

Two Conquests: Aboriginal Experiences of the Fall of New France and Acadia

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Abstract

Two Conquests uses the ‘spaces of power’ approach to compare Mi’kmaw and Huron-Wendat experiences of the conquest of New France. By addressing the political, social and cultural uses of space and power, this work argues that although the fall of Acadia and Quebec brought about the end of French influence in North America, these events also caused considerable, if variable, change within Aboriginal communities. Each community’s experience of colonialism and imperialism prior to the conquest directly shaped their reaction to this political transition.

The two case studies in this dissertation use official correspondence, travel narratives, census data, parish registers and notarial records. Part one focuses on how the Mi’kmaq in modern-day southwestern Nova Scotia reacted to the British conquest of Acadia in 1710. The Mi’kmaq did not systematically interact with European empires until after the French defeat. After the conquest, most Mi’kmaq moved away from European strongholds and maintained autonomy from France and Britain. Part two looks at the Huron-Wendat at Jeune-Lorette, a small Jesuit mission village near the town of Quebec. Unlike the Mi’kmaq, the Huron-Wendat were deeply involved in both Aboriginal and French worlds. Heavily invested in these overlapping worlds, the Huron-Wendat quickly made peace once British victory was clear. With peace, change came slowly. Only in the 1790s did the Huron-Wendat feel the full effects of the conquest.

Using ‘spaces of power’ demonstrates how Europeans capitalized on Aboriginal definitions of space to bolster their claims to North America and how Aboriginal people engaged with the colonial world and landscape to sustain their economy and culture.

Aboriginal communities' responses to the two British conquests reflected their prior relationships with the French. Where this interaction was limited, Aboriginal communities had difficulty developing a strong relationship with the British. Where Aboriginal communities shared space and developed an integrated relationship, they found it easier to develop new strategies. In both cases, they struggled to maintain their control over territory and managed to do so for nearly four decades.

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Many of my principal archives have gone to great lengths to digitize their collections. This has made a major impact in the accessibility of archival collections and how historians conduct research. This technical change made this research financially possible. Being able to consult these collections in Toronto allowed me to use a broader array of sources than I would have been able to use while on longer-distance research trips.

Many of the ideas in this dissertation were shaped and improved with help from the archivists and librarians that I have met over the course of my studies. I am particularly grateful to Peter Gagné, Jonathan Lainey, Patricia Kennedy, Rénaud Lessard, Ginette Fournier, Pierre LaFontaine, Stéphane Picard, Peter Carni, Paul Maxner, Lois Yorke and the *Programme de recherche en démographie historique*. These people gave me sage research advice and helped me to explore the rich documentary record.

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from the Huron-Wendat mission church and the parishes of St-Ambroise-de-la-Jeune-Lorette and Charlesbourg. Nova Scotia Archives and Research Management also shared their database files for the parish records from St. Jean-Baptiste. The online versions of these databases can be found at < <http://www.genealogie.umontreal.ca/en/>> and < <http://www.gov.ns.ca/nsarm/virtual/acadian/>>

This dissertation has benefitted from countless conversations and e-mail correspondence with fellow historians. Discussions with Jean-François Lozier, Katie Magee, Andrew Sturtevant and Guillaume Teasdale have helped craft my ideas about the Huron-Wendat. My perspective on eighteenth century Mi'kma'ki has been influenced by Sandy Balcom and Anne-Marie Lane-Jonah at Fortress Louisbourg and John Reid at Saint Mary's University. I am greatly indebted to Mathieu Chaurette for sharing his research on Aboriginal education at Dartmouth College.

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other forms of support given along the way. No one has sacrificed more for this dissertation, though, than my wife Susan. She has supported me throughout every stage of this process, listening to my ideas, patiently waiting for “one more minute,” and tolerating ‘vacations’ and ‘weekends away’ spent with books and a laptop. Susie’s encouragement and advice was critical to bringing this dissertation to a close.

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Contents

Abstract.....	iv
Acknowledgements.....	vi
Contents.....	x
Tables, Graphs and Maps.....	xii
Introduction: Contextualizing Conquest.....	1
The Historiography of Conquest.....	4
Space and Colonialism in the Northeast.....	11
The Nature of Comparison.....	18
A Brief History of Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Mi'kma'ki.....	19
A Brief History of Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Jeune-Lorette.....	23
Two Stories in One.....	31
Part 1: Introduction.....	36
Chapter One: Kespukwitk at the end of the Seventeenth Century.....	45
The Household Economy.....	46
Village Life.....	61
Mobility within Kespukwitk and Mi'kma'ki.....	73
Conclusion.....	81
Chapter Two: Mi'kma'ki, Wabanakia and Acadia.....	86
Relationships with French Settlers.....	88
Official Interaction with the French.....	103
Catholicism and Missions.....	114
Conclusion.....	128
Chapter Three: The Conquest of Acadia/The Survival of Mi'kma'ki.....	133
The Saint-Castin family and the French-Abenaki Alliance.....	134
The Sieges Before 1710.....	138
The Fall of Port Royal.....	150
Immediate Aftermath of the Fall of Port Royal.....	157
The Treaty of Utrecht and its Immediate Aftermath.....	165
Conclusion.....	173
Chapter Four: Mi'kma'ki Divided: The Mi'kmaq Respond to French and English Claims on their Land.....	175
France: Successful Alliance Building.....	178
Britain: Building a Relationship.....	190
Mi'kmaw Responses.....	200
Conclusion.....	217
Part 1: Conclusion.....	219
Part Two: Introduction.....	224
Chapter 5: Jeune-Lorette, Wendaké and St. Gabriel.....	237
The Huron-Wendat in the heart of New France.....	238
Connecting the Northeast and Great Lakes.....	256
Spatial Practices in the Two Worlds.....	268

Conclusion	282
Chapter 6: Parallel Conquest: The Seven Years' War and the Conquest of Quebec	284
The Growing Tensions of the Seven Years' War	285
The Siege at Quebec and its Aftermath	290
Peace with the British and Treaty-making.....	298
Conclusion	314
Chapter 7: The End of the Mission: The Long Term Impact of the Conquest on Jeune-Lorette.....	318
Visions of Post-Conquest Jeune-Lorette.....	319
Aboriginal Alliances.....	331
The (D)evolving Relationship with the British.....	343
Education and the petitions of the 1790s.....	361
Conclusion	367
Part 2: Conclusion.....	369
Conclusion: Comparing Mi'kmaq and Huron-Wendat responses to the fall of New France	372
Appendix A: Guideposts.....	392
Appendix B: Using Censuses, Parish Registers and Notarial Records.....	396
Challenges common to all three sources.....	396
1) Censuses.....	398
2) Parish Registers and Notarial Records.....	405
Parish Registers.....	406
Notarial Records	409
Bibliography	416
Archival Sources.....	416
Newspapers.....	417
Primary Printed Sources	417
Dissertations, Theses, Governmental Reports and Reference works	422
Journal Articles and Book Chapters	423
Books	429

Tables, Graphs and Maps

Maps¹

0.1: An Overview of the Eighteenth-Century Northeast	19
0.2: Seventeenth Century Huron-Wendat Migration around Quebec	26
0.3: Domicilié Villages along the St. Lawrence	27
1.1: The Mi'kmaq in Kespukwitk	63
3.1: Port Royal in the Eighteenth Century	156
5.1: Quebec Seigneuries in the Eighteenth Century	238
5.2: Huron-Wendat Landholding, 1733-1800	269
5.3: Hunting Territory along the St. Lawrence valley	278
7.1: Overlap between Sillery and St. Gabriel	359

Graphs

1.1: Age Pyramid for all Mi'kmaw Communities in 1708	52
1.2: Age Pyramid for Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq in 1708	53
1.3: Age Pyramid for non-Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq in 1708	53
1.4: Mi'kmaw Conceptions by Season	58
7.1: Huron-Wendat Marriages by Month	321
7.2: Huron-Wendat Baptisms by Month	321

Tables

1.1: Mi'kmaw Population in 1708	46
1.2: Average Mi'kmaw Family and Household Size	47
1.3: Mi'kmaw Child-Woman Ratios	49
2.1: Furs and Skins shipped from Kespukwitk between 1740 and 1743	100
2.2: Priests serving Sikniktewaq, Meductic, Pentagouet, and Kennebec	116
B-1: Mi'kmaw Censuses	403
B-2: 1784 Huron-Wendat Census	404
B-3: Huron-Wendat Land Transactions: 1730-1800	414
B-4: Huron-Wendat in Notarial Records	415

Transcription

B-1: A Typical Notarial Record, 1761	411
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¹ All maps in this dissertation have been created by the author using ArcGIS. Most of these maps combine information from a number of sources and are built on baselayer templates from ArcGIS. The base map for the seigneuries along the St. Lawrence is adapted from A.E.B Courchesne, *Carte des seigneuries de la province de Québec*, (Quebec, 1923).

Introduction: Contextualizing Conquest

The 1700s were North America's most significant century. When they began, most of the continent was Aboriginal territory. But by the early 1800s, European populations had begun to shape the continent for themselves: France and Spain had risen and fallen; Britain had gained nominal control over most of the continent and then lost its oldest colonies a few decades later; the United States was rapidly acquiring Aboriginal territory; and, although Aboriginal people could still act independently from European influence in the west, Aboriginal power in the northeast was slowly fading. In more ways than one, this was a century of conquest.

For historians of North America, 'conquest' refers to two different sets of experiences. In South, Central and North America, 'conquest' describes the erosion of Aboriginal power as Europeans extended their influence westward from the Atlantic's shores. Over the course of three centuries, men like Hernando Cortes, Samuel de Champlain and Eleazar Wheelock sought to reshape American space, building a world that mirrored the one from which they came. But in Canadian history, the term 'conquest' has a different meaning. Rather than describing how Europeans gained control over Aboriginal land and territory, 'conquest' describes a series of brief eighteenth-century military battles between France and Britain whereby Britain took control of Acadia and New France. These events are usually seen as conquests not of Aboriginal people, but of French settlers who remained – and still remain – after the French administration and military departed. The pages that follow argue that these two

conquests were linked together. The conquest of New France played an important role in the European conquest of Aboriginal peoples in North America.

Focusing on small and stable Aboriginal communities during a period of European instability connects these two ways of thinking about 'conquest.' Conquests are driven by competing conceptions of territory.¹ During the eighteenth century, French, British and Aboriginal peoples sought to define the North American landscape through the relationships they built with each other. The differences between how Aboriginal people related to the French did much to shape how they responded to the new British presence. Where this interaction was limited, Aboriginal communities had difficulty developing a strong relationship with the British. Where Aboriginal communities shared space and developed an integrated relationship, they found it easier to develop new strategies. In both cases, Aboriginal people sought to maintain their control over territory and managed to do so for nearly four decades.

The two communities at the heart of this study help to draw out these themes.

The Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq and the Huron-Wendat from Jeune-Lorette lived close to the

¹ Throughout this dissertation I have used Robert David Sack's definition of territory and territoriality. Sack defines territoriality as "the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area." This geographic area defines a territory. See Robert David Sack, *Human Territoriality: Its theory and history*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 19. The only exception to Sack's definition is his dismissal of Anishinaabe territoriality in the western Great Lakes (see pages 6-15). Sack claims that it was European territoriality expressed through maps and plans which facilitated the dispossession of Aboriginal lands. Absent from his argument is any form of retaliation or response to this dispossession. When the British begin to infringe on Mi'kmaw or Huron-Wendat resources both communities responded in ways that resonate with Sack's definition. Juliana Barr recently emphasized that historians need to be more attentive to Aboriginal forms of territoriality. She asks historians to "seek the ideas, attitudes, and practices that gave meaning to diverse territorial claims." Rather than following Sack's argument that fishers, hunters and gatherers were not territorial, I have followed Barr's suggestion to arrive at a slightly more nuanced definition of territoriality. See Juliana Barr, "Geographies of Power: Mapping Indian Borders in the 'Borderlands' of the Early Southwest," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd series, vol. 68 no. 1, (January 2011), 10.

administrative centres of Acadia and Canada when Britain defeated France. In 1710, the year Acadia was conquered by Britain, about three hundred Mi'kmaq lived in Kespukwitk, the Mi'kmaw district that included the French village of Port Royal. Their people had been in contact with Europeans, primarily fishers and traders, for nearly one hundred years before the French began to settle in the area in the 1630s. Approximately half as many Huron-Wendat lived near Quebec. As with the Mi'kmaq, they had been in contact with Europeans (primarily missionaries and traders) for about thirty years before they were displaced by the Haudenosaunee in the late 1640s and moved to Quebec. Both peoples had been interacting with Europeans, primarily the French, for about one hundred and fifty years before the British arrived.

Although the Mi'kmaq and the Huron-Wendat had been in contact with the French equally long, these conquests had very different consequences. Each community's experience of colonialism and imperialism prior to the conquest directly shaped their reaction to this political transition.² The Mi'kmaq, who had minimal contact with agents of the French crown before Port Royal fell, became embroiled in conflict with the new imperial power, whereas the Huron-Wendat, who lived in the heart of New France for over a century, quickly agreed to peace. For the Mi'kmaq, the conquest had immediate political, diplomatic and military consequences; while these effects were less important for the Huron-Wendat, the British arrival brought about economic, social and cultural changes that gradually reshaped the community. This conclusion suggests that

² Throughout the dissertation I have used the word 'imperialism' to refer to power exerted through, and because of, France's or England's territorial claim to North America. The related term 'colonialism' has been used to refer to the way Europeans exerted power through settlement.

Aboriginal responses to the British conquests were shaped by their prior interaction with the French.

These two conquests, then, were very dissimilar, and their differences, when studied closely, help point out some central truths about the evolution of the eighteenth-century northeast. Put simply, the dissertation's title describes its subject: a comparison of two communities' experiences of European imperialism. But more deeply, it emphasizes the interconnections between the British conquest of the French in Acadia and Canada. The conquest was not just a singular event; rather, it was a process that took decades to accomplish. My dissertation develops this theme of process by integrating the well-known narrative of the conquest of New France into the larger story describing the European conquest of the Americas.

The Historiography of Conquest

Until the 1990s, historians studying the conquest of New France rarely made Aboriginal people their central focus. Most of them considered the fall of New France as an event that affected Europeans, primarily along the St. Lawrence, and that cost France its North American empire. When they looked beyond Quebec (to Acadia or elsewhere) it was to support an argument centred on the history of the Laurentian colony. Guy Frégault, who argues passionately that France abandoned its colonies in North America, for example, saw parallels between the 1763 Treaty of Paris, which brought an end to the Seven Years' War, and the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, but his overall purpose was to

illustrate that the one event prefigured the other.³ Few historians focused on the ramifications of these events on non-French populations. This focus on the French people who remained in Canada began to change during the 1980s and 1990s as Aboriginal voices became more prominent in the historiography. With the rising promise of ethnohistory, historians in Quebec and elsewhere began to re-calibrate their tools in order to place greater attention on Aboriginal populations. This transition fostered a rich array of historiographical approaches that has both broadened our understanding of this period and expanded the historian's methodological tool box.

Mid-to-late twentieth-century Quebec nationalism influenced the historiography of the conquest. During the 1950s, 60s and 70s, two schools of thought on the conquest developed. The Montreal school, embodied by the work of Guy Frégault, Maurice Séguin, and Michel Brunet, argued that the conquest transformed French society. French leaders and capital returned to France, replaced by British and Anglo-American administrators and merchants who had little interest in integrating French settlers into the imperial economy. The Laval school, best represented by Marcel Trudel, Jean Hamelin and Fernand Ouellet, argued for greater continuity over the period of conquest. They saw the change brought about by the conquest as less disruptive than the Montreal school envisioned. Both groups sought to explain to their contemporaries why Quebecers were in a worse socio-economic position than their English Canadian counterparts. They took

³ Guy Frégault, *La Guerre de la Conquête*, (Montreal: Fides, 1955), 9; John Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), xiii-xiv.

aim at the economic and political constraints of the early nineteenth century.⁴ Regardless of camp, both groups took a Whiggish approach to their subject. Their perspective was firmly anchored in their overall vision of (and for) Quebec society.⁵ Dale Miquelon encapsulated this view when he wrote: “Conquest ideologies have always informed Canadian political thought and behaviour.”⁶ With their nationalist concerns, few of these historians found it necessary to consider the Aboriginal communities living among their French Canadian subjects.⁷

Before the 1990s, only William Eccles had examined the impact of the conquest on Aboriginal peoples. In a sweeping 1984 article covering three hundred years and much of the geography of New France, Eccles argues against Britain’s claim that their victory granted them sovereignty over France’s former Aboriginal allies.⁸ Instead, Eccles demonstrates that France never ruled over Aboriginal people. The French neither replaced Aboriginal forms of justice, nor taxed Aboriginal communities, nor sought to control Aboriginal decision making.⁹ As allies of the French crown, though, Aboriginal communities became more tightly bound to French interests through a form of sovereignty-association. France took a Janus-faced approach to this relationship telling

⁴ For a synthesis of this historiography see Serge Gagnon, *Quebec and its Historians: The twentieth century*, (Montreal: Harvest House, 1985); Ronald Rudin, *Making History in Twentieth Century Quebec: Historians and their society*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).

⁵ Rudin, 5.

⁶ Dale Miquelon, *Society and Conquest: The debate on the Bourgeoisie and Social Change in French Canada, 1700-1850*, (Toronto: Copp Clarke, 1977), 9.

⁷ Frégault, for example, in his *La Guerre de la Conquête* - perhaps the best known book on the history of the conquest - hardly at all discusses Aboriginal people (who when mentioned are often described as *sauvages*). C. P. Stacy, whose *Quebec, 1759* does not fit well into this historiography because of its heavy focus on military tactics, is a little bit better, though mainly for Aboriginal action during the conflict rather than discussing their motivations, perspectives and broader contribution.

⁸ W.J. Eccles, “Sovereignty-Association, 1500-1783,” *Canadian Historical Review*, LXV, 4, 1984.

⁹ For Eccles’s criteria of sovereignty see Eccles, 477-478.

other Europeans that France had sovereignty, while telling their Aboriginal allies, if anything, something more diplomatic.¹⁰ After the conquest, the 1763 Royal Proclamation and the policies of local administrators such as James Murray and Guy Carleton minimized the differences from the French regime.¹¹ Increased immigration after the American Revolution, however, gradually eroded these protections. Eccles's essay has done much to shape our understanding of the relationship between Aboriginal and European people; its influence can be seen clearly in the pages that follow.

More recently, historians of the eighteenth century have taken a greater interest in the history of Aboriginal people. Recent works on the Seven Years' War are much more attentive to the contribution made by Aboriginal people than earlier works by historians like Frégault and C.P. Stacey.¹² In Quebec, Denys Delâge and Jean-Pierre Sawaya have shown how the conquest broadly affected Aboriginal communities and shifted their place in the St. Lawrence valley. Their work on this subject, most of which has appeared in articles in *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, has focused on the influence of changed colonial, legal, and alliance structures.¹³ Historiographical debate on the status

¹⁰ Eccles, 485.

¹¹ Eccles, 505-506.

¹² For good examples see Ian K Steele, *Betrayals: Fort William Henry & the 'Massacre'*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Fred Anderson, *Crucible of war: the Seven Years' War and the fate of empire in British North America, 1754-1766*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000).

¹³ Denys Delâge, "Les Iroquois chrétiens des 'réductions', 1667-1770: I – Migration et rapports avec les Français," *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, Vol. 21 no. 1-2 (1991), 59-70; Denys Delâge, "Les Iroquois chrétiens des 'réductions', 1667-1770: II – Rapports avec la Ligue iroquoise, les Britanniques et les autres nations autochtones," *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, Vol. 21 no. 3 (1991), 39-50; Jean-Pierre Sawaya, *La Fédération des Sept Feux de la Vallée du Saint-Laurent : XVIIe au XIXe siècle*, (Sillery : Septentrion, 1998); Denys Delâge and Jean-Pierre Sawaya, *Les traités des Sept-Feux avec les Britanniques : Droits et pièges d'un héritage colonial au Québec*, (Sillery : Septentrion, 2001); Jean-Pierre Sawaya, *Alliance et dépendance : Comment la couronne britannique a obtenu la collaboration des Indiens de la vallée du St. Laurent entre 1760 et 1774*, (Sillery : Septentrion, 2002); Denys Delâge and Etienne Gilbert, "La justice coloniale britannique et les Amérindiens au Québec 1760-1820 : I – En terres amérindiennes," *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, Vol. 32, no. 1 (2002); 63-82; Denys Delâge and

of treaties – particularly the 1760 Murray Treaty between James Murray and the Huron-Wendat – has also taught us much about the formal relationships between Europeans and Aboriginal communities.¹⁴ The work of military historian, D. Peter MacLeod, has shaped our understanding of this event by demonstrating the importance that differing military tactics between the French and the Canadian Iroquois played in reducing the Aboriginal-French relationship in the lead-up to 1759.¹⁵ Studies of specific Aboriginal societies and communities, such as Colin Calloway's *The Western Abenakis of Vermont, 1600-1800*, also often discuss the influence of the conquest on communities in the St. Lawrence valley.¹⁶ Most of these works, though, focus on the diplomatic and political aspects of conquest. The chapters that follow add to this discussion by giving more attention to the socio-cultural aspects of this transition in addition to the political, military, legal and diplomatic foci of much of this work.

Etienne Gilbert, "La justice coloniale britannique et les Amérindiens au Québec 1760-1820 : II – En territoire colonial," *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, Vol. 32, no. 2 (2002), 107-117; Denys Delâge and Etienne Gilbert, "Les Amérindiens face à la justice coloniale française dans le gouvernement de Québec, 1663-1759 : I – Les crimes capitaux et leurs châtements," *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, Vol. 33, no. 3 (2003), 79-90; Denys Delâge and Etienne Gilbert, "Les Amérindiens face à la justice coloniale française dans le gouvernement de Québec, 1663-1759 : II – Eau-de-vie, traite des fourrures, endettement, affaires civiles," *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, Vol. 34, no. 1. (2004), 31-41.

¹⁴ Denis Vaugeois, ed., *Les Hurons de Lorette*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 1996); Alain Beaulieu, "Les Hurons et la Conquête : Un nouvel éclairage sur le 'traité Murray'," *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, Vol. 30, no. 3. (2000), 53-63; Denis Vaugeois, *The last French and Indian war: an inquiry into a safe-conduct issued in 1760 that acquired the value of a treaty in 1990*, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002).

¹⁵ D. Peter MacLeod, *The Canadian Iroquois and the Seven Years' War*, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1996); D. Peter MacLeod, *Northern Armageddon: The Battle of the Plains of Abraham: Eight Minutes of Gunfire that Shaped a Continent*, (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 2008).

¹⁶ Colin G. Calloway, *The Western Abenakis of Vermont, 1600-1800: War, Migration, and the Survival of an Indian People*, (London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990); *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec* also put out a couple of special volumes on the history of specific Aboriginal communities in the St. Lawrence Valley. The volume on the Huron-Wendat and Abenaki are worth consulting. See *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, Vol. 30, no. 3. (2000); and *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, Vol. 33 no. 2. (2003).

Alongside these changes, historians have emerged from within many Aboriginal communities and have successfully challenged how their past has been interpreted. Huron-Wendat scholar Georges E. Sioui – whose work focuses on the Huron-Wendat during the first half of the seventeenth century – has called for Aboriginal ‘autohistories’ to correct many of the biases implicit in the writing of non-Aboriginal historians. This approach puts an emphasis on cultural persistence and the importance of learning from modern-day descendants about their communities past.¹⁷ It was in this spirit that Mi’kmaw historian Daniel N. Paul wrote *We Were Not the Savages*. Unlike Sioui’s focus on cultural persistence, however, Paul’s work focuses on the cultural, social, and economic damage done to Mi’kmaw culture by the British. *We Were Not the Savages* helps to reorient us towards a better understanding of the Mi’kmaw sense of their past.¹⁸

Changes in the historiography of Atlantic Canada have also broadened our understanding of the concept of conquest. Although many scholars have researched the impact of the 1710 fall of Port Royal on the Acadians (known hereafter as French settlers), only a handful – L.F.S. Upton, Olive P. Dickason, Daniel N. Paul and William C. Wicken – have written about the impact of this event on the Mi’kmaq. Upton and Dickason address the political changes that took place in Mi’kmaw society, Paul emphasizes the devastating affect that the British had on Mi’kmaw communities, while Wicken persuasively demonstrates the internal cultural and economic continuities before

¹⁷ Georges E. Sioui, *Pour une Autohistoire Amrindienne*, (Quebec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 1989), 30-33.

¹⁸ Daniel N. Paul, *We Were Not the Savages: A Micmac Perspective on the Collision of European and Aboriginal Civilization*, (Halifax: Nimbus Publishing, 1993).

1760.¹⁹ Geoffrey Plank's *An Unsettled Conquest* brings the Acadian and Mi'kmaw historiography together by focusing on the conquest's impact on all five of the major players: Britain, France, Acadians, Mi'kmaq and New Englanders.²⁰ Although primarily focused on British interaction with these groups, Plank's work expands on an older historiography which tended to focus on just one or two of these groups. Recently, a collective of scholars, under the direction of John G. Reid, took this idea a step further. Drawing on their strengths, they knit their research together into a book on the imperial, colonial, and Aboriginal aspects of the conquest of Port Royal.²¹ Their collaborative work synthesized borderland, Atlantic, imperial and local historiographies to demonstrate how collectively these approaches shape our understanding of this event.

In the pages that follow, I have adopted a similar approach. I describe the internal workings of these communities before, during and after the conquest. For the Mi'kmaq before the conquest, regular contact with Europeans was primarily informal and limited to coastal encounters and trading with small nearby French settlements. Once France and Britain built a more permanent foothold in Mi'kma'ki in the 1710s more formal

¹⁹ Olive P. Dickason, *Louisbourg and the Indians: A Study in Imperial Race Relations, 1713-176*, (Ottawa: National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1976); L.F.S. Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists: Indian-White Relations in the Maritimes, 1713-1867*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1979); Olive P. Dickason, "Amerindians between French and English in Nova Scotia, 1713-1760," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 4, (1986), 31-56; William C Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales: Mi'kmaq Society, 1500-1760*, (PhD diss., McGill University, 1994). Wicken's more recent book focuses much more on the political aspect of the conquest arguing that despite the introduction of written treaties in 1726, the Mi'kmaw-British relationship was principally defined through the oral diplomacy that surrounded treaty negotiations. See William C. Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial: History, Land, and Donald Marshall Junior*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002.

²⁰ Geoffrey Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign against the Peoples of Acadia*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001).

²¹ John G. Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

interaction began. For most of this period, the Mi'kmaq lived in a world separate from their European neighbours. The Huron-Wendat were in a different position. Living in the heart of the French empire, they encountered not just the French and British but a whole host of Aboriginal and European people who came to Quebec to trade or meet with imperial officials. They lived fully in two overlapping worlds: the Aboriginal world of the St. Lawrence and the settlers' society which lined the river's banks. This difference partially determined the effect of the conquest on each community. For the Mi'kmaq, the arrival of a much stronger European presence dramatically changed their political and diplomatic approach towards Europeans, while for the Huron-Wendat socio-cultural changes more slowly reshaped their perspectives on regional politics and diplomacy.

Space and Colonialism in the Northeast

Conquests always redefine a territory, often in complex ways. Many groups of people asserted domination over the space occupied by the Mi'kmaq and Huron-Wendat. In Mi'kma'ki, space was claimed by the Mi'kmaq, French settlers, New England fishers and agents representing the French and British empires. Depending on one's perspective, the territory known as Mi'kma'ki in this dissertation was also considered Nova Scotia or Acadia. Meanwhile, the Huron-Wendat village of Jeune-Lorette was situated in the French seigneurie of St. Gabriel and the parish of Charlesbourg. Although space was more clearly delineated in the St. Lawrence valley, the close proximity of Huron-Wendat and French populations meant that definitions of space, and the powers to define them, often overlapped. In both places, historical interpretation of these spaces is highly

contingent on whether the issue is approached from an imperial, Aboriginal, or settler perspective.

I have used a conceptual framework called 'spaces of power' to help discern, separate and evaluate these competing and sometimes contradictory definitions of space. This type of analysis, recently developed by Stephen J. Hornsby and Elizabeth Mancke, helps us to understand and integrate the various interactions that people had with each other in the early-modern northeast.²² For Mancke 'spaces of power' are "systems of social power, whether economic, political, cultural, or military, that we can describe functionally and spatially. Social power has multiple forms that frequently operate at variance with one another."²³ This approach is useful for studying environments like the eighteenth-century northeast, where imperial power was decentralized and neither Aboriginal nor European people had hegemonic territorial control over specific spaces. Around both Port Royal and Jeune-Lorette, settlers, traders, missionaries, imperial officials, and neighbouring Aboriginal communities exerted influence and power on each other and sought to define and defend the territories in which they lived. Understanding the geography of these relationships clarifies how the Mi'kmaq, Huron-Wendat and other regional players conceived of space and how the conquest reshaped these spatial relationships.

²² Stephen J. Hornsby, *British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power in Early Modern British America*, (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2005); Elizabeth Mancke, "Spaces of Power in the Early Modern Northeast." in *New England and the Maritime Provinces: Connections and Comparisons*, Stephen J. Hornsby and John G. Reid eds., (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 2005).

²³ Mancke, 32.

This approach moves us beyond the work of earlier historians by probing how Aboriginal, settler and imperial power intersected, defined and redefined northeastern spaces. ‘Spaces of power’ combines the interconnected fluidity of the Atlantic World with the territorial ambiguity of a borderlands geography.²⁴ It narrows the gap between Atlantic World and Borderlands historiographies. This combination of mobility and territoriality fosters a plural understanding of space that resonates with postcolonial ideas of double positioning, hybridity, and interstitiality.²⁵ This plural perspective muddies the idea of a middle or common ground between Aboriginal and Europeans. ‘Spaces of power’ provides a more general approach that allows for a wider array of outcomes and tracks exceptional people and groups that fall outside of (but are important to) the central analysis.

Because the idea of ‘spaces of power’ has only recently begun to be developed, it requires some refinement. Henri Lefebvre’s work helps us to better understand this concept by connecting the way people interact with a space (spatial practice) to the meanings associated with it. Lefebvre rejects the post-structuralist idea that space is primarily defined and constructed through our thoughts and imagination. To understand social space an observer must focus on more than mere signs and symbols; one must also

²⁴ For an excellent critique on the limits of Atlantic history, which is rectified by a ‘spaces of power’ approach, see Paul Cohen, “Was there an Amerindian Atlantic? Reflections on the Limits of a Historiographical Concept,” *The History of European Ideas*, 34, 4 (Dec 2008), 388-410. For a critique of the borderlands approach see the introduction to part one and the last section of the conclusion.

²⁵ For good examples of literature which discuss double positioning, hybridity and interstitiality see Franz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, Charles Lam Markham, trans., (New York: Grove Press, 1967); Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, (New York: Routledge, 1994).

consider how a space was conceived and how its use changed over time.²⁶ Without an anchor, which for Lefebvre is social practice, “we are thus confronted by an indefinite multitude of spaces, each one piled upon, or perhaps contained within, the next: geographical, economic, demographic, sociological, ecological, political, commercial, national, continental, global...”²⁷ In other words, without attention to social practice, the power dynamics at work within a space, which prioritize some definitions over others, are often ignored in favour of a plural analysis of all the possible influences, no matter how inconsequential. Without rejecting the diversity and multiplicity of space, Lefebvre emphasizes that there are limits to its constitution and holds that both political and social power constrain how space can be defined. Within these limitations, though, he sees space as being continually produced and reproduced by three things: perceptions, conceptions and lived experiences. These three create a plurality of spaces which intertwine to produce social space.²⁸ In Lefebvre’s view, then, space is contradictory and comprised of multiple but unequal influences.²⁹

‘Spaces of power’ helps us to negotiate the tensions between how northeastern spaces were conceptualized, perceived, and – especially – lived. The work of Reid,

²⁶ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, Donald Nicholson-Smith, trans., (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 143.

²⁷ Lefebvre, 8. Lefebvre defines social practice in this way: “it is observed, described and analysed on a wide range of levels: in architecture, in city planning or ‘urbanism’... in the actual design of routes and localities..., in the organization of everyday life.” See page 414.

²⁸ Lefebvre, 86. This idea deserves elaboration. Lefebvre argues: “We are confronted not by one social space but by many – indeed, by an unlimited multiplicity or uncountable set of social spaces which we refer to generically as ‘social space’. No space disappears in the course of growth and development: the *worldwide does not abolish the local*. This is not a consequence of the law of uneven development, but a law in its own right. The intertwinement of social spaces is also a law.” Lefebvre uses the terms spatial practice (perceived), representations of space (conceived), and representational space (lived) to encapsulate these ideas. See Lefebvre, 37-40.

²⁹ Lefebvre, 292.

Mancke and Hornsby, among others, helps us begin to understand these complex relationships. Mancke best articulated how the early-modern northeast fits within this conception of space. She emphasizes that the region “had multiple and overlapping forces of influence and control, and some without frontiers between them, frequently because they were functionally rather than spatially differentiated... Centres did exist, but... political, economic, cultural, and military ‘spaces of power’ did not necessarily share a single centre.”³⁰ Power in the northeast was decentralized; how a person defined the region depended on his or her lived experience. In both Mi’kma’ki and Jeune-Lorette, the way that French and British colonial administrators envisioned their colonies was fundamentally different from how it was conceived or lived in by Aboriginal people or French settlers. Even at the heart of New France, Aboriginal people maintained enough power to define and control the spaces in which they lived. European power, which generally portrayed itself as hegemonic in North America, mainly shaped Aboriginal spaces through gift giving, diplomacy, and the presence of cultural intermediaries such as missionaries. The northeast was a place where Aboriginal, imperial and colonial forms of power co-existed and competed to define regional relationships and access to resources.

Increasingly historians of northeastern North America have demonstrated that European inroads into Aboriginal communities have been over-emphasized. John G. Reid and Emerson Baker’s re-evaluation of Aboriginal warfare in the northeast suggests that until at least 1720, much of the region is better conceived through its Aboriginal

³⁰ Mancke, 33-34.

rather than imperial definitions.³¹ Reid developed this argument further for the modern-day Maritime Provinces, illustrating that Aboriginal definitions of territory prevailed until the 1780s and 1790s when Loyalists flooded into the region.³² Gilles Havard has made a similar point about the Pays d'en Haut.³³ Each of these works emphasize that, despite the presence of Europeans, North American spaces remained primarily defined by the Aboriginal communities living within them.

Havard has been careful to note that neither European nor Aboriginal people could live independently from each other. The Pays d'en Haut was an Aboriginal world linked to the colonial world of the St. Lawrence valley. But this relationship was not one of equals. Aboriginal communities, though autonomous, became dependent and subordinate to the French through the fur trade, diplomacy and gift giving.³⁴ French power reduced their overall independence, and brought them into the French sphere of influence. Still, in Havard's view, Aboriginal people in the west were clients rather than subjects, of the French empire.³⁵ Note that power was a key component defining most Aboriginal-European relationships; despite Aboriginal military strength, European power should not be under emphasized.

³¹ Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, "Amerindian Power in the Early Modern Northeast: A Reappraisal," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Series, 61, 1 (January 2004), 77-106

³² John G. Reid, "Pax Britannica or Pax Indigena? Planter Nova Scotia (1760-1782) and Competing Strategies of Pacification," *The Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 85 no. 4, (December 2004), 669-692. Reid has more recently argued that although this flood of immigration overlay European settlement on Aboriginal space there was still some room for Aboriginal people to negotiate with British administrators; in his words: "from the early-1780s until 1815, a military and diplomatic continuity had been preserved that co-existed with the territorial and environmental discontinuity of that area." See John G. Reid, "Empire, the Maritime Colonies, and the Supplanting of Mi'kma'ki/Wulstukwik, 1780-1820," *Acadiensis*, vol. 38 no. 2 (summer/autumn 2009), 92-93; 95.

³³ Gilles Havard, *Empire et Métissage : Indiens et Français dans le Pays d'en Haut, 1660-1715*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 2003), 14.

³⁴ Havard, 15.

³⁵ Havard, 776.

I begin *Two Conquests* from this premise. I have tried to determine Aboriginal and European spatial practices by tracing the various forms of power that defined Mi'kmaw and Huron-Wendat spatial relationships with the French and British. My conclusion for the Mi'kmaq – most clearly developed in chapter two – builds on Baker and Reid's argument. Aside from the dyked fields around Port Royal and a handful of smaller French settlements, there is little evidence that this space was defined by a European presence. Following from this conclusion, I have primarily used Mi'kmaw, Abenaki and Wulstukwiuk definitions of the landscape to describe these places, only using European terminology when referring specifically to a space solely defined by European settlers or imperial practice.³⁶ The same principle governs the second part of the dissertation concerning the Huron-Wendat. The primary difference from Mi'kma'ki, however, was the Huron-Wendat proximity to French settlers. Jeune-Lorette was in the middle of a French seigneurial landscape, though the Huron-Wendat hunting territory – which was beyond the boundaries of French settlement and influence – retained its Aboriginal definitions. For this reason, colonial place names have been used much more frequently, though not exclusively, in the second part of this dissertation.

As British control over space increased with the immigration of new settlers, power – at first fragmented – slowly became more unified after the conquest. As

³⁶ This has not been entirely successful. The dominance of European source material has meant that I often have no other option than employ the word used in the sources. For the sake of clarity, I have also continued to use the common names for well known geographic locations, such as the St. Lawrence River. For a counter-example see Lisa Brooks's *The Common Pot*. She uses the Abenaki name Ktsitekw for this river. See Lisa Brooks, *The Common Pot: The Recovery of Native Space in the Northeast*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 17 and 22. The names for the Mi'kmaw regions have been drawn from Harald Prins, *The Mi'kmaq: Resistance, Accommodation, and Cultural Survival*, (Forthworth, 1996), 1.


political, economic, cultural and military control over these spaces tightened, colonized people had less opportunity to act independently of imperial goals. Cole Harris's work captures this transition well. Although he does not explicitly use 'spaces of power', Harris argues that Aboriginal dispossession was most severe in spaces where the imperial system (politics and military), commercial capitalism (economic), and agricultural settlement (culture) coincided.³⁷ In Lefebvre's terminology, these were spaces where conception, perception and lived experience became increasingly aligned. This shift took place in very different ways in Port Royal and Jeune-Lorette, and was not wholly complete by the end of the eighteenth century. Nonetheless, the consolidation and systematization of power under the British Regime had lasting effects on both communities. Its changes can be seen in the concluding years covered by this dissertation.

The Nature of Comparison

Some people may find comparing these two different times and places counter-intuitive. Aside from the changeover between European powers, most of this study is premised on differences. The two conquests took place fifty years apart in considerably different environments. The people living in these communities spoke different languages and had different economic practices, and the documentation available to historians from each place varies in both quantity and quality. Nevertheless there were also many similarities. Let us look for a moment at the two communities to see what lessons their differences offer for the history of the northeast.

³⁷ Cole Harris, *The Reluctant Land: Society, Space and the Environment in Canada before Confederation*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 455-462.

Map 0.1: An Overview of the Eighteenth-Century Northeast³⁸



A Brief History of Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Mi'kma'ki

Relying on fish and other aquatic resources along the coast and its estuaries, the Mi'kmaq were one of the first groups to come into contact with European fishers, explorers and missionaries. Initially, some Mi'kmaq became intermediaries between European fishers and other Algonquian-speaking peoples along the coast. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, when Samuel de Champlain arrived on their shores,

³⁸ The Mi'kmaq districts in this map are taken from Harald Prins, *The Mi'kmaq: Resistance, Accommodation, and Cultural Survival*, (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Pub., 1996), 1.

the Mi'kmaq had been engaging Europeans in trade for decades and a positive relationship had developed between them. On this foundation, the French built a small settlement in Kespukwitk, calling their small collection of buildings Port Royal. In the years that followed, missionaries travelled to the new French colony with the hope of converting the Mi'kmaq to Catholicism. Reports sent back to France considered their work to have been a success, the missionaries baptized Membertou, the local chief, and many other members from his community.

The small French settlement of Port Royal had difficulty getting started. It was razed for the first time in 1613 by Samuel Argall from Virginia. This was the first of many English attacks on the French. After 1613, the English removed France's imperial agents another two times before the end of the century. The English rarely occupied the colony after their successful attacks. After each event, sometimes quickly and other times over the course of decades, the English ceded the colony back to France. For the most part the French settlers, the bulk of whom arrived after 1632, and Mi'kmaq engaged with each other as well as New England fishers and traders informally without interference from either empire.

During the first decade of the eighteenth century, the frequency of New England attacks increased sharply. The War of Spanish Succession broke out in 1702, providing adequate diplomatic cover for France's and England's local administrators to respond to the tensions that had been building between their colonies. Port Royal was attacked on four occasions between 1704 and its fall in 1710. Aboriginal people rarely helped the French defend the village. When Aboriginal people were present more aid came from the

Abenaki, who lived across the Bay of Fundy, than the local Mi'kmaq. The Abenaki had been fighting against the English in the region for just as long as France and their relationship with the French empire was considerably stronger.

The aftermath of the 1710 attack brought about changes that did not occur when the village had been captured earlier. The British maintained troops at Port Royal, now called Annapolis Royal, and did not cede the territory back to France during the treaty negotiations at Utrecht which ended the War of Spanish Succession in 1713. As a consequence of the Treaty of Utrecht – and a significant difference from the conquest of 1759 – the French relocated to Unama'kik, which Europeans called Cape Breton and the French renamed Île Royale. There, the French invested considerably more resources in developing a fortified fishing town and a new administrative centre called Louisbourg.

Although the Abenaki led the initial resistance to the British presence, the Mi'kmaq also reacted strongly to these changes. They expressed frustration upon learning that France had ceded their land to Britain without consulting them. Nevertheless, rather than trying to resist their presence, the Mi'kmaq living around Port Royal unsuccessfully sought peace with the British. But the British did not have a plan for interacting with the Mi'kmaq. The increasing number of New England fishers along their shores led to tense relations with the Mi'kmaq. By 1715 these tensions provoked open conflict. Most of the violence occurred along the coast, where the British were unable to control the situation. The French subtly supported the Mi'kmaq in their resistance. For the first time, the French and Mi'kmaq began to meet regularly and, with

greater attention and interest, gradually France began to furnish the Mi'kmaq with more gifts and supplies.

In the early 1720s, after the Mi'kmaq attacked the British fishing station at Canso and a New England trader in the French village of Minas, tensions reached a climax. Attacks like these prompted the British in both New England and Nova Scotia to declare war against the region's Aboriginal people in 1722. Dummer's War, named after New England lieutenant-governor William Dummer, lasted until 1725. The only major event of the conflict in Mi'kma'ki was a half-hearted Aboriginal attempt to besiege Annapolis Royal in 1724. In 1725/26 Abenaki delegates at Boston made two peace treaties with the British: one covering the Abenaki and another covering the Wulstukwiuk and Mi'kmaq. Both had to be ratified, a process that took two years. With the signing of these treaties, tensions in the region diminished and the British and the Mi'kmaq gradually built a relationship based on the legal principles inherent in these treaties.

Similar tensions erupted in the late 1740s and 1750s when growing conflict between France and Britain brought a return to violence. After the outbreak of the War of Austrian Succession in the 1740s, there was a qualitative (and quantitative) shift in the imperial presence in Mi'kma'ki. Both France and Britain began to entrench themselves in the region, leading to over a decade of conflict. Although the seeds of this intensified imperial presence were sown after 1713, the events in Mi'kma'ki after 1740 were very different from those that took place earlier. Accordingly, this thesis stops at the end of the 1730s.

The central argument of the chapters that follow is that it was not until after the conquest of Port Royal that European empire had much of an impact on the Mi'kmaq. After 1710, European claims divided Mi'kmaw land, forcing the Mi'kmaq to negotiate with both French and British imperial officials. The differences between the French and British that in Mi'kma'ki brought about violence were never seen along the St. Lawrence following France's defeat at Quebec and Montreal.

A Brief History of Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Jeune-Lorette

Samuel de Champlain was one of the first Europeans that the Huron-Wendat encountered on their own territory. Before his 1615 voyage to their homeland, known as Wendaké, most Huron-Wendat contact with the French had taken place between a handful of intermediaries in the St. Lawrence valley and through trade goods that worked their way through Aboriginal economic networks.³⁹ Situated in modern-day central Ontario, at the southern end of Georgian Bay and west of Lake Simcoe, Wendaké was accessible from Lake Ontario through the Humber River, from the Ottawa valley via the Mattawa and French Rivers, and from the north and west via Lake Huron. The Huron-Wendat formed a confederacy of four tribes: the Attignaouantan (bear), Attingneenongnahac (cord), Arendaronnon (rock), and Tahontaenrat (deer).⁴⁰ Cutting across this tribal division were eight clans: Turtle, Wolf, Bear, Beaver, Deer, Hawk,

³⁹ Bruce Trigger, *The Children of Aataentsic: A History of the Huron People to 1660*, vol. 1, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976), 208-214; 236-245.

⁴⁰ There may have also been a fifth group, the Ataronchronon (marsh), but their relationship to the confederacy is unknown. Bruce Trigger suggests that they may have been part of the Attignaouantan. See Trigger, 30.

Porcupine, and Snake.⁴¹ The clan structured Huron-Wendat political and social life, linking clan segments from different villages and across tribal lines.⁴² The eighteen to twenty-five enclosed villages each had a population of about one thousand people.⁴³ The overall territory was relatively small, about the same size as Kespukwitk, but had a significantly larger population; according to Gary Warwick between twenty-eight and thirty thousand people lived in the area at the time of contact.⁴⁴

The relationship between the Huron-Wendat and the French grew in the early-seventeenth century, but it was not until after the French returned in the early 1630s – after being expelled from the St. Lawrence valley by the English Kirke brothers in 1629 – that French and Huron-Wendat interaction began to have serious consequences. The biggest difference when the French returned was the replacement of Recollet missionaries with the Jesuits. The Jesuits were an important force among the Huron-Wendat, serving as both religious and economic intermediaries. They sought to convert Huron-Wendat souls and lubricate the growing trade in furs. Within two decades their presence had divided the confederacy into three groups: traditionalists, neutrals and Christians. The division within the confederacy, intensified warfare, and a series of lethal epidemics drastically reduced the Huron-Wendat population. By the late 1640s, the confederacy dissolved and the Huron-Wendat left their homeland. One group headed west to live around Michilimackinac (and later Detroit) with their Anishinaabe trading

⁴¹ Conrad Heidenreich, “Huron,” in *The Handbook of North American Indians*, vol. 15, ed. Bruce Trigger, (Washington: The Smithsonian Institute, 1978), 371.

⁴² Trigger, 54-55.

⁴³ Heidenreich, 288; Trigger, 32.


⁴⁴ Gary Warwick, *A Population History of the Huron-Petun, A.D. 500-1650*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 153. As a point of contrast, Kespukwitk had a Mi'kmaw population of about three hundred in 1708.

partners and allies; another group headed east to settle with the Jesuits in the growing village of Quebec; smaller groups were integrated into other nearby Aboriginal societies.

Nearly three hundred people from three tribes (Attignaouantan, Attingneenongnahac, and Arendaronnon) travelled to Quebec. Over the three decades that followed, war with the Haudenosaunee and Catholic efforts at evangelization caused a considerable amount of in- and out-migration with neighbouring Aboriginal societies. During this period most of the Attignaouantans joined the Mohawks and the Arendaronnon joined the Onondagas; the Attingneenongnahac, who numbered about one hundred and fifty in 1670, remained with the Jesuits in Quebec.⁴⁵ As the population changed, the community moved around Quebec in search of security and adequate land. At various times during the 1650s and 1660s they lived with the Algonquin and Abenaki at Sillery, Île d'Orleans, Beauport and the town of Quebec. In 1673, they moved to a slightly more permanent village at Ancienne-Lorette, and in 1697 the agricultural exhaustion of their lands – and likely some Jesuit pressure – caused them to move to Jeune-Lorette. During this period of mobility they began to use the land north of the St. Lawrence, which the French had not occupied, for their hunting territory. This was likely done in consultation with the Algonquin living near Trois-Rivières.

⁴⁵ Léon Gérin, "Le Huron de Lorette," in Denis Vaugeois, ed., *Les Hurons de Lorette*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 1996), 46.

Map 0.2: Seventeenth Century Huron-Wendat Migration around Quebec⁴⁶




Similar migration into the St. Lawrence valley also took place among the Mohawk, Abenaki, and Algonquin. By the time of the conquest there were eight mission villages along the St. Lawrence. The Algonquin and Nipissing lived near the Mohawk at Kanesatake (Lac-des-Deux-Montagnes), Haudenosaunee at Kahnawake (Sault Saint Louis), Akwesasne (St. Regis) and Oswegatchie (La Présentation), Algonquin at Pointe-du-Lac, Abenaki at Bécancour (Wolinak) and Saint François (Odenak), and the Huron-

⁴⁶ This map is based on the maps in Michel Lavoie, "C'est ma seigneurie que je réclame": Le lutte des Hurons de Lorette pour la seigneurie de Sillery, 1760-1888," (PhD thesis, Université Laval, 2006), appendix.

Wendat at Jeune-Lorette (Wendaké).⁴⁷ During the French Regime, this collection of Aboriginal villages was known as *les villages domiciliés*; after the conquest they were called the Seven Fires Confederacy.

Map 0.3: Domicilié Villages along the St. Lawrence



As the Huron-Wendat became established around Quebec, the French were also beginning to build their colony by issuing royal grants to the land around the village. As often in France, the land around Quebec was managed through the seigneurial system;

⁴⁷ The village names used in this paragraph are used throughout the dissertation. The names in parenthesis are the names used by the French or the current name of the reserve in which the descendants of these people still inhabit.

whereby the crown granted a large parcel of land to a local notable or religious order, who would then grant smaller parcels to farmers called censitaires.

Both Ancienne-Lorette and Jeune-Lorette were located in the seigneurie of St. Gabriel. Robert Giffard received title to St. Gabriel in 1647, but the original grant conflicted with land that had already been conceded east of the town. As a solution, Giffard's seigneurie was relocated northwest of Quebec in the early 1650s. This movement created an overlap with the northern portion of Sillery, a seigneurie that was administered by the Jesuits, but had been granted to Algonquin, Abenaki and Huron-Wendat migrants in 1650. No challenge was made over this conflicting boundary because there were few French farmers and, after 1667, the Jesuits acquired St. Gabriel, effectively administering both seigneuries. Ancienne-Lorette and Jeune-Lorette were in the space where the two grants overlapped.

Living in such proximity to each other, the French and Huron-Wendat developed a positive relationship. French settlers often used the Huron-Wendat mission in lieu of travelling to the much more distant parish church in Notre-Dame-des-Anges seigneurie, while the Huron-Wendat produced small crafts and furs for sale and trade in Quebec. Some members of the community also rented land in St. Gabriel and neighbouring seigneuries, paying seigneurial dues alongside their French neighbours. Finally, whenever tensions with the British flared, the Huron-Wendat usually joined French military officers and other neighbouring Aboriginal communities in attacking France's enemies, particularly in New England. Their motivation for participating in these attacks was threefold. First, they could strengthen their relationship with France; second, they

could acquire booty from the villages they attacked; and third, they could take captives to help bolster their small population. By 1759, the Huron-Wendat had deep social and cultural ties to the French.

There were few immediate changes after the British captured Canada in September 1760. As the British moved down the St. Lawrence on their way to Montreal, William Johnson, the superintendant of the newly created Indian Department, sought the neutrality of the domicilié villages around the French town. This was quickly extended to all of the domicilié villages before Montreal was captured, culminating in an agreement with the Huron-Wendat on 5 September 1760. The diplomacy and negotiations in the weeks immediately before and after the fall of Montreal lay the foundation for a viable working relationship with the British. Similarly, the Jesuits, who had cultivated a tight relationship with the Huron-Wendat, were banned in most of Europe in the 1760s and 1770s, but the Bishop of Quebec and British governor allowed them to continue serving the Aboriginal villages along the St. Lawrence. This decision, and a different British approach from that taken in Mi'kma'ki, minimized any disruption to village life during the initial period after the conquest.

By 1790 the impact of the conquest began to be felt. The Huron-Wendat were not as important to the British as they had been to the French, and, as tensions mounted in the English colonies in the 1770s, members of the community were divided in how to approach the American Revolution; initially they chose neutrality, but by the end of the conflict members of the community had fought on both sides. Meanwhile, increasing population pressure from the French settlers squeezed Aboriginal hunting territories and

limited the resources available to the Huron-Wendat. The missionary presence also waned as the British, although tolerant of the Jesuits, had banned the order from recruiting. The increasing population, decreasing Jesuit presence and decreasing influence with the British reduced Huron-Wendat control over their church and local resources. This caused tension between the Huron-Wendat and their neighbours.

The community, however, was well equipped to deal with these changes. The conquest opened the St. Lawrence valley to Eleazar Wheelock and Dartmouth College. Steeped in the fervour of the Great Awakening, Wheelock sought to educate and evangelize Aboriginal youth in the northeast. One of his students, Sawantanan, graduated from Dartmouth and returned to Jeune-Lorette with greater knowledge about how to manipulate the British system through European-style petitioning of the crown and its Canadian agents.

With Sawantanan's return in the 1790s, the Huron-Wendat, who had been complaining about encroachment on their lands for decades, took a novel approach to solve their problems. In 1791 they began to submit formal petitions to the governor, the Lower Canadian Assembly, and the crown. At the core of their complaint was the overlapping boundary between Sillery and St. Gabriel. With the demise of the Jesuits as the seigneurs of St. Gabriel and Sillery, they argued that they should administer this land. These petitions marked a new period in Huron-Wendat history, when they employed a European style of petition to offset their declining influence.

Two Stories in One

Although this is primarily a comparative dissertation about Aboriginal experiences of the British conquest of New France, it can equally be read as a linear narrative of Aboriginal-imperial interaction. Studying a period extending from the 1680s to the early 1800s, *Two Conquests* explores the various and somewhat fragmented ways that both France and Britain sought to engage local Aboriginal peoples. Policies varied depending on geopolitical and economic interests. Imperial administrators took different approaches when interacting with the Mi'kmaq, Huron-Wendat or other Aboriginal peoples, such as the Abenaki. Studying these interactions helps to distil eighteenth-century European practices in North America and Aboriginal responses to them.

This is the benefit of conducting a comparison between communities which shared neither time nor space, but were connected to one another through both Aboriginal and imperial trade and communication networks. In this respect I have framed my work as a response to calls for broader comparisons that transcend some of the limitations of more localized and nationally-focused studies. John R. McNeill's path-breaking comparison between Louisbourg and Havana during the first half of the eighteenth century demonstrates the benefits of cross-colonial comparisons. By analyzing French and Spanish imperial policies and practices together, McNeill demonstrates that rather than seeing each place as a heavily defended military installation or local social and economic centre, the comparative approach emphasizes "the critical impact – often unintended – of imperial policies in shaping colonial destinies."⁴⁸ For McNeill,

⁴⁸ John R. McNeill, *Atlantic Empires of France and Spain: Louisbourg and Havana, 1700-1763*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 204, 208.

comparing the two places helped to balance local and imperial forces, providing a more nuanced understanding of their place in the French and Spanish empires. In this dissertation, the comparison has helped move beyond more colonial-based historiographies – that of Acadia and Canada – to explore a regional framework that includes European colonies but focuses on Aboriginal territory.

Scholars have been calling for this type of comparison for a number of decades. John G. Reid's work on Acadia, Maine and New Scotland sought to examine these three small and marginal colonies in an effort to move beyond a national historiographical framework and better respect the historical context in which these places were situated.⁴⁹ This point is now being made much more frequently. Over the past five years, Ken Coates, Anne Laura Stoler, and Allan Greer have all called for historians to embrace international comparisons that move beyond the more traditional historiographical confines of the nation-state.⁵⁰ Each of these scholars asks historians to pay less attention to national boundaries, particularly those created decades or centuries after our period of study.

This dissertation, though, is clearly situated within a national historiography and addresses one of the pivotal moments in Canadian history. At the same time, I have tried to design it with these critiques in mind. Although not carrying out the international type of comparison for which these scholars call, I have tried to follow the spirit of their

⁴⁹ John G. Reid, *Acadia, Maine and New Scotland: Marginal Colonies in the Seventeenth Century*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), introduction.

⁵⁰ Ken Coates, "Learning from Others: Comparative History and the Study of Indigenous-Newcomer Relations," *Native Studies Review*, vol. 16 no.1, (2005), 3-14; Anne Laura Stoler, ed., *Haunted By Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History*, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006), 55; Allan Greer, "National, Transnational, and Hypernational Historiographies: New France Meets Early American History," *The Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 91 no. 4 (Dec 2010), 695-724.

suggestions. “My hope,” Greer writes, “is that scholars will continue to look for ways to listen to the evidence of the primary sources and construct meaning without falling back on anachronistic national narratives.”⁵¹ Although Greer argues that this is best done by drawing comparisons with Latin America and the Caribbean, it is equally important to remember how Acadia and Nova Scotia differ from Canada and Lower Canada – colonies linked at times more tightly by regional Aboriginal networks than imperial or settler behaviour.

At its core, *Two Conquests* is a study about how communities interact with one another and the institutions that govern their lives. Although it can be placed within a national historiography, I have used the comparative method in order to closely focus on these communities and emphasize how they – and their historiographies – are somewhat disconnected from this larger national story. Bringing Kespukwitk and Jeune-Lorette together helps tease out themes, issues and peoples who have often been overlooked by scholars with a more teleological and nationalist focus. The themes discussed in the chapters that follow often fit more within local historiographies of the Mi’kmaq and Huron-Wendat, the history of Aboriginal engagement with colonial higher education, and the history of the American Revolution than the canon of Canadian historiography.

A good example of how this approach has helped draw out themes that have not been identified in most of the historiography is the emphasis that I place on the Abenaki.⁵² The term Abenaki refers to a group of loosely bound communities who were

⁵¹ Greer, 716.

⁵² I have chosen to use the term Abenaki rather than Wabanaki for the sake of clarity. In the context of this dissertation Abenaki refers to the people who lived on and between the Saco, St. Lawrence, and Penobscot Rivers. I have reserved the term Wabanaki for situations in which I refer to the Wabanaki Confederacy,

displaced by pressure from New England expansion in the 1680s and 1690s.⁵³ This was a period of significant migration as coastal peoples moved inland, often to the Jesuit mission villages of Becancour and St. François.⁵⁴ Bruce Bourque has argued that it was during this period of migration that the term Abenaki was extended to a number of coastal groups, such as the Etchemin and Canibas, as they moved closer to the St. Lawrence and shared village life with the Abenaki who had lived further inland when Europeans arrived.⁵⁵

French policy and practices towards the Abenaki connect many of the themes in this dissertation. In part one, the French capitalized on Abenaki resistance to the immigration of New Englanders onto their territory by joining in their fight against the English. The French sought to maintain a French-allied buffer between New England and New France. Focusing on the Abenaki demonstrates how few resources the empire allocated to develop a relationship with the Mi'kmaq before the conquest and how France began to employ the techniques used in Wabanakia in Mi'kma'ki after the conquest. In part two, the Jesuit missions to the Abenaki at Becancour and St. François figure prominently as two of the communities to whom the Huron-Wendat were most tightly

which developed at the turn of the eighteenth century and included the Wulstukwiik and was allied with the Mi'kmaq and Huron-Wendat.

⁵³ For more on the composition of the Abenaki and how scholars have grappled with their composition see Dean R. Snow, "Eastern Abenaki," in Bruce Trigger, ed., *The Handbook of North American Indians*, vol. 15, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 137-147; Gordon M. Day, "Western Abenaki," in Bruce Trigger, ed., *The Handbook of North American Indians*, vol. 15, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 148-159; Bruce J. Bourque, "Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula," *Ethnohistory*, vol. 36 no. 3, (Summer 1989), 257-284; Alice Nash, *The Abiding Frontier: Family, Gender and Religion in Wabanaki History, 1600-1763*, (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1997), chap. 1.

⁵⁴ Bourque, 270.

⁵⁵ For this reason, I have used the terms found in the sources, particularly Canibas, rather than the general term Abenaki. This is because occasionally the sources differentiate between Abenaki and Canibas. This differentiation only occurs in part one; by the mid-eighteenth century, the term Abenaki was used almost universally. For more information see Bourque, 257-284.

bound. By the 1720s, the Huron-Wendat were drawn into conflict with the British in both Wabanakia and Mi'kma'ki. Although this dissertation is not at all about the Abenaki, they – and their territory – play a central role in the pages that follow.

This dissertation is about two conquests and one story. Bringing together the experiences and impact of these two events on the Mi'kmaq and Huron-Wendat helps to draw out the different ways that France and Britain sought to relate to Aboriginal people in North America. The experiences in Kespukwitk and Jeune-Lorette were fundamentally different, illustrating the contours of European imperial practices in North America. Examining these societies through documents generated by the two different imperial powers, however, demonstrates the networks of trade, communication and alliance that connected the people living in the northeast throughout the eighteenth century. But the Mi'kmaq and Huron-Wendat were just two of many Aboriginal societies that experienced this transition. As much as this is a dissertation about comparison, it is equally about understanding common processes, the different affects of the conquest on Aboriginal people, and the relationships that existed in the northeast more generally.

Part 1: Introduction

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were tumultuous periods in Mi'kma'ki. Mi'kmaw, Abenaki, and Wulstukwiuk peoples faced new trading relationships, languages, cultures, and claims to territory as Europeans sought a secure foothold in the region. Conflict between England and France over their claims to Abenaki, Wulstukwiuk and Mi'kmaw land magnified these challenges. Although Europeans did not completely resolve this conflict until the final fall of Louisbourg in 1758, the conquest of Acadia was a key moment of geopolitical transition. The new British garrison in Kespukwitk and French garrison and town at Louisbourg introduced European imperial structures into Mi'kma'ki. Before this transition, the Mi'kmaq had minimal contact with European officials and their desire for economic and territorial expansion. A more direct European presence after 1713 transformed Mi'kmaw relationships with neighbouring Aboriginal and European communities, as many Mi'kmaq moved away from imperial centres in an effort to maintain their way of life.

The evolution of these relationships is described over the course of the four following chapters. The first chapter serves as a window onto the Mi'kmaq at the turn of the eighteenth century. It focuses on their demography, household and village structure, and the relationship between the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq and their neighbours. The next two chapters argue that before the fall of Port Royal the French had only developed a weak relationship with the Mi'kmaq. The French had stronger ties with the Abenaki than they had with the Mi'kmaq. These divergent relationships determined which Aboriginal communities came to France's defence in the early eighteenth century. Personal

connections between the French and the Abenaki at Pentagouet drew some limited Aboriginal support from that village, while closer Mi'kmaw communities did not participate in any significant way. The final chapter compares how the Mi'kmaq responded to the growing presence and influence of European empires in the region. It argues that the Mi'kmaq moved away from European centres after the conquest, though the differing French and British strategies for interacting with them encouraged more Mi'kmaq to ally with France than with Britain.

Most recent texts on the history of turn-of-the-century Mi'kma'ki have glossed over the complex nature of Aboriginal-European relations during the early eighteenth-century sieges of Port Royal. Although scholars often contextualize Mi'kmaw-European relations within the broader Abenaki-European relationship, Abenaki participation in events that took place in Mi'kma'ki is often under emphasized. General words like *savage* or *indian* in the primary documents have complicated our understanding of who helped defend the French during the early eighteenth century sieges on Port Royal. Historians have offered varied interpretations of Aboriginal participation in the events that took place between 1707 and 1713. Geoffrey Plank's *An Unsettled Conquest* claims that the Mi'kmaq, with other "Algonkian warriors," came to Port Royal's defence.¹ Likewise, John Mack Faragher's *Great and Noble Scheme* focuses on the Mi'kmaq rather than other Aboriginal participants, such as the Abenaki.² Both works relegate the role of Bernard Anselme d'Abbadie, the fourth baron of Saint-Castin, and the Abenaki during

¹ Geoffrey Plank, *The Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign Against Acadia*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 40-67.

² John Mack Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from their American Homeland*, (New York: W.W. Norton & company, 2005), 99-124.

the sieges to their participation in the 1711 resistance against the British, rather than focus on their role in the initial defence of the French village.³ N.E.S. Griffiths discusses Saint-Castin's and the Abenaki's participation in the earlier sieges in *From Migrant to Acadian*, but fails to explain the absence of the Mi'kmaq, while William C. Wicken has helped explain the absence of the Mi'kmaq in 1710 without discussing the role of the Abenaki in the conflict.⁴ These recent works depict Aboriginal involvement during the conquest of Port Royal in a slightly different manner. Most focus on the role of the Mi'kmaq, because of their local residency, rather than on the Abenaki, thus misrepresenting the nature of Mi'kmaw-European relations during this period. Taking a regional perspective places greater emphasis on the spatial dimensions of power, however, and demonstrates that a much more diverse group of Aboriginal people participated in these events.⁵

A regional view of these events helps to situate them in a borderlands historiography. Generally, a place is considered a borderland when overlapping claims to territory create spaces where distinct and often flexible social, cultural, political and economic relationships can exist. Despite problems with their teleological framework where borderlands transition into borders, Adelman and Aron's definition of a borderland

³ Saint-Castin was a French officer whose father was an influential French fur trader and military officer and mother was the daughter of an Abenaki chief. See chapter three for more information.

⁴ N.E.S. Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian: A North American Border People*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 215-243; William C. Wicken, "Mi'kmaq Decisions: Antoine Tecouenemac, the Conquest, and the Treaty of Utrecht," in John G. Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 86-100.

⁵ John Grenier has made a similar critique, observing that historians of this period – with the exception of Emerson Baker and John G. Reid – have not adequately separated the Wulstukwuik from the Mi'kmaq. See John Grenier, *The Far Reaches of Empire: War in Nova Scotia, 1710-1760*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 7.

as “the contested boundaries between colonial domains” adequately encapsulates the conditions in seventeenth-century Wabanakia and eighteenth-century Mi’kma’ki.⁶ They describe borderlands as spaces “where European colonial domains brushed up against one another, Indian peoples deflected imperial powers from their original purposes and fashioned economic, diplomatic, and personal relations that rested, if not entirely on Indian ground, at least on more common ground.”⁷ For them, a borderland is a place where Aboriginal people were more-or-less free agents who could use their position between empires to benefit their communities. This is exactly how Olive P. Dickason framed the conflicts that took place between England and France in Wabanakia and Mi’kma’ki.⁸

The territorial nature of this clash of European empires and the way that it reshaped, divided and often erased Aboriginal conceptions of territory are generally not addressed in borderlands literature. John R. Wunder and Pekka Hämäläinen highlight the absence of Aboriginal agency in Adelman and Aron’s notion of borderlands. Although Adelman and Aron discuss the freedom of Aboriginal people to engage European empires, they neglect the critical role indigenous populations play in creating these spaces. Their conceptual framework makes it difficult to have a more complex

⁶ Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American History,” *The American Historical Review*, vol. 104, no. 3 (Jun 1999), 816.

⁷ Adelman and Aron, 838.

⁸ Olive P. Dickason, “Amerindians between French and English in Nova Scotia,” *American Indian Culture and Research Journal*, vol. 10, no. 4 (1986), 31-56.

discussion about the impact of borderlands on these communities. For Adelman and Aron, Aboriginal people only played a minor role in the clash of empires.⁹

The division of Aboriginal territory partially fostered the clash of European empires that lies at the heart of borderland studies. In the northeast, the creation of European borderlands meant the division of Aboriginal land. European definitions of space often cut through and divided Abenaki, Wulstukwiuk and Mi'kmaw conceptions of territory. These Aboriginal people were not free agents trapped between two empires with whom they could choose to relate; rather these were societies whose land was divided by foreign claims and definitions. Mi'kmaw communities sought to retain their territory despite living on either side of arbitrary European lines. Their resistance created considerable ambiguity in their relationships with Europeans, a theme explored extensively in chapter four, as specific communities sought to develop distinct relationships with either the French or English based on their local interests. In both Wabanakia in the 1690s and Mi'kma'ki in the 1710s, the threatened redefinition of Aboriginal borders began a series of both internal and external conflicts with the English. The destructive nature of borderlands is a critical, though too often unrecognized, feature of how these societies experienced European imperialism and colonialism.

Focusing on the divisive nature of borderlands points to a more complex regional perspective than borderland scholars provide. The borderlands approach assumes that Aboriginal territory slowly disappeared in the European quest for rigid and clearly defined borders. John G. Reid, Elizabeth Mancke, and other scholars have argued for a

⁹ John R. Wunder and Pekka Hämäläinen, "Of Lethal Places and Lethal Essays," *American Historical Review*, vol. 104, No. 4 (Oct. 1999), 1229-1234.

pluralistic approach to the region that does not presuppose the existence of colonies.¹⁰

Mancke's use of 'spaces of power' helps to expand beyond borderlands. She writes:

In a centre and peripheries model, one system's frontiers abut on another system's, and on these frontiers, of which colonies were one type, were marchlands of contested control. The early modern northeast... had multiple and overlapping forces of influence and control, and some without frontiers between them... they were functionally rather than spatially differentiated.¹¹

Unlike the frontier or borderlands approach, where only a singular meaning is ascribed to a place, 'spaces of power' recognizes multiple and competing meanings within a space.

In much of North America Aboriginal and European definitions of space co-existed.

Both European and Aboriginal societies had the power and influence to define these spaces and to interweave their definitions.

Viewing this subject through the lens of layered relationships reveals differences between scholars like Patricia Nietfeld and Harald Prins, who argue that Mi'kmaw society and culture went through dramatic changes in the sixteenth century; L. F. S. Upton, who portrays the conquest as significantly, but not dramatically, making an impact on the Mi'kmaq; and William C. Wicken, who argues that there was only gradual change in Mi'kmaw society before the deportation of French settlers. A critical difference between the three perspectives is focus. Nietfeld and Prins emphasize the impact of European trading goods; Wicken focuses more on Mi'kmaw society and underlines the limited interactions of early commentators with the Mi'kmaq; while Upton addresses the development of the Mi'kmaw-European relationship during the eighteenth

¹⁰ John G. Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); Elizabeth Mancke, "Spaces of Power in the Early Modern Northeast," in *New England and the Maritime Provinces: Connections and Comparisons*, eds. Stephen J. Hornsby and John G. Reid, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 33.

¹¹ Mancke, 33.

century. In the subsequent chapters I try to balance these views by arguing that a significant shift in the Mi'kmaw-European relationship occurred after the conquest. This change did not undermine other aspects of Mi'kmaw society and in many ways was an attempt to maintain continuity in a time of considerable political disruption. The structures of Mi'kmaw society provided flexibility for differing political perspectives between families and villages without causing broader divisions and fissures in Mi'kmaw society.¹²

The plural conception of space also helps us understand how Europeans claimed North America. Upton believes that in French minds “there was never any question of treating for the cession of Indians lands, no concept that the Indians had rights that had to be bargained for, no thought that they should be treated as a separate nation.”¹³ Upton's perspective does not consider the way that France used its alliances to build its territorial claims on Aboriginal territoriality. The second and fourth chapters demonstrate how France sought to reinforce Abenaki and Mi'kmaw claims to Wabanakia and Mi'kma'ki as part of its own claims to New France and Acadia. The French used Aboriginal territoriality to demarcate French from English space.

This dissertation also challenges Upton's notion that the Mi'kmaq made idiosyncratic decisions by “wrest[ing] advantages from one side or the other by a mixture

¹² Patricia Nietfeld, *Determinants of Aboriginal Micmac Political Structure*, (PhD diss. University of New Mexico, 1981); Harald E. L. Prins, *The Mi'kmaq: Resistance, Accommodation, and Cultural Survival*, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996); L.F.S. Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists: Indian-White Relations in the Maritimes, 1713-1867*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1979), 37-38; William C. Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales: Mi'kmaq Society, 1500-1760*, (PhD diss., McGill University, 1994), 444; William C. Wicken, “The Mi'kmaq and Wulstukwiuk Treaties,” *University of New Brunswick Law Journal*, vol. 43 (1994), 244.

