ohio," Kenny, Box 54, File 1; "Stop Spadina will still hold demonstration," *The Globe and Mail*, May 8, 1970, 5; "Timetable of an angry confrontation," *The Globe and Mail*, 11 May 1970, 15; Peter Churchill, Don Delaplante, Neil Loutit and Robert Waller, "91 arrested at antiwar rally: Protesters fight, shatter windows during downtown Toronto chase," *The Globe and Mail*, 11 May 1970, 1,2.

Police Bernard Simmonds stated there had not been a scene like this in Toronto since the unemployed demonstrations at Queen's Park in the 1930s. In total, \$7,000 damage was reported and ninety one demonstrators were arrested. Most were charged with causing a disturbance. Other charges included obstructing police, assaulting police, theft, mischief, and one liquor violation. Of the ninety one arrested, eighty had been released by Sunday – either on bail or their own recognizance – and were scheduled to appear in special court on 8, 9, and 10 June. All but fourteen of those charged were Metro residents. Those arrested from out of town mostly came from Ontario communities such as Clarkson, Oakville, Hamilton, Kitchener, Waterloo and London. One came from as far away as Montreal.⁷¹

Among those arrested was twenty eight year old lawyer Clayton Ruby, charged with obstructing police.⁷² Ruby was vocal in his criticism of police conduct. Stated Ruby: "A couple of times I saw police hitting kids and I went up to them and asked for their numbers – they weren't wearing badges – but they wouldn't answer me." Ruby continued: "I saw officers hitting kids for just talking back." Ruby himself had to ask six times before he was informed what he was charged with.⁷³ In a press conference held later that night at Rochdale College, Dennis Corcoran, M4M spokesperson and one of those arrested, accused the police of starting the confrontation. "Toronto police are not

⁷¹ "91 Protesters are taken into custody," *The Globe and Mail*, 11 May 1970, 5; "Youth jailed 60 days for knocking officer off horse at protest," *The Globe and Mail*, 12 May 1970, 5; "Here is a list of people arrested in Toronto protest Saturday," *Toronto Daily Star*, 11 May 1970, 2. It should also be noted that eleven of the ninety one arrested were members of the far-right Edmund Burke Society. See "Burke Society Protesters: Police Acted Wisely Arrested Man Says," *Toronto Daily Star*, 11 May 1970, 2; Interview, Greg Kealey; Judith Merrill and Emily Pohl-Weary, *Better to Have Loved: The Life of Judith Merrill* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002), 193-195.

⁷² Kostash, *Long Way*, 224-225; "Timetable," *The Globe and Mail*, 15; Churchill et al "91 Arrested," *The Globe and Mail*, 1, 2; DGB, "Peace City," *Harbinger*, 14; RCMP Report, "Protests and Demonstrations re: United States Action in Vietnam, Ontario," 24 June 1970, Report 2, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Stack 10.

⁷³ Valpy, "They Brought," *The Globe and Mail*, 5.

the teddy bears as they have been described in the past,” he stated. “The Toronto Police freaked out and overreacted.”⁷⁴

One item of contention surrounding the Saturday confrontation was the role US citizens played in it. Throughout the Vietnam War it had been common for groups of demonstrators to travel from Buffalo to antiwar demonstrations in Toronto, usually at the US Consulate. Following the 9 May demonstration members of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Commission intimated that the “near riot” was caused by “professional agitators” from the United States. They claimed that five chartered buses, four from New York State and one from Washington, D.C., unloaded on University Avenue near the Consulate just prior to the fracas. Local businessman Hugh Crothers believed it all to be part of a larger Communist plot. Claire McLaughlin, Vice-Chair of the Toronto and District Liberal Association, who witnessed the events, claimed that she saw three buses from Buffalo parked near City Hall just before the march.⁷⁵ The assertion that “outside agitators” from the United States were behind the Saturday confrontation were refuted the following day when Metro Police Chief Harold Adams stated that US buses in the area were tourist buses and that of the ninety one arrested every one of them claimed Canadian citizenship. “(There) are U.S. citizens in Toronto who have been involved in other trouble at the Consulate,” declared Adams, “but they do not appear to be the leaders who caused the problem Saturday.”⁷⁶

Still, there were those on both the right and the left who insisted that Americans played a significant role in the affair. Contrary to reports in the *Star*, *AMEX* stated that of

⁷⁴ Churchill et al, “91 Arrested,” *The Globe and Mail*, 1,2; See also Kostash, *Long Time*, 224-225; Interview, Greg Kealey, 7 April 2007; Interview, Linda Kealey, 9 April 2007.

⁷⁵ “91 arrested in Toronto: What went wrong?” *Toronto Daily Star*, Monday, 11 May 1970, 1, 2.

⁷⁶ “No Evidence of US Protesters Uncovered,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 12 May 1970, 2.

the ninety one arrested, fifteen were US citizens. The evidence indicates, however, that this was not the case. On 19 May Toronto Mayor William Dennison made a speech to the National Fire Protection Association in which he stated that the violence in front of the Consulate was provoked by Americans. In response, local American exile groups in Toronto hosted a press conference to refute the mayor's comments. Red, White and Black co-founder Judith Merrill criticized the mayor's remarks, stating they were careless and would change the climate of opinion in Toronto against Americans.⁷⁷ Merrill, 47, was a well-established science fiction writer. Like many Americans she had immigrated to Canada in late 1968 in the wake of the violence-ridden Democratic National Convention in Chicago, convinced that the United States was incapable of reforming itself. She also came to assist fellow Americans evading military service in Vietnam.⁷⁸ Merrill went on to tell the press conference that since the 9 May demonstration, many Toronto employers formerly sympathetic to Americans had become reluctant to hire US exiles. Due to such negative publicity exile groups ceased plans for further demonstrations for the immediate future. The regular Monday afternoon pickets that US exiles conducted at the Consulate were cancelled. The American Deserters' Committee, maintaining its official apolitical stance, refrained from demonstrating, and Red, White and Black declared a moratorium on demonstrations "until the tide of bad publicity fades away."⁷⁹ The 9 May protest at the US Consulate ended the week of demonstrations in Toronto sparked by the invasion of

⁷⁷ "Toronto," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 4, June 1970, 18-20. Williams, *New Exiles*, 372-374.

⁷⁸ Merrill, *Better to Have Loved*, 167-169, 192-193, 199; Jolene McCann, "The Love Token of a Token Immigrant:" Judith Merrill's Expatriate Narrative, 1968-1972," MA Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2006, 40.

⁷⁹ "Toronto," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 4, June 1970, 18-20.

Cambodia and the killings at Kent State.⁸⁰ By all accounts Toronto had the most intense reaction. But it was by no means the only Ontario city to respond.

The nation's capital was in fact the first city to witness street demonstrations. On 30 April, immediately following Nixon's announcement of the foray into Cambodia, Ottawa's VMC mounted a demonstration – four days prior to the events at Kent State. While not covered by the local press, RCMP discreetly observed the event. Attended by only twelve participants, the low number is likely more testament to the speed with which the demonstration was organized, as well as the significantly lower population of Ottawa compared to Toronto and Montreal.⁸¹ The more significant Ottawa demonstration

⁸⁰ There is an interesting footnote to the week of protests in Toronto. In October 1970, the University of Toronto student newspaper *The Varsity* ran an article about an individual by the name of George Harrington. Harrington claimed to be a member of a group called the Kent 25. Five months following the shooting at Kent State, rather than attempt to determine who was responsible for the deaths of the four students, the State of Ohio pursued a "blame the victim" course. A special Ohio grand jury indicted 25 individuals for their role in the burning of the ROTC building two nights before the shootings at Kent State. Claiming membership in this group, Harrington asserted he had been picked up Metro Police in Yorkville on trumped up charges, then held under the War Measures Act which had been recently implemented to address the situation in Quebec. The article went on to state how Harrington had been threatened with physical violence by police, and informed that extradition proceedings were being initiated against him. He also complained that his girlfriend's apartment had been broken into and ransacked by police. The article concluded that Harrington ultimately chose to return to Ohio of his own accord and take his chances with the legal system there, rather than face the threat of re-arrest under the War Measures Act, and certain extradition. In the end, only three of the Kent 25 were ever convicted of anything. One person was convicted of a misdemeanor; two others struck plea bargains. Of the remaining twenty two, two were acquitted, and twenty had the charges dropped for lack of evidence. The problem with Harrington's story was that he was not a member of the Kent 25. Why he chose to make up such a story is unclear, but the attention the story generated in the antiwar community in Toronto moved *AMEX* to reprint the story in their own publication. See Brian Johnson, "War Act is Used to Threaten Man Sought by US," *The Varsity*, 23 October, 1970, reprinted in *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 21, Aug/Sept, 1970, 26. For information on the Kent 25 see "Kent 25: The Accused," *The Burr*, Kent State University, 4 May 2000, 37-46; Davies, *The Truth*, 152-166; Gordon, *Four Dead*, 88, 120-121, 255.

⁸¹ "RCMP Information – re Protests and Demonstrations – Ottawa," Records of the Security and Intelligence Service, RG 146 (hereinafter referred to as CSIS, RG 146, Box 43, File 93-A-00028 Pt. 1, Protests and Demonstrations – Ottawa, 3, 14. Ian Angus remembers this demonstration as happening on the same day as the shootings in Kent State. See Angus, interview. To date this is the earliest evidence of a demonstration in Canada protesting the invasion of Cambodia. However, it must be noted that this demonstration was not reported in the press. Nor were any such demonstrations reported in the press in any major Canadian city. This is not to say none happened, only that none were reported. It is more by luck that this evidence was discovered as attempts to determine specific responses in Canada to the invasion of Cambodia through the Access to Information and Privacy Act has availed nothing.

occurred on the same day as most international protests: Saturday, 9 May.⁸² Two hundred protesters marched from the US Embassy to the National War Memorial. There, they heard speeches and cheered as effigies of Prime Minister Trudeau and US President Nixon were burned.⁸³ Ian Angus, a member of both the LSA and VMC, and active in the antiwar movement from its earliest stirrings in 1964, was there. He too witnessed creeping anti-Americanism, but from the left. Reflecting almost forty years later, he frames reactions to Cambodia and Kent State within the larger contexts of both the antiwar movement in Canada at the time, as well as in respect to anti-Americanism:

Certainly by 1970 popular opinion in Canada was very much against the war and the shootings at Kent State generated a whole lot of generalized disgust. A lot of it was normal anti-Americanism – ‘This is how bad the Americans are ... We’re so much better than them.’ – Kind of the worst thing about Canadian politics, I think sometimes.⁸⁴

Angus had also been at the rally earlier in the week to protest the invasion of Cambodia.

It is difficult to say if the rally on the Saturday would have been significantly larger, but for the rally on Parliament Hill that day demanding the repeal of abortion laws. It would at least explain the absence of the RCMP, which was all too busy monitoring the abortion rally to pay attention to the antiwar demonstration.⁸⁵ The cross-Canada Abortion Caravan, which had left Vancouver on 23 April and held rallies in nine cities en route, had arrived in Ottawa. Events on Saturday would be the grand finale ending the historic trek for women’s rights in Canada. A group of 500, mostly women,

⁸² As noted earlier, Montreal was the exception to this rule.

⁸³ “Trudeau burned in effigy,” *Toronto Daily Star*, (Canadian Press), 11 May 1970, 4. Also Churchill et al, “91 Arrested,” *The Globe and Mail*, 11 May 1970, 1, 2.

⁸⁴ Angus, interview.

⁸⁵ It is interesting that the RCMP would monitor a rally of twelve individuals less than a week earlier but not one of 200. It is possible the RCMP did indeed monitor the rally and that documentation of the activity was simply redacted from the file. Nearly all RCMP files used in this study contained blank pages indicating where information had been removed. The abortion rally, in contrast generated extensive documentation in RCMP files. See CSIS, RG 146, Box 43, File 93-A-00028, Pt. 1.

marched from the Supreme Court to Parliament Hill. Later they deposited a wreath-topped coffin at 24 Sussex Drive, the official residence of the Prime Minister. The casket commemorated women who had died from botched and self-induced abortions. It contained the caravan's brief to Parliament, instruments of quack abortions, and a card stating "Every child a wanted child." The Prime Minister was not at home.⁸⁶

Protests concerning Cambodia and Kent State took place in other Ontario communities. In St. Catharines about one hundred and twenty five demonstrated in front of city hall on Wednesday, 6 May. Mostly students and faculty from Brock University, many carried banners with the words "Vietnam Libre," and flags with the likeness of Che Guevara on them. The event was organized by the CPL-affiliated Brock Worker-Student Alliance. Lasting three quarters of an hour, the event was called to protest both the invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State. Another demonstration, organized by a group called the Niagara Peace Movement, was scheduled to take place on Sunday at the Peace Bridge connecting Fort Erie and Buffalo.⁸⁷ In Hamilton organized labour entered into the fray, albeit cautiously. On 7 May the Hamilton and District Labour Council passed a resolution calling on the governments of all countries to re-dedicate themselves to peace, freedom, and progress for the people. "This council is shocked," the resolution read in part, "at the psychology of violence which has been brought about by the war in Vietnam ... the extension of (the) Vietnam (W)ar into Cambodia, and ... the

⁸⁶ Sheila McCook, "Pleas for abortion greeted by silence," *Ottawa Citizen*, 11 May 1970, 25. Some of the women remained in Ottawa and forced the House of Commons to recess for an hour and a half on the following Monday when about 50 of them, most in their late teens and early twenties, chained themselves to seats in the gallery and disrupted proceedings. See Gerald McDuff, "Abortion law protesters break up House sitting," *Toronto Daily Star*, 12 May 1970, 1, 8. Also see the chapter on this subject in Judy Rebick, *Ten Thousand Roses: The Making of a Feminist Revolution* (Toronto: Penguin, 2005), 35-46.

⁸⁷"Vietnam Libre banners fly," *Hamilton Spectator*, 7 May 1970, 10. It is unclear if the protest at the Peace Bridge ever took place. There was no follow-up reporting in the *Spectator*.

shooting deaths of students in Kent.”⁸⁸ Many within the labour council opposed the resolution, calling for stronger words and actions. “Words are fine, but now is the time for action,” demanded John Lewis, a delegate from Local 105 of the United Electrical Workers. “Are we going to have half the world annihilated because of some damn fools in the Pentagon?”⁸⁹ Terry Fraser, business agent for the same local, said it was time for the labour movement to assume the lead in the fight against the war. Members of a local peace committee were also critical of the resolution for being too weak. The peace committee, a body external to the labour council, was formed by union activists earlier in the year when council members voted down a proposal to establish its own such group.⁹⁰ Clearly, organized labour in one of Canada’s most unionized cities was not prepared to go very far – even as late as 1970 and following Cambodia and Kent State – in its condemnation of US aggression.

Despite labour’s lack of enthusiasm, two demonstrations took place in Hamilton, coinciding with international protests Saturday, 9 May. The first was organized by the Hamilton Area Committee to End the War in Vietnam and scheduled to commence at noon in the Civic Square lot. Its chairperson, Kathleen Dalton, explained to the press that they had been unable to obtain a permit for the larger, and more scenic, Gore Park. The committee was clear that it was not only protesting the invasion of Cambodia and the shootings at Kent State, but the Canadian government’s attitude towards these incidents. The second rally was scheduled for 1:30, down the street at City Hall. This action was sponsored by the CPC(ML)-affiliated McMaster Student Movement.⁹¹ Due to both

⁸⁸ “Labor warring on peace resolve,” *Hamilton Spectator*, 8 May 1970, 7.

⁸⁹ “Labor warring,” *Hamilton Spectator*, 7.

⁹⁰ “Labor warring,” *Hamilton Spectator*, 7.

⁹¹ “War, campus,” *Spectator*, 7 May 1970, 7.

scheduling and physical proximity, the two rallies effectively merged into one. In addition to speeches, the program included a guerrilla theatre re-enactment of the shooting at Kent State. Attracting approximately five hundred, the combined demonstration was the largest in the city's history to date, taking up a total of three city blocks. It remained peaceful.⁹²

Demonstrations also took place in the Prairie Provinces.⁹³ Following the invasion of Cambodia, the student union at the University of Saskatchewan's Regina campus sponsored a protest at Sheldon-Williams Collegiate where the United States Army Band was giving a performance. Local members of the Kinsmen service club denied the demonstrators entry to the event and a scuffle developed. One group yelled slogans such as "Go back to your red campus," while demonstrators chanted "Vietnam for the Vietnamese." Twelve demonstrators, all students, were charged with rioting, causing a disturbance, and obstructing police. Most of the charges were later dropped or thrown out of court. Those that did go to trial ended up in acquittals. Roberta Lexier, in her study of student activism at the Regina campus, states that this was the most confrontational demonstration in Regina in the 1960s and 1970s.⁹⁴ That fall *The Carillon*, the student newspaper at the Regina campus, published a full-page feature commemorating the four students slain at Kent State. Like most student newspapers, it had already ceased

⁹² "War protesters peaceful as record crowd marches on city hall, post office," *Hamilton Spectator*, 11 May 1970, 7; "Weekend of Demonstrations," (Guelph) *Daily Mercury*, (CP), 11 May 1970, 1.

⁹³ Response to the invasion of Cambodia and the shootings at Kent State in the Prairie Provinces appears to be limited to Regina and Edmonton. While James Naylor vaguely recalls a demonstration at the US Consulate in Winnipeg, there was no coverage of such an event in that city's major newspaper. (See James Naylor, interview with author, 26 November 2006.) However, as noted above, just because an event was not reported on in the press does not in itself mean it did not occur. In addition, an article run by Canadian Press listed demonstrations as only taking place in Montreal, Toronto, Ottawa, Hamilton, St. Johns, and Vancouver. See "Weekend of Demonstrations: Several Cut And Bruised in Protests Against War," *The Daily Mercury*, (CP), 11 May 1970, 1. However, as we shall see, this report was not entirely accurate.

⁹⁴ Roberta Lexier, "Student Activism at the University of Saskatchewan, Regina Campus, 1963-1974," MA Thesis, University of Regina, 2003, 89-90.

publication for the year by the time of the Cambodian invasion. The spread featured photographs of the four students with a caption underneath: "Starting May 4th, you don't have to wear a uniform to die for your country." Beneath the caption was a piece of prose fashioned on Pastor Martin Niemöller's famous reflection on The Holocaust:

When they came for the Blacks/ You weren't a Black/ So you said nothing. When they came for the Hippies,/ You weren't a Hippie/ So you said nothing./ When they came for the Students,\ You weren't a Student/ So you said nothing.' And when they come for you,' There will be no one left to say anything.⁹⁵

The protest at Sheldon-Williams Collegiate and the subsequent feature in *The Carillon* show that the reverberations of Kent State in Canada were not limited to major cities like Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver. Even a prairie city like Regina responded, if only in a limited way. It is noteworthy, however, that neither the *Regina Leader Post*, nor the *Saskatoon Star Phoenix* reported any demonstrations protesting Kent State or the invasion of Cambodia.⁹⁶

In Edmonton, a much larger city than Regina, there was markedly more response. Speaking on Friday, 8 May following the closing of the provincial NDP executive meeting, leader Grant Notley called for all parties to speak up on the widening US war in Southeast Asia.⁹⁷ It does not appear that many Alberta politicians heeded his call, but others did. On Saturday fifty protesters gathered in Winston Churchill Square in the city's downtown to condemn the widening of the war. The rally was organized by Edmonton CEWV. The organization's chair and spokesperson, Wendy Stevenson, indicated that the protest was planned in solidarity with other protests being held that day in Canada and

⁹⁵ Untitled, *The Carillon*, Vol. 10, No. 8, 11 Sept 1970, 20, quoted in Lexier, "Student Activism," 94.

⁹⁶ It is worth noting, however, that the *Star Phoenix* carried significant coverage of the Abortion Caravan's stop in Saskatoon. See "Abortion Caravan Visits City," *Saskatoon Star Phoenix*, 1 May 1970, 3; "City Marchers," *Saskatoon Star Phoenix*, 11 May 1970, 9.

⁹⁷ "Oppose US Invasion, Notley Urges," *Edmonton Journal*, 11 May 1970, 29.

the US. While the primary purpose of the rally was to condemn US actions in Cambodia, many demonstrators carried signs critical of the shootings at Kent State. The rally was also intended to spark interest in an event scheduled for the following Thursday dubbed a “speak out.”⁹⁸ The speak out, also organized by CEWV, attracted twice as many participants as the Saturday rally. Again, held in Winston Churchill Square, the event featured guerrilla theatre in the form of Uncle Sam leading his troops into Cambodia.⁹⁹ The guerrilla theatre tactics employed in Edmonton, and Hamilton for that matter, paled in comparison to events in British Columbia.

The initial newspaper report in Vancouver of the killings at Kent State was inaccurate. This was partly due to a newspaper strike affecting both of the city’s major newspapers in the spring of 1970. *The Vancouver Express* reported the deaths in Ohio as a result of a gun battle between students and National Guard. Unlike most newspapers in Canada, the *Express* did not give much prominence to the news, allotting only a small space at the bottom of page one, as opposed to the banner headlines and extensive coverage that most major Canadian papers gave the story.¹⁰⁰ In an editorial later that week the *Express* agreed with UN Secretary General U Thant’s call for a re-opening of the Geneva Conference and redeployment of the ICC. It also agreed with Mitchell Sharp’s warning that the greatest threat resulting from the Cambodia invasion was the

⁹⁸ “US Role in Asia Protested,” *Edmonton Journal*, 11 May 1970, 29.

⁹⁹ “Cambodian Parody,” *Edmonton Journal*, 15 May 1970, 38.

¹⁰⁰ “Four Killed on Campus,” *Vancouver Express*, 5 May 1970, 1. Pacific Press, which published both the *Vancouver Sun* as well as the *Vancouver Province*, was shut down by a strike for three months in the spring of 1970. Employees of both papers worked collectively on the makeshift *Vancouver Express* for the duration of the strike. It ceased publication following the end of the strike. See “Strikers paper ends existence,” *Saskatoon Star Phoenix*, 13 May 1970, 24.

risk that China would now intervene in the regional conflict.¹⁰¹ In essence, *The Express's* editorial line remained both small and large L liberal.

Vancouver's labour movement weighed in quickly on the issue, but like its cousins in Hamilton, it too waffled. Failing to criticize either the invasion of Cambodia or the killings at Kent State, the Vancouver and District Labour Council issued a tepid statement that it supported the right of people to demonstrate without fear. Paddy Neale, secretary for the organization, went on to state that those responsible for the killings in Ohio should be "criticized."¹⁰²

Vancouver did not attract either the number or size of demonstrations seen in Toronto. The first took place the evening of Wednesday, 6 May at the US Consulate. It attracted 250 demonstrators. Protesters carried signs reading "End Canada's Complicity in Vietnam," "Call off the Army and the Cops," and "Down with US Warmongers." The banner carried at the front of the march to the Consulate simply read "MURDER" in large block letters. At one point some of the demonstrators attempted to enter the Consulate, but were kept out by local police. At another point about twenty individuals described as "Yippies" attempted to block traffic, shouting "The streets belong to the people, power to the people!"¹⁰³

Protests continued in Vancouver on Friday, although it appears that demonstrators had several issues they were protesting. That evening a crowd numbering in the dozens assembled in front of the Hudson's Bay Company to protest against that store's allegedly discriminatory policies. It then moved on to the US Consulate on West Georgia Street, picking up more protesters along the way. Protesters smashed the plate glass front door of

¹⁰¹ "Push for Peace," *Vancouver Express*, 7 May 1970, 4.

¹⁰² "Protest Backed," *Vancouver Express*, 7 May 1970, 5.

¹⁰³ "250 Demonstrate Here," *Vancouver Express*, 7 May 1970, 3. See also photo on page 1.

the Consulate and stole an American flag which they proceeded to burn on the street. The mob then moved on to the local police station where they demanded the release of three demonstrators arrested at Wednesday's confrontation. By 11:00 that evening the crowd had grown to about five hundred; they threw rocks, salt and pepper shakers, and eggs. When seventy five club-swinging officers in riot gear finally moved in it took them only five minutes to break up the fracas. Police arrested five of the protesters. Echoing his Toronto counterpart, Chief Constable John Fisk said the demonstration was the first demonstration of any size in the city since the unemployed demonstrations of 1935-36.¹⁰⁴

The Vancouver demonstrations of Wednesday and Friday however, lacked the element of theatre, as well as numbers, which accompanied the largest antiwar protest in British Columbia of May 1970. On Saturday a group assembled at the International Peace Park at the Canada-US border near Blaine, Washington, fifty kilometres from Vancouver. Parodying the National Liberation Front, a group of Yippies calling itself the NLF – the Northern Lunatic Fringe – joined with the Vancouver Liberation Front and the staff of Vancouver's then-new underground newspaper *The Yellow Journal* in leading a group of between 500 and 1,000 demonstrators. The march was a burlesque of Nixon's invasion of Cambodia. "In solidarity with the people of the Third World and with white youth we make this symbolic invasion of the United States," a spokesperson for the group stated. "Of course we won't go into the US more than 22 and 7/10 miles and will withdraw by June 30," he continued, echoing the president's promises on Cambodia.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ "Near riots spur new police request," *Vancouver Express*, 12 May 1970, 3; "Vancouver police break up protest," *Saskatoon Star Phoenix*, (CP), 9 May 1970, 1.

¹⁰⁵ "Blaine: Canadians Invade US in mockery of Cambodia attack; Gate of 'Peace Arch' is bolted shut," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 4, June 1970, 17 (Liberation News Services); also "500 protesters bounced from US after 'invasion,'" *Toronto Daily Star*, 11 May 1970, 4 (UPI); "Violence in the name of peace: Canadian mob invades Blaine," *Vancouver Express*, 12 May 1970, 1; Kostash, *Long Time*, 223-224.

The group never made it past Blaine. Likely, it never planned to. While its entry into the US was ignored by border guards, once the marchers arrived in the US border town they were confronted with a mixed reception. Many shopkeepers had armed themselves in advance of the incursion. The mayor of Blaine freely brandished his .38 revolver at the marchers, though never discharging it. On the other hand, many people gave the demonstrators the “V” sign from windows and their gestures were returned with raised fists. Myrna Kostash’s account of the march depicts angry protesters punching local rednecks, but that given by Liberation News Service indicates a right-wing group called the White Servicemen’s League taunting the protesters and attacking stragglers. The story ran by UPI indicated scores of Blaine residents pummeling protesters. Protesters also attacked other targets, smashing windows and throwing rocks at cars. “We weren’t just protesting,” said one participant, “we were showing these people what it was like to have your country invaded.” Only when demonstrators began desecrating US flags, however, did police finally move in.¹⁰⁶

Police clubbed and maced the crowd, manoeuvring it back to the border. Along the way stone-throwing demonstrators caused \$50,000 damage to a shipment of GM automobiles being shipped to Canada on the Great Northern Railway. While most of the crowd dispersed upon being pushed back across the border at the Peace Park, about fifty stayed behind at the border. Straddling the border was the Peace Arch, a symbol of continental solidarity consisting of two gates bolted open with the inscription: “May these gates never be closed.” Demonstrators ripped the gates from the walls and tied them shut, declaring the border closed to US imperialism. The inscription was altered to read “May

¹⁰⁶ “Blaine,” *AMEX*, 17; “500 protesters,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 4; “Violence,” *Vancouver Express*, 1; Kostash, *Long Time*, 223-224.

these gates ever be closed.” Protesters splattered the arch with red paint, with someone adding “Amerika will fall.”¹⁰⁷

Reaction to the Blaine incursion was swift. One Washington state member of Congress called on the Canadian government to pay for damages. A state senator demanded an apology from Ottawa. British Columbia’s Attorney General called for charges to be levelled against all those involved. In response to calls for an apology, the “invaders” replied: “We’ve withdrawn our troops from the United States. We will apologize for our invasion when the US withdraws its troops from Cambodia, apologizes, and makes a full restitution to the people of Southeast Asia.”¹⁰⁸ An indirect apology came the following Thursday, when a group of concerned British Columbia residents presented new American flags to the city of Blaine.¹⁰⁹

The day after the events in Blaine, the International Peace Arch was once targeted for protest, this time by members of the United Church of Canada. The church’s provincial conference had been held that week and passed a resolution condemning the US invasion of Cambodia and backed recent resolutions of the World Council of Churches. It also voted money for a rally at the Peace Arch to be held Sunday at 3:00. The theme of the event was “We stand with our American friends.” A statement released by the conference in part read: “We are deeply concerned about the escalation of the war in Southeast Asia by the entry of American forces into Cambodia.” The statement

¹⁰⁷ “Blaine,” *AMEX*, June, 1970, 17.

¹⁰⁸ “Blaine,” *AMEX*, June, 1970, 17.

¹⁰⁹ “B.C. residents apologize for ‘invasion’ by giving new flags to US border city,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 13 May 1970, 13 (Associated Press Special).

explained that the planned protest was being carried out “to show our support to the growing number of US citizens also working for peace in these troubled times.”¹¹⁰

As a result of Saturday’s “invasion,” the Sheriff of Watson County, in which Blaine was located, requested the United Church to cancel its planned protest, but it would not. The rally went ahead as scheduled without incident with about five hundred attending. Some youths from Blaine showed up with baseball bats and chains to prevent another incursion, but they soon dispersed as it became apparent that the only actions planned were the laying of flowers at the Peace Arch. United Church spokesperson Rod Booth explained that the Church had more trouble with its own congregations over the rally than it did with anyone at the park. One congregation refused to include news of the rally in its Sunday bulletin. Protesting the decision, one congregant stood on the front steps of his church that Sunday morning and handed out flyers advertising the rally. The church called the RCMP to remove him.¹¹¹ The incident is a good indicator that the United Church of Canada, though largely sympathetic to the antiwar movement, was by no means unanimous in its support.

Response to the invasion of Cambodia and the shootings at Kent State was noticeably lacking in Atlantic Canada. Antiwar activism there had been minimal throughout the war. In Fredericton Voice of Women organized a march from the Queen Street Post Office to the cenotaph. It is unclear if the march took place as there was no press coverage of it. On 9 May, Dr. Ken Nakayama of the faculty of medicine led thirty protesters to the US Consulate in St. John’s. Most were American expatriate faculty members of Memorial University of Newfoundland. Protesters presented US Consul

¹¹⁰ “Peace plea on Sunday,” *Vancouver Express*, 9 May 1970, 11.

¹¹¹ “Church peace rally goes off quietly,” *Vancouver Express*, 12 May 1970, 2; also “500 Protesters,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 4

Richard Strauss with a petition calling for the immediate withdrawal of US troops from Cambodia. They also gave him a protest note condemning the “unduly repressive measures” against students at American campuses. The note had been drawn up by Memorial’s Graduate Student Union and endorsed by the undergraduate Council of Students’ Union. The students were particularly dismayed at the over-reaction of the Ohio National Guard at Kent State. The two student organizations were later excoriated in the campus press, not for their letter, but because they had done nothing else to support the protest. “It is sad,” read an editorial in the *Muse*, “that the opportunity was not seized for more concerted action involving a lot more people.”¹¹² Why the student organizations chose not to participate is unclear. By their absence the St. John’s demonstration was the only action in Canada that was presented as specifically American. Whether in Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver or elsewhere, US émigrés participated with Canadians in expressing dissent. The demonstration in St. John’s was solely an expatriate event. The message was clear. The faculty members and those who joined spoke as Americans, indicating to their government that its actions both abroad and at home were unacceptable.

Although St. John’s was the only Atlantic Canadian city where an organized protest was reported – indeed the only city in Canada to host an exclusively American protest – there were many Americans living in Atlantic Canada. Throughout the Vietnam War many draft dodgers and deserters came to the region, particularly New Brunswick. One such individual was David Lutz. Today Lutz is a successful lawyer. In May 1970 he was a recently arrived draft dodger living in Hampton, New Brunswick. “I remember

¹¹² “Americans petition US consul,” *St. John’s Telegram*, 11 May 1970, 1; “No excuse for closing library and bookstore or for Kent massacre,” *Muse*, 15 May, 1970, 4; “MUN students, faculty protest Kent Massacre,” *Muse*, 15 May 1970, 3.

working in the garden,” he recalls about hearing the news of the shooting at Kent State.

He cried. Says Lutz:

I would tell you that every time I hear Neil Young’s “Ohio” I feel sadness. And here it is 36 years later. I can’t hear that song without remembering that day without having the image of that girl who was shot – “but if you knew her and found her dead on the ground and soldiers and Nixon coming.”¹¹³

Young’s song is perhaps the most lasting of all Canadian protests that arose from the Kent State shootings.

Demonstrations continued after the weekend of 9-10 May. On 9 May, as demonstrators marched in cities around the world, in Augusta, Georgia a sixteen year old African American youth was beaten to death in a jail cell. In response, 1,000 African American youth demonstrated in that city the following Monday. The governor ordered in police and National Guard, who dispersed the crowd by firing on them. The shooting was followed by more sporadic shootings by law enforcement officials. By the end of the day six more African American youth were dead.¹¹⁴ The following Thursday – 14 May – Mississippi Highway Patrol fired on students at Jackson State College, wounding nine and killing two.¹¹⁵ In response, the Student Mobilization Committee – the national student antiwar organization in the US affiliated with the SWP – called for demonstrations for Memorial Day – 30 May – to commemorate these latest fatalities and to keep alive the anger regarding Cambodia and Kent State. The SWP relentlessly promoted the Memorial Day actions through its newspaper *The Militant*.¹¹⁶ By this time,

¹¹³ David Lutz, interview with author, 21 November 2006.

¹¹⁴ “Avenge the Augusta 7,” *Daily Planet*, 8 June 1970, 8; also Halstead, *Out Now*, 646.

¹¹⁵ See Spofford, *Lynch Street*.

¹¹⁶ Many of these articles were republished in booklet form entitled *May 1970: Birth of the Antiwar University* (New York: Pathfinder, 1971). For an example of one of these articles see Sid Finehirsh, “Extend the Strike, Organize, Build to May 30,” (originally published 22 May 1970).

however, the student strike in the US had run its course. While demonstrations took place throughout the United States on Memorial Day, they paled in comparison to the events of the first two weeks in May. The largest that took place was in New York, attracting 10,000.¹¹⁷ In Canada the 30 May campaign was designated as the “World Day of Protest.” The Trotskyist movement played the leading role in promoting it. Demonstrators marched in at least four cities, all but one of them in Ontario.

In the twin cities of Kitchener-Waterloo the local VMC led 200 – half of them high school students – in protest. They marched from Waterloo Square to Speakers’ Corner in Kitchener, where several individuals gave speeches. Among them was Laurel Fischer, an insurance office employee. She linked the war in Vietnam to women’s issues at home. “(A)s long as Canada remains committed to the war and US foreign policy,” she intoned, “it will be neither willing nor able to make the few elementary moves to meet the just demands of women’s liberation.” Other speakers included Paul Wyman, chair of the Kitchener-Waterloo VMC, Fran Crowley of the YS, Kenneth Gis and Gail Bender representing local high school students, and Peter Lang of the Political Action Committee, a university group. There were no incidents.¹¹⁸

The Ottawa chapter of the VMC participated in the World Day of Protest by demonstrating at the US Embassy. Like their counterparts in the US, their ostensible purpose was to remember the thirteen young Americans killed during demonstrations in May. Seventy five participants, most of them teenagers, marched from the Supreme Court to the Embassy where they lit candles. The parade then moved on to the National

¹¹⁷ Halstead, *Out Now*, 650.

¹¹⁸ “Canada’s Complicity in Vietnam Criticized,” *Kitchener Waterloo Record*, 1 June 1970, 3.

War Memorial where a spokesperson for Ontario VOW addressed them. There they adjourned.¹¹⁹

Not surprisingly, Toronto hosted the largest Memorial Day march in Canada. Again under the leadership of the VMC, 800 assembled at Queen's Park. Also present were members of M4M and VOW. From there they marched to city hall, blocking the south-bound lanes on Yonge Street for an hour. They were met at Nathan Phillips Square by the remainder of an earlier demonstration of 2,000 Ukrainian- Canadians. They had been protesting the loss of political and religious rights in Ukraine and did not look favourably on the new arrivals. Most had departed by the time the antiwar protesters arrived. Also on hand to meet the marchers were one hundred members of the Edmund Burke Society. In anticipation of such an eventuality the VMC had appointed fifty marshals to keep order. Again, illustrating the links between the Canadian and American antiwar movements, and in particular the Trotskyist supported organizations, among the speakers was 28 year-old Mike York. York was one of four eyewitnesses to the Kent State shooting who were currently touring the US and Canada on behalf of the Chicago-based SMC. York gave his account of what he witnessed at Kent State on 4 May. Also on the speakers' roster was Paul Copeland, law partner of Clayton Ruby and one of the demonstrators who had been arrested at the 9 May demonstration in Toronto.¹²⁰ While the EBS was successful in delaying and disrupting the demonstration, there were no

¹¹⁹ "13 dead US protesters remembered," *Ottawa Citizen*, 1 June 1970, 4, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Box 43, File 93-A-00028, Pt. 1.

¹²⁰ "Shouts," *Toronto Daily Star*, 4; "Toronto Anti-War," *Kitchener Waterloo Record*, 1; "6,000 At Toronto's," *Daily Mercury*, 2. It is interesting that all three sources cited above describe York differently. The account in the *Star* describes York as a faculty member at Kent State. The *Mercury* stated he was a research assistant. The *Kitchener Waterloo Record* stated York was a Toronto student studying at Kent. Interestingly, York and a colleague, Fred Kirsch, published their account of the shootings at Kent State in the *Militant* shortly after the shootings. It was reprinted in *Pathfinder's May 1970*. See Mike York and Fred Kirsch, "Eyewitness Report of the Kent Massacre," 12-14. In this account York is described as a veteran working on a federal grant studying transportation.

incidents. Afterwards, Jeff Goodall, a thirty four-year-old public relations officer for the EBS, claimed a victory for his group: “We set out to disrupt the demonstration and we believe we succeeded,” he gloated. “We certainly showed the people of Toronto that there is organized opposition to these Communists.” Goodall was one of the EBS members arrested at the 9 May demonstration.¹²¹ George Addison of the VMC viewed the matter differently. Contrasting the demonstration to the one held 9 May, he praised the peacefulness of the day’s events. “We wanted to show Toronto that we could demonstrate peacefully and we’ve done it.”