¹³ Upton, 25-26.

of threats and promises.”¹⁴ Rather, the Mi’kmaq sought the foundation (or formation) of a stable relationship that fit within the established power structures of their society. Leadership and alliance with Europeans were determined by the most beneficial outcome for the household or village.¹⁵ These local decisions rarely included all of the communities from the seven districts of Mi’kma’ki. The Mi’kmaq living around Annapolis Royal attempted to maintain peace with their British neighbours, while communities in Unama’kik cultivated stronger ties to the French at Louisbourg. People living further away from European empires – who formed the growing majority of Mi’kmaq society – were much less involved in forming alliances with Europeans. This group grew stronger over the course of the post-conquest period, as people moved away from areas where Britain and France established a strong presence. It was not necessary for all households, summer villages, or regions to agree on political strategy; with the majority of people remaining outside of dealing with Europeans, local disagreement did not mean that broader political structures fell apart.¹⁶

Abenaki, Wulstukwiuk, and Mi’kmaq societies were diverse. Some individuals sought to ally more tightly with either European power while others moved farther away from European influence; personal alliances and connections could draw groups of Aboriginal people to one empire or the other; and individual communities, and often whole regions, could differ over political allegiances. The flexibility of Mi’kmaq political structures created room for these differences to co-exist and not threaten the

¹⁴ Upton, 31.

¹⁵ Upton, 7.

¹⁶ Upton, 8. The Mohawk provide another good example of a broader political body that despite vitriolic disagreement over responses to Europeans continued to maintain connections and interactions regardless of these specific divisions.

larger Mi'kmaw polity. For the most part historians have fallen into the same trap as eighteenth-century British colonial administrators by treating the Mi'kmaq as a politically homogenous group, and minimizing the political differences among Mi'kmaw regions, communities and individuals. Unity was not compromised by the diversity of political perspectives.

Chapter One: Kespukwitk at the end of the Seventeenth Century

Before the fall of Port Royal, the Mi'kmaq remained relatively autonomous from the French. But not all Mi'kmaw communities were in a similar position. The presence of Europeans living in Kespukwitk and fishing along its shores made a significant impact on the regional Mi'kmaw population. This chapter describes the structure of Mi'kmaw society before 1710, emphasizing the elements that most deeply shaped their response to the British conquest of Acadia. It draws heavily from and builds on the work of Bernard Hoffman, Virginia Miller, Patricia Nietfeld, and William C. Wicken. Their research treats Mi'kma'ki as a whole and the Mi'kmaq as a collective and does not often discuss local nuances or site-specific historical context.¹ This chapter contributes to their work by primarily focussing on the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq in southwestern Mi'kma'ki as well as their similarities and differences with the Mi'kmaq living elsewhere in Mi'kma'ki.

A nominal Mi'kmaw census, taken in 1708 by missionary Antoine Gaulin, forms the foundation of this chapter.² It represents France's first attempt to develop an understanding of Mi'kmaw social life and the number of Mi'kmaw men capable of bearing arms. Although Gaulin likely missed some Mi'kmaq, it provides the most detailed portrait of Mi'kmaw society in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. The census lists seven Mi'kmaw communities at Port Royal, Cape Sable, La Hève, Minas, Musquidoboit, Cape Breton and Chignecto. Not only does it provide the names of the

¹ As a historian, rather than an anthropologist, Wicken's work does a much better job at anchoring the Mi'kmaq into particular historical contexts and addressing the local situation in which many local Mi'kmaw communities found themselves.

² Recensement général fait au mois de novembre mille Sept cent huit de tous les sauvages de l'Acadie, 1708, Newberry Library, Edward E. Ayer, MSS 4, no. 751. Transcription consulted at LAC, MG 18 F18.

people who lived around these places, but also their ages and basic household grouping. As such, the census, which covers all of peninsular Mi'kma'ki, serves as a window into Mi'kmaw household economy, village life, and relationships with neighbouring communities in the years immediately before the fall of Port Royal in 1710.

Table 1.1: Mi'kmaw Population in 1708

	Population
Port Royal	102
Minas	59
La Hève	126
Cape Sable	97
Chignecto	97
Musquidoboit	159
Cape Breton	196
Total Kespukwitk	325
Total	836

The Household Economy

The household was the basic unit of Mi'kmaw society. It underpinned both their production and reproduction. Over the course of the year Mi'kmaw households would move in and out of larger groups to capitalize on the seasonal availability of resources in the region. Managing a successful and large household economy was a significant factor in determining local leadership of Mi'kmaw communities.

Mi'kmaw households were smaller than those of the French settlers. The 1708 census does not directly provide information about Mi'kmaw households; rather, it places Mi'kmaw individuals into two groups: nuclear families comprised of a woman, man and their children, and widows and orphans. Mi'kmaw households combined these two groups; widows and orphans lived with the families of their relatives. Although it is nearly impossible to connect specific widows and orphans to the families in which they

lived, it is possible to develop a general understanding of the average household size. In 1708, there were about 4.5 people in each Mi'kmaw family. Adding widows and orphans suggests that the average household size was between five and six people.³ French families (not households) at Port Royal were significantly larger. Their average size was 7.2 in the census taken in 1700 and 6.14 in the 1701 census.⁴ Andrew Hill Clark, however, found the average size of French families in Acadia to be between five and six.⁵ French families, then, were about twenty to thirty percent larger than Mi'kmaw families. The difference in size is consistent with the difference between sedentary agricultural societies and those whose subsistence depended more on hunting, gathering and fishing.⁶

Table 1.2: Average Mi'kmaw Family and Household Size

Village	Family Size	Household Size
Port Royal	4.625	6.375
Cape Sable	4	4.85
La Hève	4.863	5.727
Minas	4.364	5.364
Musquidoboit	4.484	5.129
Cape Breton	4.618	5.765
Chignecto	4.316	5.105

Overall, the difference in household size was determined by lower Mi'kmaw life expectancy and a slightly lower rate of reproduction. This can clearly be seen by

³ William C. Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial: History, Land, and Donald Marshall Junior*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 30.

⁴ These two censuses have a number of inconsistencies. I have included both in order to provide a range for French family size. See the discussion on the censuses taken in Mi'kma'ki in the appendix for more on the challenges of using this type of source.

⁵ Andrew Hill Clark, *Acadia: The Geography of Early Nova Scotia*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 202.

⁶ Gary Warwick, *A Population History of the Huron-Petun, A.D. 500-1650*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 40; 164.

calculating Mi'kmaw child-woman ratios. Child-woman ratios provide insight into the rate at which Mi'kmaw society reproduced itself. I have followed the work of Peter Gossage and Danielle Gauvreau who calculate child-woman ratios by comparing the number of children under five born to married women between the ages of 15 and 49.⁷ This technique is ideal for the pre-industrial period. Under normal circumstances, the average interval between births is about 28 months. A married woman, then, will have at least one child within this time period but only a handful will have none or two or more.⁸ This is the smallest window possible to adequately understand birth patterns in a pre-industrial environment.

In addition to the limitations of the 1708 census, discussed in the appendix, some additional problems are associated with this approach. To ensure that only women likely to conceive are included in the analysis, child-woman ratios exclude widows with children under five because they were unlikely to conceive again without a full-time partner. The ratio also does not account for infant and child mortality. Some children who were born during this period died before the census was taken and were thus not enumerated. Finally, the 1708 census provides a very small sample size. It only includes 133 mothers and 124 children. Small deviations in the numbers can cause considerable variability in the ratios. Despite these limitations, and in the absence of additional evidence, child-woman ratios provide a useful window onto the overall health of Mi'kmaw society.

⁷ For more on this method see Danielle Gauvreau, Peter Gossage, and Lucie Gingras, "Measuring Fertility with the 1901 Canadian Census: A Critical Assessment," *Historical Methods*, vol. 33, no. 4 (Fall 2000), 219-228.

⁸ Warwick, 41.

Table 1.3: Child-Woman Ratios

Community	Ratio	Total W	Total C
Total Non-Kespukwitk	0.94	87	82
Total Kespukwitk	0.91	46	42
Total Mi'kmaq	0.93	133	124
La Hève	1.05	21	22
Cape Sable	0.75	12	9
Port Royal	0.85	13	11
Minas	0.80	10	8
Musquidoboit	0.97	29	28
Cape Breton	0.94	33	31
Chignecto	1.00	15	15
French Settlers - 1700	1.14	57	65
French Settlers - 1701	1.09	55	60

Given the relatively large margin of error, due to the small sample size, most Mi'kmaw communities had child-woman ratios above 0.9. Although lower than the child-woman ratios for the neighbouring French settlers at Port Royal,⁹ this ratio suggests that the overall population was relatively healthy. In fact, the Mi'kmaw child-woman ratio is in keeping with late-nineteenth-century data. It is nearly identical to the ratio calculated by Gossage and Gauvreau for the Maritimes in the 1901 census (0.96) and about twenty-five percent larger than turn-of-the-century Ontario (0.75).¹⁰ This is somewhat surprising given the general scholarly consensus that fertility in sedentary

⁹ I have used two censuses for Port Royal because they were taken one year apart but have obvious and significant discrepancies. Both censuses were nominal, but – as these numbers indicate – there are some considerable differences between who was enumerated and the ages for which some people are listed. I have discussed these problems in greater detail in the appendix. See *Estat des habitants du Port Royal leurs familles Bestiaux terres en valeur et fusils*, CAOM, G1, vol. 466 1700, 147-163; and *Recensement du Port Royal pr. 1701*, CAOM, G1, vol. 466 1701, 170-196.

¹⁰ Peter Gossage and Danielle Gauvreau, "Canadian Fertility in 1901: A Bird's-Eye View," in Eric W. Sagar and Peter Baskerville, eds., *Household Counts: Canadian Households and Families in 1901*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 78. There are many factors which affect these ratios. In 1901, religion, class and place of residence were important factors in determining the ratio in Ontario. See p. 94.

agricultural societies like Nova Scotia was higher than in societies which had to move frequently to maintain their supply of food.¹¹ These figures also directly challenge Virginia Miller's argument that the Mi'kmaw population was in decline throughout this period.¹² On the contrary, these child-woman ratios suggest that Mi'kmaw women's reproduction was not seriously limited by the effects on menstruation of frequent migration or periodic malnutrition. Mi'kmaw women were healthy enough to produce children at a frequency which likely increased their population.

Mi'kmaw population was controlled more by mortality than reproduction. Gary Warwick has emphasized that "Hunter-gatherers typically have low life expectancies at birth, high infant mortality rates (30%-60%), relatively low adult life expectancy... and moderate fertility rates."¹³ The age pyramids below, which are based on the 1708 census, illustrate that this was a relatively young society. About fifty-six percent of the population was below the age of twenty. Adult deaths did not occur evenly between genders. There were more women than men in Mi'kmaw society, suggesting that the death of male heads of household shaped these communities.¹⁴ Orphans and widows made up 17.7% of Mi'kmaw society.¹⁵ Proportionately there were more widows than in the French community. The percentage of widows was 5.5 among the Mi'kmaq, while

¹¹ Marvin Harris and Eric B. Ross, *Death, Sex, and Fertility: Population Regulation in Preindustrial and Developing Societies*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 38; Warwick, 40.

¹² Virginia Miller, "The Decline of Nova Scotia Micmac Population, A.D. 1600-1850," *Culture*, vol. 2 no. 3 (1982), 107-120.

¹³ Warwick, 164.

¹⁴ Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 44.

¹⁵ William C. Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales: Mi'kmaq Society, 1500-1760*, (PhD diss., McGill University, 1994), 127.

the French at Port Royal had a percentage of 2.4 in 1698 and 2.7 in 1714.¹⁶ In Kespukwitk they comprised about twenty percent of the population. Although the Mi'kmaq were highly fertile, their population was held in check by an increased incidence of mortality. Given the similarity in family size among Mi'kmaw communities, it is likely that most communities experienced a similar population decline during the seventeenth century.

The average age of marriage reflects the pattern of widowhood. Mi'kmaw men tended to be seven years older than Mi'kmaw women when they got married. The overall age of marriage for the Mi'kmaq was twenty-nine for men and twenty-two for women. At Port Royal, the average age of marriage for men was twenty-nine and women was twenty, reflecting nearly a ten-year difference; while at Cape Sable it was thirty-three and twenty-eight, reflecting a five-year gap; and at La Hève it was twenty-five and twenty.¹⁷ The numbers for Cape Sable and La Hève support Wicken's observation that women in Mi'kmaw society tended to marry four to five years younger than men.¹⁸

The abnormal difference in the average age of first marriage was likely connected to the absence of men in Port Royal society, which consistently had fewer men than women among its adult population, except for the cohort between twenty and twenty nine. Importantly, though, when the husbands and fathers of the widows and orphans are


¹⁶ Recensement du Port Royal, CAOM, G1, vol. 466 1698, 106-133; Recensement des habitants du Port Royal avec leurs familles de cette présente année mil sept cent quatorze, CAOM, G1, vol. 466 1714, 232-237.

¹⁷ This is about the same as the average age of marriage for the French at Port Royal. Their average age of marriage was 26 for men and 21 for women. See Gisa Hynes, "Some Aspects of the Demography of Port Royal, 1650-1755," *Acadiensis*, vol. 3 no. 1, (Autumn 1973), 11.

¹⁸ Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 124-125. I have followed Wicken's method of determining the average age of first marriage, by adding a year to the age of a family's oldest child and then deducting that amount from the age of the mother and father.


totalled together, the same proportion of men, between ten and thirteen percent, were absent from each of these summer villages. The uniformity of this loss suggests that although variability existed between these communities, they shared a common pattern of male absence.

Graph 1.1: Age Pyramid for all Mi'kmaw Communities in 1708




	Total Female	Percent Female	Total Male	Percent Male
1 to 9	143	17.11	120	14.35
10 to 19	100	11.96	104	12.44
20 to 29	61	7.3	72	8.61
30 to 39	53	6.34	47	5.62
40 to 49	33	3.95	22	2.63
50 +	39	4.67	42	5.03
Total	429	51.32	407	48.68

Graph 1.2: Age Pyramid for Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq in 1708



	Total Female	Percent Female	Total Male	Percent Male
1 to 9	62	19.08	38	11.69
10 to 19	45	13.85	38	11.69
20 to 29	21	6.46	31	9.54
30 to 39	19	5.85	16	4.92
40 to 49	13	4	8	2.46
50 +	18	5.55	16	4.93
Total	178	54.77	147	45.23

Graph 1.3: Age Pyramid for non-Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq in 1708



	Total Female	Percent Female	Total Male	Percent Male
1 to 9	81	15.85	82	16.05
10 to 19	55	10.76	66	12.92
20 to 29	40	7.83	41	8.02
30 to 39	34	6.65	31	6.07
40 to 49	20	3.91	14	2.74
50 +	21	4.11	26	5
Total	251	49.12	260	50.88

Mi'kmaw reproduction had a much more significant effect on the communities that came into frequent contact with European settlers, traders and fishers. Port Royal, Minas and Cape Sable all had child-woman ratios that were well below average. The difference in child-woman ratios cannot be explained by environmental factors. Peninsular Mi'kma'ki had a much better climate and more abundant natural resources than other parts of Mi'kmaw territory. This is best demonstrated by looking at population density, which was significantly greater in Kespukwitk than in Unama'kik (Cape Breton). In Kespukwitk, where the warm summer weather lasts a couple of weeks longer, there was one household for every 224 square kilometres of land; whereas in Unama'kik each household had about 294 square kilometres.¹⁹ The Mi'kmaq in Unama'kik needed significantly more territory to survive than the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq. The overall similarity in child-woman ratios in these two regions suggests that, although there were fewer resources in Unama'kik, the differences in the environment had a negligible effect on women in these communities.

The location of Port Royal, Cape Sable and Minas near principal French villages and ports-of-call set these three communities apart from the others in the census. The Mi'kmaq in these places directly competed with Europeans for local resources and were more likely to come into contact with European diseases. Over time the growth of European settlements limited Mi'kmaw access to some resources, forcing them to migrate more frequently in order to sustain their families. Recurrent migration likely

¹⁹ These numbers are confirmed in Frank Speck's early work on hunting territories. See Frank G. Speck, "The Family Hunting Band as the Basis of Algonkian Social Organization," *American Anthropologist*, New Series, vol. 17, no. 2 (Apr-Jun, 1915), 304. Wicken has also emphasized that the majority of the Mi'kmaw population lived on mainland Mi'kma'ki, with ¾ living below the Shubenacadie River. See Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 31.

increased the stress placed on women, lowering their nutrition while increasing their workload. Both of these changes would have affected the frequency with which they could conceive, limiting their family size.

The Mi'kmaq around Port Royal were likely also affected by the early-eighteenth century New England attacks on the French village. Unlike the Mi'kmaq at Cape Sable and Minas, the size of Mi'kmaw families at Port Royal was high relative to elsewhere in Mi'kma'ki. This suggests that the causes of their lower than average child-woman ratio may have been more recent than at Cape Sable and Minas where family size more closely reflects reproduction in these communities. Although all three communities were adversely affected by the tensions between England and France at the turn of the eighteenth century, only the Mi'kmaq at Port Royal directly used land and resources that were physically occupied during these military conflicts.

Overall, though, the difference between the child-woman ratios in each Mi'kmaw community reflects the importance of migration in Mi'kmaw daily life. The Mi'kmaw household economy was based on hunting and fishing. But, the relative importance of each varied depending on local environmental, political and social conditions. This helps explain why scholars have placed different emphasis on the importance of hunting and fishing. In the 1950s, Bernard Hoffman suggested that ninety percent of the Mi'kmaw diet came from fishing in the ocean, lakes and rivers.²⁰ Patricia Nietfeld built on Hoffman's work by comparing the terrestrial and aquatic resources available in Mi'kma'ki. She argued that the abundance of aquatic resources encouraged Mi'kmaw

²⁰ Bernard Hoffman, *The Historical Ethnography of the Micmac of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, (PhD thesis, University of California, 1955), 151.

families to live in large summer villages for nearly nine months of the year, suggesting that Mi'kmaw communities were relatively sedentary.²¹

Most scholars argue that these patterns were flexible.²² This was particularly the case in Kespukwitk, where the Mi'kmaq were never further than sixty kilometres from the coast, and food and game was easier to obtain than in many other parts of Mi'kma'ki. The Mi'kmaq living here were able to move easily between their hunting territories and coastline at all times of the year. Importantly, though, it is here where the child-woman ratios suggest that Mi'kmaw women reproduced less frequently. Given the difference in child-woman ratios, it seems likely that most Mi'kmaw households were part of stable and relatively sedentary communities; while migration played a more important role for households living closer to the French.

Whether more sedentary or mobile all Mi'kmaw households followed similar subsistence practices. For much of the year, Mi'kmaw households lived in a base camp, known as a summer village. When the ice went out, individual households came together near the coast to fish and repair tools. During subsequent spawning runs, they worked in large groups to catch smelt, gaspereau, shad, sturgeon and salmon as the fish travelled upriver to reproduce. The spawning runs ended in April, when the Mi'kmaq turned to the inshore fishery for skates, brook trout, white perch, mackerel, as well as hunting and

²¹ Patricia Nietfeld, *Determinants of Aboriginal Micmac Political Structure*, (PhD diss. University of New Mexico, 1981), 100-101.

²² Nietfeld, 318-319. Nash and Miller have suggested that the Mi'kmaq had a generalized economy that was based both on land and sea resources. Their argument is supported by archaeological evidence, which suggests that at least in the north, hunting was a critical in the pre-contact period. They stress that over time hunting became more popular, reflecting the influence of the fur trade. See Ronald J. Nash and Virginia P. Miller, "Model Building and the Case of the Micmac Economy," *Man in the Northeast*, vol. 34 (1987), 46, 50.

collecting lobster, crabs, clams, oysters and squid. The summer brought large quantities of migrating birds into the area providing meat, eggs and feathers. Catching fish and fowl communally provided for a larger yield and fostered a broader sense of community among Mi'kmaw families – providing a key motivation for uniting together in summer villages.²³ In the late fall, households left the village and moved inland to hunt beaver, moose, bear, otter, muskrat and caribou in smaller groups.²⁴ Generally the men hunted and killed the animal, while the women fetched its carcass and prepared its meat and fur for consumption and use.²⁵ As the fur trade developed, the hunt for fur-bearing animals moved to later in the winter, when animals had their thickest coats.²⁶ The rest of the winter was spent hunting inland, with the exception of January when many Mi'kmaq returned to the Kespukwitk coast to hunt seal.²⁷

Baptismal records from the parish of Saint Jean Baptiste in Port Royal reinforce the seasonality of Mi'kmaw migration patterns. The date of baptism, or birth when it was listed in the parish registers, reveals when a handful of Mi'kmaw children were conceived. Although the sample size is limited, and represents the post-conquest period, graph 1.4 confirms this pattern. Generally Mi'kmaw children were conceived in the winter, spring and summer with few conceptions during the fall hunting months when men and women lived more independently of each other. This suggests that by the early-

²³ Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 36-37.

²⁴ Hoffman, 155-181.


²⁵ Virginia Miller, "The Micmac: A Maritime Woodland Group," in *Native Peoples: The Canadian Experience*, R. Bruce Morrison and C. Roderick Wilson, eds., (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), 329-330.

²⁶ Nietfeld suggests that the winter hunt increased in significance as the fur trade developed, slowly pulling the Mi'kmaq further and further from coastal resources as fur-bearing animals were depleted near the coast. Nietfeld, 379.

²⁷ Hoffman, 155-181; Nietfeld, 318.

to-mid eighteenth century, the hunt had not yet moved to later in the winter. The lack of conceptions in the fall represents the period of most intense hunting and migration, while later in the winter men remained closer to their camps.

Graph 1.4



All Mi'kmaw communities, regardless of their local migration patterns, used inland territory for hunting during the winter. Groups of kin-related households hunted in a particular territory. The Mi'kmaq had bilocal residency patterns after marriage with a patrilocal tendency, meaning that a new couple could live with either the man's or woman's family but more often settled with the man's. Hunting groups, then, could be bound together by siblings or children of either sex.²⁸ Most scholars emphasize that in settling with either the husband's or wife's family, bilocal marriage practices, in the words of Harald Prins, "provided the social flexibility that Mi'kmaqs needed to continually readjust themselves to fit the shifting resource availability on which they built

²⁸ Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 30.

their economy.”²⁹ Using the 1708 census, Wicken noted that hunting groups averaged from sixteen to twenty-seven people in the north and considerably larger – as high as forty-two – in southern Mi’kma’ki.³⁰

Hunting territories were distributed by either the chief of the summer village, known as a sagamo, or by the local shaman. Seventeenth-century accounts do not agree over who was responsible for this task. Marc Lescarbot, a Parisian lawyer who visited Port Royal in 1606-07, claimed that the shaman told Mi’kmaw hunters where to travel in order to capture the best game.³¹ But according to Chrestien Le Clercq, a Recollet missionary, who served the Mi’kmaq in Kespe’kewaq in the 1670s and 1680s, hunting territories were assigned to family heads by village chiefs in the spring and the fall. These territories were relatively well laid out so that no family would intrude on another’s territory.³² Lescarbot’s account may have been somewhat confused, because when he visited Port Royal the local sagamo, Membertou, was also a shaman.³³

In addition to providing for the household, a bountiful hunt also brought men much more social capital.³⁴ Fishing was seen as a relatively easy task. Nicolas Denys claimed that within an hour the Mi’kmaq could catch about two hundred bass.³⁵

Likewise, many fishing techniques were communal exercises, while hunting involved

²⁹ Harald Prins, *The Mi’kmaq: resistance, Accommodation, and Cultural Survival*, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996), 32. Prins made this comment based on Nietfeld, 410-415; Wicken used more specific evidence, but made a similar point in Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 124-128.

³⁰ Wicken, *Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 30-31.

³¹ Marc Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 3, W.L. Grant. trans., (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1914), 221.

³² Chrestien Le Clercq, *New relation of Gaspesia, with the customs and religion of the Gaspesian Indians*, William F. Ganong ed., (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1910), 237.

³³ Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 3, 104.

³⁴ Hoffman, 151.

³⁵ Nicolas Denys, *Description & Natural History of the Coasts of North America (Acadia)*, William F. Ganong, ed. and trans., (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1908), 173.

smaller groups and its success more important for survival during lean winter months.³⁶

Skill in the hunt was a key component to leadership in Mi'kmaw communities.

French officials who observed Mi'kmaw society at the end of the seventeenth century noted that sagamos were always male and selected through a combination of their family relations and success in war and hunting.³⁷ Le Clercq believed that household size and connections were critical components to achieving leadership in summer villages.³⁸ At the local level sagamos administered the distribution of hunting territories, managed the collection of furs, and helped to shape the village's response to issues that affected all of its members.³⁹ Other rankings within Mi'kmaw society were merit-based, particularly in the choice of who led war parties.⁴⁰ This was not an egalitarian society.⁴¹ Sagamos held real power and were revered; commoners had difficulty breaking into power structures.⁴²

Focusing on households helps us to better understand the dynamics of Mi'kmaw life at the turn of the eighteenth century. Attention to family and household size and child-woman ratios demonstrates that migration was not as important to Mi'kmaw life as some scholars have assumed. Although affected by mortality, most Mi'kmaw communities were relatively healthy and probably increasing in population size. This

³⁶ On co-operative fishing techniques, see Nietfeld, 348-349.

³⁷ Sieur de Diereville, *Relation of the voyage to Port Royal in Acadia or New France*, John Clarence Webster, ed., Mrs. Clarence Webster, trans., (Toronto : Champlain Society, 1933), 149; Mémoire du sieur de Lamothe Cadillac sur l'Acadie. Description de ce pays et de la Nouvelle-Angleterre. Projet d'une attaque contre la Nouvelle-York et Boston, 1692, C11D-2, f. 193v; this is supported by Nietfeld, 486.

³⁸ Le Clercq, 235.

³⁹ See Le Clercq, chap. 14.

⁴⁰ Nietfeld, 468.

⁴¹ Virginia Miller, "Social and Political Complexity on the East Coast: The Micmac Case," in Ronald J. Nash, ed., *The Evolution of Maritime Cultures on the Northeast and Northwest Coast of America*, (Vancouver: Department of Archaeology, Simon Fraser University, 1983), 47-49.

⁴² Hoffman, 574-575.

was not the case for the communities that lived closest to Europeans. The Mi'kmaq living at Port Royal, Cape Sable and Minas were faced with greater competition for resources and increased exposure to disease and warfare. Although the Mi'kmaq households living around La Hève were further removed from Europeans and had a robust child-woman ratio, it is likely that they too would have been aware of the effect of Europeans on the communities around them. The material differences between the Mi'kmaq households in Kespukwitk and elsewhere shaped their responses once the British arrived in 1710.

Village Life

Although the household was the basic unit of Mi'kmaq society, the summer village was the aspect of Mi'kmaq life that was most easily observed by Europeans. The 1708 census assembled the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq into three communities around Port Royal, Cape Sable and La Hève. Each of these communities represents a Mi'kmaq summer village. Summer villages were social and political units that were primarily composed of households allied to a particular sagamo and situated around a particular geographical feature, usually a key river or bay.⁴³ Here, families could interact with each other, men and women could find partners, and corporate decisions could be made about issues that affected the community as a whole, such as trade and war.⁴⁴ Rather than representing a permanent village with a fixed population, the summer village was a stable location in which Mi'kmaq families moved in and out depending on the availability of

⁴³ Villebon's Last Journal sent to Count Pontchartrain, Fort St. John, Oct 27, 1699, in John Clarence Webster, ed., *Acadia at the end of the seventeenth century*, (Saint John: New Brunswick Museum, 1934), 125.

⁴⁴ Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 38.

resources, their desire to visit friends, trade with neighbouring communities, or engage in warfare.⁴⁵

The 1708 census sheds light on the Mi'kmaq at one brief moment in time, and its focus on these three villages neglects other areas regularly used by the Mi'kmaq. Missionaries like Antoine Gaulin timed their visits to these regions around religious festivals when many Mi'kmaq would have been present in their summer villages. The missionaries, therefore, did not visit many of the places where the Mi'kmaq are known to have congregated in smaller groups.⁴⁶ In the late 1680s, Gargas, who was employed by the Ministry of Marine to record events in the colony but for whom we know little more than his one-word name, took a census of the French settlements in Mi'kma'ki. In addition to French settlers, he enumerated a handful of Mi'kmaq that he encountered at the sites of the three summer villages and at Port Rossignol (Ogumkwegeak) and Mirligueche.⁴⁷ French records from both the seventeenth and eighteenth century also note groups of Mi'kmaq living on Saint Mary's Bay, likely on or near the Sissiboo River (Gtjipanog).⁴⁸ In addition to these places, Hoffman and Wicken have also suggested that at various times during this period other summer villages may have existed near modern day Port Mouton and Port La Tour (Pespogoitg).⁴⁹ Whenever possible, I will discuss the Mi'kmaq who used these places; however, the Eurocentric nature of the primary sources

⁴⁵ Nietfeld, 356; Miller, "The Micmac: A Maritime Woodland Group," 328.

⁴⁶ Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 97.


⁴⁷ General Census of the Country of Acadie, 1687-88, in William Inglis Morris, ed., *Acadiensia Nova*, vol. 1, (London: Quaritch, 1935), 144-160.

⁴⁸ Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 3, 37. Pierre Biard, Relation of New France, of its lands, Nature of the Country, and of its Inhabitants, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 3, 199; St. Ovide et Le Normant au ministre, 16 Nov 1732, C11B-14, f. 4v.

⁴⁹ Hoffman, 103-131, 522-527; Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 99-104. The names in parentheses are from Hoffman.

rarely provides sufficient information to do so. As a result, much of the discussion that follows will focus on the three summer villages identified by Gaulin in 1708.

Map 1.1: The Mi'kmaq in Kespukwitk



Each of these villages had at least one sagamo. Wicken has emphasized that some summer villages could have more than one, pointing out that heads of families with association to more local geographies – like the places listed in the previous paragraph – could be considered sagamos. No direct evidence exists of Mi'kmaw leadership in Kespukwitk before the conquest. We know, however, that Membertou was the sagamo at Port Royal and Messamoet was the chief at La Hève in the early seventeenth century. In the 1720s, the chiefs varied in each of these places, likely reflecting Wicken's

observation that villages could have more than one chief. In the 1722 census the chief at Port Royal was Thomas Albason; at Cape Sable it was Jean Baptiste Medesgnal, and at La Hève it was Claude Couachinauil. A different set of names appeared on the 1726 treaty signed with the British, which listed Baptiste Thomas as the chief at Port Royal, John Baptiste and Paul Tecumart at Cape Sable, and Antoine Egish at La Hève.⁵⁰ This suggests that at the local level, prominent hunting families could share village leadership.⁵¹

The size of these villages could vary considerably. The smallest village enumerated by Gaulin was Minas in Sipekne'katikik, which had eleven families, while the largest, with thirty-four families was the only community on Unama'kik. The villages in Kespukwitk fit between these two places in terms of size. Port Royal had sixteen families, Cape Sable had twenty and La Hève had twenty-two. About one hundred people lived in each of the villages in Kespukwitk.

Little is known about the material culture of these villages. Hoffman and Nietfeld suggest that they might have been fortified using examples from Lescarbot and Denys to emphasize the enclosed nature of the summer village.⁵² This, however, was not the case in Kespukwitk. Lescarbot's description of fortified villages at Port Royal and Ouigoudi (the Saint John River) shows that the walls were erected because the Mi'kmaq were

⁵⁰ Recensement fait en 1722 par monsieur Gaulin, 27 Dec 1722, C11B-6, f. 77; Lawrence Armstrong to the Board of Trade, 24 November 1726, CO217-5, ff. 3-4; Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 130.

⁵¹ Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 41-42.

⁵² Hoffman, 132-135; Nietfeld, 396.

planning to begin a war.⁵³ There do not seem to have been walls around Mi'kmaw villages during peace time. Lescarbot clearly emphasized that he had never before seen a walled village. Not only had the village's appearance changed, but its social composition had shifted to include Mi'kmaq from elsewhere in Mi'kma'ki. The fortified village at Ouigoudi, which was likely a Wulstukwiuk community, was host to Mi'kmaq from Kespe'kewaq along the Saint Lawrence River.⁵⁴ The absence of descriptions of their village during peace-time suggests that Le Clercq was correct in his observation that villages were mostly "collections of wigwams" along river banks.⁵⁵

Each of these villages was located near key aquatic resources. Pierre Biard, a Jesuit missionary who lived at Port Royal between 1611 and 1613, observed that villages were usually arranged according to important bays and rivers.⁵⁶ All three of the villages in Kespukwitk were located on important rivers. The community at Port Royal, which Bernard Hoffman called Tecopsgig, was located on the Annapolis River, though its precise location is unknown. At Cape Sable, the village of Ouikmakagan was located on Robert's Island near the Tusket River.⁵⁷ We know the least about the village at La Hève, likely on the La Hève River. Hoffman called this village Einoi Egsaoei. All three villages were situated in places with easy access to both inland and maritime resources.

⁵³ Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 2, 354. He claims that these forts were made for a sort of war game whereby the men would try to escape from the village and the women would prevent them. See Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 3, 264.

⁵⁴ Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 2, 356-357.

⁵⁵ Le Clercq, 100.

⁵⁶ Biard, Relation of New France, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 3, 87.

⁵⁷ Clarence-Joseph d'Entremont, *Histoire du Cap-Sable de l'an mil au traité de Paris, 1763*, vol. 3, (Eunice, Louisiana: Hebert Publications, 1981), 1226.

One hundred and two Mi'kmaq lived at Port Royal in 1708. Although no specific information exists about the community during the first half of the eighteenth century, early visitors to the area provided some information. The site was likely chosen because of its easy access to inland resources and annual fish migrations. Biard notes that the Mi'kmaq gathered acorns and roots from along the river banks, and moved to a location about four leagues from the fort at Port Royal to fish for 'eplan' (which given the time of year was likely eel) in the mid-spring.⁵⁸ Lescarbot claimed that the sturgeon and salmon ran up the Annapolis River later in the season.⁵⁹

The French initially built their fort near a Mi'kmaw camp in the early seventeenth century, which may have been the site of the summer village. Lescarbot reported that he inspected the village on his first day in Mi'kma'ki and he later added that the village and the French fort stood only four hundred paces apart.⁶⁰ This was the last time, however, that the village was described as being so close to French settlement.

The absence of discussion about the Mi'kmaw village in later documents suggests that it was upriver, where it was less likely visiting Europeans would come into contact with local Mi'kmaq. It must not have been far, however, as the Mi'kmaq maintained somewhat frequent interaction with French settlers and administrators. In 1703, for example, a Mi'kmaw man named Louis was paid for running letters to various outlying settlements for the French.⁶¹ After the conquest, Prudent Robichaud, a well-known

⁵⁸ Biard, *Relation of New France, Jesuit Relations*, vol. 3, 257. This fit with the general description of Mi'kmaw subsistence patterns. See Biard, *Relation of New France, Jesuit Relations*, vol. 3, 79-81.

⁵⁹ Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 3, 236-237.

⁶⁰ Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 2, 313; Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 3, 227.

⁶¹ État de la dépense et paiements faits par moi Mathieu de Goutin, 26 Nov 1703, C11A-113, ff. 169-195v.

French settler, was chastised twice by the British for interacting with the Mi'kmaq, suggesting that they continued to live nearby.⁶²

The interactions between Prudent Robichaud and the Mi'kmaq are important because of where Robichaud lived. Although he had family connections to the Mi'kmaq through his wife, Henriette Petitpas, Robichaud also lived in the only part of Port Royal where I have been able to identify a continuous Mi'kmaw presence. Robichaud lived at the Cape, southeast of the fort along the river known at various times as the Allains or Lequille River. Archaeologists have found pre-contact Mi'kmaw shell deposits and a Mi'kmaw fishing weir in and along this river.⁶³ Champlain's 1613 map of the area indicates that the Mi'kmaq would go there to fish.⁶⁴ In the 1680s Gargas noted the presence of a Mi'kmaw family living in this area. Four others had wigwams near the fort at Port Royal.⁶⁵ Finally, the southern bank at the mouth of the river, where the Robichauds settled later in the eighteenth century, was known as *Pointe aux Sauvages*, suggesting a Mi'kmaw connection to this part of the French village.⁶⁶ Importantly, a

⁶² Council Minutes, 21 Sept 1723, Archibald M. MacMechan, ed., *Nova Scotia Archives III: Original Minutes of his Majesty's Council at Annapolis Royal, 1720-1739*, (Halifax, 1908), 47-48; Council Minutes, 22 May 1725, MacMechan, ed., *Nova Scotia Archives III*, 100-101; *The American Weekly Mercury*, July 26 1722, 1

⁶³ Benjamin C. Pentz, "A River Runs Through It: An Archaeological Survey of the Upper Mersey River and Allains River in Southwest Nova Scotia," (MA thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2008), 128-135. Pentz argues that this weir may have served multiple purposes. It is positioned in such a way as to make it useful for catching a number of species, leading him to the conclusion that it may have been used year-round (131). References in Champlain and Lescarbot, however, indicate that it was used for gaspereau, which were caught by women in the early spring (132). Other features found in the vicinity of this weir, however, indicate that it was also likely used for catching eels in the fall (134). Importantly, however, Pentz's work on fishing weirs in the region suggests that the eel fishery involved migration inland (199).

⁶⁴ NSARM Map Collection: F/239-1609 - Annapolis Royal. The original map can be found in *Les voyages du Sieur de Champlain* (1613).

⁶⁵ General Census of the Country of Acadie, 1687-88, in Morris, vol. 1, 148.

⁶⁶ Maurice Basque, *Des Hommes de Pouvoir: histoire d'Ottho Robichaud et de sa famille, notables Acadiens de Port-Royal et de Néguaac*, (Néguaac, N.-B. : Société historique de Néguaac, 1996), 83.

Mi'kmaw presence continued in this area during much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.⁶⁷

La Hève was located directly across from Port Royal on the Atlantic coast. The two villages were connected through Port Rossignol, just southwest of La Hève. From Port Rossignol, the Mi'kmaq travelled up the Mersey River, which at the height of land connects to the Lequille River. This was a well-known Mi'kmaw canoe route during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁶⁸

La Hève was the largest of the three communities in Kespukwitk with a population of 126. The village was located along the La Hève River, where Isaac de Razilly briefly tried to start a colony in 1632. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, a small portion of French settlers remained in the area after the settlement was relocated to Port Royal in 1636.

Although it was the largest village, we know the least about it. Unlike Port Royal, La Hève did not have a large population of French settlers, nor was it geographically situated to encounter as many European and New England fishers as Cape Sable. We do know, however, that for both Mi'kmaq and Europeans it was an important site for the fishery and fur trading. A British report in the 1760s described La Hève as having “many Islands well situated for the Curing and drying Cod fish... the [La Hève] River is an

⁶⁷ See Field Trip to Lequille, Annapolis County, Nova Scotia, n.d., NSARM, MG15-19, no. 3; and Report of the Nova Scotia section of the Maritime Aboriginal Rights and Land Claims Commission, n.d., NSARM, MG15-19, no. 4.

⁶⁸ The voyage over land between Port Royal and La Hève was described by the French Intendant Jacques de Meulles at the end of the seventeenth century. See “Account of the voyage of Monsieur de Meulles to Acadie, 1685-1686,” in Morse, ed., vol. 1, 111-114; Description du Port de la Hève, 1686, C11D-2, f. 56v; Benjamin Pentz has archaeologically linked the two places by observing that there is a continuous line of pre-contact archaeological sites on the Mersey and Allains Rivers. See Pentz’s MA thesis.

Excellent Harbour very capacious and navigable having nine fathoms at its entrance and gradual soundings to three fathoms at Nine Miles, and Navigable for Sloops and Smaller Vessels to the Falls, twelve miles from its entrance.”⁶⁹ It is not clear where along this river the Mi’kmaq lived, though they participated in both the fur trade and fishery in this region.⁷⁰

Cape Sable was the general term that Europeans used to refer to all of the Mi’kmaq living in Kespukwitk.⁷¹ Unlike Port Royal and La Hève, where the name of the place identified a particular location or key river system, the term Cape Sable referred broadly to a region that stretched from the modern-day village of Port La Tour to the town of Yarmouth.⁷² The principal area of occupation was near the Tusket Islands; the Mi’kmaq had a summer village at Ouikmakagan, where there was an extensive eel fishery. The French lived in a village nearby at Pobomcoup, a seigneurie that had been conceded to the d’Entremont family in 1653.⁷³

The ninety-seven Mi’kmaq at Cape Sable lived a similar distance away from the French settlers as the Mi’kmaq at Port Royal. They were close enough to be in regular contact, but the villages were not side-by-side. Charles d’Entremont, the seigneur of Pobomcoup in the 1730s, provided some insight into the proximity of the two

⁶⁹ Chief Surveyors Description & State of the New Settlements in Nova Scotia, 9 Jan 1762, CO 217-18, f. 249v.

⁷⁰ Description du Port de la Hève, 1686, C11D-2, ff. 56-56v; Résumé d’une lettre du sieur de Brouillan, 29 Nov 1703, C11D-4, f. 303v.

⁷¹ d’Entremont, vol. 1, 7. d’Entremont explains that New Englanders broadly used this term to refer to the east coast of Mi’kma’ki and all of the Mi’kmaq living in peninsular Mi’kma’ki. This adds a layer of complication to the New England sources because sometimes Cape Sable is used specifically, while at others it has a more general meaning.

⁷² The specific name Cape Sable refers to the white sand beaches at Cape Sable Island.

⁷³ Sur l’Acadie, 1748, C11D-10, non-foliated; d’Entremont, vol. 1, 341; d’Entremont argues that Ouikmakagan and Pobomcoup were the only two places where people lived before the conquest. See d’Entremont, 1210.

communities. In 1736 he testified to the British council about Suzanne Buckler. Buckler was the sole survivor of the ship *Baltimore*, whose crew mysteriously died after the ship put in for fresh water in Tiboque harbour.⁷⁴ After being found by the Mi'kmaq, Buckler lived with them but sought French help. D'Entremont noted that Joseph Vigé, a settler who had been fishing eels with the Mi'kmaq "came to Pobomcoup towards the evening to acquaint them with the Lady's request."⁷⁵ This testimony suggests that the villages were close enough that Vigé could travel to Pobomcoup easily, but far enough away that Buckler would not have otherwise encountered d'Entremont.

Encounters like this were not uncommon in Cape Sable or La Hève. As the furthest extension of Mi'kma'ki into the Atlantic Ocean, the area was heavily trafficked by sea-going vessels – particularly fishing vessels from New England. The Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq had been interacting with European fishers since the early sixteenth century, serving a middling role in the nascent fur trade between fishers in northern waters and more southern Aboriginal peoples.⁷⁶ The fur trade brought considerable changes to Mi'kmaw culture. The writings of many early visitors to the region observed that some coastal Mi'kmaq had begun sailing European style ships and speaking a half-Basque pidgin language by the beginning of the seventeenth century.⁷⁷ The development of this knowledge and skill is a testament to the many interactions between the Mi'kmaq and

⁷⁴ It is not clear whether the crew died from disease, which the French feared, or froze to death during the winter.

⁷⁵ The Examination of Charles d'Entremont of Pobomcoup in his Majesty's Province of Nova Scotia, CO-217-7, f. 182v.

⁷⁶ Bruce J. Bourque and Ruth Holmes Whitehead, "Tarrentines and the Introduction of European Trade Goods in the Gulf of Maine," *Ethnohistory*, vol. 32, no. 4 (Autumn, 1985), 327-341.

⁷⁷ Bourque and Whitehead, 327-341; see also Prins, 51.

Europeans that went undocumented during the sixteenth century and demonstrates the important place of the ocean in Mi'kmaw society.

By the mid-seventeenth century New England had developed a significant fishery off the coast of Kespukwitk. According to George Rawlyk, by 1677 over five hundred New England men participated, easily bringing in over 12,000 quintals of cod.⁷⁸ By the late 1690s, the fishery had become so important that one trader argued that “nothing but a vigorous asserting of our [New England] uninterrupted right and custom will preserve” the New England fishery along the Cape Sable coast.⁷⁹ The potential for conflict between New England fishers grew as more fishers came on shore to fetch fresh water and needed supplies. Most of these encounters went undocumented, but between 1677 and 1710 the Mi'kmaq captured at least sixteen fishing vessels along their coasts. Most often these attacks were part of broader conflicts with New England, but they also resulted from local tensions. The importance of this place for the New England fisheries can be seen most clearly after the deportation of the French settlers, when in 1760 the land around Cape Sable was granted to fishers from Cape Cod, Plymouth, Nantucket, and Marblehead.⁸⁰

In addition to its dense traffic, Cape Sable also had greater regional significance for the Mi'kmaq than the other two communities. Early writers emphasize that the

⁷⁸ George Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts: a study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia relations 1630 to 1784*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973), 43. Peter Pope describes a quintal as “a traditional unit of weight for salt fish of 112 pounds.” See Peter Pope, *Fish into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 442. The italics are in the original.

⁷⁹ Letter of John Nelson, 26 Jan 1698, *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 3rd series, vol. 1, (Boston, 1825), 136.

⁸⁰ Chief Surveyors Description & State of the New Settlements in Nova Scotia, 9 Jan 1762, CO 217-18, ff. 250-251.

Mi'kmaq from all three communities buried their dead on an island near Cape Sable. For example, after Panoniac, a Mi'kmaq from Port Royal, was killed by the Armouchiquois, his body was kept at Port Royal until spring and then taken to Cape Sable for burial.⁸¹ Martin, a chief at La Hève during the early seventeenth century, died at Port Royal and rather than being buried there or taken back to La Hève, the Mi'kmaq wanted to bury his body at Cape Sable. The French eventually persuaded them to bury him as a Catholic at Port Royal, but the story demonstrates the significance of Cape Sable to the Mi'kmaq at both Port Royal and La Hève.⁸²

Burial practices are but one sign that a regional identity existed between these communities beyond the summer villages. Only a handful of other documents connect these villages together, and for the most part they recount connections between individuals rather than communities. Biard, however, observed that in the summer months, sagamos from different villages came together to make decisions for the common good.⁸³ We do not know how this took place, although it may have involved larger general meetings, on which, by the mid-eighteenth century, French missionaries could capitalize. In 1748 an anonymous French document that surveyed the Atlantic Coast observed that French missionaries would meet between two and three hundred Mi'kmaq on the Feast of St. Louis (25 August) at Pobomcoup.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 3, 283.

⁸² Lescarbot, Last Relation of What Took Place in the Voyage Made by Sieur de Poutrincourt to New France, twenty months ago, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 2, 147; Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 3, 44.

⁸³ Biard, Relation of New France, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 3, 87-89.

⁸⁴ Sur l'Acadie, 1748, C11D-10, non-foliated. There may have been a similar meeting, without a missionary present, in 1711. When a corsair dropped supplies off at Pobomcoup, he noted that about two hundred Aboriginal people were currently in the area. See Durand La Garenne au ministre, 2 July 1711,

Mobility within Kespukwitk and Mi'kma'ki

The 1708 census does not, unfortunately, provide much insight into the relationship between these villages and those elsewhere in Mi'kma'ki. The common burial ground at Cape Sable suggests that the Mi'kmaq identified themselves with forms of community that were broader than the summer village. Using oral sources, Wicken has drawn out seven political districts of which Kespukwitk was one.⁸⁵ Each district connected a number of summer villages under a regional chief called a captain.⁸⁶ Together these districts loosely linked Mi'kmaw communities across Mi'kma'ki through the Grand Council. Although no direct evidence exists of these larger political institutions during this period, some sources illustrate the connection between Mi'kmaw communities that lived hundreds of kilometres apart, indicating that the Mi'kmaq shared both a language and common identity if not a more concrete political association.

Village chiefs formed the foundation of these connections.⁸⁷ In the absence of contemporary source material, Hoffman used late-nineteenth and twentieth-century ethnographic sources collected by scholars like Frank Speck and Father Pacifique Buisson to suggest that district chiefs and the grand chief were selected from the village chiefs.⁸⁸ Most scholars agree that the Mi'kmaw Grand Council, called the *Sante Mawi'omi*, was formed in reaction to the growing imperial presence in Mi'kma'ki, although some believe it pre-dates European settlement or post-dates the fall of the

C11C-7a, f. 72. For a clearer resumé of this letter see Durand La Garenne au ministre, 20 July and 18 Oct 1711, C11C-7a, ff. 81v-82.

⁸⁵ See map 0.1 in the introduction.

⁸⁶ Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 135.

⁸⁷ Nietfeld, 523-524.

⁸⁸ Hoffman, 517.

French empire.⁸⁹ In his more recent work, Wicken does not come down firmly in any camp, but rather points to indications of a larger polity in the 1726 treaty by observing that every Mi'kmaw region was represented in the agreement.⁹⁰ Early descriptions of Membertou suggest that the Grand Council was held in Kespukwitk when the French first arrived in Mi'kma'ki.⁹¹

Nietfeld, who believes that the Grand Council developed in response to contact with Europeans, highlights that “the Micmac aboriginally were at least informally divided along geographic lines, if only because of the frequent communication, marriages, and cooperative action among geographically close bands.”⁹² Her interpretation helps to contextualize the connections between Mi'kmaw communities without requiring a more rigid political definition. There was no pan-Mi'kmaw response, or evidence of broader discussions, to European actions until the late 1710s. Given the limited and Eurocentric nature of the primary documents, we cannot be more conclusive. Nonetheless, it is clear that many Mi'kmaw communities worked together, and that some kind of broad political body developed during the pre-conquest period.

Communities could build connections with each other in many ways. Mi'kmaq migrated between villages to ensure the economic well being of their families. Nietfeld

⁸⁹ Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 53-55. Wicken divides the historiography into three camps. Those who see the Grand Council as pre-dating successful European settlement, such as James (Sakej) Henderson and Virginia Miller; those who believe that the council formed in response to the French and English presence, such as Janet Chute, Patricia Nietfeld and Ralph Pastore; and those who believe that it was formed in response to the collapse of the French Empire after 1763, such as Stephen White.

⁹⁰ Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 53-55. It is important to note that Wicken sides more clearly with the view that it existed before Europeans arrived in his dissertation. There he uses oral traditions and the observation of some early travel writers, such as Father Pierre Biard, to argue that broader connections between Mi'kmaw communities were sparked by Mi'kmaq-Iroquoian tensions. See Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 135-137.

⁹¹ Miller, “The Micmac: A Maritime Woodland Group,” 331.

⁹² Nietfeld, 422, see also 417-422, 458.

suggests that village cohesion was based on “chiefly generosity” whereby “other kin attached or detached themselves from the village” based on their ability to procure enough resources.⁹³ Some Mi’kmaw individuals fit this description. John Missel, a single Mi’kmaw man who stood trial for piracy in Boston in 1726, did not migrate from Sipekne’katikik. Rather, he was born at Chignecto, lived two years at Minas and was captured by the British after a botched attempt at capturing a New England fishing vessel at Mirligueche near modern-day Lunenburg.⁹⁴ Missel seemed to have been a part of a number of communities. His travels illustrate the highly fluid nature of these communities and that residence among ‘commoners’ may have been based on a local chief’s ability to supply the community.⁹⁵

Marriages also connected Mi’kmaw communities. In the registers of Saint Jean Baptiste parish at Port Royal, fifty-five entries involved the Mi’kmaq. Twenty-five of them include geographic information. Only three, however, involve Mi’kmaq from outside of Kespukwitk. Jacques Bernard from Cape Sable was married to Marie Kouare from Sipekne’katikik, Joseph from Cape Sable was married to Marie from Unama’kik, and Marie Anne Tannitech married Noel from Sikniktewaq.⁹⁶ This last marriage is a

⁹³ Nietfeld, vii.

⁹⁴ *The Trials of Five Persons for Piracy, Felony and Robbery... Held at the Court House in Boston, within His Majesty’s Province of the Massachusetts-Bay in New England on Tuesday the Fourth Day of October, Anno Domini, 1726* (Boston, 1726). Wicken has offered another explanation for Missel’s mobility. Using the work of Marshall Sahlins, and assuming that Missel was young and unmarried, he suggests that “in fishing and hunting societies where food resources are abundant [as they are during the summer in Mi’kma’ki], young people are not engaged in subsistence activities on a full-time basis and this provides them with time to visit friends and relatives in other villages.” See William C. Wicken, “26 August 1726: A Case Study in Mi’kmaq-New England Relations in the Early 18th Century,” *Acadiensis*, vol. 23, no. 1 (Autumn 1993), 11.

⁹⁵ Nietfeld, 7-8, 490; Prins agrees with Nietfeld see Prins, 32.

⁹⁶ Baptism of Jacque Bernard on 11 Aug 1726; Baptism of Marie on 12 Nov 1730; Marriage of Noel and Marie Anne Tannitech on 19 June 1726. The birth place for Marie Kouare was determined from Wicken,

good example of bilocal marriage patterns. Its registration in the parish registers at Port Royal suggests that the couple lived in Kespukwitk with Marie Anne's family rather than in Sikniktewaq. It also suggests the possibility of broader family connections as Noel's mother's family name was also Tannitech. Although the sample size is small, these acts demonstrate that Mi'kmaw communities were connected by at least a handful of marriages.

The connection between Sikniktewaq and Kespukwitk was not limited to this one marriage. In the 1690s, when the Abenaki and French were at war with New England, men from Sikniktewaq raided New England fishers off the Kespukwitk coast.⁹⁷ It is unclear whether the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq also participated in these attacks, but the close proximity in which the Sikniktewaq Mi'kmaq attacked the New England fisheries suggests a broader political connection between the two regions.

Non-local Aboriginal people often visited Kespukwitk. As early as the first decade of the seventeenth century, the French observed "strange visitors" among the Mi'kmaq.⁹⁸ Some of these visitors were likely from other political districts in Mi'kma'ki, but others were from Wulstukwiuk and Abenaki communities across the Bay of Fundy.

Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales, 127. The home district of Noel and Marie Anne was determined by the location attributed to their fathers. Noel's father was from Miramichi and Marie Anne's was from the East coast (La Hève).

⁹⁷ *Journal des événements survenus en Acadie, du 17 septembre 1694 au 12 juillet 1695*, C11D-2, f. 268v ; *Journal de ce qui s'est passé à l'Acadie depuis le mois de novembre de l'année dernière jusqu'au départ des vaisseaux du roi en 1696, du 2 octobre 1695 au 14 juillet 1696*, C11D-2, f. 269v. The Mi'kmaq from Richibucto, who chief was Jarim, were key allies with the French. There are few Mi'kmaw individuals who appear as frequently as Jarim in the French records. See also *État de la dépense et paiements faits par moi Mathieu de Goutin, 26 Nov 1703*, C11A-113, f. 177; *Lettre de Bégon au ministre, 25 Sept 1715*, C11A-35, ff. 120-121.

⁹⁸ Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 3, 204.

Lescarbot and Biard indicate that the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq had a relatively close relationship with the Wulstukwiuk along the Saint John River. The association between Chkoudun, the sagamo at Saint John, and Messamoet, the sagamo from La Hève, illustrates the common interests that connected these communities. In 1606 Jean de Biencourt de Poutrincourt, who was a part of France's early settlement efforts, encountered these two sagamos at Chouakoet, an Armouchiquois village near the Saco River in modern-day New Hampshire. The two had brought European trade goods with which to make peace with the Armouchiquois.⁹⁹ In the end, the Armouchiquois refused the peace. War broke out a few years later after the Armouchiquois had killed Panoniac, the Mi'kmaw man from Port Royal who was buried at Cape Sable. As they prepared for war, the Mi'kmaq from peninsular Mi'kma'ki assembled at Port Royal, while those from Kespe'kewaq assembled with the Wulstukwiuk at Saint John.¹⁰⁰

This story provides three insights into the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq's political relationships. First, it demonstrates the close connection between the Mi'kmaq and the Wulstukwiuk living along the Saint John River. The relationship between Chkoudun and Messamoet was not unique. Membertouchis, Membertou's eldest son, spent a lot of time along the Saint John after his father had died.¹⁰¹ Second, it shows that although the Wulstukwiuk and Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq were directly involved in the conflict with the

⁹⁹ Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 2, 323.

¹⁰⁰ The Mi'kmaq from Kespe'kewaq went to the Wulstukwiuk village at Saint John. Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 2, 357. The connection between the Mi'kmaq from Kespe'kewaq and Sikniktewaq to the Wulstukwiuk was also emphasized nearly a century later when the French governor Joseph Robineau de Villebon grouped the Mi'kmaw from Miramichi and Richibucto in with the Saint John rather than with the Mi'kmaw from peninsular Mi'kma'ki. See Lettre du ministre au sieur de Villebon, Versailles, 16 April 1695, *Collection de Documents relatifs a la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, (Québec: Imprimerie A Coté et Cie, 1884), 177.

¹⁰¹ Biard, Relation of New France, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 3, 245; Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 2, 356.

Armouchiquois, they represented Mi'kmaw communities from as far as Kespe'kewaq, who supported their endeavour. Finally, this vignette illustrates a broader connection, though not a positive one, with Aboriginal people living further south along the coast. Bourque and Whitehead's research on sixteenth-century Mi'kmaw traders suggests that by the time Lescarbot observed this relationship, it was already at least fifty years old.¹⁰²

The Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq were also connected to the Abenaki living along the Penobscot and Kennebec Rivers. During the 1690s, Mi'kmaq from all over Mi'kma'ki joined with the Abenaki and the French to fight against the encroachment of New England settlers. The desire of French officials to demonstrate that they were in control of the territory France claimed makes it difficult to determine the extent to which the Mi'kmaq and Abenaki interacted without French influence. But, as the next two chapters demonstrate, the French made little effort to lubricate their relationship with the Mi'kmaq. It is likely that the Mi'kmaq and Abenaki developed and sustained a relationship independent of French influence.

In 1705 a group of Abenaki from the village of Pentagouet on the Penobscot River arrived at Port Royal with a captured English vessel. The French held a feast for them. The local Mi'kmaq were also invited. During the feast the Abenaki offered the Mi'kmaq a prisoner and asked them to join their attack on English vessels. Forty-five Mi'kmaq, about half of the men capable of bearing arms in Kespukwitk, took them up on this offer.¹⁰³ This illustrates both the connection between the Abenaki and Mi'kmaq as well

¹⁰² Bourque and Whitehead, 327-341.

¹⁰³ M. de Bonaventure au ministre, 30 Nov 1705, C11D-5, ff. 108v-111v. The 1708 census notes that the age of males capable of fighting was 15. All of the older men, including those in their 70s and 80s, were considered able to bear arms.

as how the Mi'kmaq made decisions. Mi'kmaw decision-making was consensus based and non-coercive. Not everyone, or even every community, was required to agree or even participate in the discussion. That such a large proportion of the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq joined the Abenaki attack on the English, however, demonstrates that many people were willing to participate.

The Mi'kmaw decision-making process is a key reason why it is difficult to determine the existence of the Grand Council. Biard encapsulated the challenge in understanding Mi'kmaw politics in his observations of Mi'kmaw society:

if there is some news of importance, as that their neighbors wish to make war upon them, or that they have killed some one, or that they must renew the alliance, etc., then messengers fly from all parts to make up the more general assembly, that they may avail themselves of all the confederates, which they call *Ricmanen*, who are generally those of the same language... In these assemblies so general, they resolve upon peace, truce, war, or nothing at all, as often happens in the councils where there are several chiefs, without order and subordination, whence they frequently depart more confused and disunited than when they came.¹⁰⁴

But, Biard also notes in the above passage, the confederation often extended beyond linguistic group and sometimes wars were fought between people of the same language. The Mi'kmaq did not leave these meetings confused, as Biard suggests, as much as different communities made different decisions. It is important to understand the Mi'kmaq as a political collective in which its composite parts at the district, village or even household level could make different decisions without necessarily compromising their overall political unity.

¹⁰⁴ Biard, Relation of New France, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 3, 91.

Alice Nash's work on the Abenaki helps us to better appreciate this complexity.

In her study of the eighteenth-century Abenaki, Nash observed that the act of firmly identifying an individual's or group's identity is historically constructed.

One reason why attempts to create classificatory schema break down, is that, for much of their history, Wabanaki people did not define themselves in terms of fixed groups. Identity, if a twentieth-century construct may be applied in such a different context, consisted of multiple allegiances and reciprocal obligations that could be emphasized or renegotiated as needed.¹⁰⁵

In her view, Abenaki society was much more fluid and flexible than the rigid definitions often implied in the scholarship. Mi'kmaw decision-making was similar. Although a set of relationships linked villages and districts together, this structure was loose and flexible.

The Mi'kmaq did not develop a common policy in response to either the French or English presence. Chiefs at all levels of Mi'kmaw society engaged in diplomacy. At times – particularly during gift-giving ceremonies and broader treaty negotiations with Europeans – district chiefs or the grand chief represented the Mi'kmaq as a whole. At other times, village chiefs negotiated independently and occasionally at cross purposes. It remains important, though, to acknowledge, as Prins has argued, that the Mi'kmaq in all areas of Mi'kma'ki were connected by a shared territory, kin-centred culture, common language, and similar social and cultural values.¹⁰⁶ These connections allowed for individuals and households to migrate throughout Mi'kma'ki during the first half of the eighteenth century.

¹⁰⁵ Alice Nash, *The Abiding Frontier: Family, Gender, and Religion in Wabanaki history, 1600-1763*, (PhD diss, Columbia University, 1997), 68.

¹⁰⁶ Prins, 11.

Conclusion

On the eve of the fall of Port Royal, Antoine Gaulin's 1708 census illuminates the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq's household economies. Three conclusions may be drawn from this chapter's focus on Mi'kmaw child-woman ratios and age, household, village and political structures. First, despite moderate-to-high child-woman ratios, Mi'kmaw households were smaller than those of their French neighbours. Second, political structures that inter-connected Mi'kmaw communities were loose, consensus-based and non-hierarchical. Finally, communities closest to European settlements experienced considerably more stress than those living further away. Together these conclusions help us to better understand the position of the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq when the British began to attack Port Royal during the first decade of the eighteenth century.

Mi'kmaw demography is characteristic of fishing, hunting and gathering societies.¹⁰⁷ Rather than being shaped by changes in reproduction, the composition of Mi'kmaw society was more strongly influenced by mortality. Disease made the most significant impact on the size of Mi'kmaw households. The more sedentary nature of most Mi'kmaw communities along to coast, while benefiting Mi'kmaw women's reproductive health, made it easier for disease to spread from one household to another as Mi'kmaw households spent most of the year assembled together.

Many Europeans commented on this aspect of Mi'kmaw life. During France's early days in the region, both Lescarbot and Biard noted that disease was prevalent

¹⁰⁷ Gary Warwick, *A Population History of the Huron-Petun, A.D. 500-1650*, (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2008), 164.

among the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq.¹⁰⁸ Over a half century later, the governor of Port Royal, Louis Alexandre des Friches de Meneval, complained that the fur trade was suffering because many of the best Mi'kmaw hunters had died.¹⁰⁹ Just over a decade later another French official argued against organizing the Mi'kmaq into more permanent villages because of the speed at which disease travelled through their communities.¹¹⁰ Virginia Miller has emphasized that there was no evidence of epidemic disease among the Mi'kmaq, concluding that much of the disease discussed here was likely endemic and caused by a dietary shift towards European foods introduced through the fur trade.¹¹¹ Rather than warfare or other external factors, disease likely accounts for the high number of widows and orphans in Mi'kmaw society. It slowed Mi'kmaw population growth, and likely limited the size of Mi'kmaw households. Importantly, though, the relatively high child-woman ratios in 1708, suggest that disease only hit periodically. At the time of the census, Mi'kmaw society was healthy and women reproduced regularly.

Warfare also played a role in reducing the size of the Mi'kmaw population. It had a more local effect on the population and seems to have hit Kespukwitk harder than elsewhere. Comparing the age pyramid for Kespukwitk with the other Mi'kmaw communities in the census demonstrates that there was a dearth of young boys in the region. This suggests that the Mi'kmaq may have sent their young boys to live outside of Kespukwitk. Close analysis of the age pyramid for communities outside of Kespukwitk

¹⁰⁸ Letter from Father Biard, to Reverend Father Christopher Baltazar, Provincial of France, at Paris, 10 June 1611, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 1, 175; Lescarbot, Last Relation of What Took Place in the Voyage Made by Sieur de Poutrincourt to New France, twenty months ago, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 2, 141, 147.

¹⁰⁹ Mémoire du sieur de Meneval, gouverneur de l'Acadie, touchant les affaires de cette Province pour l'année 1688., Sept 10 1688, C11D-2, f. 100v.

¹¹⁰ M. de Villieu au ministre, 29 sept 1700, C11D-4, f. 18.

¹¹¹ Miller, "The Decline of Nova Scotia Micmac Population, A.D. 1600-1850," 108.

shows twenty percent more boys than girls (66:55) in the age cohort between ten and nineteen. This corresponds with the eighteen percent difference between the number of boys and girls in Kespukwitk (38:45). Near equality existed between the sexes among children between the ages of zero to nine outside of Kespukwitk, indicating that if children were being moved, the practice was highly localized. Although Mi'kma'ki was relatively peaceful during the seventeenth century, the Mi'kmaq were involved in aiding the Abenaki in their fight against New England encroachment for the four decades before the census was taken. Mi'kmaq from most of the regions participated in this conflict, but Kespukwitk was a key location where the Mi'kmaq and New Englanders would come into direct contact. This may have given the Mi'kmaq incentive to remove their young boys from these communities, further strengthening ties with more distant Mi'kmaw households.

The conflict between New England and the Abenaki and French had other consequences. In Port Royal, men between thirty and sixty, who would have fought in Wabanakia in the 1690s and at Port Royal in the early 1700s, only comprised six percent of the population, while women in this age bracket made up seventeen percent. But this lack of men was a local phenomenon. No similar trend existed in either Cape Sable or La Hève. In fact, the overall percentage of men and women between thirty and sixty was about equal in Cape Sable and La Hève. Cape Sable, however, had fewer men over fifty. In five of six marriages where the wife was at least five years older than the husband, the wife was also over the age of fifty. This reflects the over-abundance of women in this cohort and the over-abundance of younger men in subsequent generations. It may also be

an indication of second marriages, in which case this demographic trend may have also been a function of warfare and the loss of men.¹¹² Given their close proximity to the New England fisheries and small household size, it is likely that Cape Sable's population was equally influenced by warfare.

Although no census information exists for the Mi'kmaq before the conquest, other than Gaulin's 1708 census, a comparison with later censuses illustrates that the Mi'kmaw population was not growing quickly. Virginia Miller has gone as far as to suggest that this was a population in decline.¹¹³ My evidence does not support this conclusion. But, when placed beside the population of French settlers, the slow rate of Mi'kmaw growth is striking. Between 1703 and 1714, the French population at Port Royal had nearly doubled from 485 to 895; while from 1708 to 1722, the Mi'kmaw population had dropped by four people.¹¹⁴ In addition to the lower child-woman ratios, the stability within the Mi'kmaw population was caused by migration. In an effort to maintain their livelihood, Mi'kmaq from all over Mi'kma'ki built on the interconnections between them and moved into the area between the Bay of Fundy and Northumberland Strait to avoid

¹¹² Wicken drew a similar conclusion using a different methodology. He counted everyone who was married or had been married to illustrate the absence of men in Mi'kma'ki. From this observation he suggested that the men had died in the wars in Wabanakia and New England. See Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 44.

¹¹³ Miller, "The Decline of Nova Scotia Micmac Population, A.D. 1600-1850," 107-118.

¹¹⁴ Statistics Canada. - *Census of Acadia, 1703 - Acadia* (table), 1703 - Census of Acadia (database), Using E-STAT (distributor). http://estat.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-win/cnsmcgi.exe?Lang=E&EST-Fi=EStat\English\SC_RR-eng.htm, (accessed: April 16, 2011); Statistics Canada. *1714 Ac - Population of Port Royal and the Mines, Acadia* (table), 1714 - Census of Acadia (database), Using E-STAT (distributor). http://estat.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-win/cnsmcgi.exe?Lang=E&EST-Fi=EStat\English\SC_RR-eng.htm (accessed: April 16, 2011); Recensement général fait au mois de novembre mille Sept cent huit de tous les sauvages de l'Acadie, 1708, Newberry Library, Edward E. Ayer, MSS 4, no. 751; Recensement fait en 1722 par monsieur Gaulin, 27 Dec 1722, C11B-6, f. 77; Lawrence Armstrong to the Board of Trade, 24 November 1726, CO217-5, ff. 3-4.

the demographic consequences of living near Europeans (see the discussion in chapter four).

The slow growth of the Mi'kmaw population complicated Mi'kmaw decisions about interacting with Europeans. On the one hand, connections to the French brought useful material goods such as muskets, kettles and food into these communities through trade and gift-giving. These goods made it easier to hunt and cook game. On the other hand, they also led to dependency on European trade and decreased the nutritional value of the Mi'kmaq diet.¹¹⁵ Frequent interaction with the French, particularly near common ports of call, also risked exposing community members to disease. French administrators pressured them, through gift-giving, to participate in conflicts for which they had little personal stake and risked losing younger members of their community to death or captivity. The next chapter focuses on these issues by examining the French presence in Mi'kma'ki and how the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq interacted with both settlers and imperial officials.

¹¹⁵ Miller, "The Decline of Nova Scotia Micmac Population, A.D. 1600-1850," 108.

Chapter Two: Mi'kma'ki, Wabanakia and Acadia

The French capitulated without a fight. There were no Aboriginal people present. A handful of English vessels had barely anchored in front of Port Royal before the local priest rowed out to negotiate the terms of capitulation. The French governor had weighed his position relative to the five hundred Englishmen on board those vessels and deemed it necessary to submit. With less than one hundred people ready and willing to defend the fort, he was not in a position to resist. The priest reached an oral agreement with the English commander. Port Royal had fallen for the second time since the French began to settle the area in the 1630s. The peaceful surrender ended, however, when the New Englanders saw the dilapidated state of Port Royal's defences. The English troops began to ransack the village, eventually removing the governor and officers to Boston but leaving the French settlers to clean up the mess. No one – Mi'kmaq or French – came to the village's defence.

The context and consequences of the 1690 capture of Port Royal defined the two following decades. When the English captured Port Royal, the French moved their remaining troops to the Saint John River. As much as this was a retreat, it was also a strategic repositioning. Two wars had broken out in as many years. The War of the League of Augsburg pitted the two crowns against one another. Conflict between them in the northeast was fuelled by the northward expansion of new English settlements, which began to threaten the security of the St. Lawrence valley. A year earlier the Abenaki also renewed fighting with New England. They were upset about the growth of settlements around the Kennebec River and the failure of the English to maintain their

treaty promises.¹ In Acadia, Wabanakia and northern New England these wars combined into one conflict. By the early-1690s, French and Abenaki diplomats coordinated their efforts to protect the area between the Kennebec and Saint John River from English encroachment.

The events of the late-1680s and early-1690s introduce the themes discussed in this chapter. They illustrate that no Aboriginal people came to France's defence when it was faced with invasion, that the French garrison was poorly supplied and inadequately prepared for conflict, and that the principal area of French interest was Abenaki and Wulstukwiuk territory located between Canada and New England. In sum, French-Mi'kmaq relations were relatively undeveloped before the 1710 conquest of Port Royal.

This chapter adds nuance to the arguments of historians like N.E.S. Griffiths, William C. Wicken, and John Mack Faragher, who emphasize that the 1690s marked the beginning of a deeper relationship between the Mi'kmaq and French.² Although the French began to engage with the Mi'kmaq more frequently during this period, these interactions were highly contingent on France's geopolitical needs and not nearly as stable and consistent as these scholars depict. Interactions between the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq and the French settlers living around Port Royal were primarily local, kin-based and informal, whereas official French attention gave the Mi'kmaq a secondary status as

¹ Jenny Hale Pulsipher, "Dark Cloud Rising from the East": Indian Sovereignty and the Coming of King William's War in New England," *The New England Quarterly*, vol. 80, no. 4, (Dec 2007), 608.

² N.E.S. Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian: A North American Border People*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 160; William C. Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales: Mi'kmaq Society, 1500-1760*, (PhD diss., McGill University, 1994), 385-411; John Mack Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from their American Homeland*, (New York: Norton, 2005), chaps 2 and 3. Faragher's argument is somewhat different from Griffiths and Wicken in that he argues that a relationship with the Mi'kmaq was foundational to seventeenth century Acadia. His depiction of this relationship begins with French settlement.

French officials focused on building an alliance with the Abenaki. By the time that the British captured the village again in 1710, the French and Mi'kmaq still lived independently of one another, conceiving of Mi'kma'ki in fundamentally different ways. For the French this land was Acadia, while for the Mi'kmaq it remained Kespukwitk and Mi'kma'ki.

Relationships with French Settlers

French settlers made a relatively small impact on Mi'kmaw daily life. Although it was rapidly growing, the French population at Port Royal was small at the turn-of-the-eighteenth century and concentrated along the salt marshes of the Annapolis River. The Mi'kmaw economy was oriented towards coastal and inland resources, which did not interfere with French farming practices. Although the Mi'kmaq and French settlers drew on different resources, the Mi'kmaq often travelled to the area around Port Royal to fish and gather plants, nuts and berries. They likely came into contact with some French settlers regularly when they were closer to the French settlement. These interactions, though, were local and did not represent a structured and formal relationship. Peace reigned in the region largely because the French did not significantly interfere with the Mi'kmaw way of life.