The only city to see antiwar protest outside of Ontario that weekend was Vancouver. On Sunday the Vietnam Action Committee, the Vancouver sister organization of the VMC in Ontario,¹²² led 300 demonstrators in a march from city hall to the courthouse. As the march proceeded its numbers grew to 700. Although organizers had originally planned to march to the US Consulate, they rerouted the march at the last minute to avoid a confrontation with about a dozen right-wing counter-demonstrators who had already gathered there.¹²³ Two of the stated aims of the planned demonstration were by then standard slogans of the antiwar movement in Canada – “US Out Now” and “End Canadian Complicity.” Two more were added in conformance with SMC practice: “Stop the Murder of US Students” and “Free Speech, Freedom to Demonstrate.” The

¹²¹ “Shouts, name-calling, but no violence at city hall rally,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 1 June 1970, 4; “Toronto Anti-War Rally Orderly,” *Kitchener Waterloo Record*, (CP), 1 June 1970, 1; also “6,000 At Toronto’s City Hall for Peaceful Anti-War Rally, (Guelph) *Daily Mercury* (CP), 1 June 1970, 2.

¹²² Fleming and Young, “Seven Years,” *Socialist History Project*, 16; also Ian Angus, correspondence with author, 10 April 2007.

¹²³ “War, grapes bring protesters out,” *Vancouver Province*, 1 June 1970, 21.

primary concern of the organizers, however, was to keep the march and rally orderly and free of disruption,¹²⁴ hence their last-minute decision to re-route.

The VAC presented Mike Alewitz as their key speaker. Leader of the Kent State chapter of the SMC, Alewitz had witnessed the Ohio shootings. He was one of four eyewitnesses then touring North America with SMC support telling their stories.¹²⁵ That the SMC would allocate two of its four eyewitness speakers to Canadian cities for the Memorial Day demonstrations indicates the importance to them of generating support in Canada. Ian Angus, a prominent Canadian Trotskyist and VMC activist, asserts the internationalist character of the antiwar movement in Canada:

(W)e viewed the antiwar movement as *international* (emphasis in original). (O)bviously we in Canada couldn't stop the war ourselves, but we could (and did) have an effect as (a) Canadian contingent of a world-wide effort. That's one reason why we often held demos here on the same days as they were being held in the US – to maximize the global impact of the protests.

As Trotskyists, it was important to build not just an American movement, but an international one.

Also significant about the Vancouver demonstration was the prominence of the New Democratic Party. While almost invisible across Canada during the month of May as far as demonstrations were concerned, the NDP was quite visible at the Vancouver rally. NDP MLA for New Westminster Dennis Coche addressed the rally, as did the party's provincial secretary Wally Ross. Norm Reid, the president of the Vancouver area NDP council, also spoke. In addition, organizers read a telegram from party leader Tommy Douglas expressing his support for the demonstration and demanding immediate

¹²⁴ See handbill titled "Vietnam Action Committee," no date, as well as poster "All Out to End the War, World Day of Protest, Sat, May 30 at Victory Square." Both in CPC, Box 49, File 11.

¹²⁵ "War, grapes," *Province*, 21; also Randy Furst and Dick Roberts, "Over 100,000 in Washington, May 9," *May 1970*, 28-30.

US withdrawal from Southeast Asia. He also repeated his call for Canada to condemn US action in Vietnam and Cambodia.¹²⁶

Most important about the 31 May demonstration in Vancouver is that it brought to an end a month of protests in Canada that had been sparked by the US invasion of Cambodia and the shootings at Kent State. While May 1970 represents the most militant period in student history in the United States, there was neither the same sense of national outrage in Canada, nor anything remotely resembling the mass dissent expressed south of the border. Still, there was a substantial outpouring of protest. Some might argue that this was not really a Canadian phenomenon at all, but more an example of American history “up there.” This was not the case. As in the United States, by 1970 many Canadians had turned to active opposition to the war in Vietnam. The movement had been growing in Canada since before the US began to escalate the war in 1965. The invasion of Cambodia and the shootings at Kent State not only galvanized opposition to America’s war domestically, but also internationally. Canada was but one of many countries where there was widespread reaction to Cambodia and Kent. The immediacy with which dissent manifested itself following Kent State is another factor distinguishing the Canadian response. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Montreal, where within twenty four hours a thousand people were in the street. This immediacy was seen to a lesser degree in Toronto, but what that city lacked in spontaneity it made up for in tenacity, with protests at the US Consulate every day following for a week. Vancouver outdid both its eastern Canadian counterparts in pure theatricality with its incursion into Blaine, Washington. Perhaps more significant is the dissent which took place outside of Canada’s three largest cities. With demonstrations happening in St. John’s, Fredericton, Ottawa, Hamilton, the

¹²⁶ “War, grapes,” *Province*, 21.

Niagara region, Regina, and Edmonton, May 1970 was truly a national phenomenon. But Canadian response was part of a much larger international movement. Also, the follow-up demonstrations of 30-31 May in Ottawa, Kitchener-Waterloo, Toronto and Vancouver show how the Trotskyist-led wing of the antiwar movement in Canada cooperated with its US cousin. That these communities – three of them major Canadian cities – were integrated into what was for all intents and purposes an American antiwar initiative, demonstrates the movement's transnational nature and the degree of integration of the antiwar movements in Canada and the US. That American expatriates were so visible (yet clearly not dominating events) throughout May 1970 also shows the increasing role of this community in the antiwar movement. Nowhere was this more visible than in Newfoundland. The St. John's demonstration also illustrates another demographic of the antiwar movement in Canada. While students played a significant role in the movement, they by no means dominated it. By May 1970 the antiwar movement in Canada represented a diverse cross-section of society. What is surprising is the minimal role displayed by both organized labour and the political party it supported, the NDP. While some labour activists made clear, principled stands on Cambodia and Kent State, those who dominated the movement tended to sit on the fence. No doubt the support of the AFL-CIO for Nixon's war policies, and the recent "hard hat march" in New York that witnessed building trades workers beat up antiwar protesters had some effect.¹²⁷ Also, while the NDP was quite vocal immediately following the invasion of Cambodia, with the exception of the 31 May protest in Vancouver, the NDP did not play a significant role in the demonstrations of May 1970.

¹²⁷ Foner, *U.S. Labor*, 97-126.

What united those Canadians who participated in the events of May 1970 was a sense of outrage at the government of the United States. In his study of Canada's role in the Vietnam War, Douglas Ross asserts that the 9 May demonstrations in Toronto and Blaine did much to discredit the legitimacy of the antiwar movement.¹²⁸ Ross, however, presents little evidence to support this. Certainly such actions did not endear their perpetrators to most others, inside or outside of the antiwar movement. It is worth indicating, though, that violence and vandalism emanating from the Cambodia and Kent State issues were associated more with *ad hoc* groups such as M4M in Toronto and the Northern Lunatic Fringe in Vancouver. Established antiwar organizations such as the VMC and VAC were not associated with wanton acts of destruction, though it is likely the general public did not distinguish between the groups. In the United States, according to historians Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, the antiwar movement was consistently resented by the American public, despite those same people agreeing more with the movement's arguments and conclusions. A similar dynamic was at play in Canada. The events of May 1970 bear this out. Whereas previous mass antiwar marches had been planned, often months in advance, the outpouring of protest following Kent State indicated just how quickly a large number of Canadians were willing to express their discontent with the war. They had no personal agenda for dissent. Unlike many in the US, fear of being drafted and killed in an unjust war was not at issue for Canadians. Nor was the expenditure of their tax dollars in the purchase of weapons for war a concern. Canada was not a belligerent. The two key issues of May 1970 were the invasion of a sovereign country by an imperial power, and the murder of unarmed students in protesting that action. The issues for most Canadians were not imperialism,

¹²⁸ Ross, *In the Interests of Peace*, 330.

militarism, or Canadian nationalism. At the heart of the matter were issues of morality. Like so many Americans and many others around the world, Canadians stood up in May 1970 because what they saw appalled them.

Chapter Seven: VOW

In the early 1960s Judith Pocock was a teenager living in Toronto with her parents. Both her parents were Quakers and active in the peace movement. Her father, Jack, was prominent in the local CCND. Her mother, Nancy, was a leading member of the women's peace organization Voice of Women (VOW). Judith has a vivid memory of her mother coming home from a VOW meeting one night and telling her that Lil Greene, a fellow VOW member and long-time Communist Party activist, "was going on about this problem in Vietnam:"

(M)y mother basically said that the Communists were all hepped up on this one and I don't know what you can do, but it is terrible. I remember that kind of being there, but it was one of those causes that the CP was pushing but wasn't really getting picked up... I have that memory of it; I remember saying, "What is this about Vietnam?" and she told me a little bit about it.¹

Pocock's anecdote about her mother, VOW, the Communist Party, and the war in Vietnam encapsulates much of the history of the antiwar movement in Canada. Unlike the Trotskyists, Communists, and various new left actors, Voice of Women was the only antiwar organization in Canada to operate nationally. Established several years before the emergence of the antiwar movement, once the war in Vietnam began to generate opposition VOW brought an organized cadre of activists to the cause. To quote VOW historian Christine Ball, "these people were not bright-eyed neophytes."² While never a "front" organization for the Communist Party, and while Communists occupied few positions outside of its rank and file membership, both VOW and the Communist Party followed similar trajectories regarding the war in Vietnam. Both became strongly supportive of the NLF and the DRV.

¹ Pocock, interview.

² Ball, "History," 31.

The purpose of this chapter is not to present a history of VOW; this has been done by others. Nor is it the intent here to examine VOW as a women's organization. This too has already been done.³ While some writers have provided engaging analyses of one aspect of VOW's antiwar work – specifically its knitting project – this chapter examines VOW's overall role within the antiwar movement. While most accounts downplay the centrality of the Vietnam War to VOW's narrative, here it is placed front and centre. From early in its history, the organization's ideology was informed by a commitment to the principle of anti-imperialism. This ideological commitment developed over a period of several years. One question that must be asked is how much did this ideology shape VOW's activities concerning the war, and how much did the war shape its ideology? Finally, although always an autonomous organization, its commitment to ending the war in Vietnam was coterminous with a Communist victory. While this did not exclude a negotiated settlement, VOW continued to support the DRV and PRG after the United

³ In addition to a myriad of memoirs and popular biographies of VOW leaders, a number of scholarly works have been written about VOW. Christine Ball and Candace Loewen both provide histories of VOW's early years, particularly focusing on its initial support of the Liberal Party until Pearson's policy reversal regarding the deployment of Bomarc missiles in Canada. See Christine Ball, "The History of the Voice of Women/La Voix des Femmes – The Early Years," PhD thesis, University of Toronto, Toronto, 1994; and Candace Loewen, "Mike Hears Voices: Voice of Women and Lester Pearson, 1961-1963," *Atlantis*, 12:2, Spring 1987, 24-30. Frances Early and Roberta Lexier have provided two good regional studies of VOW in Halifax and Regina respectively. See Frances Early, "'A Grandly Subversive Time': The Halifax Branch of the Voice of Women in the 1960s," Judith Fingard and Janet Guildford, eds., *Mothers of the Municipality: Women, Work, and Social Policy in Post-1945 Halifax* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005); and Roberta Lexier, "Linking the Past With the Future: Voice of Women in Regina," *Saskatchewan History*, 56:2, Fall 2004. Marilyn Sweet's 2007 MA thesis focuses specifically on VOW's knitting project. It has been joined more recently by France Early's discussion of the same topic. See Marilyn Selma Sweet, "Purls for Peace: The Voice of Women, Maternal Feminism, and the Knitting Project for Vietnamese Children," MA Thesis, University of Ottawa, 2007; and Frances Early, "Re-imagining War: The Voice of Women, the Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians, and the Knitting Project for Vietnamese Children, 1966-1976," *Peace and Change*, 34:2, April 2009, 148-163. Frances Early has recently expanded her work on VOW's antiwar efforts beyond the knitting project to include Kay Macpherson's 1968 visit to the DRV and the 1969 Vietnamese women's tour of Canada. See Frances Early, "Canadian Women and the International Arena in the Sixties: The Voice of Women/La voix des femmes and the Opposition to the Vietnam War," in Dimitry Anastakis (ed.) *The Sixties: Passion, Politics and Style* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008).

States negotiated its own exit from the war. This goal was facilitated by the existence of many VOW members with strong left-of-center beliefs. Some were Communists, some members of the NDP, others unaffiliated leftists. But socialists by no means had a monopoly of VOW's antiwar activism. Many were drawn to VOW from a sense of religious conviction. The organization's commitment to Vietnamese self-determination sprang as much from the social gospel as it did socialism. But given the nature of the Communist movement, its relationship with VOW deserves special attention. This should not be perceived as some sort of latterday McCarthyite attempt to identify Communists within the antiwar movement. The Party's position and activism on Vietnam were clear from the earliest days of the war. Rather, the purpose here is to give credit where credit is due. The hangover of McCarthyism is a long one. In the 1960s, the need to conceal Party membership and influence was still very real. Communists made great contributions to the antiwar movement and many of them were made through the Voice of Women.

Voice of Women did not begin on a radical path. Founded in 1960 following the failure of the US-USSR summit on nuclear weapons testing and the shooting down of a U2 spy plane over Soviet air space, VOW, like contemporaneous peace organizations such as CUCND and the Committee for the Control of Radiation Hazards (later the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament [CCND]), was primarily concerned with ending the nuclear arms race.⁴ In the popular account of VOW's founding, *Toronto Star* columnist Lotta Dempsey suggested that it was time for women to take on a role in ending the nuclear arms race and that response to her idea was overwhelming.⁵ This narrative, however, ignores the organizing work that went into establishing VOW. This

⁴ Kay Macpherson, *When in Doubt, Do Both: The Times of My Life* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 89-90.

⁵ Sweet, "Purls," 34.

effort was performed primarily by members of the Toronto Committee for Disarmament (TCD) which initiated VOW's first meeting on 28 July 1960. Participants elected Helen Tucker of TCD and Josephine Davis as President and Vice-President respectively.⁶ It should be remembered, however, that TCD represented the right wing of the Toronto peace movement. As discussed earlier, it was lacking in democratic structures and virulently anti-Communist. It also supported Canada's membership in NATO.⁷ VOW inherited some of these characteristics.

The first mention of Vietnam in Voice of Women's monthly newsletter was a review of Dr. Thomas Dooley's *Deliver Us From Evil*. The book, we now know, was a distorted piece of anticommunist propaganda funded by the CIA to drum up support – particularly among Roman Catholics in the United States – for America's growing involvement in Vietnam. Rosemary Rochester's review in the April 1961 issue of *Voice of Women* sang its praises. Dooley, a US Navy doctor, in Rochester's words, was "ordered to Indo-China just after the *tragic* [my italics] fall of Dien Bien Phu" to assist in the relocation of Roman Catholics from the Communist-controlled North to the South under the control of the US-supported regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem, himself a Roman Catholic in a country overwhelmingly Buddhist, said of Dooley that he was "beloved by a whole nation."⁸ He was certainly beloved by Rochester. Considering the role that VOW would eventually take on with regard to Vietnam, the country's earliest mention in its newsletter was ironic.

⁶ Ball, "History," 137; Early, "Grandly Subversive," 253-254.

⁷ Moffat, *History*, 99.

⁸ Rosemary Rochester, review of *Deliver Us from Evil*, in *Voice of Women*, No. 11, 15 April 1961, 59, in VOW, Box 46, File 4. For more on Dooley see James T. Fisher, *Dr. America: The Lives of Thomas A. Dooley, 1927-1961* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1997).

The review is also indicative of VOW's ideology in 1961. Referring to the defeat of French colonialism in Indochina as tragic indeed reveals much in terms of its anticommunist orientation at the time. Christine Ball, in her study of the early history of VOW, raises the problem of red baiting, both inside and outside the organization. Early in the life of VOW, professional anti-Communist Ronald Gostick, in his extreme right-wing publication *The Canadian Intelligence Service*, accused VOW's executive of being "carriers" – using the disease metaphor for communism – of the "Red line." *The Alert Service*, a related publication also on the far right, labelled VOW a Communist Party front group.⁹ Of course the accusations were nonsense. Josephine Davis, VOW's president, was as good an anticommunist as anyone. Following a 1960 presentation in Ottawa, Davis warned the local VOW chapter to beware of Communist Party front groups or organizations controlled by the Party. In addition, Davis lobbied to exclude any VOW member from any leadership position should the member's husband have any association with the Communist Party or "fellow-traveller organizations" dating as far back as the Depression. In the case of two particular women (Ball does not give their names) Davis urged complete membership exclusion based on such criteria. VOW was also subject to anti-Communist pressure from the federal government. In 1960 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Ellen Fairclough, concerned about the associations of the word "peace" with the Communist Party, urged VOW to use a different word.¹⁰ Davis's

⁹ Ball, "History," 171. Gostick had a long history not only as an anti-Communist, but also as an anti-Semite and white supremacist. Born in Wales in 1918 and raised in Alberta, he was the founder of the Canadian Anti-Communist League in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The group's mandate was to expose the "Communist-Zionist-monopolist finance enemy of Christian civilization." The organization went through various name changes over the years, perhaps best known as the Canadian League of Rights. Gostick died in 2005. See Ron Csillag, "Ronald Gostick, Far-Right Publisher, 1918-2005," *The Globe and Mail*, 6 August 2005, S9; also David Bercusson and Douglas Wertheimer, *A Trust Betrayed: The Keegstra Affair* (Scarborough: Doubleday Canada, 1985).

¹⁰ Ball, "History," 177-179, 192-193.

successor, Helen Tucker, continued the organization's anticommunist trajectory. When the *Globe and Mail* published an article in August 1961 quoting a CBC television interview with a former undercover RCMP agent to the effect that VOW was infiltrated by Communists, VOW went to great lengths to successfully urge the former Mountie to retract the statement. VOW followed up by requesting Justice Minister E. Davie Fulton to protect them from "such slanderous comments."¹¹ In the early 1960s, as the war in Vietnam escalated, Voice of Women was very much a part of prevailing Cold War, anticommunist liberalism.

VOW's shift to a more radical ideology was partly rooted in the ascension of Kay Macpherson to the leadership of the organization. Macpherson returned to Canada from Britain in the early 1960s with her husband, Marxist political economist C.B. Macpherson, where the latter had been on sabbatical. Macpherson described herself and her friends as to the left of the CCF. While in the UK they had been involved with Bertrand Russell and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.¹² Upon her return to Canada she joined VOW in the winter of 1960-1961. She quickly rose to the position of Vice-President, from which she took over the leadership upon Thérèse Casgrain's resignation as President. Casgrain had resigned in order to run in the 1963 federal election as an NDP candidate. Shortly after Macpherson's taking office, VOW co-founder Josephine Davis circulated a seven-page letter to every VOW member, accusing Macpherson amongst other things of leading an attempt by radicals to take over the

¹¹ "Voice of Women Gets Retraction of Red Charge," reprinted from *The Globe and Mail*, 21 August 1961 in *Voice of Women*, No. 22, 20 August 1962, 21; also see reprint of statement given to Justice Minister E. Davie Fulton by VOW President Helen Tucker and Vice-President Thérèse Casgrain, 2 August 1961 in *Voice of Women*, No. 22, 20 August 1962, 22-23. Both documents in VOW, Box 46, File 5.

¹² Kay Macpherson, *When in Doubt Do Both: The Times of My Life* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 21, 54.

organization. Davis also named University of Toronto metallurgist Ursula Franklin and former Olympic skier (and future environmentalist) Dianna Wright – both Quakers – as part of this alleged conspiracy. Davis was given an opportunity to present her accusations at a special meeting held at Grindstone Island in the Rideau Lakes.¹³ The summit resulted in a vote of confidence for Macpherson's leadership and a reprimand for Davis for unauthorized use of the mailing list. Davis resigned and dissociated herself from the organization.¹⁴ The leadership of VOW remained solidly in left hands.

Also contributing to VOW's new-found left orientation was the 1963 Liberal Party reversal regarding the deployment of nuclear weapons in Canada. In its early years VOW had enjoyed a close relationship with the Liberals. Maryon Pearson, wife of opposition party leader Lester Pearson, was in fact an early member of VOW. On 28 July 1960, the day VOW was established, the future Prime Minister sent a telegram to VOW President Josephine Davis, extending greetings and best wishes to the participants. A month later the Liberal leader formally proposed that Canada not accept nuclear warheads. As an advocate of no nuclear arms for Canada, VOW threw all of its support behind Pearson. In January 1963, however, in the lead-up to the federal election, Pearson reversed this policy, citing the danger posed by Cuba. Both Pearson and his wife Maryon were flooded with angry letters from VOW members, leading Mrs. Pearson to resign from the organization in March. It was this decision, argues Candace Loewen that turned VOW away from domestic affairs and led them to involvement with international

¹³ Grindstone Island had previously been the summer home of Diana Wright's father, Rear-Admiral Charles Kingsmill. The property was donated in the early 1960s to the Society of Friends, who in turn made it a centre for peace and social justice. One can only speculate as to whether this had any bearing on the result of Davis's hearing. See Diana Kingsmill Wright (1908-1982), Saskatchewan's Environmental Champions, http://www.econet.sk.ca/sk_enviro_champions/wright.html. Accessed 3 February 2010.

¹⁴ Macpherson, *When in Doubt*, 88, 92, 102-105.

issues.¹⁵ More significantly in terms of VOW and its relationship to partisan politics, the split with Pearson lost VOW thousands of members, most of them card-carrying Liberals, who felt obligated to support Pearson's decision. A considerable number of those who stayed on in VOW were NDP supporters.¹⁶ Thus, by the end of 1963 when the war was heating up in Vietnam VOW had undergone an ideological realignment. The organization did not move to the left so much as those who had pulled it to the right in its first years were no longer players, allowing the organization to pursue a more anti-imperialist agenda.

There is conflicting evidence as to when VOW actually began to take notice of the dirty war in Vietnam. Christine Ball quotes Dorothy Smiecivch that VOW served as a bridge in keeping the issue of Vietnam alive from 1960 to 1967 when the antiwar movement, in her words, "coalesced."¹⁷ What Smiecivch meant by this is not clear, but as we have already seen in previous chapters there was a growing antiwar movement in Canada from 1964. It is doubtful that, given VOW's early anticommunist nature, they would have been involved in the emerging antiwar movement prior to 1963. The departure of liberals – both small and large L¹⁸ – beginning with the departure of Jo Davis in 1962 and turning into a mass exodus following the break with the Liberal Party in 1963 is likely when VOW began to pay attention to Vietnam. Ball credits Ursula Franklin with first bringing Vietnam to the attention of VOW. As we learned in the

¹⁵ Loewen, "Mike Hears Voices," *Atlantis*, 24-30. While Pearson publicly cited the recent Cuban Missile Crisis as the rationale for deployment of nuclear weapons in Canada, Pearson's biographer suggests the decision was more pragmatic. Indeed, Pearson, commenting on the decision in 1972 stated the reversal was when "I really became a politician." See John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, Volume II: 1949-1972* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 256, 262.

¹⁶ Early, "A Grandly Subversive Time," 267.

¹⁷ Ball, "History," 486.

¹⁸ In Canadian politics the Liberal Party is often presented as the centrist party, to the left of the Conservative Party, but to the right of the more liberal New Democratic Party. Someone who is both a large and small L liberal would therefore be a member of the Liberal Party, but within its left wing.

introduction to this chapter, Judith Pocock credits the Communists. In her memoir, Kay Macpherson indicated that VOW received letters from women in Vietnam in 1963 informing them as to what was going on there. Interestingly, Macpherson does not indicate who these Vietnamese letter writers were, but likely they were involved in some capacity with the Women's Union of the NLF. "In 1963," Macpherson states, "we had to find out where Vietnam was."¹⁹

On 30-31 May 1964 VOW held its annual meeting at the Banff School of Fine Arts. Kay Macpherson was elected to another term as President. Among the agenda items discussed was a recommendation to establish closer ties with an organization that had been founded in the United States a year after VOW's establishment – Women Strike for Peace (WSP).²⁰ It was to be the start of a long-lasting relationship, especially with regards to the two organizations' opposition to the war in Vietnam. Also on the agenda were resolutions supporting contraception (which the Quebec delegates abstained on), opposing Apartheid, and two on the issue of Vietnam. The first, recognizing the deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia called on the Canadian government to act. The resolution read in part:

Whereas the political and military situation in South Vietnam is steadily deteriorating: Be It Resolved that the Canadian government be urged to use its influence in a reconvened Geneva conference toward the demilitarization and neutralization under international guarantees of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

¹⁹ Macpherson, *When in Doubt*, 98. Throughout the secondary literature as well as the archival sources various names are given for both the NLF women's union and the women's organization which operated in the DRV. I am confident that they are all the same organizations being referred to, but I list them as they are named in the respective sources.

²⁰ Minutes, Fourth Annual Meeting, 30-31 May 1964, VOW, Box 22, File 4; Resolutions Adopted, Annual Meeting, 1964, in same file. What archives?

It should be noted that although the preamble to the resolution specified South Vietnam, the actual resolution did not, implicitly recognizing the unity of the former French colony. The second resolution called upon Prime Minister Pearson to refuse any request forthcoming from the United States for military assistance in the escalating conflict.²¹

VOW's members were not unanimous regarding the organization's growing international role. A month later Macpherson reported to the executive that some members had expressed concern about the organization taking up causes considered to be radical. She quoted from a communication she had received: "We have too many 'left-wing members,' whose voices are always heard above those of the 'moderates.'" Macpherson's detractors felt the organization should not be involved with issues pertaining to South Africa, civil rights in the US South, Cuba, NATO, or Vietnam. The concerns were politely noted. Elsewhere in her report, under the heading education, Macpherson indicated that a new publication titled *The Tragedy of Vietnam* was available.²²

A month later Macpherson, along with Nancy Pocock and two other VOW members, travelled to Helsinki to attend the convention of the World Peace Council, the international peace organization closely associated with the Soviet Union and of which the Canadian Peace Congress was an affiliate. The four were among 300 women who made up the 1,500 delegates. According to Macpherson, "The Vietnamese were the stars of the congress, for everyone felt great sympathy for this country that had been torn apart by war for more than twenty five years." Macpherson was elected to the steering committee which prepared the agenda and helped draft a resolution proposed by Jean-

²¹ Resolutions Adopted, Annual Meeting, 1964, VOW, Box 22, File 4. See also press release in same file.

²² President's Report, 1 July 1964, VOW, Box 22, File 4.

Paul Sartre condemning US actions in Vietnam.²³ If there was any ambiguity where VOW stood on the issue of Vietnam it was now removed. VOW was now an international player in the growing opposition to end the war. Significantly, the Helsinki convention predated the Gulf of Tonkin Incident by over a month.

As US military intervention in Vietnam escalated dramatically throughout the winter and spring of 1965, so did VOW's protests. In January Macpherson wrote Prime Minister Pearson expressing her opposition to the war. In March she wrote Minister of External Affairs Paul Martin, Sr.²⁴ In early April VOW sent a telegram to Prime Minister Pearson, on one hand condemning the war, and on the other congratulating him on his having asked for an end to US air raids against the North and for his proposal for a conference of twenty one nations on developing the Mekong Valley.²⁵ Later the same month, as the US continued its escalation without protest from Canada, Macpherson sent another telegram to Pearson, this one more caustic. "Voice of Women is appalled at the Canadian Government's tacit and sycophantic support of United States escalation of Vietnam civil war." Continuing to support the Prime Minister's calls for development aid, the telegram went on to question Canada's foreign policies.

If Canada has no influence in modifying United States policy then she can also have no place in alliances such as NATO and NORAD – We appeal for an immediate House debate on Vietnam and Canada's foreign policy so that the Government can hear Parliament's views and Canadians know their government's policy.²⁶

²³ Macpherson, *When in Doubt*, 167-168.

²⁴ Sweet, "Purls," 73-77.

²⁵ Translation of telegram to Pearson from Ghislaine Laurendeau, Vice-President, National; and Thérèse Cagrain, President, VOW, Quebec, 5 April 1965. In "National Activity," *Voice of Women*, 3:2, Annual Meeting Issue, Spring 1965, VOW, Box 22, File 5. It should be noted that Pearson did not call for an end to the bombings, but merely a pause.

²⁶ Reprint of telegram, Macpherson to Pearson, 25 April 1965, in "National Activity," *Voice of Women*, 3:2, Annual Meeting Issue, Spring 1965, VOW, Box 22, File 5.

The following month, in preparation for VOW's upcoming annual meeting, VOW issued a special edition of its newsletter containing resolutions to be discussed and other relevant items. Vietnam continued to occupy a substantial portion of the organization's business. In a piece titled "Message from Our President," Macpherson wrote to the members: "If Canadians condone this U.S. war, we are despicable, apathetic and toadying hypocrites." Among the resolutions presented for consideration was one to support future peace marches.²⁷

Eighty-six delegates convened at Carleton University 27-30 May 1965 for VOW's annual meeting. Addressing the women was special guest Dagmar Wilson, of WSP. Much of the regular business was set aside in order to discuss the war in Vietnam, as well as the recent US military intervention in the Dominican Republic.²⁸ As a result of this discussion VOW sent a delegation to Parliament Hill to meet with party leaders. It also issued a statement to Members of Parliament:

(The) Canadian Government and people must accept the full implications of their claim to be a peace-making nation – and independent nation – and express openly their disapproval of U.S. actions in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, which are causing unimaginable suffering as well as violating the principles of the United Nations and the right of all peoples to self-determination.²⁹

The delegation received the support of the Women's Auxiliary of the United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union.³⁰ Although it is not clear if VOW had any effect on the opinions of Canada's lawmakers, they certainly kept the issue of Vietnam before the public eye.

²⁷ Macpherson, "Message from Our President," *Voice of Women*, 3:2, Annual Meeting Issue, Spring 1965, 2, VOW, Box 22, File 5. Also "Category III – Program," same issue, 5.

²⁸ List of Delegates – Annual Meeting, May 27-30, 1965, VOW, Box 22, File 5.

²⁹ VOW Submission to MPs, 28 May 1965, VOW, Box 6, File 1.

³⁰ Isitt, "Tug-of-War," 287-288.

In the fall Macpherson, Pocock and two other members travelled to the Soviet Union. There they met with the Committee of Soviet Women.³¹ The meeting demonstrated just how far VOW had come in just a few short years from its early anticommunist orientation to travelling to the USSR. It is not known what was on the agenda for this meeting, but likely the war in Vietnam was among the items discussed.

In February 1966, in preparation for the International Day of Protest in Ottawa the following month, Macpherson wrote the Prime Minister requesting him to meet with a VOW delegation in early March. The Prime Minister's office responded that Mr. Pearson would not be available to meet with them. VOW settled for a meeting with External Affairs Minister Paul Martin Sr. On 23 March a delegation of eighty VOW members, including representatives of all VOW provincial organizations as well as twelve members of the National Council, presented a statement to Martin. The delegation had substantial backing from the Quebec labour movement. The statement, read in French and English, asked for specific answers from Martin on the subjects of recognition of the People's Republic of China and aid to Vietnam – North and South. Afterwards, one member from Dartmouth gave her impressions of Martin's response: "My impression of Mr. Paul Martin is that he is the master of double-talk in two languages."³² The delegation also met with MPs and opposition leaders. According to one member reporting on the event, members "had their breath taken away by the depth and breadth of ignorance of some of our elected representatives...." Following VOW's presentation, Martin informed the House of Commons of his meeting and commended VOW for their efforts, stating that

³¹ Casgrain, *A Woman*, 167-168.

³² Correspondence, VOW to Pearson, 9 February 1966; Correspondence, Prime Minister's Secretary to VOW, 16 February 1966; Flyer, "Drop Everything Except the Baby!"; Report, VOW National Office, 23 March 1966; Kay Dalton, in "Ottawa Report." All documents in VOW, Box 6, File 6.

VOW had accepted his efforts to bring about negotiations to end the war. Responding to this afterwards, one VOW member stated “When he had the effrontery” [to make this statement], “I could have thrown my shoe at him.”³³

Vietnam continued to dominate VOW’s agenda when sixty three delegates and sixty five observers met at the organization’s annual meeting at the University of British Columbia, 27-28 May. Kay Macpherson was acclaimed to a fourth term of office and Betty Winter of San Francisco addressed the meeting on behalf of WSP.³⁴ Any internal division on the issue of Vietnam was long gone. Delegates adopted a four point program calling on the federal government to recognize that its policy of “quiet diplomacy” with the Americans was a failure, that its export of strategic materials to the United States destroyed Canada’s integrity on the ICC, that no solution in Vietnam was possible that did not include the withdrawal of US troops and the dismantling of their bases, and finally, that no lasting peace could be established in the region without extending full diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China. Further, the resolution called on the Canadian government to take immediate steps to halt the export of war materials for use in Vietnam, to extend aid to all victims of the war – North, South, and NLF-controlled areas of the South, to pressure the US government to withdraw its troops and recognize the NLF, and to extend immediate diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China.³⁵ In two short years VOW had gone from calling for the demilitarization and neutralization of Vietnam to demanding the withdrawal of US troops.

³³ Report, VOW National Office, 23 March 1966; See also Irene Blewett, Regina VOW, Report on VOW Delegation to Ottawa, 22 March 1966. Both documents in VOW, Box 6, File 6.

³⁴ Minutes, Annual Meeting, 27-28 May 1966, VOW, Box 22, File 6.

³⁵ Minutes, Annual Meeting, 27-28 May 1966, VOW Box 22, File 6. See also Sweet, “Purls,” 73-77, and Marion Douglas Kerans, *Muriel Duckworth: A Very Active Pacifist* (Halifax: Fernwood, 1996), 110.

At the 1967 annual meeting, held at the Université de Montréal, Macpherson informed delegates that the resolutions on Vietnam, adopted at the 1966 meeting had been forwarded to the Prime Minister. She also let the members know that she had invited a representation of the Union des Femmes de Vietnam (the Vietnam Women's Union, essentially the women's league of the NLF) to visit Canada. The Vietnamese women were unable to make the trip at that time, but reciprocated by inviting Macpherson to visit Hanoi.³⁶

Also on the agenda was the Report of the Second International Conference on Peace which had taken place in Montreal immediately preceding VOW's annual meeting. Though not exclusively concerned with the war in Vietnam, the conflict dominated the conference. It included two keynote addresses on Vietnam, one by Helene Kazantzakis titled "The Problems of Peace and the Vietnam War." There was also a workshop on the topic "Achieving Peace in Vietnam," and a plenary session endorsing two resolutions on the war. The first censured the Johnson administration for its actions in Southeast Asia and called on all countries to invoke sanctions against the US to show their opposition to the war. The resolution also demanded the implementation of the 1954 Geneva Accords. The second resolution called for an international delegation to meet Prime Minister Pearson and urge him to pressure President Johnson to end the bombing of the DRV, freeze shipments of war materials to the US, urge a reconvening of the Geneva Accords, and send medical aid to all of Vietnam, not simply those areas under the control of the Republic of Vietnam.³⁷

³⁶ Minutes, Annual Meeting, June 10, 1967, VOW, Box 22, File 7; Kerans, *A Very Active*, 124.

³⁷ Report of the Second International Conference on Peace – Montreal, June 1967, VOW, Box 22, File 7.

The 1967 meeting also saw Macpherson step aside after four consecutive terms as president. Members elected Muriel Duckworth to the position. Duckworth's politics came to her through the social gospel. An activist since her undergraduate days at McGill in the 1920s, she had met her husband Jack through their involvement with in the Student Christian Movement. They attended Union Theological Seminary together. There they made the acquaintance of a veritable who's who of influential Protestant intellectuals: Henry Sloane Coffin, Harry Emerson Fosdick, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Harry Ward. Among their classmates was Miles Horton who later founded the Highlander Folk School. Throughout the 1930s Duckworth was active in the League for Social Reconstruction, the YMCA and the Fellowship of Reconciliation. Muriel and Jack joined the CCND in the late 1950s. Following a falling out with the United Church over its support of nuclear weapons, Duckworth drifted into the orbit of the Quakers, many of whom would play significant leadership roles in VOW. Among their ranks were Ursula Franklin, Nancy Pocock, Helen Cunningham, Muriel Bishop, Mildred Osterhaut, Peggy Hope-Simpson, and Dorothy Norvell. During this time and in later years many of her friends were members of the Communist Party. Duckworth proudly asserts that the issue never got in the way of working cooperatively on issues of mutual concern.³⁸

As President-elect, Duckworth represented VOW on a trip to the USSR. She had been invited to celebrate International Women's Day as part of the fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution. While there she met Madame Nguyen Ngoc Dung, and other women representatives of the National Liberation Front. Duckworth credits this experience as the

³⁸ Marion Douglas Kerans, *Muriel Duckworth: A Very Active Pacifist* (Halifax: Fernwood, 1996) 15-30, 35-42, 43-44, 57, 81-85. Actually Kerans states they joined the CND, but as this was a British organization she likely means the CCND. The Committee for the Control of Radiation Hazards was formed in 1959. It did not change its name to CCND until 1962. Also coming out of the CCND were Nancy and Jack Pocock. See Pocock, interview.

start of her education on Vietnam.³⁹ But by 1967 VOW was well established as an antiwar organization. It is difficult to imagine that Duckworth could be elected President without already having a familiarity with the subject.

Under Duckworth's leadership relations between VOW and Communist women's groups in Vietnam continued to develop. At the 1968 annual meeting, held at the Sheraton Summit Hotel in Calgary, delegates passed a resolution to continue protest actions against the war. Members also passed a motion to investigate a proposal to bring Vietnamese women to Canada for a conference. Fraternal greetings were read from the Women's Union of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, as well as from the Women's Union for the Liberation of South Vietnam. These messages articulated love and gratitude for VOW's support, and expressed a desire to visit Canada. VOW's Vietnamese comrades drank a toast to them: "Hoa binh Doc lap" (Peace and Independence).⁴⁰

The proposal to bring Vietnamese women to Canada was further explored at a conference in Paris called by WSP, the Women's Union of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the South Vietnam Liberation Women's Union. The conference was also attended by women from Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and West Germany. Participants drew up a four point program to end the war that included a bombing halt, the withdrawal of all foreign troops, recognition of the NLF, and self-determination for the Vietnamese people. Representing Canadian women were Kay Macpherson and Muriel Duckworth from VOW.⁴¹ Before the Vietnamese women could visit Canada, however, Canadian women would visit them.

³⁹ Kerans, *Muriel Duckworth*, 98.

⁴⁰ Minutes, Annual Meeting, 21-22 September 1968, VOW, Box 22, File 8.

⁴¹ Kerans, *Muriel Duckworth*, 111; "Woman's group suggests Recognize war as a civil one," *Montreal Star*, 8 May 1968, clipping in VOW, Box 3, File 23; "Paris Conference of Women Working to End the War

Kay Macpherson represented VOW. She departed Paris with Mickey Murray of the Congress of Canadian Women (a women's organization established by the Communist Party of Canada) and British peace activist Hetti Vorhaus.⁴² Together the three travelled to the DRV. There, they toured Hanoi and its outlying regions, inspecting bomb damage, touring hospitals, universities, schools and factories. Among the many women they met was Phan Thi An, Vice-President of the Vietnamese Women's Union and a member of the National Assembly. Among the items discussed was an official visit to Canada of the Vietnamese Women's Union. Upon her return home Macpherson went on a cross-country speaking tour, reporting to Canadians what she had witnessed first hand.⁴³ Speaking at a panel discussion at the University of New Brunswick, sponsored by the Fredericton chapter of VOW, Macpherson told her audience that the people of North Vietnam simply wanted to be free of foreign intervention, but that they "reserve the right to defend their country" and felt there was no place in their society for Americans.⁴⁴ Later, in a letter to the American press, Macpherson shared her impressions of life in the DRV and further called for an end to foreign intervention in Vietnam and an end to the bombing:

I have come back convinced that above all it is urgent for people everywhere to press for an end to the bombing of the North by the United States, in order that the Paris peace talks may succeed in bringing to an end this slaughter and destruction, of Americans as well as Vietnamese.

in Vietnam – Report from Voice of Women, Canada – April, 1968," VOW, Box 3, File 24. While Kerans states that the 1969 Vietnamese Women's tour of Canada originated at the Paris conference, we can see that the proposal was already being developed well before then. VOW, in fact, had been making inquiries regarding visas for the Vietnamese women as early as February 1967. See correspondence B. A. Gorman, Chief, Admissions, Home Branch, Canada Immigration Division, to Kay Macpherson, 21 February 1967, VOW, Box 45, File 27.

⁴² Avakumovic, *Communist Party*, 248-249.

⁴³ Macpherson, *When in Doubt*, 121-126; Correspondence, Kay Macpherson to Vietnamese Women's Union, 16 August 1968, VOW, Box 45, File 27.

⁴⁴ "'Hanoi Cause Just' – V.O.W. Officer," *Saint John Telegraph-Journal*, 15 November 1968. Clipping in VOW, Box 3, File 27; Kerans, *Muriel Duckworth*, 124.

The situation in both the North and the South is such that, if the bombing ceased, real progress might be made.

Macpherson concluded her letter by calling for the Vietnamese to be allowed to decide their own future as per the conditions of the 1954 Geneva Accords.⁴⁵

Following Macpherson's tour, VOW's energies were increasingly focused on the impending visit by women representatives of the DRV and the NLF. From the start, it was a joint project with WSP. Although the women were to tour Canada, the purpose of the trip was to make them accessible to American women. As the Vietnamese women were not allowed to enter the United States, the tour would give an opportunity to American women to meet "the enemy." While VOW handled most of the logistics, much of the funding came from WSP, which promoted the tour heavily in the United States.⁴⁶ In addition, although no financial support was forthcoming from its national office, US chapters of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom showed much interest in the tour, especially its Buffalo branch.⁴⁷

The delegation arrived in Montreal on 2 July. It included Vo Thi The, professor of literature at the University of Hanoi and member of the Vietnam Women's Union; Nguyen Ngoc Dung, an executive member of the Student Liberation Movement and the Women's Union, as well as a village organizer for the NLF; and La Thi Cao, a former teacher and member of the Women's Union, then working for the NLF. Accompanying them were two male interpreters. Their first three days were spent in the Montreal area, meeting with Canadian and American women, as well as union leaders. One of their first

⁴⁵ Letter to American press from Kay Macpherson following her Vietnam visit, VOW, Box 3, File 24. Macpherson attempted to publish an article on her visit to Vietnam, but it was rejected by *Chatelaine*, *Macleans*, and even *Canadian Dimension*. See VOW, Box 3, Files 23 and 24.

⁴⁶ Form letter, Cora Weiss, WSP, 25 June 1969; Correspondence, Kay Macpherson to Sally Bortz, National Secretary, WSP, 28 May 1969. Both in VOW, Box 46, File 2. This file contains numerous promotional materials produced and distributed by WSP throughout the US.

⁴⁷ VOW, Box 46, File 3.

engagements was a meeting in North Hatley, in the Eastern Townships of Quebec, where participants met in the barn of Virginia and Lowell Naeve.⁴⁸ From there the group proceeded to the Toronto area, again meeting with Canadian and American women, union leaders, Quakers, and various VOW groups. Speaking at an open air meeting in Niagara Falls, the group was joined by a delegation of women from the US led by Jane Spock, wife of the famed baby doctor for peace. The women had walked across the border, being only briefly detained by Canadian border guards. From there the party proceeded to British Columbia where they hosted a meeting in Nanaimo as well as a two-day conference in Vancouver attended by 300. Later they spoke at a public meeting with an overflow crowd of 600. While in British Columbia the group also met with American draft dodgers and deserters. Next on their agenda was Regina where they met with farm women, co-op leaders and agriculturalists. They joked with farmers that the solution to the wheat surplus was to grow rice. During a brief stopover in Winnipeg they were greeted by a delegation of local VOW members at the airport. Before departing Montreal to return home on 15 July the group made a visit to Parliament Hill.⁴⁹

The 1969 Vietnamese women's tour is important for several reasons. First, it demonstrates the close links between VOW and WSP. Secondly, it shows the partisan role that VOW had developed with regard to the war in Vietnam. No longer was VOW simply calling for a cessation of hostilities; by providing the logistics for representatives of the DRV and the NLF to present their positions to North Americans in person, the tour

⁴⁸ According to one participant Virginia and Lowell Naeve were American pacifists. Their barn had been converted into a conference centre. See Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, *Outlaw Woman: A Memoir of the War Years, 1960-1975* (San Francisco: City Lights, 2001), 184-185.

⁴⁹ Press release, "Visit to Canada of Vietnam Women," nd, VOW Box 45, File 28; VOW circular, "Vietnamese Women Visit Canada," July 1969, VOW, Box 46, File 7; Memo, Claire Culhane, National Chair, VOW Vietnam Committee, to VOW Montreal, Toronto, Regina, Vancouver, Victoria, Nanose Bay, Muriel Duckworth, 26 June 1969, VOW, Box 45, File 28; Kerans, *Muriel Duckworth*, 124.

represented a significant propaganda coup, one that would have not been possible without the hard work of VOW members. Finally, the tour made real for many – women, men, farmers, workers, and others – the brutal nature of the war being waged in Vietnam. In the case of the Americans who travelled to Canada to hear the Vietnamese women, it provided an opportunity to put a human face to “the enemy.” This increased support for the Communist war effort was reflected that October at VOW’s annual meeting in Ottawa when members passed a motion to take measures to increase support for the struggle of the Vietnamese people.⁵⁰ Some might argue that such an analysis underplays a specifically feminist element here – that women bring a unique perspective in that they make peace, not war. This may be so, but given the total mobilization of the DRV towards winning the war, it is unlikely that Communist authorities would have authorized the project if they had not felt that it advanced the overall cause. In partnering with the Vietnam Women’s Union by coordinating the tour, and by subsequently providing further support to the cause of the NLF, VOW, in its own way had become a partisan in the overall war effort. VOW demonstrated that in addition to peace, women can also make national liberation.

VOW continued its opposition to American intervention in what had become a generalized Indochinese war by the early 1970s. We have already seen the role that VOW played in drawing Canadians’ attention to the US invasion of Cambodia in April 1970. At its annual meeting in Winnipeg that year delegates passed a resolution to actively support the specific proposals of Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the PRG. These included the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam by 30 June 1971, and an

⁵⁰ Resolutions, Annual Meeting, Ottawa, 3-6 October 1969, VOW, Box 22, File 9.

immediate cessation of hostilities and opening of discussions.⁵¹ The war became further regionalized in February 1971 when forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), supported by the United States Air Force, invaded the neutral country of Laos in an operation conceived by the White House dubbed Lam Son 719. As with the Cambodian invasion a year earlier, it was an effort on the part of US President Nixon to buy time for his Vietnamization program, only this time there were no US troops directly involved.⁵²

There are conflicting reports as to how VOW initially became involved in protesting the Laos invasion. One account centres on Clare Culhane, VOW's Quebec Vice-President. A relative newcomer to VOW, Culhane, too, brought a long history of political activism with her to the organization. Her biography by Mick Lowe, titled *One Woman Army: The Life of Claire Culhane*,⁵³ is aptly titled. Culhane joined the Young Communist League in 1937. Arrested numerous times for her activism, she was a committed activist, only leaving the Party in 1947 when her husband was expelled in a factional dispute. She remained active in the British Columbia Peace Council and continued to describe herself as a "small c communist."⁵⁴ With the collapse of her marriage she put a hiatus on political activism to raise her children. In 1967 she travelled to South Vietnam where she worked as a nurse in a tuberculosis hospital run by the Canadian government. It soon became apparent to her, however, that Canada's role in Vietnam was to give legitimacy to the US war effort and she left in early 1968, ultimately

⁵¹ Minutes, Tenth Annual Meeting, Winnipeg, 1970, VOW, Box 22, File 10. After 1969 the NLF increasingly took to calling itself the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), in contrast to the Government of Vietnam under the leadership of Nguyen Van Thieu. See Herring, *America's Longest War*, 311.

⁵² Herring, *America's Longest War*, 297.

⁵³ Mick Lowe, *One Woman Army: The Life of Claire Culhane* (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1992).

⁵⁴ Lowe, *One Woman Army*, 36, 39, 41, 93.

publishing her experiences in *Why is Canada in Vietnam?*⁵⁵ En route back to Canada she met with the DRV's ambassador in Paris and offered her services to his country as a nurse. The ambassador politely told her that she would be of more use back in Canada working to "stop the bombs from coming." Accordingly, she joined VOW upon her return. In 1969 Quebec members elected her Vice-President for the province.⁵⁶ VOW, however, was almost peripheral to Culhane's antiwar efforts. Keeping the spotlight on herself, she at times dragged VOW into supporting her own antiwar initiatives.⁵⁷ It is, therefore, not surprising that Lowe's biography, a work commissioned by Culhane's family, places her at the centre of opposition in Canada to the Laos invasion. In this account, Nguyen Thi Binh, head of the PRG delegation to the Paris Peace Talks, contacted Culhane directly on Sunday 7 February, informing her of the invasion, and calling on her urgently to "mobilize peace forces in your country."⁵⁸ This account, however, is questionable. An unsigned telephone message received in VOW's office from the Vietnam Mobilization Committee indicates that Nguyen Thi Binh contacted the VMC, which in turn passed the message on to VOW. The telegram from Binh was much exaggerated in its details, but its purpose was to rally international opposition to the US-supported incursion into Laos:

Laos invasion by tens of thousands US Saigon Thai troops. Possibility of US using tactical nuclear warfare. Urgently mobilize peace forces in your

⁵⁵Lowe, *One Woman Army*, 125-169. See Claire Culhane, *Why is Canada in Vietnam: The Truth About Our Foreign Aid* (Toronto: NC Press, 1972).

⁵⁶ Lowe, *One Woman Army*, 173-174, 197.

⁵⁷ The best case example of this is when Culhane chained herself to a seat in the gallery of the House of Commons and rained leaflets down on members while yelling questions at the Members. See "Vietnam Leaflets Tossed in the House," *Vietnam Special*, excerpt from *Montreal Star*, 5 March 1971, clipping in VOW, Box 3, File 28; "Claire Culhane's Testimony in Reply to a Charge of 'Creating a Disturbance' in the House of Commons, Ottawa, March 1971," *Voice of Women National Newsletter*, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 1971, VOW, Box 3, File 29; Lowe, *One Woman Army*, 213-214; Culhane, *Why is Canada*, 9.

⁵⁸ Lowe, *One Woman*, 212.

area to prevent US military ventures in Indochina. Paris delegation.
Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

Attached to the telegram transcript is a same-day reply to Binh signed by Duckworth and Macpherson: "Voice of Women Canada Responding Across Country to Your Appeal for Protest and Insistence Ending Invasion."⁵⁹ It is quite possible that the message was received both by Culhane and the VMC. Given the wording and the nature of the telegram, it is likely it was written in a standardized format and distributed widely. What is more significant is that VOW acted promptly in this matter on the request of the PRG.

This was not an isolated incident. In June, as the Government of the Republic of Vietnam increased its repression of dissidents, the Women's Union of South Vietnam sent VOW an urgent telegram. The telegram informed VOW that twenty one students advocating peace and democracy had been put on trial. The trial was being protested by Buddhist leaders and the Women's Movement for the Right to Life. Sixty women and a Buddhist priest had been arrested. VOW responded by sending a telegram to the Saigon government demanding immediate restoration of rights to imprisoned students, women, Buddhists and all citizens, and called for an end to the repression of Vietnamese peace advocates. VOW sent a second telegram to the Canadian government calling upon it to "cease acting as messenger, spokesman, arms supplier and tacit supporter for the U.S. in Vietnam." The telegram went on to condemn the war and its continuation, calling for the withdrawal Canadian arms from the conflict, and for a change in the attitude and direction of the Departments of External Affairs and Defence.⁶⁰ The following month VOW made financial contributions to the Lao Patriotic Women's Organization, the South

⁵⁹ Unsigned note, 9 February 1971, VOW, Box 18, File 6; correspondence, Muriel Duckworth and Kay Macpherson to Nguyen Thi Binh, same date, same file; Also Kerans, *Muriel Duckworth*, 122.

⁶⁰ VOW – Statement on Indochina, June, 1971, VOW, Box 3, File 28.

Vietnam Women's Union for Liberation, and the Viet-Nam Women's Union in the amounts of \$1,000 to the Laotians, and \$750 each to the two Vietnamese organizations, further demonstrating its solidarity with the anti-imperialist struggle in Indochina.⁶¹ This solidarity was further illustrated in December when Kay Inglis, President of British Columbia VOW, received further correspondence from Vo Thi The of the Vietnam Women's Union. The's letter thanked BC VOW for its most recent contribution and urged the organization to strongly oppose Nixon's policy of Vietnamization. It also solicited support for the PRG's seven-point peace program.⁶²

At VOW's annual meeting in October, again in Banff, the war in Southeast Asia continued to dominate the agenda. Of the 14 resolutions passed relating to peace, three pertained directly to the war, while several others called for the severing of Canada's military ties with the US. These included withdrawal from NATO and NORAD, Canada's continued non-membership in the OAS, cessation of all chemical and biological warfare research, and the creation of a Disarmament Agency.⁶³ Also at the 1971 meeting delegates returned Kay Macpherson to the President's office after a four-year absence. Following the close of proceedings VOW issued a press release expressing its outrage over the Nixon administration's refusal to cancel its scheduled Amchitka nuclear test, reaffirming its support for "the long struggle of the Indochinese people for self-determination," condemning of the 3 October fraudulent elections in the Republic of

⁶¹ Correspondence, VOW to Trinh Van Anh, Information Bureau, Provisional Revolutionary Government of Republic of South Vietnam, 20 July 1971, VOW, Box 3, File 29.

⁶² Correspondence, Vo Thi The, Committee Member, Viet Nam Women's Union, to Kay Inglis, BC VOW, 6 December 1971, VOW, Box 7, File 7.

⁶³ Voice of Women/La Voix des Femmes: Summary of Policies and Resolutions Endorsed by Annual Meeting, Banff, 1971, VOW, Box 3, File 28.

Vietnam, and supporting the PRG's seven-point peace plan. VOW also sent similarly worded messages to President Nixon and Prime Minister Trudeau.⁶⁴

Late April and early May of 1971 saw the second cross-Canada tour by revolutionary women from Indochina.⁶⁵ Discussion of the project began soon after the completion of the successful 1969 tour. In the fall of 1970 representatives of VOW, WSP and the US-based Women's Liberation Movement (WLM) met as a planning committee in New York. They readily agreed to the general structure of the tour as suggested by Phan Thi An of the Union of Vietnamese Women via correspondence. As with the 1969 project, the expectation was for the Americans to provide the bulk of the funding and for VOW to take care of logistics such as visas, travel, accommodation, communications, and location bookings within Canada. The delegation would travel by way of the USSR, with the Soviet Women's Committee and other peace organizations covering air transportation from Moscow to Montreal. The New York committee agreed to keep their plans quiet until the last minute so as not to draw undue pressure from the US State Department on the Government of Canada to withhold visas for the anticipated guests.⁶⁶

Planning continued throughout 1970 and into the next year. In December representatives of WSP and WLM met in Hanoi with Vietnamese representatives.

⁶⁴ Press Release (following 11th Annual Meeting, Banff, 1-4 October 1971) VOW, Box 22, File 11. Interesting about this meeting is that an ideological cleavage began to emerge between those attempting to "radicalize" the organization vis-à-vis the emerging women's liberation movement, and those desirous of concentrating on the work at hand. See Margaret Tebbut, "Banff Conference: Voice of Women – reform or revolution," *The Gauntlet*, 6 October 1971, clipping in VOW, Box 7, File 7.

⁶⁵ Although Macpherson indicates in her memoir that women representatives from Cambodia also participated, they were unable to attend. See Macpherson, *When In Doubt*, 127; Correspondence, Phan Thi An to VOW, Cora (Weiss), WSP, WILPF, and Prue Greenblatt, VOW, Box 45, File 26.

⁶⁶ Part of letter received by Cora Weiss from Phan Thi An, Vietnam Women's Union, 24 October 1970; Correspondence, Kay Macpherson to Phan Thi An, Union of Vietnam Women, 20 January 1971, both documents in VOW, Box 45, File 26; Lydia Sayle, National Vice-President, VOW, "A Subjective Postmortem of the Indochinese conference – Held in Vancouver, April 1971," VOW, Box 3, File 29. See also Kerens, *Muriel Duckworth*, 130; "Women meet Indochinese in Canada," *Voice of Women Supplement*, July 1971, VOW, Box 3, File 29; Kay Macpherson, "Visit of the Indochinese Women to Canada, April 1971: An Assessment, Voice of Women, September 1971, VOW Box 3, File 29.

Meetings between VOW, WSP and WLM in January confirmed that the focus of the tour would be a series of conferences to be held in Vancouver and Toronto in April.

According to VOW National Vice-President Lydia Sayle, "It was evident that the American and Canadian 'middle-class' peace movement would not be able to rally significant numbers for the conference(s)... It was the Women's Liberation Movement and the Third World Movement (African Americans and Latinas) which could command the numbers...." Just weeks before the tour was to commence, communication problems between the American and Canadian women began to develop. As well, the impending tour caused discord within the respective North American groups. Many VOW members did not support the tour, fearing their organization was being used by other groups whose politics and methods they did not approve of.⁶⁷ Regardless, the project went ahead.

The tour began with the arrival of the delegation in Montreal and continued on to Vancouver for a six-day conference on peace and liberation held at the University of British Columbia. Five hundred delegates from the US and Canada attended. According to journalists Liz Briemberg and Anne Roberts, members of VOW and WSP turned out in embarrassingly low numbers,⁶⁸ leaving the conference largely in the hands of Third World and WLM women. Conference organizers felt the need for security and this role was assigned to the Third World women. Members of the press were required to show credentials to enter. Anne Van Heteren of Calgary VOW, was initially refused entry by the guards. Kay Cole of WSP explained to her that the guards were Third World women who felt VOW did not understand security. "Of course, you have never lived in a ghetto,"

⁶⁷ Sayle, "Postmortem."

⁶⁸ "Six women from Indochina put My Lai blame on Nixon," *Province*, 1 April 1971, clipping in VOW, Box 9, File 12; Liz Briemberg and Anne Roberts, "Factions Not Unity at Indochinese Conference," *Vancouver Free Press/Georgia Straight*, 16-20 April 1971, clipping in VOW, Box 3, File 29.

Cole explained, “with the fear of FBI undercover agents who provoke something, or right-wing nuts who *do* something.” The guards’ slogan was “It only takes one.”⁶⁹

Van Heteren described the atmosphere within the hall as one of intense strain. The American women were divided by what she described as a generation gap, a racial gap, an attitude gap, and an experience gap. Eighty percent of the Americans attending were below the age of 25. Their combined arrogance and ignorance of Canada prompted some Vancouver groups to prepare a primer on Canadian history for those who “haven’t yet realized that we are a separate country.” The biggest failing of the conference, however, was that, like the 1968 Hemispheric Conference in Montreal, few attended with the purpose of opposing the war. Again, according to Van Heteren, “Only VOW and WSP seemed to consider the Vietnam War the major reason for this conference; the other delegates had many other concerns.”⁷⁰ The conference ended with a rally on the Sunday night at the Queen Elizabeth Theatre attended by 700. American folksinger Malvina Reynolds performed, three of the Indochinese delegates spoke, and Muriel Duckworth read a telegram to Richard Nixon demanding the immediate withdrawal of US and allied military forces from Indochina.⁷¹

Following the Vancouver conference the tour moved to Toronto, with a brief stop in Winnipeg. The delegation did not leave the airport there, but managed to meet with all levels of government, local women’s groups, and various ethnic organizations.⁷² Once in Toronto, rather than one big conference on peace and liberation as was held in

⁶⁹ “Six women,” *Province*, 5 April 1971; “Vancouver Conference,” Comments by Anne Van Heteren, VOW Calgary, VOW, Box 9, File 12.

⁷⁰ “Vancouver Conference,” Comments by Anne Van Heteren.

⁷¹ “Nixon ‘deceit’ hit by women,” *Province*, 5 April 1971, clipping in VOW, Box 9, File 12.

⁷² Kay Macpherson, “Visit of Indochinese Women to Canada, April 1971: An Assessment,” *Voice of Women*, September 1971, VOW, Box 3, File 29.

Vancouver, organizers had decided on two separate gatherings. The first, focussing on the war in Vietnam, was held at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE) 5-7 May and was co-sponsored by VOW, WSP and WILPF. Attending it were between 230 and 350 delegates.⁷³ As in Vancouver, the Indochinese women – four representatives of the PRG and two from the Pathet Lao – addressed delegates, telling their stories of war and revolution. Of the Vietnamese women, three of them had revolutionary experience dating back to the 1940s.⁷⁴ Dinh Thi Huong, who had spent nearly six years in a Republic of Vietnam prison between 1955 and 1961, on suspicion of belonging to an anti-American organization, related that she did not become politically active until being released from prison. She horrified her audience with tales of how her captors had inserted pins under her fingernails, attached electrodes to her ears, fingertips, nipples and genitals, and forced a mixture of water, salt and lye into her mouth. She further alleged that often her torturers were coached by US advisors.⁷⁵ Another of the Vietnamese women, Phan Mien Hien, a teacher from the Republic of Vietnam, asserted that there had been many massacres of civilians by US troops other than the one at My Lai.⁷⁶

⁷³ While *The Globe and Mail* reported 350, registration forms estimated 230. See "US Withdrawal Urged: North Vietnamese women claim Calley trial of cover-up for Nixon," *The Globe and Mail*, 10 April 1971, clipping in VOW, Box 9, File 12; Registration List, Indochinese Conference, 5-7 May 1971, VOW, Box 3, File 29.

⁷⁴ The Laotian women – Kampheng Bouphe and Khemphet Pholsena – are listed in *The Globe and Mail* as representatives of the Laos Patriotic Women's Association, and in the official list of delegates as representatives of the Communist Pathet Lao. See "Indochinese Call Nixon 'Mad Man': Sacrifice all for independence, say women," *Vancouver Sun*, 1 April 1971, 20, clipping in VOW, Box 9, File 12; List of Delegates re 1971 Indo-Chinese tour, VOW, Box 45, File 25.

⁷⁵ Eileen Foley, "Canadian Conference Aims to Stop War: Enemy Women Meet with Americans," *Detroit Free Press*, 18 April 1971, clipping in VOW, Box 9, File 12.

⁷⁶ "Indochina women urge pullout," *Telegram*, 8 April 1971, clipping in VOW, Box 9, File 12. This allegation has since been proven true. Between 1968 and 1974 the US Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID), at the behest of the White House, conducted an in-depth investigation of American war crimes in Vietnam. The report was kept secret until recently. See Deborah Nelson, *The War Behind Me: Vietnam Veterans Confront the Truth About US War Crimes* (New York: Basic Books, 2008).

Poetically, she asked her audience how such tragedy could be ended “so that birds would sing, trees be ever green and roses bloom in our country.”⁷⁷

Joining the Asian guests at the podium was Cora Weiss of the event’s planning committee. Addressing the delegates as “sisters, friends and members of the FBI” (“yes they are here,” she wryly remarked) she articulated four demands: the withdrawal of all US troops from Vietnam in 1971, a guaranteed income of \$6,500, the release of all political prisoners in the US, and an end to the draft. She was met with thunderous applause.⁷⁸ Notably only two of her demands pertained directly to the war in Indochina.

Following the OISE proceedings, a second conference took place in Toronto focussing on women’s liberation. Held at Castle Frank Secondary School, this gathering was similar to the Vancouver one in terms of divisiveness. According to one particularly negative report, Black Panther women would not speak to white women, while members of the Gay Liberation Front would not speak with straight women. The conference was divided along racial, sexual and ideological lines. Between 300 and 400 women had to pass through security procedures that included frisking. Carolyn Egan, head of security, indicated that this was necessary for the safety of the Indochinese women. Although reports circulated of knives and cans of mace being seized by security, and a fist fight breaking out between delegates, organizers denied these allegations.⁷⁹ Upon the completion of proceedings the group returned to Montreal for one day where they met with more than one hundred people, including Vietnam veterans, wives of GIs,

⁷⁷ “6 Indochina women urge Saigon defeat,” *The Globe and Mail*, 8 April 1971, clipping in VOW, Box 9, File 12.

⁷⁸ “Announce Opening of Spring Offensive: Angry US women use Canada as a forum for their militant anti-war views” *The Globe and Mail*, 9 April 1971, clipping in VOW, Box 9, File 12.

⁷⁹ “Fistfights reported at feminists peace meeting,” *Telegram*, 12 April 1971; “Claws Come Out at Women’s Lib” *Vancouver Sun*, 12 April 1971, 1, both clippings in VOW, Box 9, File 12. Also Kay Macpherson, editorial comment, *Voice of Women Supplement*, July 1971, VOW, Box 3, File 29.

representatives of the Fédération des Femmes, American communes, students and others. A West German film crew was on hand to film the event, as were others from France, the US and Canada. From there the Indochinese women returned home.⁸⁰

In assessing the women's tour, Kay Macpherson presented a balance of pros and cons. On the positive side, she indicated that it was the first opportunity for Laotian women to meet with Canadians. It also provided an opportunity for US veterans to meet with the visitors and plan antiwar actions with them and with other North American peace organizations. It also raised substantial funds for the Laotian and Vietnamese women to take back home to their respective organizations. The Indochinese women in particular thought the tour a success, expressing their appreciation to VOW for all of its efforts. On the negative side there were also concerns. One of these was poor media coverage of the events. Likely VOW's keeping quiet about the events until the last minute did not help this. Also, according to Macpherson, the wide range of experience and political development among the delegates was sometimes upsetting and frustrating. Often the hardest working volunteers were unable to attend the sessions which led to tension and exhaustion. The most significant downside of the tour, however, was the general behaviour of many of the American women. Canadian and expatriate-American women became painfully conscious of American Imperialism, "not just the usual kind, but of the left." Visiting American women seemed to forget that they were not at home. According to Macpherson, this did much to test the patience and hospitality of Canadian women.⁸¹ This was also observed by the translators for the Laotian women, who noted

⁸⁰ Kay Macpherson, "Visit of Indochinese Women to Canada, April 1971: An Assessment," *Voice of Women*, September 1971, VOW, Box 3, File 29.

⁸¹ Kay Macpherson, "Visit of Indochinese Women to Canada, April 1971: An Assessment," *Voice of Women*, September 1971, VOW, Box 3, File 29; VOW Statement, September 1971, Box 7, File 7.

that American women, when talking and asking questions, repeatedly referred to “this country” during the conference when commenting on the United States. The translators perceived the American women as feeling their struggle was more important and were completely oblivious to the struggles in Canada and Laos.⁸² In a statement issued by VOW the following September, the organization acknowledged the impropriety of the American women:

Our visitors from below the border tended not to remember that Canada is still a separate country, and our hospitality and patience were often tested. Some of our people questioned the wisdom of trying to collaborate with Americans on any project at this time. Americans are unhappy, upset, and disturbed by so many pressures and problems which only they can solve.⁸³

One of those who questioned such wisdom was Jonnie Rankin, wife of prominent Communist Harry Rankin,⁸⁴ and a member of the British Columbia Peace Council.

Rankin had greatly assisted in coordinating the BC conference. In a letter to Kay Macpherson she warned of the dangers inherent in working with the American groups:

Canadian Peace Committees and organizations gain nothing to enhance the Peace Front in Canada by co-sponsoring meetings with the U.S. committees ... Canada has different problems to solve, and one of them is to try and break the American Industrial and Military Complex which so subjugates our country, as well as the long, hard task of creating a United Canadian Peace Movement.⁸⁵

In another letter to Macpherson, Rankin drew comparisons with the disastrous 1968 Hemispheric Conference in Montreal where what had been planned as an antiwar

⁸² Follow-up article to Indochinese conference written by three translators for the Laotian delegation – Lyn Center, Aline Desjardins, and Lynn Lang, *Toronto Women's Liberation Movement Newsletter*, May, 1971, clipping in VOW, Box 3, File 29.

⁸³ VOW Statement, September 1971, Box 7, File 7.

⁸⁴ Harry Rankin never joined the Party in an official capacity for fear of losing his license to practice law. He never made a secret, however, of where his loyalties lay. See Tom Hawthorn, “Harry Rankin: From Gadfly to Icon of B.C. Politics, Vancouver Councillor was Renowned for Championing the Underdog” *The Globe and Mail*, 5 March 2005. Also see Rankin’s autobiography *Rankin's Law: Recollections of a Radical* (Vancouver: November House, 1975).

⁸⁵ Correspondence, Jonnie Rankin to Kay Macpherson, VOW, Box 3, File 29.

conference was taken over by other interests, largely American ultra-leftists and Black

Panthers:

We are now at a point in Canada where the peace forces are practically non-existent. They have either almost died of old age and lethargy, or they have been split by various ultra left groups.⁸⁶

Macpherson preferred to see the overall experience as a positive one. While acknowledging that many involved with the conference would empathize with Rankin in her frustration, feeling that they had been “pushed around” by the Americans, she felt a “new and fruitful collaboration” had been achieved in working with other Canadian and US peace groups. “The movement,” Macpherson insisted, “has therefore moved significantly forward.”⁸⁷

Although the 1971 tour by the Indochinese women provided publicity – some would say notoriety – to VOW, it was its knitting project that gained VOW the most attention. Over a period of ten years VOW members and supporters knitted over 30,000 articles for distribution in Vietnam. Actually, the project was the initiative of Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians (CAVC) where Sheila Young had first proposed it. An ardent peace activist and member of the Vancouver chapter of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), Young also served on the board of CAVC.⁸⁸ As VOW’s Ontario branch, however, was the singularly most active contributor, the project is largely associated with the women’s organization.⁸⁹

The CAVC was established in Vancouver in the spring of 1966 as the result of a conference attended by fifty five people with the initial purpose of providing medical aid

⁸⁶ Correspondence, Jonnie Rankin to VOW, VOW, Box 3, File 29.

⁸⁷ Correspondence, Kay Macpherson to Jonnie Rankin, VOW, Box 3, File 29.

⁸⁸ Early, “Canadian Women,” 31. Although Early describes Young as a member of CAVC’s executive, likely she was a board member. The executive, apparently all men, are named above.

⁸⁹ Sweet, “Purls,” 2.

for Vietnamese civilians. Subcommittees were quickly established in other cities including Port Arthur, Saskatoon and Winnipeg. Later, CAVC spread to other cities, but Vancouver remained the organization's headquarters. CAVC had a broad appeal to the antiwar community and among its official sponsors were Tommy Douglas, Farley Mowat, and J. G. Endicott. The group's objectives included aiding civilian victims of the war in Vietnam, raising funds for medical aid to those victims, working for greater friendship and understanding between the people of Canada and Vietnam, support for all sincere efforts to end the war, keeping Canadians aware of the horrors of the war, and working for the implementation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.⁹⁰

Leadership of CAVC was solidly left. Dr. A. M. Inglis, an orthopaedic surgeon and husband of British Columbia VOW President Kay Inglis, led the organization.⁹¹ In addition to his leadership of CAVC, Inglis was also the founder and Chairman of the British Columbia branch of the Canada-USSR Friendship Society. When asked by the press if he was a Communist he denied it.⁹² Joining him on the executive were Jack Henderson, George Trasow, and John Stanton as Vice-Chairmen, and H.J.C. Walker as Secretary-Treasurer.⁹³ Stanton was a well known labour lawyer and a long-time member of the Communist Party.⁹⁴ Indeed, RCMP documents describe the CAVC as a front

⁹⁰ Sweet, "Purls," 95-98; Brochure, "Medical Aid for Vietnam," CAVC, Vancouver, stamped 21 March 1966, VOW, Box 6, File 8; *Canadian Aid For Vietnam Civilians* (newsletter), May 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00420, Disc 1, Stack 2, Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians.

⁹¹ Sweet, "Purls," 95-98; Tom Hazlitt, "City doctor defends Viet Nam medical aid," *Province*, 23 April 1966, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00420, Disc 1, Stack 2, Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians.

⁹² Hazlitt, "City doctor," *Province*.

⁹³ This was the executive as listed on the organization's letterhead. For samples see correspondence in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00420, Disc 1, Stack 2, Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians.

⁹⁴ Stanton left the Party in 1968 after over 30 years membership, complaining increasingly of its authoritarian tendencies. See John Stanton, *My Past is Now: Further Memoirs of a Labour Lawyer* (St. John's: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 1994), 148, 150-152, 156. For more on his earlier career

group designed to popularize the “world-wide Communist peace offensive.” Of its five directors, three were well-known to the RCMP as members of the Communist Party’s secret professional apparatus. A fourth was described as a member of one or more CPC front groups, and the last as an NDP election candidate with a history of associations with and support for Communist Party organizing endeavours. Of its seventeen listed sponsors in May 1966 the RCMP had already been keeping files on all but one.⁹⁵ This last point shows more the extent to which the RCMP spied on Canadian citizens during this period, but the force’s observations about secret Party memberships are valid. In her study of McCarthyism on American university campuses, historian Ellen Schrecker illustrates repeatedly that it was standard practice for academics to conceal their party membership for fear of losing their jobs.⁹⁶ Most certainly such concerns were shared by medical doctors and other professionals in Canada even in the 1960s. In addition, maintaining a public distance from the Party would likely provide the organization more credibility. As such, the RCMP was likely correct in determining that the CAVC was “under the complete direction from the Communist Party and as such would be labelled as a Communist front organization.”⁹⁷ While it is unclear if VOW as an organization was aware of the close links between CAVC and the Party, it should come as no surprise that VOW’s coordinator of the project was Lil Greene, a long-time Party activist.⁹⁸

see John Stanton, *Never Say Die: The Life and Times of a Pioneer Labour Lawyer* (Ottawa: Steel Rail Publishing, 1987).

⁹⁵ Correspondence, L.R. Parent, Superintendent, E Division, Security Intelligence Branch, to (exempted), 19 May 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00420, Disc 1, Stack 4, Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians.

⁹⁶ Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower*, 25, 40, 100, 109.

⁹⁷ Correspondence, L.R. Parent, Superintendent, E Division, Security Intelligence Branch, to (exempted), 19 May 1966, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00420, Disc 1, Stack 4, Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians.

⁹⁸ Macpherson, *When in Doubt*, 119.

Greene's credentials as a committed revolutionary were unimpeachable. Starting out in the Young Communist League in the 1930s, she graduated to Party membership and was at one point on the staff in the Workers' Unity League. Throughout her career she was also active in the United Jewish People's Order and the Canadian Peace Congress. In 1963 she was briefly on staff with the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers.⁹⁹

Not surprisingly, Greene actively solicited assistance from unions, particularly those with a history of Communist Party affiliation or those which had taken strong antiwar positions. First to participate was the United Electrical Workers. Later they were joined by Mine Mill, the United Rubber Workers, and the United Auto Workers, as well as those organizations' ladies' auxiliaries.¹⁰⁰ The knitting project gained the unwavering support of the Communist Party. In September 1967 its west coast newspaper, *The Pacific Tribune* praised the project:

We support the Canadian Voice of Women and their thousands of knitters who stitch into every garment – All in Dark Colours – that indispensable hope for the children of Vietnam. When these little ones can wear all the colors they love without fear and in peace – the whole world will become more radiant.¹⁰¹

The project ran for ten years – 1966-1976. Relying on numbers provided in various archival documents in the Voice of Women collection at Library and Archives Canada, Marilyn Sweet indicates that the project had 600 knitters in Ontario alone by August 1967. By April 1969 the number for Ontario had grown to 1,500. By March 1970 this number had risen to 10,000. In November and December the number was 13,000 and

⁹⁹ Ball, "History," 482.

¹⁰⁰ Sweet, "Purls," 110-1114.

¹⁰¹ *Pacific Tribune*, 15 September 1967, quoted in Sweet, "Purls," 116.

17,000 respectively.¹⁰² It should be kept in mind, however, that most of the information that Sweet uses to derive these numbers come from documents intended to popularize the project and recruit more volunteers. The numbers are likely inflated. Greene herself stated that the number was in the hundreds. While most of these – about five hundred – were in Ontario, donations came from all across Canada and after 1968 parts of the United States where WSP and FOR assisted.¹⁰³ Greene coordinated the project from her home. According to Greene:

The project was a full-time after hours voluntary job. My husband and three daughters were completely supportive and pitched in with the work. Every single item of the final total of 30,000 knitted garments and cot blankets (in dark colours) for the children of Vietnam and Laos eventually came through the dining room headquarters in my home. Every participant was thanked either personally or by letter. Many joined Voice of Women and were active.