At the end of the seventeenth century, the French population in the region hovered between five and six hundred people, about one third larger than the Mi'kmaw population.³ Colonists lived in highly diffused settlements throughout Kespukwitk. Not only did pockets of French colonists live along the coast of Mi'kma'ki, in places like La

³ See appendix two for a summary of Mi'kmaw censuses.

Hève and Cape Sable, but even in Port Royal few settlers lived near the fort. According to the Gargas census, which lists each French hamlet around Port Royal, only about seventeen percent of the French population (eighty people) lived within walking distance of the fort. Another sixteen percent (seventy-four people) lived at Bellisle about six-kilometres upstream. The rest lived in hamlets of between ten and twenty-five people spread out along the river for over thirty kilometres. The communities at Cape Sable and La Hève were similar in size to these smaller French settlements.⁴

The diffuse nature of French settlement at Port Royal was a function of the settlers' preference for dykeland agriculture.⁵ Traditionally most historians have seen dykeland agriculture as a principal division between the Mi'kmaq and the French. Some scholars, such as A. H. Clark and John Mack Faragher, argue the division accounted for their positive and symbiotic relationship.⁶ Other scholars, such as Wicken and Upton, emphasize that the division of land was important in framing the initial relationship between these people. But as the French population grew, Mi'kmaw and French use of space converged, resulting in increasing tensions and a more complicated relationship.⁷ During the seventeenth century, when more men lived in the colony than women,

⁴ General Census of the Country of Acadie, 1687-1688, in William Inglis Morris, ed., *Acadiensia Nova*, vol. 1, (London: Quaritch, 1935), 144-155.

⁵ On French dykes in the region see Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*, 67-69; and Sherman Bleakney, *Sods, Soil, and Spades: The Acadians at Grand Pré and Their Dykeland Legacy*, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2004), chap. 5.

⁶ A.H. Clark, *Acadia: the geography of early Nova Scotia to 1760*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 68; Faragher, 48.

⁷ L.F.S. Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists: Indian-White Relations in the Maritimes, 1713-1867*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1979), 26; Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 230-234; Wicken, "Re-examining Mi'kmaq-Acadian Relations, 1635-1755," in Sylvie Dépatie et al. (eds), *Vingt Ans après Habitants et Marchands Twenty Years Later*, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998), 94, 99.

intermarriage between people from the two societies was not unusual.⁸ As French society grew it became less necessary for Europeans to find sexual partners from outside of their own culture.⁹ By the eighteenth century, though memory of their relationship continued, there were fewer reasons for these societies to come together and greater competition for resources. Either way, dykeland farming techniques shaped the relationship that developed between these people.

It is easy to overstate the points of both convergence and division between these societies. The area around Port Royal was a shared space where some Mi'kmaq and French settlers would have encountered one another regularly, but both populations were dispersed enough that many Mi'kmaq did not have frequent interaction with the French. By the early-eighteenth century their relationship was informal and usually between individuals. The widespread nature of French settlement at Port Royal meant that some families had more contact with the Mi'kmaq than others. The more limited settlement and similar economies at places like La Hève, and especially Cape Sable, facilitated stronger connections.¹⁰ This difference likely created a situation where some Mi'kmaq had common interests with some French settlers, while others lived relatively independently.¹¹ The variety of relationships between these two communities, where some Mi'kmaq interacted with settlers more frequently than others, added to the diversity of ways that the Mi'kmaq responded to the British arrival in 1710.

⁸ Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 254.

⁹ Wicken, "Re-examining Mi'kmaq-Acadian Relations, 1635-1755," 102-103.

¹⁰ Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 252-255.

¹¹ The importance of understanding the societies living in Mi'kma'ki as groups with their own internal social divisions, interests and motivations is addressed in Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 207.

The registers from Saint Jean Baptiste parish provide the most insight into the relationship between the French and Mi'kmaq. They reveal which settlers were familiar enough with the Mi'kmaq to participate with them in a baptism or marriage. However, there are a number of limitations to using the parish registers. The surviving records begin just after the French administration and military returned to Port Royal in 1702. This makes it difficult to assess the pre-conquest period. More importantly, the Mi'kmaq appear in these acts very infrequently. Of the over 3500 acts in the registers, only fifty-five involve a Mi'kmaq person. Of these records, forty-three were created between 1726 and 1735 – the high point in Mi'kmaq/British relations before the deportation.¹² Only three baptisms and one marriage pre-date the conquest.¹³ Another problem with this source is the difficulty of determining the role individuals played in each religious ceremony. Many people in the registers shared the same name and often a family name is not provided for the Mi'kmaq. My analysis excludes all individuals with the same name, unless I could determine that they were different people. At least 97 French settlers and 122 Mi'kmaq, less than half of both societies, were listed in these documents.

The records between 1726 and 1735 provide the most thorough information on the relationship between the French settlers and the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq. Ninety-three Mi'kmaq and forty-four French participated in six-and-a-half percent of the baptisms,

¹² Wicken has suggested that this peak in the records reflects the restriction of Abbé Gaulin, the principal missionary to the Mi'kmaq, to the French settlements and the lack of other missionaries to serve Mi'kmaq communities. Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 346.

¹³ The Registers of St. Jean-Baptiste, Annapolis Royal, 1702-1755, "An Acadian Parish Remembered," Nova Scotia Archives and Resource Management, database records 6, 163, 183 and 1198, < <http://www.gov.ns.ca/nsarm/virtual/acadian/>>, (accessed 12 Jan 2011).

marriages and deaths in Port Royal during this decade.¹⁴ This amounted to about thirty-one percent of the Mi'kmaw population and five percent of the French settlers.¹⁵ Forty percent (10 of 25) of the Mi'kmaq for whom a place of residence can be determined were from Port Royal, fifty-two percent (13 of 25) from Cape Sable, and eight percent (2 of 25) were from La Hève, suggesting that the Mi'kmaq from La Hève were in less frequent contact with the French than the Mi'kmaq living elsewhere in Kespukwitk. Usually, the French settlers, most of whose families had lived in Mi'kma'ki for at least two or three generations, served as witnesses and godparents. Thirteen of the settlers (29.5%) were women, while thirty-one (70.5%) were men. A better gender balance existed among the Mi'kmaq. Forty-four (47%) of the participants were women, while forty-nine (53%) were men. The Mi'kmaq more frequently interacted with French men than women. Less than half of both populations engaged with each other in these types of religious ceremonies.

These figures must be considered cautiously. The ethnicity of some people in the registers is unclear and few Mi'kmaq appear in additional documents. Eleven people who first appear French had Mi'kmaw parents, grandparents or an aunt or uncle, illustrating a deeper connection to the Mi'kmaq community.¹⁶ Only a handful of the Mi'kmaq in these documents can be found in other contemporary sources. Thirteen

¹⁴ In order to prevent duplication of individuals, and in order to assess interaction between peoples, I have removed all people who are listed in the act as not present, deceased or baptized. I have also assumed that all entries with the same name have been removed. Doing this prevents the analysis from over-emphasizing the relationship between groups and provides the lowest amount of interaction possible.

¹⁵ Recensement fait en 1722 par monsieur Gaulin, 27 Dec 1722, C11B-6, f. 77; The percentage of French settlers is derived using Clark's estimated population of Annapolis Royal for 1730. Clark, 207.

¹⁶ Bona Arsenault, *Histoire et Généalogie des Acadiens*, vol. 2 and 4, (Montréal: Leméac, 1978). These people are not included in the statistics in the previous paragraph.

women and sixteen men, or thirty-one percent of the Mi'kmaq in the parish registers, appear in Gaulin's 1708 census; two of the women and one man were listed by Gaulin as French settlers. Eleven men in the parish registers signed the ratification of the 1726 peace treaty with the British, nine of which were part of the sixteen already accounted for in Gaulin's census. Most Mi'kmaq in these records, about sixty percent, do not appear in another source during the period, suggesting that they had relatively limited official contact with Europeans.

Two observations can be drawn from this information. Of the 148 French and Mi'kmaw individuals in these records, fourteen people (9 %) could have been categorized as either French or Mi'kmaq depending on the biases of the author, demonstrating the legacy of seventeenth-century intermarriage in the region.¹⁷ Many fit between the two societies. A good example is the marriage of François Vignée and Marie Muis. Their records do not indicate that Marie's mother was Mi'kmaq. But, the family lived at Ouikmakagan and likely maintained a close relationship with the Mi'kmaq there.¹⁸ This family could have been defined as either French or Mi'kmaq. The parish records provide only a glimpse into relationships that we would otherwise know nothing about.

¹⁷ For more on intermarriage see Olive P. Dickason, "From 'One Nation' in the Northeast to 'New Nation' in the Northwest: A look at the emergence of the métis," in Jacqueline Peterson and Jennifer S.H. Brown, eds., *The New Peoples: Being and Becoming Métis in North America*, (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1985), 19-36; N.E.S. Griffiths, "Mating and Marriage in Early Acadia," *Renaissance and Modern Studies*, vol. 35 (1992), 109-127; Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 236-239, 252-255; Jacques Vanderlinden, *Se Marier en Acadie Française*, (Moncton: Les Éditions d'Acadie, 1998), 45-48.

¹⁸ See the registration of baptism for François Vignée 23 May 1705; Marie Vignée on 23 Oct 1705; Charles Vignée on 27 October 1705. Marie Mius was the daughter of Philippe Mius d'Azit. See also Arsenault, 1597, 1608.

Parish records reveal the minimum amount of contact that would have occurred between these communities. Five percent of the settlers living around Port Royal had enough contact with the Mi'kmaq to serve as godparents or witnesses to marriages. A contrarian could argue that their participation was driven by religious duty performed for the sake of piety or because of a priest's request – as was probably the case with Pierre Lavergne, the priest's servant. But a number of Mi'kmaq served in these capacities both for other Mi'kmaq as well as French settlers, suggesting that this was not the case. Add to this the 1.2 percent of the French population which had Mi'kmaw roots but were described as French, and these records suggest that 6.2 percent of the French population in Kespukwitk likely had routine interaction with their Mi'kmaw neighbours.

Another way to look at this information is to focus on the families that appear regularly in the registers over the whole period. Only three family groups, the Pellerins, Savoies and Robichauds, had more than five family members who served as part of these acts.¹⁹ Two of these families were connected. The Pellerins were descendants of Etienne Pellerin and Jeanne Savoie. The Savoies were descended from Marie Breau and Germain Savoie, Jeanne's younger brother.

All three families had Aboriginal connections. Etienne and Jeanne's son François married Marie Martin, the daughter of Pierre Martin and an Abenaki woman named Anne Ouestuorouest.²⁰ The Robichauds were connected through Prudent's wife, Henriette

¹⁹ I have based this analysis on family names. Often women were listed in the parish register under their maiden name, and have therefore been included with the family in which they grew up.

²⁰ Arsenault, 673, 711.

Petitpas, whose brother Claude had married a Mi'kmaw woman named Marie Therese.²¹ Similarly François Savoie, Germain's son, married Henriette's niece, Marie Richard. Both Germain and Jeanne Savoie likely had connections among the Mi'kmaq. Their mother Catherine LeJeune, may have been part of the LeJeune family that had strong connections to La Hève and intermarried with the Mi'kmaq during the seventeenth century.²² Together, members of these families comprised twenty-six of the ninety-seven French people (27%) in the parish records. At least one member from these family groups was present in two of every five acts involving the Mi'kmaq. Kinship ties were an important factor linking people from the two communities, but these connections only existed between a small amount of French families.

It is difficult to assess the social status of the French in the parish registers. The pre-conquest registers suggest some connection to French imperial officials. These acts involved nine Mi'kmaq and ten French. Each demonstrates interconnections with the French settlement and garrison. With the exception of Marguerite Landry and Genevieve Pellerin, who were French settlers, the other four godparents in these acts were connected to the garrison. Two were soldiers, one was the notary (Jean Chrysostôme Loppinot) and the other was the wife of the fort's royal engineer (Françoise de la Bate). The groom in the marriage, who married a woman of mixed ancestry, was from Bordeaux.

It is tempting to suggest that these connections are indicative of broader interaction between the Mi'kmaq and the French administration. However, evidence

²¹ Maurice Basque, *Des Hommes de Pouvoir: histoire d'Otho Robichaud et de sa famille, notables Acadiens de Port-Royal et de Néguaac*, (Néguaac, N.-B.: Société historique de Néguaac, 1996), 73.

²² Unless otherwise noted, genealogical information is from Bona Arsenault, *Histoire et Généalogie des Acadiens*, vol. 4, (Ottawa: Leméac, 1978).

presented in the next chapter regarding Mi'kmaw participation in defending the fort will demonstrate that any connection with French officials was only just developing by the time of the British conquest. Nonetheless, the parish records illustrate that contact between the French and the Mi'kmaq was not limited to the periphery of Port Royal society. Indeed, this section demonstrates that although French officials made minimal effort to engage the Mi'kmaq, some local relationships brought these societies together.

It is much more difficult to trace this in the post-conquest period because few French settlers occupied official positions that would help to determine their social status. Maurice Basque, however, has persuasively argued that the Robichauds were a prominent family in Annapolis society. Without similar studies for other families, such as the Pellerins and Savoies, we cannot know whether the Mi'kmaq were closely aligned with Port Royal's more important residents, or whether relationships depended more on particular circumstances.

Although only about one third of the Mi'kmaq and less than a tenth of the French population were involved in the acts, these communities came together in other ways. Living in such close proximity, they shared the natural resources in Kespukwitk and traded with one another.

In a general sense the Mi'kmaq and the French practiced two different forms of subsistence. The Mi'kmaq hunted, fished and traded to support their families, while the French sowed fields of wheat, maintained gardens and kept livestock. But in some places, like Cape Sable or La Hève, with poorer soil than Port Royal, the French also

hunted, fished and traded, drawing on the same resources as the Mi'kmaq.²³ In a suggestive passage, Dièreville, a writer and surgeon who visited the colony at the turn of the eighteenth century, noted that he did not hunt because he was only a visitor. According to him, hunting was only pursued by the Mi'kmaq and the French settlers.²⁴ Similarly, the Mi'kmaq occasionally capitalized on French agriculture. Like many peasant farmers in North America during this period, the French did not fence in their livestock.²⁵ Tensions sometimes arose between settlers and the Mi'kmaq when wandering livestock were killed by Mi'kmaw hunters.²⁶ Mi'kmaw and French worlds overlapped on the periphery around French settlements.²⁷

These worlds also overlapped along riverbanks and the coastline. Like the Mi'kmaq, the settlers from Port Royal hunted seals off southwestern Kespukwitk.²⁸ The French also fished for many of the same species as the Mi'kmaq. Like his comments on the hunt, Dièreville noted the shared importance of fish to both societies.²⁹ The Mi'kmaq and French used similar technology to catch fish. Lescarbot suggests that the Mi'kmaq taught the French about local fish migration: “When the Herrings came, the Savages (with their usual good-nature) let the French know it by signaling from their quarters with fires and smoke. The hint was not neglected, for this kind of hunting is much more sure

²³ Relation de la province d'Acadie par le sieur Perrot, gouverneur du roi, C11D-2, f. 21; Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 248.

²⁴ Sieur de Dièreville, *Relation of the voyage to Port Royal in Acadia or New France*, John Clarence Webster, ed., Mrs. Clarence Webster, trans., (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1933), 102, 112. The French hunted martin, fox, otter, beaver, bear, moose, elk and seals.

²⁵ Dièreville, 109.

²⁶ For a good example of this and the priest's failure to act see *Mémoire, sans signature, concernant la conduite de MM. les missionnaires de l'Acadie, 1693*, C11D-2, f. 211v.

²⁷ Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 235.

²⁸ Dièreville, 102.

²⁹ Dièreville, 116. Dièreville noted that smelt, flounder, gaspereau, shad, sturgeon, bass, eel and sardines were all part of the French diet

than that of the woods.”³⁰ At the turn of the century Joseph Robineau de Villebon, the governor in Acadia, described how French settlers built weirs which allowed fish to swim upstream during high tide, but prevented them from travelling downstream when the tide went out.³¹ This same technology was also used at a Mi’kmaw weir on the Lequille River near *la Pointe aux Sauvages*.³²

The French and the Mi’kmaq lived much more closely at Cape Sable. In 1701 Simon-Pierre Denys de Bonaventure, France’s second in command in Acadia, observed that the French and Mi’kmaq fished together at Ouikmakagan.³³ This practice continued throughout the early eighteenth century. In 1736, Charles d’Entremont was called to testify about the fate of Suzanne Buckler, the lone survivor of the *Baltimore* discussed in the previous chapter. His testimony noted that local resident Joseph Vigé was fishing for eels at Ouikmakagan when the vessel was discovered.³⁴ French settlers were much more dependent on the Mi’kmaq at Cape Sable than elsewhere. Isolated from the larger settlement at Port Royal, one French official felt that the settlers could only survive because of their proximity to the Mi’kmaq.³⁵

³⁰ Marc Lescarbot, Last Relation of What Took Place in the Voyage Made by Sieur de Poutrincourt to New France, twenty months ago, *The Jesuit Relations*, vol. 2, 171.

³¹ Mémoire du sieur de Villebon sur les établissements et havres qui sont depuis les Mines, dans le fond de la Baie-Française, jusqu’à l’Île du Cap-Breton, 27 Oct 1699, C11D-3, f. 194v.

³² Benjamin C. Pentz, “A River Runs Through It: An Archaeological Survey of the Upper Mersey River and Allains River in Southwest Nova Scotia,” (MA thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2008), 128-135. Nietfeld explained how these weirs worked in a discussion on eels: “... eels were most easily obtainable in quantity and most important as a food resource during their fall descent to the sea. They can then be taken in large numbers by V-shaped weirs in streams or simply by crude rock obstructions, particularly just below rapids or falls...” Patricia Nietfeld, *Determinants of Aboriginal Micmac Political Structure*, (PhD diss. University of New Mexico, 1981), 79.

³³ Mémoire joint à la lettre de M. de Bonaventure du 12 octobre sur le Port-Royal et les côtes de l’Acadie, 12 Oct 1701, C11D-4, f. 85v.

³⁴ The Examination of Charles d’Entremont of Pobomcoup in his Majesty’s Province of Nova Scotia, CO-217-7, f. 182.

³⁵ M. Degoutin au ministre, 23 Dec 1707, C11D-6, 45v-46v.

Trade with the settlers was important. The absence of direct evidence about the fur trade suggests that it took place away from the imperial centre at Port Royal. In 1748 an anonymous description of Acadia reveals that in the more formal settlements, like Port Royal, the Mi'kmaq traded with settlers who then traded with New England merchants. In places with less population density, particularly along the coast, like La Hève and Cape Sable, the Mi'kmaq traded with settlers who then travelled to Louisbourg to trade with the French.³⁶ In both cases, the settlers served as liaisons between the Mi'kmaq and larger European society. Given their demographic circumstances, the Mi'kmaq used the French settlers as a buffer against traders who could introduce both violence and disease into their communities.

Import records from Louisbourg help to outline the parameters of this trade. Although the records are sparse, they reveal that ships visited Louisbourg from mainland Mi'kma'ki for much of the post-conquest period.³⁷ Seventeen different vessels made at least twenty-three trips between Kespukwitk and Louisbourg during the best documented period between 1740 and 1743. This amounted to about six to nine trips per year. For the most part, these vessels were from Port Royal and traded moose hides and cod, but lynx skins, feathers, and some agricultural products were also key exports.³⁸ Table 2.1 lists the furs and skins shipped from Kespukwitk. If all of these furs were procured by the Mi'kmaq, and there is no evidence indicating that they were, and if they represent the

³⁶ *Mémoire sur l'Acadie*, 1748, C11D-10, non-foiliated

³⁷ Christopher Moore looked at imports to Louisbourg. He found information about the arrival of ships for 1719, 1721, 1733, 1737, 1740, 1742, 1743 and 1752. In 1733 and 1752 there is no information about ships arriving from Acadia. See Christopher Moore, "Commodity Imports of Louisbourg," Manuscript Report 317, (Parks Canada, 1975).

³⁸ For detailed tables of imports to Louisbourg see Moore, 30-85.

usual amount of trade, then each family in Kespukwitk would have rarely sold the pelt of a lynx, bear, beaver, weasel or otter. On average, they would have only traded three moose skins, thirty-nine rabbit skins and two quarts of feathers during an average season.³⁹ Although these numbers do not include other trading relationships (with the English for example), they provide a sense of the scale for the fur trade, suggesting that moose, rabbit and feathers were common items of trade. The relatively small amount of beaver indicates that this famous rodent of the fur trade had already been over hunted by the 1740s.

Table 2.1: Furs and Skins shipped from Kespukwitk between 1740 and 1743⁴⁰

Number	Fur type
10	Lynx
600	Moose
10	Bear
60	Beaver
130	Muskrat
60	Weasel
6800	Rabbit
6	Otter
392	Quarts of Feathers

The decline of the beaver was just one of a number of ways that the growing presence of French settlers and fur trade began to threaten Mi'kmaw subsistence patterns. Although no evidence indicates a significant change during this period, a few primary documents suggest that the resource base in Kespukwitk was dwindling. Nicolas Denys

³⁹ These numbers were determined by dividing the total number of furs by 58, the total number of families in the 1708 census, and further dividing the result by 3 to account for the three years of trade.

⁴⁰ The figures used in this paragraph are the results of compiling the records of import from Louisbourg for the years 1740, 1742 and 1743. The records for 1740 can be found at CAOM, série F2B, Commerce aux Colonies. The records for 1742 and 1743 were consulted at Fortress Louisbourg National Historic Site using their detailed finding aid. The originals can be found at the Archives de Charente Maritime, B, vol. 272, ff. 8v-228.

suggested that New Englanders had destroyed the seal fishery at Cape Sable by the mid-seventeenth century.⁴¹ In 1703 the French governor of Acadia wrote “ils ne trouvent plus a vivre par le moyen de la chasse ce qui fait qu’ils nous tombent souvent sur les bras et nous causent une depece qu’on ne sçauroit Eviter.”⁴² Although the Mi’kmaq were likely not as needy as the governor suggested, by this time the French population was nearly one third larger than the Mi’kmaq and possibly beginning to reduce the local resource base. This change likely contributed to the lower child-woman ratios in Port Royal and Cape Sable that were discussed in chapter one.

Although the connections between these communities are hard to trace, French administrators were wary of an emerging close relationship. In the mid-1680s, Jacques de Meulles, the Intendant of New France, visited the Acadian settlements. He feared that without investment and development the colony would risk conforming to Aboriginal ways. Already, in his view, “pluspart des habitants qui se font peu de scrupul de vivre a la sauvage.”⁴³ A decade later Villebon sought to prevent trade because of its impact on Aboriginal communities. In his view alcohol negatively affected Aboriginal subsistence patterns and inhibited the influence of French missionaries. The penalty for selling

⁴¹ Nicolas Denys, *Description & Natural History of the Coasts of North America (Acadia)*, William F. Ganong, ed. and trans., (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1908), 342.

⁴² M. de Brouillan au ministre, 23 Nov 1703, C11D-4, f. 277v. Author’s translation: “they no longer find a living through the hunt, meaning that they often fall in our arms and cause a great expense that one does not know how to avoid.”

⁴³ Mémoire sur le Port Royal, 1686, C11D-2, f. 54. Author’s translation: “most of the settlers are not above living like the Natives.”

alcohol to Aboriginal people was fifty livres. Half was to go to the Church and the other half to their accuser.⁴⁴

The long absence of French administrators, who wrote most of the documents that survive from this period, means that there is little direct evidence of interaction between French farmers and the Mi'kmaq. The few pieces of information brought together here suggest that the interaction between the Mi'kmaq and French colonists was varied. It developed around common experiences that took place in common spaces. If the parish registers are any indication, only a small portion of both societies (less than half) interacted with each other. It is reasonable to conclude that in Port Royal, Mi'kmaw-French ties were maintained by family connections. Likewise, especially outside of the Acadian capital and particularly at Cape Sable, relationships developed between the Mi'kmaq and French where they shared resources. The Mi'kmaw community at La Hève seems to have been most disconnected from the French settlers. Although there were a handful of French people living nearby with whom they likely interacted, the evidence from the parish registers, when considered alongside the child-woman ratios discussed in chapter one, suggests that these relationships did not have a significant effect on the community. The Mi'kmaq, then, had a variety of relationships with the French people living in Kespukwitk. As tensions increased in the early eighteenth century, the decisions made by Mi'kmaw households and communities were likely shaped by the relative influence of those people who had a close relationship with the French settlers and those who had chosen to live more independently.

⁴⁴ Copie des ordres donnés par M. de Villebon au Port Royal, aux Mines et à Beaubassin, en vertu des ordres de Sa Majesté, 3 Auge 1698, C11D-3, ff. 102-102v.

Official Interaction with the French

The inconsistent nature of the relationship between the French settlers and the Mi'kmaq in Kespukwitk was partially a function of the relative indifference of French officials in Mi'kma'ki. Although France recognized Mi'kma'ki as one of its colonies, France never spent significant resources on its settlements.⁴⁵ With a population of just over one thousand settlers and few exports that could enrich the metropole, Acadia was an imperial backwater.

This changed in the late-1680s when New England settlement began to encroach on the area near the Kennebec River in Wabanakia. This was the first of three rivers whose headwaters were close to the St. Lawrence River. As New Englanders drew nearer these rivers, and the War of the League of Augsburg pitted France against England, defence of the region became increasingly important to the French. English migration northward towards the Kennebec also reignited tensions between the English and the Abenaki. The Abenaki had been seeking peace and territorial autonomy from the English since Metacom's War in the mid-1670s. Jesuit priests had already made inroads into Abenaki society. As their interests coalesced, the Abenaki became the centre of French strategy in the region. The French did not ignore the Mi'kmaq during this period, and during the 1690s, the French gave the Mi'kmaq gifts as part of their diplomatic strategy. But as far as the French were concerned, their interactions with the Mi'kmaq remained subsidiary to those with the Abenaki.

⁴⁵ N.E.S. Griffiths, *The Contexts of Acadian History, 1686-1784*, (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), 9.

Conflicts over Wabanakia drew the Mi'kmaq into the fighting, likely as Abenaki allies. Unfortunately, the European nature of the source material makes it difficult to distinguish their motivations. European records rarely describe Aboriginal people as agents who acted independently of European encouragement. France encouraged Aboriginal participation in this conflict by beginning a regular pattern of supplying its allies. It is difficult to assess whether the Mi'kmaq would have participated in the conflict otherwise. Regardless of the reason, the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq, and people from other Mi'kmaw communities, participated in a number of raids on New England villages over the course of the 1690s.⁴⁶ This marked the beginning of a more formal relationship with the French.

Gift giving likely encouraged the Mi'kmaq to participate in this conflict. The Mi'kmaq saw gift giving as an important symbol representing their relationship with the French. The practice of gift giving built on the culture of chiefly generosity, discussed in chapter one, and helped integrate the French into Mi'kmaw political structures.⁴⁷

According to Lescarbot, Poutrincourt's generosity in the early seventeenth century earned

⁴⁶ For instances in which the Mi'kmaq participated in the conflict in Wabanakia see: Journal of what has happened in Acadia from October 13th, 1691 to October 25th, 1692, in John Clarence Webster, ed., *Acadia at the end of the seventeenth century*, (Saint John: New Brunswick Museum, 1934), 38-39; Journal of events in Acadia... July 22, 1695 to Septembre 5, 1695, in Webster, 81-82; Journal de ce qui s'est passé à l'Acadie depuis le mois de novembre de l'année dernière jusqu'au départ des vaisseaux du roi en 1696, du 2 octobre 1695 au 14 juillet 1696, C11D-2, ff. 269-276v ; Mémoire pour servir d'instruction au sieur d'Iberville, commandant les vaisseaux du roy l'"Envieux" et le "Profond", 28 Mar 1696, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 216; M. de Goutin au ministre, 23 Sept 1696, C11C-2, ff. 116-117v; Relation de ce qui s'est passé en Canada, 1696, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 222; Mémoire sur l'entreprise de Baston, 21 April 1697, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 268; Journal of events in Acadia Oct. 1696 to Oct 1, 1697, in Webster, 104-108.

⁴⁷ Nietfeld, vii.

him the title of sagamo among the Mi'kmaq.⁴⁸ On a broader level, gift giving was an important diplomatic tool and helped to build confidence between communities. This was why Messamoet, a chief from La Hève, brought many gifts with him to the Saco River when he sought to make peace with the Armouchiquois during the first decade of the seventeenth century.⁴⁹ This was also why the Abenaki offered the Mi'kmaq a prisoner in 1705 when they sought help in attacking the New England fishery.⁵⁰ The exchange of gifts was critical for any society wishing to build or maintain an alliance with the Mi'kmaq.

France used gifts to entice Aboriginal people to fight their conflicts for them. As soon as the news of War of the League of Augsburg had reached Villebon, gift giving was seen as an effective strategy to garner allies.⁵¹ With a few exceptional years between 1690 and 1710, France set a budget of four thousand livres for gifts to be distributed annually. This was a cost-effective endeavour. Rather than sustain a full garrison, the support of the local Aboriginal communities could be had for the cost of gifts, supplies and a good commander.⁵² But relative to the other expenses in this small outpost of the French empire, alliance with Aboriginal peoples was relatively costly. In 1695, for

⁴⁸ Marc Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 3, W.L. Grant. trans., (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1914), 182.

⁴⁹ Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 2, 323.

⁵⁰ M. de Bonaventure au ministre, 30 Nov 1705, C11D-5, ff. 108v-111v.

⁵¹ Proposition du sieur de Villebon pour l'Acadie et pour faire la guerre aux Anglais et les Canibas en se portant à la rivière Saint-Jean, Feb 1691, C11D-2, f. 172v.

⁵² This point has also been made more generally by Catherine M. Desbarats, "The Cost of Early Canada's Native Alliances: Reality and Scarcity's Rhetoric," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Ser., vol. 52, No. 4. (Oct 1995), 629-630.

example, gifts for the Abenaki, Wulstukwiuk and Mi'kmaq comprised twenty-four percent of the colony's overall budget.⁵³

The amount of gifts sent over was fairly standardized. The French allocated four hundred livres to be distributed to the chiefs and three thousand six hundred livres for the general population. Only lists of goods sent for the chiefs from 1693, 1696 and 1697 have been preserved. They note that the chiefs received five quintal of powder, five muskets, five bayonettes, ten shirts, ten stockings, ten hats, and five blankets.⁵⁴ The general population usually received powder and lead, muskets, blankets, shirts and stockings, string, flour, prunes, and tobacco.⁵⁵ The chiefs received gifts of a significantly better quality than those distributed to the general population.

French officials varied in their descriptions of how the gifts were distributed. Some officials claimed that they were divided into fifths, with two fifths given to the Abenaki along the Kennebec and Penobscot Rivers, a fifth to the Wulstukwiuk and the

⁵³ État des sommes que le roi veut et ordonne être incessamment remises au port de Rochefort par le trésorier général de la Marine, M. Louis de Lubert, pour employer aux dépenses" de l'Acadie, 10 Apr 1695, C11A-113, f. 22v; Lettre du ministre au sieur de Villebon, 16 April 1695, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 176.

⁵⁴ Estate des Presens à envoyer aux chefs Abenakis à l'Acadie, 1693, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 111; Pour les cinq chefs des sauvages jusques a concurrence de 400 l, 1696, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 206-207; État des 4000 l. des présents ordinaires pour tous les Sauvages de l'Acadie en l'année 1697, C11A-113, f. 91.

⁵⁵ This list has been derived from the lists of goods sent over. Found in: Mémoire des munitions, armes, ustancilles à envoyée aux sauvages de l'Acadie, 1692, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 73-74; Etat des Presens à envoyer aux sauvages Abenakis dans lesquels les chefs auront part, 1693, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 111; Etat des munitions et marchandises embarquée en France sur la frégate 'la Suzanne' en 1693, pour estre portez a l'Acadie, 1693, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 129-130; Memoire on Fort Pemaquid, Villebon to Count Pontchartrain, 20 Aug 1694, in Webster, 71; Pour tous les Sauvages jusques à la concurrence de 3600 l dont les chefs auront aussy leur part, 1696, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 206-207; Pour les Sauvages des deux nations, 1698, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 291-292; The flour, prunes and possibly the tobacco were likely consumed as part of the feasts which were part of French-Aboriginal diplomacy.

Mi'kmaq living in Sikniktewaq and Kespe'kewaq, and another fifth to the Mi'kmaq on peninsular Mi'kma'ki. The final fifth was kept for unexpected occasions.⁵⁶ Others claimed that it was split into four equal parts.⁵⁷ Others noted that it was divided into half, with one half given to the Abenaki and the other half given to the Wulstukwiuk and Mi'kmaq.⁵⁸ The chiefs' gifts were clearly divided into fifths. These gifts were given to one Wulstukwiuk leader and two Abenaki and two Mi'kmaw leaders.⁵⁹ For the Mi'kmaq, the French gave gifts to the Grand Chief and Grand Captain of the Grand Council.⁶⁰ In all cases, it appears that gifts were distributed consistently and in a relatively uniform fashion.

How French officials divided these goods is not as important as how they were received by the Mi'kmaq. The relative difference in the size of the populations who received the gifts is a more accurate way of assessing their impact. The 1708 census tells us that 388 people lived in the Abenaki community at Pentagouet and 646 people lived in the communities in peninsular Mi'kma'ki.⁶¹ As long as the gifts were being evenly

⁵⁶ Lettre du ministre au sieur de Villebon, Versailles, 16 April 1695, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 177-178.

⁵⁷ M. de Goutin au ministre, 23 Sept 1696, C11C-2, f. 116.

⁵⁸ Instructions au Sieur de Villebon, commandant à l'Acadie, 14 Feb 1693, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 107; Etat des munitions et marchandises embarquée en France sur la Frégate 'La Suzanne' en 1693, pour ester portez à l'Acadie, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 129. The second document lists how these goods were distributed.

⁵⁹ Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 397.

⁶⁰ Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 398.

⁶¹ Recensement général fait au mois de novembre mille Sept cent huit de tous les sauvages de l'Acadie, 1708, Newberry Library, Edward E. Ayer, MSS 4, no. 751. I have excluded the Unama'kik Mi'kmaq from this discussion because they also received gifts from the French at Plaisance in Newfoundland. See Costebelle au ministre, 8 Nov 1706, C11C-5, f. 41v; Costebelle au ministre, 10 July 1707, C11C-5, f. 96.

distributed, it seems that the Abenaki at Penobscot would have received twice the amount of gifts per person as the Mi'kmaq living on peninsular Mi'kma'ki.⁶²

The difference in gifts reflects France's different goals. France gave the Mi'kmaq gifts to encourage them to fight with the Abenaki. It gave the Abenaki gifts both to encourage warfare, but also to bolster France's claim to their land. With Massachusetts arguing that the Abenaki along the Kennebec and Penobscot Rivers were subjects of the King of England, France sought to use Abenaki claims of independence to bolster their own territorial stake and provide a buffer between New England and New France.⁶³ Villebon made this most explicit in 1694 when he told Pontchartrain that the land along the Kennebec "should be regarded as the King's, for it is now occupied solely by our Indian allies. To maintain its possession, it would be an easy matter, after capturing Pemaquid, to station an officer and a few soldiers in one of the Indian forts..."⁶⁴ A decade later Jacques-François de Monbeton de Brouillan, the governor at the time, claimed to have told the Abenaki that: "... Ils estoient leurs alliez, Il a fait dire a ces sauvages que sa ma^{te} les regardoit toujours comme ses voisins et m^{rs} des Terres qu'ils habitent ce qu'ainsy les anglois navoient aucun droit sur Eux..."⁶⁵ In building an alliance with the Abenaki, France strengthened its claim that their land was part of New France.⁶⁶

⁶² Kenneth Morrison made this point without quantifying gift-giving. See Kenneth Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 129.

⁶³ Copie de la lettre de M. Dudley, gouverneur de Boston à M. de Subercase, 25 Aug 1708, C11D-6, ff. 143v-144.

⁶⁴ Memoir on Fort Pemaquid, Villebon to Count Pontchartrain, Aug 20, 1694, in Webster, 68.

⁶⁵ Extrait d'une lettre de M. de Brouillan au ministre, 21 Oct 1702, C11D-4, f. 228. Author's translation: "They were their [French] allies. He informed these natives that His Majesty has always seen them as neighbours and masters of the land where they live and that the English have no rights over them."

⁶⁶ Michel Morin's work demonstrates that a legal language recognizing Aboriginal independence and territorial rights was employed by jurists in Europe and that this was not necessarily seen as a conflict with

In 1698, after the Peace of Ryswick ended this conflict, the French believed that the Abenaki presence along the Kennebec would protect their interests without the assistance of French troops or settlers.⁶⁷ French officials thus ordered Villebon to cease giving gifts to the Mi'kmaq, but to continue giving gifts to the Abenaki.⁶⁸ The following year, as peace returned to the region, general gifts to the Abenaki stopped as well. Now only 450 livres was allocated for the chiefs as a retainer for future conflict.⁶⁹

This withdrawal from gift giving caused tension among French administrators, suggesting that the Mi'kmaq and Abenaki had come calling for their gifts only to find that none were available. An anonymous report suggested that Villebon did not make enough effort to supply these people, especially the Mi'kmaq.⁷⁰ Another report claimed that

Qu'il n'a pas distribute les présens aux sauvages de la nation appelée Micmacs; que le Sieur de Villebon a distribute ceulx des malecites à diverses fois, augmentant le nombre de leurs chefs, ce qui rend les présens du Roy moins considérables, et les sauvages malcontents.⁷¹

France's own claims in the region. See Michel Morin, *L'Usurpation de la souveraineté autochtone: Le cas des peuples de la Nouvelle-France et des colonies anglaises de l'Amérique du Nord*, (Montréal: Boréal, 1997).

⁶⁷ M. de Villebon au ministre, 3 Oct 1698, C11D-3, ff. 104-114.

⁶⁸ Lettre du Ministre à Monsieur de Villebon, Versailles, 26 Mar 1698, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 296-297.

⁶⁹ État des sommes que le roi veut et ordonne être incessamment remises au port de Rochefort par le trésorier général de la Marine, 22 Mar 1699, C11A-113, f. 94v; Lettre du Ministre à Monsieur de Villebon, Versailles, 15 Apr 1699, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 314; Bordereau des fonds nécessaires pour les dépenses à faire pour l'Acadie pendant l'année 1700, Feb 1700, C11A-113, f. 145v; État des sommes que le roi veut et ordonne être incessamment remises au port de Rochefort par le trésorier général de la Marine..., 1700, C11A-113, f. 152.

⁷⁰ Mémoire général sur l'Acadie, 9 Dec 1698, C11D-3, ff. 154v-155.

⁷¹ Plaintes contre Monsieur de Villebon, 1698, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 307. Author's translation: "That he did not distribute the gifts to the natives called the Mi'kmaq; that the Sieur de Villebon gave them to the Wulstukwuik on a number of occasions, increasing the number of their chiefs. This diminished the amount of the king's gifts and made the natives upset."

In 1700, the Abenaki refused French gifts, claiming they were too insignificant.⁷²

Although France had seen these gifts as a useful way to capitalize on Aboriginal labour, the discontent of the Mi'kmaq and Abenaki demonstrates that these gifts had been important symbols of a positive and constructive relationship between them and the French crown. When war erupted again between France and England, neither people was as committed to the French cause.

The context during the War of Spanish Succession at the beginning of the eighteenth century was considerably different than the war in Wabanakia during the 1690s. The budget for gift giving returned to what it had been during the 1690s and the Abenaki again became the focus of French attention. But France had moved its administration away from Wabanakia and the contested border with New England. With the French administration back at Port Royal imperial officials no longer met regularly with the people living in Wabanakia and Wulstukwik, relying primarily on intermediaries – particularly missionaries – to maintain its relationship with the Abenaki. France was also less able to supply the colony. An uncertain level of supplies for much of the first decade of the eighteenth century led to an inconsistent pattern of gift giving with the Mi'kmaq.

During the 1690s and 1700s, France cut its navy by over seventy percent as it dealt with burgeoning naval debt and a more continental military policy. In 1690 France's royal fleet had 105 ships, but by 1723, they were down to only thirty.⁷³

⁷² Résumé d'une lettre de Sieur de Villieu au Ministre, 20 Oct 1700, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 336-337.

⁷³ John McNeill, *Atlantic Empires of France and Spain: Louisbourg and Havana, 1700-1763*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 57-63. On the weak state of the French navy and its effect on

Alongside this reduction, and much to the aggravation of on-the-ground officials, French gift giving was also highly dependent on merchants in France. The merchandise sent over from Europe was frequently deemed insufficient for building a relationship with either the Mi'kmaq or Abenaki. Mathieu de Goutin, a royal official in the colony, had to make excuses for his continental colleagues, lamenting to the Minister of Marine that “Les presens qui ont esté envoyez pour les sauvages estant de tres mauvaise qualité, on en a renvoyé la meilleure partie en france et on a dit a ces sauvages quil avoient este pris dans la fluste de sa ma^{te} qui a est bruslée dans le port de la heve...”⁷⁴ According to Brouillan the missionaries in Wabanakia felt similarly:

Il [Brouillan] dit que ces missionnaires qui sont parmy les sauvages se plaignent de ce que les presens diminuent tous les ans, quoy que les fonds que sa Ma^{te} fait pour ce la soient toujours les mesmes, Cela vient de la mauvaise qualité de ce qu'on envoie pour ces Sauvages, Ce qui est si vray quil renvoie pres de quatre vingt chemises dont ces Sauvages n'ont fait aucun cas parce quelle sont trop mauvaise.⁷⁵

The following year Brouillan made a similar point, lamenting that his dispatch had been ignored by the merchants at La Rochelle. They had again sent fewer and lower quality goods than the Abenaki, Wulstukwiuk and Mi'kmaq expected.⁷⁶

Perhaps because of the frequent change-over between French and English power, and certainly because of its demographic and economic insignificance, France was never

North America see James Pritchard, *In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670 to 1730*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 361-362, 384-385, 391-403.

⁷⁴ Résumé d'une lettre du sieur Degoutin, 21 Oct 1702, C11D-4, f. 250-250v. Author's translation: “The gifts that were sent for the natives were of such poor quality that most of them were returned to France and the natives were told that they were destroyed when the King's ship caught fire at La Have.”

⁷⁵ Extrait d'une lettre de M. de Brouillan au ministre, 21 Oct 1702, C11D-4, ff. 229-229v. Author's translation: “He says that the missionaries living among the natives complain that the gifts decrease each year, though His Majesty's funds allocated to them remain the same. This comes from the bad quality of the items sent for the natives. Because of this he returned nearly eighty shirts which the natives did not acknowledge because of their low quality.”

⁷⁶ Résumé d'une lettre du sieur de Brouillan, 29 Nov 1703, C11D-4, f. 304.

successful in consistently supplying the colony before the conquest. When Daniel d'Auger de Subercase – the last French governor – arrived in the colony in 1706 he lamented:

Il y avait 4 mois que les sauvages de l'Acadie étaient sans poudre lors de son arrive ce la les avait engagé a une espèce de murmure qui faisait croire qu'ils voulaient faire la guerre aux français, mais heureusement ce la n'a pas eu de mauvaise suite parce que parmi les sauvages il en est trouvé un plus sage que les autres, qui leur a remis l'esprit.⁷⁷

Without gifts and diplomacy, France's alliances with both the Abenaki and the Mi'kmaq were very vulnerable.

Although the French were based in Kespukwitk, imperial officials continued to prioritize giving gifts to the Abenaki when their supplies ran low. In 1702, despite a drought which hurt the French in peninsular Mi'kma'ki, the governor gave gifts to the Abenaki. Supply problems meant, however, that an insufficient amount of low quality gifts were sent to the Penobscot and Kennebec Rivers. The missionary there was instructed to tell the Abenaki that the gifts had been captured and that they were waiting for better gifts.⁷⁸ On the arrival of the supply ship from France, in 1705, de Goutin set in motion the transfer of goods to Pentagouet: “Je passeray en despences Comme votre Grandeur L'ordonne Les marchandises et Munitions Livres á La barque de Mons^f de Brouillan po^f Luy tenir Lieu de fret des presents porté aux sauvages de Pentagouet.”⁷⁹ It

⁷⁷ Subercase au ministre, Oct 22 and 25 1706, C11D-5, f. 263-263v. Author's translation: “The natives in Acadia had been without powder for four months when he arrived. This had made them upset which sparked some worry that they might attack the French. Happily this did not take place, because there was one man wiser than the others, who convinced them to return to their former disposition [towards the French].”

⁷⁸ Le sieur Degoutin au ministre, 20 Oct 1702, C11D-4, ff. 180-180v.

⁷⁹ Le sieur Degoutin au ministre, 4 Dec 1705, C11D-5, f. 131. Author's translation: “I expensed, as your excellency ordered, the merchandise and supplies delivered to M. Brouillan's ship in exchange for the shipping of the gifts for the natives of Pentagouet.”

was their position near the English that encouraged the sieur de Quentin (most likely Saint-Castin based on the biographical information in the document) to argue that the Abenaki deserved more gifts because of their heavy involvement in fighting with the English.⁸⁰ These vignettes do not preclude gifts given to the Mi'kmaq. They indicate, however, that France made a concerted effort to continuously lubricate its relationship with the Abenaki; little evidence suggests that a similar approach was taken with the Mi'kmaq.

The increased imperial French presence after 1690 in the area around the Bay of Fundy provided the Mi'kmaq with a number of new opportunities. Annual gift giving brought useful tools and clothing and participation in raids on New England villages and the fisheries likely provided additional material goods and trade items. With the French administration located in Wulstukwik, the Mi'kmaq were not forced into any European conflicts. Unlike the Abenaki, who fought against New England for their own reasons, the Mi'kmaq could send as many or as few people as they wished and to come and go as they pleased.⁸¹ With the Treaty of Ryswick, however, the termination of gifts made it apparent that French gift giving had been a mercenary military tactic, rather than a symbol of an alliance. When gift giving resumed with the outbreak of the War of Spanish Succession, the Mi'kmaq's secondary importance and France's inability to

⁸⁰ *Résumé d'une lettre du sieur de Quentin, 06 Jan [1705], C11D-5, f. 215v.* Although one can never be certain it seems likely that Bernard Anselme d'Abbadie, baron de Saint-Castin was the author of this document. The author of the document requested passage to France in order to aid his father who was already there. He also states that his family had long lived among the Canibas. This fits with Saint-Castin's biography. In 1705 the Baron de Saint-Castin had gone to France to settle his affairs and his son, Bernard Anselme, had returned to Wabanakia from the Quebec City area to aid the French/Aboriginal resistance against New England.

⁸¹ A good example of this occurred in the fall of 1697 when most of the Mi'kmaq left Wabanakia to begin to make preparations for the winter. No French official could convince them to remain and fight. See *Journal of Events in Acadia, October 1696 to October 1, 1697*, in Webster, 107-108.

regularly supply the colony provided little incentive for the Mi'kmaq to interact with French officials. The nascent relationship was broken and in need of repair.

Catholicism and Missions

The Mi'kmaq were among the first Aboriginal groups in North America to encounter Catholic missionaries. Priests like Pierre Biard accompanied some of the earliest expeditions in the seventeenth century with the hopes of converting the Mi'kmaq to Catholicism. At one time or another, priests had lived near each of the three Mi'kmaw villages in Kespukwitk. For the most part they were successful among the Mi'kmaq, if not in achieving their actual conversion then at least in building a relationship with the French administration. It is important to recognize, however, that during the pre-conquest period missionary attention was focused on the Abenaki along the Kennebec and Penobscot Rivers rather than in Mi'kma'ki, and little consideration was given to the Mi'kmaq in the 1680s and 1690s.

Historiographical attention to individual groups like the Mi'kmaq or French settlers, or to particular periods in this region's history – particularly Nova Scotia's post-conquest history – has meant that the continuity between the pre-conquest Abenaki missions and later Mi'kmaw mission has been underemphasized. Micheline Dumont Johnson's work, which focuses specifically on France's religious influence among the Mi'kmaq and Abenaki, emphasizes the interconnected nature of missionary and imperial goals after the fall of Port Royal. She considers French policy, as it relates to

missionaries, as idiosyncratic during the pre-conquest period.⁸² Wicken's work, which focuses on the Mi'kmaq, can also somewhat mislead the reader into thinking that the political elements of Catholic missions to Aboriginal people began in Acadia after the conquest. His point is that the missions to the Mi'kmaq became much more political after the conquest. He does not address in much detail the political aspects of France's mission to the Abenaki.⁸³

French missionaries built their relationship with the Mi'kmaq based on their experiences in Wabanakia. Kenneth Morrison and Christopher John Bilodeau have demonstrated that missionary work during the 1670s and 1680s laid the foundation for France's military alliance with the Abenaki in the 1690s. The overlap between the War of the League of Augsburg and renewed Abenaki efforts to prevent English settlement on their land tied politics and priests together.⁸⁴ Regardless of missionary intentions, they quickly came to occupy a political role in the Abenaki villages in the late 1680s and 1690s.⁸⁵ When peace returned to the region in the late 1690s, the missionaries living at Pentagouet began to slowly cultivate a similar presence in Mi'kma'ki. Although the role of missionaries changed after the conquest of Port Royal, as both Dumont Johnson and Wicken have emphasized, its general structure began in Wabanakia and shaped France's relationship with the Mi'kmaq.⁸⁶

⁸² Micheline Dumont Johnson, *Apôtres ou Agitateurs: la France missionnaire en Acadie*, (Trois-Rivières : Boréal Express, 1970), 37-38.

⁸³ Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 364.

⁸⁴ Morrison, 123-124.

⁸⁵ Christopher John Bilodeau, *The Economy of War: Violence, Religion and the Wabanaki Indians in the Maine Borderlands*, (PhD diss., Cornell University, 2006), 259.

⁸⁶ Wicken has a good and succinct description of these changes in his dissertation. See Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 367-369.

The role missionaries played elsewhere in Acadia influenced the significance of Catholicism for the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq. In 1701 missions existed at Sikniktewaq, Meductic, Pentagouet and Kennebec.⁸⁷ As shown in table 2.1, eight priests served Aboriginal people in western Acadia during the pre-conquest period. Although these missions were created to spread Christianity, war with New England made the missions politically useful. Missionaries began to play an important role connecting the Abenaki to the French.⁸⁸

In addition to their religious duties, missionaries served the French administration in both Acadia and Quebec. In 1697 the Minister of Marine congratulated missionary Louis-Pierre Thury for his role in maintaining France's alliance with the Abenaki. The Minister wrote:

Je suis bien ayse de me servir de cette occasion pour vous dire que j'ay esté informé non seulement de vostre zèle et de vostre application pour vostre mission et du progrez qu'elle fait pour l'avancement de nostre religion avec les Sauvages, mais encore de vos soins pour les maintenir dans le service de Sa Majesté, et pour les encourager aux expéditions de guerre...⁸⁹

In the same year, Villebon noted that Father Simon, likely Simon-Gérard de la Place, the Recollet missionary at Meductic, was in charge of about two hundred "Bay of Fundy Indians" preparing to attack New England.⁹⁰ Another letter from 1701, this time written by the Acadian Governor, outlined the various roles played by the missionaries in the region. In his view Antoine Gaulin kept the Abenaki at Pentagouet in the French fold,

⁸⁷ Mémoire pour accompagner la lettre de M. de Brouillan, du 6 octobre 1701, C11D-4, f. 68.

⁸⁸ For background on the development of these missions see Morrison, chap. 3; Bilodeau, chaps 2 and 3.

⁸⁹ Lettre du Ministre à Monsieur Thury, 1697, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 274. Author's translation: "I am glad to have this occasion to tell you that I have been informed not only of the zeal you have brought to your mission and the progress that you have made for our religion with the natives, but also of your efforts to keep them in His Majesty's service, and for encouraging them in making expeditions of war."

⁹⁰ Journal of events in Acadia, Oct 1696 to Oct 1, 1697, in Webster, 106.

but the missionary along the Kennebec River, Vincent Bigot, was not doing enough to prevent the Abenaki from trading with the English.⁹¹

Table 2.2: Priests serving Sikanikewaq, Meductic, Pentagouet and Kennebec (1690-1710)⁹²

Name	Mission	Order	Years
Joseph Aubery	Meductic	Jesuit	1701-1709
Jacques Bigot	Kennebec	Jesuit	1687-1691; 1698
Vincent Bigot	Kennebec, Pentagouet	Jesuit	1694-1704
Joseph-Pierre de la Chasse	Kennebec	Jesuit	1701-1719
Sébastien Râle	Kennebec	Jesuit	1694-1705; 1710-1724
Simon-Gérard de la Place	Meductic	Recollet	1693-1695; 1696-1699
Antoine Gaulin	Pentagouet, Mi'kma'ki	Séminaire des Missions Étrangères	1698-1732
Louis-Pierre Thury	Miramichi, Pentagouet, Mi'kma'ki	Secular	1685-1699

One of the principal ways that they served French interests was as distributors of French gifts; usually the gifts were circulated by Louis-Pierre Thury, the missionary at Pentagouet.⁹³ As the Abenaki became integral to the success of France's military and

⁹¹ Abrégé d'une lettre de Monsieur de Brouillan au Ministre, 30 Oct 1701, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 385-386. For a more detailed description of the political role of missionaries – particularly the Jesuits – see Matteo Binasco, “Few, Uncooperative, and Endangered: The Troubled Activity of the Roman Catholic Missionaries in Acadia, 1610-1710,” *Journal of the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society*, vol. 10 (2007), 147-162.

⁹² Adapted from the work of Matteo Binasco. See Matteo Binasco, “Les activités des missionnaires catholiques romains en Acadie/Nouvelle-Écosse (1610-1755),” *Les Cahiers de la Société Historique Acadienne*, vol. 37, no. 1, 12-29.

⁹³ Mémoire pour servir d'instruction au Sieur de Villebon, 18 March 1694, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 147; Lettre du ministre au sieur de Villebon, 16 April 1695, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 177; Mémoire pour servir d'instruction au sieur d'Iberville, commandant les vaisseaux du roy l'“Envieux” et le “Profond”, 28 Mar 1696, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 210; Lettre du Ministre a

defensive goals, missionaries increasingly became the primary liaisons between the village and officials of the French crown.⁹⁴

There were no missions and few missionaries in peninsular Mi'kma'ki before 1710. In Mi'kma'ki, there were seventeen priests who served the French and only two who served the Mi'kmaq between 1664 and 1714.⁹⁵ Unlike with the Abenaki, the French made little effort to directly evangelize the Mi'kmaq.

The Mi'kmaq did not refuse priests. Considerable evidence shows that at least some Mi'kmaq considered themselves Catholic. Dièreville, for example, was confronted with a group of Mi'kmaq looking for a priest when he first arrived at Chedabuctou after crossing the Atlantic from France. He observed that these people prayed before their meals, wore rosaries and made the sign of the cross.⁹⁶ When Brouillan arrived at Chedabuctou two years later, he noted the presence of two to three hundred Mi'kmaq “qui me represanterent la dolleur ou Ils estoient qu'on leur eut donné connoissance de la vraye religion sans leur donner le moyen de la cultiver.”⁹⁷ Other Mi'kmaq, who lived closer to French settlements, had more options to cultivate their faith. But without the presence of missionaries in their communities, Mi'kmaq interaction with Catholicism remained relatively obscure and infrequent.

Monsieur de Villebon, 26 Mar 1698, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 296; Résumé d'une lettre de Sieur de Villieu au Ministre, 20 Oct 1700, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 336; Extrait d'une lettre de M. de Brouillan au ministre, 21 Oct 1702, C11D-4, f. 228v-229v.

⁹⁴ For a good summary of the political role of missionaries see *Observations sur l'Acadie*, Feb 1695, C11A-13, 281.

⁹⁵ Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 322-323.

⁹⁶ Dièreville, 77.

⁹⁷ Brouillan au ministre, 06 Oct 1701, C11D-4, f. 45v. Author's translation: “who demonstrated to me the sadness that they had because they had been introduced to the true religion without being given the means to cultivate it.”

The Mi'kmaq near Port Royal had the easiest access to priests. Dièreville reported that the Mi'kmaq came “a great distance in order to receive this Sacrament from the Curé of Port Royal.”⁹⁸ His observation suggests the Mi'kmaq visited the parish church in the years before those documented by the surviving parish registers. When they attended the church, Dièreville claims that their participation was deeply moving:

They, in the most harmonious tones,
Sang all our Sacred Hymns, transcribed
Into their tongue, a Pious Work
Done by a Missionary who lived here.
Ardent and pure was his benevolence
Toward them; amidst this Tribe he dwelt,
Long years, in our Religion teaching all
And, doing so, paid Nature's final debt.⁹⁹

Europeans visiting Aboriginal Catholic communities often commented on the beauty of indigenous voices singing Catholic liturgy. As we will see in our discussion of Jeune Lorette in part two, these liturgical expressions were often believed to demonstrate Aboriginal devotion to Catholicism. Dièreville, like visitors to the Huron-Wendat village, qualified his statements, revealing that his observations were deeply rooted in his own Catholicism. Before describing the scene at the church in Port Royal, he noted that “Their voices are very agreeable when they are willing to sing properly; but their dances, whatsoever their nature, are always very uncouth.”¹⁰⁰ As much as some Mi'kmaq may have participated in these practices, and as little as European visitors were able to see and understand Mi'kmaq culture, it is clear that Catholicism did not overshadow more traditional aspects of a Mi'kmaq worldview.

⁹⁸ Dièreville, 144.

⁹⁹ Dièreville, 173.

¹⁰⁰ Dièreville, 172.

Wicken argues that the Mi'kmaq divided their religious practices between public (Catholic) and private (customary) spheres.¹⁰¹ Along with his observations of Mi'kmaw participation in the Port Royal church, Dièreville also described Mi'kmaw shamanistic practices and their more traditional religious beliefs to his readers. With minimal interaction between the two societies, it is difficult to assess the more private aspects of Mi'kmaw spirituality. Dièreville's account, however, clearly shows that these practices continued throughout the period.¹⁰² Most of the Mi'kmaq French observers, such as Dièreville, encountered were likely converts to Catholicism; aside from trade along the coast, non-Catholic Mi'kmaq had little reason to visit French settlements.

Like in Port Royal, Catholic Mi'kmaq living elsewhere in Mi'kma'ki drew on the resources of parish priests. Although only two priests directly served the Mi'kmaq as missionaries during this period, some Mi'kmaq sought the services of priests in French parishes at Port Royal, Minas and Beaubassin.¹⁰³ Sometimes these priests would leave their French parishioners to serve the Mi'kmaq. Villebon's journal indicates that the priests at Minas (Jean-François Buisson de Saint-Cosme)¹⁰⁴ and Beaubassin (Jean Baudoin)¹⁰⁵ also served the Mi'kmaq in the 1690s along with Le Clercq, Maudoux, Thury and Gaulin who were officially appointed to serve the Mi'kmaq in one capacity or

¹⁰¹ Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 309-310, 355-357.

¹⁰² Dièreville, 157-160.

¹⁰³ Wicken has a useful table which summarizes most of the baptisms, marriages and burials in French parishes. See Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 345.

¹⁰⁴ Journal of Events in Acadia, October 1696 to October 1, 1697, in Webster, 104.

¹⁰⁵ Memoir concerning the conduct of the missionaries of Acadia, Villebon to Count Pontchartrain, 1693, in Webster, 49-52. Wicken notes Baudoin's involvement with the Mi'kmaq. See Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 344.

another.¹⁰⁶ Saint-Cosme and Baudoin were not unique in abandoning their parishes to minister to neighbouring Mi'kmaq. In 1705 Brouillan asked the Recollets to send two new priests to Acadia to serve at Port Royal and Beaubassin because the priests there had left their posts to minister to the Mi'kmaq.¹⁰⁷

Saint-Cosme and Baudoin both assumed a political role in their relationship with the Mi'kmaq. In 1692, Baudoin accompanied the Mi'kmaq from Sikniktewaq to Wabanakia to participate in Abenaki raids on New England villages.¹⁰⁸ Five years later, Saint-Cosme also travelled to Wabanakia as part of this conflict with the Mi'kmaq from Sipekne'katikik. During that campaign Villebon noted his orders to the priest:

M. St. Cosme, because of the confidence that he has inspired in the aforesaid Indians, will do all that may be required of him to keep them in their present state of mind, and for this reason I am having him supplied with powder and balls for hunting on their journey, and the wherewithal to hold a feast before their departure at the mouth of the river.¹⁰⁹

These priests were important liaisons between the French and the Mi'kmaq in the region and they helped to build stronger ties between French administrators and these villages.

The priests' role in the region, however, was informal and based on their desire as individuals to liaise with the Mi'kmaq. Tensions with Villebon in 1693 demonstrate that Baudoin had clearly stopped serving his French parish (because they had made an oath of

¹⁰⁶ Villebon's Last Journal sent to Count Pontchartrain, Fort St. John, Oct 27 1699, in Webster, 123-125. These men represented the Recollets, Sulpiciens, and the secular priests from the séminaire des missions étrangères; most were from the latter group. Thury and Gaulin primarily served the Abenaki at Pentagouet during the pre-conquest period, though both began to play a more important role in Mi'kma'ki at the turn of the eighteenth century. See Maurice A. Léger, "Les missionnaires de l'ancienne Acadie (1604-1755)," *Les Cahiers de la Société Historique Acadienne*, vol. 28, no. 2-3, 63-97; Binasco, "Les activités des missionnaires catholiques romains en Acadie/Nouvelle-Écosse (1610-1755)," 4-29.

¹⁰⁷ Le sieur de Brouillan au ministre, 19 May 1705 C11D-5, f. 75v.

¹⁰⁸ Journal of what has happened in Acadia from October 13th, 1691 to October 25th, 1692, in Webster, 38.

¹⁰⁹ Journal of events in Acadia, Oct 1696 to Oct 1, 1697, in Webster, 105. For another example of St. Cosme liaising with the Mi'kmaq see Lettre du Ministre a Monsieur de Villebon, 15 Apr 1699, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 314.

allegiance to the English in 1690) in favour of spending time with the Mi'kmaq.¹¹⁰ This led the Minister of Marine to directly intervene, telling the Bishop at Quebec that parish priests should tend to their parochial flock rather than participate in France's military actions:

Elle a aussy appris qu'ils ont refusé l'absolution à des particuliers, à cause qu'ils étoient engagez dans le service contre les Anglois. Sa Majesté auroit donné ses ordres pour les faire retirer, sy Elle n'avoit trouvé plus à propos, par considération pour vous, de m'ordonner de vous pryer d'empescher la continuation de ces desordres, et que ces ecclésiastiques ne s'ingèrent point des affaires qui concernent le temporel...¹¹¹

The tension between the priests and imperial officials, particularly between Villebon and Baudoin, demonstrates that these men acted outside of French policy. Importantly, though, the entries in Villebon's journal emphasize their importance in drawing the Mi'kmaq to the French cause. After the rebuke of Baudoin's interactions with the Mi'kmaq, the Intendant in New France, Jean Bochart de Champigny, wrote to the Minister of Marine emphasizing the important role Baudoin played in cultivating Mi'kmaq support for French war efforts.¹¹² These parish priests rather than missionaries specifically assigned to serve the Mi'kmaq maintained France's ties with these communities during the 1690s.

¹¹⁰ Memoir concerning the conduct of the missionaries of Acadia, 1693, in Webster, 49-52. See page 51 for the reference to the oath. Villebon argued (passionately) that the settlers had only taken the oath under compulsion and should not be treated in this manner by their priest.

¹¹¹ Lettre du Ministre à Monsieur l'Évêque de Québec, 8 May 1694, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 156. Author's translation: "He has also learned that they [Baudoin and Louis Petit, the priest at Port Royal who negotiated the 1690 capitulation] had refused absolution to particular people because they were involved in fighting the English. His Majesty would have given orders for their recall, if he had not thought it more appropriate, given your needs, that I ask you to prevent these disorders from continuing and that these clergy not interfere in temporal affairs..."

¹¹² Lettre de Champigny au ministre, 24 Oct 1694, C11A-13, f. 93.

There were no missions in peninsular Mi'kma'ki because the Mi'kmaq had less political utility than the Abenaki. In Mi'kma'ki, Catholicism likely only played an important role in places where parish priests were interested in cultivating a relationship with neighbouring Mi'kmaq. Elsewhere the relationship was non-existent. The Bishop of Quebec provided a good counter-perspective to Dièreville in 1686, when he toured the French settlements in Mi'kma'ki and was thoroughly disappointed with Mi'kmaw Catholicism. He lamented the religious disorder he found in Acadia: “le plus grande partie des Sauvages étaient baptisés sans avoir aucune connaissance de la religion et sans en faire aucun exercice...”¹¹³ The missionaries, in his view, could not even speak the Mi'kmaq language. Under these conditions, he warned that baptism was only to be performed after long instruction. The Bishop's observations reflect France's minimal ecclesiastic investment in Mi'kma'ki.

The parish records also reveal that, aside from the Mi'kmaq at Port Royal, few Mi'kmaq engaged regularly with a priest. Looking at baptisms of French settlers in Kespukwitk but outside of Port Royal, Wicken has observed that many were entered into the registry in 1705, but were actually conducted by lay people years earlier. He concludes from this that many of the French settlers had not seen a priest since 1689.¹¹⁴ If the French had not seen a priest during this time, it is likely that the Mi'kmaq had not seen a priest either.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Centre de référence de l'Amérique française, SME 15, no. 66. Author's translation: “most of the natives have been baptized with no proper understanding of Catholicism and without making any [spiritual] exercises”

¹¹⁴ Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 251.

¹¹⁵ Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 326.

Once the War of the League of Augsburg ended, French attention refocused on areas of Acadia where the French had settled. Although the French continued to be more attentive to the Abenaki, they considered more seriously the development of missions among the Mi'kmaq. In 1698, Thury began planning a mission for Chebucto (modern-day Halifax). From this central location, he argued that the Mi'kmaq could serve as defenders of the colony, providing a valuable service to off-set the King's investment in the mission.¹¹⁶ He quickly revised his plans and suggested that the mission be built between the Pegitegiak and Aquixadi rivers. The site was more centrally located and facilitated travel to French settlements, the ocean, and the Mi'kmaq living in Unama'kik.¹¹⁷

Thury's goal was to transform Mi'kmaw society into a quasi-French society based on French economic structures, particularly agriculture and fishing. He asked for four hundred hoes, twenty-four sickles, twenty-four shovels, fifty fishing lines, two hundred "ains a Molüe", six barrels of salt, two or three hundred hatchets, two barrels of corn, two barrels of beans, one barrel of white peas. He also sought two large shallops with which the Mi'kmaq could aid French fishing and further defend the coast.¹¹⁸ He wanted three missionaries. Two were to travel with Mi'kmaw hunters (which he believed travelled in two large groups, one to Unama'kik and the other to Kespukwitk)¹¹⁹ and one to remain in

¹¹⁶ Extraits des lettres reçues de l'Acadie de M. Villebon, 16 Oct 1698, C11D-3, ff. 123v-124; Mémoire général sur l'Acadie, 9 Dec 1698, C11D-3, f. 134v.

¹¹⁷ Mémoire général sur l'Acadie, 9 Dec 1698, C11D-3, f. 132, 133v. Beamish Murdoch suggested that this was near modern-day Windsor, NS. Beamish Murdoch, *A History of Nova Scotia*, vol. 1, (Halifax: James Barnes, 1865), 243.

¹¹⁸ Extraits des lettres reçues de l'Acadie de M. Villebon, 16 Oct 1698, C11D-3, ff. 124-124v; Mémoire général sur l'Acadie, 9 Dec 1698, C11D-3, f. 134.

¹¹⁹ Mémoire général sur l'Acadie, 9 Dec 1698, C11D-3, f. 135.

the mission. The total cost for his plan was estimated at 7500 livres.¹²⁰ Thury died in 1699 before his plan could come to fruition. He was the last missionary in the region until 1704.

It is difficult to assess just how receptive the Mi'kmaq would have been to the creation of a mission. Le Clercq, Dièreville and Brouillan refer to meeting Catholic Mi'kmaq on arriving along the shores of Mi'kma'ki. Dièreville's account in particular paints a picture of Mi'kmaq Catholicism that emphasizes how some elements of the faith were embraced and others rejected. Like in many of the missions along the St. Lawrence, some Mi'kmaq adapted elements of the French religion that resonated with their pre-existing beliefs and worldview. Micheline Dumont Johnson has suggested that the Mi'kmaq merely added Catholic practices to their pre-existing beliefs.¹²¹ Wicken has developed this idea by looking at the parallel nature of Catholicism and customary Mi'kmaq practices.¹²² Harald Prins has been more specific about the way in which these belief systems work together. He argued that concepts such as the Heavenly Father, Virgin Mary and the Holy Redeemer resonated with Mi'kmaq beliefs about the sun, moon and Klu'skap.¹²³ Catholicism offered an appropriate bridge between these two societies. Without a broader shift in Mi'kmaq culture, though, it was unlikely that the Mi'kmaq would abandon their seasonal migration patterns in favour of a more sedentary – and agricultural – lifestyle.

¹²⁰ Extraits des lettres reçues de l'Acadie de M. Villebon, 16 Oct 1698, C11D-3, ff. 124v-125.

¹²¹ Johnson, 73.

¹²² Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 355-357.

¹²³ Prins, 83.

This process of selective engagement with European religion was common within many Aboriginal communities. In his study on Mohawk-Jesuit interactions, Allan Greer emphasizes the selective nature of this process. He observes that the Mohawk at Kahnawake:

accepted their [Jesuit] direction on some points, misunderstood them on others, evaded their control in certain areas, and, on the whole, went about their pursuit of sacred experience with and without the Jesuits' support. In other words, there was far more to their encounter with Christianity than anything that can be measured on a scale of acquiescence and resistance.¹²⁴

This syncretic form of Catholicism – which was probably not embraced by everyone – helps to further contextualize the role of French missionaries and Catholicism within Mi'kmaw communities at the turn of the century. Catholicism augmented, but did not replace, more customary practices.

The idea of establishing a mission did not die with Thury. In 1703 Brouillan revitalized the plan with a renewed emphasis on the mission's defensive purpose. Protection of the European settlements was foremost on Brouillan's mind; the French had intelligence that the English were planning to attack the colony again.¹²⁵ He suggested that a mission be located at Shubenacadie, easily accessible from Chebucto, La Hève, and Minas. In a letter later that year Brouillan changed his mind and proposed fortifying La Hève in order to encourage the Mi'kmaq fishery.¹²⁶ Gaulin, who began to serve as a missionary to the Mi'kmaq in 1704, also took up Thury's idea.¹²⁷ In 1705 he argued that

¹²⁴ Allan Greer, *Mohawk Saint: Catherine Tekakwitha and the Jesuits*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2005), 124.

¹²⁵ M. de Brouillan au ministre, 23 Nov 1703, C11D-4, ff. 277-278.

¹²⁶ Résumé d'une lettre du sieur de Brouillan, 29 Nov 1703, C11D-4, f. 303v.

¹²⁷ Résumé d'une lettre du missionnaire de Gaulin au ministre, around 1705, C11D-5, f. 194v. Gaulin focused more on Mi'kma'ki because the Abenaki mission had been ceded to the Jesuits. Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 325.

“lon ne peut conserver le reste de cette grande nation qu’en les rassemblant tous afin de les obliger a cultiver les terres et les accoussumer a la pesche et que par le commerce ils puissent avoir leurs besoins.”¹²⁸ A year later he also suggested building the mission at La Hève.¹²⁹

By 1708 this plan was in jeopardy. Although Gaulin had clearly made inroads that were sufficient enough to produce the 1708 census, most of France’s other plans for the Mi’kmaq were failing. Brouillan felt that most of the Mi’kmaq were reluctant to move into permanent villages.¹³⁰ The Mi’kmaq had rejected another of Gaulin’s proposed locations at Chedabuctou because of its regular use by the English fisheries and its distance from their hunting grounds. They suggested Ste-Marie River, about twenty leagues from Canso in Eski’kewaq.¹³¹ Bringing the Mi’kmaq together proved to be too much of a challenge. The colony did not have enough funds to carry out this plan properly.¹³²

The absence of missions and missionaries in Mi’kma’ki reflects the secondary role that the Mi’kmaq played in France’s strategic interests. Despite being one of the first groups of Aboriginal people to come into regular contact with priests at the beginning of the seventeenth century, by the end of the century Catholicism was mainly promoted on an ad hoc basis by either French parish priests or by Thury or Gaulin, who lived most years at Pentagouet. Through their experience with the Abenaki, these missionaries

¹²⁸ M. de Bonaventure au ministre, 30 Nov 1705, C11D-5, f. 118. Author’s translation: “one can only conserve the rest of this large nation if they are assembled together and obliged to cultivate the land and fish and by commerce their needs may be met.”

¹²⁹ Subercase au ministre, 22 and 25 Oct 1706, C11D-5, f. 279.

¹³⁰ M. de Subercase au ministre, 20 Dec 1708, C11D-6, f. 169.

¹³¹ Extrait de la lettre de M. Gaulin, missionnaire, 20 Dec 1708, C11D-6, ff. 250-251.

¹³² Résumé d’une lettre du sieur Gaulin au ministre, 23 Dec 1708, C11D-6, ff. 263-264.

played a political role in maintaining an alliance with the region's Aboriginal people. But Mi'kma'ki's relative unimportance to French political goals minimized the presence of missionaries in Mi'kma'ki and ultimately the role of Catholicism during this period. Without these important liaisons, little connected the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq to the French Empire.

Conclusion

France's focus on the Abenaki, and the informal nature of their relationship with the Mi'kmaq, meant that French officials and the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq did not interact much before the conquest. Without frequent contact, both groups conceived of Mi'kma'ki in their own ways. Despite acknowledging Abenaki territorial sovereignty over Wabanakia, France claimed sovereignty over Mi'kmaw territory, while the Mi'kmaq continued to see their position in the region as unencumbered by Europeans. These two different conceptions of space in Mi'kma'ki set the context for understanding the 1710 conquest of Port Royal.

From the beginning of French settlement, French officials did not recognize Mi'kmaw land use.¹³³ Although the French had an amicable relationship with the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq, it is unclear whether the Mi'kmaq were ever informed of the large claims France made on their territory. The French claimed all of Mi'kma'ki, Wulstukwik, and much of northern Wabanakia as their territory. The French relationship with Aboriginal people was usually lubricated by gifts and relatively frequent meetings; in the case of the Mi'kmaq, however, the French presence was so insignificant that these

¹³³ Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian*, 11.

aspects of Aboriginal-French alliances were hardly needed. France only minimally intruded on Mi'kmaw land, and there was little discussion or conflict over Mi'kmaw and French spaces in Mi'kma'ki.

In the absence of tension, France had little reason to conceive of Mi'kma'ki in any way other than as a French territory, where Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal residents were subjects of the French crown. This was the prevailing view of most French officials between 1680 and 1710. Although France lauded itself for its humane approach to colonization, its ultimate goal was to control and to convert Aboriginal people to a French worldview. Plans for the colony in the early 1680s reveal how many French governors viewed France's role in the region:

Les differents voyageurs des navigations Français ayant fait decouvrir des pays et des illes occupés par les Savages que la docilité de nôtre nation à si bien s'en se concilie que ces habitants naturels ont désiré de vivre sous nôtre domination, nos sujets ont habité et cultivé ce vaste pays et y ont porté la connaissance de la veritable Religion.¹³⁴

Four years later, François-Marie Perrot, the governor of Acadia, expressed a much more rigid view. He argued that there were two options for Aboriginal people in the region. They would either have to be chased out of the colony or convert to the French worldview; if they converted they could continue their winter hunts, which fuelled the French fur trade.¹³⁵ Cadillac, who was later the governor at Detroit, was more direct. He saw the Mi'kmaq as lazy and cowardly.¹³⁶ These

¹³⁴ Project d'édit pour l'établissement de l'Acadie, around 1682, C11D-1 fol. 152. Author's translation: "The various French explorers having discovered the native's lands, that through our nation's gentle disposition have won over the natives, so that they wished to live under our domination and have our subjects live and cultivate this land and have taught them the true Religion."

¹³⁵ Mémoire sur ce que l'on peut faire dans l'Acadie, 1686, C11D-2, ff. 33v-34.

¹³⁶ Mémoire du sieur de Lamothe Cadillac sur l'Acadie. Description de ce pays et de la Nouvelle-Angleterre. Projet d'une attaque contre la Nouvelle-York et Boston, 1692, C11D-2, f. 194v.

views continued into the eighteenth century. Costebelle, who was then the governor of Plaisance but after 1713 became the governor at Île Royale, saw the Unama'kik Mi'kmaq as undisciplined and cruel and complained about using them against the English at St. John's.¹³⁷ The crux of his complaint, however, was that he could not control their actions.¹³⁸

Other administrators were not as negative. At the end of 1706 Subercase observed what he believed was a fundamental difference between English and French approaches to their relationship with northeastern Aboriginal peoples: "Ces sauvages aiment beaucoup mieux les français que les anglais parce que les derniers veulent les dominer, au lieu que les français s'accoutument leurs maniers..."¹³⁹ He seemed to be quite proud of the softer approach taken by the French towards Aboriginal people.

Subercase might have thought this was a successful policy but his behaviour belies France's desire to dominate and claim Mi'kma'ki as part of Acadia. In 1708 he heard that a Mi'kmaw man from Sikniktewa'q had discovered 4000-5000 piastres along the seashore. Upon receiving this news he claims to have demanded that the sum be handed over to the crown. We do not know if he actually took this action. But in reporting it to the crown, he illustrated the French belief that land and sea belonged to the king of France to do with what he pleased.¹⁴⁰ Through this act, Subercase suggested to his superiors in France that the crown had dominion over Mi'kma'ki and had achieved

¹³⁷ Costebelle au ministre, 8 Nov. 1706, C11C-5, ff. 41v-42; Costebelle au ministre, 10 July 1707, C11C-5, f. 96;

¹³⁸ Costebelle au ministre, 28 Oct 1708, C11C-6, ff. 54-54v.

¹³⁹ Subercase au ministre, 22 and 25 Oct 1706, C11D-5, f. 264-264v. Author's translation: "These natives like the French much better than the English, because the latter want to dominate them while the French accommodate to their manners..."

¹⁴⁰ M. de Subercase au ministre, 20 Dec 1708, C11D-6, f. 167.

the submission of the Mi'kmaq. In the governor's view "cest par un amour de père et non par aucun besoin qu'on ait d'Eux qu'on les fait toutes les graces qu'ils recoivent."¹⁴¹

Underpinning Subercase's perspective on the Mi'kmaq were ideas that were very similar to those of his predecessors:

Les Sauvages sont comme Les abeilles qui ne manquent Jamais de piquer ceux qui ont peur d'eux, une expérience de vingt deux ans m'a appris cela et que ceux qui Les ont chatiés severement quand ils L'ont merittés ont été Leur meilleurs amis... Je crois qu'il faut traiter avec eux non comme des alliés, mais comme avec des sujets.¹⁴²

In his view the Mi'kmaq were subjects, not allies, of France.

Only two documents allude to the Mi'kmaq staking a claim to their territory during the pre-conquest period. In 1694 Villebon described the principal locations where the Mi'kmaq lived. At the end of his brief description he noted to the minister that "Ils regardent tous ces endroits comme leur établissement de tout temps."¹⁴³ This statement suggests that the Mi'kmaq had emphasized their claim to the spaces they occupied in Mi'kma'ki and sought to keep them separate from the French. A decade later, during the summer of 1703, Brouillan sent an identical dispatch using the same words to describe the Mi'kmaq.¹⁴⁴ By directly repeating information that was over a decade old, Brouillan's actions suggest that the French administration was in less contact with the

¹⁴¹ M. de Subercase au ministre, 20 Dec 1708, C11D-6, f. 167v. Author's translation: "it is by the love of a father and not by any need of them that they receive all of these favours..."

¹⁴² M. de Subercase au ministre, 20 Dec 1708, C11D-6, ff. 167v-168. Author's Translation: "Twenty years of experience has taught me that the natives are like bees that never fail to sting those who are afraid of them, and that those who chastised them severely when they deserved it are their best friends... I believe that one must treat them not as allies, but as subjects."

¹⁴³ Extrait d'une lettre de Joseph Robinau de Villebon à Lagny concernant les Indiens de l'Acadie (Canibas, Malécites et Micmacs), 2 Sept 1694, C11A-125, f. 186. Author's translation: "They regard all of these places as theirs for all time."

¹⁴⁴ Lettre de Monsieur de Brouillan au Ministre, 1 June 1703, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 403-404. This is an exact copy of Villebon's 1694 report. Only one paragraph is missing from the 1703 version. It refers specifically to two Abenaki chiefs.

Mi'kmaq than his predecessor had been. At the same time, his statement, like Villebon's, demonstrates that the French were aware of Mi'kmaw territorial claims.

The Mi'kmaq had no reason to strongly oppose French views during this period. French correspondence reveals that the French considered the Mi'kmaq subject to the will of the crown and laid claim to most of Mi'kma'ki. But aside from the odd messenger and missionary, there were few points of connection between these societies. Even if the Mi'kmaq had known and understood France's belief that they were subject to its jurisdiction, it is unlikely that this would have mattered to them. The French presence was too weak to subject the Mi'kmaq to its rule. France may have claimed much of Mi'kma'ki, but, on the ground, French jurisdiction did not extend much further than the seat of the governor.

No single Aboriginal-French relationship existed in Acadia. Although some settlers and Mi'kmaq built important personal and economic relationships, French officials placed greater priority on developing a relationship with the Abenaki. This began to change once the French administration returned to Port Royal in 1701, and France began to consider building a permanent mission for the Mi'kmaq. But, as the next chapter will show, these changes did not occur fast enough. The French relationship with the Abenaki, rather than with the Mi'kmaq, defined Aboriginal participation in France's conflicts with New England. With the relative weakness of the French crown, and only minimal interaction with the French, the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq were not prepared to fight to defend France's interests.

Chapter Three: The Conquest of Acadia/The Survival of Mi'kma'ki

France's interactions with the Mi'kmaq and Abenaki affected the way each participated in the four early-eighteenth-century sieges of Port Royal. The Mi'kmaq played a marginal role in defending Port Royal. French alliance structures were bound much more tightly to the Abenaki, whose territory was slowly being eroded by English encroachment. Unlike the conflicts discussed earlier, however, the French-English tensions during the early 1700s took place in Mi'kma'ki. The Abenaki did not have any territorial stake in defending French interests there, nor could they rapidly respond in the event of a surprise attack. Nonetheless, some of these people and some Wulstukwiuk usually came to Port Royal's defence, because of the influence of French gift-giving, ties formed with missionaries, and the personal connections they had developed with the Saint-Castin family. Aside from the Mi'kmaq living around Port Royal, who were often involved in these battles, few Mi'kmaq from other areas joined the Abenaki and Wulstukwiuk to fight in this European conflict.

After their defeat of the French, the British brought many of the same tensions to Mi'kma'ki that had existed in Wabanakia. Although the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq initially sought peace, the absence of Aboriginal people from the Anglo-French peace agreement at Utrecht, as well as a weak British Indian policy, led to tensions between the British and the Mi'kmaq and Abenaki. Surprised to learn that their land was claimed by the British crown, most of the region's Aboriginal people began to resist the new British regime with much more vigour. By 1714, it was increasingly apparent that the Mi'kmaq could no longer selectively engage with the Europeans claiming their land.

The Saint-Castin family and the French-Abenaki Alliance

The Mi'kmaw response to the conquest of Port Royal can only be understood in the context of France's relationship with the Abenaki through the Saint-Castin family. The Saint-Castins were an elite Abenaki-French family who lived at Pentagouet along the banks of the Penobscot River. By marriage, the family linked its noble French heritage with Abenaki power structures. The patriarch, Jean-Vincent d'Abbadie, the third baron of Saint-Castin, was an officer in the Carignan-Salières regiment. His wife, Marie-Mathilde Pidianske, was the daughter of Madokawando, one of the principal chiefs along the Penobscot. The Saint-Castins' considerable regional connections and interests, formed in the fur trade, gave them incentive to encourage their Abenaki kin to participate in conflicts outside of Wabanakia. This network made the family more useful than missionaries or gift giving in liaising with the Abenaki after the French administration returned to Port Royal in 1701.

Jean-Vincent d'Abbadie de Saint-Castin arrived in North America with the Carignan-Salières regiment in 1665. Five years later, after Acadia had been ceded back to France during the Treaty of Breda, he was stationed with the new governor of Acadia, Hector d'Andigné de Grandfontaine, at Pentagouet. During the 1670s he built a positive relationship with the Abenaki, which culminated in his marriage to Pidianske. According to some historians, it was during this decade, that he became "entirely an Abenaki."¹

¹ Georges Cerbelaud Salagnac, "Jean-Vincent d'Abbadie de Saint-Castin," *DCB* online. For more on Saint-Castin see Marjolaine Saint-Pierre, *Saint-Castin: baron français, chef amérindien*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 1999). For an opposing view, see Owen Stanwood, "Unlikely Imperialist: The Baron of Saint-Castin and the Transformation of the Northeastern Borderlands," *French Colonial History*, vol. 5 (2004), 58, n. 13.

Jean-Vincent's connection with the Abenaki governed his behaviour. Although he remained a French officer and frequently fought for the French, his trading interests mirrored those of his wife's society. The French frequently accused Saint-Castin and the Abenaki of trading with the English in both New England and Albany. In the 1670s and 1680s, he was tightly allied with the New England trader John Neilson.² His trading relationship with the English caused frequent conflict with French officials as they repeatedly, though unsuccessfully, tried to convince him to end this trade and focus on the Abenaki. In 1688, Meneval claimed to have successfully convinced Saint-Castin to work full time in building the alliance with the Abenaki. Meneval saw Saint-Castin as the perfect middleman: "il connoist parfaitement les moeurs et les Intentions."³ Despite Meneval's assurances, Saint-Castin was, a decade later, again accused of trading with the English.⁴ There was much truth to this accusation. New England trader John Alden told the Earl of Belloment that "Mons^r de Saint-Castin told him he hop'd he should Shortly come under the King of England's Government, for that he had much rather be a Subject of England than a Slave to France."⁵

As in the 1670s, however, Saint-Castin's action did not prevent him from working as a mediator between the French and the Abenaki. In 1701 Brouillan asked him to work

² George Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts: A Study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia Relations, 1630-1784*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973), 35.

³ Mémoire du sieur de Menneval, gouverneur de l'Acadie, touchant les affaires de cette Province pour l'année 1688, 10 Sept 1688, C11D-2, f. 102. Author's translation: "he perfectly understands the customs and intentions."

⁴ M. de Villieu au ministre, 20 Oct 1700, C11D-4, ff. 25-25v.

⁵ Cap^t John Alden's Relation to the Earl of Belloment, 13 June 1700, in *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, vol. 10, 58.

on winning back the Abenaki living along the Kennebec.⁶ The fear that English trade would draw the Abenaki into the English fold reached a climax in 1702. The French believed that despite their efforts, the village of Pentagouet had allied with the English. Brouillan's only hope to maintain a French and Abenaki connection was Saint-Castin.⁷

Jean-Vincent occupied a privileged position between European and Aboriginal power structures in the northeast. As a French officer with strong Abenaki ties, he was able to live in both worlds without fear of his French superiors. His illegal trading was tolerated because of his connections with Abenaki leaders, and because many colonial officials were similarly involved in the trade. This balancing act caught up with him at the turn of the century, when he returned to France to quell rumours that he had been disloyal to the crown and to settle some family affairs. He remained in Europe until his death in 1707.

Meanwhile, strained tensions between England and France sparked a renewal of conflict in the northeast. Without Jean-Vincent as a principal liaison with the Abenaki, France feared that the alliance would weaken. In 1704 Brouillan asked Bernard-Anselme, Jean-Vincent's and Pidianske's eldest son, to return from his studies at the Petit Séminaire in Quebec to rally the Abenaki to France's side.⁸

Unlike his father and two younger brothers, who lived at Pentagouet for much of their lives, Bernard-Anselme embraced the European side of his family tree. Although growing up in the Abenaki community, he was educated in the town of Quebec until

⁶ Mémoire pour accompagner la lettre de M. de Brouillan, 6 Oct 1701, C11D-4, ff. 69-69v.

⁷ Brouillan au ministre, 30 Dec 1702, C11D-4, ff. 212-213.

⁸ Salagnac, "Bernard-Anselme d'Abbadie de Saint-Castin," *DCB* online.

1704 when he left to fight the English during the War of Spanish Succession. By 1707, after New England twice attacked Port Royal, Saint-Castin married the daughter of a French settler and purchased a home in Port Royal. His two sisters followed suit shortly thereafter – also marrying into Port Royal ‘elite’ society and tightening the connections between the French village and the Abenaki community at Pentagouet.⁹ In the aftermath of the two New England sieges in 1707, Saint-Castin was promoted from ensign to lieutenant.¹⁰ After Port Royal fell in 1710, he was further promoted to the position of commander of the French resistance in British-held Acadia.¹¹ Throughout this period, Bernard-Anselme maintained his family’s stake in the fur trade. When the English captured him in the Bay of Fundy – just after Port Royal fell in 1710 – his vessel contained “Forty & ffifty Bundles of Beaver Severall Bundles of Seale Skins and many other Loose Skins some Bundles of Otter three small ffrench Guns & Ffour bags of Ffeathers.”¹²

Saint-Castin was promoted both for his kin-relationship with the Abenaki, and his rapport with French society at Port Royal.¹³ He became an important part of settler society in Port Royal and active in defending France’s colonial interests. Unlike his

⁹ Salagnac, “Bernard-Anselme d’Abbadie de Saint-Castin,” *DCB* online.

¹⁰ Résumés des lettres du sieur de Subercase au ministre, 30 Dec 1708, C11D-6, f. 245.

¹¹ Nomination, par M. De Vaudreuil, du baron de Saint-Castin, commandant de Pentagouet, avec la charge du commandant en pied dans les troupes, Jan 01 1711, C11D-7, ff. 122-123v.

¹² Council Minutes: Account of the capture of Saint-Castin, 1 November 1710, in *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, vol. 9, 366.

¹³ Subercase au ministre, 22 and 25 Oct 1706, C11D-5, f. 265; Nomination, par M. De Vaudreuil, du baron de Saint-Castin, commandant de Pentagouet, avec la charge du commandant en pied dans les troupes, 1 Jan 1711, C11D-7 ff. 122-123v; Vaudreuil au ministre, 25 Oct 1711, C11A-32 ff. 41-64v; Vaudreuil au ministre, 25 Apr 1711, C11A-32, ff. 24-31v. On his relationship with the French settlers: Marly à Subercase, 24 Aug 1707, Série B-29 f. 232; Marly à Saint-Castin, 24 Aug 1707, Série B-29 f. 242. On his relationship with the Abenaki see Versailles à Subercase, 30 June 1707, Série B-29 f. 192; Versailles à Subercase, 6 June 1708, Série B-29 f. 485v.

father, whose military exploits principally focused on securing parts of Wabanakia coveted by the English, Bernard-Anselme defended French settlements – principally Port Royal. Although often accompanied by Abenaki from Pentagouet, Bernard-Anselme also led French settlers against English invaders. Unlike the 1690s, Abenaki participation in the campaigns of the early 1700s was relatively marginal, tied to direct connections with Saint-Castin, and mirrored the more hesitant involvement of the Mi'kmaq in the earlier campaigns.

The Sieges Before 1710

It is a miracle that the French were able to hold Port Royal as long as they did during the first decade of the eighteenth century. With infrequent supply from France, several years of bad harvests, and relatively persistent attacks from New England, the French position in Mi'kma'ki was very weak. The French had few resources to convince the Mi'kmaq, Abenaki, or Wulstukwiuk that defending French settlements was beneficial to their interests. It was left to Bernard-Anselme to draw additional assistance.

A resurgence of fighting in Wabanakia – along the New England frontier – pushed New Englanders to attack Port Royal during the first decade of the eighteenth century. In 1703, the Abenaki, with French military support, attacked the New England villages of Wells and Saco, killing at least a dozen people and capturing twice as many.¹⁴ That February Abenaki and French forces from Canada attacked Deerfield, Massachusetts,

¹⁴ N.E.S. Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian: A North American Border People 1604-1755*, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 205.

killing forty-seven and taking 111 people captive.¹⁵ This attack, which lives on in New England memory, was the immediate cause of the 1704 attack on French Acadia.

On 2 July 1704, twenty-two English boats under the command of Benjamin Church sailed up the Bay of Fundy. According to the French account the English came in two large ships with forty and sixty cannons respectively and about one thousand troops.¹⁶ The French garrison at Port Royal – such as it was – was not a central target; rather, the settlements at Pentagouet, Minas and Beaubassin received the harshest treatment. Dykes were destroyed, homes were burned, and settlers, including some Abenaki from Pentagouet, were captured and taken back to Boston. For most of July, Port Royal basin was the staging ground for these attacks. Ten vessels remained in the basin for much of the campaign. Around Port Royal the English pillaged the countryside and burned a handful of houses but left the fort and town alone. The capital of Acadia got off easily compared to the other settlements.

Surviving documents provide only brief glimpses of Aboriginal participation in this event. Upon news of the English threat, Brouillan called for Aboriginal support. Between fifteen and thirty people – about the same number of Mi'kmaw men from Port Royal capable of bearing arms in the 1708 census – responded to this call.¹⁷ On 22 July Brouillan sent nine French settlers and twenty Aboriginal people to Minas to help defend

¹⁵ Griffiths, 206. Haefeli and Sweeney claim that only 89 captives arrived in Canada after this attack. See Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney, *Captors and Captives: The 1704 French and Indian Raid on Deerfield*, (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 125. For the connections between the French attack on Deerfield and the English attacks of Port Royal see chap. 10.

¹⁶ Expéditions faites par les Anglais de la Nouvelle-Angleterre à Port-Royal, aux Mines et à Beaubassin, 1704, C11D-5, f. 8.

¹⁷ Invasion des Anglois de Baston par Monsieur de La Bat, 1 July 1704, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 422; "Recensement général fait au mois de novembre mille Sept cent huit de tous les sauvages de l'Acadie," 1708, Newberry Library, Edward E. Ayer, MSS 4, no. 751.

against the English attacks. They arrived six hours too late and did not help with the resistance.¹⁸ In his summary of the year's events the Acadian governor noted that both Aboriginal people and the French militia drew resources from the garrison for defensive purposes.¹⁹ Unfortunately, the sources do not distinguish whether these people were Abenaki or Mi'kmaq; however, given the number of people involved and the nearby presence of the Mi'kmaq during the summer months, it is reasonable to suggest that these were Mi'kmaq rather than Abenaki. For nearly the entire period under study, the presence and activity of local Mi'kmaq seems to have only rarely warranted direct comment, never mind extensive discussion.

Tensions were high in Port Royal in the years following 1704. Rumours continued to flow through Wabanakia about preparation in Boston for another attack.²⁰ Some French officials believed they would be supported by neighbouring Aboriginal people in the event of another attack. At the end of 1705 de Goutin was confident that he could build a force of seventy or eighty Aboriginal fighters, nearly twice the number that participated in defending the French in 1704.²¹ Evidence indicates that Aboriginal people

¹⁸ Expéditions faites par les Anglais de la Nouvelle-Angleterre à Port-Royal, aux Mines et à Beaubassin, 1704, C11D-5, f. 9v.

¹⁹ Mémoire du sieur de Brouillan sur les affaires les plus importantes de l'Acadie, 5 Mar 1705, C11D-5, f. 64.

²⁰ Le sieur Degoutin au ministre, 4 Dec 1705, C11D-5, f. 137.

²¹ Le sieur Degoutin au ministre, 4 Dec 1705, C11D-5, f. 138v-139. de Goutin's estimation of Aboriginal support was likely drawn from the experience in 1702 when between sixty and seventy Aboriginal people – about the same number of Mi'kmaw men who could bear arms from Kespukwitk – came to the village when the French asked for Aboriginal support upon news of a planned English attack. See Extrait d'une lettre de M. de Brouillan au ministre, 21 Oct 1702, C11D-4, f. 229v-230.

visited Port Royal most summers and were willing to defend the French fort, but few documents reveal the size and importance of these groups.²²

De Goutin was overly optimistic. The 1704 attack left Port Royal even more destitute than it had been before. In the late winter of 1705, Brouillan told the Ministry of Marine that the last two years' harvests had been poor and that the French settlers were going hungry.²³ By the end of 1706 the situation was even more desperate. Beyond the food shortage, the fort was falling apart and, even more concerning, the French feared that they had lost the support of their Aboriginal allies.²⁴ Bonaventure worried that they could soon find themselves at war with their allies. No longer confident that there were sufficient resources to defend the colony, he emphasized France's precarious situation: "Les sauvages de l'Acadie se sont assembler plusieurs fois par rapport a la misere extreme qu'ils souffroient voulant absolument declarer la guerre aux françois. Il les a appaisé en leur faisant distribuer un peu de poudre et de plomb pour les faire subsister."²⁵ The French were vulnerable and their relationship with the Abenaki and Mi'kmaq seemed to be deteriorating quickly. The Minister of Marine thanked

²² Brouillan au ministre, 30 Dec 1702, C11D-4, f. 211; Brouillan au ministre, 23 Nov 1703, C11D-4, f. 277v; Bonaventure au ministre, 30 Nov 1705, C11D-5, ff. 108v-111v.

²³ Mémoire du sieur de Brouillan sur les affaires les plus importantes de l'Acadie, 5 Mar 1705, C11D-5, f. 64.

²⁴ Subercase au ministre, 22 and 25 Oct 1706, C11D-5, f. 263v.

²⁵ Bonaventure au ministre, 24 Dec 1706, C11D-5, f. 293v; Subercase shared these fears see: Subercase au ministre, Oct 22 and 25 1706, C11D-5, f. 263. Author's translation: "The natives in Acadia have assembled many times due to the extreme misery that they suffer and wish to declare war against the French. He appeased them by supplying them with enough powder and lead shot for them to survive." See also *Résumé d'une lettre de Monsieur de Bonaventure au ministre, 24 Dec 1706, Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 464; *Résumé d'une lettre de Monsieur de Subercase, 25 Oct 1706, Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 460.

Bonaventure the following year for preventing a conflict by supplying the disaffected groups.²⁶

Bonaventure was a controversial representative of French interests. He serves as a good example of the problems France faced in the region. In late 1706, Charles de Saint-Étienne de La Tour, son of the famous seventeenth-century governor, blamed Bonaventure for the erosion of the French-Abenaki relationship. Not only was Bonaventure accused of fuelling tensions with the Abenaki by trading with the English, but also of inhibiting traditional forms of Mi'kmaw resistance along the coast by forbidding them from capturing New England fishing vessels. La Tour provided a poignant image of Bonaventure's desire to extend his authority into Mi'kmaw affairs: "Quelques Sauvages ayant pillé un autre bastiment anglois chargé de marchandises Le Sr de Bonnaventure a envoyé un detachment de Soldats pour prendre ces Sauvages et les faire chastier ce qui heureusement ne s'est pas executé parce que cela auroit entierement déterminé les Sauvages a faire la guerre aux françois."²⁷ After these complaints had reached Canada, Bonaventure presented his perspective directly to the Ministry of the Marine. Like officials during the two previous decades, he was unrepentant and claimed that he sought to protect Aboriginal interests: "nous navons pas besoin d'eux, et que nous sommes icy leurs protecteurs enfin Monseigneur mes intentions ont été pures dans

²⁶ Lettre de Ministre à Monsieur de Bonnaventure, 30 June 1707, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 473.

²⁷ Résumé d'une lettre du sieur de La Tour, 20 Dec 1706, C11D-5, f. 296. Author's translation: "Some natives having attacked another English vessel full of merchandise, the Sr de Bonnaventure sent a detachment of soldiers to take these natives and punish them. Thankfully the order was not executed because it would have determined the natives' resolve to go to war against France."

tout ce que j'ay fait Je suis malheureux qu'on aye interpreté mal toutes mes actions."²⁸

Bonaventure sought to establish French dominance over the region's Aboriginal people and likely alienated as many people as he sought to win over.

The French alliance with neighbouring Aboriginal people was not abandoned altogether. The French continued to build relationships through missionaries, as we have previously seen, and through trading and military intermediaries like Saint-Castin. These individuals continued to influence the communities where they resided. In the eyes of Daniel d'Auger de Subercase, the last French governor at Port Royal, Saint-Castin was a tool of French control. In 1706, Subercase stressed the importance of having 'reliable' people living in Aboriginal communities. Saint-Castin was his best example. "Il est très important d'avoir toujours un homme de caractère parmi ces sauvages pour veiller à leur conduite... Le fils du S^r de S^t Castin est très propres pour cela parce que sa mère est de leur nation et que d'ailleurs c'est un jeune gentilhomme très sage et très capable."²⁹ With French influence weakened, Saint-Castin became a principal connection maintaining Aboriginal support in the face of growing indifference in both Abenaki and Mi'kmaw communities.

By the late spring of 1707, the situation must have seemed dire to imperial officials. The English fleet again appeared before the village on 6 June. This time, according to Pierre-François-Xavier de Charlevoix's account, the English brought

²⁸ Le sieur de Bonaventure, 18 Dec 1707, C11D-6, f. 16. Author's translation: "we do not need them, and we are their protectors, that is, Monseigneur, my intentions were pure in all that I have done. I am upset that someone has misinterpreted my actions."

²⁹ Subercase au ministre, 22 and 25 Oct 1706, C11D-5, f. 265. Author's translation: "It is very important to always have a man of character among the natives to oversee their conduct... Saint-Castin's son is well suited for this purpose because his mother is from their community, and he is moreover a wise and capable young gentleman."

twenty-four ships and nearly two thousand men.³⁰ Thankfully for the French, sixty troops arrived from Canada a couple of hours before the attack. This raised the morale of the garrison. But, regardless of these reinforcements, the militia and even their children had to fight to repel the English.³¹ Using the strategy of forest- and ambush-based warfare, the French and some Aboriginal allies were able to protect Port Royal.³²

Saint-Castin, who may have recently moved to Port Royal, was a key figure in these events. There is little evidence, however, to suggest that many of the Mi'kmaq, Abenaki or Wulstukwiuk communities participated with him. According to Charlevoix, the famed eighteenth-century French historian, only six Abenaki fought alongside Saint-Castin; they apparently repelled four hundred English soldiers. When the fighting ended, this group and the sixty French soldiers had made the difference in saving Port Royal from defeat. Although Aboriginal people do not figure prominently in accounts of the first siege, which is likely a function of European bias and evidence of a relatively loose relationship with the Mi'kmaq, Saint-Castin may have been able to mobilize a handful of men to join in the village's defence. For the most part, Saint-Castin's place, according to Subercase, was at the head of the French settlers, not the Aboriginal people.³³ Given that he was married in Port Royal shortly after the 1707 sieges, it is likely that Saint-Castin had spent much of 1707 in Port Royal and had little time to recruit his Abenaki countrymen before the attack.

³⁰ Pierre François Xavier de Charlevoix, *History and General Description of New France*, vol. 5, book 19, John Gilmary Shea, tr. and ed., (New York: Francis P. Harper, 1900), 191-195; Subercase claimed that there were three thousand men. See Extrait de la lettre du sieur de Subercase au ministre, 26 June 1707, C11D-6, f. 19.

³¹ Extrait de la lettre du sieur de Subercase au ministre, 26 June 1707, C11D-6, f. 22.

³² Le sieur de Subercase au ministre, 7 July 1707, C11D-6, f. 11v.

³³ Extrait de la lettre du sieur de Subercase au ministre, 26 June 1707, C11D-6, f. 28.

Just as in earlier battles involving the Abenaki, French, and English, the Mi'kmaq were not entirely left out of the fighting. A group of Mi'kmaq along the Atlantic coast captured two English fishing vessels that summer. Although the Mi'kmaq probably attacked the vessels for reasons other than in support of French interests, they brought the only two surviving prisoners with them to Port Royal.³⁴ The sailors' information opened a window onto New England preparations for the attack. The prisoners told the French that this had been a major expedition, using all available sailors and putting the New England economy on hold for three months.³⁵ The gravity of their statement was demonstrated after the failed second attempt at Port Royal later that summer, when the returning troops were met by a furious New England population.³⁶ The Mi'kmaq played an important role by providing the French with intelligence about developments in New England.

Despite the fragile state of the colony, France's alliances remained intact in 1707. After learning about the attack, many Aboriginal people arrived from around the Bay of Fundy. François-Edmé Rameau de Saint-Père, a nineteenth-century historian, claimed that along with their French neighbours, Mi'kmaq came from the three summer villages in Kespukwitk, as well as Sipekne'katikik and Wulstukwik.³⁷ They asked for gifts as a condition for future military support. Subercase told them that he had nothing to give. It

³⁴ Wicken discusses some of the underlying dynamics of these conflicts in William C. Wicken, "26 August 1726: A Case Study in Mi'kmaq – New England Relations in the Early 18th Century," *Acadiensis*, vol. 23 no.1 (Autumn, 1993), 5-22. His argument has been briefly summarized in chapter one of this dissertation.

³⁵ Extrait de la lettre du sieur de Subercase au ministre, 26 June 1707, C11D-6, f. 23v-24.

³⁶ John Mack Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from their American Homeland*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), 116.

³⁷ François-Edmé Rameau de Saint-Père, *Une Colonie Féodale en Amérique (L'Acadie, 1604-1710)*, (Paris: Didier et Cie, 1877), 328.

had been another year of poor supply. In Subercase's view, the muskets and other munitions that had arrived that spring were of such low quality that they had no value at all.³⁸ Without gifts, the Mi'kmaw-French relationship was vulnerable. Worried, he wrote to France: "il est important de les mettre en estat de leur faire des presens parce qu'autrement Il arrive quelque chose de fascheux de leur part..."³⁹

The absence of Aboriginal people while Port Royal was under attack concerned Subercase. He claimed that the Abenaki had grown tired of waiting for French supplies and had instead renewed trade with the English at New York. Subercase feared closer ties between the Abenaki and English would lead to a broad alliance uniting them with the Haudenosaunee against the French. French gift giving could prevent this disaster. Subercase called for an additional five hundred pistoles of merchandise to be sent to "ces premiers Sauvages."⁴⁰ The minister responded two months later by increasing the value of French gifts by 1000 livres, and earmarking all additional presents for the Abenaki.⁴¹ Although not his top priority, Subercase also established a mission in peninsular Mi'kma'ki to develop a better understanding of the Mi'kmaw community.⁴²

French views remained divided over how the Mi'kmaq, Abenaki and Wulstukwiuk felt about their presence in the northeast. Despite the tensions and lack of supplies, Subercase believed that the relationship remained amicable and that they would

³⁸ M. de Subercase au ministre, 5 July 1707, C11D-6, f. 4v.

³⁹ Extrait de la lettre du sieur de Subercase au ministre, 26 June 1707, C11D-6, f. 23v. Author's translation: "It is important to make it possible for them [the French at Port Royal] to give them presents otherwise they [the Mi'kmaq] will do something bad."

⁴⁰ Extrait de la lettre du sieur de Subercase au ministre, 26 June 1707, C11D-6, f.28-28v.

⁴¹ Lettre du ministre a Monsieur de Subercase, 24 Aug 1707, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 483.

⁴² Extrait de la lettre du sieur de Subercase au ministre, 26 June 1707, C11D-6, f.29.

help defend the colony if it came under attack again. According to him “les sauvages de ces costés viennent nous faire de grands offres du service....”⁴³ Bonaventure, who was not one to trust Aboriginal people, took the opposite view. He feared that they would

prendre de facheuses resolutions; ce que j’ay lhonneur de vous avancer n’est point sans fondement, puisque l’année passée J’ay eu beaucoup de peines a les detourner de leurs mauvais desseins, ils y persistent maintenant plus que jamais. Je feray neatmoins [sic.] tous ce que je pouray de mon coté pour leurs faire prendre patience.⁴⁴

Both views had merit. Examples from other Aboriginal societies in the northeast suggest that many communities were divided on how to deal with Europeans. This was most apparent among the Mi’kmaq following the fall of Port Royal.

Based on the limited evidence, it seems that Subercase’s positive analysis was closer to the truth. Although certainly misguided in his reasoning, Mi’kmaw attacks on New England fishers reinforced French defences. The Mi’kmaq kept New Englanders at bay between the two sieges of 1707. Dièreville claimed that they drove off a fleet of thirty New England vessels that were scouting fishing locations between Port Royal and Cape Sable.⁴⁵ The Mi’kmaq defended their coast that summer from New England encroachments by capturing fishing vessels.

⁴³ M. de Subercase au ministre, 5 July 1707, C11D-6, f. 4v-5. Author’s translation: “the natives of this land come to offer us their services...”

⁴⁴ Le sieur de Bonaventure au ministre, 5 July 1707, C11D-5, ff. 6v-7. Author’s translation: “make bad decisions; what I have the honour to tell you is not without foundation, because last year I went to great pains to reverse their ill intentions, but they persist now more than ever. I will do everything that I can for my part to teach them patience.”

⁴⁵ Sieur de Dièreville, *Relation of the voyage to Port Royal in Acadia or New France*, John Clarence Webster, ed., Mrs. Clarence Webster, trans., (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1933), 210-211. This incident has not been included in appendix 2 because it does not seem to have involved the capture of these vessels. It does, however, reinforce the argument that the coast was a principal Mi’kmaw site of both contact and conflict.

Fearful of returning to Boston unsuccessful, the English made a second attempt on the French fort in August. This time, many Aboriginal people were present. The exact numbers and composition of the Aboriginal fighters are unknown. The closest image we have comes from an end-of-year dispatch, which Subercase sent to the Minister of Marine. Subercase sent eighty Aboriginal people and thirty French settlers to ambush and harass the English.⁴⁶ This was typical of the type of fighting in which Aboriginal and French settlers engaged. On some occasions they surprised small groups of English scouting parties;⁴⁷ at other times they fought alongside French soldiers in more formal engagements.⁴⁸ On at least one occasion, Aboriginal and French fighters were responsible for bringing the English advance guard to a halt.⁴⁹

Saint-Castin continued to play a central role in the French defence. Although he was injured in one of the principal attacks, he successfully led one hundred and fifty men in defending the French fort.⁵⁰ In Charlevoix's eyes Saint-Castin had once again saved the day.⁵¹

The attacks during the summer of 1707 left Port Royal completely destitute. Before the English troops arrived, Subercase had ordered the killing of the habitants' livestock to prevent the English from accessing a ready source of food.⁵² When combined with the destruction wrought by the English, little food was left for winter. The governor implored France to send supplies immediately, otherwise the English were

⁴⁶ Résumé d'un mémoire de M.de Subercase, 20 and 25 Dec 1707, C11D-6, f. 54.

⁴⁷ Dièreville, 211.

⁴⁸ Dièreville, 213.

⁴⁹ Résumé d'un mémoire de M.de Subercase, 20 and 25 Dec 1707, C11D-6, f. 54v.

⁵⁰ Extrait d'une lettre de M. de Subercase au ministre, 20 and 25 Dec 1707, C11D-6, ff. 74v-76.

⁵¹ Charlevoix, 196-201.

⁵² Extrait d'une lettre de M. de Subercase au ministre, 20 and 25 Dec 1707, C11D-6, f. 89.

likely to soon be victorious.⁵³ The Abenaki, Wulstukwiuk and Mi'kmaq also required gifts and supplies. Subercase was petrified that without gifts they would abandon the alliance with France.⁵⁴ As in 1702, Subercase sent a small amount of gifts to Pentagouet with Saint-Castin in an effort to appease Abenaki (rather than Mi'kmaw) needs.⁵⁵ The Abenaki were too valuable to the French to allow gaps in the supply chain risk losing their support. If it had not been for the diversion to Port Royal of flour destined for Plaisance and the arrival of a ship captured by privateers, the colony would have been in crisis that winter.⁵⁶

The descriptions of the first three attacks on Port Royal demonstrate the continued, though weakened, connections between France and Aboriginal communities in the northeast. French documents often refer only to Aboriginal people as *sauvages*; they are rarely more specific. This makes determining who was present at Port Royal during these events difficult. Nonetheless, most often when a specific group was mentioned, they were Abenaki from the Penobscot or Kennebec Rivers. Time and time again, it was these people to whom the French appealed for its defence.

If the number of Aboriginal people cited by French officials was accurate, the Mi'kmaq living around Port Royal most likely participated in these events as well. There is no evidence, though, that Mi'kmaq from more northern communities were engaged in these conflicts. The French presence was too weak and too concerned with its own

⁵³ Extrait d'une lettre de M. de Subercase au ministre, 20 and 25 Dec 1707, C11D-6, ff. 78v-79.

⁵⁴ Extrait d'une lettre de M. de Subercase au ministre, 20 and 25 Dec 1707, C11D-6, ff. 79-79v.

⁵⁵ Extrait d'une lettre de M. de Subercase au ministre, 20 and 25 Dec 1707, C11D-6, f. 80.

⁵⁶ Extrait d'une lettre de M. de Subercase au ministre, 20 and 25 Dec 1707, C11D-6, f. 80v.

survival to be bothered with reaching out to these people. The Mi'kmaq in these communities had no incentive to build a stronger relationship with the French.

The Fall of Port Royal

The French fear of English attack did not diminish after 1707. Subercase did as much as he could to ensure that the French were prepared. One of his central aims was to build Abenaki, Wulstukwiuk and Mi'kmaw support. As in the past, Subercase's plans were thwarted by poor supply and harvests. He never had enough resources to draw sustained Aboriginal support to bolster his troops. Few Aboriginal people were present during the 1710 siege. But, France's alliances had not totally broken down. Once again, in the resistance against the British in 1711 and 1712, the Abenaki under Saint-Castin's leadership attempted to oust the British.

After the attacks in 1707, Subercase tried to bring the garrison back to a position of strength. When that seemed impossible, he sought to create the illusion of strength. Subercase requested two to three thousand additional troops and worked tirelessly to win the support of neighbouring Aboriginal peoples.⁵⁷ In 1708 and 1709 the budgets for gifts for Aboriginal people were increased from four to six thousand livres worth of goods.⁵⁸ Antoine Gaulin was also charged with enumerating the Mi'kmaw population and assessing the number of men who could bear arms.

⁵⁷ M. de Subercase au ministre, 20 Dec 1708, C11D-6, ff. 159v-160.

⁵⁸ État des dépenses que le roi veut et ordonne être faites par M. Moïse Augustin Fontanieu, trésorier général de la Marine, CAOM, Série F1A, Fonds des Colonies, vol. 14, f. 130; Estat des fonds que le Roy veut et ordonne [est remis ?] au port de Rochefort par M. Jacques de Vnolles Trésorier général de La marine pour Employer aux Dépenses faites et a faire a l'acadie pour Le Service du Sa Majesté pendant La présent année 1709, CAOM, Série F1A, Fonds des Colonies, vol. 15, f. 20;

Some local Mi'kmaq actively aided the French. Subercase noted that Aboriginal people helped with the reconstruction of the fort in 1708. He told the Minister of the Marine that "Ces nouvelles luy firent prendre le party de rassembler tous les sauvages pour travailler a reparer le fort du port Royal dont les trois quarts des fortifications estoient esboulées et il a si bien menagé ces Sauvages et les habitans du pays qu'il a fait remettre ce fort en bon état et que les ouvrages qu'il a faire dureront plusieurs ans."⁵⁹ He claimed that two hundred and fifty additional people, some settlers, some Aboriginal, were living off the garrison's supplies.⁶⁰ Despite the large number of people Subercase identified, most were French. The Aboriginal people who were present likely lived around Port Royal and were part of the small group that had built relationships with some of the French settlers. So few Aboriginal people were around the fort that summer, Subercase had to wait to release an English messenger until after a sufficient number of Aboriginal people had amassed near the fort. In his mind, the garrison had to appear well protected.⁶¹ Showing the British that Port Royal was strongly defended was critical if Subercase was going to prevent another attack.

The illusion of strength, supported primarily through demonstrations of France's alliances with the region's Aboriginal peoples, was Subercase's only defence. In 1708, after a difficult winter, the governor was mortified to discover that no supplies had been

⁵⁹ Résumés des lettres du sieur de Subercase au ministre, 20, 25, 30 Dec 1708, C11D-6, ff. 226-226v. Author's translation: "This news caused him to assemble all the natives in order to work on repairing Port Royal's fort because three quarters of the fortifications were falling down and he handled the natives and settlers so well that they brought the fort back into good shape and that the work that they did will last many years."

⁶⁰ Subercase au ministre, 20 Dec 1708, C11D-6, f. 171v

⁶¹ Résumés des lettres du sieur de Subercase au ministre, 20, 25, 30 Dec 1708, C11D-6, f. 227.

sent over on the first vessel.⁶² The only thing keeping the colony afloat was the prizes captured by privateers.⁶³ At the end of 1709 Subercase complained to the minister about France's efforts to supply the colony. He lamented that no supply ship had arrived that year and ordered supplies to be sent immediately in 1710.⁶⁴ In the early days of 1710 Subercase repeated his complaints. He claimed that it had been nearly four years since Acadia had sufficient supplies from France.⁶⁵ Again, the seizures made by privateers prevented the colony from collapsing.⁶⁶

The colony was in a precarious position. Subercase dared not release the one hundred and forty English prisoners at the fort for fear that they would disclose the poor state of the colony's defences.⁶⁷ In his view, the garrison did not have enough strength to defend against the English.⁶⁸ In 1708 intelligence continued to flow from New England through the Abenaki and French privateers that hinted at plans for another attack.⁶⁹ In early 1710, prisoners brought to Port Royal by privateers claimed that the number of troops at Boston was increasing.⁷⁰

⁶² M. de Subercase au ministre, 3 Jan 1710, C11D-7, f. 36.

⁶³ M. de Subercase au ministre, 20 Dec 1708, C11D-6, f. 164v. Port Royal had a fairly extensive history of privateering, particularly at the turn of the eighteenth century. Even Saint-Castin was involved in this activity in the early eighteenth century. For a detailed discussion of this subject and a list of privateers with connections to Acadia see Armand Robichaud, "Les flibustiers de l'Acadie, corsairs ou pirates?" *Les Cahiers de la Société historique acadienne*, vol. 33 no. 1 and 2 (Mar-June, 2002), 7-32.

⁶⁴ Lettre du sieur de Subercase au ministre, 7 Dec 1709, C11D-7, ff. 16-17v.

⁶⁵ M. de Subercase au ministre, 3 Jan 1710, C11D-7, f. 36v, 46.

⁶⁶ M. de Subercase au ministre, 3 Jan 1710, C11D-7, f. 37.

⁶⁷ Résumés des lettres du sieur de Subercase au ministre, 7 Dec 1709 and 1 Jan 1710, C11D-7, f. 19v. The technology used to hold prisoners is not clear here, however, there are a number of references to dozens of people being held at the fort during the French and British regime. More research needs to be done on prisoners and hostages in the northeast during this period.

⁶⁸ Résumés des lettres du sieur de Subercase au ministre, 7 Dec 1709 and 1 Jan 1710, C11D-7, f. 26.

⁶⁹ M. de Subercase au ministre, 20 Dec 1708, C11D-6, ff. 161-161v.

⁷⁰ M. de Subercase au ministre, 3 Jan 1710, C11D-7, f. 33.

The failure of the French to adequately supply their colony had a major impact on their relationships with the Abenaki, Wulstukwiuk and Mi'kmaq. In a lettre written in early 1710, Subercase considered them "plus mortifiés que nous de ne voir pas arriver le navire du Roi."⁷¹ Unlike in previous years he believed that their support of France had diminished by half.⁷² Despite this claim, on the next page of this document, he claims to have told the region's Aboriginal people "qu'ils n'étaient pas aussi nécessaires qu'ils ce l'étaient imaginés et que toutes les grâces que vous leur faites faire sont par un principe de charité et non par aucun besoin que nous avons d'eux."⁷³ The next day he claimed to be able to muster one hundred and forty Mi'kmaq and many French settlers from Minas available for the colony's defence.⁷⁴ Whether caused by poor gift-giving practices, blatant explanations that they were not needed, or mere indifference, none of these people came to Port Royal's defence when the English appeared off the village's shores in September 1710. Despite moving its administration to Port Royal, France had done little to build a relationship with the Mi'kmaq since the War of the League of Augsburg had ended.

On 24 September 1710, the British arrived on the shores of Port Royal with forty-three ships carrying fifteen hundred troops and Aboriginal allies. Unlike earlier attempts to capture the village, which had largely been colonial affairs this attack was heavily

⁷¹ M. de Subercase au ministre, 3 Jan 1710, C11D-7, f. 50. Author's translation: "more mortified than us that the King's ship had not arrived."

⁷² M. de Subercase au ministre, 3 Jan 1710, C11D-7, f. 50-50v.

⁷³ M. de Subercase au ministre, 3 Jan 1710, C11D-7, f. 50-50v. Author's translation: "that they were not as necessary as they thought and that all the consideration given to them was given through charity and not because of a need that France had for them."

⁷⁴ Extraits des lettres de MM. de Subercase et Degoutin à M. Bégon au sujet des munitions requises par la colonie, avec l'avis donné au ministre par M. Bégon, 4 Jan 1710, C11D-7, f. 85.

supported by the English crown. Subercase feared that the British would block the fort's supply and wait the garrison out rather than attack directly.⁷⁵ He was wrong. The British wasted little time before they attacked. Unlike in 1707, Saint-Castin was not at Port Royal during the attack and there is little evidence that many Aboriginal people participated in the limited fighting.⁷⁶ Subercase capitulated seven days after the British arrived.

Historians explain why the Mi'kmaq were not present during these attacks in two related ways. John G. Reid points to the weak French presence in Mi'kma'ki to account for the lack of Mi'kmaw engagement. In his view this was principally a French and British affair.⁷⁷ William C. Wicken builds on this argument by demonstrating that the British attacked during a crucial period in the Mi'kmaw subsistence cycle. As winter approached, few Mi'kmaw men could leave their fishing weirs to defend the French village.⁷⁸ This chapter supports these arguments by emphasizing the way that France continued to direct its limited resources towards the Abenaki rather than to the Mi'kmaq.

Indeed, only a handful of Aboriginal people were likely present during the final days of French administration at Port Royal. Wicken's work shows that most of the Mi'kmaq were busy fishing for eels, which was an important part of Mi'kmaw

⁷⁵ M. de Subercase au ministre, 1 Oct 1710, C11D-7, ff. 90-90v.

⁷⁶ There is one exception to this. Correspondence from Newfoundland claimed that Subercase had seven hundred French troops and two hundred Aboriginal people at his disposal. These numbers are not supported by any additional information from the attack, making it unlikely that he had this much support in the fall of 1710. See Durand La Garenne au ministre, 6 Nov 1710, C11C-7a, f. 55.

⁷⁷ John G. Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 8.

⁷⁸ William C. Wicken, "Mi'kmaq Decisions: Antoine Tecouenemac, the Conquest, and the Treaty of Utrecht," in *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions*, John G. Reid et al., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), chap. 5

preparations for the winter.⁷⁹ Regardless of the strength of their alliance with France, this was a critical period of the year as the availability of resources during the winter was highly conditional on the weather. Because the men were catching eels, they could not fight at Port Royal.⁸⁰

Wicken's evidence focuses on the Cape Sable area of Kespukwitk and not on the Mi'kmaq living around Port Royal. With much more at stake, and a positive relationship with some of the effected French settlers, the Mi'kmaq living close to Port Royal likely participated in this event. Like their minimal presence in the parish records, their numbers were likely so small as to render them insignificant in official accounts.

Combining the documentary and archaeological records suggests that the Mi'kmaq were at Port Royal in September and October 1710. The journal of Francis Nicholson, the British commander, claims that British troops engaged French settlers and Aboriginal people in the area around "Allen's Mill."⁸¹ A Mi'kmaw fishery along the Lequille River, which enters the Annapolis Basin just below the fort, was located near this mill.⁸² Although it is impossible to be certain that the Mi'kmaq were at any of the sieges (they could have fled), their closer proximity to Port Royal, connections with French settlers, and their custom of fishing for eels near the fort suggests that the attack likely had serious consequences for the Port Royal Mi'kmaq. These Mi'kmaq had personal and economic relationships, as well as other material interests, to defend.


⁷⁹ Wicken, "Mi'kmaq Decisions: Antoine Tecouenemac, the Conquest, and the Treaty of Utrecht," 92.

⁸⁰ Wicken, "Mi'kmaq Decisions: Antoine Tecouenemac, the Conquest, and the Treaty of Utrecht," 90, 94.

⁸¹ Nicholson's Journal during the siege of 1710, 6 Nov 1710, NSARM, RG1-6 No. 4.

⁸² Benjamin C. Pentz, "A River Runs Through It: An Archaeological Survey of the Upper Mersey River and Allains River in Southwest Nova Scotia," (MA thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2008), 128-135. For more on this location see the discussion about the Mi'kmaq at Port Royal in chapter one.

Map 3.1: Port Royal in the Eighteenth Century⁸³



For the most part, the 1710 British siege of Port Royal was a European event.

France had poorly invested in Acadia and was without the defences necessary to protect

⁸³ Plan du cours de la Rivière Dauphine et du Port Royal, 1710, Nova Scotia Archives and Research Management (NSARM), 2.5.1 1710; Plan of the River of Annapolis Royal in Nova Scotia. Based on Map of the River Annapolis Royal surveyed in the year 1733. Corrections from other surveys of 1753, [1758], Library and Archives Canada (LAC), NMC18182.

the fort. Resources were focussed on maintaining the relationship with the Abenaki, whose territorial stake protected the St. Lawrence from the northward encroachment of New England settlers. The French relationship with the Mi'kmaq remained tenuous. With their population growing more slowly than the French settlers, the Mi'kmaq were hardly in a position to come to France's defence. The Mi'kmaq around Port Royal, however, were in a more precarious position. When the British attacked, these people had fewer options than the communities at Cape Sable and La Hève. They could not ignore the conflict. They could either flee, leaving their preparations for winter, or join in France's defence. The little evidence available suggests that at least some of them stayed to fight.

Immediate Aftermath of the Fall of Port Royal

It is unlikely that anyone at the time saw the fall of the French fort as permanent. Although Port Royal had surrendered, France and England were still at war and imperial tensions were higher than they had ever been; it would be another three years before a peace was finalized. Brenda Dunn observes, however, that "this was the first time that an occupying force had been put in place" after France had been defeated.⁸⁴ Unlike earlier defeats, the British would continue to govern the region after its fall. Almost immediately the occupying troops named the fort and town after the reigning monarch, Queen Anne. From this point, Port Royal was known as Annapolis Royal. The decision to maintain a military garrison at Annapolis Royal divided Mi'kma'ki between the French and British, forcing the Mi'kmaq to navigate between the two empires.

⁸⁴ Brenda Dunn, *A History of Port Royal/Annapolis Royal, 1605-1800*, (Halifax: Nimbus Publishing, 2004), 86.

The British believed the capture of Port Royal included not only the defeat of the French but also the Mi'kmaq. Immediately following the British seizure of the French fort, Samuel Vetch, the new British commander, issued notification that the region's inhabitants – both French and Mi'kmaq – were forbidden from fighting with British subjects on both land and sea and trafficking with French or Aboriginal people living beyond Annapolis Royal's jurisdiction. Trade and commerce were restricted to the area around Annapolis Royal. Although the Mi'kmaq had little to do with the conflict, the British clearly signalled to the Mi'kmaq and French settlers that they sought to control all of the people living around the fort.⁸⁵

The Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq had to navigate between British and French interests to use their land and resources. Much like the Huron-Wendat who made peace in Montreal just before the city's capitulation in 1760, the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq sought reconciliation following the capture of Port Royal. Two people who lived near Annapolis asked Vetch for the freedom to trade under conditions similar to those that had existed when the French were in power.⁸⁶ Delegates from La Hève and Cape Sable came to make peace in February and March. They met with Charles Hobby, the fort's commander-in-chief. A delegate from La Hève claimed:

the Indians understood that the Fort of *Port-Royal* was taken, they all Assembled together, and concluded among themselves, that now the *English* had Conquered the Country, they were resolv'd hence forward to offer no Violence to any of the *English*, unless they first began with them and finding we are not disposed to maintain Hostilities with them, they are come to Mediate an Accommodation.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ *Boston News-Letter*, 30 Oct 1710, 9-10.

⁸⁶ Vetch to Dartmouth, n.d. NSARM, RG1-5, 17.

⁸⁷ *Boston News-Letter*, 19 March 1711, 1.

After receiving gifts, the delegate left with the goal of bringing news of the amity to other communities. Just over a week later, a man and his son arrived from Cape Sable to enquire about the reconciliation. According to the British, the man and his son left this meeting with the intention of drawing the Mi'kmaq together to sign "Articles of Peace."⁸⁸ Although a larger peace was not made at this time, these three meetings suggest that Mi'kmaw families in Kespukwitk desired amity.

Vetch was not present during the last two negotiations, and was sceptical of the Mi'kmaw desire for peace. He believed, that their appeal reflected their fear that the British would successfully take Canada. Once they learned that the Walker expedition, which had been sent to capture Quebec, had met with disaster off the north shore of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, he expected the Mi'kmaq to turn against the British.⁸⁹

Vetch was right about the outbreak of hostilities but wrong about their cause. The conflict in the early summer of 1711 was strongly influenced by the French. Although Port Royal had been captured, France and England remained at war. France continued to treat the area as it had in earlier years, planning to retake the fort. In 1711, France continued to produce budgets for the colony that included funds to reinforce the fortifications at Port Royal and the payment of colonial administrators.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ *Boston News-Letter*, 19 March 1711, 1-2.

⁸⁹ Vetch to Dartmouth, n.d. NSARM, RG1-5, 17. It is unclear exactly when this letter was written. The letter makes reference to the destruction of much of Walker's fleet along the north shore of the St. Lawrence at the end of the summer of 1711. If the letter was written later in 1711, it completely ignores the battle of Bloody Creek (discussed later in this chapter) and other acts of resistance against the English. There is little evidence explaining where, or how, exactly this document fits into the story. That the Mi'kmaq around Port Royal sought to make peace before the end of the War of Spanish Succession, however, suggests that they were interested in maintaining their autonomy and willing to work with the new occupants of the garrison at Annapolis Royal. It also suggests that some people in the English garrison could distinguish between Abenaki and Mi'kmaw resistance.

⁹⁰ Fonds nécessaires pour les dépenses de l'Acadie pendant l'année 1711, LAC, MG1-F1A-17, f. 18.

In the months immediately following the attacks Beauharnois, the Intendant of the Marine at Rochefort and LaRochelle, drafted a plan to retake the fort. The Mi'kmaq were to play an important part. He suggested that Beaubassin be used as a staging ground for French and Mi'kmaw troops. Responsibility for rallying the Mi'kmaq fell to Gaulin, the only missionary to the Mi'kmaq. Michel Leneuf de la Vallière de Beaubassin, whose father was briefly the governor of Acadia in the early 1680s, was to be the commander of the expedition and ensure that the Mi'kmaq were properly supplied. Beauharnois suggested that the Mi'kmaq be outfitted with two hundred livres of powder, three hundred livres of lead, one hundred livres of tobacco, twenty muskets, ten barrels of maize, and two barrels of lard.⁹¹ These gifts were small compared to previous years' distribution, amounting to only about ten percent of the powder, twenty-five percent of the tobacco, and thirty percent of the muskets given to Aboriginal people in 1694.⁹² It was eleven percent of the powder, ten percent of the lead, and sixty-six percent of the muskets distributed in 1723, the first year after the conquest with an itemized list of gifts.⁹³ Given the relative unimportance of the Mi'kmaq to the French up until that point and the low quantity of gifts offered, it seems unlikely that Beauharnois's plan would have met with success.

Subercase had a more ill-conceived plan. He felt that if France did not act soon, the French settlers and Mi'kmaq would be less willing to support them and the British

⁹¹ *Projet d'un armement pour reprendre l'Acadie, joint à la lettre de M. de Beauharnois, 13 Jan 1711, C11D-7, ff. 127-127v.*

⁹² *Villebon to Count Pontchartrain, Memoir on Fort Pemaquid, 20 Aug 1694, Webster, 71.*

⁹³ *M. de Mézy rend compte au ministre de l'Etat des vivres, habillement, magasins et des fonds, 20 Nov 1723, C11B-6, ff. 246-250.*

would soon start to try to win over both populations.⁹⁴ A handful of other plans were proposed that involved rebuilding the colony closer to Aboriginal communities and called for the construction of a new French stronghold at La Hève, Musquidoboit, or Chebucto.⁹⁵ Like Port Royal, each of these places was near a Mi'kmaw summer village and each had already been suggested as a site for a Catholic mission before the conquest. None of these places were seriously considered when France re-established its administration at Port Royal at the beginning of the century. Only when Acadia was lost did they fully realize the importance of these places. In the end, none of these proposals were followed; rather resistance to the British occupation of Port Royal was led by Saint-Castin, the French settlers and the Abenaki.

In 1711 Vaudreuil appointed Saint-Castin as the commander for all of Acadia.⁹⁶ In this capacity, at the head of primarily Abenaki troops, he led the French resistance until the end of the War of Spanish Succession in 1713. It was not long after Saint-Castin's return from Canada, where he had brought the news of Port Royal's defeat to the French Governor-General that tensions began to pick up again.

Although the Mi'kmaq and the French settlers had initially tried to make peace, heavy demands on the local population and the death of nearly three hundred soldiers in the garrison made resistance more likely.⁹⁷ The sentiments of the local French settlers

⁹⁴ *Projet d'un armement pour reprendre l'Acadie*, joint à la lettre de M. de Beauharnois, 7 Feb 1711, C11D-7, ff. 135-136v.

⁹⁵ *Mémoire sur l'importance de reprendre l'Acadie*, 1711, C11D-7, f. 113; *Mémoire sur l'importance de reprendre l'Acadie*, 1711, C11D-7, ff. 114v-115; *Mémoire sur l'Acadie*, around 1711, C11D-7, ff. 139-143v.

⁹⁶ *Nomination, par M. De Vaudreuil, du baron de Saint-Castin, commandant de Pentagouet, avec la charge du commandant en pied dans les troupes*, 1 Jan 1711, C11D-7, ff. 122-123v.

⁹⁷ *Résumé de la lettre du sieur Gaulin, missionnaire*, 5 Sept 1711, C11D-7, ff. 177-178.

summarize these feelings well. Settlers complained that they were being treated poorly by the British governor.⁹⁸ By mid-June resistance to the British was growing.⁹⁹ Vetch reported that Aboriginal people had recently begun pillaging and robbing French settlers who cut wood for the garrison.¹⁰⁰ The situation was so bad that he had asked Major John Livingston, his brother-in-law from New York, to raise a company of Haudenosaunee to help protect the garrison.¹⁰¹

Shortly after Vetch wrote his request, about forty Abenaki attacked between sixty and eighty British soldiers on Saint-Castin's orders. They killed eighteen men, including two officers, and wounded ten; the rest were taken captive.¹⁰² This event, known as the 'Battle of Bloody Creek,' marks the only serious attempt to counter the British presence at Annapolis Royal before the end of the War of Spanish Succession.

It is nearly impossible to discern why the British troops had been sent out of the fort. According to British sources, they were sent to cut wood because the French settlers had been scared off the task by Aboriginal threats;¹⁰³ from the French perspective the troops were sent to attack Aboriginal people and settlers who were blocking the fort's supplies.¹⁰⁴ Both perspectives have merit. Vetch complained that "we are so entirely

⁹⁸ Copie d'une lettre écrite par les principaux habitants de Port-Royal à M. de Vaudreuil, 13 Nov 1710, C11D-7, ff. 98-99v.

⁹⁹ Vetch to Captain Pidgeon, 9 June 1711, NSARM, RG1-8, 1.

¹⁰⁰ Vetch to Dartmouth, 18 June 1711, NSARM, RG1-7.5, 21. In his discussion of the Battle of Bloody Creek, Vetch claims that the expedition went up the river with too much confidence because they had never met with much resistance before.

¹⁰¹ Vetch to Dartmouth, 14 June 1711, NSARM, RG1-7.5, 20; Vetch to Hill, 11 Sept 1711, NSARM, RG1-8, 13.

¹⁰² Vetch to Dartmouth, 18 June 1711, NSARM, RG1-7.5, 21.

¹⁰³ Vetch to Dartmouth, 18 June 1711, NSARM, RG1-7.5, 21.

¹⁰⁴ Résumé de la lettre du sieur Gaulin, 5 Sept 1711, C11D-7, ff. 177-180v; Lettre de M. Christophe Cahouet au ministre au sujet de la situation de l'Acadie, 20 July 1711, C11D-7, f. 173v.

blocked up by the Indians that we cannot get one stick of wood to burn.”¹⁰⁵ Under these constrained circumstances it is likely that the British soldiers were sent to both procure wood and encourage the French settlers to do this for them.

There is no evidence that the Mi’kmaq participated in the Battle of Bloody Creek. Given Vetch’s letter indicating that the Mi’kmaq living around Port Royal were prepared for peace and that the attack was carried out by the Abenaki, it is reasonable to suggest that these attacks were entirely directed by Saint-Castin. His position in both French and Abenaki society, and the Abenaki history of tensions with the British, would have likely provided him with the influence necessary to draw them into this conflict.

After the success at Bloody Creek, however, some Mi’kmaq began to participate in the fighting. That autumn, three New England fishing vessels were captured by the Mi’kmaq off Cape Sable and handed over to Gaulin.¹⁰⁶ Around the same time, a French corsair supplied the people living at Cape Sable with eighty barrels of flour, encouraging them to side with France and attack the New England fisheries.¹⁰⁷ This is the only time between 1710 and 1713 that the Kespukwitk Mi’kmaq were documented attacking the English.

Further north, in Sipekne’katikik, Gaulin and Saint-Castin made preparations to retake Port Royal. Gaulin went to Plaisance, which was still controlled by the French, for supplies and returned with twelve hundred pounds of powder, fourteen hundred musket balls, ten thousand musket flints, and ten rifles.¹⁰⁸ Though still less than the usual

¹⁰⁵ Vetch to Dartmouth, 18 June 1711, NSARM, RG1-7.5, 21.

¹⁰⁶ Résumé d'une lettre du sieur Degoutin au ministre, 17 Nov 1711, C11D-7, ff. 183v.

¹⁰⁷ Résumé d'une lettre du sieur Degoutin au ministre, 17 Nov 1711, C11D-7, f. 183v.

¹⁰⁸ Résumé de la lettre du sieur Gaulin, 5 Sept 1711, C11D-7, f. 179v.

amount of gifts, this was much more in keeping with French gift-giving practices than earlier plans to re-take the colony. Gifts had also been sent into the region from Canada through the Tantramar Marshes.¹⁰⁹ In total Gaulin claimed to have about two hundred Aboriginal people and French settlers prepared to attack and blockade Annapolis.¹¹⁰

They had little chance of success. As Naomi Griffiths notes, even with the aid of the entire French population, such a siege was bound for failure without heavy artillery.¹¹¹ There were also larger problems. Although Gaulin claimed to have rallied two hundred people to fight for France, France's broader alliances fell through. The Abenaki at St. François and Becancour, for example, were unwilling to come to Port Royal's defence despite their close relationship with the crown and connection to the region.¹¹² France's defeat at Port Royal had softened Aboriginal support in the St. Lawrence valley. For all of France's effort, they continued to have problems supplying the region.¹¹³ In 1713, on the eve of peace, Vaudreuil complained that despite the minister's orders, the Intendant, Bégon, would not approve the funds necessary for gift giving in Mi'kma'ki.¹¹⁴ Like earlier, France was unable to adequately muster enough support to retake its former colonial capital.

¹⁰⁹ Mémoire sur le Canada. Fonds, 1711, C11A-31, f. 200v

¹¹⁰ Résumé de la lettre du sieur Gaulin, 5 Sept 1711, C11D-7, ff. 178v-179.

¹¹¹ Griffiths, 247-248.

¹¹² Lettre de Ramezay au ministre, 25 Oct 1710, C11A-31, f. 168; Lettre de Vaudreuil au ministre, 3 Nov 1710, C11A-31, f. 49; Lettre de Vaudreuil au ministre, 25 Apr 1711, C11A-32, ff. 24-31v; Lettre de Vaudreuil au ministre, 25 Oct 1711, C11A-32, f. 42.

¹¹³ Lettre de Vaudreuil au ministre avec commentaires dans la marge, 6 Nov 1712, C11A-33, ff. 63v-64

¹¹⁴ Lettre de Vaudreuil au ministre, 15 May 1713, C11A-34, ff. 37v-38. Bégon was later chastised for not adequately supplying Saint-Castin. The Minister of Marine wrote to him: "Qu'ayant voulu envoyer le Sieur de St Castin aux Abenakis, vous refusâtes de fournir les vivres et les canots que cet officier demandait pour ce voyage. Ce qui a donné le temps aux Anglois d'avoir des pourparlers avec ces sauvages, que la présence du dit Sieur de St Castin aurait empêché." See Lettre du ministre à monsieur Bégon, 10 July 1715, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 3, 12.

After 1711, there were no major incidents before the peace at Utrecht. British defences were significantly strengthened over the winter. In the autumn of 1711, the garrison was reinforced by the remnants of the failed Walker expedition. In the spring the Haudenosaunee recruits arrived with Major Livingston and patrolled the area around the fort. Rumours had also crossed the Atlantic that peace was soon to be reached in Europe, bringing an end to the War of Spanish Succession. Even in New England, signs suggested that the war was nearly over. Early in the new year New England's Governor Dudley instructed Captain Cyprien Southack to sail up the Mi'kma'ki coast making peace with all of the French and Aboriginal people he met along the shores of what was to be Nova Scotia. Perhaps more importantly, Southack was also instructed to return Aboriginal captives.¹¹⁵ The groundwork was being laid for peace.¹¹⁶

The Treaty of Utrecht and its Immediate Aftermath

The War of Spanish Succession ended on 11 April 1713 with the signing of the Treaties of Utrecht. The treaty cited most frequently by North American historians was just one of a series of treaties signed at Utrecht. Among others, Spain, Austria and the Rhenish states were part of the negotiations and signed other treaties.¹¹⁷ The Anglo-French treaty ceded Acadia and Newfoundland to the British crown, though France continued to occupy Île Royale (Unama'kik) and Île St-Jean (Epekwitk) and maintained fishing rights off Newfoundland. Despite this important geopolitical shift, which had considerable implications for the Mi'kmaq, no Aboriginal society was included in these

¹¹⁵ Instructions for Capt Cyprien Southack, 11 Mar 1712, CO 217-2, f. 244.

¹¹⁶ Griffiths, 247-250.

¹¹⁷ Griffiths, 252. For a copy of the treaty see Henri Vast, ed., *Les Grands Traités du Règne de Louis XIV*, vol. 3, (Paris: Alphonse Picard et fils, 1899), 68-86.

negotiations. Their absence from treaty discussions led to many tensions over the coming decades.

The Mi'kmaq, Wulstukwiuk and Abenaki were shocked to learn that France had ceded their land to Britain. The treaty's twelfth and thirteenth articles split Mi'kma'ki into French and British jurisdictions. The twelfth article ceded all of Acadia to Britain, while the thirteenth gave France Cape Breton and Île St-Jean. For the Mi'kmaq this meant that Britain claimed Kespukwitk, Sipekne'katikik, Eski'kewaq, Piktukewaq, and Sikniktewaq as Nova Scotia, while France continued to have jurisdiction over Unama'kik, Epekwitk, and Kespe'kewaq. European definitions of the land threatened to divide the Mi'kmaq.

The British also claimed all of the land from the Kennebec to the top of the Bay of Fundy.¹¹⁸ For the Abenaki and Wulstukwiuk, this meant that they were no longer on the northern frontier of British claims. Although still a borderland of sorts, the coastal colonies that lay on either side of their territory (Maine and Nova Scotia) were now part of the British Empire. Although they were left out of the negotiations and had never ceded their land to either France or England prior to 1713, Britain tried to enforce the provisions of the treaty on the region's Aboriginal peoples.

Two additional articles weighed heavily on northeastern Aboriginal peoples during the decades following the conquest. The fourteenth article provided one year for French subjects to relocate to French-held territory. Those who chose to remain were considered British subjects and, if Catholic, they could practice their religion to the extent

¹¹⁸ Board of Trade to the Duke of Bedford, 27 July 1749, CO 217-32, ff. 74-88; Mascarene to the Lords for Trade and Plantations, 6 June 1749, CO 217-32, f. 89.

allowed in Britain. Because of the language of submission that French administrators used when referring to the Mi'kmaq, it is not surprising that the English assumed that this applied to the region's Aboriginal peoples as well. From the English perspective, France had total sovereignty over the region and its people before the conquest. With this mindset, the fourteenth article created a somewhat fragile framework through which the British could claim the Mi'kmaq and others as subjects under its crown.¹¹⁹

The fifteenth article posed a more immediate problem. This article stated that French subjects (particularly those in Canada) were not to molest the Haudenosaunee or other English allies or subjects and reciprocally that English subjects were not to disturb French allies or subjects.¹²⁰ Even if the fourteenth article did not apply and the Mi'kmaq were not to be considered as British subjects, as France's allies this clause extended the treaty's provisions over the Mi'kmaq. Both Britain and France sought to use this provision to secure their claims in the region, pitting the Mi'kmaq – the only people who truly occupied this space – in a delicate position between European empires.