Upon receipt by Greene, every item was repacked and expressed to CAVC in Vancouver. From there CAVC shipped the knitted articles, along with medical aid and other items, to Vietnam aboard Soviet vessels.¹⁰⁴

Most of the knitters were older women, residents of nursing homes, members of church groups, and homemakers. Following an article on the project inserted in the *United Church Observer* in April 1967, 146 more women joined the cause, mostly from the United Church.¹⁰⁵ This in no way made them immune from RCMP scrutiny. One report describes a meeting hosted by Canadian Medical Aid for Vietnam Civilians at United College in Winnipeg. The informer reported that the meeting opened with a short

¹⁰² Sweet, "Purls," 120-126.

¹⁰³ Macpherson, "Persistent Voices," 68-69; Sweet, "Purls," 105-108, 132-156. Some of these women in the United States were of the mistaken belief they were knitting items for use by GIs in Vietnam in some sort of support the troops campaign.

¹⁰⁴ Greene, quoted in Macpherson, "Persistent Voices," 68-69. Regarding shipments made on Soviet vessels see Macpherson, *When In Doubt*, 119.

¹⁰⁵ Sweet, "Purls," 105-108; Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 2, May-June 1967, in VOW, Box 6, File 8.

talk by (deleted) on Vietnam who spoke with “a pompous air, a clipped British accent and a very soft voice.” Four shorts films were shown lasting an hour. The informer noted they were of poor quality and in French without translation. Afterwards the speaker encouraged audience members to organize their neighbours into knitting clubs to make baby garments for Vietnam.¹⁰⁶ In Calgary too, the VOW chapter was infiltrated. An RCMP report from 1969 indicated that although the organization was not penetrated by the Communist Party at the executive level, there were several prominent Party members within the rank and file. The report noted that the chapter had supported Calgary CEWV in the past, as well as CAVC and other antiwar initiatives in general. The report’s author noted concern over the positive coverage that VOW was receiving in both local papers.¹⁰⁷

The rationale of the knitting project was outwardly straightforward. Women knitted items for Vietnamese civilians affected by the war. While many of the articles were children’s clothing, items also included shawls and blankets. Though intended for civilian use, once delivered to Vietnam, CAVC had no control over the distribution of these articles. Therefore, it is impossible to say with absolute certainty that items such as blankets were not diverted for military use. This was quite possible as the bulk of what was produced was delivered directly to Communist authorities. In fact the distribution of the knitted articles further indicates the CAVC’s and VOW’s partisan support for the national liberation struggle. Only ten percent of knitted items went to civilians in areas under the control of the Republic of Vietnam, distributed by the International Committee

¹⁰⁶ RCMP Report, Canadian Medical Aid for Vietnam Civilians, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 17 February 1967, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00421, Disc 2, Stack 2, Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians. It appears that at the local level some chapters would call themselves Canadian Medical Aid for Vietnam Civilians. More often the word medical was left out.

¹⁰⁷ RCMP Report, Voice of Women, Calgary, Alberta, 17 July 1969, in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00299, Calgary Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

of the Red Cross (ICRC). The rest was evenly divided between the DRV and the NLF. While one might question why so much support went to the Communist side, this distribution was in fact supported by the ICRC.¹⁰⁸ It was rationalized by the fact that the Government of Canada recognized neither the DRV nor the NLF and provided humanitarian aid only to the Republic of Vietnam. VOW and CAVC, therefore, attempted to make up for this shortfall.

While the gesture was noble, the value of the project was more in its propaganda impact than in providing aid and comfort to Vietnamese in Communist-controlled areas. VOW and CAVC instructed their knitters to produce items in dark or camouflage colours so as project recipients could avoid detection and subsequent bombing or napalming. As mentioned earlier, however, forty five percent of all knitted items were sent to the DRV. Only in the rarest of cases were US combat forces on the ground north of the 17th parallel. The war in the North was a strategic one. Napalm is a tactical weapon and was used in the South to support ground operations. The targets of the Americans in the North were in built up urban, industrialized areas, largely around Hanoi and Haiphong. The method of attacking those targets was through the use of bombers such as B52s flying at altitudes of often tens of thousands of feet. Targets were pre-selected. What an individual on the ground was wearing would have had absolutely no impact on whether he or she fell victim to US bombers. In the South, where ground fighting and napalm were both in abundance, the rationale for camouflage knitted items is better borne out. But providing knitted woollen garments for the Vietnamese was also premised on the understanding that

¹⁰⁸ Sweet, "Purls," 99-102; "City group give \$1,500 for Vietnam civilian aid," *Winnipeg Tribune*, 21 January 1967, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A2006-00421, Canadian Aid to Vietnam Civilians, Disc 2, Stack 2.

those wearing them were largely living underground where conditions were cool.¹⁰⁹ If they were underground, they would not be visible from the air.

The value of the knitting project was in the impact it had on civilians in Canada, especially the members of VOW. As Sweet explains, by 1967 VOW's membership had fallen to an all-time low of 3,000. It was in need of active programs to recruit and retain members. One member of VOW's Ontario council, a Mrs. Barrett, had been monitoring the situation and concluded that there was a necessity for active program(s) to keep members involved.... Groups with active programs," she insisted, "don't lose members." As many members of VOW were adverse to marching and picketing, an activity such as the knitting project not only allowed women to participate in an activity which was safely in the tradition of maternal feminism, but also allowed them to project an image of protecting those more vulnerable.¹¹⁰ More specifically, it enabled women to actively participate in the antiwar movement as individuals in a way that was within their own comfort levels. As Sweet states, it allowed women outside the antiwar movement to participate in the movement in their own way. "It helped to reach out to a different demography that had not really had to think of the effect of war prior to this time."¹¹¹ It also provided a medium with which to transmit the antiwar message. Lil Greene explained:

Some of us doubted at first the validity of expending so much time and effort on what was essentially an "aid" project when political action and lobbying seemed more direct. But time and time again women would give

¹⁰⁹ Leaflet, Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians, "Guidelines for volunteer participants in the knitting and sewing project to make garments and bed covers for the children of Vietnam," reprinted in August 1967 newsletter of Ontario Voice of Women, cited in Sweet, "Purls," 101. According to one source knitters were instructed to use 100 percent wool because in the event the person wearing the garment was the victim of a napalm attack, wearing wool would somehow lessen the severity of injuries. This, of course, is nonsense. See Dorothy Goldin Rosenberg, interview with author, 14 November 2006.

¹¹⁰ Sweet, "Purls," 72.

¹¹¹ Sweet, "Purls," 107.

variations of “I took my knitting to school/church/meeting/laundromat, etc. and when I was asked why I was knitting baby clothes in dark green, or brown, or blue, I would say that in Vietnam babies have to live mainly underground and if, at any time, light coloured clothing could be seen they could be bombed by American planes. Women were horrified, shocked, and wanted to know more and how they too could help.”¹¹²

This message in some cases had a long-lasting impact. Kevin Neish, the son of British Columbia Communist Party activists, remembers his own mother participating in the project:

I was on my mother’s knee while she was knitting shawls for Vietnamese children ... knitting blankets for Vietnamese children and families. She would always be knitting and she would be knitting dark colours. It had an impact on me as a kid. She’d explain why it had to be greens and browns and dark colours. It couldn’t be the usual bright colours that she knit because they were being shipped over to North Vietnam for the families to use in the streets. When they were trying to hide, you had to have these camouflage-coloured knitted shawls and blankets. Strange stuff for a kid to understand.¹¹³

In essence, the knitting project made the war tactile for many. Regardless of the impact the knitted items made in Indochina, the project was hugely successful in mobilizing hundreds into the antiwar movement and disseminating its message to untold additional numbers in Canada and to a lesser extent the United States.

The knitting project was the most consistent, long-lasting, and comprehensive of any antiwar initiative undertaken in Canada during the war in Indochina. By the early 1970s, in addition to Vietnam, the project was shipping items to Laos and Cambodia. Indeed, following the January 1973 cease-fire which resulted in the withdrawal of US combat troops from Southeast Asia and the almost overnight disappearance of the antiwar movement in Canada, the project continued.¹¹⁴ In November of that year CAVC sent its

¹¹² Greene, quoted in Macpherson, “Persistent Voices,” 68-69.

¹¹³ Quoted in Isitt, “Tug-of-War,” 127-128.

¹¹⁴ Sweet, “Purls,” 120-126.

forty second shipment, valued at \$16,815.00 including 3,185 knitted garments as well as medical supplies, glasses, toys and other items. Three more shipments were made between November 1973 and September 1974. The project even continued after the Communist victory of April 1975. The final shipment was made in December 1976, almost a year after the war had ended. "It is now time," Greene wrote, "for the Vietnamese to knit and sew their own clothes...."¹¹⁵

While the knitting project was significant, and by far the most substantial contribution of VOW to Canada's antiwar movement, it was by no means its only contribution, especially in the later years of the war. In February 1972, as peace talks in Paris stalled, the World Peace Council sponsored the World Assembly for Peace and Independence for the People of Indochina at the Palais des Congrès in Versailles. Of the 1,200 delegates, twenty four attended from Canada, representing unions, churches and peace organizations. Kay Macpherson, Joan Ostry and Laurette Chrétien-Sloan represented Voice of Women.¹¹⁶ Also that year, VOW joined with the Canadian Peace Congress and other antiwar groups in protesting US President Richard Nixon's visit to Canada. They also criticized the Government of Canada for laying responsibility for the continuing war on the DRV.¹¹⁷ In December VOW groups across the country again joined with other groups in demonstrating against Nixon's cynical and politically motivated Christmas bombings of the DRV.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ Sweet, "Purls," 128-131.

¹¹⁶ Press Release, 4 February 1972, VOW, Box 7, File 7; List of Participants, Paris World Assembly for the Peace and Independence of Indochinese Peoples," VOW, Box 16, File 6; Halstead, *Out Now*, 760-761. According to Dorothy Gildin Rosenberg, in addition to being a member of VOW, Sloan was also a member of the Communist Party. See interview with author, 14 November 2006.

¹¹⁷ "May Memo," 9 May 1972, VOW, Box 4, File 15.

¹¹⁸ "All 3 parties asked to protest U.S. bombing," *Toronto Star*, 3 January 1973, 1, clipping in VOW, Box 18, File 9; Minutes, Twelfth Annual Meeting, 18-21 May 1973, Hamilton, Box 22, File 13. For more on the Christmas bombings see Herring, *America's Longest War*, 315-317.

On 20 January 1973 Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho signed the Paris Peace Agreements, effectively removing US troops from the war in Vietnam. Part of the agreement called for an International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) to monitor the agreement's implementation. Partly due to a desire to help, and partly due to the insistence of US President Richard Nixon, Canada was appointed to this body along with Hungary and Indonesia. VOW actively opposed Canada's membership of the ICCS. In part this was influenced by Canada's record as a member of its predecessor organization, the ICC. More immediately, however, the national leadership of VOW felt that the ICCS would simply act as an umbrella to facilitate the release of American POWs and to relocate US combat troops to nearby Thailand where they could be called upon quickly if the need arose. In addition, the agreement did nothing to end the war in Cambodia, or to limit US actions in that country. Taking its lead from antiwar forces in the US, Canadian groups, VOW among them, lent their voices to a campaign for an end to the bombing of Cambodia. They also called for the release of political prisoners in the Republic of Vietnam.¹¹⁹

VOW continued to lobby the Canadian government on Indochina-related issues until the last days of the war. In what was possibly VOW's final political act of the Vietnam War, the National Council wrote to Prime Minister Trudeau on 12 April 1975 outlining four major concerns. The first was remarkably out of character given VOW's enduring relationship with the DRV and PRG. VOW requested the Canadian government

¹¹⁹ Correspondence, Ursula Franklin, National Steering Committee, VOW, to Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, 8 March 1973, VOW Box 18, File 6; Peace News: A Bulletin of the Canadian Peace Congress, Vol. 1, No. 3, June 1973, in VOW, Box 3, File 10; Minutes, National Council Meeting, VOW, Toronto, 6 April 1974, VOW, Box 22, File 14; Correspondence, Ursula Franklin, VOW National Steering Committee, to Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, Delegation of the PRC of South Viet Nam, 29 April 1973, VOW, Box 18, File 6.

to push for an immediate cease-fire of limited duration in order to evacuate South Vietnamese nationals who had worked closely with the US. In the final analysis there were indeed limits to VOW's support for the Communist belligerents, although the same letter also expressed a fear that the Americans would directly re-enter the war. VOW's second concern was a request for the Canadian government to give top priority to the safety of political prisoners in South Vietnamese jails. Third, VOW called upon the Government of Canada to extend recognition to the PRG in order to facilitate the distribution of aid to civilians (Canada did not provide aid to unrecognized entities). Finally, VOW discouraged the evacuation of Vietnamese children, and urged the Canadian Government to send financial aid instead to alleviate problems concerning orphans.¹²⁰ Less than two weeks later the war ended.

Throughout the war VOW had played a central role in supporting the antiwar movement in Canada and internationally. Emerging from the confines of Cold War liberalism in 1963, it was solidly within the antiwar camp by the spring of 1964 – a full year prior to the introduction of US combat troops into Vietnam. The war dominated VOW's priorities and its annual meetings for its duration. Voice of Women supported various antiwar initiatives on local, national and international levels and played a central role in bringing Indochinese revolutionaries and American antiwar activists together in 1969 and again in 1971. Its knitting project, in partnership with Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians, mobilized hundreds, possibly thousands of women into taking an active, individual role in opposing the war. Even with the withdrawal of US troops in 1973, and indeed even with the end of the war in 1975, VOW continued to provide

¹²⁰ Text of letter to Prime Minister Trudeau from National Council, VOW, 12 April 1975, VOW, Box 18, File 6.

support to the national liberation struggle in Vietnam. Fuelling these efforts was a conscious awareness that the only way to peace in Southeast Asia was through a Communist victory. VOW's efforts in helping to bring this about were based firmly on an ideology of anti-imperialism. Differentiating this from a mere belief in self-determination for the people of Indochina was VOW's informed analysis and solidarity with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front.

Chapter Eight: Americans

Richard Paterack is a municipal politician in Caledon, Ontario. Victor Schwartzman is retired and lives in Winnipeg, Manitoba. They are roughly the same age; Paterack was born in 1943, Schwartzman in 1945. They are both American by birth, Paterack being born in Boston, Schwartzman in Brooklyn. They both have university degrees and were both involved to one extent or another in the antiwar movement in the United States. The most significant characteristic they share is that both of them came to Canada as draft dodgers.¹ There the similarities end. Whereas Paterack felt morally obliged to continue to oppose the war upon his arrival in Canada, Schwartzman, in his words, “simply melted into the population.”²

During the research and writing of this dissertation, the author found it a common occurrence, when explaining that this work concerns the anti-Vietnam War movement in Canada, for individuals to immediately respond with comments to the effect that someone they know was a draft dodger. The comment, as should be evident by this point, is somewhat secondary to this study. Throughout the course of the Vietnam War a vibrant antiwar movement developed in Canada. While it was very much a part of an

¹ I use the terms draft dodger and deserter here to distinguish between Americans who came here to avoid conscription, and those who left after being inducted into the armed forces. Neither term is intended as pejorative. While many use the blanket term resister to describe military-age Americans who came to Canada at the time, I do not. Resistance implies active, engaged opposition, which in many instances was simply not the case. While many who came to Canada were indeed resisters, sometimes before, sometimes after coming to Canada, such a term cannot be used to accurately describe all who came. Also, to use such a blanket term for anyone who chose not to go to Vietnam – either through legal or illegal means – who otherwise was eligible to do so, would require the inclusion of individuals such as George W. Bush and Richard Cheney within their ranks. Dubbed “chickenhawks” by the media, their actions can hardly stand as principled opposition to an unjust war. The *Encyclopaedia of Canada's Peoples* actually uses both sets of terms. While collectively referring to American draft-age immigrants as war resisters, it subdivides this group into three related groupings. The first it refers to as draft dodgers, the second deserters, and the third those not connected with the US military system, but nevertheless hostile to the war. See Multicultural Canada – Encyclopaedia of Canada's Peoples – Americans, [Http://www.multiculturalcanada.ca/ccp/content/americans.html](http://www.multiculturalcanada.ca/ccp/content/americans.html), accessed 15 August 2006.

² Richard Paterack, interview with author, 19 November 2006; Victor Schwartzman, interview with author, 30 October 2006.

international movement centered in the United States, it was by no means an American import. Nor were those who made up its membership predominantly Americans. The vast majority of those in Canada who worked to end the war in Southeast Asia were Canadians. That some immigrants from south of the border became involved in this movement is almost incidental. Given the widespread belief that the antiwar movement in Canada was somehow fundamentally linked to the presence of American immigrants, the subject deserves investigation and discussion. Paterack and Schwartzman represent two ends of a continuum of Americans in Canada and their relationship with the antiwar movement. While one could be considered a leader in it, the other was not a part of it. Further complicating the subject is the question, how do we, or even should we, separate the subject of American exiles from the larger antiwar movement? Indeed, should the act of leaving the United States to avoid military service in Vietnam in and of itself be considered an act of opposing the war, or simply one of self-preservation? Such a question is likely best answered by considering the motivations of those who came here, which are as varied as the individuals themselves.

Related to this question is the dilemma of whether to separate the antiwar and anti-draft movements. Quite early in the war activists in both the United States and Canada began organizing opposition to the draft. In the United States this took many forms, including burning draft cards, choosing jail over the military, assisting others to evade the draft, and evading the draft oneself. In Canada the anti-draft movement focused more on assisting Americans in Canada. Jessica Squires, in her study of the anti-draft movement in Canada, is emphatic that anti-draft and antiwar activism must be considered as two separate movements. Her rationale is based primarily on the premise that the anti-

draft movement's purpose was to undermine a specific element of the US war effort: the Selective Service System.³ As this dissertation focuses on the movement to end the war, the anti-draft movement is somewhat peripheral. Therefore, I agree with Squires's separation of the two movements. There is, however, enough overlap to warrant discussion.

There is no exact number available for Americans who came to Canada to avoid military service. In his study of what he refers to as military and draft resisters, David Sterling Surrey indicates that the earliest Vietnam draft dodgers began trickling into Canada in 1962.⁴ Nothing is known of these pioneers, but coming as they did two years before the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, and almost three years before the United States' commitment of combat troops to Vietnam, their actions prefigured what would become a significant immigration wave of draft-age Americans to Canada. James Dickerson, in his study of the subject, estimates that as many as half a million war-related immigrants (half of them women) came to Canada during the 1960s and 1970s.⁵ His numbers, however, seem extremely inflated. Most others writing on the subject place the number in the area of around forty thousand.⁶ The numbers arriving in Canada remained a trickle prior to the

³ Squires, "Refuge from Militarism?" 12-13.

⁴ David Sterling Surrey, *Choice of Conscience: Vietnam Era Military and Draft Resisters in Canada* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 4-5.

⁵ James Dickerson, *North to Canada: Men and Women Against the Vietnam War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), xii-xiii.

⁶ Roger Neville Williams places the number of war-related exiles in Canada by 1970 at 40,000. Renée Kasinsky estimates between 30,000 and 40,000 war-related immigrants coming to Canada. David Churchill agrees with Kasinsky, estimating 40,000. John Hagan estimates 26,000 men and 27,000 women achieving landed immigrant status, with another 10,000 ultimately returning to the United States. To a large degree these are educated guesses. Hagan's numbers are likely the most accurate. His estimation is determined by subtracting the average number of military age American immigrants during the war from the average prior to the deployment of combat troops. See Roger Neville Williams, *The New Exiles: American War Resisters in Canada* (New York: Liveright, 1971), 21-36; Renée G. Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism: Draft-Age Americans in Canada* (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1972) 4-5; David S. Churchill, "An Ambiguous Welcome: Vietnam Draft Resistance, the Canadian State, and Cold War Containment," *Social*

commitment of combat troops. In 1964 a mere one hundred came. The following year, with the United States now fully committed to fighting a war on the Asian mainland, the number soared to ten times that, doubling again by the end of 1966. By 1967 there were between 3,000 and 5,000 recent draft-age American immigrants in Canada. By 1968, the year that the number of Americans opposing the war finally became a majority, the trickle had become a torrent. John Hagan reports that from then until 1973 an estimated 5,000 to 8,000 war-related immigrants arrived annually. Roger Neville Williams indicates the numbers for 1968 alone were possibly as high as 20,000.⁷ Roughly half of those arriving were women. Again, the numbers are not precise. Williams asserts that one quarter of military-related exiles brought a female partner. Dickerson states that most brought partners. According to Hagan the number of women in fact exceeded that of men, with women making up 27,000 and men only 26,000.⁸

Other demographic details of war-related exiles are telling. For one they were overwhelmingly white. Few African Americans made the journey to Canada. This is explained by the fact that overall, the movement of draft-age Americans to Canada was a profoundly middle-class phenomenon. Of the few African Americans who did come, they tended to be from middle-class homes and on average had completed two years of college.⁹ Educational levels and social class tended to correspond with whether the immigrant in question was a draft dodger or a deserter. Dodgers were middle-class and well educated. Deserters tended to come from working-class families. Due to the point system used by the Canadian immigration system, it was much easier for draft dodgers to

History/Histoire Sociale, 37:73, 2004, 4; John Hagan, *Northern Passage: American Vietnam War Resisters in Canada* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001) 185-186.

⁷ Hagan, *Northern Passage*, 185-186; Williams, *New Exiles*, 21-36.

⁸ Williams, *New Exiles*, 84; Dickerson, *North to Canada*, xv; Hagan, *Northern Passage*, 29-30, 185-186;

⁹ Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism*, 11.

immigrate as their education and skills were valued. Deserters, lacking credentials, did not have as easy a go it. Also, as late as 1969 desertion was grounds for exclusion from Canada.¹⁰

For many draft dodgers the decision to come to Canada was based on an innate sense of authenticity.¹¹ As one unnamed Ohio University professor stated, “It was clear that any man with an ounce of brains, money or education could beat the system,”¹² meaning that with even limited resources, and a little dishonesty, a draft deferral could be acquired. But many of those who came to Canada were not interested in “beating the system.” Rather, they wanted to make a point of opposing the war by coming to Canada. For Victor Schwartzman, who we met at the beginning of this chapter, the decisive factor for leaving the United States came while watching the 1968 Democratic National Convention on television. Schwartzman’s parents, one-time members of the Communist Party, half-jokingly threatened to disown him if he allowed himself to be drafted. Parental pressure aside, Schwartzman’s decision was based on issues of right and wrong. “I had a moral point of view,” says Schwartzman, “and it didn’t seem to be a great idea to try and demonstrate a moral point of view by lying.”¹³

One of the recurring themes in Jim Christy’s 1972 *The New Refugees*, a collection of oral histories by Vietnam War exiles, is the issue of authenticity. Although never stated as such, many of Christy’s subjects refused to evade military service through dishonest means. Most of them made sincere efforts to acquire conscientious objector

¹⁰ Multicultural Canada – Encyclopedia of Canada’s Peoples – Americans, <http://www.multiculturalcanada.ca/ccp/content/americans.html>, accessed 15 August 2006.

¹¹ The literature does not use the word authenticity, but rather usually honesty. For example see Williams, *New Exiles*, 46–47.

¹² Frank Kusch, *All American Boys: Draft Dodgers in Canada from the Vietnam War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 67.

¹³ Victor Schwartzman, interview with author, 30 October 2006.

(CO) status, and only when those efforts proved unsuccessful did they move north. One such example is Richard Lemm, a draft dodger from Seattle who came to Canada in 1967. Well aware that medical deferments were easily obtainable, he refused to take that route. In his words:

It was a matter of crucial personal honesty, self-respect, and intellectual integrity, to face the matter squarely.... It is, I must add, an example of the highest ethical value that so many men rejected, perhaps not even considering, the alternative of a medical deferment, or any other of the several deferments.¹⁴

Another of Christy's subjects who articulate a similar refrain is Roger Costain, who immediately began making preparations to come to Canada upon failing to gain conscientious objector status. He arrived in Canada from Minneapolis in 1969. Says Costain:

The dilemma I faced when my C.O. status was refused was not of my own making. The machinery of the U.S. left me but two choices: go against the dictates of my conscience and serve in the military, or come to Canada.¹⁵

Costain chose Canada. Sam Steiner was an individual who did not need to seek conscientious objector status. As a Mennonite he was automatically eligible for it by virtue of his membership in a historically recognized peace church.¹⁶ Steiner, however, felt overly patriotic on his eighteenth birthday in 1964 and chose not to seek CO status. Six months later, after attending voting rights rallies in Selma, Alabama, he experienced what he referred to as a "political if not spiritual, conversion." He joined SDS and applied for CO status, not based on his membership in the Mennonite church, but rather on his opposition to the war. Called up for duty in April 1968, he publicly refused induction and

¹⁴ Richard Lemm, in Jim Christy, ed., *The New Refugees: American Voices in Canada* (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1972), 14.

¹⁵ Roger Costain, in Christy, *New Refugees*, 122-123.

¹⁶ Quakers and Brethren were also recognized peace churches.

a warrant was issued for his arrest on 30 October. He entered Canada 2 November, largely at the urging of his future wife.¹⁷ Another who chose Canada over dishonesty was Don O'Connor. Originally from Indiana, he grew increasingly despondent over the situation in the United States following the assassination of Robert Kennedy. O'Connor also chose going to Canada as a statement against the war. He wanted people to know that he had intentionally left his country because of the war:

I felt I should do something or make a contribution. The only thing I could think of was coming to Canada. That would have the effect of all the people who knew me, all my relatives and friends from small-town Indiana ... it made them think more deeply about the political situation.¹⁸

Hence, while it is impossible to generalize that all who came to Canada did so to make an intentional statement about the war, it was clearly a significant factor in a great many people's decision to leave the United States.

Not all were as concerned with issues of authenticity. In the case of Bryan Dragon, a draft dodger from Connecticut, the primary concern in coming to Canada was not even the draft. Rather he came to be with his wife.¹⁹ In another case, Madelyn Averitte Starbuck came to Canada from Florida with her partner George. George had obtained a letter from his doctor stating that he was gay, unstable, and possessed other un-stated qualities that would make him ineligible for military service. His draft board subsequently granted him 4F status (exempt for mental health reasons). The couple decided to move to Canada anyway.²⁰

¹⁷ Sam Steiner "Alternative Service or Alternative Resistance? A Vietnam War Draft Resister in Canada," *Journal of Mennonite Studies*, 25:1, 2007 (195-204), 195-198.

¹⁸ Don O'Connor, interview with author, 12 November 2006.

¹⁹ Bryan Dragon and G. Smith, interview with Mary Mullins, 11 November 1978, AME-5001-SMI, Multicultural History Society of Ontario.

²⁰ Madelyn Averitte Starbuck, interview with Mary Mullins, 28 October 1978, AME-5010-STA, Multicultural History Society of Ontario.

Kent Lawrence, also originally from Connecticut, simply did not want to be a soldier. Not overly concerned about the war prior to being drafted, he deserted three days after being inducted but remained in the United States. Arrested 18 months later, he was given the choice of 7 years in Leavenworth and the prospect of still being in the army upon his release, or completing his service. He chose the latter and deserted again two months later, first going to New York where he became active with SDS as well as the Black Panther Party. Later he moved to Canada with his girlfriend, having given up hope in the prospects of positive change for American society.²¹

This is a common theme in many of the stories of those who came to Canada. In effect, many came not so much to escape military service, but because they had given up on the hope of positive change in the United States. A perusal of Alan Haig-Brown's *Hell No, We Won't Go: Vietnam Draft Resisters in Canada*, a collection of 20 short biographical essays concerning draft dodgers and deserters who came to Canada, shows rampant racism in the United States as an overwhelming factor in motivating draft-age Americans to come to Canada.²² Frank Kusch, in his *All American Boys: Draft Dodgers in Canada from the Vietnam War*, reiterates that expatriates in Canada, as the sons of the middle- and upper middle-class, had numerous choices available to them in the US that would have kept them out of the military without having to go to Canada. "(T)heir decisions," says Kusch, "had less to do with the draft – and the unlikely prospect of service in Vietnam – than it did with feelings and attitudes about the United States." That being said, while the draft was not the prime reason for their departure, according to

²¹ Kent Lawrence, interview with Mary Mullins, 17 October 1978, AME-5012-LAW, Multicultural History Society of Ontario.

²² See Alan Haig-Brown, *Hell No, We Won't Go: Vietnam Draft Resisters in Canada* (Vancouver: Raincoast Books, 1996).

Kusch, most were morally opposed to the war.²³ Similar sentiments are found elsewhere. Tom Bonanno, a draft dodger from Schenectady, New York, who came to Canada in 1969, indicated that he immigrated as much from a sense of disgust with the United States as he did a fear of the draft.²⁴ David Zimmerman, a draft dodger from New Jersey, stated his situation thus: “The only thing I had going for me was I knew I didn’t want to be in the army and I didn’t particularly want to live in the States.”²⁵

Whether or not American expatriates felt strongly in opposition to the war is a complicated question. The literature is quite contradictory. There is also often a difference in Americans’ antiwar activism (in the case of those who were active) before and after coming to Canada. Many who were active prior to their departure put antiwar activism behind them once they reached Canada. Others, who had not been active prior to their departure, were politicized by the process and became active upon their arrival. Many were neither active before nor after. In Christy’s work, very few of his subjects mention being active prior to leaving the US. Only three specifically mention such activity. One was active in the New Mobe, another in the McCarthy campaign, and the last at the campus of the University of Kentucky. Arriving in Canada, three of Christy’s subjects – only one of those previously active – became involved with *AMEX*, a magazine that catered to US expatriates.²⁶ In Dickerson’s work, not a single reference is made to expatriates engaging in antiwar activism after coming to Canada. Indeed, he cites one of his subjects as stating that he was far more concerned with concentrating on his

²³ Kusch, *All American Boys*, 79, 115.

²⁴ Tom Bonanno, interview with Mary Mullins, January 1979, AME-5003-BON, Multicultural History Society of Ontario.

²⁵ David R. Zimmerman, interview with Mary Mullins, 9 January 1979, AME-5015-ZIM, Multicultural History Society of Ontario.

²⁶ Christy, *New Refugees*, 21, 105, 125, 135. Such activity, however, cannot in and of itself be considered antiwar activism. As will be seen, *AMEX* was not itself a specifically antiwar publication.

career and “leaving America to the Americans.”²⁷ This theme is reiterated in Frank Kusch’s work, which points out that the majority of expatriates “tended to be stable, conservative in behaviour, highly individualistic and resolute to pursue higher education and careers free of interference from the state.” According to Kusch, they tended to be uninvolved with antiwar activism, focusing instead on completing their studies and establishing their careers.²⁸

Renée Kasinsky asserts that most émigrés were not political activists. Kasinsky, however, uses tough standards to define activists. In her definition activists were leaders, people who organized antiwar work, not simply those who marched in antiwar demonstrations. Kasinsky tells us that while almost all subjects within her study had marched in antiwar demonstrations prior to departing the US, most were not leaders in the movement. Movement leaders, rather, either avoided the draft internally or went to jail. This theme is reiterated by Kusch.²⁹ While some might assert that leaving the United States and going to Canada was itself an act of antiwar sentiment, Kusch pre-empts this argument. Indicating that the majority who came to Canada did so with no intention of returning, Kusch argues that this was more a lifestyle change than a political statement. He cites one of his subjects: “Leaving the country, vowing never to return, as far as I’m concerned, was not an act of protest in trying to reform the country. We were saying ‘sayonara.’”³⁰

In contrast, John Hagan, in his book *Northern Passage: American Vietnam War Resisters in Canada*, argues, both implicitly and explicitly, that the majority of American

²⁷ Dickerson, *North to Canada*, 171.

²⁸ Kusch, *All American Boys*, 1-3.

²⁹ Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism*, 13-14; Kusch, *All American Boys*, 89-94.

³⁰ Kusch, *All American Boys*, 89-94.

expatriates in Canada were active in resisting the war once they arrived. Included in such resistance is organizing and attending marches and demonstrations, leafleting and mailing, as well as staff work with organizations such as the Toronto Anti-Draft Program (TADP) and *AMEX*. Further, he states that two-thirds of his sample was active in the antiwar movement prior to departing the US.³¹ There are, however, difficulties with some of these assertions. While both TADP and *AMEX* were inherently political organizations, is it accurate to use adjectives such as “antiwar” and “activist” in describing them? As a condition of maintaining its funding from the National Council of Churches, TADP took no public position on the war.³² Its function was to assist Americans in Canada. It did not mobilize opposition to the war or lobby politicians against US policy in Southeast Asia. It was, in effect, more an anti-draft than an antiwar organization. *AMEX* is a more complicated matter. Originally the newsletter for the Union of American Exiles (UAE), which was an antiwar and an anti-draft organization, the publication gained its independence about a year after its founding. Although maintaining an antiwar flavour, *AMEX* was more a forum for American expatriates in Canada, rather than a vehicle for antiwar activism. A former editor of *AMEX* lamented the fact that the great majority of American expatriates were not active in the antiwar movement once they got to Canada.³³ Even if we consider membership in organizations geared towards aiding American exiles as antiwar and activist, Kasinsky states that the majority of Americans in Canada did not involve themselves in such organizations.³⁴ Even to consider aid to expatriates as a form of antiwar dissent, however, is a complex issue. In the early years of the anti-draft

³¹ John Hagan, *Northern Passage: American Vietnam War Resisters in Canada* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001) 20, 70-71.

³² Hagan, *Northern Passage*, 152.

³³ Anonymous, interview with author, 22 April 2007.

³⁴ Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism*, 77-78.

movement in Canada (1966-1967) it was felt that any action taken to get a draft-age American into Canada had the effect of undermining America's war effort. By 1968, however, such thinking was changing. As early as 1967 the *Yankee Refugee*, the newsletter of the Vancouver American Deserters' Committee (ADC), pointed out that diverting prospective soldiers into Canada did not impede the Selective Service System, but merely resulted in the likelihood of someone less fortunate being called up for military service:

Every time one of us refused to be inducted someone else is drafted in our place, likely a ghetto black, a Mexican-American, or a poor white, few of whom as a rule, can afford a student deferment, legal aid, etc...

The *Yankee Refugee* continued, stating that it was imperative for those who did come to Canada to actively engage in the antiwar struggle:

Avoiding the military is only significant morally and politically when we use our freedom from conscription to struggle to free our brothers and sisters who are brutalized by United States imperialism....³⁵

The problem for the *Yankee Refugee*, and others, of course, was that most expatriates did not join the struggle.

The media promoted the impression that all Americans in Canada were active in the antiwar movement. In their book *Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, The War, and the Vietnam Generation*, Lawrence Baskir and William Strauss indicate that, by and large, "(e)xiles wanted privacy and a chance to blend into Canadian life...." The minority of activists, however, wanted to raise issues about the war in Canada and had easy access to the media. According to Baskir and Strauss the media gravitated to the outrageous

³⁵ Cited in Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism*, 104-105.

minority rather than the invisible majority.³⁶ Such sentiment is reinforced in Donald Simons' memoir of his draft dodger experience. According to Simons, most of his draft dodger friends in Canada, as well as himself, looked like junior executives. Yet every time the media did a story on war immigrants they always located the same countercultural radicals,³⁷ thereby reinforcing the pervasive impression that all Americans were hippies and radicals.

Also, if Americans had organized major antiwar initiatives in Canada, the RCMP would have been sure to have noted such behaviour with an eye to prospective deportations. But with the exception of the few small, specifically American antiwar groups that emerged during this time, this was not the case. Hagan tells us that the antiwar work engaged in by American expatriates peaked between 1974 and 1975.³⁸ This is likely a reference to the campaign at that time to seek an amnesty from the US government for draft dodgers and deserters in Canada. To consider such efforts antiwar resistance is something of a stretch. Concerted antiwar action in Canada had long ceased by that time, having peaked in 1970 with the response to Cambodia and Kent State, and experienced limited resurgences during the February 1971 invasion of Laos, and again in May 1972. Indeed, American combat troops had left Southeast Asia following the cease-fire of January 1973. With their departure the antiwar movement in the United States declined precipitously. In Canada it all but disappeared.

Resistance is a term that Hagan uses to describe the behaviour of the federal government in its decision to allow draft dodgers, and later deserters, into Canada.

³⁶ Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, *Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam Generation* (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1978), 204.

³⁷ Donald L. Simons, *I Refuse: Memories of a Vietnam War Objector* (Trenton, NJ: Broken Rifle Press, 1992) 150-151.

³⁸ Hagan, *Northern Passage*, 116.

According to Hagan, American war-related immigrants became a symbol of Canadian sovereignty. Allowing them entry was a way in which the Canadian government provided “peaceful defiance (to) the American Vietnam war.” The problem with this statement is that almost every war America has fought has resulted to some degree in a portion of its citizens coming to Canada.³⁹ Vietnam happened to be one of the more substantial cases. More significantly, Canadian corporations profited enormously from the war in Vietnam. The Canadian government was not going to jeopardize those profits by opposing the war. Nor was it going to jeopardize its access to senior US decision-makers by alienating them over the issue of Vietnam.⁴⁰ During the early years of the war Canada actively and publicly asserted the right of the Americans to be in Vietnam, and never throughout the war did Canada publicly oppose the Americans’ military presence in Southeast Asia. Again, allowing draft-age Americans into Canada was more an issue of self-interest on the part of the Canadian government, at least in the case of draft dodgers, who were highly educated and required minimum assistance if any in assimilating into Canadian society. It was an immigration boom for Canada. If such a practice was a form of antiwar resistance on the part of the Canadian government, it was a passive form indeed. Jessica Squires argues that Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s famous axiom that “Canada should be a refuge from militarism” was far from sincere, especially with regard to deserters. Canadian government obstruction towards war-related immigrants was to a large degree the reason an anti-draft movement developed in Canada in the first place.⁴¹ Trudeau’s comment, though, could be interpreted as a message to Canadian border guards that draft

³⁹ Multicultural Canada – Encyclopedia of Canada’s Peoples – Americans, <http://www.multiculturalcanada.ca/ccp/content/americans.html>, accessed 15 August 2006.

⁴⁰ Ross, *In the Interests of Peace*, 383-384.

⁴¹ Squires, “A Refuge from Militarism?” 2.

status was not grounds for exclusion from Canada. Further, it would discourage immigrations officials from colluding with their US counterparts in the apprehension of draft dodgers and deserters.