From the French perspective the article threatened their alliance with the Mi'kmaq. With the majority of the Mi'kmaq living on land claimed by the British, France risked losing all Aboriginal support in the region if Britain could establish a positive relationship. Although French officials never articulated their perspective to the Mi'kmaq, they were asked by the crown to encourage the Mi'kmaq to relocate to

¹¹⁹ For a more detailed discussion of the differing ways that submission to the crown was understood by the British and Mi'kmaq see Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 110-116.

¹²⁰ Extrait du Traité de Paix Conclue à Utrecht le 11 Avril 1713, C11A-43, ff. 378v-379.

Unama'kik.¹²¹ France's failure at establishing permanent mission villages before the conquest demonstrates that this policy was unlikely to succeed. That it was even proposed reveals that the French were aware of the treaty's geopolitical consequences. If the Mi'kmaq were not all assembled together on territory claimed by France, they were vulnerable to British attempts to win their allegiance, just like the situation in Wabanakia.

The British used this article as a tool to encourage the French to rein in Mi'kmaw resistance. In the spring of 1714, several Mi'kmaq from Richibucto captured a British trading vessel at Beaubassin. Although the local French settlers and some of the Mi'kmaq from around Beaubassin intervened, the merchant, John Adams, lost about £70 worth of goods.¹²² Thomas Caulfeild, the lieutenant-governor at Annapolis Royal, sent a letter to Vaudreuil describing the Mi'kmaw attack as a breach of Utrecht. In his mind, their interference with British trade was caused by the French and, therefore, needed to be solved by the French. He specifically addressed the Mi'kmaw claim that they knew of neither the treaty nor their place in it.¹²³ Whether they were subjects of France or England, a point that remained to be clarified over the following decades, Caulfeild saw the Treaty of Utrecht as applying to these people.

The extension of Utrecht over the Mi'kmaw communities continued throughout the British regime. In 1743 an official at Whitehall complained that Mi'kmaw

¹²¹ Lettre du Ministre au Sieur Baron de Saint-Castin, 8 April 1713, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 559-560.

¹²² Caulfeild to Nicholson, n.d. 1714, in Archibald M. MacMechan, ed, *Nova Scotia Archives II: A Calendar of two letter-books and one commission-book in the possession of the government of Nova Scotia, 1713-1741*, (Halifax, 1900), 6-8.

¹²³ Caulfeild to Vaudreuil, 7 May 1714, in MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives II*, 5. According to MacMechan Caulfeild is the correct spelling of Thomas Caulfeild's name. Despite many nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians spelling the name Caulfield, MacMechan claims that it never appears this way in the original letter books.

interference in the British fishery was a violation of the treaty.¹²⁴ Even as late as 1762 – after the British had engaged in a series of treaties with the Mi'kmaq in an attempt to establish rule in Nova Scotia – they continued to see Mi'kmaw sovereignty as subsumed through French negotiations at Utrecht. While arguing that the Mi'kmaq could make no further claims against the British crown once these treaties were concluded, Jonathan Belcher, the lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia, effectively conveyed British reasoning: “no other Claim can be made by the Indians in this Province, either by Treaties or long possession... since the French derived their Title from the Indians, and the French ceded their Title to the English under the Treaty of Utrecht.”¹²⁵ This was the same language used three decades later by British officials when the Huron-Wendat claimed the seigneurial rights to Sillery. The power of these European agreements weighed heavily on Aboriginal communities in the northeast.

Unlike during the fall of Canada, and despite the belief that the Mi'kmaq, Wulstukwiuk, and Abenaki people now fell under the British crown, British authorities in both Annapolis Royal and Boston had little idea how to engage with these people as a new sovereign power. As a consequence, the Mi'kmaq were more-or-less ignored as a people with a stake in the region.

A number of Abenaki and Wulstukwiuk leaders approached the British to make peace in July 1713. Surprisingly, Mi'kma'ki rather than Wulstukwik or Wabanakia was one of the key places emphasized, and yet the Mi'kmaq were not represented in the discussions. When the exchange of captives was discussed, for example, the Abenaki

¹²⁴ Bluden to their excellencies the Lord Justices, 23 Aug 1743, CO 217-31 f. 179-183v.

¹²⁵ Belcher to the Lords for Trade and Plantations, 2 July 1762, CO 217-19, f. 23.

brought in three New England captives, while New England released fifteen Mi'kmaq, nine to Cape Sable and six to Annapolis Royal.¹²⁶ During the negotiations the New England governor emphasized to the delegates the impact of Utrecht on the region:

In former Warrs twenty or thirty years ago what Lands and ffortifications wee then took from the ffrench King wee returned them againe, but now all that we have got from him, ww hold it... We have taken Port Royal and we keep it, We demanded Nienis [Minas] and Seneclica [Chignecto?] and all Cape Sables and he hath given it us... Noe more ffrench are to live in those places unless they becom Subjects to the Crown of Great Britain.¹²⁷

Although the Mi'kmaq were not involved in treaty negotiations, the land transfer at Utrecht made Mi'kma'ki a central component. That a treaty was arranged between these groups in the months following the European agreement, and that one was not negotiated with the Mi'kmaq for nearly a decade-and-a-half later, clearly shows the distance that remained to be bridged between the Mi'kmaq and the British.

After 1713, the British began to build a relationship with the Mi'kmaq from scratch. The British had two goals: the conversion of the Mi'kmaq to Protestantism and the establishment of commerce.¹²⁸ In the closing days of that year, Nicholson probed the quality of trade with the Mi'kmaq. It was imperative for him that a relationship be struck that would further British goals in the region. Vetch echoed this desire a year later, fearing that without a strong British supply of goods, the Mi'kmaq would continue trading with the French.¹²⁹ There was no playbook. Nicholson needed to learn about the Mi'kmaq to form policies that would direct British engagement with these people.

¹²⁶ Sachems of the Indians, unsigned letter, 13 July 1713, in *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, vol. 23, 39.

¹²⁷ Documents related to the 1713 Treaty with the Eastern Indians, 14 July 1713, in *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, vol. 23, 41-42.

¹²⁸ Geoffrey Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign against the Peoples of Acadia*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 49-52, 65-66.

¹²⁹ Vetch to the Board of Trade, 24 Nov 1714, CO 217-1, f. 97-97v.

Unlike a half-century later when William Johnson brought a clearer sense of direction to the task of engaging France's former Aboriginal allies along the St. Lawrence, the early days at Port Royal involved a significant amount of uncertainty.¹³⁰

Initial British attempts to interact with Aboriginal people failed. When one British official asked Jean Loyard, a Jesuit living along the Saint John valley, why Aboriginal peoples chose to trade at the mouth of that river rather than Annapolis Royal, Loyard replied that they found the prices too high and chose to avoid the new administrative centre of Nova Scotia.¹³¹ Over the following decades, this would be a recurring problem. Although the British made many attempts, they never fully succeeded in winning the Mi'kmaq over or convincing them that they had sovereign power over Mi'kma'ki.

The situation was complicated by the presence of the French settlers. As soon as Port Royal had fallen, discussion began about how to effectively govern Nova Scotia. For many British administrators, the French settlers and the Mi'kmaq could not be governed together. As early as the autumn of 1710, British officials believed that to achieve Mi'kmaq conversion to Protestantism and political support for the British, the French had to be completely removed.¹³² The plan for removal temporarily fell by the wayside and the British initially sought oaths of allegiance from both the French settlers

¹³⁰ Nicholson to Caufeild, 15 Nov 1713, CO 217-1, f.66.

¹³¹ Loyard à ?, 8 April 1714, CO 217-1, f. 362.

¹³² Memorial of the Council of War relative to the Settlement of Annapolis Royal, 14 Oct 1710, CO 217-1, ff. 116-7. This was coupled by threats from Francis Nicholson that the French settlers would be held accountable for any French and Aboriginal attacks on New England or if the New England captives that were being held in Canada – particularly Eunice Williams – were not swiftly released. See Lettre du General Nicholson et autres a Monsieur de Vaudreuil, 11 Oct 1710, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 2, 524; Original copies of this correspondence can be found in Lettre de Vaudreuil à Nicholson, 14 Jan 1711, C11A-31, ff. 121-125v; Lettre de Nicholson à Vaudreuil, 11 Oct 1710, C11A-31, ff. 129-131v.

and the Mi'kmaq in Sipekne'katikik and Sikniktewaq.¹³³ They also requested that the French settlers at Annapolis Royal take the oath, but it is unclear whether they also sought an oath from the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq. All of these people, except some of the settlers at Annapolis, refused to pledge allegiance to the British crown.

In 1714 Loyard sent a letter from the Saint John River to Annapolis Royal outlining why the Wulstukwiuk had refused to take the oath. These people did not see the outcome of the War of Spanish Succession as final and they sought to maintain their place between European empires.¹³⁴ After nearly two decades of fighting between France and Britain, they were reluctant to choose one side or the other when they could continue to interact with both. The Mi'kmaq probably also wished to avoid the pitfalls of partisanship.

British demands were rendered much clearer when they sought an oath of allegiance from the Abenaki at Pentagouet. There, the Jesuit missionary, Pierre de la Chasse, recorded what the crown envisioned for their future relationship as well as the Abenaki's response to this vision:

1. De se trouver à La proclamation du Prince George Leur nouveau Roy
2. De Luy prester sermont de fidelité
3. D'aller desormais en traite au Port Royal
4. D'avoir un magazin qu'on Leur placeroit ou ils voudroient
5. De n'estre pas plus gesnez que quand Le roy du France estoit maistre de l'acadie
6. Qu'on Leur feroit bon marché et au prix de Baston pour Les encourager
7. Que Les anglois s'establiroient parmy eux et que tous vivoient en paix et union
8. Qu'ils fissent Leurs plaintes et qu'on Leur rendroit Justice, par exemple sur Leurs gens perdus

¹³³ Lettre de Bégon au ministre, 25 Sept 1715, C11A-35, f. 110v.

¹³⁴ Loyard à ?, 8 April 1714, CO 217-1, f. 362.

9. Qu'on Leur Laisseroit toujours La Liberté sur Leur Relligion.¹³⁵

Three Penobscot leaders, 8e'nanghenon, 8n8de'ganba8in, and K8erebinn8it, responded to these demands in the same way as the people along the Saint John River. They acknowledged all kings with interests in the region, but sought to favour none. Their response to the second point adequately summarized their sentiment: “Je ne veux point prester serment de fidelité a personne; le François par exemple n'est pas mon Roy. Il est mon Père parcequ'il m'instruit. Jay mes roys naturels et mes gouverneurs. Mes chefs et mes anciens.”¹³⁶ It was clear that the leaders in this community saw themselves as autonomous and sovereign. Despite the political role assumed by French missionaries, the Abenaki and Wulstukwiuk did not see the missions as European political spaces. Although we do not know what the Mi'kmaq said to British officials when asked for a response to the oath, it seems likely that their words were similar to their Wulstukwiuk and Abenaki allies. For all three Aboriginal societies, Utrecht was not understood as an agreement that affected their status in the region.

Conclusion

These Wulstukwiuk and Abenaki views encapsulated later Mi'kmaw responses.

But Mi'kmaw reaction to the treaty, and to the more permanent establishment of a British

¹³⁵ Messieurs Button et Capon Commissaire,...parler aux Sauvages de Pentagouet..., 1 April 1715, CO 217-1, f. 364. Author's translation: “1. To be present at the proclamation of Prince George, their new king; 2. To take an oath of fidelity to him; 3. To trade henceforth at Port Royal; 4. To have a storehouse placed wherever they would like; 5. To have the same degree of freedom as when the king of France ruled Acadia; 6. The English will trade fairly and at the same price as Boston to encourage trade; 7. That the English will establish themselves among them and they will live together in peace and harmony; 8. That they will listen to their complaints and render justice, for example on their lost [captured?] people; 9. They will always be given the freedom of religion.”

¹³⁶ Messieurs Button et Capon Commissaire,...parler aux Sauvages de Pentagouet..., 1 April 1715, CO 217-1, f. 364v. Author's translation: “I do not at all want to take an oath of allegiance to anyone; the frenchman, for example, is not my king. He is my father because he instructs me. I have my natural kings and my governors; my chiefs and elders.”

military presence, does not appear in the documents until 1714, when those who wanted to remain under the King of France were to have left British territory. Discussions about European claims to land in the New World had been taking place for nearly two centuries, but they had never before had serious ramifications in Mi'kma'ki. For the first time, the Mi'kmaq were forced to engage with the claims to their land made by men in Europe. With Mi'kma'ki divided between the French and British, and more open to New England traders and fishers, the Mi'kmaq could no longer avoid engaging with European empires.

Chapter Four: Mi'kma'ki Divided: The Mi'kmaq Respond to French and English Claims on their Land

The fall of Port Royal brought the conflict over Wabanakia to Mi'kma'ki. For the first time since European fishers began visiting its shores, Mi'kma'ki's political geography underwent a significant reorientation. The tensions between the English and French moved directly onto Mi'kmaw soil. With Port Royal in British hands, the French built a new stronghold at Louisbourg in Unama'kik. European claims on Mi'kmaw land threatened to divide Mi'kma'ki and the relationships that knit it together.

Up until 1710 the Mi'kmaq had been on the periphery of European claims in North America, but they were now drawn into the heart of French-English conflict. Like the Abenaki, the Mi'kmaq made it clear that although they had fought alongside the French in the past, they were not subject to foreign control. This autonomy from Europeans created the possibility for a peaceful solution whereby both Britain and France could build a relationship with the Mi'kmaq and maintain their limited presence on Mi'kmaw land. The British, however, refused to take Mi'kmaw claims of independence seriously. Their policies for building a constructive relationship were only successful on the local level and were often based on fear and intimidation. Once the French had re-established themselves at Louisbourg around 1717, the Mi'kmaw-French alliance developed in a pattern strikingly similar to the French and Abenaki relationship during the 1690s and 1700s.

Some scholars who have studied this period consider the Mi'kmaw-French relationship before the conquest strong, and see the Mi'kmaq as auxiliaries in the fight

against the British once Port Royal was captured.¹ Even those who emphasize Mi'kmaw autonomy tend to place the Mi'kmaq in a borderland between French and British interests, playing one side off of the other.² These categories of analysis are Eurocentric and neglect Mi'kmaw agendas and agency. The work of Micheline Dumont Johnson demonstrates the power of European definitions in determining the historian's gaze: "Le phénomène de la guerre des Abénakis se reproduit ici avec une remarquable ressemblance, avec cette différence cependant qu'on se trouve cette fois non pas dans un territoire contesté, mais dans un région clairement cédée aux Anglais lors du Traité d'Utrecht."³ For most of these scholars Mi'kma'ki had ceased to exist by 1710.

This chapter takes Mi'kma'ki as its central focus, not as a borderland between two European empires, but rather a territory that was at risk of being ripped apart by France and Britain. With two empires aggressively claiming Mi'kma'ki as either Acadia or Nova Scotia, Mi'kmaw communities were left to negotiate between competing European conceptions of territory. Rather than capitalizing on their position in between, the Mi'kmaq were often forced into making pragmatic decisions. Local populations tried to live peaceful lives with their European neighbours, regardless of whether they were French or British, while more distant communities, generally located in Kespe'kewaq and Sikniktewaq, maintained their distance from European powers. The dynamics among

¹ Patricia Nietfeld, *Determinants of Aboriginal Micmac Political Structure*, (PhD diss. University of New Mexico, 1981), 445; Olive P. Dickason, *Louisbourg and the Indians: A Study in Imperial Race Relations, 1713-1760*, (Ottawa: National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1976), chap. 1.

² L.F.S. Upton, *Micmacs and Colonists: Indian-White Relations in the Maritimes, 1713-1867*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1979), 31; Olive P. Dickason, "Amerindians between French and English in Nova Scotia," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal*, vol. 10, no. 4 (1986), 31-56.

³ Micheline Dumont Johnson, *Apôtres ou Agitateurs: la France missionnaire en Acadie*, (Trois-Rivières : Boréal Express, 1970), 118.

these local, district and regional relationships shaped and defined how the Mi'kmaq, French and British interacted in the years following the conquest.

This did not mean, however, that the Mi'kmaq were divided. Stephen Patterson asserts that the Mi'kmaq did not have an over-arching political system governing decision-making during this period.⁴ Although they came together to discuss important decisions, Patterson believes these meetings were for consultation and not deciding on common policy. Patterson's emphasis on the variability of local decision-making is correct, but this does not mean that the Mi'kmaq did not share a common political identity. Maurice Basque provides a useful framework for understanding Mi'kmaq politics. His work on the French settlers in Acadia draws on Abenaki examples to demonstrate that French neutrality towards European empires after the conquest did not prevent individuals from interacting with imperial officials on either side of the conflict. Some French settlers allied themselves much more directly with the British, others with the French. But even these more partisan people maintained connections through kinship or trade with people whose political views were substantially different.⁵

The Mi'kmaq were in a similar position. All Mi'kmaq communities saw the land that France and Britain occupied as Mi'kma'ki. They tried to live peacefully with their European neighbours. The Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq often sought peace with the British, while the Mi'kmaq in Unama'kik, Piktukewaq and Eski'kewaq were more tightly

⁴ Stephen E. Patterson, "Indian-White Relations in Nova Scotia, 1749-61: A Study in Political Interaction," *Acadiensis*, vol. 23, no. 1 (Autumn 1993), 26-27.

⁵ Maurice Basque, "The Third Acadia: Political Adaptation and Societal Change," in John Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 170.

connected with the French. Despite these differences, Mi'kmaq in every region maintained Mi'kma'ki's territorial autonomy.

This chapter has three parts. The first two discuss how France and Britain interacted with the Mi'kmaq during the first three decades after the conquest, when both European powers substantially increased their presence and involvement in North America.⁶ France built Louisbourg and began to invest much more heavily in maintaining its presence in Mi'kma'ki. Regular gift giving and the arrival of missionaries created a new relationship with the Mi'kmaq. The British were in a weaker position at Annapolis Royal. But the presence of a permanent garrison indicates that they too took their claim more seriously than they had in the past. Through trade, hostage taking and treaties, the British significantly influenced the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq and limited their political options. The final part focuses on the Mi'kmaw reaction to these changes, demonstrating how the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq balanced their local interests with the decisions being made elsewhere in Mi'kma'ki.

France: Successful Alliance Building

The development of Louisbourg created a more structured French presence than had ever been seen in Mi'kma'ki. From Louisbourg, the French were able to extend their influence throughout Mi'kma'ki. As Dickason has observed, this pragmatic policy (like that used in Wabanakia) was a useful tool through which France could counter English

⁶ Linda Colley, *Captives: The story of Britain's pursuit of empire and how its soldiers and civilians were held captive by the dream of global supremacy, 1600-1850*, (New York: Random House, 2002), 158; James Pritchard, *In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670 to 1730*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), preface.

influence.⁷ The French increased their gift giving, recognized Mi'kmaw territorial sovereignty, and used missionaries to reach deep into the parts of Mi'kma'ki claimed by the British.

France was well prepared to relocate its administrative centre to Unama'kik. In the years before the conquest, plans had already been made exploring the possibility of building an administrative centre on the island.⁸ The French saw the site as an ideal location both for the French fisheries and disrupting the English fisheries. It was also seen as a useful location for a trade entrepôt between France's Atlantic colonies and a defensive barrier between New England and Canada. In Canada, the French governor, Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, had begun to formulate a much stronger and unified policy with Aboriginal peoples, including building defensive alliances with Aboriginal people who lived near French outposts.⁹ Re-building the French administration at Louisbourg allowed for all of these goals to be met.

Missionaries played a central role in the extension of French influence among the Mi'kmaq. Missionaries served as liaisons between French imperial officials and Mi'kmaw communities in British occupied Mi'kma'ki. The Treaty of Utrecht permitted French settlers to practice Catholicism, allowing for priests to travel to their parishes and to Mi'kmaw communities. These men conveyed messages, served as interpreters and encouraged the Mi'kmaq to resist the British. Their influence, however, was limited by their ability to visit and engage with more distant Mi'kmaw communities. The

⁷ Dickason, *Louisbourg and the Indians*, 127-128.

⁸ Anonyme. Mémoire adressé à Pontchartrain sur l'établissement d'une colonie dans l'île du Cap-Breton, 30 Nov 1706, C11C-8, ff. 10-39.

⁹ Yves F. Zoltvany, "The Frontier Policy of Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, 1713-1725," *The Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 48 no. 3 (1967), 227-250.

Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq, living furthest away from Louisbourg had less opportunity to interact with priests than those living closer to the French.

The biggest difference from the pre-conquest period was the creation of enduring missions. As they had before the conquest, the French continued to encourage the Mi'kmaq to move into permanent villages. Though they built only one mission in Unama'kik, Mi'kmaw missions were established in Piktukewaq at Antigonish, Epekwitk at Malpec, and Sipekne'katikik at Shubenacadie during the 1710s, 1720s and 1730s. The French were interested in drawing the Mi'kmaq closer to Louisbourg without compromising their use of mainland Mi'kma'ki. For the most part these missions served the Mi'kmaq who already used these locations as summer villages and, despite their more permanent location, missionaries continued to travel from community to community.

Three missionaries principally served the Mi'kmaq between 1713 and 1745. Antoine Gaulin, who had been instrumental in following up Louis-Pierre Thury's plan for a mission in peninsular Mi'kma'ki, continued to serve the Mi'kmaq and French settlers until 1732. He established a number of missions, most predominantly at Antigonish, but also seasonal mission sites in Kespukwitk and Sipekne'katikik at Cape Sable, La Hève, Shubenacadie and Mirligueche.¹⁰ In the mid-1730s two other missionaries followed in Gaulin's path. In the late summer of 1735 Pierre Maillard came to serve in Unama'kik at Malagawatch.¹¹ Three years later, Jean-Louis LeLoutre arrived at Shubenacadie.

¹⁰ David Lee, "Antoine Gaulin", *DCB*, vol. 2, 238; Délibération du Conseil de la Marine sur une lettre de Saint-Ovide datée du 24 novembre 1719, May 1720, C11C-15, no. 33.

¹¹ Micheline D. Johnson, "Pierre Maillard," *DCB*, accessed online.

LeLoutre worked in mainland Mi'kma'ki until the expulsion of the French settlers in the late 1750s.¹²

Although Gaulin and LeLoutre made an effort to serve the Mi'kmaq in Kespukwitk and Sipekne'katikik, it was nearly impossible for them to visit these communities regularly. When travelling, the priests timed their visits with large regional gatherings at the height of the summer. They visited Mirligueche, in Sipekne'katikik but near La Hève, on the Feast of St. Anne (26 July) and Pobomcoup on the Feast of St. Louis (25 August).¹³ Often, though, these men were unable to travel. When the priests did not visit these communities, the Mi'kmaq occasionally went to parish priests serving the French settlers. The Mi'kmaq who visited the church at Annapolis Royal in the 1720s and 1730s interacted with five different priests.¹⁴ In 1727, two priests, Breau and Decloches, were appointed to Piziquid and Beaubassin respectively; service to the Mi'kmaq was part of their assignment, though little more is known about their involvement with the Mi'kmaq.¹⁵ In 1736, the last time a Mi'kmaq is noted in the Annapolis Royal parish registers, Chauvereux, the priest at the French village of Piziquid, was appointed the missionary to the Mi'kmaq at Cape Sable.¹⁶ The distance between these places, about two hundred kilometres as the crow flies, was too far for him to travel regularly. Two years after his appointment, the Sipekne'katikik and Kespukwitk

¹² Gérard Finn, "Jean-Louis Le Loutre," *DCB*, accessed online.

¹³ *Mémoire sur l'Acadie*, 1748, C11D-10, non-foiliated. This type of visitation was established by the 1720s and likely reflects Thury and Gaulin's work at the turn of the eighteenth century. See *Délibération du Conseil de la Marine sur une lettre de Saint-Ovide datée du 24 novembre 1719*, May 1720, C11C-15, no. 33.

¹⁴ See chapter two for a more extensive discussion of the Mi'kmaq in the parish registers from Annapolis Royal.

¹⁵ *Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au Ministre concernant les Sauvages*, 20 Nov 1727, C11B-9, f. 68. The given names of these two priests do not appear in the documents, nor are they included in the *DCB*.

¹⁶ *M. Le Normant au ministre*, 16 Nov 1736, C11B-18, f. 112.

Mi'kmaq were still in need of a priest.¹⁷ Although they clearly met with priests more often than they had before the conquest, for most Mi'kmaq, their interactions continued to be limited.

Like the missionaries among the Abenaki before the conquest, these men served in both a religious and a political capacity. By the 1720s Gaulin had become so valuable to the French that Saint-Ovide feared the alliance with the Mi'kmaq would erode in his absence.¹⁸ The French governor expressed a similar sentiment on the death of Jean-Baptiste Loyard, the missionary at Meductic. Without a missionary, Saint-Ovide worried that the Wulstukwiuk would begin to trade with the British.¹⁹ Five years later, De Poncy, the priest at Annapolis Royal, and Chauvereux made their allegiance to France explicit. They refused British orders to accompany Charles d'Entremont, the seigneur at Cape Sable, in recovering goods from the shipwrecked *Baltimore*. The two priests declared that they served Nova Scotia's Catholic population and the king of France; they would not do the British crown's bidding.²⁰

Although their role was similar to their predecessors in Wabanakia, the missionaries that served in Mi'kma'ki no longer bore French gifts. This aspect of the French-Mi'kmaw relationship was claimed by the governor and his subordinates. Philippe Pastour de Costebelle, the first French governor at Unama'kik, believed that France's gift-giving policy had been a failure before the conquest. He wished to

¹⁷ Monsieur de Bourville au ministre, 3 Oct 1738, C11B-20, ff. 87-88.

¹⁸ Délibération du Conseil de la Marine sur une lettre de Saint-Ovide datée du 24 novembre 1719, May 1720, C11C-15, no. 33.

¹⁹ Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au ministre, 25 Nov 1731, C11B-12, f. 36v.

²⁰ Council Minutes, 18 May 1736, Archibald M. MacMechan, ed., *Nova Scotia Archives III: Original Minutes of his Majesty's Council at Annapolis Royal, 1720-1739*, (Halifax, 1908), 343-345.

streamline gift giving through the office of the governor rather than through missionaries to prevent gifts from being traded for personal gain.²¹ Gift giving became a central pillar of France's relationship with the Mi'kmaq. Unlike in the 1690s when the Mi'kmaq periodically received gifts along the Saint John River, meetings between the French and Mi'kmaq from all over Mi'kma'ki were held regularly in June or July at Port Toulouse, Port La Joye and Antigonish.

The Abenaki did not attend these meetings. In 1717 the gifts sent to North America for the Mi'kmaq and Abenaki were divided. The Abenaki received their gifts from Quebec, while the Mi'kmaq received theirs from Louisbourg.²² Each group initially was supplied with two thousand livres worth of goods each year, but this amount increased dramatically over the 1720s, 1730s and 1740s – as it did everywhere in New France – as France sought to strengthen its relationship with Aboriginal people.²³

The type of gifts also changed. In addition to the gifts outlined in chapter two, France also sent agricultural implements such as picks and hoes.²⁴ These gifts did not meet Mi'kmaw needs. Rather than clothing and gardening tools, the Mi'kmaq wanted lead, powder and muskets. They could acquire other tools and useful items through the

²¹ Costebelle au ministre, 24 Oct 1713, C11C-7a, ff. 244-245.

²² Délibération du Conseil de Marine sur une lettre de Vaudreuil et Bégon datée du 14 octobre 1716, 19 Jan 1717, C11A-37, f. 27v; Le Conseil de Marine. Arrêt sur un mémoire de monsieur de Soubras au sujet des Sauvages, 10 April 1717, C11B-2, f. 41.

²³ Gilles Havard and Cécile Vidal, *Histoire de l'Amérique Française*, (Paris: Flammarion, 2003), 265. Havard and Vidal observe that the amount France spent on gifts in North America nearly quadrupled.

²⁴ M. de Mézy rend compte au ministre de l'Etat des vivres, habillement, magasins et des fonds, 20 Nov 1723, C11B-6, ff. 246-250; État des divers outils pour l'artillerie des batteries de Louisbourg pour l'année 1733, 15 Nov 1732, C11B-13, ff. 95-98v; Etat des vivres, habillement et munitions nécessaires, 31 Oct 1734, C11B-15, ff. 194-196v; État des vivres, habillement et munitions nécessaires, 31 Oct 1734, C11B-15, ff. 194-196v; État des vivres, habillement et munitions nécessaires pour la Colonie pendant l'année 1737, 1 Oct 1736, C11B-18, ff. 228-230v; État des vivres, habillement et munitions nécessaires pour la Colonie pendant l'année 1739, 4 Nov 1738, C11B-20, ff. 201-203v.

fur trade.²⁵ The French responded to Mi'kmaw demands. Over the 1720s and 1730s the amount of items associated with hunting and warfare increased. By the mid-1730s France had also begun to distribute medals in an effort to attract Mi'kmaw leaders.²⁶ These latter changes reflected the growing importance of the Mi'kmaw-French alliance.²⁷

With the British situated on Mi'kmaw territory, gift giving became an important part of French-Mi'kmaq diplomacy. Not only were gifts given annually, but the governor also personally disbursed them and met with local chiefs. The regularity and frequency of these meetings paralleled Mi'kmaw diplomatic practices. Mi'kmaw diplomacy emphasized the fluidity and often changing nature of relationships, requiring regular discussion and negotiation. Although the relationship with the French would wax and wane during the post-conquest period these meetings continued on an annual basis and provided important opportunities to review and build their relationship.

²⁵ Résumé de lettre de 1726 par le Conseil de la Marine sur les Sauvages, 11 Mar 1727, C11B-9, ff. 11-12.

²⁶ Monsieur de Forant au ministre, 16 Nov 1739, C11B-21, ff. 86-87v. This was not the first time medals had been given to a group of Aboriginal people. By the late-seventeenth century medals were fairly common symbols of both French and English alliances with Aboriginal peoples. Christian Roy, "Médaille commémorative ou 'médaille de paix': parure de traite ou gage d'alliance," *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. 34, no. 1 (2004), 46-47.

²⁷ For documents that discuss Mi'kmaw gifts during this period see: M. de Mézy rend compte au ministre de l'Etat des vivres, habillement, magasins et des fonds, 20 Nov 1723, C11B-6, ff. 246-250; Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au Ministre, 24 Nov 1724, C11B-7, ff. 24-31; Lettre au Gouverneur M. de Saint-Ovide, 30 Oct 1726, C11B-7, ff. 53-53v; État des vivres et habillement et munitions nécessaires pour la Colonie en l'année 1712, 20 Nov 1727, C11B-10, ff. 120-121; Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au ministre, 14 Nov 1732, C11B-12, ff. 254-262; État des divers outils pour l'artillerie des batteries de Louisbourg pour l'année 1733, 15 Nov 1732, C11B-13, ff. 95-98v; État des vivres, habillement et munitions nécessaires, 31 Oct 1734, C11B-15, ff. 194-196v; État des vivres, habillement et munitions nécessaires, 31 Oct 1734, C11B-15, ff. 194-196v; État des vivres, habillement et munitions nécessaires pour la Colonie pendant l'année 1737, 1 Oct 1736, C11B-18, ff. 228-230v; État des vivres, habillement et munitions nécessaires pour la Colonie pendant l'année 1739, 4 Nov 1738, C11B-20, ff. 201-203v.

Meetings with the French became an annual event after 1719.²⁸ After that, with the exception of six years in the 1720s and 1730s, a French official – most often the governor – met with most Mi'kmaq on an annual basis.²⁹ The Mi'kmaq did not meet with the French as frequently when they were at war with the British. In 1722 most of the Mi'kmaq were too busy fighting the British to meet with the French.³⁰ The following year, Saint-Ovide – who had spent the winter in France – returned to Île Royale too late in the season; only the Mi'kmaq living on Unama'kik received gifts. Peace with Britain was on the table in 1725 and, although there is no accounting for why a meeting did not take place, it seems likely that the Mi'kmaq were too occupied to meet with the French governor.³¹ Saint-Ovide's correspondence for 1726 noted that the gifts from 1725 were to be given in 1726.³² We do not know why the French and Mi'kmaq did not meet during the 1730s, although it is possible that these meetings went unrecorded.

Aside from gift giving, these summer meetings were times of diplomacy and discussion. France was petrified of losing Mi'kmaw support to the British. The Mi'kmaw relationship with the British was a frequent subject of conversation. Saint-Ovide broached the subject during the annual meeting in 1720, after learning that some

²⁸ Gifts do not seem to have been given during the late-1710s. St. Ovide claimed that with the arrival of the gifts in 1719, the Mi'kmaq were to come to Louisbourg to receive the gifts for the year and those from previous years. See Arrêt du Conseil sur une lettre de M. de Saint-Ovide à Louisbourg le 24 novembre 1719, 07 May 1720, C11B-5, f. 20.

²⁹ The Mi'kmaq did not meet with the French in 1722, 1723, 1725, 1730, 1736 and 1737.

³⁰ Lettre de monsieur de Saint-Ovide au ministre lui apprenant l'assassinat de monsieur le comte Degrain par deux Sauvages qui ont été arrêtés, 28 June 1722, C11B-6, ff. 38-39v; Arrêté du Conseil de Marine, 14 Sept 1722, C11B-6, ff. 22-23; Lettre de Saint-Ovide de Brouillan au Conseil, concernant une expédition à Arrigoniche, 31 July 1722, C11B-6, ff. 40-42.

³¹ It is unlikely that the wreck of the King's ship, *Le Chameau*, in late-August 1725 prevented this meeting. Nearly all French-Mi'kmaw meetings took place in June and July, before the ship was destroyed. If *Le Chameau* had been carrying supplies for the Mi'kmaq, it is more likely that the disaster would have made an impact on the 1726 meetings.

³² Résumé de lettre de 1726 par le Conseil de la Marine sur les Sauvages, 11 Mar 1727, C11B-9, ff. 9-12.

Mi'kmaq had accepted gifts from the British. The chiefs brushed the issue off, and told him that they had paid for the goods and that they were necessary for survival.³³ The issue arose again in 1728 after the Mi'kmaq had made peace with the British. Saint-Ovide warned them that they could not have 'two fathers.' The Mi'kmaw representatives from peninsular Mi'kma'ki, Miramichi River and Bay of Chaleurs, assured the governor "que leurs cœurs estoient toujours a leurs vray père."³⁴ In a 1732 diatribe, Saint-Ovide explained that relating with the English put the alliance with France at risk.³⁵ Two years later, the Mi'kmaq dominated the annual meeting by discussing the possibility of peace with the British. Saint-Ovide warned them that British promises were false.³⁶ A key goal for the French during this meeting was to maintain the Mi'kmaq alliance.

Throughout the post-conquest period the French used these gifts and meetings to subtly foment war between the Mi'kmaq and British and at the very least prevent a relationship between them. Vaudreuil claimed that war with New England was better than peace; it kept the Abenaki and Mi'kmaq in France's interests.³⁷ A decade later, after a peace had been made between the Mi'kmaq and the British, French officials continued to try to use the Mi'kmaq to agitate against the British.³⁸ They believed that the Mi'kmaq had met with the British in July 1726 more to feast and trade than to make peace.³⁹

³³ Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au Conseil, concernant les relations avec les Sauvages, 15 Sept 1721, C11B-5, ff. 358v-360.

³⁴ Monsieur de Saint-Ovide, seul, au Ministre, 3 Nov 1728, C11B-10, f. 70-70v. Author's translation: "that their hearts are always for their true father."

³⁵ Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au ministre, 14 Nov 1732, C11B-12, ff. 254v-255.

³⁶ Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au ministre, 1 Nov 1734, C11B-15, ff. 141-141v.

³⁷ Lettre de Vaudreuil au Ministre, 16 Sept 1714, C11A-34, ff. 289v-190.

³⁸ Extraits de lettres diverses, 29 Apr 1727, C11A-49 f. 579v.

³⁹ Extraits de lettres diverses, 29 Apr 1727, C11A-49 f. 580.

French officials in Unama'kik told their superiors that the Mi'kmaq who made the peace were young and without the power to make corporate decisions.

Fuelling Mi'kmaw aggression towards the British was a policy that had to be pursued carefully. The international stakes were high if France was caught meddling in Mi'kmaw-British affairs. While they sought to encourage Mi'kmaw harassment of the British – as it served both to annoy an old enemy and provided fertile ground for a French claim to peninsular Mi'kma'ki in the future – a series of letters in 1715 indicates that the French sought to diminish the severity of attacks and ensure that they were not held responsible.⁴⁰ A marginal note in a copy of Costebelle's letters indicates that while the French governor actively tried to use the Mi'kmaq to reduce British power in Mi'kma'ki, he feared that the European conflict would resume if France was caught encouraging the Mi'kmaq.⁴¹ An alliance forged in Europe between the two powers the following year made maintaining peace in the colonies even more important.⁴² Costebelle, who was never a fan of using Aboriginal people to fight France's battles, considered the Mi'kmaq as “animaux bien difficiles à conduire.”⁴³ Although useful for France, Mi'kmaw goals of resisting British expansion often exceeded French desires.

French officials shifted the language that they used to refer to the Mi'kmaq.

Before the conquest, French administrators used terms that rendered the Mi'kmaq subject

⁴⁰ Costebelle au Ministre, 09 Sept 1715, C11B-1, ff. 128v-129v; Costebelle au ministre, 05 Nov 1715, C11B-1, f. 142v.

⁴¹ Conseil de Marine: résumés de lettres de Costebelle (datées des 9 septembre, 1er octobre et 5 novembre 1715) et de Soubras (datées des 8 octobre et 9 décembre 1715) et de M. Bégon (datée du 25 septembre 1715), sur les ennus que leur causent les Sauvages par leurs incursions et pillages en terres anglaises. Observations marginales, 28 Mar 1716, C11B-1, f. 336.

⁴² Zoltvany, 233-234.

⁴³ Costebelle au Ministre, 09 Sept 1715, C11B-1, f. 129v. Author's translation: “animals very difficult to direct.”

to the French crown. After the conquest, French officials instead employed a rhetoric that respected Mi'kmaw territorial claims. Although France had clearly ceded most of Mi'kma'ki to Britain in the Treaty of Utrecht, the language of alliance was used as a tool to limit British expansion. The French claimed that much of the land beyond Annapolis Royal belonged to the Mi'kmaq.

Throughout the post-conquest period France argued that the Mi'kmaq held an autonomous position in the region. In 1712 Bégon, the Intendant at Quebec, ruled that the Mi'kmaq were not subject to French jurisdiction after they had captured a vessel off Unama'kik.⁴⁴ Forty years later, Charles des Herbiers de la Ralière, the new French commandant at Louisbourg told Edward Cornwallis that he had no authority to force the Mi'kmaq to return a captured vessel. He reported to the British governor at Halifax that “si les Sauvages etoient Sujets du Roy (comme vous le croyez) il n'est pas douteux que je les aurois obliges a rendre le bateau mais VE ne doit pas ignorer quils ne sont que sur le pied d'Allies dans toutes nos Colonies et que nous n'exigeons rien d'eux par autorite.”⁴⁵ In the post-conquest environment, it was in the French interest to consider the Mi'kmaq as autonomous and independent allies. They could thus encourage attacks against the British without bearing the responsibility for them.

The full meaning of this alliance was clarified in 1735 when Britain and France investigated the potential for silver mining in the hills around the Minas Basin. Saint-

⁴⁴ Résumé d'une lettre de l'intendant Michel Bégon, May 1713, C11A-123, ff. 45v-47; Lettre de l'intendant Bégon au ministre, 8 Nov 1712, C11A-33, ff. 109-110.

⁴⁵ Deshebert to Cornwallis, 15 Oct 1749, CO 217-9, ff. 114. Author's translation: “if the natives were subjects of the crown (as you believe) it is clear that I would have forced them to return the boat but your Excellency should not ignore that they are only considered allies in all of our colonies and that we do not require anything of them as subjects.”

Ovide argued that the potential mines were on neither French nor British territory, but rather on Mi'kmaw land. When meeting with a chief from Sipekne'katikik, "M. de S^t Ovide lui a fait sentir que ces mines appartenoient à sa nation, puisque de tous temps la terre ou elles sont, a été a elle, qu'elle avoit grand intérêt d'empêcher que les Anglois n'y fissent aucun Etablissement et de ne pas se laisser corrompre par les presens qu'ils pourroient faire pour la surprendre."⁴⁶ Instead of claiming the silver mines for France, as the French had claimed the four thousand piastres found by the Mi'kmaw man in 1708, the French recognized Mi'kmaw territorial sovereignty. This argument provided the French with an opportunity to prevent British expansion beyond Annapolis.

The change in French rhetoric dovetailed nicely with Mi'kmaw claims of territorial sovereignty. By affirming the Mi'kmaw view that most of Mi'kma'ki had not been ceded during the Treaty of Utrecht, France gained important military allies and, through their alliance, some legitimacy in their claims on Mi'kmaw lands among Europeans. The Mi'kmaq gained greater access to clergy, tools, weapons and clothing that had become increasingly important to them. Mi'kmaq and French political and religious leaders discussed, re-evaluated and reshaped their relationships at regular and frequent meetings.

There are three important components to the French-Mi'kmaw relationship that evolved after the conquest. First, gift giving and missionary activity increased. Second, despite French efforts, gift giving and the overall effectiveness of missionaries was

⁴⁶ Le Conseil de la Marine sur un résumé d'une lettre de M. De Saint-Ovide, datée du 20 octobre 1735, concernant les Sauvages, 23 and 31 Jan 1736, C11B-18, ff. 3-3v. Author's translation: "M. de St. Ovide indicated to him that the mines belonged to his nation, because the land had been theirs since the beginning of time, that they had great interest in preventing the English from establishing themselves and that they should not allow themselves to be compromised by gifts that they may give to subjugate them."

limited to the area around Unama'kik. Third, during the 1730s, Mi'kmaw interaction with the French increased and the quality of French gifts improved. Every indication suggests that the Mi'kmaq – not the French – were responsible for the growth and success of these policies. France's relationship to the Mi'kmaq after 1713 had more in common with their pre-1710 relationship with the Abenaki than with the Mi'kmaq.

Britain: Building a Relationship

The British entered Nova Scotia with a poorly planned policy for interacting with the Mi'kmaq. In the context of growing imperial rivalry with France, there was no precedent for governing a colony whose principal population – the French settlers – were the former subjects of that crown.⁴⁷ The British were also unprepared for Aboriginal claims that they had not conquered Wabanakia, Wulstukwik and Mi'kma'ki. They had few plans for building a relationship with these people. Following the conquest, they focused on trade and securing their claim to Nova Scotia. But without a strong leadership structure or someone to act as an intermediary, they had no way to implement their wishes. The result was a series of peace agreements instigated by the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq, which inevitably failed due to increasing conflict and agitation from New England. A broad peace agreement, which laid the framework for co-existence, was not reached until 1726.

Three pillars comprised British policy toward the Mi'kmaq during this period. Each had long been used with the Abenaki during the seventeenth century. Trade was at the heart of the British strategy to win over Aboriginal people. The British could offer

⁴⁷ Elizabeth Mancke, "Imperial Transitions," in John G. Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 179.

superior quality goods for less than the French.⁴⁸ Next they sought to bring about peace through intimidation, attacking the Mi'kmaq and holding them hostage. Then, after Dummer's War in the early 1720s – which marked the height of this violence – the British sought to establish a legal relationship through treaty making. Although this practice had been used regularly in New England, the 1726 treaty was the first time that the Mi'kmaq entered into this type of formal relationship with a European power.

Underpinning the development of these three policies was an initial lack of direction. Elizabeth Mancke has divided the British administration of Nova Scotia into three periods. From 1710 to 1720 considerable ambiguity existed over the colony's status with France still active in the region and French settlers living around Annapolis Royal. This was coupled by weak power structures at Annapolis. Until the 1720s, the governor was rarely in the colony and the Board of Trade seldom paid attention to Nova Scotia.⁴⁹ Between 1720 and 1730 governance structures – particularly the executive council – were slowly established. Once in place, the government at Annapolis was better able to administer the colony. But it was not until the creation of Halifax that sufficient administrative infrastructure existed for the British to securely govern Nova Scotia.⁵⁰

The central problem facing the British was that no official could believe that the Mi'kmaq made decisions independent of French influence. Mi'kmaw resistance was always framed as part of an imperial struggle. The Nova Scotia Council, for example,

⁴⁸ For an illustration of the different cost of goods see *Differences of Prices in the Indian Trade at Montreal and Albany, 1689*, in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 9, 408-409.

⁴⁹ See the *DCB* entries for Thomas Caulfeild and John Doucett; William C. Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 141; Mancke, 182-183.

⁵⁰ Mancke, 182.

rejected a claim that the Mi'kmaq had acted without the help of the French when they captured a New England sloop in 1720. In the council's view "the Indians rarely if ever commit depredations except at French instigation."⁵¹ This opinion was sent to England despite the fact that the chiefs in Sipekne'katikik had sent the British a letter declaring their autonomy from European interests and governance.⁵²

British suspicion of French influence was fuelled by their inability to cultivate intermediaries with the Mi'kmaq. They relied on French settlers and missionaries to serve as their principal point of connection to Mi'kmaw leaders. French settlers were often used to convey messages or help with trading.⁵³ Settlers and missionaries also often served as key interpreters during treaty negotiations.⁵⁴ Plank's work does an excellent job at illustrating the difficulty the British had at separating the two communities. He demonstrates how the close proximity of French and Mi'kmaw villages created frequent problems for British governance in the region.⁵⁵ The British did not have a single official who could communicate directly with the Mi'kmaq.

⁵¹ Statement to People of Minas, 4 March 1721, Archibald M. MacMechan, ed., *Nova Scotia Archives II: A Calendar of two letter-books and one commission-book in the possession of the government of Nova Scotia, 1713-1741*, (Halifax, 1900), 72.

⁵² Antoine and Piere Coauret to Philipps, 2 Oct 1720, CO 217-3, f. 155; See also Lettre des Sauvages a Monsieur le General Philipps, 2 Oct 1720, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 3, 46-47. For another example of how the British blamed the French for Mi'kmaw actions see Philipps' response to the Mi'kmaw attack on Canso in Philipps to Craggs, 1720, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives II*, 67.

⁵³ Lettre de Bégon au ministre, 25 Sept 1715, C11A-35, f. 120; Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au ministre, 1 Nov 1734, C11B-15, ff. 141-141v.

⁵⁴ Council Minutes, 4 June 1726, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives III*, 115-116; Ceremonials at Concluding a Peace with the several Districts of the general Mickmack Nation of Indians..., 25 June 1761, CO 217-18, ff. 276-284.

⁵⁵ Geoffrey Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign against the Peoples of Acadia*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 81.

The looming threat of the French-Mi'kmaw alliance encouraged the British to explore gift giving as a way to build ties with the Mi'kmaq. In 1715 Thomas Caulfeild, the lieutenant-governor at Annapolis Royal, suggested that the British focus on developing a successful trade with the Mi'kmaq by building a series of truck houses.⁵⁶ Richard Philipps, who became governor in 1717, agreed and implemented the plan.⁵⁷ The policy was shaped by John Doucett, Caulfeild's successor, who after meeting with a group of Aboriginal leaders, suggested that Britain begin giving gifts annually. In his view, the Mi'kmaq would abandon the French if they could receive similar supplies from the British without travelling to Louisbourg or Quebec.⁵⁸

The policy was a short-lived. The gift giving coincided with rising Aboriginal anxiety over British encroachments in both Wabanakia and Mi'kma'ki. In 1720, after Philipps had given gifts to the Mi'kmaq at Canso, the Mi'kmaq attacked a New England trader at Minas and the British fishing station at Canso. A dismayed Philipps abandoned the policy, convinced that under these conditions even "£100,000 would not keep them faithful."⁵⁹ Plank reasons that this approach failed because the British could not adequately communicate with the Mi'kmaq and because the timing and location of the

⁵⁶ Caulfeild to the Board of Trade, 01 Nov 1715, CO 217-2, 51v. A truck house is the term used by the British for trading post.

⁵⁷ Memorial from Col Philips relating to Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, 26 April 1718, CO 217-2, f. 171v.

⁵⁸ John Doucett to the Board of Trade, 10 Feb 1718, CO 217-2, f. 194; Copy of a Letter from Lt Gov: Doucett to Colo Philips, n.d., CO 217-31, f. 63.

⁵⁹ Philipps to Craggs, 1720, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives II*, 68. The conversion for livres to pounds is 20:1, suggesting that the English gave the Mi'kmaq more than the French.

gift giving, at Canso where the British had recently stationed a garrison, aggravated the situation.⁶⁰

Failure to adopt gift giving met with mixed reviews in the decades that followed. In 1733 Lawrence Armstrong, the lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia, lamented the inconsistent shipment of gifts for the Mi'kmaq, noting that a strong alliance had developed between France and the Mi'kmaq because of the British failure to sustain this policy.⁶¹ The next year, Philipps – who had strained relations with Armstrong – defended the current policy. He argued that after receiving gifts in 1720-21 the Mi'kmaq deceived him and went to war. They had “disqualified themselves in the most effectual manner.” He did not recommend administering the colony through gift giving.⁶²

Without gifts or intermediaries, the Mi'kmaq had little reason to interact with British officials. The Mi'kmaq-British relationship was left to develop without official direction in Nova Scotia and under considerable influence from Boston. The principal site of contact between the Mi'kmaq and British subjects was along the coast. It was here – rather than Annapolis – where tensions flared. The Mi'kmaq captured as many as seventy-five New England fishing vessels between 1713 and the peace of 1726.⁶³ At the peak of this violence, in 1715 and between 1722 and 1724, New England sent out vessels

⁶⁰ Geoffrey Plank, *An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign against the Peoples of Acadia*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 73-74.

⁶¹ Armstrong to the Board of Trade, 29 Oct 1733, CO 217-7, f. 29.

⁶² Philipps to the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 30 Nov 1734, CO 217-7, ff. 136-140.

⁶³ Résumé d'une lettre du sieur Degoutin au ministre, 17 Nov 1711, C11D-7, ff. 182v-183v; MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives II*, 5; Conseil de Marine: résumés de lettres de Costebelle... , 28 Mar 1716, C11B-1, ff. 333-344; Philipps to Board of Trade, 27 Sept 1720, John Alden's testimony, 14 Sept 1720, CO 217, vol. 3 f. 124; vol. 3 ff. 151-155; George A. Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts: a study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia relations 1630 to 1784*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973), 129; Extrait des nouvelles de l'Acadie, rapportées par le père Félix, missionnaire récollet de l'Acadie, 1724, C11D-8, f. 65; Affidavit: Falmouth July 6 1725, in *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, vol. 10, 303; Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au Ministre, 18 Nov 1726, C11B-8, ff. 47-52.

specifically to patrol Mi'kma'ki shores.⁶⁴ In 1715 the sloop *Caulfeild* and *HMS Rose* had orders “to make diligent inquiry as to what provocation the Indians had, especially in the ports of ‘Pugmagoe, Cape Sables, Port Rossway, Lahave, Merligesh and Shebuctoe’.”⁶⁵ In early 1722, the British requested another ship be added to the two already patrolling these waters.⁶⁶ This was a much less diplomatic mission than in 1715. Orders were given to search every harbour. If the ships “can hear of the Enemy on shoar & his Men be capable of Service that Way Lett Him land such a Number of his Comp^a as he shall think fit & prosecute the Indians vigorously on the Shoar.”⁶⁷ One captain successfully recaptured seven vessels, fifteen captives, six hundred quintals of fish and killed two Mi'kmaw chiefs.⁶⁸

In addition to the crackdown along the coast, the British also sought to stabilize their position by capturing hostages. The policy of capturing Aboriginal people to ensure the good behaviour of the rest of the community was common in British North

⁶⁴ 26 July 1715, *Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, 1715-1717*, vol. 1, (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1919), 58; 26 June 1723, *Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, 1723-1724*, vol. 5, (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1924), 65.

⁶⁵ Caulfeild's instructions to Capoon, 16 Aug 1715, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives II*, 21; Caulfeild to Dudley, 12 Aug 1715, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives II*, 22. See also 21 July 1715, *Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, 1715-1717*, vol. 1, (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1919), 50.

⁶⁶ No title, 23 Mar 1722, CO 217-4, f. 180. Captains Eliot and Robinson had already been ordered from Canso to protect the coast with the “hope to recover all the Vessels and Captives, and to clear the Coast of those Barbarous Wretches.” See *The American Weekly Mercury*, 23 August 1722, 1. In addition to Eliot and Robinson, Capt. Harmon had also been assigned to similar duties between the Bay of Fundy and Gulf of Maine. Letter Col. Tho^s Westbrook to Lieut. Gov. Dummer, 16 Dec. 1723, in *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, vol. 10, pp. 159-160. For another example see Instructions to Capt. Sanders, June 1725, *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, vol. 10, 284-285.

⁶⁷ Letter to Capt. Durrell, n.d. in *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, vol. 10, 214. Although this document is undated, the documents around it are from 1724 which fits with the contextual information provided in Durrell's orders.

⁶⁸ *The American Weekly Mercury*, 23 August 1722, 1. These numbers do not seem that unusual. On 10 September, Capt. Blin arrived at Boston with four Aboriginal captives, twenty-one New Englanders who had been taken captive, and five vessels: *The American Weekly Mercury*, 13 Sept 1722, 1-2.

America.⁶⁹ Even before the conquest, as many as five percent of the population of Kespukwitk had been held hostage in Boston.⁷⁰ Hostage taking reached a crisis point, though, in the 1720s. In 1722 after a particularly difficult year for the British, Doucett captured twenty-two Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq in an effort to prevent further violence and encourage them to submit to British authority.⁷¹ When two leaders from Sipekne'katikik brought a letter to Annapolis demanding their release, they were taken hostage as well.⁷² More people were held at Boston. In 1723 the *Boston News-Letter* reported that "A sloop in the Country's Service, came in here on Monday Night last, with Seven of the Cape Sables Indians on Board, who were all sent to Prison."⁷³ Not all of these people were innocent. The British at Boston captured and tried Samuel Meuse, a Mi'kmaw from La Hève, after he was accused of murdering two New England fishers in July 1723.⁷⁴ A similar case arose in 1726 after a group of Mi'kmaq failed to sack a New England fishing vessel at Mirligeuche.⁷⁵ In total as many as thirty people were held captive during the early 1720s; this amounted to nearly ten percent of Kespukwitk's Mi'kmaw population.⁷⁶

⁶⁹ Council Minutes, 13 Dec 1722, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives III*, 43.

⁷⁰ Instructions for Capt Cyprien Southack, 11 Mar 1712, CO 217-2, f. 244. In a letter to Samuel Moody about the effect of the Treaty of Utrecht on the Abenaki, New England governor Dudley noted that there were 16 people from Cape Sable being held at Boston. Letter for Gov^r Dudley to Capt. Sam^l Moodey, 17 Jan 1712, in *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, vol. 9, 317-319; Sachems of the Indians, unsigned letter, 13 July 1713, in *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, vol. 23, 39.

⁷¹ Doucett to the Board of Trade, 29 June 1722, CO 217-4, f. 113.

⁷² Council Minutes, 3 Dec 1722, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives III*, 42.

⁷³ *Boston News-Letter*, 3 Oct 1723, 2.

⁷⁴ 3 Dec 1723, *Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, 1723-1724*, vol. 5, (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1924), 256.

⁷⁵ *The Trials of Five Persons for Piracy, Felony and Robbery... Held at the Court House in Boston, within His Majesty's Province of the Massachusetts-Bay in New England on Tuesday the Fourth Day of October, Anno Domini, 1726* (Boston, 1726); 7 Dec 1726, *Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, 1726-1727*, vol. 7, (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1926), 141.

⁷⁶ Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au Ministre rendant compte de l'état de la colonie, 24 Nov 1723, C11B-6, f. 195v.

Hostage-taking was not an adequate long-term solution. Within a handful of years, both sides were prepared to make peace. The tensions that had flared during the early 1720s had begun with renewed hostility between New Englanders and the Abenaki in Wabanakia. These hostilities began to wind down after the British razed the Abenaki village of Norridgewock and killed Sébastien Rale, their Jesuit missionary. The Abenaki, Mi'kmaq and British were ready for peace. Another attempt at treaty making began in 1725 and 1726.

Although the Mi'kmaq occasionally had representatives present during earlier Abenaki peace agreements, this was the first time they directly participated.⁷⁷ Their involvement marked the beginning of a new British tactic for justifying their presence in Mi'kma'ki.⁷⁸ From this point on, treaties became the foundation of British-Mi'kmaw interaction. The 1726 treaty served as a model for subsequent agreements after the War of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ There were twenty Mi'kmaq who witnessed the renewal of peace between the British and Abenaki at Portsmouth following the Treaty of Utrecht. This provides a good example of how the Mi'kmaq had not been an active part of this process during earlier agreements. See James Phinney Baxter, *The pioneers of New France in New England: with contemporary letters and documents*, (Albany: J. Munsell and sons, 1894), 59.

⁷⁸ Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 73.

⁷⁹ References to the 1726 treaty were frequently made in British negotiations with the Wulstukwuik and Mi'kmaq in the late-1740s, 1750s and 1760s. The 1726 treaty terms were ratified by the Wulstukwuik in 1749. See *Boston News-Letter*, 14 Sept 1749, 2; Cornwallis to Board of Trade, 20 Aug 1749, CO217-9, f. 82v; Treaty and Articles of Peace and Friendship Renewed," 22 Nov 1752, CO 217-40, ff. 379v-380; Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded with the Delegates of the St. Johns and Passamaquoddy Tribes of Indians, 23 Feb 1760, CO 217-18, ff. 17v-18; Ceremonials at Concluding a Peace with the several Districts of the general Mickmack Nation of Indians..." 25 June 1761, CO 217-18, ff. 276-284. This latter document does not refer directly to the 1726 treaty, but shares many similarities with the treaty. It added a clause to the provisions in the 1726 treaty which limited traffic with the King's enemies. It should be noted that Stephen Patterson does not agree with the continuity outlined here. He argues that although the treaty was renewed by the Wulstukwuik, this was not the case with the Mi'kmaq, for whom there is no documentary support demonstrating continuity with 1726. He does not discuss the short-lived 1752 treaty between the British and Jean-Baptiste Cope, which specifically references the 1726 treaty. See Stephen

The Abenaki from Pentagouet, who originally spearheaded the negotiations with the British, negotiated on behalf of the Mi'kmaq.⁸⁰ This process resulted in the signing of two treaties, one for the Abenaki (with Massachusetts and New Hampshire) and another for the Mi'kmaq and Wulstukwiuk (with Nova Scotia).⁸¹ Without delegates present during the initial negotiations, each treaty was sent to central British locations (Casco Bay in Maine and Annapolis Royal) to be ratified by individual communities.

Many Mi'kmaw leaders met at Annapolis Royal in June 1726 to hear the treaty's terms, quite possibly for the first time. Although there are no minutes and few documents outlining what took place,⁸² a few details can be recovered. The council and local Mi'kmaq conducted the proceedings with neither the lieutenant-governor nor representatives from all of the communities present.⁸³ Armstrong planned to have another meeting with the Mi'kmaq and Wulstukwiuk in the middle of September where gifts could be given to cement the relationship.⁸⁴ Patterson and Wicken agree that this initial meeting involved only local Mi'kmaq, and over the next days, weeks and months the ratification process was expanded to include Mi'kmaq living further afield.⁸⁵ This

Patterson, "Anatomy of a Treaty: Nova Scotia's First Native Treaty in Historical Context," *University of New Brunswick Law Journal*, vol. 48 (1999), 63. See also Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, part 3.

⁸⁰ Letter L¹ Gov. W^m Dummer to Col. Armstrong, 16 Aug 1725, in *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, vol. 10, 321-323; Conference with the Delegates, 27 Nov 1725, *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, vol. 23, 188.

⁸¹ Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 86; see also Patterson, "Anatomy of a Treaty: Nova Scotia's First Native Treaty in Historical Context," 41-64.

⁸² Patterson, "Anatomy of a Treaty: Nova Scotia's First Native Treaty in Historical Context," 55-56. Also pertinent to this discussion is Patterson's observation that the lack of documentation, especially when compared with the ratification process in Maine, reflects the relative inexperience of British officials working in Nova Scotia.

⁸³ Council Minutes, 31 May 1726, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives III*, 114; Council Minutes, 8 June 1726, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives III*, 117-118

⁸⁴ Armstrong to Board of Trade, 27 July 1726, CO 217-4 ff. 346-346v.

⁸⁵ Patterson, "Anatomy of a Treaty: Nova Scotia's First Native Treaty in Historical Context," 58-59; Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 152-154.

meeting was the beginning of a multi-year process where each community discussed and decided to adopt the treaty's provisions.⁸⁶ It took until 1728 to finalize the agreement. In the end seventy men signed the treaty along with seven chiefs. They were primarily from Kespukwitk, Sipekne'katikik, Sikniktewaq, Wulstukwik and Pentagouet – the areas around the Bay of Fundy – although there were one or two people from Unama'kik. No one from Epekwitk, Piktukewaq or Kespe'kewaq ratified the treaty.⁸⁷

The treaty created a legal framework that accommodated Mi'kmaw grievances and allowed for a relationship to develop without a heavy emphasis on gift giving. By signing a treaty, the British recognized the Mi'kmaq as an independent political and legal entity who held proprietary rights over Nova Scotia's resources.⁸⁸ Because of their absence from the negotiations at Utrecht, the treaty established the relationship with the Mi'kmaq that the British had taken for granted during the 1710s.⁸⁹ It also established the parameters on which the Mi'kmaq and British could address local grievances.

The treaty did not solve all of the British problems, however. The British still did not have intermediaries who could reliably communicate with the Mi'kmaq. Neither was there an agreement over how they could build new settlements without interfering with the Mi'kmaw livelihood. In only focusing on British-held territory, the treaty also failed to include all of the Mi'kmaq. It only really involved those people living on land ceded to the British by France at Utrecht. Mi'kmaq living elsewhere – though likely involved in this process – do not seem to have played a prominent role during the ratification

⁸⁶ Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, chap. 7.

⁸⁷ Treaty of 1726, 4 June 1726, CO 217-5, f. 3; This observation was also made by Stephen Patterson in Patterson, "Indian-White Relations in Nova Scotia, 1749-61: A Study in Political Interaction," 27.

⁸⁸ Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 219.

⁸⁹ Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*, 73.

process. Finally, ambiguity over language, and a rapidly changing political context, shaped both sides' understanding of the treaty and evolved over time.⁹⁰ There was still much to negotiate.

Although these circumstances periodically caused problems similar to those before the treaty, the 1726 agreement generally resulted in peace between the Mi'kmaq and British in Kespukwitk. Between 1726 and 1735, Mi'kmaq came to Annapolis Royal to participate in Catholic rites in numbers never before seen. With a few exceptions in the late 1720s, mostly before the treaty was finally ratified, the seizure of New England fishing vessels also dropped significantly. Another ship was not captured until 1737. Even when war broke out again between France and Britain in the mid-1740s, the Mi'kmaq from Sipekne'katikik and Kespukwitk did not give the French much aid.⁹¹ The 1726 treaty brought greater stability to the region.

Mi'kmaw Responses

The Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq responded to these French and British policies by seeking to maintain their position in southwestern Mi'kma'ki. Doing so required making peace with the British. This was a difficult task. Tensions that had existed between the Mi'kmaq and New England fishers, the strengthened French presence, and a desire to prevent British expansion often forced these people to take up arms. Yet, peace

⁹⁰ See Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial*.

⁹¹ Recensement du nombre de sauvages "Miquemaques" (Micmacs) portant les armes conformément aux états qui ont été remis par les missionnaires, 1737, C11D-8, f. 76; Bernard Pothier, ed., *Course à L'Acadie: Journal de campagne de François Du Pont Duvivier en 1744*, (Moncton: Éditions d'Acadie, 1982), 43. Although LeLoutre had been able to muster nearly three hundred Mi'kmaq to attack Annapolis in 1744, François du Pont Duvivier claimed that his troops comprised one hundred Mi'kmaq from Unama'kik, thirty from peninsular Mi'kma'ki, and seventy Wulstukwik, despite there being about two hundred men able to bear arms in peninsular Mi'kma'ki.

continued to be their first option. Amid these circumstances, Mi'kmaq from all regions migrated into the area between the upper Bay of Fundy and Northumberland Strait to minimize the impact of the conquest on their livelihood. Although this migration was not as pronounced in Kespukwitk as it was elsewhere – particularly in Unama'kik – the Mi'kmaq living near Annapolis Royal moved further away from the British, and joined the summer village at La Hève. This process of migration marked an important reorientation as the Mi'kmaq confronted this new imperial environment.

The Abenaki, Wulstukwiuk and Mi'kmaq initially sought peace with the British. In addition to the 1711 meetings with the British, discussed in the last chapter, Aboriginal leaders from these communities also reached out to the British in 1714 and 1715. In 1714 the Wulstukwiuk met with Francis Nicholson to explore the possibility of amity.⁹² The following year a Mi'kmaw chief, likely from Kespukwitk, met with Doucett, telling him that they would cease hostilities if the British supplied them with gifts.⁹³ These attempts at making peace demonstrate that Aboriginal communities were prepared to work with the new European administration at Annapolis Royal.

Peace was not unconditional, however. The Mi'kmaq made it clear that their permission was needed before either empire could expand its presence in Mi'kma'ki. A 1720 letter to the British from the Sipekne'katikik Mi'kmaq illustrates their perspective:

Nous croyons que cette terre ici que Dieu nous a donnée... cependant nous voyons que vous voulé nous l'ôter par les places que vous habité, et les menace que vous nous fait de nous réduire à votre servitude, ce que vous ne devez point

⁹² Lettre de Vaudreuil au Ministre, 16 Sept 1714, C11A-34, f. 289.

⁹³ Copy of a Letter from Lt Gov: Doucett to Colo Philips, n.d., CO 217-31, f. 63.

espéré. Nous sommes maitres et independent de personne et voulons avoir notre pays libre.⁹⁴

This was not the first time that the British had heard these sentiments. The French claimed the Mi'kmaq made similar statements in both 1714 and 1715.⁹⁵

Keenly aware that the French were complicit in dividing their territory, the Mi'kmaq delivered the same message to the French. In 1718 they relayed: "ils souffrent avec peine et impatience l'abandon de l'acadie comme d'une terre qui leur appartient et dont ils pretendent [n]avoir abandonné aux françois que l'usage et l'usufruit, ils s'en sont expliqué d'une manière fort a M. de S^t ovide."⁹⁶ Two years later they made a similar statement to the French governor.⁹⁷ By declaring their position to both imperial powers, the Mi'kmaq made it clear that they would only tolerate the European presence if it did not interfere with their own subsistence.

This sentiment had its limits. When Europeans over-stepped their bounds violence erupted. Local circumstances along the coast caused the most friction between the Mi'kmaq and British. According to James Pritchard, "by 1700, more than 100 [New

⁹⁴ Antoine and Pierre Couaret to Philipps, 2 Oct 1720, CO217-3, f. 155. For a transcription see *Lettre des Sauvages a Monsieur le General Philipps, 2 Oct 1720, Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France, vol. 3, 46-47*. Author's translation: "We believe that this land that God gave us... however we see that you wish to remove us from the places where you live, and the threats that you make to reduce us to your servitude. You will hardly succeed in these attempts. We are masters and independent of everyone and wish to live in a free country."

⁹⁵ Observations du Conseil de l'Île Royale sur des lettres de monsieur de Costebelle concernant la fidélité des Acadiens et des Sauvages de l'Île à la France, 26 Oct and 12 Nov 1714, C11B-1, f. 263; Conseil de Marine: résumés de lettres de Costebelle (datées des 9 septembre, 1er octobre et 5 novembre 1715) et de Soubras (datées des 8 octobre et 9 décembre 1715) et de M. Bégon (datée du 25 septembre 1715), sur les ennus que leur causent les Sauvages par leurs incursions et pillages en terres anglaises. Observations marginales, 28 Mar 1716, C11B-1, f. 336.

⁹⁶ Arrêté du Conseil au sujet d'une lettre du Père Dominique de la Marche concernant la situation présente des Acadiens, 23 May 1719, C11B-4, f. 101. Author's translation: "they suffered with pain and impatience the abandonment of Acadia as a land that belongs to them and which they claim to have only given the French usage and usufruct rights. They passionately explained this to St. Ovide."

⁹⁷ "Discours des Sauvages de l'Acadie au gouverneur de l'île Royale" et "réponses que Monsieur de Saint-Ovide leur a faites," 1720, C11A-122, ff. 84-85v.

England] fishing vessels worked the Acadian coast, pushing the French out of the way and competing successfully in traditional French markets of Portugal and Spain where they annually sold 50,000 quintals of dried cod.”⁹⁸ The rising importance of the New England fishery brought more New Englanders to Kespukwitk’s shores, both decreasing the availability of aquatic resources – a key part of the Mi’kmaw diet – and increasing the potential for conflict.

The Mi’kmaq went to war in retaliation for murdered relatives or due to some other perceived injury to their community.⁹⁹ Three relatively isolated and independent events brought the Mi’kmaw to arms in 1715. Each were typical causes for conflict within Mi’kmaw society. First, two young Mi’kmaw men had been found dead after being hired to hunt birds for a fleet of New England fishers. The Mi’kmaq suspected their employers of murder. In reprisal, the Mi’kmaq captured nine or ten fishing vessels, holding the captains captive and disfiguring the crew with slashes to their cheeks.¹⁰⁰ At Annapolis Royal, a Mi’kmaw man had been killed by a soldier.¹⁰¹ Rumours abounded that the British had poisoned the Mi’kmaw food supply at Minas, resulting in a number of deaths. In return the Mi’kmaq went on the warpath;¹⁰² they captured around thirty vessels in 1715 alone.¹⁰³

⁹⁸ Pritchard, 148.

⁹⁹ William C. Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales: Mi’kmaq Society, 1500-1760*, (PhD diss., McGill University, 1994), 145; Marc Lescarbot, *The History of New France*, vol. 3, W.L. Grant. trans., (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1914), 263.

¹⁰⁰ Lettre de Ramezay et Bégon au ministre, 13 Sept 1715, C11A-35, f. 12v-13; See also *Délibérations du Conseil de Marine*, 1 Apr 1716, C11A-123, ff. 183-184.

¹⁰¹ Lettre de Bégon au ministre, 25 Sept 1715, C11A-35, f. 127-127v.

¹⁰² Costebelle au Ministre, 09 Sept 1715, C11B-1, f. 128v; Soubras en réponse au Ministre, 21 Sept 1715, C11B-1, f. 172v.

¹⁰³ Conseil de Marine: résumés de lettres de Costebelle... , 28 Mar 1716, C11B-1, ff. 333-344.

Mi'kmaw violence was fuelled by a broad spirit of resistance that sought to prevent the extension of British influence outside of Annapolis. Most often they targeted French settlers who supported the British. In 1714, the Sikniktewaq Mi'kmaq attacked a vessel of French settlers from Port Royal trading at Beaubassin and burned down the homes of anyone who tried to stop them.¹⁰⁴ Nearly a decade later, the notary at Minas complained to the French at Quebec that the Mi'kmaq took food and supplies by force if the French settlers did not supply them voluntarily; sometimes little was left for the settlers.¹⁰⁵ In 1732, after a local resident agreed to help the British build a blockhouse at Minas – their first physical expansion outside of Annapolis Royal – three Mi'kmaq broke into his home and threatened him with death.¹⁰⁶

British expansion caused considerable concern to the Mi'kmaq, for which they unsuccessfully, but repeatedly, sought French aid.¹⁰⁷ But France had little stomach to renew direct conflict with Britain. This reluctance to directly aid their Aboriginal allies weakened the Mi'kmaw-French relationship. During a meeting with Saint-Ovide in 1720 – one of the few for which there is a transcription – the Mi'kmaq established their position relative to the French and the British. They told the French governor to learn from them “que nous sommes sur cette Terre que tu foule aux pieds et sur laquelle tu marche, avant mesme que ses arbres que tu Voyes n'eussent commence a en Sortir, Elle

¹⁰⁴ Lettre de Bégon au ministre, 25 Sept 1715, C11A-35, ff. 120-121.