Organized assistance to draft-age Americans seeking refuge in Canada began only after the introduction of combat troops to Vietnam in 1965. By the end of the war such groups existed from coast to coast. According to Kasinsky, the early groups in particular were apolitical, focussing on the service aspect of helping Americans. "The aid group was often the first contact with the newly adopted country and helped place these newcomers in private homes or refugee hostels for the first few weeks."⁴² Such groups alleviated loneliness, played a welcoming role, and helped establish networks.⁴³ It was not their objective to conduct antiwar activity. The earliest such group was the Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors, established by University of British Columbia professor Robin Brown in 1966. Initially composed of UBC faculty, their wives and a lawyer, the Committee opened an office that October. The Committee served as a model for the Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters established that summer by Doug Saunders. Saunders had been involved with the Vancouver committee and was a draft dodger himself.⁴⁴

In Atlantic Canada the Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors emerged later. Based in Halifax, the Committee was founded by Richard Lind, a draft dodger who had arrived in the summer of 1970. The Nova Scotia Committee was

⁴² Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism*, 6, 9.

⁴³ Surrey, *Choice of Conscience*, 139-140.

⁴⁴ Williams, *New Exiles*, 56-57; Lansing R. Shepherd, "Draft evaders: jail or self-exile?" *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 December 1968, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00320, Part 2, Union of American Exiles. Throughout the literature there is a tendency to use the words objector and resister interchangeably when referring to groups such as the Montreal Committee to Aid War Objectors. Here I use the term employed in the source cited.

exclusively service oriented. In a 1971 interview Lind explained that local antiwar activists would call and ask if he would be able to get the local American expatriate community out for a march. "I tell them," said Lind, "that Americans, individually, can do as they please. We're not instructing them. It's my politics to be non-political."⁴⁵

In 1966 the Vancouver committee published a fact sheet on Canadian immigration procedures and how they related to those seeking to avoid military service in the US. The Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA) began to widely distribute the document. That same year SUPA initiated its anti-draft program in Toronto, hiring Danny Drache as a full-time staff person whose sole job was to answer inquiries from draft-age Americans seeking information on immigrating to Canada. The following year SUPA hired Mark Satin, a draft dodger originally from Texas, to take over draft counselling responsibilities. Other early activists with the SUPA's Toronto Anti-Draft Program (TADP) included John and Nancy Pocock, Richard Paterack, and Peggy Morton.⁴⁶ According to Kasinsky, SDS became alarmed that SUPA was counselling war immigrants and disseminating propaganda aimed at encouraging draft dodgers to come to Canada. SDS's position, although it later changed, was that those seeking to avoid military service should stay in the United States and actively resist the Selective Service System. Tom Hayden and Rennie Davis especially urged SUPA to disassociate itself from the practice of counselling draft dodgers. According to Kasinsky, "(b)eing loyal to SDS, SUPA eventually bowed out of these responsibilities."⁴⁷ It is doubtful, however,

⁴⁵ Paula Span, "Expatriates in Halifax: A Reasonable Alternative," *Phoenix*, 31 August 1971; Howard Hull, "American draft dodgers receive information, help at Halifax office," *Chronicle-Herald*, 27 February 1971. Both clippings in Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors Collection, MS-1007, Dalhousie University Archives.

⁴⁶ "The Sixties: Remember?" *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 2, nd, (ca January 1970); Williams, *New Exiles*, 56-57; Paterack, interview; Hagan, *Northern Passage*, 75.

⁴⁷ Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism*, 98.

that SDS wielded that much influence over SUPA. In addition, such an assertion is not entirely accurate. By 1967 SUPA was in its organizational death throes. Its anti-draft initiative, TADP, on the other hand, had taken on an organizational life of its own. By the time of SUPA's demise in the fall of 1967 TADP was quite capable of supporting itself. In fact, according to Richard Paterack, the first American to work with the project, it was TADP that broke with SUPA.⁴⁸ TADP became the largest of several such organizations operating throughout Canada, working within an anti-draft network of 2,000 counsellors and volunteers across North America.⁴⁹

Perhaps TADP's greatest contribution to the anti-draft movement was its publication of the *Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada*, a "how to" book for Americans wishing to avoid the draft and come to Canada. The manual began as a twelve-page brochure titled "Escape from Freedom," alternatively titled "I Didn't Raise My Boy To Be a Canadian." A peace group at Cornell University printed five thousand copies *pro bono* and shipped them back to Toronto via Buffalo in batches of 200. SDS chapters throughout the US also distributed the brochure. Mark Satin expanded the original brochure into a full-length booklet. House of Anansi Press issued the first printing of 5,000 issues in February 1968. A second printing of 20,000 was issued in March. The book went through numerous printings, with ultimately 65,000 copies published. It was used extensively by Americans seeking a home in Canada. In Hagan's

⁴⁸ Paterack, interview.

⁴⁹ Dickerson, *North to Canada*, 90. TADP worked with thousands of clients, assisting recent arrivals with housing and employment and orientation to life in their new country. Perhaps its most infamous clients were Karl and Dwight Armstrong, later convicted of the 1970 bombing of the Army Math Research Center at the University of Wisconsin in Madison that resulted in the death of graduate student Robert Fassnacht. Initially having fled to Montreal, the pair left that city following the October Crisis and presented themselves at the door of TADP as draft dodgers. Even after TADP learned their true identities, the organization continued to support them. See Tom Bates, *Rads: The 1970 Bombing of the Army Math Research Center at the University of Wisconsin and its Aftermath* (New York: Harper-Collins, 1992), 348.

sample of war-related immigrants fully one third reported having read the manual prior to departing the US.⁵⁰

According to *AMEX*, the *Manual* became a major source of revenue for TADP, but how much, the magazine never specified.⁵¹ TADP also received funding from both the Canadian Council of Churches (CCC) and its American counterpart the National Council of Churches (NCC). Both of these organizations were latecomers to the anti-draft movement, assuming active roles in 1969.⁵² Other church groups had been active longer, but not by much. Mennonites were among the first and most active of religious groups to offer aid and council to draft dodgers and deserters from the Vietnam War. It was during a meeting with Mennonites in 1970 that Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau uttered his famous statement: "I, too, hope Canada will become a refuge from militarism."⁵³

Although the Society of Friends (Quakers) in Canada did not involve itself as a body in anti-draft work, its members were active as individuals assisting young Americans, often accommodating them in their homes.⁵⁴ Also early among church groups active in supporting these new immigrants were the United Church of Canada and the Unitarian Fellowship. Later they were joined by Anglicans, Presbyterians, and Lutherans. In 1969 Mennonites and spokespeople for the United Church of Canada came together to successfully lobby to have deserters admitted to Canada along the same lines

⁵⁰ Williams, *New Refugees*, 34, 51, 56-57; Paterack, interview; Hagan, *Northern Passage*, 75, 78; "Transition of a 'How To' Book," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 21, August-September, 1970, 9; "Sending them Home," (review of 6th edition of the Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada) *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 9, 30 June 1971. According to Lara Campbell, Naomi Wall arranged for the publication and distribution of the Manual. It is not clear, however, if Wall performed that function consistently from the Manual's initial publication in 1966 to its final printing in 1971, or if only during part of that time. See Campbell, "Women United," 341; also Squires, "Refuge from Militarism?" 93.

⁵¹ "Transition," *AMEX*, 9.

⁵² Hagan, *Northern Passage*, 75.

⁵³ Frank H. Epp, "My Own History Allows Me No Escape," in *I Would Like to Dodge the Draft Dodgers But...*, Frank H. Epp, ed. (Waterloo: Conrad Grebel Press, 1970) (9-19) 17; Williams, *New Exiles*, 85.

⁵⁴ Paterack, interview.

as draft dodgers. Mennonites were influential in persuading the CCC to assume a national initiative to aid draft dodgers and deserters. In December representatives of US and Canadian churches met in Windsor to develop a joint strategy. Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV) was instrumental in persuading the NCC to adopt fund-raising guidelines and by January \$10,000 had been raised, ninety percent of it coming from south of the border. Some of these funds were dispensed directly to aid organizations by CALCAV. The rest was administered by Canon Maurice Wilkinson of the CCC. In addition to CALCAV and the NCC, the CCC received monies directly from churches throughout the United States as well as Denmark, France, West Germany and the Netherlands.⁵⁵

Despite religious support for Americans in Canada, it should be noted that often individual denominations did not support the actions of those who had deserted or dodged the draft. Their participation as a church was based solely on compassionate grounds, to assist those in need. Officially they had no position on the draft or the actions that those they helped had taken to avoid it. Indeed, the funding that these churches distributed to aid groups was conditional in that it was not to be used to induce others to desert or dodge the draft or for other political work, but strictly to help those who were already in Canada and in need. Statements to this effect were issued by both the Lutheran and United Churches in Canada, as well as internationally by the World Council of Churches.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism*, 83, 85; Wert and Epp, in Epp, *I Would Like*, 69-70; Williams, *New Exiles*, 85; Epp, "My Own History," 17; Donald W. Maxwell, "Religion and Politics at the Border: Canadian Church Support for American Vietnam War Resisters," *Journal of Church and State*, 48:4, 2006, (807-827) 817-820. US churches contributing directly to the CCC included the Brethren, First Methodist, United Methodist, United Presbyterian, Disciples of Christ USA, Protestant Episcopal, and the United Church of Christ.

⁵⁶ Williams, *New Exiles*, 85-86; Maxwell, "Religion and Politics," 820.

The reasons for such apolitical stances might have been due to a fear of being perceived as political and thereby posing a threat to their tax exempt status as churches. It might also have been due to a fear of dividing their congregations. Not all members of those churches that aided American immigrants supported such action. For instance, a 1968 poll conducted by the *United Church Observer* of 134 clergy and 2,201 lay readers indicated that while sixty three percent of clergy supported aid to American expatriates, only forty five percent of the laity did, indicating a significant disconnect between clergy and laity. Similarly, a 1969 poll conducted by the *Christian Century*, America's flagship magazine of mainstream Protestantism, indicated that while seventy four percent of Canadian clergy supported aid to draft dodgers and deserters, only forty eight percent of their church members did. American church-goers, in fact, were more inclined to support aid than their Canadian counterparts. In a poll conducted by the United Church of Canada similar to the one cited above, fifty five percent of respondents indicated opposition to aiding American expatriates, whereas in a similar American poll only fifty two percent expressed hostility.⁵⁷ Hence, support for draft dodgers and deserters from a religious perspective cannot be automatically interpreted as opposition to the war itself.

Larry Swartz lives in Fort Simpson, Northwest Territories. When interviewed in 2002 he worked as a relief custodian. Born in San Francisco in 1946, Swartz was typical of deserters in that he did not have a college degree. His father, an alcoholic, was a veteran of Saipan as well as Korea. Drafted in 1967, Swartz deserted from Fort Lewis,

⁵⁷ Maxwell, "Religion and Politics," 827. Ironically, taxpayers in both the United States and Canada indirectly contributed to aid organizations. In Canada, the CCC received funding from the Canadian International Development Agency. Similarly, in the US, the NCC received funding from the United States Agency for International Development.

Washington, just prior to his scheduled deployment to Vietnam. He recalls reading an article around that time in *Ramparts* magazine called “The Children of Vietnam.” It featured photographs of Vietnamese children burned by napalm. It led him to seek conscientious objector status, but his request merely landed him an appointment with a psychiatrist who told him he was fine. The circumstances regarding his decision to desert might or might not have been typical.

I think I was tripping out on LSD or something off post and something happened and it was either Robert Kennedy’s or Martin Luther King’s assassination and something happened and I decided to go.⁵⁸

He travelled to Vancouver where he made contact with the ADC, which gave him advice and helped him find a place to stay. They encouraged him to go to Montreal, where, he was assured, French-Canadian immigration agents would be much more favourable to his gaining landed immigrant status. He stayed in Vancouver for eight months, taking computer training before going back to the US and re-entering Canada in Quebec. He found the French-Canadian agent friendly and comfortable to talk with. The agent admitted Swartz as a landed immigrant.⁵⁹

Immigrating as he did in 1968, Swartz was part of a new trend in war-related immigration. Prior to that year the vast majority of military-age American men coming to Canada were draft dodgers. That changed in 1968. The Tet Offensive, the televised summary execution of an NLF suspect by the Saigon chief of police, Walter Cronkite’s public declaration that the war was un-winnable, the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy, the Democratic National Convention – all of these violent

⁵⁸ Larry Swartz, interview with author, 21 June 2002.

⁵⁹ Swartz, interview. Michael Klein gives a similar account of being encouraged by TADP to enter Canada via Montreal where Francophone customs agents would be more favourable to his application for landed immigrant status. See Michael Klein, interview with author, 29 October 2006.

images contributed to turning the majority of American people against the war. And if the war was un-winnable, why fight it? More and more young, working-class men who had previously accepted their fate to go to Vietnam chose to desert. For the first time the number of deserters entering Canada outstripped that of draft dodgers. By 1969-1970 for every draft dodger entering Canada there were two deserters.⁶⁰

Deserters were not greeted with the same enthusiasm as draft dodgers. For one, they were of a different class and did not possess the education and skills that made draft dodgers more desirable immigrants. Also the pall of desertion, which many interpreted as cowardice, hung over them. As 234 of Canada's 353 immigration officers in 1969 were war veterans, they shared a strong cultural identification with the military. Needless to say, deserters experienced greater difficulties gaining landed immigrant status than draft dodgers⁶¹ until policies were ultimately changed. Indeed, Canadian policy and procedure regarding war-related immigrants went through significant revision in the latter half of the 1960s. In January 1966 Operational Memorandum (OM) 117 was issued by the Department of Immigration. A secret internal document, OM 117 barred deserters from landed immigrant status and allowed immigration officers to consider applicants' draft status with regard to overall suitability. The problem with the deserter clause was that the Immigration Act did not list military deserters as a prohibited class of immigrant. OM 117 was therefore itself in violation of the Act. In addition, as OM 117 only applied to Americans, it was discriminatory. The provisions of OM 117 were re-affirmed in a January 1967 letter from Director of Immigration J.C. Morrison to regional directors in

⁶⁰ Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism*, 16, 18; Williams, *New Exiles*, 6-7; Anonymous, interview.

⁶¹ David S. Churchill, "An Ambiguous Welcome: Vietnam Draft Resistance, the Canadian State, and Cold War Containment," *Social History/Histoire Sociale*, 37:73, 2004, 12; David S. Surrey, *Choice of Conscience: Vietnam War Military and Draft Resister in Canada* (New York: Praeger, 1982) 121; Hagan, *Northern Passage*, 34-54.

which he stated “we do not want deserters as immigrants.” Such provisions were again re-affirmed in July 1968 when operational regulations were revised and approved by Immigration Minister Alan MacEachen. Even the newly-elected Prime Minister and former Minister of Justice Pierre Trudeau did not question the provisions at the time, stating “surely a person who deserts from the armed forces of the U.S. is guilty of a criminal offence and accordingly would be inadmissible to Canada on that ground alone.” Trudeau again committed himself to the exclusion of deserters to coincide with a trip to Washington in the spring of 1968. According to John Hagan, it was only after a concerted campaign led by the United Church of Canada that increasingly framed the issue of deserters’ exclusion as an issue of national sovereignty that the government reversed its policy in May 1969.⁶² Jessica Squires, however, indicates that the sovereignty argument was not decisive in Cabinet’s decision to admit deserters. Cabinet members, rather, cited issues of international relations, legalities and public opinion in making their decision.⁶³

Though Cabinet allowed deserters entry into Canada, the deserters themselves still had to qualify for landed immigrant status. Most did not qualify anyway, and those who were admitted were kept under the scrutiny of the RCMP. David Churchill, in his work on American expatriates and Cold War containment, indicates Canadian and American authorities worked hand in hand in keeping tabs on deserters in Canada. In rare occasions this resulted in their illegal extradition by the RCMP and immigration officials. More common was for the RCMP to monitor deserters and advise the FBI of their findings. RCMP interviewed 2,259 deserters in this way. Churchill argues that this was

⁶² Hagan, *Northern Passage*, 34-54, 56-64.

⁶³ Squires, “Refuge from Militarism?” 223-224.

representative of the security relationship between the two countries and their domestic intelligence agencies, all part of the Cold War security state. According to Churchill:

The Canadian government would be independent as long as it served government interests, but once those interests ceased to apply, or when individuals were thought to be a possible security threat, the attitude of acceptance changed. Only when the deserter issue came to be framed as a question of national sovereignty did the government officially change its entry policy. Throughout it all, expatriate Americans were a monitored population, a reflection of Canada's participation and support of American Cold War hegemony.⁶⁴

Churchill's assertion that American expatriates were a "monitored population" is not entirely accurate. The expatriate population included deserters, draft dodger, as well as a large number of women. The evidence he presents, however, only indicates that deserters were monitored. There is no evidence to suggest a systematic monitoring of other American expatriates.

Nor was the monitoring of deserters conducted solely within a Cold War context. In some cases Canadian national security issues independent of the Cold War precipitated RCMP monitoring of American expatriates. A case in point is an organization called the American Ex-Patriots' League (AEL). The malapropism was deliberate. Founded in Vancouver in early 1970 by four expatriates, the organization had the audacity to publicly support the FLQ. By October 1970 the AEL had already disbanded, but the RCMP considered three of the four founding members to be threats to security.⁶⁵ One of the founding members, a deserter from the Marine Corps, had been a member of the resistance organization Movement for a Democratic Military before coming to Canada. He had been in Canada for three years and had been a leader of the Vancouver ADC prior to his involvement with the AEL. In May 1970 he was one of two individuals primarily

⁶⁴ Churchill, "Ambiguous Welcome," 22-26.

⁶⁵ Likely the fourth was the RCMP's source of information.

responsible for the “incursion” into Blaine, Washington. For reasons unclear, immigrations authorities issued a deportation order for him. The RCMP, suspecting that he would either appeal the order or simply ignore it, advised “direct enforcement action against him,” suggesting the RCMP assist in his immediate deportation. Despite no mention of any specific crimes committed by any of the three co-founders of the AEL, RCMP determined to locate them and report on their whereabouts to local police and immigration authorities. As well, the Department of Manpower and Immigration advised its staff to continue monitoring former members of the organization as “no doubt the members will be active in anything militant.”⁶⁶ That potential alone for radical involvement was grounds for monitoring anyone was indeed broad license for surveillance. That such activity all took place well after Canada reversed its official (and unofficial) policy on the restriction of entry for deserters shows that old-fashioned anti-radicalism had as much to do with the decision to monitor expatriates as anything. Even if the issue could be dressed up in terms of national sovereignty, as Churchill suggests, security, or at least perceived threats to it, always came first.

In some cases police surveillance and harassment of expatriates went beyond the realm of security issues and was petty and personal. Such was the case of David Lutz, a draft dodger from Pennsylvania who settled in New Brunswick. Lutz was working as a teacher when the RCMP contacted his employer and conveyed information that Lutz was a hippy, hosted wild orgies, and was peddling dope. At first the accusations were

⁶⁶ RCMP Memo, J.L. Morris, Officer-In-Charge, Intelligence Unit, Vancouver, BC, to W.S. Fontaine, Chief Intelligence Officer, Ottawa, 23 October 1970; RCMP Memo, J.L. Morris, Officer-in-Charge, Intelligence Unit, Vancouver Regional Office to C. Scatchard, District Administrator, Vancouver District Office, 22 June (ca 1971); Memo, Department of Manpower and Immigration, 29 October 1970. All documents in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00475, Stack 5, American Ex-Patriot League.

believed to be politically motivated, but upon investigation it was discovered that because Lutz had accepted a full-time position with the school board, the wife of a local RCMP officer who had been employed half-time had been displaced. The campaign against Lutz was simply an attempt by the RCMP officer to get his wife's part-time job back.⁶⁷

Political activism on the part of expatriates certainly aided in attracting RCMP attention. Deserters were much more active in antiwar work than other exiles.⁶⁸ The largest group organizing deserters was the Americans Deserters' Committee which arose in Montreal around 1968. While providing assistance with job placement and housing, the Montreal ADC was determined to continue the war against the war from Canada. It participated in demonstrations, sent delegates to the Hemispheric Conference to End the War in December 1968, and sent a 20-man contingent to the March 1970 demonstration in Ottawa organized by the McGill Moratorium Committee. One representative of the Montreal ADC attended the Revolutionary Peoples' Convention sponsored by the Black Panther Party in Philadelphia during the summer of 1970. The manifesto of the Montreal ADC openly called for those currently serving in the US armed forces to desert. "We recognize," the document stated, "U.S. imperialism as the greatest threat to the progress of freedom and self-determination for all people, and view desertion as the most effective way to resist."⁶⁹

Upon their arrival in Montreal in fall 1970, after fleeing prosecution for their role in the bombing of the Army Math Research Center in Madison, Wisconsin, Dwight and

⁶⁷ Charles Campbell, "RCMP Harassment of U.S. Deserters: A Three-Year History," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 6, October/November 1970; David Lutz, interview with author, 21 November 2006.

⁶⁸ Williams, *New Refugees*, 6-7.

⁶⁹ "Exile Report: Montreal," *AMEX*, Vol. 1, No. 2, nd (ca November 1969); "Trans-Canada Report," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 3, April-May 1970; "Montreal's American Deserters' Committee and Council to Aid War Objectors reported to be underground," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 6, October-November 1970, 12; Kusch, *All American Boys*, 91.

Karl Armstrong sought and received aid from Montreal ADC. The assistance, however, was short-lived. The October Crisis served as a pretext for a series of raids against both the ADC and the Montreal Council to Aid War Objectors, forcing both groups underground. Such repression combined with factional splits led to the merger of the two organizations in 1971 under the name the American Refugee Service.⁷⁰

Montreal was not the only city in which the ADC was active, it was only the first. ADCs sprang up in Stockholm and Paris to aid and mobilize deserters in those cities. Elsewhere in Canada a second ADC was established in Vancouver some time in 1969.⁷¹ There, the ADC worked hard to build relationships with the unemployed, unions, students, natives, street people and women's groups. They demonstrated with these groups against the war and would often leaflet US Navy crews, encouraging them to desert. In July that year four ADC representatives met with the three NLF women who were currently touring Canada with Voice of Women.⁷²

The Toronto ADC did not become active until later, in December 1969 with the demise of the Union of American Exiles (UAE). Some former UAE members played a role in starting the organization. What seems to have brought them together was disenchantment with TADP. Like other ADCs, Toronto's concerned itself with both service and politics. One of its organizers, Bill DeBra, a deserter from Fort Dix, New

⁷⁰ Bates, *Rads*, 335; "Montreal American Deserters Committee Dissolves; left faction sets up new counseling center," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 7, nd (ca November 1970), 22-23; "Montreal's American Deserters' Committee and Council to Aid War Objectors reported to be underground," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 6, October-November 1970, 12; The American Refugee Service, <http://nuclearmidnight.com/C/TheAmericanRefugeeService.html>, accessed 20 May 2009.

⁷¹ It is hard to pinpoint the exact date when ADCs were established. In the case of the Vancouver group, an undated issue of *AMEX* likely published around November 1969 indicates that an ADC was not yet established in that city. Another undated issue of *AMEX* indicates representatives of the Vancouver ADC meeting with representatives of the NLF in July 1969. Reading Kasinsky's work, it appears there was one well established there by that time. See "Exile Report: Montreal," *AMEX*; "World-Wide Resistance Roundup: ADC Delegation Meets Viet Women in Vancouver," *AMEX*, Vol. 1, No. 16, nd (ca June-July 1969), 12; Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism*, 131.

⁷² "World-Wide Resistance," *AMEX*, 12; Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism*, 131.

Jersey, expressed the concern that a lot of deserters were losing themselves in the Yorkville drug scene. He felt the ADC could help alleviate the problem. Toronto ADC provided housing referrals, counselling, a coffee house and Friday night encounter meetings. One of its first activities was a teach-in on 7 December 1969 at Toronto Workshop Productions. The teach-in featured a panel composed of writer and social activist June Callwood, CBC newscaster Stanley Burke, Rabbi Abraham Feinberg, and two deserters.⁷³

In addition to Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, ADCs were also established in Regina and Ottawa. The shared commonality of all of them was a commitment to political action. Unlike organizations such as TADP or the Nova Scotia Committee to Aid War Objectors, ADCs were unashamedly political. According to Kasinsky, ADC members saw themselves as exiled rebels whose primary goal was to stop the war by means of international resistance to American imperialism.⁷⁴

The first evidence of political action by American expatriates was during the October 1967 Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam demonstration in Toronto. Several hundred marched as a contingent, carrying placards reading "We Refused to Go."⁷⁵ It would not be until the following spring, however, that efforts were begun to organize Americans in Canada.

April 4, 1968 is a day burned into the memory of many Americans. In Memphis that day, a lone gunman fired across a parking and into the second floor balcony of the Lorraine Motel, killing Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Riots erupted in most major American

⁷³ "Toronto American Deserters' Committee Newsletter," *Harbinger*, Vol. 3, No. 5, 8 May 1970, 15; "Success Opens New Doors for a new ADC in T.O.," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 2 nd (ca January 1970), 28-29; "Report on Toronto: Toronto A.D.C. at Critical Point," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 3, April-May 1970, 26.

⁷⁴ Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism*, 131; Anonymous, interview.

⁷⁵ Williams, *New Exiles*, 77-79.

cities. In Canada, while news of the tragedy in Memphis was met with grief, there were no major outpourings of rage. In Toronto that day, a previously scheduled meeting of American exiles went ahead at First Unitarian Church. Organized by Patty Proctor, the purpose of the meeting was to establish an employment service for American émigrés titled American Resisters in Service for Employment (ARISE), but as the meeting progressed it became apparent that there were many issues other than employment affecting the Americans. Several more meetings followed, both at First Unitarian and at the Newman Centre at the University of Toronto. The group finally went public by setting up a booth at the Sunshine Teach-in, 27 April at Queen's Park. They called themselves the Union of American Exiles (UAE). The first public activity the group sponsored was a picnic and baseball game at High Park which brought out between fifty and sixty draft dodgers, their wives and girlfriends. The RCMP, which monitored the group from its earliest days, described the UAE as mainly a social group that was trying to alleviate some of the loneliness of the draft dodgers.⁷⁶ In an organizational assessment conducted by the RCMP in March 1969 it was concluded that the UAE was concerned primarily with securing housing, jobs and social contacts for draft dodgers. The UAE, the RCMP determined, "appears to be non-political."⁷⁷

There was a tension from the beginning, however, between those UAE members inclined towards a service orientation and those more politically motivated. The group developed a mailing list of one hundred and soon had approximately one hundred and

⁷⁶ Tom Kane, "The Complete History of the Union of American Exiles," *AMEX*, Vol. 1, No. 13, 30 March 1969, 10-11; Interview, Phillip Mullins by Janice Spellenberg, 7 January 1979, AME-5013-MUL, Multicultural Society of Ontario; RCMP Report, "Union of American Exiles – Toronto, Ontario," 5 June 1968, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00320, Union of American Exiles, Part 2; Brochure, "Join the Sunshine Teach-in," Kenny, Box 54, File 1.

⁷⁷ (RCMP) Organizational Assessment Card, 3 March 1969, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00320, Union of American Exiles, Part 4.

fifty members. The Students' Administrative Council at the University of Toronto provided the group with an office rent free at 44 St. George St. Members established a steering committee and other committees. By December, responding to the development of an organized anarchist faction within the organization, the group began the processes of constitutional and organizational development.⁷⁸

The earliest political action undertaken by UAE took place during the summer of 1968. The first incident was a twenty four hour vigil by thirty members in front of the US Consulate on 10 July to protest the conviction of Dr. Benjamin Spock, Mitchell Goodman, Michael Ferber, and the Reverend William Sloane Coffin on charges of counselling people to resist military conscription. RCMP described the event as quiet and orderly. UAE's second political action occurred 29 August, again at the Consulate, where forty members wearing black armbands and accompanied by wives and girlfriends marched in mourning following the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. One member was arrested after throwing a bottle of red paint at the building.⁷⁹ In October the UAE participated in the International Day of Protest by holding a vigil at the Consulate beginning at midnight on the evening of 25 October and lasting until 2:30 the following afternoon when the organization Canadians for the National Liberation Front (CNLF)

⁷⁸ Williams, *New Exiles*, 77-79; Kane, "Complete History," 10-11.

⁷⁹ "Americans Protest Sentencing of Dr. Spock," *The Peace Centre News*, July 1968, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00320, Union of American Exiles, Part 2; also, RCMP Report, "Protests and Demonstrations, Ontario," 30 July 1968 in same file; "U.S. consulate daubed with paint as draft dodgers stage protest," *Toronto Daily Star*, 30 August 1968, clipping in same file, part 2; "Union of American Exiles Demonstration in Mourning for United States," *Canadians for the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Newsletter) September 1968 Issue; *Union of American Exiles* (Newsletter), Issue 1, 12 September 1968. Note: this was in effect the first issue of *AMEX*, before it took on that name. It is interesting that in internal RCMP communications over the 29 August incident, Superintendent Hogg reported only twelve demonstrators, but indicated that "paint bombs" had been thrown at the Consulate. The Department of External Affairs, in addition to expressing its regret to the United States government and offering to pay for any repairs, also offered the Consulate additional police protection, but was declined. See telegram, Superintendent Hogg to Superintendent Draper, 30 August 1968; and Memo, E.T. Galpin, (Department of) External Affairs, 30 August 1968, both in above-cited file, part 2.

took over from them. In the interim a group from the right-wing Edmund Burke Society attempted to disrupt the vigil.⁸⁰

Tensions between the politically and service minded continued within the UAE. This is illustrated by the steering committee's decision in November 1968 to send four delegates to the Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam, but to send them as unofficial representatives.⁸¹ While the majority on the steering committee favoured more political action, they feared that such a course would alienate fifty percent of their membership. The biggest impediment to further political action was resistance from draft dodgers. An article in the University of Toronto's student paper the *Varsity* explained the position of this constituency: "They see a chance to build a new life in Canada," the article read. "They refuse to care about the forces that caused them to leave, and they start to forget the country they left behind. In fact, they stopped living as exiles."⁸² Indeed the language one used to describe Americans in Canada was very important. Those who saw themselves as exiles hinted at the possibility of return to the United States one day when circumstances were better. Expatriates, on the other hand were resigned to becoming Canadians. Many began referring to themselves as "New Canadians." In the spring of 1969 a petition, signed by most members of the steering committee and several others was submitted to the organization for the purpose of changing the organization's name to the Union of American Expatriates. As the group began to fall apart about this time, it is

⁸⁰ *Union of American Exiles Newsletter Extra*, 19 October 1968; Van Gosselin, "October 26th: What it Was Like," *AMEX*, Vol. 1, No. 5, 10-23 November 1968, 4-5, 12; "What's New E.B.S.?" *Straight Talk*, December 1968 issue, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00320, Union of American Exiles, Part 2; also "Police block Yonge St. march," *Toronto Daily Star*, 28 October 1968, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00315, Vietnam Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam.

⁸¹ "UAE Proceedings," *AMEX*, Vol. 1, No. 6, 24 November-7 December 1968.

⁸² John Doyle, (title exempted), *The Varsity*, 4 December 1968, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00320, Union of American Exiles, part 2.

not clear if the name change ever took effect. Efforts were also begun at this time to separate the UAE from its publication *AMEX*.⁸³

The UAE eventually settled into a state of inaction. After the organization had been in operation for a year, the tension between service and politics was still there, with the leadership attempting to do both. But in reality not much was accomplished other than more debate. In discussing plans for the 6 April 1969 International Day of Protest, the greatest issue was not what was to be done, but whether the coordinating committee should be doing it, or whether an ad hoc committee should be struck.⁸⁴

The last significant political action undertaken by UAE was the November 1969 Moratorium in Toronto. Most of the organization's energies were devoted to this endeavour throughout October and early November. The climax of protest activities which took place over 14-15 November was a march of 3,000 from Queen's Park to Nathan Phillips Square. Marches and demonstration took place across North America. In Toronto the UAE led the march.⁸⁵

When the end finally came for the UAE it came with a whimper, not a bang. Most sources credit internal factionalism for its demise. According to Roger Neville Williams's account, when the organization folded its members joined with other groups as diverse as the Maoists, the Trotskyists, the Canadian Party of Labour and the Canadians for the National Liberation Front.⁸⁶ In its post-mortem on the UAE, *AMEX* placed responsibility

⁸³ Petition, *AMEX*, May 1969, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00320, part 3; RCMP Report, "Union of American Exiles, Toronto, Ontario," 18 June 1969, in same file.

⁸⁴ "UAE Proceedings," *AMEX*, Vol. 1, No. 12, 9 March 1969, 7-8. Most of the coverage of UAE's activities comes from *AMEX*, which uses the terms coordinating committee and steering committee interchangeably.

⁸⁵ "Report on Toronto," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 1, nd, (ca November 1969), 24; RCMP Report, "International Day of Protest – U.S. Action in Vietnam – November 15, 1969 – Canada," CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00320, Union of American Exiles, part 4.

⁸⁶ Williams, *New Exiles*, 77-79.

for the group's demise on internal squabbling that began around Christmas 1968 and did not let up. It was never able to overcome personal and political differences. According to *AMEX*, these differences were aggravated by ideological ones:

There were strong anarchist and Maoist political tendencies among active members and unless an individual had strong radical leanings he was usually out of the action at UAE.⁸⁷

One member, commenting on the group's demise, felt that the UAE had become "a forum for people working out their anger," that it had become a support group where the focus was on discussion."⁸⁸ An internal RCMP report in March 1970 stated that the group had "more or less folded up their operations and are almost dormant." It also indicated that newer exile groups such as Red, White and Black, and the American Deserters' Committee were becoming quite active locally.⁸⁹

The Union of American Exiles formally closed its doors on 7 April 1970. It had lasted almost exactly two years. Perhaps its greatest weakness was trying to be all things to all people. Ironically, as members were packing up the office and putting the UAE to rest, Laurence M. Suirchev of the Montreal ADC arrived in an attempt to drum up support for the first pan-Canadian conference on war resisters.⁹⁰ He was too late. Despite the UAE's early demise, however, it left a considerable legacy in the form of *AMEX*.

The one interview subject for this study who chose to remain anonymous is today a Roman Catholic priest living in Southern Ontario. Born in Wilmington, Delaware, in 1943, he had the distinction of being the first resident of that state to be indicted for draft evasion following his move to Canada in late 1967. Prior to his departure he would have

⁸⁷ U.A.E. Finally Folds," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 3, April-May 1970.

⁸⁸ Interview, Phillip Mullins.

⁸⁹ RCMP Report, "Union of American Exiles, Toronto, Ontario," 6 March 1970, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00320, part 4.

⁹⁰ "U.A.E. Finally Folds, *AMEX*.

described himself as somewhat apolitical, but the process of becoming an exile changed that. In April 1968 he had been living quietly in Toronto for nine months, like many draft dodgers, blending into the woodwork, when he had his first contact with the UAE at a booth set up at the Sunshine Teach-in at Queen's Park. He began attending their meetings and it was not long before he decided that his experience in publishing – he had worked for *Newsweek* prior to his departure – would be of assistance to the UAE in getting out a newsletter.⁹¹ Ultimately he became editor of what became the most influential publication by expatriate Americans.

The first issue, simply titled *Union of American Exiles Newsletter* was a barebones effort – a single-sheet, double-sided tract published 12 September 1968. It boasted of the organization's new office and advertised the upcoming membership meeting to elect its first coordinating committee. It also lauded the efforts of its members in the protest actions at the US Consulate the previous summer.⁹² The next four issues were similar in nature, though progressively thicker. In November the newsletter changed its format and its name. Now much more professional looking, sixteen pages with more sophisticated graphics and a polished look, the publication looked much more like a magazine. It was now called *The American Exile in Canada*. The cover story of the first issue under the new format was dedicated to the 26 October International Day of Protest.⁹³

With the new format the magazine established a level of popularity, especially in Toronto. In November *AMEX* mailed a total of 457 copies to subscribers. Of these, 364 were Metro residents. The others went largely to the US, with some going to other parts

⁹¹ Anonymous, interview with author, 27 April 2007.

⁹² *Union of American Exiles Newsletter*, Issue 1, 12 September 1968.

⁹³ "October 26: What It Was Like," *The American Exile in Canada*, Vol. 1, No. 5, 10-23 November 1968.

of Canada. Three went to other Commonwealth countries. With the publication of the next issue sales jumped even higher. Although Metro subscriptions stayed pretty much the same, sales to the US jumped from sixty to eighty. Sales at locations in Canada but outside Toronto jumped from thirty three to seventy one. By March 1969 500 issues were being delivered to newsstands in New York and Philadelphia with an additional 271 subscriptions being mailed throughout the US. Eleven subscriptions were sent overseas. Sales within Canada remained pretty much the same.⁹⁴ Within less than a year what had begun as a single-page tract for local expatriates had become an international publication. Unfortunately for the magazine, it was at this time that it lost its second class mailing privileges. The reason given by the post office was that it was published by an association. To regain those privileges it would have to become an incorporated publication, independent of the UAE.⁹⁵

The problem of postage rates was compounded by political factors internal to the UAE. An editorial in the May 1969 issue complained:

Working under the yoke of the present coordinating committee, and around the UAE in general, makes for an impossible situation on several counts, the first being unprofessional working conditions dictated by an often petty-fogging committee, and second, the Union not being a source of manpower for this venture, but rather driving the best qualified people in Toronto away.

The editorial went on to state that for the cost of \$35 and a sympathetic lawyer's help, the publication could become AMEX-Canada Limited and still support the activities of the

⁹⁴ "Editor's Notebook," Vol. 1, No. 7, 15 December 1968, 8; "Notebook," Vol. 1, No. 9, 12 January 1969; "Editor's Notebook," Vol. 1, No. 13, 30 March 1969, all citations in *The American Exile in Canada*.

⁹⁵ "Editor's Notebook," *The American Exile in Canada* Vol. 1, No. 13.

UAE, which up to that point had been living off the subscription revenues of the magazine. The editorial ended with a call to separate the publication from the UAE.⁹⁶

Reflecting almost forty years after the fact, *AMEX*'s former editor suggests that political factors were more significant in the need to separate the publication from the Union:

To publish anything that was really going to reflect what was really going on, not just the extreme left UAE political sentiments, the publication just had to be separated. There's no way; we were trying to get it out every two weeks and there was just no way you could get it out. There was wrangling and wrangling in meetings that afterwards nobody would do the work after all the screaming and yelling.... They (UAE members) wanted a really hard line. They wanted the thing to be a polemic and my idea was to cover everything happening with Americans here already or those getting ready.