¹⁰⁵ Lettre de Vaudreuil et Bégon au ministre, 14 Oct 1723, C11A-45, ff. 54-54v.

¹⁰⁶ Council Minutes, 25 July 1732, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives III*, 239-240

¹⁰⁷ Monsieur de Saint-Ovide. Rend compte des conférences qu'il a eues avec les Sauvages, 1 Nov 1729, C11B-10, ff. 189v-190; Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au ministre, 14 Nov 1732, C11B-12, f. 256; Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au ministre, 1 Nov 1734, C11B-15, f. 145; Le Conseil de la Marine sur un résumé d'une lettre de M. De Saint-Ovide, datée du 20 octobre 1735, concernant les Sauvages, 23 and 31 Jan 1736, C11B-18, ff. 3-4; Monsieur de Bourville au ministre, 3 Oct 1738, C11B-20, ff. 86-86v.

est a nous Et Rien ne pourra jamais nous l'ôter n'y nous la faire abandonnés."¹⁰⁸ The Mi'kmaq felt that the British had impinged on their land and were destroying the fisheries. Saint-Ovide replied that he would be contradicting royal orders if he took action against the English; the lands that the British occupied were of no use to the Mi'kmaq, and the fisheries were not exclusively theirs. The Mi'kmaq exclaimed that they would do what was necessary to remove the British and that if the French opposed their resolution, they would consider Saint-Ovide to be in league with the British.¹⁰⁹

When tensions between the Mi'kmaq and the British increased in the late summer of 1720, French goals played less of a role in Mi'kmaq decisions. In August, sixty Mi'kmaq pillaged the British fishing station at Canso, the only British foothold on Mi'kma'ki aside from Annapolis Royal.¹¹⁰ The following month, the Sipekne'katikik Mi'kmaq captured John Alden's trading vessel and demanded a £50 tribute for trading on their land.¹¹¹ These events coincided with increasing tensions between the British and Abenaki along the Kennebec River. In 1721, Samuel Shute, the governor at Boston, received the 'insolent' letter from a broader Aboriginal polity that included representatives from most Aboriginal communities in the northeast.¹¹² The letter, sent on behalf of the entire Abenaki polity and their Catholic Huron, Iroquois and Mi'kmaw

¹⁰⁸ "Discours des Sauvages de l'Acadie au gouverneur de l'île Royale" et "réponses que Monsieur de Saint-Ovide leur a faites", 1720, C11A-122, f. 84. Author's translation: "that we are on this land on which your feet walk, even before the trees that you see began to grow, it is ours and nothing can force us to abandon it."

¹⁰⁹ "Discours des Sauvages de l'Acadie au gouverneur de l'île Royale" et "réponses que Monsieur de Saint-Ovide leur a faites", 1720, C11A-122, ff. 84-85v.

¹¹⁰ Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au Conseil, 5 Sept 1720, C11B-5, f. 160v.

¹¹¹ Mr. John Aldens Testimony of his Sloop being plundered by the Indians, 14 Sept 1720, CO 217-3, ff. 151-155.

¹¹² Philipps to Board of Trade, 16 Aug 1721, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives II*, 76-77.

allies, threatened attacks if the British did not withdraw from Abenaki lands.¹¹³ These events marked the peak of Aboriginal-British conflict during the eighteenth century.

The lack of French influence in Mi'kma'ki during the early 1720s provides a unique opportunity to better understand divisions within Mi'kmaw society. In 1722, the Mi'kmaq, Wulstukwiuk and Abenaki met in Sipekne'katikik without French knowledge to discuss war with the British.¹¹⁴ This meeting and the events surrounding it help us to better understand the political dynamics among Mi'kmaw communities. People from Kespukwitk, Sipekne'katikik and Siknikte'waq were the only Mi'kmaq to attend. Significantly, the Mi'kmaq who lived closest to the French were not invited or informed of the meeting.¹¹⁵ Perhaps they were left out because of their more frequent interaction with the French.¹¹⁶ This division suggests there were important differences among the Mi'kmaq. Some Mi'kmaq sought peace; others aligned themselves with the French; a third group – the large number of people absent from European records – were likely neutral.

¹¹³ Letter of Eastern Indians, 28 July 1721, CO5-869, ff. 106-107. As appears in John G. Reid, *Essays on Northeastern North America: Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 138. See also 1 Sept 1721, *Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, 1721-1722*, vol. 3, (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1922), 109-111. I have used the word 'Iroquois' here in order to differentiate between the Haudenosaunee confederacy and the Iroquoian people living in the domicilié villages.

¹¹⁴ Arrêt du Conseil sur une lettre de Saint-Ovide de Brouillan, 25 Nov 1721, C11B-5, ff. 341-342; C11C-15, no. 193. St. Ovide found out about the meeting and its purpose after getting a young Mi'kmaw man from Sipekne'katikik drunk.

¹¹⁵ Lettre de Saint-Ovide de Brouillan au Conseil, concernant une expédition à Arrigoniche, 31 July 1722, C11B-6, ff. 40-40v; Délibération du Conseil de la Marine sur une lettre de Saint-Ovide datée du 31 juillet 1722 à Louisbourg, 13 Sept 1722, C11C-15, no. 225.

¹¹⁶ Attention to gift giving, discussed earlier in this chapter, reinforces this interpretation. The Mi'kmaq who lived around the Bay of Fundy avoided the French in 1722, 1723, and 1725, suggesting that the relationship with the French was less important for the people living in peninsular Mi'kma'ki. Saint-Ovide explicitly stated that they opted out of gift-giving in 1722. See Arrêté du Conseil de Marine, 14 Sept 1722, C11B-6, ff. 22-23.

Although present at this meeting, it is unlikely that the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq were united in the decision to attack the British. In 1722, the British took most of their hostages from this group. With such a large portion of their population held captive, many Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq opted to make peace rather than continue to fight.¹¹⁷ By the end of the year, seven people had submitted to the British.¹¹⁸ The submission of Jackish – only three days after the British declared war – illustrates the motives that encouraged Mi'kmaw individuals to make their peace:

Jackish the Indian who has his Wife & Children here prisoners was come to Submitt himself upon the Tarmes of his Excellys Proclamation which being taken into Consideration, he was called in & Examined and he promising never to do anything in prejudice to the Government & that he would give himself Information of any who might have any evil Designe against it.¹¹⁹

These submissions were unlike the peace that Mi'kmaw leaders made in 1711. These people were focused on freeing family members, rather than a general peace. There is no indication that this agreement was made on behalf of a larger Mi'kmaw political body. From the British perspective, the agreement was more formal. Jackish and three other 'chiefs', more likely heads of households, from near Annapolis signed a written document outlining their future behaviour: first, they would act only as friends and allies of King George and all his subjects; second, they promised to not carry out any acts of violence against the British and to notify British authorities of impending danger; third, the Mi'kmaq would leave their chiefs with the British as hostages when required; fourth, they would not take up arms against the English in the event of war between

¹¹⁷ Council Minutes, 14 Nov 1722, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives III*, 41.

¹¹⁸ Council Minutes, 3 Nov 1722, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives III*, 36-37; Council Minutes, 23 Nov 1722, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives III*, 41; Council Minutes, 11 Dec 1722, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives III*, 42-43.

¹¹⁹ Council Minutes, 19 Oct 1722, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives III*, 36.

France and Britain.¹²⁰ Another peace seems to have been made in 1724, although the primary documents make only indirect references to it.¹²¹

This local peace quickly failed. The problem was that many Mi'kmaq continued to fight the British. Even in Kespukwitk, violence continued along the coast. Without an intimate knowledge of the population, the British could not distinguish between Mi'kmaq who were part of the peace and those who were not. Just a month after the Mi'kmaq submission a proposal was made to the British council to send troops up the Annapolis River to search for enemy Mi'kmaq.¹²² The British continued to hunt the Mi'kmaq and hold them captive. In 1723, the British captured Samuel Meuse near La Hève for killing two New England sailors, while the Mi'kmaq captured Boston trader Francis Doucett off of Cape Sable, killing the rest of his crew.¹²³ The British still held Mi'kmaq captive at Annapolis in late-March 1726, after receiving news that peace had been reached with the Abenaki at Boston. The British agreed to free the hostages once the peace had been ratified.¹²⁴ Although they clearly recognized that some individuals had made peace before 1726, the British were reluctant to recognize the peace more broadly.

The 1725-26 treaty ended this conflict but not the division within Mi'kmaq communities. Like in 1722, the meetings about the ratification took place without French involvement, but unlike earlier, they included more Mi'kmaq living near the French. In

¹²⁰ *New England Courant*, 31 Dec 1722, 1-2.

¹²¹ Lettre de Bégon au ministre, 4 July 1724, C11A-46 ff. 144v-145; Rapport de Monsieur Bégon au Ministre, 4 July 1724, *Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France*, vol. 3, 104.

¹²² Council Minutes, 13 Dec 1722, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives III*, 43.

¹²³ 3 Dec 1723, *Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, 1723-1724*, vol. 5, (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1924), 256; 5 June 1728, *Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, 1727-1729*, vol. 8, (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1927), 191.

¹²⁴ Council Minutes, 4 June 1726, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives III*, 115-116

1727 Saint-Ovide claimed that all of the Mi'kmaw men from Unama'kik had left for a meeting at Antigonish; he did not know its purpose.¹²⁵ The following year he learned that the Mi'kmaq wished to make peace with the British.¹²⁶ Without evidence recording these meetings, it is difficult to know the motivations of specific Mi'kmaw communities. The large number of men who ratified the treaty indicates that most Mi'kmaw communities embraced it, but the brief glimpses we have into the ratification process and events in the late 1720s and 1730s suggest that the Mi'kmaq were divided on the issue.

Locally the signing of the peace had some effect. The British used the treaty to hold the Mi'kmaq to account for their actions. They first used it against the Mi'kmaq during the 1726 trial for piracy discussed earlier in this chapter.¹²⁷ The two French settlers involved in this affair were tried separately from the Mi'kmaq (because the Treaty of Utrecht extended British jurisdiction over them) while the trial against the Mi'kmaw defendants focused on whether they should have known about the treaty ratified at Annapolis two months before. From this point forward, the 1726 treaty formed the foundation of British-Mi'kmaw interaction.

Even when a particular community was not responsible for a transgression, the Mi'kmaq as a whole were charged with rectifying the situation. Following two attacks on New England fishers off the east coast of Mi'kma'ki in 1727, for example, the chiefs from around Annapolis Royal and Cape Sable were brought before the British administration. After pleading ignorance of the acts, Armstrong read the treaty to them;

¹²⁵ Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au Ministre concernant les Sauvages, 20 Nov 1727, C11B-9, f. 67v;

¹²⁶ Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au Ministre, 3 Nov 1728, C11B-10, f. 69v-70v.

¹²⁷ *The Trials of Five Persons for Piracy, Felony and Robbery... Held at the Court House in Boston, within His Majesty's Province of the Massachusetts-Bay in New England on Tuesday the Fourth Day of October, Anno Domini, 1726* (Boston, 1726).

he expected the Mi'kmaq to bring the culprits to justice.¹²⁸ Nearly a decade later, Antoine Tedeumart (who ratified the treaty) and another Mi'kmaq living near Cape Sable were suspected of murder. Although nothing came of these suspicions, Armstrong used the treaty to request that the offenders be handed over to him.¹²⁹ The following year, after a trader's vessel was captured at Piziquid, Armstrong sent the Mi'kmaq a circular letter demanding that restitution be made.¹³⁰

The treaty caused friction with the Mi'kmaq who interacted more frequently with the French. Mi'kmaw actions during the late-1720s suggest that communities living further from the British were reluctant to agree to the treaty's terms. Only a small number of participants from Epekwitk, Piktukewaq, Eski'kewaq and Unama'kik were involved in the treaty ratification. After the treaty was ratified, Saint-Ovide met with 130 Mi'kmaq in 1728 who claimed that they had no part in signing the treaty. Many told him they had already burned the British papers.¹³¹ These Mi'kmaq argued that this decision did not represent their collective will and that it had been made by their youth.¹³² Although possibly rhetoric to urge for French gifts, the following year, these statements were reinforced by action. The Mi'kmaq forced New Englanders fishing around

¹²⁸ Council Minutes, 7 Nov 1727, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives III*, 167

¹²⁹ Armstrong to the Chief of the Cape Sable Indians, 17 May 1736, MacMechan, *Nova Scotia Archives II*, 102.

¹³⁰ Armstrong to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 8 July 1737, CO 217-8, ff. 10-11.

¹³¹ Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au Ministre, 3 Nov 1728, C11B-10, ff. 69v-70.

¹³² Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au Ministre concernant les Sauvages, 20 Nov 1727, C11B-9, ff. 65v.

Epekwitk and Unama'kik back to Canso.¹³³ These attacks continued throughout the 1730s.¹³⁴

The division of the Mi'kmaq over the treaty was not as important as it seems. In the face of European pressures, these types of divisions were relatively normal. Mi'kmaw leadership structures were non-coercive. Allegiance to a particular chief was sought through gift giving and other actions aimed at improving community life. Individuals competed to determine policies and the community's direction, occasionally taking multiple and contradictory decisions.¹³⁵ On a large scale, alliances and other political relationships were shaped through similar processes. Individuals, families and communities had to decide how they would proceed, often moving particular factions of a community apart and others together. Similar division occurred among the Mohawk and Huron-Wendat in the seventeenth century as francophile Catholics separated from their more traditional kin.

A faction of Mi'kmaq likely sought to remain neutral. This is the hardest group to understand as they would have had the least interaction with the Europeans whose writings form the foundation of this dissertation. Their presence, however, is suggested by the broad geographic reorientation that took place during this period. By the early 1730s the differences between France's and Britain's interactions with the Mi'kmaq had become much more apparent and the Mi'kmaq distanced themselves from the British and began to build a stronger relationship with the French.

¹³³ Monsieur de Saint-Ovide. Rend compte des conférences qu'il a eues avec les Sauvages, 1 Nov 1729, C11B-10, f. 190v; Major Bourville au ministre. Relations avec les Sauvages, 30 Nov 1730, C11B-11, f. 38v.

¹³⁴ *New England Weekly Journal*, 7 August 1732

¹³⁵ Upton, 7-8.

This did not mean, however, that they abandoned the British and fully embraced the French. Rather, most people began to occupy territory away from both empires, allowing them to capitalize on the European presence – particularly through French missionaries – without directly exposing their communities to the will of either empire. This shift marked a compromise that provided cultural unity amid the divisions caused by the French and British empires.

The migration of the 1720s and 1730s reflected the success of France's strategies for building Mi'kmaw support. Over the post-conquest period, the number of Mi'kmaq who visited the French grew. According to Saint-Ovide, the Mi'kmaq within the French sphere of influence had increased during the 1720s by nearly sixty percent, from 400 to 635 people, mainly due to the migration into the area between the Bay of Fundy and the Northumberland Strait.¹³⁶ France had moved to the heart of Mi'kma'ki making it easier for communities from all over Mi'kma'ki, but particularly those in Kespe'kewaq and Sikniktewaq, to participate in French gift giving and diplomacy.¹³⁷ The Mi'kmaq likely spent more time in this region than they had before the conquest.

Despite France's ability to draw more Mi'kmaq into its sphere of influence, the Mi'kmaq did not move closer to French settlements or the administrative centre at Louisbourg. In contrast to Dickason's suggestion that the population of Unama'kik

¹³⁶ Messieurs de Saint-Ovide et Le Normant, 16 Nov 1732, C11B-12, ff. 206v-207; Observations du bureau du ministre sur des résumés de lettres du sieur Saint-Ovide, concernant les Sauvages, datées du 14 novembre 1732, Feb 1733, C11B-14, ff. 12-12v.

¹³⁷ Délibération du Conseil de la Marine sur une lettre de Mésy datée du 24 novembre 1721, 24 Mar 1722, C11C-15, no. 212; Observations du bureau du ministre sur des résumés de lettres du sieur Saint-Ovide, concernant les Sauvages, datées du 14 novembre 1732, Feb 1733, C11B-14, ff. 12-12v.

doubled after the conquest, my analysis of French censuses suggests the opposite.¹³⁸ The Mi'kmaw population primarily increased in Sikniktewaq and Piktukewaq where the French had key missions but where French officials rarely visited. Four new sites appear on Gaulin's 1722 census that were not in his 1708 enumeration: Beaubassin, Tatamagouch, Shubenacadie, and Antigonish. Roughly, this was the area called Chignecto in 1708. Before the conquest it had a population of about one hundred. By 1722 its population had risen to 339 and by 1737 to 635. The similarity of these numbers to Saint-Ovide's observations suggest that the French saw the most dramatic change in this area. In thirty years the Mi'kmaw population in this area, located between the two empires, had increased six-fold. The 1722 census suggests that the population of Unama'kik and Eski'kewaq was forty-five percent less than it had been in 1708. Though the population had increased by 1737, it continued to be significantly lower than it had been in 1708.

Three factors fuelled this change. First, greater official interaction between French officials and Mi'kmaw leaders, led to a deeper knowledge of the Mi'kmaw population and therefore a greater percentage of Mi'kmaq were likely enumerated in the later censuses. French missionaries were more active in drawing the Mi'kmaq to their mission villages, encouraging both increased migration to the region and greater familiarity with the Mi'kmaw population. The drop in population in other Mi'kmaw regions, particularly along the northeast coast suggests that confrontation with New England fishers was partially responsible for this migration. Perhaps most important,

¹³⁸ Dickason, *Louisbourg and the Indians*, 72.

though, this part of Mi'kma'ki was most distant from both the French and British while still close enough to use hunting and fishing grounds on peninsular Mi'kma'ki and receive French gifts.

Comparison with the French population suggests that the Mi'kmaw population also grew from natural increase.¹³⁹ Between 1714 and 1731 the French population – cut off from immigration – increased at a rate similar to that described for the Mi'kmaq, about sixty percent.¹⁴⁰ Chignecto, where the population increased most significantly, had the second highest child-woman ratio in Mi'kma'ki (1.00). Though not as high as the French, it is not surprising that this was the location where the Mi'kmaw population increased. But this apparent similarity does not account for the difference between Mi'kmaw and French child-woman ratios, subsistence practices, nor the declining population elsewhere in Mi'kma'ki.

It is nearly impossible for natural growth to have fuelled Mi'kmaw population growth alone. According to Gary Warwick, the theoretical maximum annual growth for a hunter, gatherer and fisher society is about thirty births per thousand people per year.¹⁴¹ But most societies did not increase by more than ten people per thousand per year. Even at the highest growth rate, the population sizes in the census were barely attainable (and not at all attainable for Shubenacadie which grew by 179 percent). The inclusion of Mi'kmaw communities not enumerated in 1708 and the migration of Mi'kmaw families

¹³⁹ Wicken, *Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales*, 201.

¹⁴⁰ Jacques Houdaille, "Quelques aspects de la démographie ancienne de l'Acadie," *Population (French Edition)*, vol. 35 no. 3 (May-June 1980), 582.

¹⁴¹ Gary Warwick, *A Population History of the Huron-Petun, A.D. 500-1650*, (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2008), 51.

into the area between the upper Bay of Fundy and Northumberland Strait were the most important elements increasing Mi'kmaw population numbers in these documents.

A similar type of migration took place locally in Kespukwitk. Although the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq had regularly sought peace with the British, the experiences of the 1720s and the growth of the French population at Annapolis Royal slowly pushed the Mi'kmaq away from this area.¹⁴² Many moved east to La Hève where the child-woman ratio suggests that living conditions were better than at Port Royal and Cape Sable, while others left the region entirely, moving towards the top of the Bay of Fundy. Gaulin's 1722 census notes that the population living around Annapolis Royal was only forty-six percent of the size it had been in 1708, while the Mi'kmaq enumerated at La Hève increased by twenty-four percent. In 1735, the village population returned to its 1708 level.¹⁴³ Two years later the community was not enumerated at all.¹⁴⁴ The variation in the census data suggests that although they may have moved, many of these households continued to use the area around Annapolis selectively.

The ambiguity of the censuses demonstrates that the summer village at Annapolis was becoming less important. Although some households continued to live in the area, these people probably capitalized on their connections with La Hève. The example of the Grand Claude family illustrates how this migration likely took place. In 1708 all of the

¹⁴² The French population at Annapolis grew from 895 to 1406. See Statistics Canada. *1714 Ac - Population of Port Royal and the Mines, Acadia* (table), 1714 - Census of Acadia (database), Using E-STAT (distributor). http://estat.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-win/cnsmcgi.exe?Lang=E&EST-Fi=EStat\English\SC_RR-eng.htm (accessed: April 16, 2011) and Recensement de la Paroisse du Port Royal, 1737, CAOM, G1, vol. 466, 262.

¹⁴³ Recensement fait des sauvages portant les armes en 1735, CAOM, G1, vol. 466, no. 71.

¹⁴⁴ Recensement du nombre de sauvages "Miquemaques" (Micmacs) portant les armes conformément aux états qui ont été remis par les missionnaires, 1737, C11D-8, f. 76.

Grand Claude family lived around Port Royal; by the 1720s, the parish registers at Annapolis illustrate that family members lived in both places and perhaps moved between them.¹⁴⁵ By merging with La Hève, the Mi'kmaq who lived around Annapolis could continue to use their traditional land and resources via the Mersey and La Hève Rivers while avoiding regular contact with the British. A report from the late 1730s confirms that the Mi'kmaq from Annapolis Royal joined La Hève: “[Annapolis and La Hève] ne forment qu'une village par raport aux sauvages... et ont une communication aisé par les Rivieres.”¹⁴⁶

By the 1740s the Mi'kmaq had distanced themselves from the British and restricted most of their regular contact with the French to interactions with missionaries and French settlers. A strong minority faction of Mi'kmaq remained tightly linked with the French. It comprised no more than the three hundred men who attacked Annapolis Royal with Abbé LeLoutre in 1744. This was only half of the men capable of bearing arms recorded in the 1737 census. Given that François du Pont Duvivier could only muster one hundred and thirty Mi'kmaq to launch a similar attack a few months later – most of whom were from Unama'kik – it seems likely that three hundred was a high

¹⁴⁵ The Registers of St. Jean-Baptiste, Annapolis Royal, 1702-1755, “An Acadian Parish Remembered,” Nova Scotia Archives and Resource Management, database records 1156, 2075, 2076, 1638 <<http://www.gov.ns.ca/nsarm/virtual/acadian/>>, (accessed 12 Jan 2011).

¹⁴⁶ Mémoires sur les missions des Sauvages Mikmak et de l'intérieur de l'Acadie, 1715, C11B-1, f. 249. Author's translation: “form only one village as far as the natives are concerned... and [they] communicate easily by the river.” This statement refers to the Mersey and Lequille River, which form a well known pre- and post-contact canoe route linking Annapolis Royal to La Hève.

The date attributed to this document is clearly wrong as it discusses the missionary work of Maillard and LeLoutre. Neither missionary arrived in Mi'kma'ki until the late 1730s. Olive Dickason has suggested that it was part of the reports take to Versailles by St. Ovide in 1739. See Dickason, *Louisbourg and the Indians*, 151, n. 74.

number.¹⁴⁷ The vast majority of these people sought to avoid both empires; they defended their territory and resources when necessary, but chose peace as their default position.

Conclusion

By dividing Mi'kma'ki, the conquest had a major impact on the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq. In reorganizing themselves at Louisbourg, the French significantly changed how they approached the Mi'kmaq. Rather than treating them as secondary to the Abenaki, France strengthened its gift giving and diplomacy, using a language in official documents that better reflected Mi'kmaw perspectives on their place in the region. The arrival of the British created a new set of conditions. Without a clear direction determining their interaction, much of the initial relationship took place along the coast with New England fishers. The arrival of Richard Philipps in 1720 began to stabilize these relationships, as the British attempted to use gift giving to build a connection with the Mi'kmaq. Not until the 1726 treaty, however, was a relationship, however tenuous, established.

Facing these imperial entrenchments, the Mi'kmaq sought to retain control over their land. This was a difficult task. The problem for the Mi'kmaq, French and British was that the Mi'kmaq lived in spaces claimed by both (and neither) empire. Some communities, like the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq, strove to establish and maintain peace with the British; others, like the Unama'kik Mi'kmaq, allied with the French. Although no

¹⁴⁷ Pothier, 43.

community could avoid the European presence after 1713, most Mi'kmaq distanced themselves from both empires by moving into the central part of Mi'kma'ki.

What happened to the Mi'kmaq after the conquest had its parallels elsewhere.

Daniel Richter, for example, observed that among the Haudenosaunee:

the War of Spanish Succession had proved that the Five Nations could trust their survival in the hands of neither European empire... Anglophiles and francophiles remained, but the vast majority of Iroquois now agreed with the neutralists in their determination now to rely on native cultural resources rather than on exclusive alliances with the colonial powers.¹⁴⁸

The migration to central Mi'kma'ki reflected a similar spirit. The development of missions and increased French gift giving drew some of the Mi'kmaq from Kespe'kewaq and Sikniktewaq, but the more important trend was migration away from both French and British administrative centres. The violence along the coast and threat of imperial attacks led the Mi'kmaq to locations where their families could live more stable lives. In central Mi'kma'ki, the Mi'kmaq were able to easily return to their hunting and fishing territories without the risks associated with living there more permanently.

¹⁴⁸ Daniel K. Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 235.

Part 1: Conclusion

By 1740 the Mi'kmaw world that Antoine Gaulin enumerated in 1708 had dramatically changed. The conquest of Acadia caused the Mi'kmaq's geopolitical situation to shift rapidly and radically. Between 1705 and 1715 the region transformed from an Aboriginal space, where the French had a limited influence, to a land divided between European empires. The Mi'kmaq were pitted between French attempts to strengthen their alliance, and British efforts to diminish tensions and integrate them into the British empire. The Mi'kmaq living near each imperial centre sought to minimize conflict by building a stable relationship with their European neighbours. Mi'kmaq living further from Europeans resisted European expansion when it did not recognize their claims to Mi'kma'ki's land and resources.

The violence against the British was one of the principal differences between how the Mi'kmaq and Huron-Wendat responded to the conquest. Although the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq initially sought peace for reasons similar to the Huron-Wendat, the period immediately after the conquest was defined by conflict. Two principal reasons, and one less significant contributing factor, led to the eruption of violence after the Treaty of Utrecht.

The Treaty of Utrecht marked the first time that the Mi'kmaq learned that Europeans ignored their claims to Mi'kma'ki's land and resources. The weak alliance with France before the conquest had not brought the Mi'kmaq tightly into a European sphere of influence, nor had it prepared them for Britain's claim on their land. Upset

with both France and Britain, the Mi'kmaq repeatedly told imperial officials that the land Europeans occupied belonged to them and not to the French or British crown.

The Mi'kmaq feared British expansion beyond Annapolis Royal. Having fought alongside the Abenaki in their resistance against New England's northward expansion, the Mi'kmaw took every opportunity to resist a similar extension of British influence. Informal attacks on the Mi'kmaq in 1714 and 1715, particularly along the coast, aggravated this situation. The Mi'kmaq saw these as acts of war, leading to nearly a decade of intermittent violence. Without a clear set of direction, strong leadership, and the resources to make their presence felt, the British could not prevent these conflicts.

France was much more successful at building a relationship with the Mi'kmaq. Using the same tools that they had developed with the Abenaki, France employed religious missions, gift giving and the language of alliance to strengthen its relationship with the Mi'kmaq and draw them into the territory between the two empires. French censuses and qualitative descriptions of the Mi'kmaw population demonstrate that the population in the area around these missions was growing at a rapid rate in the post-conquest environment, particularly after 1726. The Mi'kmaw population in this part of Mi'kma'ki more than doubled in the fifteen years between the 1722 and 1735 censuses, while elsewhere it had remained the same or was in decline, suggesting that these policies were effective.

The French approach had its limitations, however. Most importantly, although the Mi'kmaw population around French missions increased over this period, the Unama'kik Mi'kmaw population – who lived closest to the French – declined. Having left the

communities around Unama'kik out of the Mi'kmaw-Abenaki war councils during the early-1720s, the broad Mi'kmaw polity was likely wary of being too closely associated with the French at Louisbourg. Even after many Mi'kmaq had moved into the region around the French missions in the 1740s, France's close relationship with the Mi'kmaq did not translate into widespread military support.

Mi'kmaw demographic patterns help explain how the Mi'kmaq responded to these changes. The moderate-to-high fertility ratio suggests that the stresses typically associated with migration (postponed menarche, a longer period of lactation, male absenteeism) did not play an important role in regulating Mi'kmaw fertility. It also indicates that the Mi'kmaq were well nourished and that their population was increasing at the turn of the eighteenth century. Under these conditions, it is possible that Mi'kmaw households remained nearer to the coast – where there was a more stable food supply – and the isolation of Mi'kmaw households from one another during the winter hunting months – particularly men from women – was less important than has generally been assumed. As imperial tensions increased, the Mi'kmaq likely moved to places where they could maintain a similar lifestyle away from European influence.

This was particularly important for the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq, who, even before the conquest, faced greater challenges caused by disease, warfare and competition with French settlers for local resources. These patterns were exacerbated after the conquest as the population of French settlers increased, the Mi'kmaq at Port Royal were held responsible for Aboriginal actions elsewhere in the region, and the increasing presence of New England fishers amplified conflict along the coast. In an effort to protect their

population and maintain access to important food supplies, these Mi'kmaq responded to these challenges by reducing the amount of time spent near these sites of conflict, which reduced their access to the coast and increased migration to the interior.

Some Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq likely moved up to Shubenacadie and the upper Bay of Fundy, but many became more closely associated with the summer village at La Hève. La Hève was only a short and relatively easy journey from Annapolis Royal and throughout this period it had the highest child-woman ratio of all Mi'kmaw communities in peninsular Mi'kma'ki. As part of this summer village, the Mi'kmaq could continue using their traditional land and resources without living as close to the British as they had in the 1710s and 1720s. Decisions to migrate into the area between the upper Bay of Fundy and Northumberland Strait were likely governed by a similar calculus. Being centrally located, Mi'kmaw households could visit French missions during the summer when resources were abundant and the French willing to give gifts; they could return to their more traditional hunting territories in the winter. On the whole, the Mi'kmaq chose to withdraw from European centres in an effort to maintain their autonomy and reduce the impact of European disease and warfare on their population.

The division between French- and British- occupied Mi'kma'ki did not create a political situation where the Mi'kmaq were free agents able to play European empires off one another; rather they were required to develop political relationships with both European powers while maintaining connections among themselves. Mi'kma'ki had been a European borderland since the early 1620s, when William Alexander claimed as Nova Scotia the territory France considered Acadia. Throughout the seventeenth century

Mi'kma'ki remained contested ground for Europeans, but European actions had little impact on Mi'kmaw society. It became a divided land in 1710. The British occupation of Mi'kma'ki after 1710 caused the Mi'kmaq to engage Europeans more directly. As a result, they moved further away from European settlements and administrative centres. The process of dividing Mi'kmaw land between European empires, and not the creation of a borderland between them, shaped the dynamics of the region during the first half of the eighteenth century.

Part Two: Introduction

In 1745, the Huron-Wendat captured William Pote during a French attempt to retake Annapolis Royal. They brought him to Quebec. On the evening of 24 July they arrived near the town. Rather than head into Quebec at such a late hour, the Huron-Wendat and their captives camped on Île d'Orleans. The next morning, the Huron-Wendat painted themselves and their prisoners, mounted the scalps that they had taken on poles in the middle of their canoes, and departed for Quebec.

As they neared the town, the Huron-Wendat let out a series of whoops, some to represent the number of their captives, others for the number of scalps, and others for those that they had killed. Once close to land the group stopped and waited for the town's people to assemble on the shore. As they gathered, a fleet of canoes came swiftly towards Pote and his captors from up river. Seeing this threat, Pote's captor told him to paddle for his life, and once on shore to run and "not to Stop." On shore, two other Huron-Wendat grabbed him and encouraged him to move quickly to the back of the crowd where they took him to a nearby house.

Once safely inside the house Pote met Joseph Marin de la Malgue, son of Paul Marin de la Malgue, who had been the commander of the French expedition that captured him. Marin told him that it was custom when captives were brought to Quebec that Aboriginal people living far up river would come down and try to overtake the prisoners before they reached the first house. If caught, these Aboriginal people would torture their

new captives; if not, they would be held prisoner by either the Huron-Wendat or the French.¹

This account of Pote's arrival in Quebec demonstrates how the Huron-Wendat were integrated into Quebec society. If Pote's account is to be believed, and there is little corroborating evidence, what he experienced was a highly scripted performance which separated the Huron-Wendat from the town, but also integrated them into its structure and culture. The return of the war party, along with their captives, was a routine ritual for both the region's Aboriginal people and the town's residents. The Huron-Wendat were a permanent part of the town's life, but continued to be set apart by their different culture and economy.

Their existence both within, and yet apart, from the French, and later British, encapsulates the Huron-Wendat position in Quebec society. Unlike the Mi'kmaq, who continued to live in a world that was principally defined by Aboriginal people, the Huron-Wendat simultaneously lived in two different worlds. The first was made up of Aboriginal people in the St. Lawrence valley, shaped by the interconnections among Aboriginal communities and principally manifest through the administration of hunting territories. The second was made up of Europeans along the banks of the St. Lawrence River. Physically – and metaphorically – Jeune-Lorette was located within these two spaces. The village's geographic location created the conditions in which members of the community selectively engaged both worlds. As the impact of the conquest was slowly felt in the community, however, the distinction between these worlds became

¹ William Pote, *The Journal of Captain William Pote, Jr.*, (New York: Dodd & Mead, 1896), 76-78.

increasingly blurred, leading to the Huron-Wendat increasing their engagement with the European world of the St. Lawrence. At the end of the eighteenth century, access to European forms of education helped the community ensure that their desires were heard (if not always accepted) by colonial administrators.

The idea of separate Aboriginal and European worlds in early modern North America is not original. The differing ways in which Aboriginal societies have lived within and between these two worlds, particularly the world introduced by Europeans in the seventeenth century, has long been the study of historians, archaeologists and anthropologists, and underpins the events and themes discussed in part one. The case of the Huron-Wendat is different from these other studies because the community was deeply rooted within both worlds simultaneously.

Conceptualizing Aboriginal people as living simultaneously within two worlds adds to our understanding of Jeune-Lorette in two important ways. First, it draws together Aboriginal and European worlds without reducing them to a binary analysis emphasizing accommodation, mutual construction or resistance to outside influences. Many studies of the Huron-Wendat focused on the ways in which the community engaged separately with either the Aboriginal or European worlds, or how they created limited common spaces between the two worlds. The chapters that follow do not completely disagree with these interpretations; rather, in balancing how community members engaged with the European and Aboriginal worlds, I argue that like the situation Aboriginal people found themselves in British Columbia a century later, the

Huron-Wendat engaged in both worlds selectively.² Theirs was a moditional culture – to use the terminology recently suggested by John Lutz – in which the language and ideas of the ‘middle ground’ or ‘common ground’ do not adequately encapsulate Huron-Wendat practices.³ The second point derives from this. The emphasis on how the Huron-Wendat negotiated between these two worlds contextualizes a principal historiographical debate over whether the Huron-Wendat were allies or subjects of the crown.

The history of eighteenth-century Aboriginal migration into the St. Lawrence valley created a different spatial dynamic than the division of Mi'kmaw and Abenaki land between the French and British empires. With the French hardly established in Quebec and Montreal when the Huron-Wendat migrated to the region in the late 1640s and early 1650s, the development of their agreements with Aboriginal neighbours regarding hunting territory paralleled the growth of French seigneurialism. With their village in Sillery/St. Gabriel and their hunting territory effectively beyond European control, the Huron-Wendat (and most of the other Aboriginal communities in the valley) existed in a space with overlapping meanings. These communities physically embodied the post-colonial concept of multiple subjectivities, whereby they occupied both a

² See Cole Harris, *Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002).

³ Lutz defines moditional economies as economies “which combined the traditional modes of reproduction and production (for subsistence, prestige goods, and exchange – trade was always a part of the pre-European economy) with new modes of production for exchange in a capitalist market... they are as resilient and as long-lived as capitalism. Historically, people have engaged in multiple modes of production at different times of the day and year: they hunted, fished, gathered, farmed, raised their children, and exchanged their labour in different combinations, and as opportunities presented themselves. I refer to this mixed-mode production system as the ‘moditional economy.’” See John Sutton Lutz, *Makúk: A New History of Aboriginal-White Relations*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 23-24. I have borrowed from this, extending his analysis to culture.

colonial and autonomous position along the St. Lawrence.⁴ Jeune-Lorette shares many similarities with Allan Greer's depiction of seventeenth-century Kahnawake; it was simultaneously both a Jesuit mission and Aboriginal village.⁵

Looking at a moditional culture spatially modifies our understanding of Aboriginal-European interactions. Rather than seeing the St. Lawrence valley as distinctly part of New France, space in St. Gabriel seigneurie and north of the town of Quebec was mutually constructed, creating places where both Aboriginal and French jurisdictions operated simultaneously. Jan Grabowski has called this confluence the 'common ground,' a modification on Richard White's 'middle ground.' He argues that Aboriginal people were an integral part of society in Montreal.⁶ This is not an appropriate concept for the Quebec region, where French farmers significantly outnumbered Aboriginal people. Quebec was neither a middle ground nor a common ground; rather the land around Quebec was a shared space where French and Aboriginal worlds co-existed but were not always mutually negotiated and constructed.

As I will discuss at the end of chapter five, this context is best demonstrated by the way that the Huron-Wendat engaged with the land around the village. The Huron-Wendat managed land in many ways. Within the seigneurie, community members bought and sold land and paid seigneurial dues; they were exempt from paying dues within the village, but hired notaries and surveyors to help administer the allocation of land; and in

⁴ See Franz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, Charles Lam Markham, trans., (New York: Grove Press, 1967); Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, (New York: Routledge, 1994).

⁵ Allan Greer, *Mohawk Saint: Catherine Tekakwitha and the Jesuits*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2005), 90-91.

⁶ Jan Grabowski, *The Common Ground: Settled Natives and French in Montreal, 1667-1760*, (Ph.D. diss., University of Montreal, 1993). Allan Greer has also suggested that this area was a sort of Middle Ground involving newcomer Mohawk and French populations. See Greer, 98-99.

their hunting territory, their relationships and diplomacy with neighbouring Aboriginal communities governed their land use. Although each of these places fell within the purview of the government of Quebec, the varying strength of colonial and Aboriginal influence and power along the St. Lawrence shaped how these people chose to use the land.

Two reasons explain why these different forms of land tenure have not been observed before. First, the evidence on which this argument is based – notarial records – is very difficult to use.⁷ The second reason is the ambiguity over whether the Huron-Wendat paid seigneurial dues in the first place. In a recent article on Aboriginal people and colonial law, Denys Delâge and Etienne Gilbert refer to a court case that emphasized that “le village des Hurons n’était à cette époque [pas] soumis aux impôts du système seigneurial...”⁸ They do not clarify whether these statements refer specifically to community lands or to the broad Huron-Wendat relationship with the Jesuit seigneurs.⁹ The confusion over this issue seems to have begun with the anthropological work of Léon

⁷ See the appendix for a more thorough discussion of notarial records.

⁸ Denys Delâge et Étienne Gilbert, “Les Amérindiens face à la justice coloniale française dans le gouvernement de Québec, 1663-1759 : I – Les crimes capitaux et leurs châtements,” *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. 33, no. 3, (2003), 79. Author’s translation: “at this time the Huron village was not subject to seigneurial dues...” They were more explicit in their article on British law : «Il en est résulté un système seigneurial hybride où non seulement des Amérindiens domiciliés n’ont jamais été soumis au paiement du cens mais encore un système qui les a faits eux-mêmes seigneurs, collectivement.» See Denys Delâge et Étienne Gilbert, “La justice coloniale britannique et les Amérindiens au Québec 1760-1820 : I – En terres amérindiennes,” *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. 32, no. 1, (2002), 70. Author’s translation: “It resulted in a hybrid seigneurial system where not only did Aboriginal people not pay the cens, but it was also a system that made them collective seigneurs.” This idea has also been perpetuated in Denys Delâge, “Le tradition de commerce chez les Hurons de Lorette-Wendake,” *RAAQ*, vol. 30, no. 3 (2000), 35 and 37; Denys Delâge, “Les Hurons de Lorette dans leur contexte historique en 1760,” and Cornelius Jaenen, “Rapport historique sur la nation huronne-wendat,” in Denis Vaugeois, *Les Hurons de Lorette*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 1996), 120-121, 184.

⁹ Delâge notes that there are some Huron-Wendat who acquired land outside of the village in his contribution to Denis Vaugeois, ed., *Les Hurons de Lorette*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 1996), 122. He does not go into much detail about these holdings, however, and suggests that they are more-or-less isolated phenomena.

Gérin who claimed that there was no individual property holding in Jeune-Lorette.¹⁰ The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the Huron-Wendat only held land in the village. It does not take into account the variety of forms of land holding that existed around Jeune-Lorette during the eighteenth century.

The focus of scholarly attention on political and diplomatic issues, rather than the social and cultural dynamics of these communities, is another key reason for the lack of engagement with Huron-Wendat notarial records. Although they were focused on the legal system, Delâge and Gilbert's work emphasized the justice system rather than lower forms of the law such as property law. This approach led them to conclude that European and Aboriginal law formed parallel and separate justice systems in the St. Lawrence valley for most of the eighteenth century. It was not until 1796, according to their research, that Aboriginal people began to appear before British courts in cases that did not involve Europeans.¹¹

Had they focused on the everyday aspects of the law – particularly property transactions – they might have modified their conclusions. Without discarding the concept of parallel legal structures, part two suggests that people living within the colonial sphere of influence selectively employed European and Aboriginal forms of law depending on the location of the land which they sought to use – not based on their own

¹⁰ Léon Gérin, "Le Huron de Lorette," in Denis Vaugeois, ed., *Les Hurons de Lorette*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 1996), 41. Gérin, who wrote at the turn of the twentieth century, seems to have based many of his conclusions on personal experience and interactions with the community. His conclusion here may reflect changes in property holding during the nineteenth century, although I have not conducted enough research on this period to be certain. The evidence presented in chapter five, however, indicates that in the eighteenth century there seems to have been a fairly clear conception of individual property holding within the village, which is why they had the land surveyed.

¹¹ Delâge et Gilbert, "La justice coloniale britannique et les Amérindiens au Québec 1760-1820 : I – En terres amérindiennes," 64.

subject position within colonial or Aboriginal society. This is in keeping with Delâge and Gilbert's broader conclusions. Andrée Lajoie and Grabowski separate the operation of the legal system based on its application in Aboriginal territory (including the villages along the St. Lawrence) and colonial territory to illustrate how, by the late 1790s, Aboriginal people in the region began to use the British justice system.¹² A similar type of division took place in terms of land use. Colonial law applied to land within seigneuries. A hybrid system operated within the village. And an Aboriginal system based on broader alliances and connections governed their hunting territory. This plural system, which Delâge and Gilbert see as a function of the late eighteenth century, was in full swing as early as 1733. It is very important to note, however, that the legal nature of the Huron-Wendat petitions to the crown, which began in 1791, reflects the historiographical emphasis on the 1790s as a key period of transition in the legal history of Aboriginal-European relations. The central point, though, is that this was more of a shift in emphasis than a completely new form of engagement.

Understanding Huron-Wendat land use situates the historiographical debate over the position of the Huron-Wendat in the St. Lawrence valley. This debate is encapsulated in historians' responses to the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in *R. v. Sioui*. In 1990 the court ruled that a short document signed by James Murray on 5 September 1760 was a treaty. The so-called 'Murray Treaty' granted the Huron-Wendat safe passage back to

¹² See Delâge et Gilbert, "Les Amérindiens face à la justice coloniale française dans le gouvernement de Québec, 1663-1759 : I – Les crimes capitaux et leurs châtements," 87; Denys Delâge et Étienne Gilbert, "Les Amérindiens face à la justice coloniale française dans le gouvernement de Québec, 1663-1759 : II – Eau-de-vie, traite des fourrures, endettement, affaires civiles," *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. 34, no. 1, (2004), 41; Denys Delâge et Étienne Gilbert, "La justice coloniale britannique et les Amérindiens au Québec 1760-1820 : II – En terres colonial," *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. 32, no. 2, (2002), 110. Jan Grabowski made a similar observation for the Montreal area. See Grabowski, 310.

Jeune-Lorette from Montreal, but, significantly, it also contained clauses ensuring the preservation of Huron-Wendat religion (Catholicism), commerce and customs.¹³ The court's decision created considerable debate among historians, led by Québécois publisher Denis Vaugeois. It focused on whether the court had made the right decision in ruling the document a treaty. Vaugeois, Alain Beaulieu, Peter MacLeod, and Marcel Trudel all argued against the decision, claiming that the document did not correspond with other British-Aboriginal treaties. Denys Delâge, the leading historian supporting the court's decision, insisted that the Huron-Wendat developed an alliance-based relationship with both the French and British colonial governments.

The status of Aboriginal people living near French colonial towns in the mid-eighteenth century was a central issue in the debate. While the scholars who shared Vaugeois's perspective argued that the Aboriginal-French relationship was akin to subjecthood, Delâge and Cornelius Jaenen argued that this relationship formed the foundation of an alliance. At the heart of these differences lie varying interpretations over the role and influence of Jeune-Lorette in French and Aboriginal worlds.¹⁴

Within this historiographical division are a series of more nuanced perspectives. Alain Beaulieu, for example, argues in response to the Sioui decision that although initially allies with the French, the Huron-Wendat slowly became subjects. Over time they were "christianisé, francisés, et métissés."¹⁵ He suggests that the village's role in the

¹³ 'James Murray to Hurons of Lorette', 5 Sept 1760, Centre de référence de l'Amérique française, Faribault, no. 256.

¹⁴ For more information see Denis Vaugeois, *Les Fins des Alliances* (Sillery: Septentrion, 1995); Vaugeois, *Les Hurons de Lorette*; Denys Delâge and Jean-Pierre Sawaya, *Les Traités des Sept Feux avec les Britanniques: droits et pièges d'un héritage colonial au Québec*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 2001), chap. 4.

¹⁵ Vaugeois, *Les Hurons de Lorette*, 14.

Seven Years' War, though marginal relative to other Aboriginal communities, fit within the broader pattern of Aboriginal-French alliances, demonstrating the important ways that the logic of alliance continued throughout the 1750s. In his view, the logic of alliance ended with the Murray Treaty.¹⁶ Denys Delâge disagrees, arguing that the exemption from seigneurial dues and the existence of contraband trading between Albany and the communities around Montreal indicates that these communities were not subjects of the French crown.¹⁷ In an earlier article, however, Delâge reveals a similar perspective to Beaulieu. In reference to the communities around Montreal, he argues that they were allies but subject to French attempts at domination and assimilation.¹⁸

Jean Tanguay made a similar point, emphasizing French attempts at rendering these communities subject to the crown, while at the same time illustrating how they continued to manifest their military and economic independence.¹⁹ Tanguay also helps delineate some of the complexity of the issue by highlighting the French use of a double language.²⁰ When engaging with people in North America the French most often preferred a language of alliance – particularly with Aboriginal people but also with English governments – but when interacting with their European superiors, colonial officials often used the language of conquest and submission.²¹ Michel Lavoie has traced

¹⁶ Alain Beaulieu, "Les Hurons et la Conquête : Un nouvel éclairage sur le 'traité Murray'" *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. XXX, no. 3 (2000), 54-55, 61.

¹⁷ Denys Delâge, "Les Hurons de Lorette dans leur contexte historique en 1760," in Denis Vaugeois, ed., *Les Hurons de Lorette* (Sillery: Septentrion, 1996), 116-118.

¹⁸ Denys Delâge, "Les Iroquois chrétiens des 'réductions', 1667-1770 : I : Migration et rapports avec les Français," *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. XXI, no. 1-2 (1991), 59-70.

¹⁹ Jean Tanguay, "La Liberté d'Errer et de Vaquer : Les Hurons de Lorette et l'Occupation du Territoire, XVIIe-XIXe siècles," (MA Thesis, Université Laval, 1998), chap. 4.

²⁰ There are a number of similarities between the double language that Tanguay identifies and John Reid's concept of double diplomacy discussed in part one.

²¹ Tanguay, 73.

how the British capitalized on this difference between Aboriginal and European perspectives on the position of Aboriginal people in North America by employing a policy of ‘indirect rule.’ This policy allowed the British to retain many French Regime institutions while overseeing their overall administration. By adopting this policy, the new colonial power slowed any impact that the conquest might have had, while securing their control over the colony.²² For the Seven Fires this meant that initially the British did not challenge Aboriginal conceptions of alliance, but rather worked to create structures that built dependence on the colonial regime.

This idea builds on Jean-Pierre Sawaya’s work on the Seven Fires. He argues that the British strategy of indirect rule subtly brought the Seven Fires into a more dependant position over the first decade and a half of British rule.²³ Sawaya’s perspective – which shares much in common with Delâge and Tanguay – deals with the tensions between alliance and dependence, suggesting that for the mid-eighteenth century these communities might best be seen as dependant allies. Gilles Havard made a similar point, but one that resonates more closely with scholars like Beaulieu, considering the domicilié communities as sovereign subjects during the French Regime.²⁴ These two ideas are merely two sides of the same coin, and are rooted in Eccles’s concept of sovereignty-association between Aboriginal societies and the French crown. The rhetorical similarities between Sawaya’s and Havard’s work demonstrate that the central difference

²² Michel Lavoie, “*C’est ma seigneurie que je réclame*” : *Le lutte des Hurons de Lorette pour la seigneurie de Sillery, 1760-1888*, (PhD. Diss., Université Laval, 2006), 70.

²³ Jean-Pierre Sawaya, *Alliances et Dépendance: Comment la couronne britannique a obtenu la collaboration des Indiens de la vallée du Saint-Laurent entre 1760-1774*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 2002).

²⁴ Gilles Havard, “Les forcer à devenir Citoyens’ État, Sauvages et citoyenneté en Nouvelle-France (XVIIe – XVIIIe siècle),” *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales*, no. 5 (Sept-Oct 2009), 1017.

in this debate is one of perspective based on the relative weight and influence attributed to European institutions and culture on Aboriginal societies.

Whether dependant allies or sovereign subjects the central issue is that the Huron-Wendat lived in both worlds. The relative influence of these worlds divides these scholars. Those who argue that the people living in the Seven Fires communities were subjects of European empires acknowledge that the French and British (at least initially) highly valued the Huron-Wendat military and economic culture. Those that consider these communities as allies emphasize the significant difference in power wielded by Europeans relative to that of the Aboriginal communities along the St. Lawrence. Huron-Wendat existence in these two worlds makes it difficult to adequately encapsulate their position vis-à-vis colonial authorities. Both sides formulate good arguments with convincing evidence. At times the Huron-Wendat appear more as subjects of the French or British crowns, while at other times they clearly operated independently of European interests. This situation, balanced between alliance and subjection, did not change during the eighteenth century. As with their selective use of European legal structures, the dynamics of the relationship changed during the French and British regimes. The general tensions between the ideas of alliance and subjection, however, continued throughout the period. The interaction between Aboriginal and European worlds was slow and uneven.

Like the world in which William Pote found himself in 1745, where Aboriginal and European cultures came together but hardly intersected, the St. Lawrence valley was a place where alliance and subjection could co-exist. Rather than being binary opposites, the historiographical conflict between alliance and subjection developed out of

French/Huron-Wendat mutual co-habitation. Placing greater emphasis on the plural nature of the St. Lawrence valley resolves some of these contradictions by illustrating how Aboriginal and European peoples engaged with each other and the spaces around them. The chapters that follow lay out the plural nature of this world, and how its dynamics slowly shifted after the fall of Quebec.

Chapter 5: Jeune-Lorette, Wendaké and St. Gabriel


By 1730 the Huron-Wendat at Jeune-Lorette were deeply entrenched in two worlds. In one, they maintained and strengthened their relationships with neighbouring Aboriginal communities. In the other, they interacted regularly with their French neighbours, buying and selling land, small crafts and furs. Together these two worlds shaped almost every aspect of the community's life, from the way that they interacted with their environment and structured their economy to how they balanced their relationships with the French crown and other Aboriginal people. Unlike in Montreal where a common ground existed, Aboriginal people had a significantly smaller presence around Quebec. The much larger proportion of French settlers left little room for common ground between these worlds.

This chapter describes the Huron-Wendat position in overlapping French and Aboriginal worlds. It situates the community in the broader context of their local, regional and more distant relationships. The first part of the chapter addresses the Huron-Wendat relationship with French settlers and administrators, demonstrating the dependencies that had developed between these people by the mid-eighteenth century. The second part examines their relationships with other Aboriginal communities in the northeast. It emphasizes the variety of different relationships which connected the Huron-Wendat to events both along Atlantic shores and in the Great Lakes region. The final section brings these two discussions together to illustrate how their involvement in both these worlds shaped how they administered land in their village and elsewhere around Quebec.

The Huron-Wendat in the heart of New France

During the eighteenth century no Aboriginal society lived closer to the centre of a European colonial power than the Huron-Wendat. Located about thirteen kilometres away from the governor's chateau, and within one of the most populated seigneuries in the colony, the Huron-Wendat were surrounded by French and other European influences. They interacted with the French farmers who lived around their village, adopted French and New England settlers into their community, lived within a Catholic mission, and participated in, and supplied, French military actions.

Map 5.1: Quebec Seigneuries in the Eighteenth Century¹



¹ This map uses geo-spatial data from the Canadian Land Inventory – Soil Capability for Agriculture, (<http://geogratias.cgdi.gc.ca/cgi-bin/geogratias/cli/agriculture.pl>), accessed 9 November 2009. It is for general reference only. The Canadian Land Inventory uses current data. The more heavily urbanized areas of Quebec City, which were farmed in the eighteenth century, therefore do not display information about the soil.

Jeune-Lorette was different from other domicilié communities living along the St. Lawrence. The Huron-Wendat village was very small. According to a 1781 survey it only included twenty arpents of arable land, six arpents of pasture, and thirty four arpents of woods.² Because of its small size, the Jesuits granted the community an additional sixteen hundred square arpents about three kilometres from the village in 1742. The population of Jeune-Lorette was only about one hundred and fifty people for most of the period under study.³ In contrast, in 1739 there were 549 French settlers living in the censives around the village.⁴ Unlike in Montreal, where the ratio between Aboriginal and French populations was much more balanced; the Huron-Wendat were significantly

² Registre contenant une copie des aveux et dénombrements des seigneuries des Révérends Pères Jésuites situées dans les districts de Québec et Montréal, le premier en date du 12 décembre 1781 et le second, du 17 janvier 1733, BANQ-QUE, E21, s64, ss5, sss1, d283, f. 29; see also St. Gabriel Names of the Tenants Censitaires, n.d., CO 42-75, f. 20v-21. An arpent is a term of measurement. One arpent equals about 5/6 acres. The total village size was about fifty acres.

³ Concrete information on the village population is difficult to find during this period. Official estimates tend to vary; while nominal lists of village residents and even the few village censuses are often incomplete. All forms of enumeration focused on men. There is no source for the Huron-Wendat similar to the 1708 Mi'kmaw census. Most estimates suggest that the village could muster between thirty to forty warriors, but there is some evidence that this number could have been as high as sixty. Using the average family size from the 1784 census (four people per family) and assuming that each warrior had a family, we can estimate that the village population was between 120 and 160 but possibly as high as 240 before the conquest. The lower end of this estimate fits with the French military engineer Louis Franquet's observation that there were 120 people living in the village in 1752. See *Revue des Indiens qui ont suivi les Français pour la guerre, 17 Aug 1684*, C11A-6, f. 267; Enumeration of the Indian Tribes connected with the Government of Canada; the Warriors and Armorial bearings of each Nation, 1736, in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 9, 1052; *Détail de toute la colonie, [1737]*, C11A-67, f. 102v; Governor Clinton to the Duke of Newcastle, 27 March 1745, in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 6, 276; D. Peter MacLeod, *Northern Armageddon: The Battle of the Plains of Abraham: Eight Minutes of Gunfire that Shaped a Continent*, (Toronto, Douglas & McIntyre, 2008), 73; Registre contenant un recensement nominatif pour les paroisses situées dans les seigneuries des Jésuites en 1784, BANQ-QUE, E21, S64, SS5, SSS1, D288; Louis Franquet, *Voyages et mémoires sur le Canada*, (Québec: A. Côté & Cie, 1889), 107. See the appendix for more on the challenges of using censuses.

⁴ Statistics Canada. *NF - Statement of the Population of Canada, 1739 - New France* (table), 1739 - Census of New France (database), Using E-STAT (distributor). http://estat.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-win/cnsmcgi.exe?Lang=E&EST-Fi=EStat\English\SC_RR-eng.htm (accessed: September 22, 2010). A censive is a parcel of land which a seigneur granted to a French settler.

outnumbered.⁵ The small population size coupled with the growing number of French neighbours created an environment where the border between the Huron-Wendat village and neighbouring French seigneurie was highly permeable.

Throughout the eighteenth century, the Huron-Wendat selectively adopted French technology and economic practices. They developed a modifical economy that combined customary and European forms of agriculture, hunting, and trade.⁶ The Huron-Wendat continued the seasonal hunting patterns established in early Wendaké, where hunting took place in the autumn and late winter and fishing was pursued year-round.⁷ Agriculture also continued; the Scandinavian naturalist Pehr Kalm, who visited the village in 1749, observed that the Huron-Wendat grew maize, sunflowers, wheat and rye and also kept some cattle.⁸ By this time the Huron-Wendat had a hybrid culture. Community members had integrated European livestock and crops into their economic

⁵ In Montreal there was a 2.6:1 ratio of settlers to Aboriginal people while the ratio was 4.6:1 in the area around Jeune-Lorette, and 61.3:1 for the entire area around Quebec. See Grabowski, 67; Statistics Canada. *NF - Statement of the Population, 1754 - New France* (table), 1754 - Census of New France (database), Using E-STAT (distributor).

http://estat.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-win/cnsmcgi.exe?Lang=E&EST-Fi=EStat\English\SC_RR-eng.htm

(accessed: September 22, 2010); Statistics Canada. *NF - Statement of the Population of Canada, 1739 - New France* (table), 1739 - Census of New France (database), Using E-STAT (distributor).

http://estat.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-win/cnsmcgi.exe?Lang=E&EST-Fi=EStat\English\SC_RR-eng.htm

(accessed: September 22, 2010). The ratio for Montreal was calculated using the population for Kahnawake and Montreal in 1754. The ratio for Quebec was calculated by adding the 1739 population of the seigneuries around Quebec (Champigny, Gaudarville, Jeune Lorette, Notre-Dame-des-Anges, Charlesbourg, St. Bernard, St. Gabriel, St. Ignace, Ste-Foy, Sillery, Beauport and the town of Quebec). The total comes to 7355.

⁶ John Sutton Lutz, *Makúk: A New History of Aboriginal-White Relations*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 23-24.

⁷ Bruce Trigger, *Children of Aataensic: A History of the Huron People to 1660* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976), 41-3; Joselyn Tehatarongnantase Paul, "Le territoire de chasse des Hurons de Lorette," *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, Vol. 30, no. 3. (2000), 6; Jean Tanguay, "Les règles d'alliance et l'occupation huronne du territoire," *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, Vol. 30, no. 3. (2000), 23.

⁸ Peter Kalm, *Travels into North America*, vol. 2, 2nd ed., trans. John Reinhold Forester (London: T. Lowdens, 1772), 308-9.

and subsistence traditions, but wheat did not fully replace maize or sunflowers, nor did livestock replace hunting and fishing.

The importance of agriculture to the village's economy has generally been thought to have decreased during the eighteenth century due to the poor quality of soil around Jeune-Lorette.⁹ Although agriculture may have declined, it continued to play a role within the community. Accounts of its diminishing importance reflect the community's political posturing during negotiations with the British (discussed in chapter seven) and also result from the gender bias of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century observers.

Post-conquest sources describe the extent of agriculture in Jeune-Lorette. George Heriot, who visited in the early-nineteenth century, was one of the few people to describe the scope of Huron-Wendat agriculture. He observed that the community sowed about two hundred acres (240 arpents) of corn.¹⁰ These fields were likely located on the sixteen hundred square arpents granted to the village in 1742.¹¹ This amounted to about 7.5 square arpents of cultivated land per household at the turn of the nineteenth century.¹² A

⁹ Léon Gérin, "Le Huron de Lorette," in Denis Vaugeois, ed., *Les Hurons de Lorette*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 1996), 22-23.

¹⁰ George Heriot, *Travels through the Canadas, Containing a description of the picturesque scenery on some of the rivers and lakes; with an account of the Productions, Commerce and Inhabitants of those provinces* (Philadelphia: M. Carey, 1813), 93.

¹¹ *Appendice du Quatrième volume des journaux de l'Assemblée Législative de la Province du Canada du 28 Novembre 1844, au 29 mars 1845, ces deux jours compris et dans la Huitième année du Règne de Notre Souveraine Dame La Reine Victoria: Première session du second Parlement Provincial du Canada* (Montréal: L. Perrault, 1845), EEE-23; *Appendix to the sixth volume of the Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada, From the 2nd Day of June to the 28th Day of July 1847...* (Montreal: R. Campbell, 1847), T-82 and T-83.

¹² This calculation is derived by dividing the land under cultivation by the thirty two families observed by Joseph Bouchette in 1821. See Joseph Bouchette, *A Topographical Dictionary of the Province of Lower Canada*, in Joseph Bouchette, *The British Dominions in North America; or a topographical and statistical description of the provinces of Lower and Upper Canada...* vol. 2 (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1831).

government report somewhat confirms these numbers, indicating that each family in the village cultivated about 3-4 square arpents of land.¹³ This was slightly less than they required during the seventeenth century. Conrad Heidenreich determined that the Huron-Wendat needed 2.3 acres of land per person in early Wendaké, while Heriot's observations suggest that each person used between 1.6 and 2 acres in Jeune-Lorette.¹⁴ The French settlers also used more land. In 1781 the average family in St. Gabriel cultivated twenty-two square arpents; twenty-two farmers had seven square arpents or less.¹⁵ Although it is clear that relative to their neighbours the Huron-Wendat farmed less, agriculture maintained its importance in Huron-Wendat society.

The difference between European and Huron-Wendat gender norms partially accounts for why European visitors thought that agriculture had diminished. Unlike the farms of their French neighbours, agriculture in Jeune-Lorette continued, as it had in early Wendaké, to be women's work. With the exception of Kalm and to a lesser extent Heriot, most other visitors used gendered language to dismiss agriculture as relatively inconsequential to the Huron-Wendat economy. In 1776, F. V. Melsheimer, a military

¹³ Rapport sur les Affaires des Sauvages en Canada, sections 1^{ère} et 2^{ème}. Mis devant l'Assemblée Législative, le 20 Mars 1845. #6 : Hurons de la Jeune Lorette, in *Appendice du Quatrième volume des journaux de l'Assemblée Législative de la Province du Canada du 28 Novembre 1844, au 29 mars 1845, ces deux jours compris et dans la Huitième année du Règne de Notre Souveraine Dame La Reine Victoria: Première session du second Parlement Provincial du Canada* (Montréal: L. Perrault, 1845), Appendix EEE.

¹⁴ Conrad Heidenreich, *Huronian: A History and Geography of the Huron Indians, 1600-1650*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 198. This is a crude comparison. A deeper understanding of the soil fertility in the two places is required. Nonetheless, there is some similarity between Wendaké and Jeune-Lorette, which make this superficial comparison useful. Both sites were located on predominantly sandy loam soil structures which made agriculture somewhat marginal. For more information on soil in these two places see Heidenreich, 195-200; Gérin, 22-23; and Cole Harris, *The seigneurial System in Early Canada: A Geographical Study*, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1966), 16-17.

¹⁵ Registre avec index contenant l'État général des biens des Jésuites dans la province de Québec, comprenant l'aveu et dénombrement de 1781, BANQ-QUE, E21, s64, ss5, sss1, d284.

chaplain who visited the community during the American Revolution, summarized this perspective: “In the summer they are idle, doing nothing, unless it may be to aid their wives and children in the cultivation of their fields and gardens – for to the squaws is delegated this business, as well as all the domestic economy of the household.”¹⁶ These views were echoed by John Lambert who, although more descriptive about agricultural production, spent little time focusing on women’s and children’s work.¹⁷ Agriculture may have diminished in importance relative to hunting and fishing, but the male-dominated nature of the source material and the female-oriented nature of Huron-Wendat agriculture should caution us from devaluing this aspect of Jeune-Lorette’s economy.

The Huron-Wendat also supported their economy by selling agricultural surpluses and small crafts in the town of Quebec. Antoine-Denis Raudot, who shared the intendancy with his father in the early eighteenth century, claimed that

Ils cultivent le bled d’Inde comme les autres sauvages qui sont en cette colonie, mais ils sont meilleurs travailleurs qu’eux; c’est de leur travail qu’ils font la vente de gibier, de poisson, de canots, d’avirons et gomme et enfin de tout ce qu’ils peuvent faire et dont le bon employ qu’ils font de leur argent les fait subsister sans être à charge à Sa Majesté.¹⁸

General Murray’s 1762 report notes that the Huron-Wendat also traded with other Aboriginal people during the hunting season and brought these furs to Quebec as well as

¹⁶ F.V. Melsheimer, *Journal of the Voyage of the Brunswick Auxiliaries from Wolfenbuttel to Quebec*, (Quebec: ‘Morning Chronicle’ Steam Publishing Establishment, 1891), 166.

¹⁷ John Lambert, *Travels through Canada and the United States of North America in the years 1806, 1807, & 1808*, 2nd ed. vol. 1, (London: C. Cradock and W. Joy, 1813), 356.

¹⁸ Camille de Rochemonteix, ed., *Relation par Lettres de l’Amérique Septentrionale*, (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1904), 211. Author’s translation: “They cultivate maize like the other natives in this colony, but they are better workers than the others. From their various enterprises they sell game, fish, canoes, paddles, gum and finally anything else that they can sell. This work earns them enough money that they do not rely on the crown.”

the ones they had caught themselves.¹⁹ John Long, who briefly visited the village in 1791, emphasized that some Huron-Wendat grew enough crops that they were able to take some of their produce to market.²⁰ Much later, Tsawanhonhi testified that the community sold “moccasins, snowshoes, sashes, baskets, Indian sleighs, fur caps and mittens, collars of porcupine quills, purses, reticules, bows, arrows, paddles, small canoes and little figures of Indians.”²¹ Though it is nearly impossible to assess the extent of village trade, these sources indicate that the Huron-Wendat were part of a market economy and that they traded the surpluses from almost everything they produced whether farmed, trapped, fished, or manufactured.

The development of this moditional economy was partially fuelled by the adoption and integration of Europeans into Huron-Wendat society. Like other Iroquoian people, the Huron-Wendat compensated for their small numbers by adopting outsiders.²² Two types of adoption occurred in Jeune-Lorette. The most prominent form was the adoption of English settlers and enemy Aboriginal people during military campaigns. French children born out of wedlock were also occasionally abandoned to the community. The incidence of this second form of adoptions is difficult to determine. French correspondence suggests that it was less common and discontinued in the early

¹⁹ General Murray’s Report of the State of the Government of Quebec in Canada, 5 June 1762, in Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, eds., *Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 1759-1791*, vol. 1 (Ottawa: J. Taché, 1918), 73. This is discussed by Jean Tanguay, “La Liberté d’Errer et de Vaquer : Les Hurons de Lorette et l’Occupation du Territoire, XVIIIe-XIXe siècles,” (MA Thesis, Université Laval, 1998), 53.

²⁰ J. Long, *Voyages and Travels of an Indian Interpreter and Trader*, (London: self-published, 1791), 154.

²¹ Appendix A. House of Assembly Thursday 29th January 1824, in *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly, on that part of the speech of His Excellency the Governor in Chief which relates to the settlement of the crown lands with the minutes of evidence taken before the committee*, (Quebec: Neilson & Cowen, 1824), 22.

²² Daniel K. Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: the Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 32-35.

eighteenth century. But the parish records from the early 1760s tell a different story. They suggest that this type of adoption continued as an important element of the village population. Studying the evidence for both forms of adoption provides an excellent opportunity to examine some of the inner-workings in Jeune-Lorette.

The French made it illegal to give an unwanted child to an Aboriginal person after 1717. The ban was put in place after the child of Françoise Boissel and the Sr de la Durantaye was given to a Huron-Wendat woman.²³ Shortly after the child arrived in Jeune-Lorette Boissel changed her mind. She solicited the aid of the royal prosecutor, François-Mathieu Martin de Lino, and the intendant, Michel Bégon. De Lino and Bégon differed over the merits of adoption. De Lino wanted to end the practice. He felt that “L’Intention de sa Majesté a Toujours esté de franchiser les sauvages et les acoutumer a nos moüers et non les françois aux moüers des sauvages.”²⁴ Bégon was much less fearful. Referring to a handful of seventeenth-century colonial laws he argued that the people living in the domicilié villages had the same rights as French subjects.²⁵ The Council of the Marine sided with de Lino on 15 Feb 1721, banning Aboriginal adoption

²³ Requête de Martin de Lino, procureur du roi de la Prévôté de Québec, au Conseil de Marine, [1717], C11A-38, ff. 226-227v; Résumé de lettres du Conseil et de Bégon et délibération du Conseil de Marine, 20 Apr 1720, C11A-41, ff. 259-261bis; Serge Goudreau has written most extensively about this case and the issues which develop out of it. See Serge Goudreau, “Le village huron de Lorette: une crèche pour les enfants canadiens du XVIIIe siècle,” *Mémoires de la Société généalogique canadienne-française*, vol. 51, no. 1, (Spring 2000), 7-12.

²⁴ Requête de Martin de Lino, procureur du roi de la Prévôté de Québec, au Conseil de Marine, [1717], C11A-38, f. 226. Author’s translation: “The King’s intention has always been to frenchify the natives and accustom them to our values and not the French to the native way of life.”

²⁵ Résumé de lettres du Conseil et de Bégon et délibération du Conseil de Marine, 20 Apr 1720, C11A-41, f. 260v.

of French children and threatening harsh punishment for anyone found guilty of abandoning their child to an Aboriginal person.²⁶

Evidence from the parish records, however, suggests that this practice did not stop. Of the thirty baptismal entries that involved the Huron-Wendat between 1760 and 1765, eight (27 percent) involved adopted children.²⁷ Although the nature of these adoptions is unclear, they demonstrate that adoption continued to play a significant role in shaping the community's population. This evidence contextualizes the periodic references to the presence of French people living in the community. Some of these were spouses of the Huron-Wendat, but others may have been French children brought up by Huron-Wendat parents.²⁸

The adoption of captives was another relatively common way to sustain the population. Used as a tool to bolster Iroquoian populations at times of dramatic population loss, the adoption of New England captives and others into Huron-Wendat society played an important role in defining this community's identity.²⁹ It is unclear just how many people in the village were captives or descendants of captives, but anecdotal evidence suggests that these people comprised a significant portion of the population. The Huron-Wendat adopted a Fox woman in 1734.³⁰ A decade later William Pote

²⁶ CAOM, fonds des colonies, série B-42, ff. 452v-453; *Ordonnances des intendants de la Nouvelle-France*, 9 June 1736, BANQ-QUE, E1, S1/5, vol. 24, ff. 62-63. Originally cited in Goudreau, "Le village huron de Lorette," 7-12.

²⁷ Hubert Charbonneau and Jacques Légaré, *Répertoire des actes de baptême, mariage, sépulture et des recensements du Québec ancien*, vol. 33, (Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1986), B-464.

²⁸ There are no parish records for the period before 1760. It is therefore impossible to adequately address the issue of intermarriage.

²⁹ For more on the Haudenosaunee mourning war as a method of population replacement see Richter, 3, 32-35, 60-66.

³⁰ Lettre de Beauharnois et Hocquart au ministre, 7 Oct 1734, C11A-61 ff. 89v-90.

learned that the Huron-Wendat hoped he would join their community. Pote's captor told him that "he hoped I Should make as Good a heron. As one John Honewell an English man that had Lived with ym Near thirty years, and was married amongst them and had Severel Children."³¹ Honewell may have been the same person that guided Pehr Kalm around the Quebec countryside. He claimed his guide had been taken captive as a child thirty years earlier in order to replace a member of their community killed in battle.³² Similarly, in early 1746 Pote described a conversation with Jacob, who lived at Jeune-Lorette, but had fought with John Gorham's company before being captured by the Huron-Wendat.³³ In 1750 two additional English captives were listed at Jeune-Lorette. Both had integrated into Huron-Wendat society.³⁴ In the twenty years between 1730 and 1750 there were at least five captives at Jeune-Lorette who had decided to remain in the village.