Feeling compelled to separate the publication from what he referred to as the UAE's "anarchist tendencies," the editor formed a legal partnership with Charles Campbell, a PhD student in the English department at the University of Toronto.⁹⁷ In the meantime UAE members voted unanimously to endorse the split.⁹⁸

The first issue of the newly independent publication rolled off the presses in the early summer of 1969. With its new-found freedom, it also had a new name: *AMEX-Canada: The American Expatriate in Canada*. According to the former editor, the name change was reflective of the fact that many Americans in Canada were coming to the realization that "this was going to be for the long haul and we were becoming more

⁹⁶ "Editorial," *The American Exile in Canada*, Vol. 1, No. 15,

⁹⁷ Anonymous, interview.

⁹⁸ "Editorial: Anyone Can Have a Magazine," *AMEX-Canada: The American Expatriate in Canada*, Vol. 1, No. 16, nd, (ca June-July 1969) 3.

disinterested in the United States. We just saw ourselves as expats so there was a title change.”⁹⁹

In its first editorial after severing ties with the UAE the magazine pledged itself to three principles: 1) to be a communication medium among draft dodgers and deserters in Canada, 2) to convey information about Canada to people in the United States, and 3) to be a forum for opinion and insight by American expatriates in Canada.¹⁰⁰ No mention was made of the UAE, although an internal RCMP report indicated the publication intended to continue to support the organization.¹⁰¹ Although such support had been talked about in discussions prior to the split, the reality was unlikely. Although *AMEX* continued to report on the activities of the UAE until its demise in April 1970, the magazine developed a different trajectory. *AMEX* became a loud mouthpiece for Canadian nationalism, but not so loud regarding the antiwar movement.¹⁰² Many of its contributors lauded their own efforts to learn about Canada and encouraged others to do so.¹⁰³ One article by Charles Campbell explicitly stated “We must become Canadian nationalists.”¹⁰⁴ While such a trend had begun long before the split, it continued to be a growing part of *AMEX*’s identity. Perhaps somewhat cynically, in the 1970s during the campaign for an amnesty for draft dodgers and deserters *AMEX* made a slight change to

⁹⁹ Anonymous, interview.

¹⁰⁰ “Editorial: Anyone,” *AMEX*, 3.

¹⁰¹ RCMP Report, “The American Exile in Canada, General Information, Toronto, Ontario, AMENDED TO: The American Expatriate in Canada (AMEX) General Information, Toronto, Ontario, 11 September 1969, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00320, Union of American Exiles, Part 3.

¹⁰² A rare exception to this was *AMEX* extolling its readers to join with the Vietnam Mobilization Committee in April 1971 for a major antiwar march. See D.K. (Dee Knight), “Anti-War Demonstrations,” *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 8, March-April 1971, 6.

¹⁰³ Christy, *New Refugees*, see especially sections by Dee Knight (125-134) and Charles Campbell 135-142).

¹⁰⁴ Charles Campbell, “The Vietnamization of Canada,” *AMEX*, Vol. 1, No. 6, 24 November -7 December 1968, 26.

its official name. It now became *AMEX: Published by American Exiles in Canada*,¹⁰⁵ alluding, in many cases falsely, to a desire to return to the United States.

AMEX ceased publishing in the late 1970s. By then the war was long over, American troops had returned home, and President Carter had enacted a blanket pardon for draft dodgers (although not deserters) enabling many Americans who wanted to return to the United States to do so. Being overwhelmingly white, middle-class and English-speaking, many expatriates were well along the route to assimilation into Canadian society. In short, *AMEX* had lost its purpose. Still, for a period of ten years it had catered to and met the needs of a large expatriate population in Canada, and a prospective one in the United States. Ruminating on the project from his home in Southern Ontario, our anonymous priest says: "I have absolutely no regrets."¹⁰⁶

Vietnam War-related immigration to Canada peaked in 1969-1970. The majority were deserters as the lottery system and easier medical deferments reduced the number of draft dodgers coming to Canada.¹⁰⁷ It was also a peak year in terms of the number of organizations in Canada available to assist American émigrés. Such organizations crossed Canada, with operations in nine provinces. Most were in Ontario, which boasted thirteen, but small numbers in Vancouver and Montreal did not mean the number of Americans arriving in those cities was insignificant. The only province which could not boast such a group was Prince Edward Island.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Anonymous, interview.

¹⁰⁶ Anonymous, interview.

¹⁰⁷ Williams, *New Exiles*, 324-326.

¹⁰⁸ "Information Desk," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 4, June 1970, 28. Although *AMEX* reported that the Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors had closed its doors (see Vol. 2, No. 2, nd [ca January 1970] 15-19) a perusal of that organization's archival collection at Dalhousie University clearly indicates it continued to function throughout this period. See Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors Collection, MS-10-7, Dalhousie University.

In Toronto, TADP continued to predominate among groups assisting American immigrants, but it was not without competition. Red, White and Black moved into the offices vacated by the UAE and embarked on a program of assisting exiles integrate into Canadian society. Ted Stiener, a 22-year old from Kansas City, and science fiction writer Judith Merrill from Pennsylvania, founded the group. According to Williams, RW&B devoted its energy to community development rather than politics. This we know to be not entirely accurate given the group's role in responding to the shootings at Kent State discussed earlier. RW&B also endeavoured to foster a growth in Canadian nationalism as an effort to throw off American economic and cultural domination (of the left as well as the right). In Merrill's words, she had to make a choice between becoming an active revolutionary and leaving the country. Red, White and Black later changed its name to the Committee to Aid Refugees from Militarism (CARM).¹⁰⁹

Merrill was not the only Toronto woman prominent in immigrant aid organizations. At TADP Naomi Wall was a leading figure, and before her Nancy Pocock.¹¹⁰ Also in Toronto Nancy Goldsberry and several other staff at the YWCA attempted to organize American women into the Group of Young American Women. A room was provided for them at the ADC for a clothing and household depot, but it does not appear the organization got off the ground.¹¹¹ Despite the project's lack of success, it serves as an example of what historian Lara Campbell has argued was a gendering of labour within the anti-draft and antiwar movements.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Williams, *New Exiles*, 372-374.

¹¹⁰ Bates, *Rads*, 347; Pocock, interview.

¹¹¹ Dorothy Jones, "In Toronto: Exile Women Are Organized," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 3, April-May 1970, 30.

¹¹² Campbell, "Women United," 339.

Exile groups were active throughout Canada. In Vancouver the Committee to Aid War Objectors handled immigration counselling while the ADC ran two hostels, attempted to keep the *Yankee Refugee* afloat, and continued its political activism. But financial troubles were causing it to devote more time to fundraising and less to political action. Groups were also active in Edmonton, Regina, Winnipeg, Thunder Bay, Windsor, Ottawa, Montreal, Sherbrooke, Saint John, Halifax, and St. John's. As well, numerous farms around Huntsville sheltered exiles but endeavoured to be left out of the limelight.¹¹³

In Sault Ste. Marie an aid organization calling itself Alpha One operated until the fall of 1970. Taking its place was an agency called The Bridge, operated by the Ontario Drug Addiction Research Foundation. TADP had requested it take over the service and the agency agreed. Brian McCutcheon, an employee of Algoma Steel, took on the volunteer position. In addition to counselling between thirty and forty émigrés over the next year and half, occasionally he would find himself driving Americans back and forth across the border.¹¹⁴ McCutcheon was just one of hundreds of Canadians who volunteered throughout the 1960s and 1970s assisting Americans evading military service.

When Laurence M. Suirchev of the Montreal American Deserters' Committee came looking for the UAE in Toronto and came upon an office in the process of closing down, he was in town to promote an upcoming conference in Montreal. The conference was to take place at the end of May 1970 and was intended to bring organizations

¹¹³ "Trans-Canada Report," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 2, nd (ca January 1970), 15-19; Nova Scotia Committee.

¹¹⁴ "The Soo: Centre Closes at Sault Saint Marie," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 7 nd (ca November 1970), 25; "The Soo: New Immigrant aid centre at Sault Saint Marie," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 6, October-November 1970, 11; Brian McCutcheon, interview with author, 2 July 2002.

representing exile groups as well as antiwar organizations together in one place to exchange information and facilitate cooperation. It was to be international in scope, with Jim Hayes of the New Mobilization Committee in the US coordinating American participation. Also participating were members of the then-famous Oleo Strut coffee house in Killeen, Texas.¹¹⁵ The conference opened 29 May and included representatives from exile groups across Canada. Of much contention was the issue of which groups received funding. Political groups felt left out.¹¹⁶ Also on the agenda, which was rare for such kinds of activity, was a women's caucus sponsored by the women of the Montreal ADC. They made several suggestions, including revision of the *Manual for Draft-Age Immigrants to Canada* to include women and provisions to publish it in plain language. Although some listened, they were largely ignored.¹¹⁷ It was the consensus of those assembled that the exile community needed to become more political. Likely their definition of political had to do more with raising the profile of Americans in Canada given that none of the five major resolutions passed by the conference called for stepped up opposition to the war itself. Dimitri Roussopoulos, attending as editor of *Our Generation*, complained that five years earlier the expectation had been that exiles would flood the antiwar movement in Canada. In Roussopoulos's words: "It didn't happen."¹¹⁸ According to the former editor of *AMEX*:

¹¹⁵ "American Deserters," *Harbinger* (Liberation News Service) Vol. 3, No. 4, 22 April 1970. The Oleo Strut was a coffee house in Killeen, Texas that catered to antiwar GIs from nearby Fort Hood. It took its name from the shock absorbers of helicopters used in Vietnam and was meant to assist returning soldiers absorb the shock of life after Vietnam. It served as a centre for antiwar activism.

¹¹⁶ Anonymous, interview.

¹¹⁷ Williams, "The Parley," 4.

¹¹⁸ Roger Williams, "The Parley in Montreal," *AMEX*, Vol. 2, No. 4, June 1970, 5-10. Those specifically mentioned included Tim Edwards of the Montreal Council to Aid War Objectors, Dick Perrin of Regina ADC, Peter Burton of the Vancouver Committee to Aid War Objectors, Jim Wilcox of the Ottawa group Assistance with Immigration and the Draft (AID), Ted Steiner of Red, White and Black; Stan Pietlock of

(It became clear that it might be better if people are willing to do it, if people would go back and jam up the system in the United States. This (business of) just emigrating people who would just disappear into the middle-class woodwork is not necessarily going to change anything. TADP even went through the transition and they got to the point themselves of admitting that one of the options is to stay and fight the system, possibly going to jail.¹¹⁹

This was indeed a dramatic reversal for organizations such as TADP. As Kasinsky points out, during their first five years of existence counselling groups served as social welfare and benevolent organizations, orienting tens of thousands toward assimilation. The coming crisis in Quebec, an increasing radicalism in Canada, and the conference itself, however, led to aid groups advising Americans to stay in the US and resist until jail was the only other option.¹²⁰ Such a reversal for these groups was late in coming and also somewhat moot. By 1970 Nixon's policy of Vietnamization was well underway. Troops were being withdrawn from Vietnam. Draft calls were substantially lowered, and the introduction of the lottery system further reduced one's chances of being conscripted. The conference ended with a keynote address by Tom Hayden, who urged exiles to take an active interest in the prospect of an amnesty. In addition, the NLF sent fraternal greetings.¹²¹

A second such conference was held in Vancouver in December 1973 hosted by the Vancouver American Exiles Association and the Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors. It was attended for the most part by the same groups represented in 1970. The result of the conference was twofold: the establishment of the Coalition of American War Resisters, and the issuance of a statement of unity regarding

AMEX, Naomi Wall of TADP, and Canon Wilkinson of the Canadian Council of Churches. Many others attended as well.

¹¹⁹ Anonymous, interview.

¹²⁰ Kasinsky, *Refugees from Militarism*, 141.

¹²¹ Williams, "The Parley," 5-10.

amnesty for draft dodgers and deserters.¹²² By then amnesty was one of the few remaining issues emanating from the war in Southeast Asia. A cease-fire had been signed the previous January resulting in the withdrawal of American troops. Nixon had ended the draft. A rump antiwar movement continued in the United States, protesting the war that continued *sans* US troops. But the movement was a shadow of what it had been. In Canada the antiwar movement evaporated almost immediately following the cease-fire. Amnesty, then, was now the political focus of exile groups in Canada.

The amnesty campaign enjoyed limited support, with some church organizations endorsing it. In 1974 the Canadian branch of the United Auto Workers unanimously endorsed the proposal at its convention in Port Elgin. At the same time the union was highly critical of the clemency program which had been offered by President Gerald Ford.¹²³ Such a program, open only to draft dodgers, required those willing to participate in it to earn their clemency through alternative service. In effect, Ford's program was little different from clemency procedures already in place. Most exiles found the program repulsive, as they did not see themselves as having committed any crime. Ford's pardoning of Nixon for all crimes related to the Watergate scandal so soon after the former president's resignation was salt in the wound for the exile community. Few took Ford up on his offer.¹²⁴ In 1977 newly-elected President Jimmy Carter enacted a more generous amnesty package, but again, only for draft dodgers. Deserters would be handled on a case-by-case basis. How many returned to the United States is difficult to determine; there is no agreement in the literature. According to Kusch, Carter's amnesty did not

¹²² "Pan Canadian Conference of War Resisters Held in Vancouver," *AMEX*, Vol. 4, No. 6, January-February-March 1974.

¹²³ "U.S. war resisters demand full amnesty," *Pacific Tribune*, 11 October 1974, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00320, Vancouver American Exiles Association.

¹²⁴ Simons, *I Refuse*, 158-159; Baskir and Strauss, *Chance and Circumstance*, 212-213.

result in many exiles returning to the United States, but it did have the benefit of allowing those in Canada to visit their families. Those who did return, despite their exclusion from the program, tended to be deserters – African Americans, minorities, white working-class – those who found it difficult to assimilate and often without the necessary job skills and education.¹²⁵ Baskir and Strauss, on the other hand, assert that three quarters of exiles returned to the US. Those who stayed were those who succeeded, largely draft dodgers.¹²⁶ John Hagan points out that those draft dodgers who arrived in Canada in 1970 and witnessed the country at its most militaristic – what with the implementation of the War Measures Act – were much more inclined to return to the US than those who came before or after. Of the 1970 cohort, only forty seven percent stayed, as opposed to fifty eight percent in 1967 and sixty five percent in 1972.¹²⁷ There is irony, and yet consistency on the part of Americans in Canada, that so many would return home when the prime minister who coined the term “refuge from militarism” enacted martial law.

Hagan also explores a certain ambivalence on the part of Vietnam War-related immigrants to Canada. In his sample of one hundred former draft dodgers in Toronto, three quarters became Canadian citizens. Yet the same number kept their US citizenship, and fully half of the sample obtained dual citizenship. Several moved back to the US for occupational reasons and then returned to Canada, preferring the quality of life.¹²⁸ Even in the twenty first century the majority are not willing to sever all ties to the US.

¹²⁵ Kusch, *All American Boys*, 121-123

¹²⁶ Baskir and Strauss, *Chance and Circumstance*, 185, 187.

¹²⁷ John Hagan, “Cause and Country: The Politics of Ambivalence and the American Vietnam War Resistance in Canada,” *Social Problems*, 48:2, May, 2001 (168-184), 174. Hagan arrives at these numbers by examining immigration data for the years 1967 through 1972, subtracting the average for 1960-1963, and then comparing these statistics with 1996 data on the same cohort.

¹²⁸ Hagan, “Cause and Country,” 178-179.

In addition, Hagan explores voting patterns as an indicator of Americans' ambivalence about being in Canada. Looking at trends in the 1997 federal election, he indicates that seventy two percent of his sample voted, a fairly high number, indicating a degree of assimilation. More interesting is the pattern when he breaks it down by the year they entered Canada. Eighty five percent of those who arrived in Canada in 1967 voted, compared with 52.9 percent of those who arrived in 1970.¹²⁹ Again, Hagan attributes Trudeau's implementation of the War Measures Act for this discrepancy.

There is also disagreement on the political nature of many former war immigrants in Canada. David Surrey, in his work *Choice of Conscience: Vietnam Era Military and Draft Resisters in Canada* argues that coming to Canada changed the world view of those immigrating – that they tended to become more critical of the US in general.¹³⁰ This is not borne out by the evidence. As shown earlier, many came to Canada, not so much to escape military service, but because they had lost hope in the ability of America to reform itself. In his book *All American Boys: Draft Dodgers in Canada from the Vietnam War*, Frank Kusch argues that those who went to Canada, rather than the traitors that some would portray them as, were in essence quintessential Americans who embraced the core values of the United States:

In many respects they embody the best of what America has to offer: fortitude, optimism, determination, perseverance, and a strident individualism that carves its own path into the ever-expanding frontier of human autonomy. Their attitudes and actions as draft dodgers reflect much of the America they left behind. It is a nature unapologetic for its position, unrepentant for its stridency, unashamed of its resources and ability, and unafraid to stake out alone. After all, they were, and are, all American Boys.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Hagan, "Cause and Country," 180.

¹³⁰ Surrey, *Choice of Conscience*, 179-182.

¹³¹ Kusch, *All American Boys*, 3.

Kusch can be forgiven for his disregarding the many thousands of American women who came to Canada as well. While Lara Campbell has begun the process of uncovering the story of American women who came to Canada in opposition to the war, scholars still await a comprehensive study of the subject. Still, Kusch's sentiments likely ring true for both the men and women who came to Canada rather than live in an America at war in Vietnam.

One aspect that the literature is in general agreement about is the benefit that such an immigration wave brought to Canada. To quote one source: "Man for man, the draft dodgers probably are the best educated immigrants we've ever had."¹³² Similarly, the literature also agrees that those who stayed settled down, got good jobs, and became contributing members to Canadian society.¹³³ One such example is David Lutz, who we have met in several places throughout this dissertation. Settling down in Hampton, New Brunswick, Lutz became president of the local chamber of commerce, President of the Law Society of New Brunswick, a leading member of the New Brunswick Liberal Party, and a recipient of the Queen's Fiftieth Jubilee Medal.¹³⁴ He occupies a local pinnacle of respectability. Others became members of legacy families, such as Dr. Michael Klein. Successful in his own right in the field of paediatrics, his wife Bonnie is a successful film-maker with the National Film Board, his son Seth the Director of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, and his daughter Naomi an accomplished social critic and writer of international stature.¹³⁵

¹³² Surrey, *Choice of Conscience*, 107.

¹³³ See John Sandman in Christy, *New Refugees*, 107.

¹³⁴ Lutz, interview.

¹³⁵ Michael Klein, interview with author, 29 October 2006.

Not all war-related immigrants who came here experienced success levels akin to Lutz and Klein, but they are happy to remain here. Larry Swartz, the former deserter from California who established a life for himself in the Northwest Territories has no regrets.

Says Larry:

When I look back on the whole experience now, I'm glad it all happened because I really love Canada and I really love the North.... I think it was the Canadian attitude and the freedom that I felt being up here. That's why I didn't go back, and that's why I don't want to go back now.¹³⁶

Similarly, our anonymous priest is happy that he chose Canada, although perhaps more from a less than favourable view of the United States than a positive one of Canada. He simply says, "I am just so glad that I am not down there."¹³⁷

¹³⁶ Swartz, interview.

¹³⁷ Anonymous, interview.

Chapter Nine: Endings

The antiwar movement in Canada went into a period of decline following the demonstrations of May 1970 until it disappeared altogether. This was not unlike the movement in the United States, where the movement mirrored the war itself in its graduated ending. This is not a reflection of the historic divide within the antiwar movement – those advocating the immediate withdrawal of US troops on one side and the other side calling for negotiations – but rather more an indication of movement burnout. In many ways the Vietnam War had two endings. The first came in January 1973 with the signing of the cease-fire by Le Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger, effectively removing American military personnel from Vietnam. Some scholars erroneously consider January 1973 as marking the end of the war.¹ But the war continued between North and South (as well as in Cambodia and Laos) until April 1975 and ended only after Communist victories. The movement made a noble effort of continuing to mobilize Canadians, with mixed results from February 1971 and the invasion of Laos until the signing of the cease-fire. Following the cease-fire, as in the United States, the focus of the movement shifted its attention towards enforcement of the terms of the cease-fire, and in particular focusing attention on the plight of political prisoners in South Vietnamese jails. The issue became moot when Soviet-made tanks rolled onto the grounds of the Presidential Palace in Saigon and the last helicopter left the roof of the American Embassy.

On 3 February 1971 reports started filtering out of Indochina that 25,000 ARVN troops, accompanied by 9,000 US soldiers were massing on the Laotian border for an imminent invasion. This was accompanied by the heaviest, round-the-clock aerial

¹ For an example, see Terry H. Anderson, *The Movement and the Sixties: Protest in America from Greensboro to Wounded Knee* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 409.

bombardment of the war. When the invasion finally began on 8 February it was almost anticlimactic given the huge build-up it had been given in the media. When troops crossed the border into Laos, only ARVN forces were involved. American troops stayed on the Vietnamese side to secure the rear and handle logistics. It appeared that the United States had learned its lesson from the invasion of Cambodia a year earlier. Nixon's policy of Vietnamization relied on superior US airpower, less use of American ground forces, and the increased use of ARVN troops. In this respect, the invasion of Laos epitomized Vietnamization (except for the fact that it continued to expand the war outside Vietnam's borders). It also reflected Nixon's policy in another way – it was a disaster. Despite some initial ARVN successes, Communist forces were able to mount a successful counterattack, humiliating the Republic of Vietnam and Nixon.² Likely the operation would have been a rout for anticommunist forces if not for the 9,000 US troops holding the fort on the other side of the border.

Unlike the invasion of Cambodia, the Laos adventure did not generate the same massive protest experienced a year earlier. This was probably due in part to the absence of US ground forces in Laos, as well as the absence of an event like Kent State to crystallize opposition. It was also indicative of the antiwar movement losing steam. In all, only about fifth thousand people nationwide took part in Laos-related protests in the United States, most notably in New England where between 5,000 and 10,000 rallied on the Boston Commons. Several thousand held a “mill-in” in Times Square. Elsewhere, 3,000 demonstrated in Ann Arbor, another 2,000 at the White House. At the University of Wisconsin at Madison daily mass meetings drew crowds of 1,500 to 2,000. Several hundred smaller demonstrations were held across the United States, but according to

² Halstead, *Out Now*, 684; DeBenedetti, *American Ordeal*, 298; Wells, *War Within*, 476-478.

historians Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, nationwide protests were muted, almost resigned.³

In Canada protests were even more muted. An internal report prepared for the Young Socialists' Executive Council Plenum in December was telling. Reviewing the year's antiwar activities, it focused more on the humiliating defeat of the ARVN in Laos rather than on any protest it generated against the invasion itself.⁴ Protests in Canada were indeed few and far between. In Vancouver the Vietnam Action Committee was able to draw little more than one hundred people to a rally at the US Consulate on 4 February – actually, not a bad turnout given that reports of the imminent invasion had only begun to leak out the day before.⁵ In Montreal an ad hoc committee calling itself the Mobilization Committee Against American Aggression in Indo-China led an undisclosed number of students from McGill, the Université de Montréal, and the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) in a march to the US Consulate. The committee had been formed earlier in the week in response to the invasion. It was the first demonstration at the consulate since the Kent State demonstrations the previous May.⁶ Also significant was the participation of students from two of Montreal's French-speaking universities. Francophones had been noticeable by their absence from Montreal antiwar activities since the 1968 Hemispheric Conference. In Ottawa the VMC led a handful of protesters to the US Embassy and later the Department of External Affairs to demonstrate both the invasion and Canada's failure to protest it. The official response by the Government of

³ Halstead, *Out Now*, 684; Wells, *War Within*, 276-278; DeBenedetti, *American Ordeal*, 299. According to DeBenedetti, 50,000 took part in protest activity in Washington, DC during the two days following the invasion. Neither Halstead nor Wells mention this statistic.

⁴ "Anti-War Report," *Young Socialists Executive Council Plenum Reports*, December 1971, Ross Dowson Fonds, (hereinafter referred to as RDF) Box 20, File 1, Library and Archives Canada.

⁵ "Placard army mobilizes again as new threat looms in Laos," *Vancouver Sun*, 5 February 1971, 9.

⁶ "Laos march today," *McGill Daily*, 11 February 1971, 3.

Canada had been to refer the matter to the ICC, which Canada was a member of, to investigate the invasion. Elsewhere in Ottawa that week Claire Culhane, representing VOW, was able to buttonhole Prime Minister Trudeau at the entrance to a constitutional conference. Culhane grilled the Prime Minister on Canada's position on the Laos invasion, but Trudeau simply reiterated his decision to refer the matter to the ICC.⁷ Elsewhere in the world, James Endicott attended an emergency meeting of the World Peace Council in Budapest on behalf of the Canadian Peace Congress. The meeting had been called in response to the Laos invasion and was attended by representatives of 124 countries. Also attending from Canada were representatives of VOW. Following his return to Canada Endicott embarked on a speaking tour in which he condemned the expansion of the war into Laos, but there is no evidence of further mobilization efforts being made in Canada.⁸ For Canadians the invasion of Laos was but a blip on the antiwar radar screen. Much more concerted efforts would go into preparing for the International Day of Protest planned for the following April.

In the United States, another contributing factor for the decline in antiwar activism was continued division within the movement. The National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam had split apart. Although never formally disbanding, it had ceased functioning by the end of May 1970. In its place sprang two rival coalitions. The first was the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), grouped

⁷ "Protest: Laotian buildup prompts reaction," *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 February 1971, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00423, Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Ottawa, Ontario, Stack 3; Murray Goldblatt, "Sharp worried attack will hurt neutrality, urges probe by ICC," *The Globe and Mail*, 9 February 1971, 31; Malcolm Reid, "'Professional protester' once ran a hospital near My Lai: Woman asks Trudeau to seek conference on Indochina war," *The Globe and Mail*, 10 February 1971, 10.

⁸ Terry Sharon, "Endicott Speaks in Alberta," *Young Worker*, Vol. 2, No. 7, July 1971, 3, clipping in Communist Party of Canada Collection, (hereinafter referred to as CPC) Box 59, Library and Archives Canada.

around the Socialist Workers' Party and their allies. NPAC continued to advance the line of immediate troop withdrawals and endeavoured to build mass actions. Its rival, the People's Committee for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), centred around individuals such as radical pacifist Dave Dellinger, former SDSer Rennie Davis, and the Progressive Labor rump organization of SDS. This second group took a more general anti-imperialist line, more and more typical of new left protest. PCPJ also advocated mass civil disobedience, or what Fred Halstead referred to as "confrontationism." Also within the PCPJ coalition was a reluctant Communist Party that tended to advocate supporting antiwar Democratic candidates in the upcoming elections. NPAC declared the week of 19-24 April 1971 National Peace Action Week. It would feature local antiwar actions nationwide throughout the week, culminating in two mass demonstrations – one in Washington, the other in San Francisco, on Saturday, 24 April. Eventually PCPJ reluctantly endorsed the campaign and the united front was able to bring off the largest demonstrations of the war. In Washington between 200,000 and 500,000 marched. In San Francisco the number ranged between 125,000 and 300,000.⁹ From this point on the movement in the US steadily declined.

Although organizers in the United States did not specifically call for participation outside of the United States, the April actions were indeed international in scope, with demonstrations occurring throughout Europe and Japan.¹⁰ Canada too saw widespread involvement. In the nation's capital the VMC mobilized 150 protesters to march from

⁹ Halstead, *Out Now*, 653-660, 680-712; DeBenedetti, *American Ordeal*, 304. DeBenedetti uses numbers provided by government sources, which Halstead asserts were grossly misrepresented to diminish the protests' importance.

¹⁰ "Canadian peace marchers were generally peaceful," *Vancouver Sun* (CP), 26 April 1971, 3. Halstead usually indicates which protests involved international participation; he gives no such indication for 23 April 1971.

Lansdowne Park to Parliament Hill.¹¹ The national NDP, holding its convention in the city that weekend, voted almost unanimously on a resolution condemning the war as indefensible. Outgoing party leader Tommy Douglas, echoing the VMC line, argued in favour of the resolution, stating that the quickest way to end the war was to withdraw immediately, “without slowdowns, windups, and Vietnamization.” Douglas attacked the Canadian government for continuing to supply \$300 million worth of arms annually to the US for use in Indochina. Stated Douglas: “Our hands are bloody before the bar of history.” The convention observed a minute’s silence as protest against the war and encouraged delegates to attend a rally outside the convention centre as a prelude to the march on Parliament Hill.¹²

In Vancouver protests spanned two days. They began with a candle-lit march through downtown Vancouver on Friday night. Attracting about two hundred and fifty people from church, peace and labour organizations, as well as a contingent from the Young Communist League, protesters marched single-file behind a banner reading “End Canadian Support of Indochina War.” Demonstrating a more assertively antiwar labour movement, Jack Phillips addressed the crowd on behalf of the Vancouver Labour Council and activists distributed postcards condemning the war addressed to Prime Minister Trudeau.¹³ On Saturday the Vietnam Action Committee led between 600 and 700 marchers from the Canadian National railway station to the US consulate. With 200 women leading the procession, a small group of yippies continually upstaged the march

¹¹ RCMP Report, “Protests and Demonstrations – Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist), Canada,” 30 April 1971, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00423, Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Ottawa, Ontario, stack 3.

¹² “Party condemns Vietnam war as indefensible,” *The Globe and Mail*, 26 April 1971, 1. Although the resolution was carried almost unanimously, many were unhappy with it as it did not call for any action. It was merely a statement of protest. The chair of the convention was able to cut off debate on the motion before any of the delegates could advance amendments to the resolution calling for concrete action.

¹³ LLN, “Candle Parade in Vancouver,” *Young Worker*, Vol. 2, No. 5, May 1971, 4, CPC, Box 59.

by taunting police and occasionally sitting down in front of the marchers. At the consulate the yippies attempted to burn an American flag, but VAC marshals extinguished the fire.¹⁴

In Winnipeg 300 marched from Portage and Main Streets to Young United Church. Police stopped the group from carrying an American flag with a peace sign over the stars, stating that to do so they would have to carry a Canadian flag as well.¹⁵ Police did not indicate whether the maple leaf would require a peace sign too.

In Montreal, the Mobilization Committee Against the War in Indochina, formed the previous February in response to the invasion of Laos, organized a demonstration in that city. The Montreal action was significant for several reasons. First, the participation of the Young Communist League and the Canadian Peace Congress indicates renewed CP activity in the antiwar movement. Secondly, large representation from the Quebec Federation of Labour and the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU) showed a reinvigorated commitment on the part of Quebec labour to the antiwar movement. Continuing the trend following the October Crisis, Québécois nationalists continued to return to the antiwar movement. This was demonstrated by the presence of the Parti Québécois. A total of twenty three organizations participated, included VOW and the Montreal Moratorium Committee. Numbers of those attending the rally at the US consulate on Saturday vary, with Canadian Press reporting 700 and the Young

¹⁴ Mike Finlay, "'End arms sale to U.S.' call as 700 protest Viet war," *Vancouver Sun*, 26 April 1971, 27; LLN, "Candle Parade," *Young Worker*.

¹⁵ Photo and caption only, *Winnipeg Free Press*, April 26, 1971, 4.

Communist League claiming 2,500. It was, according to the YCL, the largest antiwar protest in the city since 1966.¹⁶

The largest demonstration took place on Sunday, 25 April in Toronto, where the VMC led between 1,500 and 2,500 in a march from Queen's Park to Nathan Phillips Square. Chanting the slogans of the Trotskyist line, "Withdraw U.S. Troops Now," and "End Canadian Complicity," VMC organizers had been joined by a contingent of the YCL in organizing the event. The Party had recently made efforts to rebuild the YCL and antiwar activity was one way in which to do so. George Addison chaired the rally; speakers included Joe Myler, a Vietnam veteran, Pat Lawler of the NDP, Gordon Massie of the Communist Party, and Claire Culhane of VOW.¹⁷

Protests took place in smaller centres across the country. In Edmonton 300 marched, in Calgary 200. In Atlantic Canada 300 protested in Halifax, thirty in Fredericton. In Brandon a group of sixty held a rally at Brandon University and then travelled seventy miles to the International Peace Gardens on the US border where they were joined by 200 American comrades.¹⁸

While perhaps not as dramatic as the demonstrations of May 1970, the April 1971 International Day of Protest showed that the Canadian antiwar movement was still capable of mounting a nationwide antiwar protest. The rapprochement between

¹⁶ "Canadian peace marchers," *Vancouver Sun*, 3; Claude Demers, "Montreal tells Trudeau to Pressure Nixon," *Young Worker*, Vol. 2, No. 5, May 1971, 4, CPC, Box 59; photo and caption only, *Montreal Star*, 26 April 1971, 3.

¹⁷ "Protest Against the War," *Young Worker*, Vol. 2, No. 4, April 1971, 5, CPC, Box 59; ZS and CS, "Get Out Now say Toronto Demonstrators," *Young Worker*, Vol. 2, No. 5, May 1971, 4, CPC, Box 59; "1,500 march in Toronto protest against the war in Vietnam," *The Globe and Mail*, 26 April 1971, 17. Ironically, in her speech, Culhane denounced the Canadian government for not enforcing of the Foreign Enlistment Act against Canadians serving in the American armed forces in Vietnam, legislation she cites in her biography that was a deciding factor in her decision not to serve in the Spanish Civil War. See Lowe, *One Woman Army*, 36-41.

¹⁸ "Canadian peace marchers," *Vancouver Sun*, 3.

Trotskyists and Communists continued to hold and both tendencies were able to direct their organizing capabilities towards the same goals. Widespread support from labour – both in English and French Canada – the NDP, the Parti Québécois, church and women’s organizations also contributed to the successful turnout. Such unity of purpose would hold for the next International Day of Protest, but to a large degree it would not be the war in Indochina that would be protested.

By the fall of 1971 many believed the war in Southeast Asia was about to end. People had good reason to believe so. Despite continued fighting in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, most of the combat on all sides was being conducted by Asians. US casualties were at their lowest since American escalation in 1965. Draft calls had been reduced by eighty percent since April. President Nixon announced his intention to visit the People’s Republic of China the following year, and the United States had ceased its opposition to China’s admission to the United Nations.¹⁹ Still, the air war continued unabated and American capital continued to bankroll the anticommunist belligerents. And despite drastically reduced numbers, Americans did continue to kill and die in a war that had now gone on almost twice as long as America’s involvement in World War Two.

Rather than focusing on Washington, DC, for the fall antiwar campaign, NPAC called for local, nation-wide, mass demonstrations on 6 November. Its rival, the PCPJ, planned a more general “Evict Nixon” campaign in Washington in late October. Turnout for the November demonstrations was good, with 40,000 marching in San Francisco, 30,000 in New York, 10,000 in Boston and 8,000 in both Chicago and Minneapolis. The 6 November campaign saw the largest local demonstrations of the war in Denver and Houston with 15,000 and 5,000 respectively.

¹⁹ Halstead, *Out Now*, 753-754.

That week also witnessed widespread demonstrations in Canada as well, but they were as often as not unrelated to the war in Indochina. The issue once again was Amchitka. One of the westernmost islands in the Aleutian chain, Amchitka had been used as a navy air base during the Second World War. Throughout the 1950s it had been part of the DEW Line defence network. In October 1965 it had been the site of an underground nuclear test blast. Considerable opposition emerged in Canada in October 1969 when a second bomb was tested there. A third test was scheduled for 8 November 1971. It was to be the biggest so far, a five-megaton Spartan missile warhead.²⁰

In an internal document distributed subsequent to the protests, the Young Socialists asserted that in almost all cases the November antiwar demonstrations were linked to anti-Amchitka protest,²¹ but this was not entirely accurate. While the Trotskyist movement actively participated with other groups in building mass demonstrations to the blast, to a large degree the Amchitka issue eclipsed the war entirely. Indeed, opposition to the Aleutian test blast became a decidedly Canadian moment in the antiwar movement, the issue never arising in the United States.

The Communist Party, and its ally the Canadian Peace Congress, as well played a role in the fall demonstrations. The Peace Congress published a four-page pamphlet promoting both anticipated antiwar demonstrations emanating from the PCPJ's October demonstration, as well as the NPAC's 6 November campaign.²² The Communist Party itself, at its twenty first convention at the end of November passed a resolution in support of the peoples of Indochina and calling upon the Canadian government to dissociate itself

²⁰ *League for Socialist Action/Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière – Discussion Bulletin* 1972, No. 12, RDF, Box 2, File 23;

²¹ "Cross-Country Fall Anti-War Reports for YS/LJS Plenum," 29-30 December 1971, RDF, Box 2, File 11.

²² Pamphlet, "We Now Know," Canadian Peace Congress, Kenny, Box 54, File 1.

from the war, halt the sale of arms to the United States, and call upon the US to withdraw its troops. Party leader William Kashtan gave a stirring speech in support of the motion.²³ In Vancouver, however, the Party was lambasted by the Young Socialists for allegedly failing even to mention the scheduled demonstrations.²⁴

Protests were a direct statement to the United States that Canadians condemned the test. They were also directed at the Prime Minister. While the Government of Canada was on record as opposing the blast, Prime Minister Trudeau refused to personally contact President Nixon to request a halt to the test. Stated Trudeau, "If I were to approach Mr. Nixon on every subject of disagreement between our countries, I would be on the phone to him pretty often." It became apparent in the days leading up to the blast that the Canadian government was soft-peddalling its own opposition.²⁵

In Manitoba protests began a day before scheduled actions in the rest of the country. On Tuesday, 2 November the University of Manitoba hosted Amchitka Day, a day-long teach-in organized by a coalition calling itself the Amchitka Day Committee. While the University of Manitoba Student Union appeared to take on the primary organizing role, other organizations involved included Pollution Probe and the VMC. About ten other student organizations were also involved. Most classes were cancelled for the day to allow students to attend. Following the teach-in, about 2,500 marched on the US Consulate.²⁶ Nationwide, the bulk of protests followed the next day.

²³ "Resolution on Vietnam – 21st Convention, Communist Party of Canada, 27-29 November 1971, Kenny, Box 6, File 1; "The Growing Crisis and the Tasks of the Party," Speech by William Kashtan at the 21st Convention, Communist Party of Canada, 27-29 November 1971, in same file.

²⁴ "Cross Country," RDF, Box 2, File 11.

²⁵ John Gray, "Trudeau: Canada's hands tied," *Montreal Star*, 4 November 1971, 53.

²⁶ "Police Protect U.S. Consulate," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 3 November 1971, 1, 10.