Aside from adoption, the Huron-Wendat also built bridges with their French neighbours through marriage. Like in Mi'kma'ki, this is an aspect of village life that we know little about. The lack of French Regime parish registers and the difficulty of assessing a person's ethnic background make it hard to determine the importance of intermarriage. Although at times it is fairly easy to identify Huron-Wendat individuals, often by a distinct Aboriginal name, many villagers also had French monikers.

³¹ *The Journal of Captain William Pote Jr. during his captivity in the French and Indian War from May 1745 to August 1747*, (Dodd, Mead & Co., 1895), 20. Jean Langlois is one of the Huron-Wendat who appear in the documentary record relatively frequently. His name and his engagement with the French suggest that he might have been the person to which this Huron referred.

³² Pehr Kalm, *Voyage de Pehr Kalm au Canada en 1749*, Jacques Rousseau and Guy Béthune, trans., (Montréal: Pierre Tisseyre, 1977), 726.

³³ *The Journal of Captain William Pote Jr.*, 86.

³⁴ Minutes of the Exchange of Prisoners. 1750: General Return of the English prisoners detained in the government of New France, in *DRCHSNY*, vol.10, 214-215.

Sawantanan, who we will meet in the seventh chapter, serves as a good example. In most documents he is known as Louis Vincent, a relatively common French name. Despite these problems, visitors to the village emphasized the important role of intermarriage.

Louis Franquet observed:

Le sang parmi eux est mêlé aujourd'hui; d'autant qu'il y a en hommes et en femmes des esclaves anglais faits prisonniers dans les guerres et qu'ils ont adoptés, qui y prennent des habitudes et s'y marient. Il y a même des femmes françaises qui épousent des sauvages; d'ailleurs, il n'est point sans exemple qu'on y porte des bâtards qui élevés dans les manières sauvages ne tiennent à rien de celles de notre nation. Il est aisé de distinguer tous ces étrangers à la couleur de leur peau qui est autant blanche et de celle des sauvages est bronzée.³⁵

Franquet's words summarize the variety of ways that this community integrated outsiders. Whether by marriage, infant-adoption, or captivity these practices brought new blood and new ideas into the community. Their presence must have helped to better situate the community within both French and Aboriginal worlds. Drawing people from the outside – particularly adults with a different set of perspectives – helped the community acquire skills and build relationships to better negotiate and integrate into the colonial environment.

The church was the most important link between the Huron-Wendat and their French neighbours. Many settlers attended the Huron-Wendat mission church rather than travelling to their parish at Charlesbourg. The Charlesbourg church was located in the seigneurie of Notre-Dame-des-Anges about thirteen kilometres east of the village. This

³⁵ Franquet, 107. Author's translation: "Today their blood is mixed. Accordingly, there are English men and women slaves captured and adopted during wartime who take on their characteristics and marry into their society. There are also French women who marry natives; furthermore, there have been cases of bastards being taken to the community, growing up with native manners and having none of our nation's customs. It is easy to distinguish all of these foreigners by the colour of their skin which is white and that of the natives is tanned." Goudreau uses this quotation and another similar quotation from James Murray's 1762 report on Quebec to illustrate this same point. See Goudreau, "Le village huron de Lorette," 12.

was too far for many parishioners. When the Huron-Wendat church was without a priest in the early 1790s, the settlers – who claimed to have attended the church at Jeune-Lorette for over sixty years – complained to the Bishop that “plusieurs habitans pauvres & leurs Familles, n’ont pu aller à la Paroisse de Charles Bourg...”³⁶ The importance of these people to the mission is most clearly demonstrated by the parish registers from 1761 to 1765. Of the 206 baptisms between these dates, 163 (79 percent) did not involve a single Huron-Wendat participant.³⁷ Although Jeune-Lorette was principally a Huron-Wendat village, the Jesuit presence turned the village into an important religious centre for the wider community.

Jesuit missionaries served as a bridge between Huron-Wendat and French culture. At the time of their move to Jeune-Lorette in 1697, Claude-Charles le Roy de la Potherie, author and imperial official, observed that the Jesuits had made many perceived improvements to Huron-Wendat culture; the community was known for its piety, temperance with alcohol, and close relationship with their missionaries.³⁸ The daily routine at Jeune-Lorette was deeply shaped by the missionaries. Although many people – particularly Huron-Wendat men – did not live in the village all year, the Jesuit missions operated on a rigorous schedule of prayer and devotion. According to Louis Davaugour, the Jesuit missionary in the village in 1710, the day began at sunrise with “saluting the Mother of God in the words of the Angel.” Mass was held a half-hour later for all of the

³⁶ A Monseigneur Jean François Hubert Évêque de Québec, 2 April 1792, AAQ, 61, Loretteville, CD I-2. Author’s translation: “many poor settlers and their families could not attend the parish church...”

³⁷ Charbonneau and Légaré, B-464.

³⁸ Bacqueville de la Potherie, ‘Letter IX: *Description of the River St. Lawrence up to Quebec, the Capital of New France. How the French discovered this Continent, and the Progress that has been made in its Evangelization,*’ in Joseph Burr Tyrrell, ed., *Documents relating to the early history of Hudson Bay* (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1931), 289-91.

people living in the village. Much like Dièreville's observations of the Mi'kmaq in the Port Royal church, Davaugour noted that during the mass "they sing sacred Hymns written in the vernacular tongue, and adapted to the feasts which are then being celebrated, - with a harmony truly beautiful, and not at all barbarous." After mass the Huron-Wendat left to work in their homes, fields or forests. The community would return around noon for vespers and religious singing, and in the evening there was also community prayer.³⁹ At Kahnawake there were two church services on Sundays, one for the Mohawk and another for their French neighbours.⁴⁰ Jeune-Lorette likely followed a similar pattern. These daily routines structured life in the village around franco-Catholic traditions and cultivated a mutual space between Huron-Wendat and French societies.

Like the missionaries in Wabanakia and Mi'kma'ki, the Jesuits linked the community to the French administration at Quebec. On arriving from France in the late 1740s, Pierre Potier, who was to spend eight months in Jeune-Lorette preparing to become the future missionary to the Huron-Wendat living near Detroit, was introduced to the colony's more powerful personalities. On his second day, he dined with the bishop and on his fourth day with the governor-general and intendant.⁴¹ Two weeks passed in Quebec before he relocated to the Huron-Wendat village a mere half-day away. The connection to European power structures continued throughout the eighteenth century. In the 1770s and 1780s Étienne Girault, the last missionary to serve the community, acted as

³⁹ Letter of Reverend Father Louis Davaugour to Reverend Father Joseph Germain, superior General of the Canadian Missions, Concerning the Mission of Lorette in New France, 1710, 7 Oct 1710, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 66, 149-151.

⁴⁰ Letter by Reverend Father Nau, missionary of the society of Jesus, written to Reverend father Bonin, of the same society, 2 Oct 1735, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 68, 271.

⁴¹ Robert Toupin, *Les Écrits de Pierre Potier*, vol. 1, (Ottawa, Les Presses de l'Université d'Ottawa), 111.

an intermediary between the governor and the village, writing letters on behalf of the community and relaying the governor's will during Sunday morning church services.⁴²

Through the Jesuits, the mission served as an important link between the Huron-Wendat and some of the colony's most powerful administrators.

Missionaries also served as the principal avenue for gift giving. Although there are few sources which shed light on this subject, a French report on the state of the colony just after it had fallen described how gift giving worked at Jeune-Lorette:

Leur missionnaire produit un Etat qui Etablit le nombre des Sauvages qui compose sa mission. Il expose leurs besoins deux ou trois fois L'année seulement sur cet Etat M. L'Intendant ou Commissaire des Postes fait delivrer des Magazins de Sa Majesté une quantité fixée de Farine, de Poison de Bled d'Inde, Des [Suifs] ou quelque peu de Viande. A l'Egard des Marchandises, Elle consistent En Couvertures, Capots, [Braquets], Mitanes et Chemises.⁴³

Although there are not many specific details about how these goods were doled out, this document describes a process that was significantly different from gift giving along the Atlantic Coast. Rather than receiving gifts annually, the Huron-Wendat received gifts at regular intervals throughout the year. No muskets, powder or lead were given to them, instead most of the gifts were made up of food and clothing. The difference in these lists reflects the more sedentary nature of Huron-Wendat society, where hunting only comprised a portion of the village's economy.

⁴² Girault to Haldimand, 6 Jan 1778, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21777, ff. 7-8; Girault to Haldimand, 30 Jan 1778, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21777, f. 13; Girault to Haldimand, 26 Mar 1778, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21777, f. 23;

Girault to Haldimand, 20 Sept 1778, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21777, f. 36; Girault to Haldimand, 24 Nov 1778, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21777, ff. 44-45.

⁴³ Mémoire, [1760], C11A-104, f. 482. Author's translation: "Their missionary produces a statement of how many people live in the mission. He detailed their needs two or three times a year and based on his account, the Intendant or the Commissaire des Postes delivers a fixed quantity of flour, fish, maize, [des Suifs], and a bit of meat. In terms of manufactured goods, they were given blankets, hoods, [nails], gloves, and shirts."

In addition to gifts, many Huron-Wendat earned additional income by supplying and fighting for the French military. Louise Dechêne argues that Aboriginal people played the principal role in French military endeavours during most of the pre-conquest period. French settlers had neither the skill nor endurance to fight in the North American environment, and there were too few regular troops to meet France's defensive needs.⁴⁴ Though they never comprised a significant portion of France's Aboriginal allies, community members fought against New Englanders and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy from as early as the 1650s.⁴⁵ According to Davaugour, a mutual respect existed between the French and the Huron-Wendat; some community members may have even served as the Governor's personal bodyguard and sentinels.⁴⁶

The Huron-Wendat also played an important role supplying the French military. Between October 1745 and October 1747 the community sold at least 338 sleds, 250 snowshoes, 125 paddles, and 75 canoes. This was essential equipment for quick travel over the North American landscape. The French paid handsomely for these goods. In 1745-46 the community earned 1610 livres tournois (lt) by supplying 42 canoes. The following year they made just over 5150 lt. Together, this would have amounted to approximately 270 lt per family or about one third the annual income of a small farmer if

⁴⁴ Louise Dechêne, *Le Peuple, l'État et la Guerre au Canada sous le Régime français*, (Montréal: Boréal, 2008), 27-28 and 194-196.

⁴⁵ *Revue des Indiens qui ont suivi les Français pour la guerre*, 17 Aug 1684, C11A-6, f. 267; *Requête adressée au ministre Pontchartrain pour que les Indiens du Sault-Saint-Louis, de Lorette et de Saint-François aient part "à la gratification que le roi accorda l'an passé aux Sauvages qui font la guerre aux ennemis des Français"*, [1692], C11A-12, ff. 137-138v; *Relation de ce qui s'est passé au Canada depuis le mois de septembre 1692 jusqu'au départ des vaisseaux en 1693, 1693*, C11A-12, f. 185v.

⁴⁶ Letter of Reverend Father Louis Davaugour to Reverend Father Joseph Germain, superior General of the Canadian Missions, Concerning the Mission of Lorette in New France, 1710, 7 Oct 1710, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 66, 159-161.

it had been divided evenly.⁴⁷ Beyond the amount earned by the community, at least seven Huron-Wendats sold goods individually. Most of these men made less than one hundred livres tournois. Vincent and Jacques earned significantly more. Jacques made 361 lt supplying canoe gum and building sleds, while Vincent, who was a key canoe builder, was paid 390 lt for nine canoes. In total the community took in over 7800 lt. Without counting income from agriculture, fishing, hunting, or trading, the Huron-Wendat made about three times more than the local seigneur in 1746-47.⁴⁸ Although the wartime conditions suggest this revenue was somewhat irregular, its size relative to seignorial income indicates it was important to the community.

The moditional nature of the Huron-Wendat economy could occasionally cause tension with the French settlers. Conflict arose in 1748 over the cutting of trees on Huron-Wendat land. The Huron-Wendat accused the settlers of taking more wood than had been agreed on. François Bigot, the colony's intendant, intervened by issuing an ordinance requiring settlers to deal with the village's principal chief and the missionary rather than individual community members. Anyone who violated this rule was required

⁴⁷ État des munitions qui ont été fournies par les particuliers ci-après nommés pour munir les magasins de Québec à l'occasion de la guerre depuis le 20 octobre 1745 jusqu'à pareil jour 1746, 26 Oct 1746, C11A-117, ff. 49-65; 'État des munitions qui ont été fournies par les particuliers ci-après nommés pour munir les magasins de Québec à l'occasion de la guerre depuis le 20 octobre 1746 jusqu'au 10 octobre 1747', 15 Oct 1747, C11A-117, ff. 95-116. The amount per family is based on Franquet's estimate that there were 25 families in the village. Franquet, 107. Gregory Kennedy, whose work focuses on farming societies in Acadia and the Loudonais, has compiled annual budgets for these regions which provide a good point of comparison. In the 1760s revenue for an average day worker in the Loudonais (in livres) was 349.8 and for a ploughman was 1872.47. In Acadia, the income in 1707 of a small farmer was 776.33 and 1647.07 for a large farmer. See Gregory Kennedy, *French Peasants in Two Worlds: A Comparative Study of Rural Experience in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Acadia and the Loudonais*, (PhD thesis, York University, 2008), appendix A.

⁴⁸ 'Dépouillement fait les 8, 9 et 10 mars 1756 des sommes dues tant pour les arrérages de cens et rentes que des droits de lots et ventes, 1755 compris,' 1756, BANQ-QUE, E21,S64, SS5, SSS6, D1419; 'Registre avec index contenant l'État général des biens des Jésuites dans la province de Québec, comprenant l'aveu et dénombrement de 1781,' BANQ-QUE E21, S64, SS5, SSS1, D284.

to pay twenty livres to the mission.⁴⁹ Three years later, the intendant became involved in another conflict. This time the settlers complained that Huron-Wendat dogs were attacking their sheep. The Huron-Wendat refused to pay for their losses so the intendant declared that a dog's owner was to pay five livres as well as a sheepskin for each animal killed. If unwilling to pay, the dogs were to be destroyed and the community as a whole held accountable.⁵⁰

Conflict was complicated by other points of division and difference between the two communities. Many traditions from early Wendaké continued in Jeune-Lorette. Like in the early-seventeenth century, the village was structured by clan. Although we know little about how the clan system worked in the village, Franquet claims that families were divided into the Turtle, Vulture and Wolf clans. Each of these clans appointed a chief and together they appointed a grand chief. There is no mention of war chiefs being appointed during this period.⁵¹ Many Huron-Wendat – particularly men – had embraced French fashion, architecture, language and technology, but travellers to the village observed that the Huron-Wendat shared more in common with their ancestors

⁴⁹ Ordonnance de l'intendant Bigot en faveur des Hurons de la Nouvelle-Lorette, contre quelques habitants de Charlesbourg qui allaient bûcher du bois dur [*sic.*] le terrain donné aux Hurons par les Jésuites, 28 Nov 1748, BANQ-QUE, E21, S64, SS5, SSS6, D1450.

⁵⁰ Ordonnance de l'intendant Bigot, 29 May 1751, BANQ-QUE, E1, S1, P4038.

⁵¹ Franquet, 107. More research needs to be done on the Jeune-Lorette's political structure. Franquet is one of the few people who comments on Huron-Wendat clan structure. His description resonates with later sources, particularly the 1791 petition to the Lower Canadian Governor General which was signed by four chiefs. However, there are also a number of differences which need to be probed. In pre-dispersal Huron-Wendat society, for example, there does not seem to have been a vulture clan. Rather the only clan named after a bird was the Hawk clan. In the 1791 petition, the four chiefs (Thoma Martin, Zachirie Otis, Etienne Petit and Augustin Picard) signed with totemic signatures resembling a top hat, an x, a hatchet and a bow and arrow. For more on clans see Trigger, 54-55. For the 1791 petition see At the Council Chambers in the Bishop's Palace, 15 Aug 1791, Centre de Référence de l'Amérique française, SME 1/2/12.

than with their French neighbours.⁵² Even as late as the 1820s, many community members continued to speak in their native tongue, wear traditional fashions, and use the technologies that their ancestors had brought with them from early Wendaké.⁵³ As much as they were integrated into French society, these cultural divisions continued to separate these societies.

Nonetheless, after nearly a century in the Quebec region, the Huron-Wendat were well integrated into the seigneurial world of the St. Lawrence. The community had relatively positive relationships with their neighbours. Though occasionally conflict erupted between these communities, most of the time these people shared local resources peacefully. Adoptees brought European cultural knowledge into the community and likely built bridges between French and Huron-Wendat cultures. The mission church drew French settlers into the village; while the missionaries themselves played an important role connecting the Huron-Wendat to the French administration in Quebec. Through their connection to the French governor, the Huron-Wendat joined other Aboriginal groups in attacking the British and other French enemies, providing the community with the opportunity to sustain their population by acquiring captives and earn additional income. The Huron-Wendat were deeply invested in the region around Quebec through their neighbours, church, and military alliance with the French.

⁵² Kalm, 307-9; Franquet, 102-8.

⁵³ *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly*, see particularly pages 11 and 22. See also *Three Chiefs of the Huron Indians, Residing at La Jeune Lorette, Near Quebec, in Their National Costume*, 1825, Library and Archives Canada, W.H. Coverdale collection of Canadiana, R3908-0-0-E.

Connecting the Northeast and Great Lakes

Although deeply integrated into the colonial world, the Huron-Wendat were also well-connected to other Aboriginal communities in the northeast and Great Lakes region. They maintained regular contact with three different Aboriginal groups. Most importantly, ties continued to bind the remnants of the Huron-Wendat Confederacy. Although no structural connection between these communities can be observed, Huron-Wendat individuals linked the villages at Jeune-Lorette and Detroit. The community also had connections with the Abenaki and Mi'kmaq. As we saw briefly in part one, Huron-Wendat warriors frequently fought in Wabanakia and Mi'kma'ki. Finally, Jeune-Lorette was connected through the Jesuits to other domicilié communities along the St. Lawrence. Together, these communities determined how land and resources beyond the French seigneuries were to be administered. Examining these three relationships demonstrate that the Huron-Wendat were part of a more independent Aboriginal world which continued to shape the community throughout this period.

Understanding the connections between Huron-Wendat communities after their dispersal has not been a central focus for historians. With limited attention given to the Huron-Wendat after 1650, many scholars conclude there was a rigid separation between Lorette and the Huron-Wendat of the Great Lakes, the two principal post-dispersal Huron-Wendat communities. Alain Beaulieu argues that few links existed between the Huron-Wendat in the east and in the west: “[les] Hurons des Grand Lacs formaient une communauté distincte, qui ne semble plus avoir, sous le Régime français, de liens étroits

avec les Hurons de Lorette.”⁵⁴ This type of argument however, fails to address what makes the Huron-Wendat situation different from the Mohawk and the Abenaki. When the Mohawk and Abenaki moved into the St. Lawrence valley they maintained their relationships with the communities from which they came. This section presents an array of evidence which suggests that similar lines of connection were maintained among the Huron-Wendat living in Jeune-Lorette and Detroit. Although these communities no longer maintained a strong political connection, kinship and religion drew these two Huron-Wendat villages together.

Two references from the end of the seventeenth century, before the Huron-Wendat from Michilimackinac moved down to Detroit, suggest the Huron-Wendat maintained connections with each other after their dispersal. Around 1675 Jacques Otratenkoui, a Huron-Wendat from Lorette married a Huron-Wendat woman living in the mission of St-Ignace near Michilimackinac where he had gone to trade.⁵⁵ Otratenkoui’s connection to St-Ignace was through the fur trade and may not reflect a more significant tie between the two communities. Two and a half decades later, Gilles Havard speculates, the Huron-Wendat leader Kondiaronk – from Michilimackinac – may have represented Jeune-Lorette during the Grand Settlement of 1701. Given their proximity to the negotiations, the absence of representatives from Jeune-Lorette is surprising.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Alain Beaulieu, “Les Hurons de Lorette, le ‘traité Murray’ et la liberté de commerce,” in Denis Vaugeois, ed., *Les Hurons de Lorette* (Sillery: Septentrion, 1996), 263. Author’s translation: “[the] Huron from the Great Lakes formed a distinct community, who no longer seem to have tight links, under the French regime, with the Huron from Lorette.” Ian Steele makes a similar observation see Ian K Steele, *Betrayals: Fort William Henry & the ‘Massacre’*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990), 80.

⁵⁵ État Présent des missions en la Nouvelle-France, 1675 in *The Jesuit Relations*, vol. 60, 49-53.

⁵⁶ Gilles Havard, *La Grande Paix de Montréal de 1701*, (Montréal: Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, 1992), 139. Havard, however, also emphasizes that the community may have been represented by the

Neither example strongly supports the idea that these communities were tightly connected, but only that a connection may have existed between these two places.

The connection between these two communities is much clearer in the 1740s, once the Jesuits increased their activity around Detroit. Possibly because of the longer Jesuit presence at Jeune-Lorette, the village served as an important place of preparation for Jesuits planning to serve at Detroit. Potier spent his first eight months at Jeune-Lorette learning the Huron-Wendat language and culture before joining father Armand de La Richardie in the western mission. The missionaries at Jeune-Lorette also sought to maintain some influence further west. Three years after Potier left for Detroit, father Pierre Daniel Richer, the missionary at Jeune-Lorette, wrote to the Huron-Wendat at Detroit in their own language in an attempt to persuade them to continue their alliance with France after a Huron-Wendat faction attempted to expel the French.⁵⁷ The presence of the Jesuits in Detroit served as a link between the two communities.

In 1747 Potier took a census of the Detroit community. Potier's census was deeply flawed. Like the French censuses in Mi'kma'ki, Potier must have left people out. Not only did his assessment of the population coincide with the Huron-Wendat hunting season, when many of the men would have been away from the village, but the attempted overthrow against the French made it likely that some of the population was inaccessible to the Jesuit missionary. The uprising ripped the community apart. It is unlikely that members of the community who rejected the French were enumerated.⁵⁸

Mohawk from Kahnawake, who, as the central fire of the Seven Fires frequently represented the St. Lawrence communities during the British Regime.

⁵⁷ Toupin, 40.

⁵⁸ Toupin, 171.

Despite these problems, Potier's census provides a valuable window onto the connections between these two Huron-Wendat villages. Two of the cabins in the community were occupied by people from Jeune-Lorette. Toutsaint, who was described as a Huron from Lorette, lived with his three daughters and five grand children in cabin twenty six.⁵⁹ Sohendinnon, who was known as the Lorrétain, lived separated from his wife in cabin forty one.⁶⁰ That these people were at Detroit during this period is not surprising. Detroit was a cosmopolitan village.⁶¹ The presence of families, however, indicates that some Huron-Wendat had moved from Jeune-Lorette to settle at Detroit.

There was significant back-and-forth between Detroit and Jeune-Lorette during the War of Austrian Succession. When Sieur Delestre arrived back in Canada from Detroit in the summer of 1747 he was accompanied by a number of people from Jeune-Lorette who had gone there with him the winter before.⁶² The following year, two men from the community wished to remain in Detroit after they accompanied Father Richardie, the Jesuit missionary at Detroit, on his return journey from Quebec.⁶³ People from these communities also fought together. Twelve Huron-Wendats from Jeune-Lorette and Detroit received joint supplies during the 1747 campaign against the

⁵⁹ Toupin, 193.

⁶⁰ Toupin, 198.

⁶¹ In addition to the Huron-Wendat, Potier also noted people from the Fox, Haudenosaunee, and Ottawa in the village. See Toupin, 171.

⁶² Abstract, in form of a Journal of the most interesting occurrences in the Colony, in reference to military movements, and of the various intelligence received, since the departure of the ships in November, 1746, in *DRCHSNY*, vol.10, 116.

⁶³ Journal (de La Galissonière et Hocquart) concernant ce qui s'est passé d'intéressant dans la colonie de novembre 1747 à octobre 1748, C11A-87, f. 185; Journal of whatever occurred of interest at Quebec in regard to the operations of the war, and the various intelligence received there since the sailing of the ships in November, 1747, in *DRCHSNY*, vol.10, 145.

British.⁶⁴ A decade later they were also listed as fighting together during the siege of Fort William Henry.⁶⁵ Similarly, the five missionaries serving the Huron-Wendat at both Jeune-Lorette and Detroit were grouped together in a 1749 list of Jesuits in North America.⁶⁶

Over the century that they had lived around Quebec, the Huron-Wendat had also built a relationship with the Abenaki. After the conquest of Port Royal – and particularly during Dummer's War – the Huron-Wendat became much more involved in events along the Atlantic coast. Three factors governed this involvement. The first was their position as the eastern-most domicilié community along the St. Lawrence. Affairs along the Atlantic coast and particularly in Wabanakia could directly affect Jeune-Lorette. Second, was their connection to the French who at least nominally claimed much of the northeast as part of New France. Third, the Abenaki, like the Huron-Wendat at Detroit, were connected to Jeune-Lorette through the Jesuits. Besides the Jesuit mission to the Abenaki at St. François, the Abenaki and Huron-Wendat also shared the Jesuit mission at Sillery during the 1650s. It was this third factor which ultimately drew the Huron-Wendat into Dummer's War, and more broadly into an Atlantic sphere of influence.

Huron-Wendat participation in the 1721 Abenaki/English negotiations, discussed briefly in part one, was initiated by the French in an effort to sway Abenaki opinion

⁶⁴ Extrait de la dépense qui a été faite dans les magasins du roi à Montréal tant pour les équipements de divers petits partis qui ont été sur les côtes de la Nouvelle-Angleterre et autres dépenses à l'occasion de la guerre depuis le premier janvier 1747 jusques et compris le 31^e août de ladite année, 01 Sept 1747, C11A-117, f. 292.

⁶⁵ Letter of M. de Bougainville to the Minister, with the Articles of capitulation granted to Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, on the 19th of August, 1757, in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 10, 607.

⁶⁶ Catalogue of the Persons and Offices in the Society of Jesus, for the Province of France, at the end of the year 1749: Missions of North America in New France, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 69, 77.

against making peace. The Abenaki living along the Kennebec and Penobscot Rivers were divided over whether to make peace or war with the British. Sébastien Rale, the Jesuit missionary among the Abenaki, sent “six of the well disposed Indians to come hither to invite the domiciled Abenakis and the Hurons of Loretto to attend the conference.”⁶⁷ Three canoes each travelled from St. François and Becancour, and one canoe from Jeune-Lorette, to the negotiations with the British at the mouth of the Kennebec River.⁶⁸ The tactic worked. The New England governor chose not to attend this meeting. In response, the Abenaki delegates drafted a letter which clearly stated that the Kennebec River was part of Wabanakia and not New England. The letter threatened reprisals from the Abenaki, Huron-Wendat, and Mi’kmaq collectively.⁶⁹ As we saw in part one, this letter marked the outbreak of renewed warfare between the British and most northeastern Aboriginal people. Despite French instigation, the fear of sparking a broader conflict with Britain prevented France from becoming directly involved.

The Abenaki and Huron-Wendat living along the St. Lawrence did not hesitate to follow up on this promise. Sébastien Rale described the situation to his nephew:

⁶⁷ Messrs. De Vaudreuil and Bégon to Louis XV, 8 Oct 1721, in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 9, 903. The divisions that Rale observed within Abenaki society help to contextualize the tensions that developed in Wabanakia and Mi’kma’ki after the Abenaki from Pentagouet began peace negotiations in 1725. See also *Résumé d'une lettre de Vaudreuil et Bégon datée du 8 octobre 1721 et délibération du Conseil de Marine*, 19 Dec 1721, C11A-43, f. 372v.

⁶⁸ Messrs. De Vaudreuil and Bégon to Louis XV, 8 Oct 1721, in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 9, 904. See also *Résumé d'une lettre de Vaudreuil et Bégon datée du 8 octobre 1721 et délibération du Conseil de Marine*, 19 Dec 1721, C11A-43, f. 372v.

⁶⁹ Messrs. De Vaudreuil and Bégon to Louis XV, 8 Oct 1721, in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 9, 904-905. See also *Résumé d'une lettre de Vaudreuil et Bégon datée du 8 octobre 1721 et délibération du Conseil de Marine*, 19 Dec 1721, C11A-43, f. 372v; *Lettre of Eastern Indians*, 28 July 1721, CO5-869, ff. 106-107. As appears in John G. Reid, *Essays on Northeastern North America: Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 138. See also 1 Sept 1721, *Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, 1721-1722*, vol. 3, (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1922), 109-111.

They sent to the several Villages of the Savages to interest them in their Muse, and to urge them to lend a hand in this their necessity of righteous defense. The deputation was successful. War was sung among the Hurons of Lorette, and in all the Villages of the Abnakis [*sic.*] tribe. *Nanrantsouak* was the place appointed for the meeting of the warriors, that they might there together deliberate upon their plan.⁷⁰

One hundred and sixty Abenaki and Huron-Wendat men met at Norridgewock (Nanrantsouak) to attack the British.⁷¹ If 1723 is any example, the Huron-Wendat were quite active in the fighting. Vaudreuil told the Minister of Marine: “Les hurons de Lorette on été aussy deux fois en guerre ils en sont revenus la premier fois l’Eté dernier, après avoir tué quatre personnes et perdu un de leurs chefs, ils en sont revenue la seconde fois le quinze du mois dernier, ont tué deux Anglois et ont amené un prisonnier.”⁷² They continued to support the Abenaki until the war came to a close in 1725.⁷³

According to Rale the decision for war was made without French influence. In another letter to his nephew, Rale echoed the French at Louisbourg. He claimed that “the latter [the Abenaki and Huron-Wendat] expect no aid from the French, on account of the peace which exists between the two Nations; but they have a resource in all the other Savage tribes, who will not fail to enter into their quarrel and to undertake their

⁷⁰ Letter from Father Sébastien Rales, Missionary of the Society of Jesus in new France, to Monsieur his nephew, Nanrantsouak, 15 Oct 1722, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 67, 115. Nanrantsouak is another name for Norridgewock, Maine.

⁷¹ Messrs. de Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Council of Marine, 17 Oct 1722, in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 9, 911; see also *Extrait de la réponse de Vaudreuil et Bégon au mémoire du roi du 8 juin, 17 Oct 1722*, C11A-44, f. 305.

⁷² Lettre de Vaudreuil et Bégon au ministre, 14 Oct 1723, C11A-45 ff. 19v-20. Author’s translation: “The Hurons from Lorette have gone to war twice. They returned the first time last summer, after having killed four people and lost one of their chiefs. They returned the second time on the fifteenth of last month, having killed two English and captured one prisoner.”

⁷³ M. de Vaudreuil to the Minister, 28 Nov 1724, in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 9, 937; see also Abstract of letters of M. De Vaudreuil and Father de la Chasse respecting the Abenakis report, with the recommendation of the Minister thereupon, 24 April 1725, in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 9, 945;

defense.”⁷⁴ Nonetheless the French were active in mobilizing people to fight in the conflict. They encouraged the Mohawks from Kahnawake and Kanasatake to participate in an effort to diminish the likelihood that the Haudenosaunee would join the British. Vaudreuil claimed, however, that the invitation to join the conflict was extended by the Abenaki and Huron-Wendat.⁷⁵ The French provenance of much of the documentary record for this period should caution historians from placing too much emphasis on their agency in the conflict. Though the French likely encouraged the attacks on the English, like they did in Mi’kma’ki, they did not determine community policies. It is just as likely that the Abenaki and Huron-Wendat invited the Mohawk without French interference.

Little evidence connects these communities between the end of the war and the mid-1740s. It is likely that they continued to interact with one another, but European administrators had little reason to discuss Aboriginal people in their correspondence during times of peace. Once war broke out again in the 1740s the Huron-Wendat were once again active along the Atlantic’s shores. By 1745, when William Pote was captured by community members near Annapolis Royal, the Huron-Wendat had gained important geographic knowledge of the area. As they travelled around the Bay of Fundy, Pote was told that he must walk briskly for fear that the incoming tide would flood out a creek that they needed to cross, thus further delaying them.⁷⁶ A decade later, their connections with the east and west were drawn together during the siege of Fort William Henry. A letter written by Bougainville outlined Aboriginal participation in the siege. He grouped the

⁷⁴ Letter from Father Sébastien Rales, Missionary of the Society of Jesus in New France, to Monsieur his nephew, Nanrantsouak, 15 Oct 1722, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 67, 115-117.

⁷⁵ Abstract of Messrs. De Vaudreuil and Begon’s Despatches, with the Report of the Minister thereupon, in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 9, 935.

⁷⁶ *The Journal of Captain William Pote Jr.*, 48.

Huron-Wendat from Jeune-Lorette and Detroit together, and listed them as serving under the same officer as the Abenaki.⁷⁷

Beyond these more distant relationships, connections with neighbouring domicilié communities played an important role in shaping Jeune-Lorette's identity. Three factors bound Jeune-Lorette to neighbouring Aboriginal communities. Most importantly, all of the domicilié villages shared the experience of living near French farms and villages. Although these forces were stronger in Jeune-Lorette than elsewhere, their presence and impact on the communities should not be discounted. Catholicism also played an important role in linking these communities together; the Abenaki at St. François and Becancour and the Mohawk at Kahnawake all lived in Jesuit missions. Finally, these villages were relatively close to one another, requiring that the use of resources and hunting territories be negotiated.

Although the contours of this relationship are difficult to parse, these communities likely began to work together as each settled in the St. Lawrence valley during the latter half of the seventeenth century. In testimony before a committee of the Lower Canadian Assembly in 1824, the Huron-Wendat chief Tsawanhonhi explained that the Seven Fires Confederacy, which was not described as such until after the conquest, was formed two hundred years earlier, or around the same time many of the ancestors of these communities began to move into the St. Lawrence valley.⁷⁸ Delâge and Sawaya's work has developed this argument further. Sawaya in particular stresses the importance of

⁷⁷ Letter of M. de Bougainville to the Minister, with the Articles of capitulation granted to Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, on the 19th of August, 1757, in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 10, 607.

⁷⁸ Appendix A. House of Assembly, 29 January 1824, in *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly*, 20.

Catholicism in linking these peoples. He notes that both French and English descriptions of this alliance emphasized their devotion to Catholicism.⁷⁹ The confederacy likely also grew out of three sets of alliances built with the French. The first was the Huron/Algonquin/Nipissing alliance that pre-dated the arrival of Europeans and probably facilitated the Huron-Wendat migration into Algonquin hunting territory north of Quebec.⁸⁰ The second was the alliance that slowly developed between the Christian Mohawk living around Montreal and the Haudenosaunee at the end of the seventeenth century.⁸¹ And finally, the third was the alliance that developed with the Abenaki over the same period.⁸²

The status of the Huron-Wendat among the domicilié communities is unclear during the French Regime. No sources clearly indicate how these communities interacted with each other. However, a number of pieces of circumstantial evidence suggest that the Huron-Wendat occupied a relatively important place among their Aboriginal neighbours. For example, Rale observed “The Huron language is the chief language of the Savages, and, when a person is master of that, he can in less than three months make himself understood by the five Iroquois tribes.”⁸³ Father Nau, at Kahnawake, made a similar comment in 1735: “Iroquois and huron are The only two difficult languages; we must, however, be familiar with Them both in our mission, because all the prayers are in huron.

⁷⁹ Jean-Pierre Sawaya, *La Fédération des Sept Feux de la Vallée du Saint-Laurent: XVIIe au XIXe siècle*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 1998), 35.

⁸⁰ Kathryn Magee, personal correspondence.

⁸¹ Denys Delâge and Jean-Pierre Sawaya, *Les Traités des Sept Feux avec les Britanniques: droits et pièges d'un héritage colonial au Québec*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 2001), chap. 1. The three treaties to which they refer are the treaties of 1735, 1742 and 1753.

⁸² Sawaya, *La Fédération des Sept Feux de la Vallée du Saint-Laurent*, 161-163.

⁸³ Letter from Father Sebastien Rales, Missionary of the Society of Jesus in New France, to Monsieur his Brother, Narantsouak, 12 Oct 1723, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 67, 143.

These two Languages have A common origin, but differ from each other as much as french and Spanish. All our savages understand huron, and prefer It to Iroquois...”⁸⁴ The Huron-Wendat language was the lingua franca of religious services in the Jesuit missions, demonstrating the central place that they played in the evangelization of northeastern Aboriginal people.

A 1740 conflict between the Huron-Wendat and the Mohawk at Kanesatake helps to further illuminate Jeune-Lorette’s place in the St. Lawrence valley. Tensions erupted between the communities over the treatment of Huron-Wendat wampum belts. The Mohawk at Kanesatake held the belts since the council fire was lit in that village. When he arrived in the village in hope of seeing the twelve important belts, Vincent – one of the chiefs at Jeune-Lorette – could only find two. Given that the belts had been deposited on the lighting of the council fire, Vincent declared the village’s fire extinguished and took the two remaining belts back to Jeune-Lorette.⁸⁵ This caused a small crisis and gave the Governor-General, Charles de Beauharnois de la Boische, an opportunity to liaise between the two communities. In his account of the events, he was not only successful at eventually getting Vincent to return the belts to Kanesatake, but also in establishing himself as the Grand Master of the council fire there. Although the governor clearly retold this story as part of his effort to reduce the influence of Jesuit missionaries, this

⁸⁴ Letter by reverend Father Nau, missionary of the society of jesus, written to Reverend Father Bonin, of the same society, 2 Oct 1735, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 68, 277.

⁸⁵ Lettre de Beauharnois au ministre, 21 Sept 1741, C11A-75 fol. 138-142v; M. De Beauharnois to Count de Maurepas, in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 9, 1069-1070.

event demonstrates how these communities were interconnected through customary forms of alliance.⁸⁶

These brief examples of the community's position relative to its neighbours are strengthened by a statement that the Huron-Wendat made to Daniel Claus, the British Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs, in 1773. Community leaders claimed that they "have been lookd after by all Indⁿ. Nat^s. from Tadousack to Niagara as their Superiors and obeyed as such, we have invited the Mohawks to this Country & procured their Settlements being considered by all the Nations in the above Light & original Proprietors of this Country."⁸⁷ The extent to which the Huron-Wendat were actually involved in drawing together the communities that lived along the St. Lawrence is difficult to accurately assess. These brief illustrations, however, demonstrate that there was a broad network connecting these communities to each other, and – given its size – that Jeune-Lorette had a relatively important role to play.

Tracing connections between Aboriginal communities that existed independently of the French is a difficult task. The French provenance of the source material favours relationships developed through French colonial structures. The previous pages have argued that although only a small village, the Huron-Wendat had a wide social and political network with Aboriginal communities in the northeast and Great Lakes region. These connections were maintained by relationships developed in Wendaké and the common experience of migrating into the St. Lawrence valley. Jeune-Lorette was also in

⁸⁶ This event occurred at the height of conflict between the governor and the Jesuits. Beauharnois is known for the favouritism that he bestowed on Kanasatake because of their Sulpicien (rather than Jesuit) roots. See S. Dale Standen, *DCB*.

⁸⁷ Journal of Daniel Claus, 19 June-27 July 1773, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, vol. 13, 624-625.

a good location for the Huron-Wendat to encounter France's Aboriginal allies when they came to Quebec to meet with French administrators or to trade.⁸⁸ The relationships that developed with other Aboriginal communities were supported by the French but also reflect an evolving Aboriginal world that bound these communities more tightly to one another.


Spatial Practices in the Two Worlds

As a community, the Huron-Wendat engaged with the landscape northwest of the town of Quebec in three different ways. Limited by the small amount of land available in the village, community members acquired additional land nearby and, like their habitant neighbours, paid the necessary seigneurial dues. Village land was exempt from these dues but often governed through French practices such as surveys and deeds of sale. Outside of the seigneurie, Huron-Wendat hunting territory was distributed and regulated by village leaders in consultation with neighbouring Aboriginal communities. This threefold division of land management reflects the Huron-Wendat position in the region. When near colonial structures, the Huron-Wendat employed European forms of land tenure; when in their village they practiced greater autonomy but continued to use some European methods to govern their interactions; when beyond European influence they engaged with their Aboriginal neighbours and used land in more traditional ways in an effort to avoid conflict over hunting territories. These pragmatic decisions reflected their position not *between* French and Aboriginal worlds but rather *within* them.

⁸⁸ Letter of Reverend Father Louis Davaugour to Reverend Father Joseph Germain, superior General of the Canadian Missions, Concerning the Mission of Lorette in New France, 1710, 7 Oct 1710, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 66, 155.

Both Huron-Wendat men and women owned land outside of the village and in neighbouring seigneuries. Over the eighteenth century community members held land in Gaudarville, St. Gabriel and St. Ignace seigneuries.⁸⁹ These people acquired land in two different ways. A very small group of people were granted land individually, and were more-or-less isolated from other community members. The second, larger group, held land in bundles. Although each was conceded land individually, people in this group simultaneously purchased lots adjacent to one another. In both cases, land was held by individuals and was subject to the same seigneurial dues as the French settlers.

5.2: Huron-Wendat Landholding, 1733-1800⁹⁰



⁸⁹ The seigneurie of Gaudarville is called Saint-Jean-Baptiste in these notarial documents. Benoît Grenier's biography of Marie-Catherine Peuvret, the seigneur, indicates that the name Saint-Jean-Baptiste was frequently used to describe Gaudarville, in honour of her father, the previous seigneur, Jean-Baptiste Peuvret Demesnu. See Benoît Grenier, *Marie-Catherine Peuvret: Veuve et seigneuresse en Nouvelle-France, 1667-1739* (Sillery: Septentrion, 2005), 88, 128.

⁹⁰ Ignace Plamondon (père), Plan de la seigneurie Saint-Gabriel, 13 Mar 1754, BANQ-QUE, E21 G.1A; Plan d'une partie de la seigneurie Saint-Gabriel, n.d., BANQ-QUE, E21 G.1N; For a list of notarial records used to create this map see this dissertation's appendix.

There was rarely a period between 1730 and 1800 when the Huron-Wendat did not hold land outside of Jeune-Lorette.⁹¹ The first discernable grouping occurred in 1733 when eight people acquired land in Gaudarville.⁹² Each of these parcels of land was about two by thirty arpents – although some were slightly narrower and others slightly wider. When combined, the total land holding measured 510 square arpents. Although granted together, each landholder kept his or her land for different lengths of time. For example, Antoine, whose land was on the end of this grouping, sold his land to a French settler a year later and seems to have continued acquiring and selling land in Gaudarville for the rest of the decade.⁹³ In 1745 Louis abandoned his land; it was re-conceded under the same terms to Athanase, who was also from the community.⁹⁴ In 1754, two of these parcels were sold to French settlers.⁹⁵ The final document that I have found regarding this cluster is from 1784 when François Vincent sold the land he had inherited from his father.⁹⁶ By this time neither of his neighbours was Huron-Wendat.

⁹¹ I have only included contracts in which a notary listed one or more participant as Huron-Wendat. My methodology for finding these contracts was to begin with a keyword search of the PARCHEMIN database. I also stumbled upon a number of documents in working my way through the microfilm reels, which were not listed in PARCHEMIN but include Huron-Wendat. For a list of these sources see the appendix.

⁹² Benoît Grenier notes that Marie-Catherine Peuvret kept these documents in a separate workbook from the contracts that she made with French settlers; they were also listed as part of the inventory of her goods taken upon her death. See Grenier, 128, 218.

⁹³ Noel Duprac, 21 Oct 1733, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s94; Noel Duprac, 4 July 1734, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s94. Antoine seems to have been conceded another piece of land elsewhere in Gaudarville a couple of weeks after this sale. He sold this land in 1736. See Noel Duprac, 16 Oct 1736, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s94. A year later, he was conceded another parcel of land. See Noel Duprac, 6 Oct 1737, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s94.

⁹⁴ Noel Duprac, 14 Sept 1745, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s94.

⁹⁵ Andre Genest, 3 Mar 1754, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s115; Andre Genest, 24 Dec 1754, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s115; Andre Genest, 28 Dec 1754, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s115. The records for the 3rd of March and 28th of December are for the same parcel of land, suggesting that the first sale did not go through.

⁹⁶ Jean-Baptiste Panet, 20 March 1784, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s206.

After this sale, many community members began to acquire land north of the village. As had been the case earlier, the land was acquired in a series of bundles. In 1790 Zacharie Thomas and Etienne Ondiaraété received land on either side of Zacharie Outaise in côte St. Raphael.⁹⁷ Together these concessions totalled approximately 180 square arpents. A month later, three more Huron-Wendat acquired a similar amount of land north of côte St. Raphael. Their concessions measured 270 square arpents.⁹⁸ In 1794 five more concessions were made to Huron-Wendat in this region.⁹⁹ When put together these concessions measured 480 square arpents. Another five were made in 1799 totalling 435 square arpents.¹⁰⁰ Assuming that none of these concessions were sold or otherwise forfeited during the 1790s, by the end of the decade, the Huron-Wendat held a total of 1365 square arpents around côte St. Raphael. This was nearly the same amount as the sixteen hundred square arpents that the Jesuits conceded for village use in 1742. Five of the seven members of the village council in 1819 held land in this grouping.¹⁰¹ The large size of this land and the prominence of the land-holders suggests that these concessions were part of a community strategy to acquire more land at the end of the eighteenth century.

Serge Goudreau is likely correct that these concessions relate to the impending demise of the Jesuit Order, which will be discussed in much greater detail in chapter

⁹⁷ Jean-Baptiste Panet, 7 June 1790, BANQ-QUE, E21, s64, ss5, sss6, d433 and d434. This cote was in the far northeast of the seigneurie.

⁹⁸ Jean-Baptiste Panet, 10 July 1790, 12 July 1790, BANQ-QUE, E21, s64, ss5, sss6, d443.

⁹⁹ Jean-Baptiste Panet, 3 May 1794, 2 Sept 1794, 10 Sept 1794, 21 Oct 1794, 18 Nov 1794, BANQ-QUE, E21, s64, ss5, sss6, d523-526; d528; .

¹⁰⁰ Jean-Baptiste Panet, 1 June 1799, 3 June 1799, 3 June 1799, 4 June 1799, BANQ-QUE, E21, s64, ss5, sss6, d576-580.

¹⁰¹ "Petition of the Huron for the seigneurie of Sillery. Written at Lorette on the 26th January 1819," in *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly*, i. The members of the council were André Romain, Stanislas Koska, Etienne Ondiaraété, Louis Vincent and Michel Sioui.

seven.¹⁰² In 1792, Girault conceded 360 square arpents in the northeast of the seigneurie near côte St. Raphael for the use of the mission. Significantly, because there were no plans for a new missionary, the concession was made to the village chiefs (Zacharie Otesse, Augustin Picard and Etienne Ondiaraété). They were to hold it in trust until a new missionary arrived.¹⁰³ Given the proximity of these two places it is likely that the concessions around côte St. Raphael were connected to this concession.

The post-1794 concessions do not fit well with this argument, however. Although the seigneurial dues on the land acquired between 1790 and 1794 were about one quarter of what the French settlers in neighbouring Notre-Dame-des-Anges paid, and about one third what was required of Huron-Wendat landholders both before and after this period, the land acquired after 1794 was charged significantly higher rates.¹⁰⁴ Community members still continued to acquire land despite the rise in fees. Given this continuity, it is more likely that these concessions were part of a broader strategy to gain more land in the face of rising population pressure and a decline in the availability of local resources.

Along with these large groupings of land, other individual notarial records demonstrate that smaller pockets of land in St. Gabriel were also populated by village residents. In 1746, Jacques Tourallaty acquired a lot next to Vincent Ouentattata and

¹⁰² Serge Goudreau, "Étienne Ondiaraété (1742-1830) : Un chef huron du village de Lorette," in *Mémoires de la Société généalogique canadienne-française*, vol. 54, no. 3 (Winter 2003), 276-277.

¹⁰³ A.S.7: "Contrat de concession par le Père Girault aux sauvages Hurons, daté de Québec, le 11 septembre 1792". This was part of a collection of documents which are held by a private collector. With the exception of six documents which appeared in *Le Journal de Montréal*, they have not been made public. See *Le Journal de Montréal*, "Les documents historiques consultés par le Journal", <http://fr.canoe.ca/archives/infos/general/2006/11/20061103-220652.html> (accessed Sept 13 2010). See also Jonathan Lainey, "Le fonds Famille Picard : un patrimoine documentaire d'exception," *Revue de Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec*, no. 2 (2010) : 94-105.

¹⁰⁴ Goudreau, "Étienne Ondiaraété (1742-1830)," 276. See the last five lines in the records listed in the appendix for specific details about these concessions.

Pierre Pinquet.¹⁰⁵ In 1752, Andre-Antoine purchased a property from a French settler in côte Dupuy St. Claude that was neighboured by Vincent and Nicolas Hanonoura.¹⁰⁶ Two years later, Hanonoura severed his lot and sold half to Pierre Oronyoyo.¹⁰⁷ The remaining half seems to have been sold in 1762 to Jacques Vincent.¹⁰⁸ Also in 1762, Jean Langlois purchased a parcel of land from Raphael Xiehouy near Jeune-Lorette. This plot was surrounded by land held by other community members.¹⁰⁹ A survey of Huron-Wendat land outside of the village in 1795 demonstrates a similar grouping in an area known as 'le petit deser.'¹¹⁰ The pockets of Huron-Wendat people peppered St. Gabriel and demonstrate just how closely some Huron-Wendat lived to their French neighbours.

All of these people had to pay seigneurial dues. There were at least fifty concessions, sales, or transfers where seigneurial dues were applied. In addition to these records there are a handful of other seigneurial documents which list the people who were to pay seigneurial dues in St. Gabriel. These documents demonstrate that at least some of these dues were actually collected.¹¹¹ A list of land holders during the French Regime indicates that Jacques Troattati, Jean Langlois, and Louis Anieoton paid seigneurial dues between 1720 and 1750.¹¹² The papier terrier for 1753 indicates that five Huron-Wendats

¹⁰⁵ Pinguet de Vaucour, 4 Oct 1746, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s223.

¹⁰⁶ Andre Genest, 19 Mar 1752, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s115.

¹⁰⁷ Andre Genest, 15 Nov 1754, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s115.

¹⁰⁸ Andre Genest, 14 June 1762, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s115.

¹⁰⁹ Andre Genest, 2 Jan 1762, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s115.

¹¹⁰ Ignace Plamondon (fils), 21 May 1795, BANQ-QUE, CA 301, s44.

¹¹¹ Like with the notarial records, I have only included in this analysis people who were recorded in the documents as Huron-Wendat.

¹¹² Répertoire avec index de la seigneurie Saint-Gabriel... 1720-1750, BANQ-QUE, E21, s64, ss5, sss6, d1713.

paid in that year.¹¹³ A 1773 list records two Huron-Wendat, Zacharie and Etienne, as paying rent.¹¹⁴ Similarly, in 1794, the livre terrier notes that twenty eight people in the community paid at least some cens et rentes.¹¹⁵ Although it is difficult to match these documents to individual notarial records, the presence of Huron-Wendat on each of these lists suggests that dues were collected. This evidence corresponds with Bougainville's 1756 observation that "Ils [the Huron-Wendat] possèdent leurs terres en propriété avec les memes redevances et la meme police que les habitants français."¹¹⁶

The Huron-Wendat paid a similar amount of seigneurial dues relative to their French neighbours. Cole Harris studied the cens and rentes in the neighbouring seignury of Notre-Dame-des-Anges and found that the average amount paid for twenty square arpents after 1730 was one livre and one capon (or about two livres).¹¹⁷ Of the thirty-two records where sufficient information was provided to calculate both the area of a property and the cens and rentes, the average amount of dues paid by the Huron-Wendat was one livre four sols and eight deniers for twenty square arpents. However, this number is skewed by the concessions distributed between 1790 and 1794 where the seigneurial dues were considerably reduced (they averaged only nine sols and seven deniers). During the French Regime the cens and rentes were much closer to those in

¹¹³ Papier terrier des terres et concessions de la seigneurie Saint-Gabriel... 1753, BANQ-QUE, E21, s64, ss5, sss6, d1715.

¹¹⁴ Répertoire pour la Jeune-Lorette de ce que chaque tenancier censitaires doit de cens et rentes... 1773, BANQ-QUE, E21, s64, ss5, sss6, d1447.

¹¹⁵ Livre terrier (censier) de la Jeune Lorette, 1794-1820, BANQ-QUE, E21, s64, ss5, sss6, d1484.

¹¹⁶ Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, *Écrits sur le Canada: Mémoires – Journal – Lettres*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 2003), 161. Author's translation: "They possess their land under the same dues and policies as the French settlers."

¹¹⁷ Harris, 66-67. Because the value of a capon (chicken) varies in the contracts between 15 and 20 sols, I have standardized my calculations by monetizing all alternative forms of payment (based on the value outlined in specific contracts).

Notre-Dame-des-Anges, averaging one livre fourteen sols and two deniers; excluding the period between 1790 and 1794, they averaged one livre, nine sols and nine deniers during the British regime. Although this amount is below Harris's figures for the neighbouring Jesuit seigneurie, the Huron-Wendat occupied land that was in the northern part of St. Gabriel and less viable for agriculture. This likely reduced the amount they had to pay.

These notarial records reveal a community strategy to engage with the seigneurial system. Few Huron-Wendat acquired land alone. Although there is no way of knowing whether the Jesuits and other neighbouring seigneurs actually collected the dues they were owed, the records suggest that the cens and rentes were applied without exception and more-or-less to the same degree as their French neighbours. When they were on land outside of the village, the Huron-Wendat were treated just like their French neighbours.

Village lands were handled differently than land elsewhere in St. Gabriel. Here community members were exempt from paying seigneurial dues and the land was administered by community members themselves. Nonetheless, the Huron-Wendat drew on French administrative and legal structures to manage the allocation of land within the village. Often, this involved the expertise of notaries and surveyors.

I have found eight notarial records that involved land transactions within the village.¹¹⁸ These records are different from those governing land outside of the village. Most of these records cover transactions of very small parcels of land – often no bigger

¹¹⁸ Jacques-Nicolas Pinguet de Vaucour, 15 Sept 1745, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s223; Jacques-Nicolas Pinguet de Vaucour Pinguet de Vaucour, 4 Nov 1746, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s223; Andre Genest, 23 May 1747, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s115; Andre Genest, 25 Oct 1750, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s115; Andre Genest, 7 July 1775, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s115; Andre Genest, 8 July 1775, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s115; Jean-Baptiste Panet, 2 Apr 1799, BANQ-QUE, E21, s64, ss5, sss6, d581; Jean-Baptiste Panet, 8 Apr 1799, BANQ-QUE, E21, s64, ss5, sss6, d572.

than one or two square arpents – or they focus on the sale of homes. Unlike the notarial records from elsewhere in the seigneurie, which seldom involved Huron-Wendat witnesses, these transactions sometimes took place within a home in the village and were often witnessed by other members of the community. This type of land transaction seems to have built more on internal community structures, than those governing the distribution of land elsewhere in St. Gabriel.

In addition to using notaries, the Huron-Wendat also employed French surveyors when determining the layout of community land. Land was surveyed in both the village and sixteen hundred square arpents.¹¹⁹ Reflecting the role of Jeune-Lorette as both Jesuit mission and Huron-Wendat village, surveys were requested by either the Jesuits or members of the Huron-Wendat community and sometimes both parties together.¹²⁰ There is no evidence that the Huron-Wendat required permission from the Jesuits to hire a surveyor, though the Jesuits never used a surveyor without some degree of Huron-Wendat involvement.

Focusing on notarial and survey records demonstrates that land belonging to the community was administered differently from the land they acquired elsewhere. In hosting and witnessing the meetings where the transfer of land took place, village leaders had an active part in overseeing the administration of village land. However, the use of

¹¹⁹ Noël de Bonhomme dit Beaupré, 6 Dec 1737, BANQ-QUE, CA301, s2, p675; Noël de Bonhomme dit Beaupré, 9 Oct 1742, BANQ-QUE, CA301, s2, p890. The quantity of land surveyed in the second record, about 105 square arpents, was larger than the size of the village, suggesting that this was one of the first surveys conducted in the 1600 square arpents ceded by the Jesuits six months before. See Acte de concession d'une terre de quarante arpents..., 7 Mar 1742, BANQ-QUE, E21 s64, ss5, sss6, d388.

¹²⁰ For examples see Ignace Plamondon (père), 3 Oct 1746, BANQ-QUE, CA301, s43, P118; Ignace Plamondon (père), 24 May 1762, BANQ-QUE, CA301, s43, P437; Ignace Plamondon (fils), 8 June 1776, BANQ-QUE, CA 301, s44; Ignace Plamondon (père), 13-23 June 1787, BANQ-QUE, CA301, s43, p918-1; See also E21, s64, ss5, sss6, d397; Ignace Plamondon (fils), 1-2 Dec 1787, BANQ-QUE, CA 301, s44.


notarial records and surveys to manage the community's spatial layout demonstrates how the Huron-Wendat employed European tools in their village life. It appears that Jeune-Lorette was a place where French legal structures were adapted onto more traditional forms of governance and administration.

Beyond St. Gabriel seigneurie, the Huron-Wendat practiced more customary forms of land management. Huron-Wendat hunting territory has been the most rigorously studied aspect of their land use. Their hunting territory was family-based and administered through Aboriginal networks without European influence. Jean Tanguay, whose research demonstrates that the hunting territory north of Quebec was regulated through the Seven Fires Confederacy, argues that “Indépendamment des prétensions européennes en Amérique du Nord-Est, nous avons pu constater que les nations domiciliées de la vallée du Saint-Laurent ont su conserver une certaine autonomie politique et juridique qui leur permettaient d’occuper et de gérer une partie de ce territoire.”¹²¹ More recently Jocelyn Tehatarongnantase Paul has demonstrated that, like the Cree from Mistassini studied by Adrian Tanner and Toby Morantz, the governance of their hunting territory was flexible and focused on the territory as a whole, rather than rights to specific parcels of land within it.¹²² At the end of the eighteenth century, a loose set of rules and regulations governed and defined Huron-Wendat hunting and gathering; they differed strikingly from the way that land was administered in and around the village.

¹²¹ Tanguay, “La Liberté d’Errer et de Vaquer,” 106. Author’s translation: “Independent of European pretensions in northeastern North America, we can affirm that the domicilié nations living in the St. Lawrence valley were able to conserve their political and judicial autonomy in such a way as to permit them to occupy and administer a part of this territory.”

¹²² Paul, “Le territoire de chasse des Hurons de Lorette,” 18.

Map 5.3: Hunting Territory along the St. Lawrence valley¹²³



Tsawanhonhi's (also known as Nicolas Vincent, the Grand Chief at the time) testimony before a committee of the Lower Canadian Assembly in 1824 provides insight into how these lands were managed. According to the Huron-Wendat chief, their hunting territory was bounded from east to west by the Chicoutimi and St. Maurice Rivers, along the south shore of the St. Lawrence to the River St. John.¹²⁴ Tanguay's work demonstrates that the Huron-Wendat and the Algonquin living around Trois-Rivières

¹²³ Hunting territory in this map has been determined using Prins, 1; Appendix A. House of Assembly, 29 January 1824, in *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly...*, 20; Minutes of a meeting between Indian Agent Duchesnay and the Algonquin of Three Rivers and Huron from Lorette, Library and Archives Canada, Naval and Military Affairs, RG 8-268, f. 726.

¹²⁴ Appendix A. House of Assembly, 29 January 1824, in *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly...*, 20.

agreed to hunt together along the north shore of the St. Lawrence.¹²⁵ But these were just general guidelines. The 1701 Peace at Montreal carried a provision that allies of the French crown could hunt on one another's territory.¹²⁶ In addition to the territory above, the Huron-Wendat occasionally hunted around Lac St. Jean, Becancour and Kahnawake; likewise people from the other villages hunted on their land.¹²⁷ The flexibility of hunting territories reflects the low population density in the region and therefore less competition for resources. The distribution of hunting territories between communities became more important in the nineteenth century when European settlement south of the St. Lawrence forced the Abenaki to expand their hunt north of the river onto land used by the Algonquin and Huron-Wendat.¹²⁸

Within the community clearer points of territorial division existed. The Huron-Wendat divided their hunting territory along family lines, in a fashion similar to many of the Algonquian peoples living in the region.¹²⁹ Based primarily on his first-hand experience and interviews, Frank Speck noted that in the nineteenth century the community's hunting territories were broken down in the following manner: Francis GrosLouis – who had the most extensive territory – held rights along the Blanche, St.

¹²⁵ Tanguay, "Les règles d'alliance et l'occupation huronne du territoire," 24.

¹²⁶ Tanguay, "Les règles d'alliance et l'occupation huronne du territoire," 26.

¹²⁷ Requête de François Hazeur, sous-fermier de la traite de Tadoussac, au sujet des empiétements des Abénaquis et des Hurons de Lorette sur son territoire, 22 Sept 1707, C11A-59, ff. 297v-298v; see also Tanguay, "La Liberté d'Errer et de Vaquer," 33; Girault to Haldimand, 24 Nov 1778, Haldimand Papers, vol. 21777, ff. 44-45; Report of the Commissioners for Exploring the Saguenay, in *Appendix to the XXXVIIIth volume of the Journals of the House of Assembly of the province of Lower-Canada, second session of the thirteenth provincial Parliament, sess. 1828-29*, (Quebec: Neilson & Cowan, [1829]), V-54.

¹²⁸ Minutes of a meeting between Indian Agent Duchesnay and the Algonquin of Three Rivers and Huron from Lorette, LAC, Naval and Military Affairs, RG 8-268, f. 726. There was also conflict between the Huron-Wendat and Algonquin over where their hunting territories met. It was quickly resolved in the Huron-Wendat's favour.

¹²⁹ Frank Speck, "Huron Hunting Territories in Quebec," *Indian Notes*, vol. 4, no. 1 (Jan 1927), 1-12.

Anne, and Jacques Cartier Rivers; Thomas Sioui joined Gros-louis at some point during the nineteenth century; Magloire Romain and Alexandre Picard had rights to the land west of Gros-louis along the Batiscan River, Lac des Isles, Lac Bellevue, and the Miguick River; François Gros-louis also held a smaller plot along the Jacques Cartier River.

Nearly a century earlier, Tsawanhonhi described the Huron-Wendat hunting territories differently. His hunting grounds were on the Ste-Anne River:

The hunting grounds of Paul's ancestors, are at Lake St. Vincent; of André Romain, on the river St. Ann; but below Paul, the ancestors of Louis, at Tantary, between the river Jacques Cartier and St. Ann; Seewée's at Lake Caché, between the Montmorency and Jacques Cartier River; Zacharié's ancestors lake St. Joseph. There were families occupying the hunting grounds, between the St. Ann and St. Maurice, but they are now all extinct.¹³⁰

The difference between these two descriptions makes it clear that significant changes were afoot during the nineteenth century; many of these changes were already well underway by the time of Tsawanhonhi's testimony. Unfortunately, this is as much evidence as I have been able to collect on this aspect of Huron-Wendat life. The extent to which this decline was a result of the conquest is an issue which will only be tangentially addressed in chapter seven. For now, however, the decline suggests that the system likely existed during the French regime.

Despite the changes that occurred to the Huron-Wendat hunting territory over the nineteenth century, families could hunt on the same land for many years. In February 1828, when the *Star and Commercial Advertiser* published a series of stories about the community, Tsoui, a member of the village council and chief of the warriors, told the newspaper that his father took him "out to hunt for the first time in the ground that is the

¹³⁰ Report of the Commissioners for Exploring the Saguenay, V-54.

hunting ground of our family. I could not have been more than ten years old, it was at our cabin situated upon lake Ta-oriuk-tara-sik-ti, which signifies concealed lake.”¹³¹

Tsoui’s testimony demonstrates that this land was passed down from father to son. It also reinforces Tsawanhonhi’s testimony a year later that placed Sioui’s land at Lake Caché.

Women also used land beyond the village site. In 1734, the governor general and intendant observed that the Fox captive adopted into the Huron-Wendat village behaved well enough that she would not pose a threat if she went with the village women to pick maiden hair around Lac Saint-Pierre, where the St. Lawrence widens just upstream from Becancour.¹³² It is unclear why they needed to travel so far to find this plant. The letter is an excellent illustration of how the land beyond the village was used to support many different parts of the Huron-Wendat economy. Not only did it fuel meat and fur production, but it was also an important for gathering berries and other plants that were part of the Huron-Wendat diet.

To the Huron-Wendat this was clearly their land, despite France’s, and later Britain’s, claim. The rivers, lakes and important landmarks surrounding the French seigneuries all had Huron-Wendat names.¹³³ The best example comes from a pivotal moment in the re-inscription of this space, when the colonial government used Huron-Wendat geographic knowledge to map the landscape for European use. In 1829, Tsawanhonhi guided a group of Europeans sent to explore the region. He revealed the Huron-Wendat landscape to them as they travelled: they passed through Tiora Dathek

¹³¹ ‘Indian Lorette’, *Star and Commercial Advertiser/L’Étoile et Journal du Commerce*, 19 March 1828.

¹³² Lettre de Beauharnois et Hocquart au ministre, 7 Oct 1734, C11A-61 ff. 89v-90. Maiden hair is a type of fern.

¹³³ Tanguay, “La Liberté d’Errer et de Vaquer,” 37-39. For more on Huron-Wendat place names see Jean Poirier, *La Toponymie des Hurons-Wendats*, (Québec: Commission de Toponymie du Québec, 2001).

(Lac à Diamant), Atochiateake (chez le cheval), Lahdaweonle (Jacques Cartier River), Aoutsiole (Lakes St. Thomas, St. Vincent and St. Guillaume), Onenwot (Grand Lake), Kiooliyatentiaon (the stream that feeds Lake Onenwot), Kialoskatora (waterfall flowing into the Ste-Anne), Atourile (a branch of the Ste-Anne River), Showaska (a long narrow lake), Thiyonontaleniat (another lake: sur la Montagne haute), Telayer (another branch of the Ste-Anne), Soulariski (a River – ‘the bark is long’), and Oyahensque (Owl Lake). As they travelled through these places, they used Huron-Wendat trails and pathways which would soon be developed into European roadways into the region.¹³⁴

As many historians and anthropologists have observed in the past, Huron-Wendat hunting territories – which began where settlement ended – were autonomously governed and controlled spaces. This completely differed from how land was administered closer to the village. Unlike Huron-Wendat land in Saint-Gabriel, the division of hunting territories was made in the presence of neither a notary nor surveyor; rather the division of this territory was conducted according to Huron-Wendat rules and regulation in consultation and negotiation with neighbouring Aboriginal communities.¹³⁵

Conclusion

Raudot’s early-eighteenth century observations serve as an excellent summary for this chapter. They illustrate how the Huron-Wendat engaged with the seigneurial and Aboriginal worlds of the St. Lawrence:

¹³⁴ To Andrew Stuart and David Stuart, Esquires, Commissioners appointed by an Act of the Provincial Parliament of Lower Canada, for Exploring certain Lands lying between Lake St. Charles and the River Chicoutimie, in *Appendix to the XLth volume of the Journals of the House of Assembly of the Province of Lower-Canada, first session of the Fourteenth Provincial Parliament*, 1831, C9-12.

¹³⁵ For a more detailed discussion of Huron-Wendat hunting territories see Tanguay, “La Liberté d’Errer et de Vaquer,” 40-45.

vous ne le [the changes in their culture] connaitrés que dans les choses qui regardent la religion et dans l'usage de nos armes et de nos marchandises, mais vous n'en trouverés aucun dans leur gouvernement, dans leur politique ny dans leur maniere de s'habiller... Il faudra un travail et un tems infiny pour affranchir ces peuples et pour pouvoir les reduire à prendre nos usages et nos coutumes, ce ne sera que par une application continuelle sur eux et peu à peu qu'on y pourra parvenir, et c'est, je vous assure, un ouvrage de plusieurs siecles.¹³⁶

More important than the selective way the Huron-Wendat embraced both of these worlds was the separate identity Raudot ascribed to these people. This autonomy underpinned all of the Huron-Wendat relationships. Occasionally, they made this explicit to European observers. In 1745 William Pote noted that his Huron-Wendat captors boasted that “they was In Subjection to no king nor prince In ye Universe.”¹³⁷ In a more direct illustration of their independence, his captors asked him

if there was not people In my Countrey, Sometmes [*sic.*] Distroyed by ye Thunder and Lightening yes I told ym I had known Several Instances of that Nature, they Told me yt Never any thing hapned to ye Indians, of harm Neither by thunder nor Lightning. and they Sd it was a judgement on ye English, and French, for Incroaching on their Libertys In America.¹³⁸

Embracing the French world – an act they could hardly avoid – was not linked to the abandoning of Aboriginal traditions or their autonomy as a political community. In the pre-conquest period, Jeune-Lorette was a complex space where the Huron-Wendat engaged with many aspects of French society while continuing to consider themselves separate from the other communities around them.

¹³⁶ Rochemonteix, 61-62. Author's translation: “You will see it in how they view religion and use our arms and material goods, but you will not at all find their government, policies, or clothing similar to ours... It will be a large task, taking an infinite amount of time, to enfranchise these people and to reduce them to embrace our way of life and customs, it will only be by continual application on them that little by little it will be reached, and it is, I assure you, a work of many centuries.”

¹³⁷ *The Journal of Captain William Pote, Jr.*, 36.

¹³⁸ *The Journal of Captain William Pote, Jr.*, 55.

Chapter 6: Parallel Conquest: The Seven Years' War and the Conquest of Quebec

The difference between Aboriginal and European worlds minimized the effect that the Seven Years' War and fall of Quebec had on the Huron-Wendat. Although members of the community participated in many of the key battles in North America, the war was primarily fought between Europeans. It took place, however, in Aboriginal spaces. By 1758, Europeans – particularly the British as they drew nearer Quebec – were required to consider both the European and Aboriginal dimensions of the conflict. When Quebec fell on 13 September 1759, there was little doubt in British minds that they had only conquered the French empire; their Aboriginal allies occupied a place in the St. Lawrence valley beyond the influence of French authorities. With Quebec in British hands, military commanders were in a strong position to negotiate neutrality and peace with these peoples. These negotiations maintained many of the structures that governed Aboriginal-French relations, minimizing the overall effect of the imperial transition.

The technique of negotiation and treaty-making, led by Sir William Johnson and the Indian Department, brought about British/Aboriginal accommodation in the St. Lawrence valley. The weeks, months, and years following the final surrender of the French at Montreal in early September 1760 were filled with a variety of types of negotiations on which this new relationship was built. This approach contrasts with the post-conquest environment in Mi'kma'ki, where it took the British over a decade to sign a treaty with the Mi'kmaq. The treaty-making process in Canada began as soon as it was clear that Montreal was going to fall. Both the Huron-Wendat – through the Seven Fires

– and the British wanted peace. The peace that followed had four principal components: the Treaty of Oswegatchie (1760), the Murray Treaty (1760), the Treaty of Kahnawake (1760), and the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Over the course of these agreements a foundation was developed on which the Huron-Wendat and British could interact without resorting to the type of violence seen in Mi'kma'ki.

The Growing Tensions of the Seven Years' War

The overall military importance of the Huron-Wendat and their Aboriginal allies declined during the 1740s and 1750s. Tensions between France and Britain had become a growing concern for imperial authorities overseas. As the War of Austrian Succession developed, metropolitan concerns and perspectives became more prominent. Fewer imperial officials had experience interacting with Aboriginal people, and the growing European military strength and tactics in North America made them less necessary. Nonetheless, many Aboriginal people participated in the key battles of the Seven Years' War. Their involvement marked some of the defining moments of the conflict.

French military engagements were an important component of Huron-Wendat community life. Their involvement in French conflicts was usually of a mercenary nature. Only rarely did they have a direct attachment to the people and places where military campaigns were conducted. Until 1759, the conflict between the French and British had a major impact on their community, providing considerable material and demographic profit. In his discussion of the Canadian Iroquois in the Seven Years' War, D. Peter MacLeod encapsulated the motivation that drove these people to participate in this conflict. The people from Kahnawake, Akwesasne and Kanesatake fought more as

allies of the French than as enemies of the British.¹ The Huron-Wendat were in a similar position. Unlike the Abenaki and Mi'kmaq, who had material grievances against the British, the Huron-Wendat fought because of the benefits they gained from the French and on the warpath.