Despite tension between Vancouver Communists and Trotskyists, turnout on the west coast was substantial – ten thousand British Columbians protested. The largest demonstrations in the province were in Kelowna and Victoria, each with 3,000 protesters. Heavy rain kept numbers down in Vancouver where only a thousand took part. In addition to many high school and university students participating, organized labour also supported the protests. The British Columbia Federation of Labour called for a half-hour general strike in support of the November 3 Amchitka demonstrations. Although numerous labour organizations endorsed the protest, very few of their members actually participated. Those who did came mostly from the IWA and UE. The Vancouver demonstration at the US Consulate drew between 1,000 and 1,500. In addition to labour support, it was organized by several groups, including the Vancouver Students' Action Committee Against Nuclear Testing, the Canadian Coalition Against Nuclear Testing, and the University of British Columbia Alma Mater Society.²⁷

Similarly, protests in Ontario on 3 November were almost exclusively concerned with Amchitka. In Ottawa, a series of demonstrations at the US Embassy garnered 1,000 protesters. But the main focus of Ontario protests was aimed at closing the border. Groups of students, workers, clergy, housewives and others blocked four border crossings. At Sarnia 3,000 jammed the Bluewater Bridge; at Windsor 5,000 blocked the Ambassador Bridge. At the Rainbow Bridge in Niagara Falls folk singer Stan Rogers placed a dummy corpse atop a coffin containing 6,000 signatures of those opposing the

²⁷ "Massive Amchitka protest planned," *Vancouver Sun*, 3 November 1971, C39; "Crowd of 1,300 braves rain here to protest at U.S. consulate," *Vancouver Sun*, 3 November 1971, 1,2; "1,500 Brave Downpour to Protest Blast: Roving demonstrators halt downtown traffic," *Vancouver Sun*, 4 November 1971, 39; Ken Romain, "A-test demonstration spreads into streets in Vancouver," *The Globe and Mail*, 4 November 1971, 1. In addition to UE and IWA, other participating labour organizations included the British Columbia-Yukon Building Trades Council, the Letter Carriers' Union, and the British Columbia Fishermen's Union.

test. He was accompanied by 2,500 other protesters organized by the McMaster University student union. The protest resulted in traffic being diverted to other border crossings along the Niagara Frontier. Even in Eastern Ontario, 1,500 blocked the border crossing at Cornwall. Again, in coverage of these protests no mention was made of the war in Southeast Asia; the issue was exclusively Amchitka.²⁸

The exception to this was Toronto, where the issues of the war and Amchitka blended. A series of demonstrations unfolded over the course of November 3, but the slogan was the same: “Stop Amchitka, Stop the War!” Again demonstrating renewed labour involvement, activities started when 1,200 delegates to the convention of the Ontario Federation of Labour left the Royal York Hotel and marched to the US Consulate. Shortly thereafter they were joined by an even greater number of high school students. In all there were four separate demonstrations that day – two at the consulate, one at Nathan Phillips Square, and one at Queen’s Park – with combined participation of 8,000. As protests wound up that afternoon at the Consulate, George Addison of the VMC led protesters in a march from there to Queen’s Park for the final rally of the day. While many dropped out along the way, 2,500 arrived. In addition, the League for Socialist Action organized teach-ins at both York University and at the University of

²⁸ “Angry Canadians Block Border: Thousands march in protest,” *Vancouver Sun*, 4 November 1971, 1; Rudy Platiel, “2,500 sing O Canada and chant in Amchitka protest at Niagara Falls,” *The Globe and Mail*, 4 November 1971, 1. Although the action at Niagara Falls was organized by the McMaster University student union, coverage of protests at other border crossings does not indicate which organizations were responsible for organizing them. While the Trotskyist movement hinted that it was responsible (see “Cross Country,” RDF, Box 2, File 11), clearly the actions were the result of much larger initiatives involving labour, student, and other groups. Curiously, in the case of the action at Cornwall, while the *Vancouver Sun* reported 1,500 participants, the Young Socialists, who were much more inclined to inflate such numbers, only reported one tenth that.

Toronto, where, according to the LSA, there was no longer a functioning antiwar group on campus.²⁹

While British Columbia and Ontario might have boasted the greatest aggregate number of protesters, other protests, big and small, took place throughout the country on 3 November, but again, the focus was largely on Amchitka. The following is a list of smaller Canadian cities that experienced protests on 3 November and the estimated number of protesters participating:

Victoria	250
Edmonton	1,500
Calgary	unknown
Lethbridge	350
Saskatoon	5,000
Regina	500
Montreal	1,000
Fredericton	250
Saint John	400
Moncton	1,000
St. Stephen	200
Halifax	150-200 ³⁰

²⁹ Warren Gerard, "Two windows are broken at U.S. consulate as thousands protest Amchitka nuclear test," *The Globe and Mail*, 3 November 1971, 1,2; "Angry Canadians," *Vancouver Sun*, 1; "Cross-Country," RDF, Box 2, File 11.

³⁰ "Angry Canadians," *Vancouver Sun*, 1; "Cross-Country," RDF, Box 2, File 11.

On a cross-country scale, participation in the 3 November 1971 Amchitka protests exceeded anything the antiwar movement had been able to accomplish since its beginnings in 1964.

The Amchitka demonstrations are significant for two reasons. The first is that they ushered in the arrival of the antinuclear/environmentalist movement in Canada, sowing the seeds of the organization that would eventually take the name Greenpeace. The Don't Make a Wave Committee had been founded in Vancouver to protest the blast. In an operation it named Greenpeace Too, from which the future environmental organization would take its name, the Committee purchased a former Canadian minesweeper, the Edgewater Fortune, and with a crew of twenty eight attempted to sail it to the blast site. The vessel was still 700 miles short of its target when the blast took place on Saturday, 6 November and so it returned to port. Although its mission may have been unsuccessful, Greenpeace, without question, went on to become the most renowned environmental activist organization to emerge from the Vietnam era.³¹

Secondly, but more pertinent to our discussion, is that the 3 November demonstrations were, to a degree, divorced from the war in Indochina. This was in spite of the antiwar movement participating in, and in some cases leading the protests. All spoke on one issue – Amchitka. Clearly, the prospect of a five megaton nuclear blast in Alaska spoke to Canadians in a way the ongoing war in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos never could have. The risks of fallout from the test were much more tangible to many Canadians than a war that in many minds was almost over. As well, Amchitka protests can also be seen as the apex of left nationalism that had been growing throughout the

³¹ "Protest ship didn't make it," *Montreal Star*, 8 November 1971, 54. For more on Greenpeace see Michael King, *Death of the Rainbow Warrior* (New York: Penguin: 1986); David Robie, *Eyes of Fire: The Last Voyage of the Rainbow Warrior* (Philadelphia: New Society Press, 1987).

1960s in Canada and were best represented at the time by the emergence of the Waffle movement within the NDP.³² Surprisingly though, there is no specific mention of such groups supporting the protests. From the perspective of those organizing antiwar protests in Canada to coincide with demonstrations in the United States, the Amchitka issue was both a blessing and a curse. Particularly for those attempting to use the issue to mobilize people with a view to recruitment – and likely the Trotskyists were not alone in this category – Amchitka was a gift. But in terms of getting people to continue to think about the war in Southeast Asia, the Aleutian blast was a diversion. But it is doubtful the Amchitka demonstrations would have gone ahead, let alone experienced the success that they did, without the antiwar movement. In addition to providing much of its organizational talents, the antiwar movement provided the zeitgeist that energized people and motivated them to get into the streets. Also at work was a sense of Canadian nationalism. The Amchitka blast posed a palpable threat to Canada and Canadians arose in record numbers to defend their country from US militarism.

Despite the outpouring of Canadian militancy mid-week, in many cases antiwar groups went ahead with demonstrations on 6 November in solidarity with the NPAC campaign in the United States, but while also continuing to protest Amchitka. While somewhat obscured by actions earlier in the week, they were not entirely unsuccessful. In

³²For more on left nationalism in Canada see James Laxer, "The Americanization of the Canadian Student Movement," in *Close the 49th Parallel etc: the Americanization of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970) 276-286. For discussion of the Waffle movement see John Bullen, "The Ontario Waffle and the Struggle for an Independent Socialist Canada: Conflict Within the NDP," *Canadian Historical Review*, LXIV, 2, 1983, 188-215. Also see the following articles in *Studies in Political Economy*, which featured a special two-issue feature on the 20th anniversary of the Waffle. Articles in volume 32, Summer 1990 include John Smart, "The Waffle's Impact on the New Democratic Party," 177-186; Patricia Smart, "The Waffle and Quebec," 195-201; Mel Watkins, "The Waffle and the National Question," 173-176; Reg Whitaker, "The 20th Anniversary of the Waffle: Introduction." Articles featured in volume 33, Autumn, 1990 include Gregory Albo, "Canada, Left-Nationalism, and Younger Voices," 161-173; Varda Burstyn, "The Waffle and the Women's Movement," 175-184. Gilbert Levine, "The Waffle and the Labour Movement," 185-192.

Vancouver the VAC sponsored a march attracting 250. In this case, the emphasis was specifically on Indochina.³³ In Saskatoon 150 marched to City Hall. In Winnipeg a group calling itself the Action Committee on Amchitka fielded between 300 and 500 marchers on a trek from City Hall to the University of Winnipeg. Later, a group broke off from this protest and launched an impromptu demonstration at the US Consulate. Just how impromptu it was, however, is questionable as most members of the Action Committee participated in it.³⁴ Even after bringing out so many for the Wednesday protests in Toronto, the LSA was still able to bring out between 2,000 and 4,000 for the Saturday march in that city. Elsewhere in Ontario many returned to the border for another round of Amchitka protests, with an unknown number at Fort Erie, 1,500 returning to the Ambassador Bridge in Windsor, even 150 in Sault Ste. Marie.³⁵

In Montreal the focus was again on the war. There, the Mobilization Committee to Stop the War in Indochina enlisted the support of the Quebec Federation of Labour, the CNTU, and the Parti Québécois in drawing out a crowd of 2,000. En route past the US Consulate, a breakaway group of between 200 and 300 stopped to burn a gasoline-soaked papier maché representation of a Cariboo airplane. The march continued on to CIL House

³³ "250 city marchers protest blast, war," *Vancouver Sun*, 8 November 1971, 8.

³⁴ Groups identified as participating included the CPC (M-L), the NDY, Women's Liberation, and the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood. "Two youths Arrested In Protest," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 8 November 1971, 3. Another report indicates that it was the Winnipeg VMC that organized the march, however the VMC dissociated itself from the demonstration. While reporting on the action in their cross-country roundup after the November demonstrations, the Young Socialists took pains to indicate that they had not supported the actions because they had no leadership over it. Given that Communist alderman Joe Zuken was one of the featured speakers, it might be reasonable to assume the Communist Party played a role in organizing this demonstration; one of the rare cases in the November demonstrations where they displayed a leadership role. See "Cross-Country," RDF, Box 2, File 11; RCMP Report, "International Day of Protest, Re: United States Action in Vietnam, November 6, 1971 – Canada," 24 November 1971, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00422, Winnipeg Vietnam Mobilization Committee, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Stack 3.

³⁵ "Cross-Country," RDF, Box 2, File 11; "3 Flareups Reported: Protests Mostly Peaceful," *Winnipeg Free Press* (CP) 8 November 1971, 1, 9.

where demonstrators protested that corporation's production of explosives for use in Vietnam.³⁶

Finally, in St. John's, 350 demonstrated at the US Consulate. Police arrested three after protesters broke five of the building's windows.³⁷ One can only speculate as to how many more the antiwar movement would have been able to bring out into the streets on 6 November had not so much steam already been blown off earlier in the week by Amchitka actions. It is possible the number would have been lower as clearly many were mobilized not by the war, but the bomb test. Nevertheless, the antiwar movement in Canada was still clearly a going concern, and still taking its cue from the movement in the US.

While the Trotskyists continued to dominate the antiwar movement, the Communist Party and its allies in the Canadian Peace Congress suffered a substantial setback. In the context of the Sino-Soviet split, which by then had been on-going for a decade, on 16 December James Endicott resigned from the Congress. Joining him were his daughter Ella, Executive Secretary of the organization; Mrs. Eva Sanderson, Vice President; and Lukin Robinson, Treasurer. In an undated letter from the National Executive Committee to all members of the National Committee and participating organizations of the Congress, leaders of the organization indicated that Endicott's position on China did not correspond with the position of the Congress. Also, recent developments between India and Pakistan sharpened the issue. According to the leadership, Endicott tendered his resignation only "after all efforts failed to convince him

³⁶ Mark Wilson, "Protesters smash city police cars," *Montreal Star*, 8 November 1971, 1, 3; "4-mile march quiet: Montreal raps blast," *Montreal Star*, 8 November 1971, 54; "3 Flareups," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 1, 9. Cariboods, made in Canada, were used by the Americans in Vietnam for tactical supply.

³⁷ "Cross-Country," RDF, Box 2, File 11.

not to resign.”³⁸ Endicott, however, countered such claims in a letter of his own, insisting that his resignation came as the result of increased pressure on him to do so by those claiming otherwise. Endicott cited his detractors’ displeasure with his support of China in the Sino-Soviet split. According to Endicott they claimed such positions hurt the Congress. Endicott insisted that his discussion of China had always been independent of the Congress, but that those pushing for his resignation perceived such discussion as “anti-Sovietism.” Endicott’s letter ended with a criticism of the USSR for its support of the Indian invasion of East Pakistan, asserting that in doing so, the USSR had “betrayed the principles of the World Peace Council.”³⁹

Following Endicott’s departure, the Canadian Peace Congress moved on. At its Conference that spring delegates elected a new executive comprised of Reverend John Hanly Morgan as President, and Edward M. Sloan (head of the Montreal Moratorium Committee), John Beeching and Jean Vautour as Co-Chairmen. The conference also reaffirmed its ties to the World Peace Council and approved a call from the Versailles World Peace Assembly to make 1972 the year to end the war in Vietnam on the basis of the nine-point program laid out by the PRG.⁴⁰

While the Canadian Peace Congress recovered from the departure of Endicott, many on the left in Canada geared up to protest the state visit of President Richard Nixon to Canada 13-15 April. Activists held several protests in Ottawa during that time, some by an increasingly fringe left with limited connection to the antiwar movement. When Nixon arrived in Ottawa at Uplands Air Base on Thursday, 13 April, he was greeted by a

³⁸ Letter, National Executive Committee, Canadian Peace Congress, to all members of the National Committee and Participating Organizations of the Canadian Peace Congress, nd, Kenny, Box 53, File 10.

³⁹ Letter, James G. Endicott to Friends and Fellow Workers for Peace, January 1971, Kenny, Box 53, File 7.

⁴⁰ “Summary of the Canadian Peace Congress Conference,” 20-21 May 1972, Kenny, Box 53, File 6.

cheering crowd of 400, including Wolf Cubs and Boy Scouts. Across the street from Parliament, at the US Embassy, thirty five demonstrators stood in the rain for over an hour, protesting Nixon's visit and US imperialism in general. Most were members of the Canadian Liberation Movement (CLM), a radical group that had been growing since 1969. About half a dozen of those gathered were from the Ottawa Waffle.⁴¹ Two more demonstrations occurred on Friday at Parliament Hill where Nixon gave his address to a joint session of Parliament. The first was composed largely of about two dozen members of an otherwise unknown group calling itself the Progressive Youth Wing of the World Socialist Front (Marxist-Leninist). Given that there were three times as many police present, there were no incidents. The second demonstration was composed of about forty five Communists and their leader William Kashtan. They had taken a chartered bus from Toronto that day.⁴² The main demonstration took place on Parliament Hill on Saturday as Nixon was signing the Great Lakes cleanup agreement. Although organized by the Ottawa VMC, which brought out about between 400 and 600 supporters, other participating organizations included the Canadian Party of Labor and its affiliate the Worker-Student Alliance, Red Dawn, and a group of African Americans from Buffalo. As well, a group of about fifty CLM members, which eventually grew to about one hundred, lined the front of the protest and jabbed RCMP officers with the ends of their picket signs. They also managed to tear down the US flag and burn it on the Centennial

⁴¹ "PM, Nixon to talk just 3 hours," *Toronto Daily Star*, 6 April 1972, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00423, Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Ottawa, Ontario, Stack 4; "Warm welcome to Ottawa: Nixon lauds Canadian identity: President expects friendship to grow," *The Globe and Mail*, 14 April 1972, 1, 2. The Canadian Liberation Movement was an organization "dedicated to the overthrow of capitalism and American imperialism." Headquartered in Toronto, with branches in several Canadian cities, its publishing arm was NC Press. See fond description, Canadian Liberation Movement, McMaster University Archives, <http://library.mcmaster.ca/archives/findaids/fonds/c/canlib.htm>, accessed 4 February 2010.

⁴² Stanley McDowell, "Anti-Nixon protesters outnumbered by police," *The Globe and Mail*, 15 April 1972, 11.

Flame. The greatest threat of violence that day was a shoving match between CLM and VMC supporters. The final demonstration surrounding the Nixon visit was later that day, again on Parliament Hill, where an unlikely coalition of 200 members of the New Democratic Youth, the Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist), the CLM and the Ottawa Waffle turned out. The Waffle group later dissociated itself from the event.⁴³

In a fashion similar to Amchitka, the Nixon protest had the effect of obscuring the antiwar protests that had been called for the following week. In the United States, NPAC had scheduled mass demonstrations as part of what had become the annual April antiwar protests. The spring campaign was given momentum when the PAVN launched a massive Easter campaign. On 30 March three divisions drove across the border, again humiliating ARVN forces and Nixon's policy of Vietnamization. Nixon, viewing the offensive as an attempt to undermine his ongoing campaign for re-election, was furious and ordered massive bombings of Vietnam – north and south. According to Seymour Hersh, Nixon was now “conducting the war by temper tantrum.”⁴⁴ As Canadians protested Nixon's Ottawa visit, demonstrations began across the United States. On 21 April students at over 150 colleges and universities conducted a nation-wide strike. Though paling in comparison to May 1970, protest actions closed many campuses. When the NPAC-sponsored demonstrations took place on 22 April, 50,000 marched in New York, 30,000 in San Francisco, and 20,000 in Los Angeles.⁴⁵ Protests were also planned in twenty other countries, though no coverage was given to them in the North American

⁴³ Stanley McDowell, “Nixon greets hostile chants with smile, wave: Protesters yank U.S. standard off Parliament Hill flagpole,” *The Globe and Mail*, 17 April 1972, 27; RCMP Report, “Young Socialists,” Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario, 25 April 1972, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00423, Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Ottawa, Ontario, Stack 4.

⁴⁴ Wells, *War Within*, 536.

⁴⁵ Wells, *War Within*, 538-539.

press. In Canada it appeared that people had lost interest in the war in Indochina, including the most active adherents of the antiwar movement, the VMC. In Ottawa, they were only able to bring out twenty to a rally on Parliament Hill; in Toronto, even with the support of fifteen other organizations only 150 marched from Nathan Phillips Square to the US Consulate. Surprisingly, antiwar organizers in Halifax were able to bring out fifty people.⁴⁶ It appeared that the VMC could no longer get out the kind of crowds to protest the war that it had been able to since its founding in 1968. The antiwar movement in Canada was dying.

This was admitted. In an internal document, the Young Socialists indicated that the antiwar movement was experiencing a lull:

Aside from Amchitka, there has been an absence of explosive struggles. While the sentiment against the war is greater than it has ever been, there is a hesitancy and an unwillingness to come into action against it.

The document went on to blame Moscow and Peking (Beijing) for trying to force the Vietnamese to abandon the struggle. "The Nixon-Brezhnev-Mao entente," it continued, "has deflated the antiwar movement in the United States and Canada."⁴⁷ But despite Trotskyist accusations, the demise of the antiwar movement was likely due to other reasons. The widely-held belief that the war was about to end likely created an attitude among many to the effect of "why protest a war that's almost over anyway?" Added to that is the issue of old age. American combat troops had now been in Vietnam for over seven years. The antiwar movement was as old as the war and people were tired.

⁴⁶ "Anti-war rally attracts 50," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 24 April 1972, 16; "Anti-American speeches heard by about 50," *Mail Star* (Halifax), 24 April 1972, clipping in Nova Scotia Committee to Aid American War Objectors, File 1.4.

⁴⁷ "The Power and Importance of the Anti-War Movement," in *Young Socialist Discussion Bulletin*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1972, RDF, Box 20, File 2. This publication was for internal discussion only and not distributed to the general public.

Amchitka provided a momentary diversion, but much history had passed since 1965 and many new movements had supplanted the antiwar movement. In addition to environmental issues, women's, aboriginal and gay rights were increasingly coming to the forefront. Identity politics were beginning to replace the politics of the antiwar movement.

Still, the Trotskyist movement soldiered on in its efforts, continuing to incorporate the antiwar language of their comrades in the United States. South of the border the Student Mobilization Committee (SMC) had effectively functioned as the student wing of the Trotskyist antiwar camp and had garnered great success throughout its existence. Beginning in the fall of 1972 the concept of student mobilization committees came to dominate discussion in the Canadian Trotskyist movement. Despite its effective control of local antiwar organizations across the country,⁴⁸ Trotskyists now declared the proliferation of SMCs throughout Canada to be its priority.

The main vehicle for carrying on this (antiwar) work and building the student anti-war movement are the SMCs. The SMCs should operate on a regional basis and encompass all the anti-war committees from the high schools and campuses. The SMCs, with a center in Toronto, should give the antiwar movement leadership, enabling for better coordination.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ *The Mobilizer*, a publication which began publishing in 1971 with the assistance of the University of Guelph student paper *The Ontarion*, and a grant from the University of Waterloo Federation of Students, listed the following antiwar groups as contacts in its September 1972 issue: Victoria Student Antiwar Committee, Vancouver Vietnam Action Committee, Edmonton Indochina Action Committee, Saskatoon Committee to End the War in Southeast Asia, Prairie Student Mobilization Committee (Edmonton), Winnipeg Vietnam Action Committee, Simcoe CEWV, Kitchener-Waterloo VMC, Guelph VMC, Niagara Peace Movement, Hamilton VMC, Toronto VMC, York University CEWV, York CEWV (Richmond Hill), Peterborough CEWV, Ottawa VMC, Comité Québécois Contre La Guerre En Indochine, Collect Vietnam (the location of these two groups is unclear but likely Montreal), Fredericton VMC, and the Halifax Antiwar Committee. To what extent the Trotskyists exerted influence over these groups is uncertain, but given the tendency of antiwar groups not to give credit to the competition, a minimum degree of influence can be assumed. Notice, for instance, the absence of the Canadian Peace Congress or any of its affiliates. Also note the absence of the Montreal Moratorium Committee, a group with close links to the Communist Party. See "Contact Us," *The Mobilizer*, Vol. 2, No. 2, September 1972, in Pocock, Box 27, File 16.

⁴⁹ "The Power and Importance," *Young Socialist Discussion Bulletin*, 18.

The focus of this work was to build support for the International Day of Protest that NPAC had scheduled for 18 November. In preparation, Trotskyists called for antiwar conferences to take place in Toronto and Vancouver on 30 September, and Ottawa and Edmonton on 1 and 14 October respectively.⁵⁰

Despite organizers having almost four months to prepare for the International Day of Protest, turnout was a flop. Even in the United States, where protests were held in twenty one cities, attendance that was usually counted in the thousands was enumerated in the hundreds. The largest crowd assembled in New York, where 2,000 marched. Comparing this to the April protest in that city which garnered 30,000, the 18 November International Day of Protest was an unmitigated disaster.⁵¹ Canadian participation was worse – antiwar protests simply did not happen.⁵²

Despite the failure of the November protests, there was one last gasp in the antiwar movement in Canada. Again it took its lead from its counterpart in the United States. On 13 December secret negotiations between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam broke off. The DRV was not willing to move beyond the proposals it had tabled in October. In an attempt to force a change of heart on the part of the DRV, and also to send a message to the Republic of Vietnam that the US meant business, the United States launched its most severe bombing campaign of the entire war. Dubbed the Christmas bombing, it began 18 December and continued for the next 12 days with the exception of a 36-hour pause over Christmas. It was Richard Nixon's

⁵⁰ "CEC Political Report – The Line Adopted by the YS/LJS Executive Council Plenum, September 8, 1972," *Young Socialist Discussion Bulletin*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1972, 15, RDF, Box 20, File 2; Wells, *War Within*, 557; Announcement, *Mobilizer*, Vol. 2, No. 2, September 1972, Pocock, Box 27, File 16.

⁵¹ Wells, *War Within*, 557; Halstead, *Out Now*, 801.

⁵² One of the very few protests reported that day was a rally at the Colonel By Auditorium at the University of Ottawa. Following the rally 27 marched to Parliament Hill. See RCMP Memo, Secret, 20 November 1972, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00423 Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Ottawa, Ontario, Stack 5.

twelve days of Christmas. One hundred thousand tons of bombs were dropped, largely on the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong, resulting in 2,200 civilian casualties. The world expressed its revulsion with the United States. Dozens of governments, many of them American allies, expressed their protest. None was more scathing than Sweden's Prime Minister Olaf Palme who compared the actions of the Americans to those of the Nazis. Mass demonstrations rocked Western Europe, the largest in Amsterdam where 100,000 protested. Dockers' unions in Australia and Denmark refused to handle American cargoes until the bombing ended. In the United States, 3,000 marched in an impromptu demonstration in New York. On a national scale, NPAC, with PCPJ later reluctantly signing on, called for massive protests for 20 January – the day of Nixon's second inauguration. Its focus would be Washington, DC. The night before, 15,000 attended a counter inaugural concert at the National Cathedral. On the day of the scheduled protest 100,000 marched in Washington. Smaller demonstrations took place in other cities around the US and around the world.⁵³

The Canadian antiwar movement's response to the Christmas bombings represented its last gasp, at least on a national scale. As in the United States and elsewhere, impromptu demonstrations occurred throughout the bombing campaign, with more concerted actions scheduled for 20 January. On 22 December the VAC led an undetermined number of demonstrators in a rally at the US Consulate in Vancouver. An RCMP officer reporting on the action credited the VAC with organizing a successful protest given its impromptu nature and the fact that most LSA members were attending a

⁵³ Herring, *America's Longest War*, 315-317; Halstead, *Out Now*, 801-810; DeBenedetti, *American Ordeal*, 343-346.

convention in Toronto.⁵⁴ Later that week, the VMC brought out 100 in Toronto. In Ottawa the VMC led two dozen in a demonstration at the US Embassy on Christmas Eve. In British Columbia on Christmas Day, a group of twenty led by Clare Culhane demonstrated at the home of James Sinclair, the Prime Minister's father-in-law. The group had hoped to find Mr. Trudeau there and to urge him to pressure Nixon into ending the bombing. No one was home.⁵⁵

In Pointe Claire, Quebec, the Lakeshore Unitarian Church mounted a three-day vigil to protest the bombing. It began following its Christmas Eve service and continued until the day after Boxing Day. Sixty people, mostly parishioners, took part.⁵⁶ Official Canadian response to the Christmas bombing was mixed. On 26 December Canadian Press reported that the Prime Minister had no intention of pressuring the United States to cease its campaign of terror. While reiterating the fact that Canada was already on record as being of the opinion that bombing was "the wrong way to end the war," Prime Minister Trudeau would not bend. "I think it would be wrong," he said, "to sort of put our nose into it and try to make negotiations any more difficult."⁵⁷ But what Trudeau said publicly somewhat differed from what he did privately. In fact, Trudeau sent a total of three diplomatic notes – none of them publicized – to Nixon urging cessation of the Christmas bombings. His note of 3 January, sent after the bombings had ended, deplored the bombings. According to Douglas Ross, Trudeau later publicly urged the US not to

⁵⁴ RCMP Report, "Vietnam Action Committee," 8 January 1973, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A02006-00425, Vietnam Action Committee, Vancouver.

⁵⁵ RCMP Report, "Secret, Re: Protests and Demonstrations, Ottawa, Ontario," 4 January 1973; RCMP Memo, Secret, Re: Protests and Demonstrations, Ottawa, Ontario," 27 December 1972; "Pickets seek end of war," *Ottawa Citizen*, (CP) 26 December 1972; "20 protesters miss Trudeau," *Ottawa Citizen*, (CP) 26 December 1972. All clippings and files from CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00423, Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Ottawa, Ontario, Stack 5.

⁵⁶ Patricia Lowe, "Unitarians protest increased bombings," *Montreal Star*, December 27, 1972, A3.

⁵⁷ "Avoid Controversy On Vietnam: PM," *Winnipeg Free Press* (CP), December 26, 1972, 28.

resume the bombings, but this was likely only after the House of Commons gave him such direction.⁵⁸ Sensing the number of Canadians who were appalled by the Christmas bombings, despite the small number of protests, the House of Commons voted unanimously on Friday, 6 January to deplore the bombings and urge the US not to resume them. Former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, who had opposed the motion, was not in the House when the vote was taken.⁵⁹

Protests increased in intensity and in level of organization in the New Year. On the same day Parliament voted, between 300 and 400 marched from Vancouver City Courthouse to the General Post Office. Significantly, the protest was not organized by the VAC, but rather a group calling itself the Sign Now for Peace in Indochina Committee.⁶⁰ The absence of the Trotskyists is explained by their ambivalence towards the prospect of any kind of treaty. Their position had always been summed up in their slogan “Withdraw Troops Now.” They called for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of US troops from Indochina. That said, they also declared that anyone who was in the process of being mugged by an armed robber had the right to surrender their wallet to save their life, a reference to the DRV being forced to treat with the Americans. On the other hand, PCPJ, of which the Communist Party was a member, called for an immediate cease-fire.⁶¹ Hence, there is a likelihood that BC Communists played a behind-the-scenes role in the 6 January demonstration, although outwardly it drew a wide range of support. Speakers came from the provincial Liberal and New Democratic Parties, the BC

⁵⁸ Ross, *In the Interests of Peace*, 342.

⁵⁹ Peter Rehak, “House deplores bombing,” *Montreal Star*, 6 January 1973, 1, 2.

⁶⁰ Gerry Condon, “2,000 Vancouverites Protest Bombing,” *AMEX*, Vol. 3, No. 7, January/February, 1973, 16.

⁶¹ Halstead, *Out Now*, 801. Some Communists cynically referred to the Trotskyist line as “fighting to the last drop of Vietnamese blood.”

Federation of Labour and the Unitarian Church. Also supporting the march were members of the Vancouver American Exiles Union. Two thousand postcards were signed and mailed to Prime Minister Trudeau urging him to join with countries such as Sweden and Australia in condemning the bombings and supporting the nine-point agreement advocated by the DRV and PRG.⁶²

Other protests followed throughout Ontario. In Ottawa a small group of no more than twenty people protested on Parliament Hill on 8 January.⁶³ In Toronto activists held a public meeting 9 January at the St. Lawrence Centre titled "Vietnam: This War Must Stop." The theatre was half empty. Of the 600 seats, only 300 were occupied. The meeting featured a panel discussion consisting of Dr. Eoin MacKay, Secretary of the Canadian Council of Churches; Dr. Ursula Franklin, Vice-President of VOW; Professor Donald Wilmott, Chair of Sociology at York University's Glendon College; and Dave Monie, President of UE Local 531. Harkening back to an earlier day, most of the audience was middle-aged and middle-class. Many in the audience either groaned or shouted down the rare audience member who advanced Marxist rhetoric.⁶⁴ Noticeably absent were any signs of the VMC. The Trotskyists were out in force the following week, however, when 500 attended an antiwar rally in Toronto at Metro United Church. Pierre Berton was the keynote speaker. Following the meeting participants marched in a torch-lit parade to Nathan Phillips Square.⁶⁵

On 19 January the Vietnam Moratorium Committee led 100 protesters to the US Consulate in Montreal. Those present represented a cross-section of women, students,

⁶² Condon, "2,000 Vancouverites," 16.

⁶³ Photo and caption only, *Montreal Star*, 9 January 1973, 13.

⁶⁴ Larry Kearley, "Toronto Anti-War Meeting Disappointing," *AMEX*, Vol. 3, No. 7, January/February 1973, 17-18.

⁶⁵ "Other Toronto Anti-War Activity," *AMEX*, Vol. 3, No. 7, January/February 1973, 18.

professional men and even children. Organizers had anticipated a much larger crowd. The *Montreal Star* reported that hardly enough people showed up to carry the stack of stencilled picket signs waiting on the sidewalk. Demonstrators chanted “US Out Now!”⁶⁶

As in the United States, the main day for protests was 20 January. Turnout, where there was any, reflected the diminishing popularity of the antiwar movement in Canada. In the nation’s capital about thirty people, led by the VMC, demonstrated at the US Embassy for half an hour before marching to Parliament Hill.⁶⁷ Comparatively speaking, the demonstration in Edmonton, led by the University of Alberta Vietnam Action Committee, was huge, drawing seventy five to a picket at Imperial Oil before proceeding to the federal building.⁶⁸ In Vancouver, 400, led by the VAC and other local peace groups, marched from the Pacific Centre Plaza to the US Consulate. Representatives of the provincial NDP, the LSA and other organizations addressed the assembled crowd. Significantly, also on the speakers’ roster was the Gay Alliance Towards Equality, signalling a new chapter in Canadian social activism. Elsewhere in the province, about twenty held a beach bonfire and rally near the Canadian Forces Maritime Experimental and Tests Ranges near Nanoose Bay.⁶⁹ The greatest turnout was in Toronto, where the VMC led an estimated 1,000 from King Street United Church to the US Consulate.⁷⁰ It was the last mass anti-Vietnam War protest in Canada. Three days later Le Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger signed the cease-fire and the antiwar movement in Canada evaporated.

⁶⁶ “Doubt peace is at hand: War protesters march on,” *Montreal Star*, 20 January 1973, F8.

⁶⁷ RCMP Memo, Secret, Re: Protests and Demonstrations Re: U.S. Action in Vietnam, 20 January 1973 – Canada, 23 January 1973, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00423, Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Ottawa, Ontario, Stack 5.

⁶⁸ “75 rally for war protest,” *Gateway*, 23 January 1973, 3.

⁶⁹ “Demand Gov’t End Canadian Involvement: City protesters march against U.S. bombing,” *Vancouver Sun*, 22 January 1973, 27.

⁷⁰ “Other Toronto,” *AMEX*, 18; “Anti-War Protesters March as Nixon is Inaugurated,” (photo and caption only), *The Globe and Mail*, 22 January 1973, 5; “Anti-War Protesters March As Nixon Is Inaugurated,” (photo and caption only), *The Globe and Mail*, 24 January 1973, 5.

Under pressure from the United States, Canada agreed to become a member of the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS). It was joined by with Indonesia, Hungary and Poland. Unlike its almost 20-year commitment on the ICC, however, Canada had no intentions of being entangled in any further long-term commitments in Southeast Asia. Canada was prepared to commit for six months and by the following summer Canadian troops were gone. In effect, the main purpose of Canadian troops was to ensure the short-term goals of the agreement – extraction of the US from the war and the return of US POWs. With that accomplished, Canada was free to go, but not before the death of Captain Charles Laviolette of Quebec City. Laviolette died when PRG forces shot down the clearly marked ICCS helicopter he was riding in.⁷¹

Other than the return of American POWs and the withdrawal of US combat troops from Vietnam, the terms of the rest of the cease-fire were for the most part meaningless. As one historian has stated, “The treaty was a hoax and was quickly violated on all sides.”⁷² The air war in the North came to an end, but it continued in the South. American planes were no longer dropping the bombs, but American crews in civilian clothing continued to service Republic of Vietnam aircraft, readily supplied by the United States. As well, American bombers continued to pulverize Cambodia until Congress finally ordered a halt in August. Between February and August the United States dropped 250,000 tons of bombs on Cambodia. As for ground forces, although American ones had gone home, the “cease-fire” claimed the lives of 26,500 ARVN troops in 1974 alone, and

⁷¹ Peter Rehak, “60-day limit set: Canada to help truce force,” *Montreal Star*, 24 January 1973, 1, 2; Herring, *America’s Longest War*, 318; Doug Ross, *In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954-1973* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984) 350, 361.

⁷² Terry Anderson, *The Sixties*, (New York: Longman, 1999) 208. For the full text of the agreement see Allan E. Goodman, *The Lost Peace: America’s Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War* (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1978).

another 26,500 the following year. Corresponding losses for the PRG and DRV were 39,000 and 61,000 respectively. During the same period 15,000 civilians were killed and 70,000 wounded. Another 800,000 were made refugees.⁷³ In short, there was no cease-fire.

The official line of the Trotskyist-oriented peace movement was that they would continue to mobilize against the war in Indochina despite the cease-fire. “Our organization will continue until the Vietnamese have acquired full self-determination, including the right to unite Vietnam,” stated Grant Hargrave of the Vancouver Vietnam Action Committee.⁷⁴ Internationally, however, Trotskyists began to refer to the antiwar movement in the past tense. Socialist Workers Party leader Gus Horowitz, in a fall 1973 article titled “On the Differences Over Vietnam,” discussed the inter-relatedness of the antiwar movement and the international class struggle. He argued that over the course of the Vietnam War the best way to advance that cause was by defending the Vietnamese revolution. Said Horowitz, “The degree to which we could do that was the degree to which we could radicalize growing numbers of people and recruit to the party itself.” While some might argue that Trotskyist efforts to mobilize opposition throughout the war were purely a cynical move to recruit new members to their organization, their approach was more complex. As internationalists they saw the war and international class struggle as two parts of the same thing. Continued Horowitz, “Our goal was to mobilize the largest number of people against the Vietnam (W)ar in mass action independent of the

⁷³ Marilyn B. Young, *The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991) 279-280, 282, 290.

⁷⁴ Peter Trask, “Cease-fire doesn’t apply to city protest groups,” *Vancouver Sun*, 10 February 1973, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00425, Vietnam Action Committee, Vancouver, British Columbia.

ruling class.”⁷⁵ More significant about Horowitz’s article, however, is that it repeatedly shifts between the present and past tenses, as if he’s not sure if the war and the antiwar movement have concluded or not. As the war continued to wind down, so too did Trotskyist support for the antiwar movement. Internal party documents increasingly made references to “Vietnamese Stalinism.” While still asserting that it was possible for workers to wrest control from Stalinist governments such as the PRG and the DRV, as it referred to them, it could only be done with great difficulty. Indeed, Trotskyists became virulent in their discussion of Communist forces in Vietnam. Also, they became more willing to openly discuss (internally at least) atrocities that had been visited upon their own Vietnamese members by Communist forces:

Where does the idea come from, after all, that the North and South Vietnamese Stalinists who are responsible for the murder of countless of our comrades, and who have followed a consistent policy of class collaboration at home and of apology for the Kremlin and Peking bureaucrats internationally, are a revolutionary force?⁷⁶

The SWP urged further discussion of the matter within the Fourth International.

What exactly were the conditions under which Trotskyists in Canada finally withdrew from the antiwar movement? The answer is complex. Clearly, as can be seen above, there was an increasing tendency on an international level to distance the movement from the Vietnamese Communists. But the antiwar movement in Canada had been dying a slow death since the end of 1971. How much the withdrawal of the Trotskyists was a conscious act and how much it was simply the result of attrition is unclear. With the cease-fire of January 1973 the primary goal of the Trotskyist-oriented

⁷⁵ Gus Horowitz, “On the Differences Over Vietnam,” *International Internal Discussion Bulletin*, Vol. 10, No. 15, October 1973, 16-30, 16.

⁷⁶ George Johnson, “The Trotskyist View of Vietnamese Stalinism,” *SWP Discussion Bulletin*, Vol. 32, No. 2, December 1973, RDF, Box 7, File 1; Stephen Bloom, “The Basis of the International Discussion on Vietnam,” *SWP Discussion Bulletin*, 6 May 1973, 11-13, RDF, Box 6, File 15.

peace movement was fulfilled. Since 1965 they had chanted US Troops Out Now. They were now out. Records are not available as to when organizations such as the various VMCs and VACs finally folded up. Part of this is compounded by the fact that so many RCMP records on the organizations are still exempted by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) or heavily redacted under access to information legislation. (Almost forty years later the reason cited is most often national security.)⁷⁷ But in almost all cases the paper trail for these organizations ends in late 1972 and early 1973. Reporting on the Vancouver Vietnam Action Committee in July 1975, an RCMP document simply stated that the organization had been inactive for the past two years.⁷⁸

The Trotskyists were not alone in their withdrawal from antiwar activism. For different reasons, the Communist Party, too, gave less attention to the issue, though to be fair it should be noted that the Party's attention to Vietnam had fluctuated throughout the war. Among the various documents prepared for the Party's 22nd Convention in May 1974, only one makes brief mention of the conflict; it accuses President Thieu, "backed by U.S. imperialism," of "tearing to shreds the Paris Treaties by continued U.S. intervention in Cambodia." The statement continued: "U.S. imperialism has not ceased its intervention in South Vietnam (and) continues its neo-colonialist policy and the perpetuation of the partition of Vietnam."⁷⁹

In the United States, many peace activists returned to work and life. Organizations such as NPAC and the SMC became skeletal organizations, ready to resume national

⁷⁷ Even today, in voluminous correspondence with the author, Library and Archives Canada cite reasons of national security for exempting such files.

⁷⁸ RCMP Transit Slip, 14 July 1975, Re: Vietnam Action Committee, CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00425, Vietnam Action Committee, Vancouver, British Columbia.

⁷⁹ "The International Situation," 22nd Convention, *Communist Party of Canada, May 18-20, 1974*, 5, Kenny, Box 6, File 4. Document also in *74 Convention*, No. 1, 15 January 1974, 3-4, in same file.

efforts should circumstances dictate. Occasional teach-ins and small demonstrations were characteristic of the movement in the United States during the period between 1973 and 1975. Similarly, PCPJ became a shadow of itself.⁸⁰ The only visible national antiwar group in the United States during this period was the Indochina Peace Campaign (IPC). Formed by Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden, both of whom had visited the DRV and witnessed the bombing first-hand, the IPC had played a key role in electing antiwar Democrats in 1972 Congressional elections in states where the vote was expected to be close. During the period 1973-1975 the IPC lobbied and educated, often hosting mass meetings on campuses where Fonda or Daniel Ellsberg would be the featured speaker and Holly Near would sing.⁸¹ The IPC only made one trip to Canada. In late November 1974 Fonda, Hayden, and David Harris spoke to a rally of 200 at the Peace Arch Park on the Washington-British Columbia border. Sponsored by Vietnam Veterans Against the War, the Winter Soldier Organization, and the Vancouver American Exiles Association, the purpose of the rally was to put pressure on the Lon Nol and Thieu regimes to adhere to the terms of the cease-fire.⁸²

⁸⁰ Halstead, *Out Now*, 814.

⁸¹ Halstead, *Out Now*, 798, 815-816.

⁸² "Fonda urges peace in Vietnam," *Canadian Tribune*, 27 November 1974, clipping in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2006-00320, Vancouver American Exiles Association, Vancouver, British Columbia. Same article published as "Jane Fonda Speaks at Peace Arch: 'We are determined to bring genuine peace to Indochina,'" *Pacific Tribune*, 27 November 1974, clipping in same file. Fonda had made two other trips to Canada in her capacity as an antiwar activist, speaking at Fanshawe College in November 1971, and at the University of Windsor in February 1971. She was scheduled to make an appearance in Toronto after speaking in London, but on a stopover in Cleveland she was arrested on trumped up charges of assault. As a result the Toronto engagement was cancelled. See "'Foot soldiers refusing to wage war in Vietnam,' says actress Fonda," *Ottawa Citizen*, 1 February 1971; "U.S. 'creating murder machine,'" *Telegram*, 1 February 1971; RCMP Report, "Fanshawe College, London, Ontario, November 3, 1970. Clippings and report in CSIS, RG 146, Access to Information Application A-2007-00228, J.S. Fonda, Stack 1. See also "Fonda faces pill, assault counts," *The Globe and Mail*, (AP) 4 November 1970, 14; "Not guilty plea entered by Fonda," *The Globe and Mail*, 5 November 1970. Clippings courtesy of Fanshawe College Library.

Elsewhere in Canada antiwar dissent had almost all but disappeared. Charles Taylor, writing in the *Globe and Mail* in May 1974 referred to the conflict as the “Forgotten War.” Except for a few people agitating for the release of political prisoners in the Republic of Vietnam, Taylor stated, the war had ceased to be an important issue for Canadians after Ottawa withdrew its soldiers and diplomats from the ICSC the previous July. Taylor complained that despite the recent opening of a Canadian Embassy in Saigon, Canada had not taken any steps to recognize the PRG, despite the cease-fire affording recognition to the PRG-held areas of southern Vietnam. The response of the Canadian government was that it could only recognize one government in one country. Similarly, Canadian aid was equally one-sided, with the Saigon regime receiving \$3 million in 1974, although \$1 million in indirect humanitarian aid was dispensed by Canada through the Red Cross to Cambodia, Laos and PRG-held areas of the Republic of Vietnam. When Canada did finally extend recognition to the DRV on 7 February 1973, it chose not to open an embassy in that country. Rather, John Small, Canada’s ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, took charge of DRV affairs. For its part, Hanoi had not yet found it convenient to receive Small’s credentials. The snub was intentional. The DRV was still annoyed with Canada’s historic performance on the ICC as well as its more recent performance on the ICCS.⁸³ Hanoi had good reason to be upset with Canada. In November it was revealed that a secret meeting of representatives of fifteen nations had taken place in Paris the previous month. The meeting, under the auspices of the World Bank (then headed by Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defense for

⁸³ Charles Taylor, “The Forgotten War continues despite ceasefire pact,” reprinted from *The Globe and Mail*, 20 May 1974, by International Committee to Free South Vietnamese Political Prisoners from Detention, Torture and Death – Canadian Council of Churches, Buttrick, Box 6, File 5; “Aid to Vietnam,” Canada Vietnam Newsletter, November/December 1974, No. 10, Pocock, Box 22, File 1; Ross, *In the Interests*, 354.

President Johnson, and largely responsible for the bombing of the DRV during Johnson's administration) and the Asian Development Bank discussed ways in which the World Bank could prop up the Thieu regime. The discussion got nowhere as most participants opposed the idea and quickly leaked the details of the meeting. Many viewed the proposal as a cynical attempt to get the World Bank to take up the slack of supporting Thieu since the US Congress had been consistently cutting requests for aid to the Republic of Vietnam. The only countries supporting the idea were the United States, Japan and Canada.⁸⁴

The sole issue sustaining those few in Canada who still concerned themselves with the plight of Vietnam (excluding VOW's knitting project) was the issue of political prisoners held in prisons, jails and detention centres throughout the Republic of Vietnam. Amnesty International estimated their number to be at least 100,000 in December 1973, more than the number of political prisoners in the Soviet Union, Brazil, Greece and Turkey combined.⁸⁵ In the United States, from June until August 1974, again reverting to the protest of the streets, the United Campaign, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), and seventeen other organizations sponsored the "tiger cage" vigil. Replicas of tiger cages, the term given to the cramped cells in which political prisoners were held which often resulted in permanent deformation for its occupant, were set up at the Capitol and the White House.⁸⁶ In the weeks leading up to the cease-fire a meeting was held in Minneapolis. The result of the meeting was the establishment of the International Committee to Free South Vietnamese Political Prisoners from Detention, Torture and

⁸⁴ Charles Taylor, "Secrecy, Controversy over plan to aid Thieu," reprinted from *The Globe and Mail*, 11 November 1974, Buttrick, Box 6, File 5; "Inside Thieu's Prisons: The Forgotten War," *The Varsity*, 2 October 1974, 6-7, clipping in Pocock, Box 27, File 16.

⁸⁵ Fred Branfman, "Vietnam: The POW's We Left Behind," *Ramparts*, 12:5, December 1973, (11-14) 11.

⁸⁶ Zaroulis, *Who Spoke*, 413; Wells, *War Within*, 574.

Death. The Committee estimated the number of detainees at twice the number that Amnesty reported and feared a wholesale massacre if the US did not take strong action. In addition to the representatives of a dozen antiwar groups in the United States, three representatives from Canada participated. One represented the Primate of the Anglican Church of Canada, the other two came from Voice of Women. Subsequently a Canadian branch of the Committee was established with its headquarters in the offices of the Canadian Council of Churches on St. Clair Avenue in Toronto. The Council and VOW were largely responsible for its work.⁸⁷

One of the first projects the Canadian Committee took on, with the assistance of the United and Anglican Churches, was the sponsorship of a cross-country tour by Don Luce of the AFSC. Luce had recently returned from a trip to South Vietnam and had exposed the tiger cage scandal. He spoke at engagements in Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Hamilton, Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver. In Parliament NDP MP Andrew Brewin headed a group of MPs representing all three parties. They expressed their concern regarding political prisoners to the Canadian government, but External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp ignored their warnings, preferring instead, "quiet diplomacy."⁸⁸ In December, Edward Scott, Primate of the Anglican Church of Canada, after meeting with Ivan Head of External Affairs, assured the International Committee

⁸⁷ Ann Buttrick, "International Committee to free Political Prisoners," *AMEX*, Vol. 3, No. 7, January/February 1973, 16-17. See also finding aid, Buttrick Papers.

⁸⁸ Buttrick, "International Committee," *AMEX*, 16-17; Ann Buttrick, "Canadians Move to Free S.Viet Political Prisoners," *AMEX*, Vol. 4, No. 1, March/April 1973, 17; "Address by Andrew Brewin, MP, House of Commons, 8 March 1974, reproduced by the International Committee to Free South Vietnamese Political Prisoners from Detention, Torture and Death, Pocock, Box 22, File 1; also "MPs plan Vietnam Campaign, reprinted from *Ottawa Citizen*, 30 October 1974, by International Committee, in same file. Several months later, at Sharp's recommendation, Canada would distinguish itself as being one of the first western nations to extend diplomatic recognition to the government of Augusto Pinochet in Chile, while at the same time denying refugee status to those Chileans fleeing the bloodbath. See "Tragic Ending in Chile," *The Globe and Mail*, 13 September 1973, 6; "Bodies Carted off in Trucks, Canadian Woman Says," *The Globe and Mail*, 18 September 1973, 9; "Four take Refuge," *The Globe and Mail*, 19 September 1973, 9.

that he was confident that quiet diplomacy was in fact working.⁸⁹ The Committee was not as confident.

In January 1975 the International Committee launched another cross-Canada speaking tour, this time by three former political prisoners – Nguyen Long, a lawyer who had been held for six years; Ton That Lap, a singer and teacher who been arrested three times since 1963; and Vo Nhu Lanh, the chair of the students' association at Van Hanh Buddhist University. Lanh had been arrested in May 1972. The three recounted tales of their detention and torture as well as the role of US advisors in these actions.⁹⁰ On Saturday, 1 February 1975 the three were accompanied by Father Philip Berrigan at a speaking engagement in Toronto at Central Tech High School. Berrigan had gained notoriety in 1967 for burning and pouring blood on draft records in Maryland. In 1972 he was acquitted on a charge of conspiring to kidnap Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The four were given a standing ovation by a crowd of 500.⁹¹

In 1975, as winter turned to spring, the prospects for political prisoners in the Republic of Vietnam were increasingly becoming moot. When the war finally ended that spring it did so quickly. The final offensive, which Communist leaders anticipated taking two years to complete took less than two months.⁹² On 11 March Ban Me Thuot in the central highlands fell. It was quickly followed by Pleiku, Kontum, and Hue. On 30 March

⁸⁹ Letter, Edward Scott, Primate, Anglican Church of Canada to Ann Buttrick, Canadian Council of Churches and International Committee, 20 December 1974, Buttrick, Box 6, File 21.

⁹⁰ "Historical Visit Planned," *Canada Vietnam Newsletter*, No. 10, November/December 1974, 7, clipping in Pocock, Box 22, File 1; "Two Alleged Beatings in S. Vietnam Prisons," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 15 January 1975, clipping in Buttrick, Box 6, File 19. Also in same file, Richard Moore, "Former Saigon Prisoner Visits SFU," *The Peak*, 23 January 1975, 2; "South Vietnamese, 'Canada aids war with arms,'" reprinted from *Ottawa Citizen*, 3 January 1975.

⁹¹ "Activist Berrigan to speak on political prisoner topic," *Excaliber*, 23 January 1975, 7; "Priest, 3 Vietnamese urge freeing of Saigon prisoners," *Toronto Star*, 3 February 1975, A9. Both clippings in Buttrick, Box 6, File 19.

⁹² Herring, *America's Longest War*, 332.

Danang fell.⁹³ On 12 April Canadian chargé d'affaires in Saigon, Ernest Hebert, seeing the writing on the wall, advised Canadians without pressing business to leave the country. On Thursday, 24 April as somewhere between 150,000 and 200,000 PRG and PAVN troops massed on the edges of Saigon, the Canadian Embassy there closed. Television news coverage showed pianos, souvenirs and cars being loaded onto a Canadian evacuation plane bound for Hong Kong. About 100 South Vietnamese who had been previously promised Canadian exit visas showed up at the Embassy. Hebert had previously instructed them to appear at the Embassy that day. When they arrived they found locked doors.⁹⁴ The day before, President Ford, speaking at Tulane University had declared the war in Vietnam to be "finished as far as America is concerned."⁹⁵ Fearing that the United States might make a last minute attempt to reverse Vietnamese fortunes, NPAC staged a demonstration in Washington on 26 April; 60,000 turned out.⁹⁶ If similar protests took place in Canada, there is no record of them. On 27 April President Thieu fled Vietnam. On the 30th the last helicopter left the roof of the US Embassy in Saigon, and Soviet-made tanks crashed through the gates of the Presidential Palace. The war was over.

Following the Communist victories in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, reaction in Canada was generally muted. Most had stopped caring about the war a very long time ago. *The Forward*, a relatively new publication of the League for Socialist Action had barely reported news on the war since its inception in July the previous year. It greeted

⁹³ DeBenedetti, *American Ordeal*, 378-379; Wells, *War Within*, 577.

⁹⁴ "Canadian in Saigon: His Welcome is a Warning," *The Globe and Mail*, 12 April 1975; "Sharp denies Saigon pullout was callous," *Toronto Star*, 25 April 1975; "Tory Describes Ottawa's role as Chicken-livered diplomacy," *The Globe and Mail* (CP) 26 April 1975, 1-2; Malcolm Gray, "Claims of Canadian Embassy means exit pledges worthless," 26 April 1975, 1. All clippings in Buttrick, Box 6, File 6.

⁹⁵ Gerard J. Degroot, *A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War* (Harlow, UK: Pearson Education, 2000), 250.

⁹⁶ Halstead, *Out Now*, 820.

the news with a straightforward accounting. There was no note of celebration.⁹⁷ In Toronto the Ad Hoc Committee to Celebrate the People's Victories in Indochina scheduled a demonstration of celebration at the US Consulate for May 3.⁹⁸ No coverage of the event has yet been located. On the same day in Kingston, Jamaica, Prime Minister Trudeau was attending a Commonwealth Conference when asked for a comment on the end of the war. Careful as always not to criticise the United States, he commented that America's decision to go into Vietnam in the first place had been a mistake, a mistake he felt the United States was not likely to make again.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ "US Puppets routed in Indochina," *Forward*, Vol. 1, No. 8, Mid-April 1975, 1, 7, RDF, Box 19, File 2.

⁹⁸ Poster, "Celebrate the Historic Victories of the Vietnamese and Cambodian Peoples," Kenny, Box 54, File 1.

⁹⁹ "Trudeau looks for realism in West after Vietnam fall," *Vancouver Sun*, 3 May 1975, 3.

Conclusion

From 1965, when the United States first introduced combat troops, until the 1973 cease-fire the war in Vietnam dominated the political agenda of the United States. While the government attempted with less and less success to “sell” the war to its citizens, more and more Americans actively opposed the war. If opposition had remained solely an American concern, this dissertation need not have been written. While opposition to the war defined a generation of Americans, it also left a lasting impact on many other nations. From its earliest days antiwar dissent manifested on an international level. Europeans, Latin Americans, Asians, Africans, Australians, New Zealanders and Canadians joined with Americans in an effort to bring about peace in Vietnam.

From its earliest days international influences helped to shape the movement in Canada. As the international Communist movement was early in its defence of the Vietnamese revolution, the Communist Party of Canada and allies such as the Canadian Peace Congress were among the first to disseminate the antiwar message in Canada. This was as much the result of genuine concern on the part of activists as it was from strong encouragement from the Soviet Union. To a much lesser degree, the Trotskyist Fourth International influenced the antiwar movement in Canada through the League for Socialist Action and its various antiwar front groups. It is likely, though, that the Fourth International did not exert the same degree of influence on the movement in Canada as did its US affiliate: the Socialist Workers’ Party. The Voice of Women also brought a strong internationalist outlook to the antiwar movement in Canada. Following a similar trajectory as that of the Communist Party, VOW participated in the World Peace Council and its leaders travelled extensively to carry the antiwar message. It twice brought

representatives of the Indochinese revolutionary movement to tour Canada. The antiwar movement in Canada was indeed part of a larger international phenomenon.

Proximity to the United States ensured that the American antiwar movement would influence the movement in Canada. In this respect the relationship between the movements was transnational. Events illustrating the transnational nature of this relationship were seen time and again, from the earliest International Days of Protest, to the Mobilization to End the War; from anti-Dow protests to the Moratorium, Kent State and the Christmas bombings. For every major antiwar campaign that took place in the United States between 1965 and 1973 there was a Canadian counterpart. Geography placed the Canadian movement in a unique position. Travel between the two countries was relatively easy and it was common to see Americans travelling to Canada to participate in antiwar activities. Likewise, many Canadians travelled to the US to participate in American actions. Also, the increasing presence of American expatriates in Canada often added a distinctly continental flavour to Canadian protests. Again, largely due to the ties between the SWP and the LSA, most antiwar initiatives in Canada were also linked to larger, international antiwar campaigns initiated in the United States. But the transnational nature of the antiwar movement is not solely attributable to Trotskyist efforts. Voice of Women worked extensively at developing its relationships south of the border, in particular with the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and even more so with Women Strike for Peace. Indeed, two of VOW's signature antiwar projects – the 1969 and 1971 cross-Canada tours by Indochinese revolutionary women – would not have been possible without the support of WSP. Indeed, the primary function of these tours was to reach American women. In this context the antiwar movement in

Canada was as much transnational in relation to the United States as it was part of a larger, international movement.

The antiwar movement in Canada was also a national movement. This point cannot be overstated. The literature concerning the 1960s in Canada often portrays the antiwar movement as a largely Toronto-based movement. This is especially so in the work of Moffat and Levitt, and to a lesser degree in that of Kostash. From its earliest days the movement was active in Canada's three major cities. Although the narrative begins with the first recorded antiwar march in Montreal in August 1964, it is likely that the first protest took place in Winnipeg three months earlier and remains unrecorded. It was not long before antiwar dissent spread to other urban centres: Victoria, Edmonton, Calgary, Regina, Hamilton, Ottawa, and Saint John. Nor was the movement limited to major cities. At different times antiwar activity took place in Saskatoon, Port Arthur-Fort William, St. Catharines, Windsor, Sarnia, London, Kitchener-Waterloo, Guelph, Kingston, Fredericton, Halifax and St. John's. The only region of Canada left untouched by the antiwar movement was the northern territories.

Despite the national character of the movement, no single national antiwar organization ever emerged to lead it. Unlike in the United States where several such organizations came and went throughout the course of the war, the movement in Canada remained local or regional. That said, organizations such as the CP and the LSA were indeed national in scope and carried their influence into antiwar groups across the country. VOW came closest to what could be considered a national antiwar organization. Originating as a "ban-the-bomb" group in 1960, VOW became increasingly focused on Vietnam as the war in that country raged throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. With

chapters across the country, VOW can certainly be considered a national antiwar organization, despite the attempts of many scholars and former leaders of the organization who have consistently downplayed the centrality of Vietnam to the organization. VOW cooperated with other organizations in co-sponsoring demonstrations, providing speakers, and organizing conferences. With respect to the war in Vietnam, it is best known for its knitting project, a partnership with Canadian Aid for Vietnam Civilians. But VOW was always a partner in antiwar efforts. Unlike the Trotskyists, there was never an attempt on VOW's part to "take over" the movement.

Although national in its dimensions, the antiwar movement in Canada did not present itself as nationalist, which in its Canadian context usually carries undertones of anti-Americanism. Notable by their near absence at antiwar demonstrations were picket signs or slogans to the effect of "Yankee Go Home." Movement leaders were too sophisticated for such chauvinism. Also, there was too much of an American influence on the movement as a whole for it to be considered anti-American. While James Laxer has criticised the antiwar movement in Canada for not being Canadian enough, it must be kept in mind that first and foremost it was part of a larger, international movement.¹ It was a movement in solidarity with the people of Vietnam, and in sympathy with its American cousins who led the international effort to end the war. The job of the antiwar movement was to end the war, not to assert national pride. The movement in Canada was not anti-American, rather, it represented a rejection of what was most foul about the United States. But the movement did not shy away from criticising Canada's role in the war as arms supplier, intelligence gatherer, and, at least in the early stages of the war, cheerleader for the United States. One of the movement's earliest activities was a

¹ Laxer, "The Americanization," 279-281.

postcard campaign by the Canadian Peace Congress directed at the Government of Canada to put pressure on the United States to end its aggression in Vietnam.² From early on, Trotskyists, too, recognized the special role that Canada played in the war. Their primary slogans were “Withdraw US Troops Now” and “End Canadian Complicity.” In addition to openly supporting America’s war effort, Canada, through the Defence Production Sharing Agreement, was an arms bazaar for the United States. In the words of Clare Culhane, Canada was “the Butcher’s helper.”³ So from early in the conflict, Canadians not only were part of an international movement, but were able to Canadianize their involvement in a way that would prevent the movement from degenerating into simple anti-Americanism.⁴ As such, the antiwar movement in Canada was directed as much at the Canadian government as at that of the United States. Jeff White, who first became involved in the antiwar movement during the March 1966 International Day of Protest and became the Ottawa CEWV representative for the *Canada Vietnam Newsletter* states:

There’s no reason for the United States to listen to an antiwar movement in Canada or any other country, but we felt we could build a movement that would have some influence on our own government that in turn could help to end the war.⁵

In this respect, the movement in Canada enjoyed a degree of success, if one considers that in the early years of the war Canadian politicians publicly supported US war aims. By the end of the war, although never publicly opposing American intervention in Southeast Asia, Canada had at least learned to keep its mouth shut, thereby depriving the United States of much needed international legitimacy. Ending Canadian complicity,

² Moffat, *The Peace Movement*, 80.

³ Clare Culhane, *Why is Canada in Vietnam? The Truth About Our Foreign Aid* (Toronto: NC Press, 1972).

⁴ Angus, interview.

⁵ Jeff White, interview with author, October 29, 2006.

however, was always a secondary concern, to a degree employed by movement activists to remind Canadians that it was our war too. But it is doubtful that Canadianizing the movement did much to mobilize dissent. According to Douglas Ross it was the bombing of the DRV that “decisively alienated Canadian mass opinion from support for American interventionary objectives.”⁶

An exception to this was the wave of protests generated by the testing of US nuclear weapons on Amchitka, particularly the 1971 test. While separate from the issue of the war in Vietnam, many antiwar activists worked to mobilize Canadians against the blast. Organizers were hugely successful in bringing out protesters from one end of the country to the other, and in record numbers. It is doubtful organizers would have the same success had not the antiwar movement spent the previous seven years building opposition to American militarism. But it was the perceived threat that the Amchitka tests posed to Canada that motivated protesters most. Although the protests were not successful in stopping the US military from conducting the test, the November 1971 Amchitka protests served as a quintessential Canadian moment in the antiwar movement.

Quebec nationalism was more influential in mobilizing public opinion in that province against the war. Québécois nationalists’ perception of their province as a colony of English Canada, and of Francophones as an oppressed people invited parallels with the colonial status of Vietnam. Indeed, the anti-colonial struggles of the former French colonies of Indochina and later Algeria informed the early independence movement of Quebec. Separatists were quick to join the antiwar movement in the winter of 1965.⁷

⁶ Ross, *In the Interests*, 303.

⁷ “Bombing protested in demonstration,” *McGill Daily*, 12 February 1965, 1.

Such support built throughout the 1960s, but dissipated in 1969-1970 as radical Quebecois nationalism peaked with the October Crisis of 1970. In the aftermath of the crisis, Quebecois nationalists, in the form of the Parti Québécois and a reinvigorated Quebec labour movement returned to antiwar activism with a vengeance.

The contributions of civil rights and new left organizations imported from the United States were pivotal in sparking the antiwar movement in Canada, but in later years often acted at cross purposes. The role of SDS in shaping early antiwar dissent among members of CUCND, and later SUPA was significant. This was especially the case in Toronto. CUCND, and later SUPA, commonly attended SDS functions in the US and received SDS members to its events in Ontario. SDS and SUPA even allowed their members to sit on each others' governing councils. SDS's decision to organize its April 1965 march on Washington against the war generated considerable Canadian support.

Often working in tandem with SDS was SNCC. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee had been active in courting Canadian support throughout the early 1960s. By 1965 SNCC had established several branches in Canada. Often members of these groups held dual membership in SUPA chapters. The Selma solidarity demonstrations of March 1965 represented the first mass marches in Canada of the 1960s. For the first time a number of Canadians in several cities felt it incumbent upon themselves to demonstrate against the actions (or in this case the inaction) of the United States government and to call on their own government to speak up. Occurring when they did – at the very end of the popular civil rights movement in the South and at the same time that the United States introduced its first combat troops into Vietnam – the Selma

marches helped to popularize dissent for many Canadians at a time when the antiwar movement was in its infancy.

But how much the new left continued to influence the antiwar movement, at least in a positive way, is questionable. While Toronto's chapter of SUPA was instrumental in establishing the Toronto Anti-Draft Program, SUPA as a whole did little after February 1966 in opposing the war. By 1967 the organization had ceased to exist. In the later sixties and early seventies new left sympathies were often expressed through formally recognized student associations. Their impact on the antiwar movement differed significantly between French and English Canada. UGEQ had a profound influence in mobilizing Quebec opposition to the war. CUS's efforts (and results), on the other hand, were minimal. During the later years of the war new left influences were felt more on a local basis, and often did more to confuse and divide the antiwar movement. Such instances were seen again and again: at the 1968 Hemispheric Conference to End the War, where American white radicals and Black Panthers derailed the conference's focus on the war; at the April 1969 antiwar demonstrations in Vancouver where Simon Fraser's SDU's insistence on a march against imperialism fractured antiwar forces; with wanton property damage in Toronto and in Blaine, Washington, following the shootings at Kent State; and during the VOW-sponsored cross-Canada tour of Indochinese revolutionary women, when third world and WLM activists factionalized women's antiwar efforts. Indeed a pattern appears that where more established and "old left" organizations attempted to build strong antiwar coalitions, new left organizations worked to weaken them. New left organizations often suffered what Ian McKay describes as radical

ahistoricism.⁸ They perceived themselves as the sole bearers of truth and could not see where older activists might be right. The result was division.

One particular constituency that old left organizations aggressively courted with an eye to bringing it into the antiwar fold was that of labour, and its political partner the NDP. Initially labour support for the antiwar movement was limited to unions with historic ties to the Communist Party. NDP opposition to the war was scattered within various branches of the party's youth wing. Although Party Leader Tommy Douglas criticized the war from early on, his party remained divided on the issue. This resulted as much from the party's historic anti-communism as from the presence of a substantial bloc of international union support within the party. The AFL-CIO supported Johnson, and later Nixon, in their military policies until well after the withdrawal of US troops from Southeast Asia. While the Canadian Labour Congress issued tepid opposition to the war beginning in the mid-1960s, labour and the NDP waffled on Vietnam. The March 1966 International Days of Protest, which the New Democratic Youth played a vital role in organizing, saw substantial labour support. And labour remained a part of the antiwar movement until the end of the war. But labour support – both in English and French Canada – was neither overwhelming nor consistent, despite occasions where unionists were quite visible in antiwar demonstrations. Even as late as 1970, labour councils, provincial federations of labour, and various union locals sent mixed messages regarding the war in Vietnam. Non-Communist unions that distinguished themselves in antiwar war work, such as the United Auto Workers, were rare.

Throughout the history of the antiwar movement different organizations at different times rose to occupy leadership positions. Leadership of the movement was by

⁸ McKay, *Rebels, Reds, Radicals*, 85-86.

no means static and, in contrast to the United States, never focused on charismatic individuals. In both countries, however, certain organizations at varying times assumed a vanguard role. Such organizations focused on specific objectives, while at the same time attempting to enlarge the overall antiwar movement. Given the coalition nature of most antiwar protest, such leadership often overlapped. From the earliest days this function was performed by the Communist Party of Canada and the various groups allied to it, most significantly the Canadian Peace Congress. The Congress, since its founding, had championed the cause of national liberation struggles in the emerging post-colonial world. Building the antiwar movement necessitated a policy of united frontism. In addition to front groups and unions historically allied with the Party, reform left organizations, non-Communist unions, and more moderate peace groups joined in what were sometimes tenuous alliances. These included the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the New Democratic Youth, and some influential members of its parent organization. As the movement grew, the role of the Communist Party was increasingly eclipsed by other organizations. For a brief moment the Student Union for Peace Action took on a significant leadership role. It was greatly influenced by the emergence of new left groups in the United States, most significantly SDS and SNCC. But it is questionable as to whether SUPA constituted a vanguard organization. Certainly it liked to think of itself as such, but it was limited in what it could accomplish in terms of mobilizing Canadian opposition to the war. For one, it was limited by geography. Outside of Toronto, most SUPA branches did not actively mobilize against the war. And there is little evidence of SUPA carrying the message of the antiwar movement beyond the confines of the

University of Toronto. Also, SUPA was often loathe to work with other organizations in building effective coalitions. Its open mockery of the founding convention of the TCC, and its sectarian theatrics during the Canada-Vietnam Week did not generate recruitment. Without more people coming into its orbit, SUPA was challenged. Its failure to branch out and develop partnerships with other organizations, compounded with its own internal divisions, led to its marginalization.

The Trotskyist movement, in contrast, was clearly vanguardist in its approach to the antiwar movement. It had been active in antiwar protest from early on. As the war dragged on the LSA became increasingly central to the antiwar movement. This was particularly so from 1968 on, when the Communist Party, faced with a crisis of credibility as the result of its hypocritical support for the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia,⁹ declined in influence over the movement. The Party's Hemispheric Conference to End the War that December was nothing short of disastrous. From that point on the Trotskyists were the undisputed leaders of the movement in Canada.

Remaining somewhat aloof from the larger antiwar movement and its factionalism, the Voice of Women consistently supported the struggle for national liberation in Vietnam, as well as Cambodia and Laos, until the end of the war. In this respect VOW cannot be considered a vanguardist organization. An argument could be made, however, that there were elements within VOW that worked to keep the organization focused on antiwar objectives consistent with those of the Communist Party, though VOW was never a front group of the Party. VOW engaged Canadian (and

⁹ The Czechoslovakia crisis was devastating for the CPC. Originally supporting the Prague Spring movement, the party initially opposed the Warsaw Pact intervention, but then reversed itself. The result was a loss of perhaps as much as fifty percent of its membership. See Gregory S. Kealey, "Stanley Bréhaut Ryerson: Canadian Revolutionary Intellectual – Part 1," *Studies in Political Economy*, 8 (1982)22-24; also Avakumovic, *Communist Party in Canada*, 262-263.

American) women in antiwar work compatible with maternal feminist values while at the same time articulating an ideology of anti-imperialism. VOW was the only antiwar organization to operate in Canada on a national scale. Hence, regardless of which organization exerted primary influence at a given time, leadership of the antiwar movement in Canada was defined by institutions rather than individuals. In contrast to the United States, where key individuals were associated with specific antiwar organizations, Canada's movement – as exemplified by the Montreal woman with the purse, hat and picket sign – was much more anonymous.

The earliest years of the antiwar movement in Canada saw a coming together of various groupings in opposition to the war. While groups such as the Communist Party and the League for Socialist Action, and even Voice of Women, were motivated by a commitment to anti-imperialism, most of those who participated in the anti-war movement opposed the war on moral grounds. And it was with moral arguments that these organizations recruited activists to the movement. The war was alternatively framed as a civil war in which the United States had no business being involved, and a conflict reminiscent of a schoolyard bully pulverizing someone much smaller. Despite shared anti-imperialist ideologies, leading organizations eschewed framing the war as an anti-imperialist struggle for fear of alienating those otherwise inclined. The goal was, after all, to build a mass movement.

Throughout the war Americans seeking to avoid military service fled to Canada. Beginning as a trickle, by the height of the conflict it became a torrent. At first those who came were draft dodgers – largely white, educated, middle-class men – often accompanied by their wives and partners. Later their number was joined by deserters,

who more often tended to be from working-class backgrounds and lacking in formal education and training. While the former were considered an immigration boon to Canada, the latter were not, and were often perceived as cowards. Many who made the journey to Canada did so out of a sense of authenticity, choosing a life of exile rather than remaining in the United States with a questionable military deferment. Often those who came to Canada did so after having completely given up on the possibility of positive reform in their native country. Many were involved in the antiwar movement in the United States. Upon arrival in Canada many continued that activism, while many others did not, choosing instead to become a part of the middle-class mainstream. Many were assisted by organizations which sprang up across the country to aid American exiles. Some joined organizations established by and for Americans themselves. Many of these organizations published newsletters in an attempt to reach out to other exiles as well as to prospective exiles back home. Most notable in this regard was the magazine *AMEX*, which played a significant role in the transformation of exiles to expatriates, and in some cases Canadian nationalists. While some Americans returned home with the Carter Amnesty of 1977, many stayed and continue to contribute to Canadian society.

The antiwar movement declined in Canada throughout the early 1970s. From a peak of protest activity in May 1970, marches and rallies fell off precipitously, although the antiwar movement experienced one last substantial International Day of Protest in the spring of 1971. That fall, while massive protests rocked the country, most were in response to US nuclear testing in Alaska. Antiwar activism continued to decline throughout 1972, although the Christmas bombing of that year brought about a limited last gasp of the movement. With the cease-fire of January 1973 protest activity

disappeared. While some campaigns continued, such as VOW's knitting project and its support of political prisoners, and American exiles' campaign for amnesty, mass protests against the war ended. The final Communist victories in April 1975 were in a sense anticlimactic.

Still, the anti-Vietnam War movement was the most significant protest movement of the 1960s and early 1970s in Canada. Lasting for a period of roughly ten years – 1963 to 1973 – to varying degrees it united young and old, men and women, English and French, worker, student and scholar. While predominating in large, urban centres, the movement made its presence known in smaller communities in every region of Canada except the North. Gary Moffat argues that the antiwar movement saved the world from nuclear catastrophe. “(W)ithout the massive effort of resistance launched by the peace movement,” asserts Moffat, “Viet Nam would have pushed US foreign policy over the brink.”¹⁰ While Moffat's assertions might sound dramatic, most historians of the antiwar movement in the United States agree that the movement placed limits on American military escalation. Douglas Ross credits Canadian foreign policy with the same result,¹¹ although he is ambivalent regarding the impact of the antiwar movement in Canada. Even if indirectly, however, public opinion was a factor in shaping Canadian policy. A decade of demonstrations, marches, rallies, teach-ins and other forms of public protest against the war was the most visible and consistent expression of public opinion on the war in Vietnam. If the Canadian government can claim any credit in restraining the United States in its barbarism against Vietnam, then it must share that credit with the antiwar movement.

¹⁰ Moffat, *History*, 188.

¹¹ Ross, *In the Interests*, 8-9.

Another aspect that the antiwar movement in Canada shares with its American counterpart is one of legacies. Most historians of antiwar dissent in the US credit it with being instrumental in the formation of other social movements – the environmental, women’s, gay and Aboriginal rights – movements whose impact we see today. Ian McKay argues that the legacy of 1960s Canadian social activism was the emergence of these movements in Canada.¹² But this is not entirely accurate. These legacies are not simply attributable to 1960s social activism in general, but specifically to the antiwar movement. Further, the antiwar movement was the progenitor of the anti-cruise missile testing campaign of the 1980s, the Central American solidarity movement of the 1980s and 1990s, and opposition to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This last example testifies to the limits of such a legacy. But similar to the situation today, the antiwar movement in Canada was never the concern of the majority. For most Canadians, it was not “our” war. But a minority of people thought otherwise and acted to demonstrate that it indeed was. Through the hard work of organizing and coalition building the minority continued to increase. Despite varying degrees of nationalist and internationalist sentiment, old or new left orientation, male or female, French or English, at heart opposition to the war was motivated by humanist concerns. Canadians opposed the war in Vietnam largely for the same reason Americans did: it was an atrocity.

¹² McKay, “Sarnia,” 32.

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