The actual participation of the Huron-Wendat in the conflicts of the Seven Years' War is very difficult to assess. Often members of the community made up only a small percentage of the Aboriginal people who accompanied the French military on these expeditions. At the most, in 1755, members of the community likely comprised a mere 1.3 percent of the total fighting force and only 5.3 percent of the Aboriginal people who accompanied the French troops to Fort St. Frederic on Lake Champlain.² Ian Steele observed that two years later only 52 Huron-Wendat from Jeune-Lorette and Detroit were a part of the Aboriginal contingent that attacked Fort William Henry.³ On a percentage basis, they made up less than one percent of the total number of troops, 2.8 percent of the Aboriginal people involved in the campaign, and only six percent of the fighting force from the domicilié communities.⁴ It would not be easy to catalogue their participation in each event during this conflict, nor would such a list add to the central issues discussed in this dissertation. These small numbers suggest that the Huron-Wendat presence at many

¹ D. Peter MacLeod, *The Canadian Iroquois in the Seven Years' War* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1996), 19-20.

² Journal of the Operations of the Army from 22d July to 30th September, 1755, in *DRCHSNY*, vol.10, 338. There were 720 men from the regiments of La Reine and Languedoc, 1500 Canadians, and 760 Iroquois, Huron, Abenaki, and Nipissing. These calculations have been determined assuming the community sent about forty men to fight in the conflict. See chapter five, footnote 2.

³ Ian Steele, *Betrayals: Fort William Henry & the 'Massacre,'* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990), 83.

⁴ The percentages listed here are based on Ian Steele's assessment of the French troops. I have placed the page number in parentheses following the number: 2570 French regulars (92), 2546 militia (93), 1000 Aboriginal people from the Pays d'en Haut (79-80), 839 Aboriginal people from the St. Lawrence valley (82-83). See Steele, chap. 4.

of the conflicts during the war could easily be overlooked by contemporary observers. MacLeod observed that the Canadian Iroquois living at Akwesasne, Kahnawake, and Kanesatake participated in every major campaign of the war.⁵ There is little indication that the Huron-Wendat would have responded to the war any differently than the domicilié communities further west.

Unlike earlier campaigns, where Louise Dechêne has suggested that Aboriginal people made up the principal fighting force, Aboriginal participation during the Seven Years' War was much less significant.⁶ In the 1755 campaign at Fort St. Frederic, Aboriginal people made up only thirty-four percent of the people fighting with the French; in the 1757 attack on Fort William Henry they made up thirty-six percent. These numbers reflect the general increase in European troops that began during the War of Austrian Succession. Interest in North America was growing in colonial metropolises. At the height of the Seven Years' War, between 1757 and 1761, the British parliament provided 30000 troops (on paper) to join 20000 armed colonists.⁷ Similarly French military spending also increased dramatically over the course of the 1730s, 40s, and 50s.⁸ Officers and troops from Europe began filling a role that until then had been played primarily by people from the colonies or Europeans with significant colonial experience.

⁵ MacLeod, *The Canadian Iroquois*, x.

⁶ Louise Dechêne, *Le Peuple, l'État et la Guerre au Canada sous le Régime français*, (Montreal: Boréal, 2008), see pages 27-28 and 194-196 for the central role of Aboriginal people during French Regime warfare and page 386 for the diminishment of this role during the Seven Years' War.

⁷ Linda Colley, *Captives: The story of Britain's pursuit of empire and how its soldiers and civilians were held captive by the dream of global supremacy, 1600-1850*, (New York: Random House, 2002), 171.

⁸ William J. Eccles, "The Social, Economic, and Political Significance of the Military Establishment in New France," *The Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 52 no. 1, (1971), 16-17.

The arrival of men without North American experience caused significant friction between France and its Aboriginal allies. Conflict regularly arose between French or British officers and Aboriginal leaders over the conventions of war. MacLeod's work illustrates how the European preference for fort-building and siege warfare conflicted with Aboriginal motivations for going to war.⁹ By limiting access to captives and material goods after successful battles – two key motivators for the Huron-Wendat – European officers reduced the incentives for Aboriginal people to join in what were increasingly becoming European battles.

European disdain for Aboriginal people existed at highest ranks on both sides of the battlefield.¹⁰ The Marquis de Montcalm, who only reluctantly fought alongside Aboriginal people, preferred European military strategy and tactics.¹¹ One of his aides-de-camp famously summarized the view of French officers by writing that he found France's Aboriginal allies one thousand times more annoying than mosquitoes.¹² This was a strong statement considering the insects the armies would have encountered as they marched through northeastern forests.

These views had detrimental consequences on the battlefield. Disappointed with their allies as the French bore down on Forts Edward and William Henry, Montcalm called them together "...to reproach them that, whilst more engaged in firing to little purpose around the fort than with the essential business of scouting, they were neglecting their Father's will..." The allies replied to him with their own concerns about the

⁹ MacLeod, *The Canadian Iroquois*, 114.

¹⁰ Colley, 185.

¹¹ Steele, 131-2; MacLeod, *The Canadian Iroquois*, chap. 2.

¹² MacLeod, *The Canadian Iroquois*, 120.

conflict, reflecting the growing chasm between them and Montcalm. The allies felt “that they seemed to be despised; that they were not consulted on the actual operations and would be made march without any understanding with their chiefs.” Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, who recorded this encounter, considered this trouble to have been the result of the haste with which the army was required to move. He observed that the conflict was easily solved: “two Belts and ten Strings of Wampum were sufficient to efface the bad impressions, to clear the sight, cleanse the heart and restore the senses.”¹³ But later, in the same document, he revealed some of the likely causes of these tensions:

Tis true, my Lord, that the Marquis de Montcalm has known how to win their affections. They themselves observed that he was acquainted with their customs and manners as if he had been reared in the midst of their cabins, and what is almost unprecedented, he has succeeded in managing them, throughout this entire expedition, without giving them either brandy or wine, or even an outfit of which they stood in the greatest need, but the army lacked.¹⁴

Although emphasizing that Montcalm was adept at liaising with France’s Aboriginal allies, the end of this passage demonstrates a policy that marked a significant deviation from past French gift-giving practices. They may have fought alongside Montcalm initially, but as Fred Anderson has observed, the abandonment of gift giving, trade and mediation in the 1750s ultimately led to their unwillingness to fight on France’s behalf. Montcalm was attempting to change France’s relationship with its Aboriginal allies from

¹³ Letter of M. de Bougainville to the Minister, with the Articles of capitulation granted to Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, on the 19th of August, 1757, in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 10, 612.

¹⁴ Letter of M. de Bougainville to the Minister, with the Articles of capitulation granted to Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, on the 19th of August, 1757, in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 10, 613.

one of alliance to that of military auxiliary.¹⁵ Like in Mi'kma'ki, there was little reason for many of these people to support the French without the supply of provisions and gifts.

The commander-in-chief of British troops in North America, Jeffery Amherst, was also reluctant to accommodate Aboriginal people. Amherst responded to the suggestion of using Aboriginal fighters against Pontiac's 1763 uprising by exclaiming, "I can by no means think of Employing them upon this Occasion... by perseverance, & proper measures, I have no Doubt but we shall by our own Strength... Reduce the Savages... to Such a Low Ebb, as will Effectually Deter them from Attempting to Disturb Us hereafter."¹⁶ Although not all Europeans shared these views, similarities between the French and British demonstrate the decreasing value officers on both sides of the conflict placed on Aboriginal people. Although the Huron-Wendat did not abandon the French before Quebec fell, interactions with men like Montcalm during the late 1750s must have made their decision to make peace with the British that much easier.

The Siege at Quebec and its Aftermath

The Huron-Wendat actively fought against the British when General Wolfe and Admiral Saunders sailed up the St. Lawrence during the summer of 1759. Although there are only a handful of sources about Aboriginal participation during these tense months, one of the richest is the memoirs of Etienne Ondiaraété. In 1828, Ondiaraété, better known as Petit Etienne, told the *Star and Commercial Advertiser* about the village's experiences of the conquest. In his late teens, he was considered too young to fight, but

¹⁵ Fred Anderson, *Crucible of war: the Seven Years' War and the fate of empire in British North America, 1754-1766*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 742.

¹⁶ Jeffery Amherst to William Johnson, 30 September 1763, CO 5-63, ff. 383-383v.

being from Jeune-Lorette he had a front row seat when the British began their attack on Quebec. From that vantage point, he remembered that most Huron-Wendat warriors – about sixty or seventy – were stationed at Quebec’s principal defences at Beauport. When Wolfe’s men arrived on the Plains of Abraham on 13 September, they encountered between one thousand and twelve hundred other Aboriginal people from as far west as the Great Lakes.¹⁷

Other than Ondiaraété’s narrative, little is known about Aboriginal participation in this battle. MacLeod has suggested that the autonomy of Aboriginal decision-making about where, when and how they would fight accounts for their absence from the documentary record.¹⁸ Based on their positions in the field, with the Canadian militia on the flanks, he argues that they were in an ideal position “to fight in their own way.”¹⁹ Louise Dechêne has suggested an alternative perspective. Unlike during earlier conflicts, Dechêne argues that both the militia and regular troops took a dominant role in the fighting during the late 1750s, highlighting the secondary role Aboriginal people played in some of the later conflicts of the war.²⁰ With their decreased importance, and having lost the battle, there is little reason for French accounts to discuss the role of Aboriginal people in great detail.

Ondiaraété provides the only Aboriginal perspective on the fighting. Although his account sometimes confuses the 1759 attack with the American invasion of Quebec in 1775, Ondiaraété’s memory of the event reinforces MacLeod’s interpretation by

¹⁷ D. Peter MacLeod, *Northern Armageddon: The Battle of the Plains of Abraham: Eight Minutes of Gunfire that Shaped a Continent*, (Toronto, Douglas & McIntyre, 2008), 73.

¹⁸ MacLeod, *Northern Armageddon*, 164.

¹⁹ MacLeod, *Northern Armageddon*, 165-7.

²⁰ Dechêne, 386.

suggesting that the Huron-Wendat made their decisions independently from the French. He told the reporter from *The Star and Commercial Advertiser* that when “The fire of musketry, was first heard at Cap Rouge. – Our Warriors rushed across the St. Charles, leaving Beauport at full speed to take their share in the engagement.”²¹ Implied in this statement is that the Huron-Wendat acted without French orders. This was all that Ondiaraété saw of the conflict. Being too young to participate in the battle, his grandfather sent him home from the lines when the fighting became too intense. Rather than returning to the village, he remained nearby but did not see much of the action.

Ondiaraété had much more to say about the aftermath of the battle. Following the French defeat he joined the rest of the community as they abandoned Jeune-Lorette and retreated with the French to the Jacques Cartier River, where they spent the winter. This was a hasty retreat. After having watched one thousand militia march through the village, the Huron-Wendat joined the retreat in the early evening. Ondiaraété remembered leaving the village:

By 12 o'clock that night we and our women and children had commenced our march; but before doing so, we concealed all that we had in the woods, in the neighbourhood of the Village, taking nothing with us but the ornaments and sacred vessels of our Church. We marched the whole night and reached Capsa, which is just beyond the limits of Old Lorette, about 7 o'clock on the following morning. We passed the whole of that day and the following night there. The next morning as soon as we had boiled our kettles (breakfasted,) we again commenced our march, and reached the hither side of Jacques Cartier River that night; and we put up our Cabins on the high-lands at its mouth. We crossed this River the next day... A store house was erected on the other side, we pitched our cabins here for the Winter, receiving provisions from the King's stores.²²

²¹ ‘Indian Lorette’, *Star and Commercial Advertiser/L'Étoile et Journal du Commerce*, 13 Feb 1828. It is important to note that this document does not appear in Louise Dechêne's work because she died before its discovery was publicized. See Alain Beaulieu, ‘Les Hurons et la Conquête : Un nouvel éclairage sur le ‘traité Murray’,’ *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, 30: 3 (2000), 53-63.

²² ‘Indian Lorette’, *Star and Commercial Advertiser/L'Étoile et Journal du Commerce*, 27 Feb 1828.

The community's support for the French ended with that retreat. During the winter the council of chiefs adopted a policy of neutrality.

With Quebec taken, Jeune-Lorette was in a highly vulnerable position. The year before, St. François had been attacked in reprisal for capturing a British messenger sent to seek their neutrality.²³ The only two things preventing a similar fate for the Huron-Wendat were the village's location on the other side of the city from the principal sites of action along the St. Lawrence and that it was abandoned during the 1759 winter. It was with this in mind that Ondiaraété claimed the "council Chiefs thought our force too small to effect much for our own safety, they determined upon being neutral – We knew our weakness and observed that neutrality did not endanger us with the conquerors."²⁴ With the fighting so close to their village, they had few other options than a policy that would allow their community to survive regardless of what transpired in 1760.

The community adhered to this policy when the French returned to Quebec in the spring of 1760. At the end of April and beginning of May, the Chevalier de Lévis pushed the British back behind Quebec's walls. French victory seemed certain until British warships arrived sealing France's 1759 defeat. Although some Aboriginal people fought alongside Lévis, there is no indication that the Huron-Wendat participated in the French attempt to win back Quebec. One French mémoire observed: "Les sauvages Etoient sous le commandement de M. S^t Luc De la Corne Pas un n'avance durant l'action. Ils Etoient

²³ 'Amherst to Pitt', 22 October 1759, CO 5-56.2, ff. 1-26.

²⁴ 'Indian Lorette', *Star and Commercial Advertiser/L'Étoile et Journal du Commerce*, 27 Feb 1828.

tous caches dans un petit Bois a un quart de Lieue de notre armée... ”²⁵ With Quebec taken, and St. François razed, there was little reason for the Huron-Wendat or any other Aboriginal people to antagonize the British.

It is unlikely that Jeune-Lorette’s decision to remain neutral in 1760 was made in isolation from the decisions being made in the other domicilié villages. The British sought Aboriginal neutrality in the region throughout the Seven Years’ War. They made it clear that if the French were defeated, Aboriginal people would be able to continue to live as they had before the conquest.²⁶ After 1759, achieving Aboriginal neutrality became a British priority. William Johnson, the Superintendent of the newly created Indian Department, told British Prime Minister William Pitt that he had “judged it highly necessary to gain them [France’s Aboriginal allies] if possible, at least to bring them to a Neutrality, being very sensible of the difficultys which an Army had to encounter in their way to Montreal...”²⁷ Johnson was deeply connected to the Mohawk living south of the St. Lawrence. Using these connections, the British reached out to the Mohawk communities west of Montreal, stressing the importance of Aboriginal non-interference as British troops marched on the town. These western agreements lay the groundwork for the treaties and relationships that developed during the early 1760s, including those involving the Huron-Wendat.

²⁵ Mémoire, [1760], C11A-104, f. 483. Author’s translation: “The natives were under the command of M. St. Luc De la Corne and not one advanced during the action. They were all hidden in a small woods about a quarter of a league from our army...”

²⁶ Jean Tanguay, “La Liberté d’Errer et de Vaquer : Les Hurons de Lorette et l’Occupation du Territoire, XVIIe-XIXe siècles,” (MA Thesis, Université Laval, 1998), 88. Delâge and Sawaya note that the British and Haudenosaunee sent wampum belts requesting their neutrality on 21 Apr and 11 Oct 1759. See Denys Delâge and Jean-Pierre Sawaya, *Les Traités des Sept Feux avec les Britanniques: droits et pièges d’un héritage colonial au Québec*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 2001), 43-45.

²⁷ To William Pitt, Fort Johnson, 24 Oct. 1760, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, vol. 3, 272.

Community leaders from Kanesatake recounted their memories of the 1759/60 neutrality and peace to John Johnson, William Johnson's son and replacement as the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, in 1787. Their memories shared many similarities with Ondiaraété's account, while also setting the stage for later negotiations once it was clear France would be defeated. Like the Huron-Wendat, the delegates from Kanesatake claimed that even before Montreal was taken they had arrived at the decision to make peace with the British. They took their captives down to Sir William Johnson at Fort Johnson – near Amsterdam, New York – and returned to Canada with a message of forgiveness for any of the domicilié communities who abandoned French interests and came under British protection. This was not a simple gesture of kindness. Johnson was prepared to use violence if necessary. He made it clear that “if after this warning they still persisted in their former Conduct, and blindly rushed on to make any opposition to the army that would soon March into their Country; He would extirpate all those nations and raze their village to the Ground.”²⁸ This began a fierce debate among the domicilié villages about how to proceed. Many people still did not believe that the British could remove the French administration.

The Mohawk at Kanesatake received another message from Johnson before they reached a resolution. He was upstream at Oswegatchie preparing to descend on Montreal. The message informed the Mohawk that this was their last chance to make

²⁸ Minutes of a Speech addressed to Sir John Johnson Bart, Superintendant General + Inspector General of Indian Affairs, by the Principal Chiefs of the Village of Lake of two Mountains assembled in Council, 8 Feb 1787, CO 42-66, f. 53v.

peace before the British arrived. In council, the community decided to meet with Johnson and confirm their neutrality before the British attacked.

The Mohawk did not act alone. Whether the Huron-Wendat were with them or not – and it is likely that they were not – the delegates from Kanesatake began a process that eventually incorporated all of the domicilié villages into the peace with Britain. In remembering the meeting, the Mohawk claimed that Johnson “received the Submissions of all the Deputies from Canada, and there in a full Council granted us Protection in the King’s Name, & confirmed to us our Lands as granted by the King of France, and the free exercise of our Religion with the Indulgence of a Priest, to reside in our Village.”²⁹ Johnson confirmed this agreement with a wampum belt which the delegates from Kanesatake presented to his son as they recounted this initial meeting in 1787.³⁰

This agreement is known as the Treaty of Oswegatchie. It was neither a treaty of peace nor an alliance, nor was it a capitulation or surrender; rather, the British sought only the neutrality of the domicilié villages as they invaded Canada.³¹ The agreement did, however, prepare the ground for an alliance in the future. These meetings began the process of further integrating the St. Lawrence communities into the British-Haudenosaunee covenant chain.³² Although a copy of the proceedings no longer exists,

²⁹ Minutes of a Speech addressed to Sir John Johnson Bart, Superintendent General + Inspector General of Indian Affairs, by the Principal Chiefs of the Village of Lake of two Mountains assembled in Council, 8 Feb 1787, CO 42-66, f. 54.

³⁰ Minutes of a Speech addressed to Sir John Johnson Bart, Superintendent General + Inspector General of Indian Affairs, by the Principal Chiefs of the Village of Lake of two Mountains assembled in Council, 8 Feb 1787, CO 42-66, ff. 53-54.

³¹ Delâge and Sawaya, chap. 3

³² Jean-Pierre Sawaya, *Alliances et Dépendance: comment la couronne britannique a obtenu la collaboration des Indiens de la vallée du Saint-Laurent entre 1760-1774* (Sillery: Septentrion, 2002), chap. 1; Cornelius Jaenen, “Rapport historique sur la nation huronne-wendat,” in *Les Hurons de Lorette*, ed. Denis Vaugeois (Sillery: Septentrion, 1996), 208.

this was an important meeting with long lasting consequences. Sawaya and Delâge have noted eight occasions in which this agreement was referenced by either the British or Seven Fires between 1763 and 1828.³³ Although there is no evidence that the Huron-Wendat attended any of the meetings described by the delegates from Kanesatake, their support of the agreement at Oswegatchie can be inferred because of the Mohawk claim that they spoke with the support of ‘all the Deputies from Canada.’

Ondiaraété’s memoirs, though, suggest that the Huron-Wendat made their initial decision to make peace during the winter of 1759-1760, independently from broader regional discussions. He also observed that most of the community did not arrive in the Montreal area until much later in the summer of 1760. The Huron-Wendat followed the British, and subsequently the French armies, to Montreal, where they took up residence in what Ondiaraété described as the deserted village of Kahnawake. It seems likely that many of the people from Kahnawake – like those from Kanesatake – were at Oswegatchie meeting with the British.

Once news had reached Kahnawake that the domicilié communities had agreed to neutrality with the British, the Huron-Wendat made haste to meet with the British General. This meeting occurred on 5 September 1760, three days before Montreal capitulated and the war along the St. Lawrence ended. The timing of the British/Huron-Wendat meeting suggests that the news about the end of the war was not focused on the impending French defeat but rather reflected the importance of the agreement at

³³ Delâge and Sawaya, 51.

Oswegatchie the week before.³⁴ By meeting with Murray before Montreal fell, the Huron-Wendat sought their part in the agreement at Oswegatchie.

Although the Huron-Wendat participated in the Battle of the Plains of Abraham and were deeply involved in defending Quebec, the 1759 defeat marked a significant change in their approach to the Seven Years' War. With France significantly weakened, the winter of 1759-1760 was spent reshaping Huron-Wendat external relations. For the first time, these events revealed the deep political interconnections among the Aboriginal communities living in the St. Lawrence. The decision to remain neutral, and the peace that quickly followed, were collective decisions that demonstrated the development of a robust alliance in which the western villages became the principal spokespeople for the group as a whole. This is most apparent in the negotiations that followed the neutrality agreement at Oswegatchie.

Peace with the British and Treaty-making

Although Johnson sought Aboriginal neutrality using a similar language to his predecessors in Mi'kma'ki, the treaty process during the early months of British administration was fundamentally different from the approach taken with the Mi'kmaq a half-century earlier. The British had intermediaries who could immediately begin to build a relationship with the domicilié communities and both sides were eager to negotiate a framework through which they could interact with one another. Primarily because of his connections with the Mohawk and Haudenosaunee Confederacy, William Johnson and the newly created Indian Department that he directed were responsible for this shift in

³⁴ 'Indian Lorette', *Star and Commercial Advertiser/L'Étoile et Journal du Commerce*, 27 February 1828.

policy. They were able to employ the culture of the Aboriginal world of the St. Lawrence to ensure a smooth transition to British rule.

In the midst of growing tensions with Aboriginal people in Ohio, the British created an Indian Department to coordinate policy on Aboriginal affairs. The creation of the department in 1755 removed responsibility for liaising with Aboriginal people from the colonies through an administrative structure that was less dependent on the political whims of specific colonial governments.³⁵ It allowed for a broad regional approach to Aboriginal diplomacy and helped to coordinate British policy with the Aboriginal communities with whom they sought a relationship.³⁶ It embraced Aboriginal forms of diplomacy, while legitimizing Britain's claim to their land. The department had two superintendencies. The southern department conducted affairs with Aboriginal people living south of the Ohio River, while the northern department – with which we are most concerned here – principally administered relations with the Haudenosaunee and those people living north of the Ohio River.³⁷

William Johnson was selected as the northern department's first superintendent because of his close trading, and later conjugal, relationships with the Mohawk. Over his years as a trader, Johnson had earned considerable influence with these people and was able to use his skills – many of which mirrored the diplomatic acumen of Saint-Ovide at Louisbourg – to align Aboriginal and British interests during the department's first

³⁵ Robert S. Allen, *The British Indian Department and the Frontier in North America, 1755-1830*, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975), 19-20.

³⁶ Colin Calloway, *Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 52.

³⁷ For more on the British Indian Department see Allen, *The British Indian Department and the Frontier in North America, 1755-1830*, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975); and Calloway, chap. 2.

decade. On 20 September 1760, immediately following the acquisition of Canada, Johnson hired Daniel Claus as his deputy in the St. Lawrence valley. Claus, who was present during the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, was to reinforce the relationship with the domicilié communities begun by Johnson only weeks earlier. These two men set the tone for future British-Aboriginal relations after the French defeat.

In many ways, Johnson's approach to Aboriginal people was similar to the approach taken by the French before their defeat. The British continued many French policies in the years following the conquest. They sought to maintain a space separating New England from the St. Lawrence valley, regulate trade, and prevent settlers from moving onto Aboriginal land.³⁸ Johnson also hired deputy superintendants like Claus to represent the department's interests on a more local level. Like many representatives of both the French and British crown, these agents interacted with Aboriginal people using, what Colin Calloway has called, 'frontier diplomacy.'³⁹ Like the 'double diplomacy' practiced in New England at the beginning of the eighteenth century, these 'frontier diplomats' massaged British policy, particularly as it related to claims on Aboriginal territory, in order to prevent alienating the Aboriginal communities with whom they worked. They embraced the culture of the Aboriginal world without recognizing its territorial nature.

This approach, as well as Johnson's connection to the Mohawk, helped the British convince the domicilié communities to remain neutral for the final attack on New France. Unlike in Mi'kma'ki, where imperial officials on the ground had only a vague idea of

³⁸ Calloway, 58.

³⁹ Calloway, 64-69.

how to interact with the Mi'kmaq, Johnson had a clear plan and understood the stakes at risk if the British were not careful. He assured the British Prime Minister, William Pitt, that even if the French attacked again, the British would be supported by the local Aboriginal population:

provided we preserve their esteem & cultivate their friendship, by proper management of them, as well as by a fair extensive trade, than> which nothing <will attach them more> to our <Interest.> - I need not S'. <enlarge much on the rea>sons for keeping up a good understanding <with all Indians,> who may be friends, and can be troublesome <Enemys...⁴⁰

The British began to build this framework in September 1760. With France defeated, the British quickly sought to achieve a broad peace with the Seven Fires. These negotiations and agreements were separate from the French and British negotiations which shaped the Capitulations of Quebec and Montreal and the 1763 Treaty of Paris, which brought about an end to the Seven Years' War.

With neutrality hastily agreed to at Oswegatchie, the Huron-Wendat and the British seemed keen on ensuring that the parties that were not present on 30 August supported the agreement. On 5 September the Huron-Wendat met with General James Murray – the British General to whom they made haste upon learning of the peace – who wrote them a short note granting safe passage home from Montreal and guaranteeing the preservation of their religion, customs and trade.⁴¹ These were the same provisions agreed to the week before by the delegates from Kanesatake and the other Montreal communities. Like Kanesatake, the people at Jeune-Lorette placed a high value on this

⁴⁰ To William Pitt, Fort Johnson October 24th. 1760, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, vol. 3, 274. The arrows appear in the transcription, signaling the difficulty that the editors had in deciphering the words.

⁴¹ James Murray to Hurons of Lorette, 5 Sept 1760, Centre de Référence de l'Amérique française, Séminaire du Québec (SME), Faribault, no. 256.

agreement. Ondiaraété provided a brief glimpse into the importance of the document to the community: “We received the next morning a paper from him [Murray], which we understood to mean that Peace was made.”⁴² Although it was comprised of only a handful of sentences and bears little resemblance to most Aboriginal-European treaties, it was kept by the community for decades as an important document illustrating their relationship with the British.⁴³ This document became known as the Murray Treaty after a ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1990.

The Supreme Court’s decision that the Murray Treaty was indeed a treaty sparked extensive historiographical debate. One group of historians, best represented by Denis Vaugeois, argued against seeing the document as a treaty, claiming that it did not correspond with other British-Aboriginal treaties. Denys Delâge, the leading historian supporting the court’s decision, focused on the alliance-based relationship between the Huron-Wendat and the French and British colonial governments.⁴⁴ Jean Tanguay saw this as the confirmation of the Treaty at Oswegatchie, highlighting that there were representatives from some of the other Aboriginal communities in the region who also saw Murray on that day.⁴⁵ Twelve years after the court’s decision Alain Beaulieu used Ondiaraété’s account in the *Star and Commercial Advertiser* to shed new light on the debate.⁴⁶ Although he argued that the document was not a treaty because its form did not follow the same structure as the negotiations that took place at Oswegatchie and

⁴² ‘Indian Lorette’, *Star and Commercial Advertiser/L’Étoile et Journal du Commerce*, 27 Feb 1828.

⁴³ ‘Indian Lorette’, *Star and Commercial Advertiser/L’Étoile et Journal du Commerce*, 27 Feb 1828.

⁴⁴ For more information see Denis Vaugeois, *Les Fins des alliances* (Sillery: Septentrion, 1995); Vaugeois, *Les Hurons de Lorette* (Sillery: Septentrion, 1996); Delâge and Sawaya, 55-62.

⁴⁵ Tanguay, 93; see also Delâge and Sawaya, 51.

⁴⁶ Beaulieu, 59-61.

Kahnawake, he noted that the community gave considerable importance to the document following the conquest. Indeed, this document was still kept in the council house and used in petitions to the crown during the late 1820s.⁴⁷ Beaulieu concluded that while not a treaty, the document symbolized the community's integration into the British Empire.⁴⁸

This view, however, does not warrant discounting the document's legitimacy as a treaty. Wicken's and Reid's work demonstrates that written agreements between English and Aboriginal peoples during this period often misrepresent the oral agreements at their foundation. As with all symbols, the meaning and interpretation of a document is liable to shift over time with society's changing perspectives.⁴⁹ Emphasizing the context in which eighteenth century treaties were created, Wicken's and Reid's work should caution scholars from a narrow reading of this document. When placed in the context of the meetings at Oswegatchie and Kahnawake, Johnson's broader plan for peace along the St. Lawrence and Great Lakes, and its symbolic importance for the community, it seems clear that its intention was to embody the new peace and developing alliance between the British and the Seven Fires. Although stylistically different from other treaties, the ideas that it embodied seem to have been the same.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ 'Indian Lorette', *Star and Commercial Advertiser/L'Étoile et Journal du Commerce*, 27 February 1828; Appendix A. House of Assembly Thursday 29th January 1824, in *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly, on that part of the speech of His Excellency the Governor in Chief which relates to the settlement of the crown lands with the minutes of evidence taken before the committee*, (Quebec: Neilson & Cowen, 1824), 24.

⁴⁸ Beaulieu, 61.

⁴⁹ William C. Wicken, *Mi'kmaq Treaties on Trial: History, Land, and Donald Marshall Junior* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); John G. Reid, *Essays on Northeastern North America: Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), chaps 7 and 9.

⁵⁰ A similar, but counter-argument, can be made about the 1722 peace agreement between the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq and the British. This was not a treaty. Although the document physically looks like a treaty, its spirit did not represent a broader peace between the British and Mi'kmaq. It set out the principal British grievances against the Mi'kmaq and a framework for the two groups to interact in the future, but there is no

For men like Etienne Ondiaraété, however, much of this debate would have been moot. Although they carefully preserved the document, the Huron-Wendat rarely made reference to it during the eighteenth century. With little direct pressure on their hunting territories, it was legal title to lands the community held around their village that were of far greater importance. The debate over the meaning of the Murray Treaty has been principally a twentieth-century issue and does not seem to have been a point of significant contention until then.

Montreal capitulated three days after Murray and the Huron-Wendat made their agreement. Like at Oswegatchie and during the meeting with Murray, the fortieth article of the town's capitulation emphasized the protection of Aboriginal territory, religion and neutrality, further cementing the new policies that the British were taking in their interactions with Aboriginal people in the region.⁵¹ The incorporation of Aboriginal people in the capitulation makes this document unlike the earlier French capitulations at Quebec and Port Royal. This difference reflects the important role Aboriginal people played in the western end of the colony. The capitulation, however, was not an agreement with the Seven Fires, but merely a reflection of the important place of

indication that it was signed on behalf of a Mi'kmaw political body. For each of the signatories, the continued captivity of many local Mi'kmaq, not a desire for peace, was a principal factor in bringing about their submission. The *New England Courant* reported that after signing, each man was given "leave to go see their Country Folks in Prison." The signing of this document neither stopped Mi'kmaw-British violence nor other local Mi'kmaq from coming in to submit. The overall differences in the context of the two documents, rather than their form, determined the overall weight they were given in determining each community's relationship with the British. See *New England Courant*, 31 December 1722, 1-2;⁵⁰ Council Minutes, 23 Nov 1722, Archibald M. MacMechan, ed., *Nova Scotia Archives III: Original Minutes of his Majesty's Council at Annapolis Royal, 1720-1739*, (Halifax, 1908), 41; Council Minutes, 11 Dec 1722, Archibald M. MacMechan, ed., *Nova Scotia Archives III: Original Minutes of his Majesty's Council at Annapolis Royal, 1720-1739*, (Halifax, 1908), 42-43.

⁵¹ Articles of Capitulation, 8 Sept 1760, in Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, eds., *Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 1759-1791*, vol. 1 (Ottawa: J. Taché, 1918), 33.

Aboriginal people around Montreal. The difference between this capitulation and earlier ones suggests that perhaps without the large number of Aboriginal people living around Montreal, a different approach might have been taken.

Representatives from the St. Lawrence villages met with Amherst, Johnson and delegates from the Haudenosaunee Confederacy just over a week after Montreal capitulated. Although a signed document does not seem to have been produced during this meeting, the giving of wampum and the meeting's minutes suggest that an agreement was reached.⁵² This agreement is known as the Treaty of Kahnawake. It marked the beginning of the British-domicilié relationship and drew the villages more directly into the British-Haudenosaunee Covenant chain.⁵³ This treaty also marked the beginning of Kahnawake as the central fire of the Seven Fires Confederacy.⁵⁴

Only one set of minutes remains from this meeting. Unlike the agreement made at Oswegatchie and on 5 September with Murray, these minutes discuss the British-Aboriginal relationship in much greater detail.⁵⁵ The meeting began with an expression of thanks, in the form of a string of wampum, from the Seven Fires to the British for agreeing to neutrality in the weeks leading up to the attack on Montreal. Likewise, the first speaker, who was likely from one of the Mohawk communities around Montreal, thanked those people from the Seven Fires who went to Oswegatchie and negotiated

⁵² Delâge and Sawaya, 71-72.

⁵³ Sawaya, *Alliances et Dépendances*, chap. 1.

⁵⁴ Sawaya, *La Fédération des Sept Feux de la Vallée du Saint-Laurent: XVIIe au XIXe siècle*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 1998), 52-56

⁵⁵ Indian Conference, 16 Sept 1760, in *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, vol. 13, 163-166. It is important to note that this document does not actually refer to the Seven Fires. Rather, it discusses the Eight Nations of Canada. These were the same communities and for the sake of coherence, I have continued to use the term Seven Fires throughout the post-conquest period.

peace, telling those assembled that “Your coming along was very necessary and of mutual Service.”⁵⁶ He then continued to outline the position of the Seven Fires relative to the British and Haudenosaunee Confederacy.

The speaker expressed a desire for the Covenant Chain with the British to be renewed. There is no evidence that any of the communities other than the Mohawk living at Kahnawake, Kanasatake and Akwesasne were a part of the Covenant Chain before this time. It is clear, however, that he intended on including all of the assembled communities. He told Amherst and Johnson, “We thank you most heartily for [them] renewing and strengthening [sic] the old Covenant Chain [of] which before this War subsisted between us, and we in y^e. Name of every Nation here pres^t. assure you [to] that we will hold fast [of] the Same, for ever hereafter.”⁵⁷ With this declaration Albany was opened for trade with these communities.

The next two statements were much more focused on the terms of the peace. A belt was exchanged with the Seven Fires’ agreement to return all of the British captives living in their communities. With another belt, they agreed to bury the French hatchet, a metaphorical promise to end their military assistance to the French.

The speaker then replied to the Haudenosaunee desire for peace between all of the communities. Illustrating the way that these communities were connected through the Mohawk, the delegate summarized the Haudenosaunee words from a meeting the day before: “... there had been during this War a Division & Disunion between us; and

⁵⁶ Indian Conference, 16 Sept 1760, in *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, vol. 13, 163.

⁵⁷ Indian Conference, 16 Sept 1760, in *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, vol. 13, 163. Square brackets appear in the transcription.

[*thereby*] desired us to reunite & be firm Friends as heretofore, We hereby assure all here present that we with pleasure agree to your friendly Proposal and reunite as formerly.”⁵⁸

A wampum belt was then passed to the Haudenosaunee to symbolize this agreement.

The next statement set out the parameters of the Covenant Chain and the way in which it would be maintained. Johnson planned to leave two representatives of the Indian Department in Canada, while the communities would likewise send representatives to Albany. This structure was likely more fluid than these minutes suggest. Examples of meetings between Johnson and members of the Seven Fires demonstrate that this arrangement likely referred to the desire for frequent contact between the Indian Department and St. Lawrence villages rather than a permanent Laurentian delegation at Fort Johnson.⁵⁹ It is clear, however, that Johnson kept his word about appointing representatives for the colony; he appointed his future son-in-law, Daniel Claus, Deputy Superintendent for Canada, four days later. As we will see in the next chapter, Claus quickly became a critical link between the Seven Fires communities and British administration.

The end of the negotiation focused on maintaining the position of these communities in the valley before the conquest. They emphasized that the French, had provided the communities with services, such as blacksmithing.⁶⁰ Although they did not directly state that they wished for these services to continue, it seems that this was their intention. They also thanked the British for the agreements made at Oswegatchie over

⁵⁸ Indian Conference, 16 Sept 1760, in *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, vol. 13, 164.

⁵⁹ See chapter seven for more on these meetings.

⁶⁰ Indian Conference, 16 Sept 1760, in *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, vol. 13, 165.

religion and trade, demonstrating the importance of this early meeting. The Seven Fires sought to maintain in the St. Lawrence valley an Aboriginal world set apart from the French settlers.

A war headman from Kahnawake spoke the final clauses. His words emphasized the Seven Fires' vision for their future relationship with the British. He asked that if any of the young men became drunk and caused offense, the British not deal directly with them, but engage instead with the village chiefs. He also sought to avoid the appointment of one of the French Regime interpreters, Louis Perthuis, to the roll of the Indian Department. Finally, he hoped to further reinforce their permanence along the St. Lawrence by requesting that the land they occupied continue to belong to them even if they relocated. As Delâge and Sawaya have observed, this last point was aimed at limiting British power over Aboriginal lands.⁶¹ Throughout these negotiations the Seven Fires sought to maintain the difference between European and Aboriginal worlds.

The minutes of this meeting provide the first documentary evidence describing the parameters of the relationship between the British and Seven Fires. Although these negotiations demonstrate that the British were willing to continue many French Regime practices, Delâge and Sawaya have made an important observation about the power dynamics inherent in this relationship. The treaty at Kahnawake could be considered a reciprocal military agreement where both sides agreed to peaceful interactions with one another, but it was not one of equals: "c'était plutôt une logique de conquête et il est certain que les 'frères' n'étaient pas égaux. L'Anglais, c'est-a-dire l'empire britannique,

⁶¹ Delâge and Sawaya, 81-84.

avait acquis suffisamment de force pour arriver à transformer ces alliés en mercenaires sans devoir les y forcer.”⁶² This discrepancy in power underpins the 1763 Royal Proclamation and is central to understanding British-Aboriginal relations in the post-conquest period. Although the Aboriginal people involved in these agreements may have continued to have a fair amount of autonomy, the British quickly moved to define the framework through which their decisions would be made.

On 7 October 1763, King George III issued a Royal Proclamation governing future affairs in North America. It dealt extensively with the treatment of Aboriginal land and was posted in each of the villages.⁶³ The policy stemmed from instructions which had already been sent to the colonies nearly two years earlier outlining how land was to be acquired from Aboriginal people for settlement.⁶⁴ At its heart was the idea that the crown must acquire land by treating with Aboriginal communities before it could be settled. It also created the Proclamation Line along the height of land in the Appalachian Mountains dividing Aboriginal from European space. These two separate aspects of the text were often conflated, leading to the false conclusion that the Royal Proclamation did not apply because the Seven Fires’ villages were located within colonial space. Delâge and Sawaya have argued that although many historians and legal scholars have reached this conclusion, British officials made it clear on many occasions that the Proclamation applied to the Seven Fires and their hunting territories. Likewise, the Seven Fires also made reference to the proclamation in discussions with the British on a number of

⁶² Delâge and Sawaya, 87. Author’s translation: “it was rather a logic of conquest and it is certain that the ‘brothers’ were not equals. The English, that is to say the British Empire, had acquired sufficient power that they could transform these allies into mercenaries without force.”

⁶³ Jean-Baptiste D’Estimauville, 10 Jan 1797, LAC, RG 8-250, pt. 1, p. 66 in Delâge and Sawaya, 105.

⁶⁴ Delâge and Sawaya, 99.

occasions, primarily – though not exclusively – in the nineteenth century.⁶⁵ The Royal Proclamation was a critical piece of British law, which helped to govern and shape the relations between the British and Seven Fires throughout this period.

This was not merely an imposition of British policy on Aboriginal peoples. Constitutional scholar John Borrows argues that in the west, the British sought ratification of the proclamation through the 1764 Treaty of Niagara. He argues that the Royal Proclamation cannot be understood without also understanding the context, speeches, and symbols that were produced during these negotiations.

In July and August 1764, Johnson met with representatives from the western Great Lakes. Two treaties were made during these meetings, one with the Huron-Wendat from Detroit and the other with the Seneca. Other delegates at the negotiations represented the Haudenosaunee, Ottawa, Anishinaabe, Meynomineys, Fox, Sakis, and Puans.⁶⁶ An undated and unsigned document suggests that at least one chief from Jeune-Lorette was also at the meetings; his role in these proceedings is unclear.⁶⁷ Regardless of whether Jeune-Lorette was included in the treaty, the idea that the Royal Proclamation had to be ratified by the people it affected, whether at Niagara or not, is an idea worth addressing in greater detail.

For Borrows, the Royal Proclamation and Treaty of Niagara lay the framework on which Aboriginal-British relations developed over the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the eighteenth century, at least two separate views existed on the place of

⁶⁵ Delâge and Sawaya, 100. According to their studies these communities were more likely to refer to the Treaty at Oswegatchie as the foundation of their relationship with the British in the eighteenth century.

⁶⁶ Sir William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 30 Aug 1764, in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 7, 648.

⁶⁷ Indian Intelligence, n.d. *Sir William Johnson Papers*, vol. 4, 495. The editors of these papers have attributed this letter to Johnson.

Aboriginal people in North America. Borrows described these perspectives clearly: “Britain was attempting to secure territory and jurisdiction through the Proclamation, while First Nations were concerned with preserving their lands and sovereignty.”⁶⁸ As a document, the Royal Proclamation is highly problematic because of its one-sided nature reflecting British interests. The Treaty of Niagara was the first opportunity in which the tensions between British and Aboriginal positions could be rectified and the Aboriginal people around the Great Lakes engage with the ideas in the Royal Proclamation. “The Royal Proclamation became a treaty at Niagara,” Borrows writes, “because it was presented by the colonialists for affirmation, and was accepted by the First Nations.”⁶⁹

Whether the Seven Fires were part of this negotiation or not is difficult to accurately assess. Unlike the Royal Proclamation and the agreements made at Oswegatchie and Kahnawake, the Seven Fires never mentioned the agreement at Niagara in their interactions with the British. This is likely because the Royal Proclamation fit into the context set by the 1760 agreements. Given their ties with the Great Lakes communities, however, the idea of the Treaty of Niagara as a ratification of the Royal Proclamation demonstrates that the document did not stand alone in governing the interactions between Aboriginal people and the British. In the case of the Seven Fires, this example points to the importance of understanding the agreements reached in 1760 as laying the context for this piece of British law.

⁶⁸ John Borrows, “Constitutional Law from a First Nations Perspective: Self-Government and the Royal Proclamation,” *UBC Law Review*, vol. 28: 1 (1994), 19.

⁶⁹ Borrows, 20.

Delâge and Sawaya have emphasized that even when situated in a broader diplomatic context, the Proclamation remains a highly problematic document. In their opinion, it hinges on a false premise: the equality of Aboriginal and European peoples in the eyes of the crown.⁷⁰ This was an unequal relationship. Aboriginal people did not have the same status as European settlers in the eyes of colonial officials.

From this observation Delâge and Sawaya identify five additional problems inherent in the document. Since 1763, these difficulties have been at the root of many tensions between Aboriginal and colonial peoples. Most importantly, the proclamation uses a double speak that creates a circular argument: Aboriginal people were not to be molested in parts of the king's dominion which had not yet been ceded to or purchased by the crown. In other words, the king's territorial possession – if only on paper – preceded the crown establishing a legal right to it. Nonetheless, the crown determined who had right to the land, regardless of the crown's relationship with the people already living there. The Royal Proclamation also inferred that Aboriginal rights were not permanent and could be superseded. Aboriginal people may have had a right to use the land, but they did not have a right to own the land. The proclamation stipulated that Aboriginal people could not sell their land directly to settlers. There is no consideration for Aboriginal people who practiced agriculture, and used the land in ways similar to Europeans. Finally, the Royal Proclamation created a formal structure for land transfer without providing for Aboriginal refusal to cede land.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Delâge and Sawaya, 234.

⁷¹ Delâge and Sawaya, 101.

I would add one additional point. The Royal Proclamation assumes that the boundaries between European and Aboriginal people were clear. It implies that French people and other Europeans lived along the St. Lawrence, while Aboriginal people lived well apart from their settlements. Like the situation in Mi'kma'ki, the Royal Proclamation assumed that the division between French and Aboriginal territory had already been determined during the French Regime. This was not the case for most Aboriginal communities along the St. Lawrence; they moved into the St. Lawrence valley at the same time as France was developing its colony. French and Aboriginal worlds overlapped and developed simultaneously, an idea which the Royal Proclamation could only poorly accommodate.

The ambiguities inherent in the Royal Proclamation had an important effect on the St. Lawrence communities. Unlike most other Aboriginal peoples in North America, the dual worlds in which these communities lived created significant problems and left these communities vulnerable to the whims of colonial officials. In their villages, which had been conceded by the French crown, the British did not acknowledge an Aboriginal right and only grudgingly – and occasionally – recognized their French regime title.⁷² Likewise, their hunting territories, which were just as autonomously governed by Aboriginal people as the land west of the Proclamation Line, were clearly considered to be within the colonial boundaries. Like in Mi'kma'ki, the general British assumption in the years after the fall of Quebec, was that this was land clearly ceded to the French by

⁷² The argument that these villages would have had Aboriginal title is controversial given that these people migrated to Jesuit missions. However, given the fairly extensive literature which depicts these villages as autonomous or at least semi-autonomous, it is at least worth considering this argument. The Mississauga moved to the north shore of Lake Ontario after France had become active in the region, indicating that post-contact migration does not prevent groups from claiming an aboriginal right.

Aboriginal people. There was no conception that an Aboriginal world continued to exist along the banks of the St. Lawrence.

With both their village land and their hunting territory considered part of the colony, the Seven Fires had few protections for their land. The British threatened to take away their land, for example, when the Seven Fires waived in their support for the British during the American Revolution. Carleton was clear: “in case of their persisting in their Denial [to support the British] they must expect of having their Lands taken from them & be deprived of other priviledges they enjoyed.”⁷³ The Royal Proclamation only protected Aboriginal people from unplanned settlement; it did not protect them from a vindictive colonial government. The British were willing to make some accommodations to Aboriginal people so long as they were willing to submit to British authority and territorial control.

Conclusion

The British decision to strike an agreement with the region’s Aboriginal people separate from the articles of capitulation at Quebec and Montreal and Treaty of Paris marks a significant difference from the approach taken in Mi’kma’ki. Although the British continued to use military conquest as a way of claiming spaces principally defined and used by Aboriginal people, these agreements lay the groundwork for a relatively stable relationship during the decades which followed.

The memory of the peace remained with many of the Seven Fires communities for decades and was regularly referred to during their negotiations with the British during the

⁷³ Daniel Claus, Memorandum of the Rebel Invasion of Canada in 1775, CO 42-36, f. 37v.

1770s and 1780s. At a meeting with William Johnson in 1770, for example, the Seven Fires addressed concerns over the encroachment of settlers at Akwesasne and Kahnawake. In prefacing their remarks they reminded the British of the agreements that they made as British troops approached Montreal:

Brother, you know us for many years – we knew you, and esteemed your character, when we were in the arms of the French, and when you came down with the army to Montreal ten years ago; you then spoke to us, gave us good words, and by the order of the General gave us solemn assurances, that if we did not assist the French, but permitted you to descend the River without interruption, we should be placed among the number of your friends, and enjoy our rights and possessions and the free exercise of our Religion forever. – This we believed, for we knew your character, and had a confidence in you, and accordingly agreed to your request, and have ever since behaved in such a manner, as to demonstrate our fidelity, and attachment to the English.⁷⁴

Although the context of this claim focuses on the communities living west of Montreal, the presence of Huron-Wendat delegates at this meeting with Johnson suggests that they likely held similar sentiments.

As new British allies, these agreements shaped the relationship between the Huron-Wendat and people who were not part of the peace. In 1761, John Collins the master of a schooner sailing towards Quebec killed two Aboriginal people near Tadoussac. Although he claimed self-defence, and Murray was inclined to trust his “very good character,” the circumstances of the case and pressure placed on Murray (by Aboriginal people) suggested that Collins had killed them without much provocation. The tensions between the British and Aboriginal people at Tadoussac were mediated by the Huron-Wendat from Jeune-Lorette. Although Murray does not describe this process,

⁷⁴ Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with the Indians, German Flatts, July 1770, in *DRCHSNY*, vol.8, 237-238.

his dispatch about the event provides considerable insight into the position that the Huron-Wendat believed they occupied in the region. Murray wrote:

In the course of this treaty the Savages desired I would acquaint all the Kings Subjects that they, having submitted to his Majestys Government, expected his Protection, and to be exempted for the future from the insults of the crews of the Ships trading in the River. I have in consequence beg'd of General Amherst to publish this request in the manner he shall think proper to his Majestys colonies.⁷⁵

Although clearly focusing on the people living around Tadoussac, Murray's words help to situate the Huron-Wendat perspective on the conquest. With only months having passed since the fall of Montreal, the Huron-Wendat sought to prevent broader provocations.

A similar circumstance arose when Pontiac's War threatened to disrupt the peace in the region. Delâge and Sawaya found an 1832 document by Joseph Vincent, a Huron-Wendat from Jeune-Lorette, who claimed that his grandfather and uncles represented the British government to the western communities in an effort to make peace with Pontiac.⁷⁶ The willingness of the Huron-Wendat to become involved in this conflict likely reflects their connections with the Huron-Wendat living in the Great Lakes, but also their willingness to work with the British for peace.

When the dust began to settle in 1764 it was clear that despite the autonomy that they had during the French Regime, the Huron-Wendat and their Aboriginal neighbours along the St. Lawrence were considered by the British as dependant allies. But like the British treatment of the Abenaki – but not the Mi'kmaq – in 1713, the agreements made

⁷⁵ Dispatch from James Murray, 21 Jan 1761, CO 42-24, f. 4.

⁷⁶ Joseph Vincent to Matthew, Lord Aylmer, 1 Nov 1832, LAC, RG 10-85, p. 33791, in Delâge and Sawaya, 93.

among Europeans in Europe were deemed an insufficient foundation for the British-Aboriginal relationship. The newly created Indian Department and its superintendent bore much of the responsibility for minimizing tensions as Britain took control of the region. The agreements made at Oswegatchie, Montreal, and Kahnawake laid the ground work for future relationships.⁷⁷ By beginning this process before Montreal fell, the British avoided much of the tension that had developed a half-century earlier in Mi'kma'ki. Although the treaties that they negotiated were imperfect, and the Royal Proclamation minimized the protection of Huron-Wendat land, these agreements mitigated some of the harsher edges of the new regime. In avoiding military confrontation, the impact of the conquest on the Huron-Wendat was minimized. It would not be until the 1780s and 1790s that the Aboriginal communities along the St. Lawrence began to feel the full impact of this regime change.

⁷⁷ These points have been made by Delâge and Sawaya, conclusion.

Chapter 7: The End of the Mission: The Long Term Impact of the Conquest on Jeune-Lorette

Despite the turmoil of 1759 and 1760, the people of Jeune-Lorette would have noticed few immediate changes in their everyday lives. The community still had access to the same resources and territory, the Jesuits continued to have a presence in the village, and the Indian Department maintained many elements that defined the French/Huron-Wendat relationship. Most importantly, the conquest included the entire St. Lawrence valley, and made few direct claims on Huron-Wendat territory. In the short term these continuities reduced conflict and prevented the division that occurred in Mi'kma'ki. By the 1790s, however, tensions over land became more prominent and tensions increased.

Although the conquest made a minimal impact on day-to-day life in the village, broader social and cultural changes were slowly taking place. The Jesuits could not recruit new members; Jeune-Lorette's political influence waned with their integration into British-Aboriginal alliance structures; and unrestricted access to New England opened the door for some members of the community to attend Dartmouth College. While these changes occurred, the fissures of the American Revolution ran through the community during the 1770s and 1780s. Like in Mi'kma'ki, however, these differences in political opinion did not divide the Huron-Wendat; residents in the village continued to be united by their language, culture and place in the St. Lawrence valley.

By the 1790s, these slow changes had transformed the community's nature. It was no longer a Jesuit mission and it no longer played an important military role. In response to this evolution, the community began a series of petitions for the legal title to

the nearby seigneuries of Sillery and St. Gabriel. These petitions sought a steady income from seigneurial rents and access to colonial education in order to balance declining yields from hunting, fishing, agriculture and trade. Following similar adaptations made after they moved into the area around Quebec at the end of the seventeenth century, the Huron-Wendat confronted a new political environment that required an innovative strategy for the community's long-term cultural and political survival.

Visions of Post-Conquest Jeune-Lorette

As change occurred slowly in Jeune-Lorette, most of the structures of everyday life remained the same. Visitors described the village much as they had before the conquest; studying the parish registers demonstrates that the community continued to follow Catholic traditions; and the Huron-Wendat still claimed land in the three ways outlined at the end of chapter five. This continuity should not be surprising. Donald Fyson has demonstrated that after the conquest, change mainly occurred within the upper echelons of society; the legal world remained the same for most French settlers.¹ This continuity minimized the conquest's overall impact, making it less likely that the Huron-Wendat would respond like the Mi'kmaq. At the same time, Jesuit influence was slowly declining and the population around the village was increasing. Between 1760 and 1800, these two factors resulted in a growing distance between the Huron-Wendat and their French neighbours.

Visitors to the village continued to observe the selective way that the Huron-Wendat engaged with French culture. During the American Revolution, the chaplain to

¹ Donald Fyson, *Magistrates, police, and people: everyday criminal justice in Quebec and Lower Canada, 1764-1837* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006).

the Duke of Brunswick's Dragoon Regiment, F.V. Melsheimer, emphasized the foreign nature of Huron-Wendat culture, especially in terms of fashion and physical appearance. In the end, though, he arrived at a conclusion not all that different from Antoine-Denis Raudot: "The Hurons deserve the name of Savages solely from their physiognomy, their dress and language; while, as regards their morals, they are surely just as good, if not better, than the best Christians."² Despite similarities with their French neighbours, most earlier and later observers would have also agreed with John Lambert, who in the early nineteenth century echoed Kalm's and Franquet's descriptions, noting "that the Indians, though so closely allied by intermarriages, have never entered fully into the European mode of living;... All the domiciliated Indians in Lower Canada employ themselves either in hunting or fishing; or are engaged by the merchants in the North-west fur trade; very few attend much to agriculture."³ In the aftermath of significant geopolitical change, the Huron-Wendat continued to embrace European culture selectively.

A survey of the mission registers between 1760 and 1795 demonstrates that the Huron-Wendat closely followed Roman Catholic traditions and shared many similarities with the French settlers.⁴ This is best seen in Lenten and Advent abstentions from marriage. Both groups were most likely to marry in November and January and least likely in March and December (Lent and Advent). The seasonality of births reflects this pattern. Huron-Wendat children were born at all times of year. The lower incidence of


² F. V. Melsheimer, *Journal of the Voyage of the Brunswick Auxiliaries from Wolfenbuttel to Quebec* (Quebec: 'Morning Chronicle' Steam Publishing Establishment, 1891), 167.

³ John Lambert, *Travels through Canada, and the United States of North America, in the years 1806, 1807, & 1808 to which are added, biographical notices and anecdotes of some of the leading characters in the United States* (2nd ed.; London: C. Cradock and W. Joy, 1813), 356.


⁴ I am very grateful to Bertrand Desjardins at the Research Program for Historical Demography (PRDH) for access to their extensive database.

births between November and January suggests that abstinence was practiced during Lent. One of the most popular times for childbirth was around October, nine months after the peak in marriages. Another peak in childbirth reflects Louise Dechêne's observation that late spring was a high point for conception in New France.⁵

Graph 7.1



Graph 7.2



⁵ Louise Dechêne, *Habitants et marchands de Montréal au XVIIe siècle* (Montréal: Boréal, 1974), 114.

Though many members of the community followed these Catholic traditions, Huron-Wendat land management continued to vary depending on its location. The Huron-Wendat followed French law near Quebec, but more customary practices when in their hunting territory. As far as the Indian Department was concerned, the land in Aboriginal villages was to be administered by village councils. In August 1771 Daniel Claus, the Deputy Superintendent of the Indian Department, told Hector Theophilus Cramahé, who had just become lieutenant-governor at Quebec, that under no circumstances were European settlers to occupy Aboriginal lands, unless:

they be unanimously called or invited by the whole Town, since every Indⁿ Nation or Village in this prov^{ce} and for ought I know in America is to be considered as a Republic or Community governed by Sachems or chiefs appointed by the whole town in public council and not the minutest matter concerning the Community may be under taken without the Approbation of those chiefs assembled in the Council house.⁶

The village council continued to hire notaries and surveyors to help administer their land in St. Gabriel, while also allocating hunting territories to village families. These geographic practices continued until at least the beginning of the nineteenth century.

By the 1820s the Huron-Wendat began to claim that agriculture had ceased to be a viable way of supporting the entire community. Although nineteenth-century visitors to the community like George Heriot commented on their agricultural practices, the Huron-Wendat argued that farming yielded too little produce to support the community. In his 1824 testimony before a committee of the Lower Canadian Assembly, Tsawanhonhi testified: “Such of the Indians as have Lands, plant Indian Corn, Sow Potatoes, and a little Corn, but the number is very small. The others live on the produce of Hunting and

⁶ Claus to Cramahé, 20 Aug 1771, LAC, MG 19 F1, Daniel Claus Fonds, vol. 1, f. 123.

Fishing, because they have no Lands.”⁷ In his eyes, trade was also diminished.

Tsawanhonhi told the committee that although the community continued to manufacture small handicrafts: “There is occasionally a sale, but at half the price for which they were formerly sold; we are often obliged to barter them for Marchandize.”⁸ Some members of the community had even taken up occupations among the French such as joiners, house carpenters and day labourers.⁹ The extent of this transition away from agriculture is very difficult to trace. It was likely a function of the marginal quality of agricultural land in the northern part of St. Gabriel seigneurie, the modal nature of the Huron-Wendat economy before the conquest, the growth of the French population, and the declining importance of the community to imperial officials. Tsawanhonhi’s observations contextualize the petitions that the Huron-Wendat sent to the British in the early 1790s.

We should be wary, however, of taking Tsawanhonhi’s testimony literally. His goal during these discussions was the acquisition of Sillery and its seigneurial dues, and his language reflected common rhetorical strategies used in these circumstances. Denys Delâge and Jean-Pierre Sawaya have used Mary Black-Rogers’s work on the different meanings of starvation to illustrate how the Mohawk from Kahnawake used language strategically in their protest against the reduction of British gifts. They observed that “Les mots famine, nudité, pauvreté, pitié sont souvent associés et ils ne doivent pas, le plus souvent, être interprétés au sens littéral. Leur utilisation s’inscrit plutôt dans une relation d’échange où l’on marque son dépouillement pour inciter le partenaire [Britain] à

⁷ *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly, on that part of the speech of His Excellency the Governor in Chief which relates to the settlement of the crown lands with the minutes of evidence taken before the committee* (Quebec: Neilson & Cowen, 1824), 19.

⁸ *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly*, 22.

⁹ *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly*, 22.

la générosité.”¹⁰ Although there was likely some truth to Tsawanhonhi’s statements regarding the state of the village, the context in which his testimony was made, and the significant transitions taking place as Aboriginal people lost political clout at the beginning of the nineteenth century, suggest that these words may have been chosen more for their political and symbolic weight than as a depiction of the Huron-Wendat material reality. Even if the relative importance of hunting, fishing, and agriculture changed over this period, the moditional nature of their economy still shared much in common with their ancestors from early Wendaké.

The church was one of the few French regime structures that continued to play a direct role in the community. Despite a near global suppression of the Jesuits during the last four decades of the eighteenth century, the Order continued to have a presence in the village until the early 1790s. As their influence declined, and the French population increased by nearly 6300 people, tensions developed over access to resources such as the mission church, which had been shared for most of the eighteenth century.¹¹ These issues came to a head in the early 1790s when Jesuit influence in the area ended.

¹⁰ Denys Delâge and Jean-Pierre Sawaya, *Les Traités des Sept Feux avec les Britanniques: droits et pièges d'un héritage colonial au Québec*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 2001), 141. Author’s translation: “The words famine, nudity, poverty, pity are often associated and most often they should not be interpreted literally. Their use is a function of the exchange relationship where groups emphasize their desperation to convince their partner to be generous.” See also Mary Black-Rogers, “The Varieties of ‘Starving’: Semantics and Survival in the Subarctic Fur Trade, 1750-1850,” *Ethnohistory*, vol. 33, no. 4 (Autumn 1986): 353-383.

¹¹ The total population of the parishes of Ste-Foy, Ancienne-Lorette, Charlesbourg, Beauport, and Quebec was 12,406 in 1765 and 18,693 in 1790. See Statistics Canada. *Cda Table I - Families, Population, Sexes, Conjugal Condition, 1765 - Canada* (table), 1765 - Census of Canada (database), Using E-STAT (distributor).
http://estat.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-win/cnsmcgi.exe?Lang=E&EST-Fi=EStat\English\SC_RR-eng.htm
 (accessed: October 25, 2010); and Statistics Canada. *Cda Table I - Population, Sexes, Conjugal Condition, 1790 - Canada* (table), 1790 - Census of Canada (database), Using E-STAT (distributor).
http://estat.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-win/cnsmcgi.exe?Lang=E&EST-Fi=EStat\English\SC_RR-eng.htm
 (accessed: October 25, 2010)

Although the religious rights of Catholics and the presence of missionaries in Aboriginal communities were provided for in the Capitulation of Montreal and Treaty of Paris, the continuation of the Jesuit Order in the aftermath of the conquest was far from certain.¹² Hostility to the Order's political influence had been rapidly building in Europe during the Seven Years' War, on both sides of the conflict. These tensions culminated in the Jesuit expulsion from Portugal in 1759, France in 1764, and Spain in 1767. In 1773 Spanish influence pressured the new anti-Jesuit Pope, Clement XIV, into suppressing the order outright. Globally, the Jesuits were to be disbanded and removed from positions of influence; their affairs fell under the control of local bishops.

Given the global rejection of the Jesuits, one would expect that the British would have seized the international climate as an opportunity to cleanse their new colony of Jesuit influence. Indeed, much of the official correspondence crossing the Atlantic during this period called for an end to the Order. Michel Lavoie's recent work on this period of Jeune-Lorette's history demonstrates well that it was the British policy of indirect rule, whereby the British retained many French regime institutions while overseeing their administration, coupled with the Jesuits' weak numbers (there were only sixteen priests and five brothers left by 1764¹³), that created an environment where the Order's influence was tolerated but not encouraged.¹⁴ Rather than banishing the few

¹² 'Articles of the Capitulation of Montreal,' in *Documents relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 1759-1791*, eds. Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty (2nd ed.; Ottawa, 1918), 7-24; 'Treaty of Paris 1763', in *Documents relating to the Constitutional History of Canada*, eds. Shortt and Doughty, 97-112.

¹³ Roy C. Dalton, *The Jesuits' Estates Question 1760-1888: A Study of the Background for Agitation of 1889* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 6.

¹⁴ Michel Lavoie, '*C'est ma seigneurie que je réclame*': *Le lutte des Hurons de Lorette pour la seigneurie de Sillery, 1658-1890* (Montréal: Boréal, 2009). This approach was also been taken in Maryland and

remaining priests, the policy enacted by James Murray, but championed by his successor, Guy Carleton, and Quebec Bishop Joseph Olivier Briand, prevented new religious appointments in the colony while allowing those Jesuits already there to carry out their work. This created a situation in which the Jesuit influence slowly diminished with the death of the few remaining missionaries.¹⁵ By the 1790s they only had a weak presence in Jeune-Lorette and by 1801 they had completely disappeared from Lower Canada.

With the weakening Jesuit presence, tensions between the Huron-Wendat and neighbouring French population became more palpable. Up until the 1790s, the Huron-Wendat shared the church at Jeune-Lorette with neighbouring French farmers. Although the French and Huron-Wendat shared the church, they did not share many of life's key events together. Between 1760 and 1795, 87 percent of the baptisms conducted in the mission church were for French children. The Jesuits were the link holding these communities together. Once they were removed, the relationship diminished.

Fissures between the French settlers and the Huron-Wendat grew over the post-conquest period. In 1767 the parish priest at Charlesbourg informed the Bishop that the French living around Jeune-Lorette wanted to create a new parish. The French settlers felt that the parish priest was overworked and that the distance for him to travel to administer the last rites or visit parishioners was too far; the Huron-Wendat also wanted a separate place of worship.¹⁶ Despite his role in fuelling the settlers' desire for a separate

Pennsylvania. Sixteen Jesuits were asked to continue their role in these colonies as secular rather than Jesuit priests. See List of the 10 Jesuits of Maryland and the six Jesuits of Pennsylvania at the time of the suppression of the Society of Jesus, 5 Oct 1773, LAC MG17-A25, vol. 6, f. 23rv, 26rv. I am grateful to Luca Codignola for bringing this document to my attention.

¹⁵ Dalton, 7-8.

¹⁶ Morriseau to the Bishop, 21 Sept 1767, AAQ, 61, Charlesbourg, CD I-2A.

parish, Girault's presence as the local priest at the Huron-Wendat mission diminished the urgency of this request. He could continue to balance serving both the French and Huron-Wendat populations. Once he left the community in the early 1790s, however, the demand for a new parish separate from the mission re-emerged.

In the 1790s French settlers petitioned the bishop arguing that the people living around the mission had never been fully served by the priest at Charlesbourg, choosing rather to interact with the Jesuit priest at Jeune-Lorette. They emphasized the long distance between Charlesbourg and Jeune-Lorette and that it was mostly the sick and elderly who were not being served under the current arrangement.¹⁷ These petitions continued for a number of years, and were regularly rejected by the bishop.¹⁸ Some of the reasons he gave for not creating a new parish were based on the availability of priests, the depopulation of the neighbouring parishes, and a desire to keep Aboriginal and French churches separate – although this was an interesting contradiction given the French use of the mission church during much of the eighteenth century.¹⁹

While these demands were being put forward, the French and Huron-Wendat drew up an agreement in 1793 over how the church building would be shared. The relationship between the two communities was negotiated with broad consultation and read orally before the Huron-Wendat. French settlers gained more control over the church than they had before, but some provisions also respected Huron-Wendat desires. There were nine specific points in the agreement:

¹⁷ Requête des habitants demandant un cure résident, 2 April 1792, AAQ, 61, Loretteville, CD I-2.

¹⁸ Raisons de la réponse négative a la requête des habitans de charles Bourg, sur l'érection d'une paroisse a la jeune Lorette, 4 April 1794, AAQ, 61, Charlesbourg, CD I-9A-D.

¹⁹ Raisons de la réponse négative a la requête des habitans de charles Bourg, sur l'érection d'une paroisse a la jeune Lorette, 4 April 1794, AAQ, 61, Charlesbourg, CD I-9A-D.

- 1) The habitants could only expand the church to the northeast and build chapels in the north and south. If they expanded they would also have to build a load bearing wall.
- 2) The Huron-Wendat felt that they would be served by the Church in perpetuity and therefore would continue to sit in the same places within the church (which were separate for men and women). They would also get the future north chapel for their services.
- 3) Services would be sung by the Huron-Wendat one week and by the French the other.
- 4) The Huron-Wendat agreed that they would not serve as church wardens (marguilliers).
- 5) All material (ornaments and silver) used in the church was not to be removed.
- 6) The land in front of the church was exclusively for Huron-Wendat use (this is the land between their homes and the King's road), French carriages were not to be parked there.
- 7) Each year the parish and mission would give three low masses and alms for dead Huron-Wendat souls in purgatory.
- 8) Issues around church land, cemetery and parish clerk were to be decided by the Bishop or the Curé.
- 9) All of the parties involved in this agreement were equal stakeholders.²⁰

This last provision emphasized the equal standing that the Huron-Wendat sought to maintain in their church affairs. On the whole, this document reflects the need that both communities had to re-establish their relationship given the new absence of the Jesuits. Not everyone in the Huron-Wendat community was happy with this arrangement. A month after the agreement was signed, fifteen Huron-Wendat men wrote a letter to the bishop rejecting the idea that the parish be combined. The signatories made it clear that the church belonged to the Huron-Wendat and not the French.²¹

By late 1794 it was clear that the parish was growing too quickly and this arrangement would not last. Even the parish priest at Charlesbourg began to send letters to the bishop suggesting that at the very least an additional priest be sent to the area. His idea was to formalize what had been practiced by the French settlers for more than a

²⁰ Précis des conventions entre les Hurons de la Jeune Lorette avec une partie des habitants..., 11 Nov 1793, AAQ, 61, Loretteville, CD I-177.

²¹ Requête des Sauvages de la jeune Lorette, 9 Dec 1793, AAQ, 61, Loretteville, CD I-181.

century by combining the Huron-Wendat and French church.²² The next year, the creation of the parish, separate from the Huron-Wendat, was agreed to and the boundaries were drawn from Lac St. Charles (St. Ignace seigneurie) to the Belair/Gaudarville boundary and north from the last two rangs of Ancienne-Lorette in St. Gabriel.²³

The decision to create a new parish around Jeune-Lorette revealed some of the tensions in both the French and Huron-Wendat communities. By October 1794 French farmers were sending petitions to the Bishop of Quebec declaring their desire to remain as part of Charlesbourg.²⁴ Quickly the bishop's emphasis on the need to keep the two communities separate became apparent. Shortly after this petition was received another much more extensive petition was sent asking for permission to build a new church and presbytery because of tensions that had developed in their partnership with the Huron-Wendat. The petition noted that 103 members of the parish were in favour, while twenty members wanted to continue at the Huron-Wendat church.

The French settlers had four central grievances concerning the initial agreement with the Huron-Wendat. According to the settlers the Huron-Wendat did not acknowledge that the French had shared distinctions and privileges at the church; they were deliberately aggravating the French; they had broken the guardrail that was installed

²² M. Derome prte. Il se [jouit d'appren...] qu'il va être donne un prêtre a la Jeune Lorette, 16 Sept 1794, AAQ, 61, Charlesbourg, CD I-10A/B. Once the parish was established in 1795 the residents from this region petitioned the Bishop to attend the newly established church at Jeune-Lorette rather than the church at Charlesbourg. See Requête de plusieurs habitants du fief St. Ignace Paroisse Charlesbourg, 22 Dec 1795, AAQ, 61, Charlesbourg, CD I-12.

²³ Requête des habitants de la jeune Lorette, 22 April 1795, AAQ, 61, Loretteville, CD I-5.

²⁴ Habitans de chales Bourg refusans de rejoindre a la jeune Lorette, 31 Oct 1794, AAQ, 61, Charlesbourg, CD I-11.

by order of the curé; and finally, they were unwilling to continue along the guidelines established in 1793.²⁵ Not only did the French community want its own church and presbytery, but they also did not want to be buried in the Huron-Wendat cemetery.²⁶ These tensions, like the tensions that were developing at the same time over land and resources, were sparked by the growth in population. The fundamental issue fuelling these problems, according to the habitant petition in April 1795 was that the French population was too large for the mission church.²⁷

But population was not the only motivation for the separation of these communities. Underlying these tensions was a more general sense of division. The relationship between these communities was uneasy. In 1783, for example, a French man sought the hand of a Huron-Wendat woman. All the necessary parties were supportive except the groom's parents. The groom's sister had already married into Huron-Wendat society – also without the consent of her parents.²⁸ It is unclear why the parents objected to these marriages. The family was, after all, in close enough contact with the Huron-Wendat for two of their children to find a partner there.²⁹ Their apprehension, though, demonstrates that although living close together, and sharing many community resources, tensions between the communities existed. This sense of difference may have fuelled the drive to separate the French and Huron-Wendat congregations.

The quest for a new parish illustrates both the close proximity of these communities and how their separate identities caused conflict and tension. As much as

²⁵ Petition to the Bishop of Quebec, 3 Nov 1794, AAQ, 61, Loretteville, CD I-3.

²⁶ M. J-L. Paquet. *Le presbytère est commencé*, 3 July 1795, AAQ, 61, Loretteville, CD I-6.

²⁷ *Requête des habitants de la jeune Lorette*, 22 April 1795, AAQ, 61, Loretteville, CD I-5.

²⁸ She was above the age of majority at the time of marriage. She was 28.

²⁹ *Au sujet du mariage a un français avec une sauvagesse*, 16 Nov 1783, AAQ, 61, Loretteville, CD I-176.

the Huron-Wendat had embraced some elements of the French culture and economy, they maintained a distinct separation from many of their French neighbours. This difference became more apparent as the rising population limited the natural resources around Jeune-Lorette. Without the Jesuit missionaries, there seems to have been little keeping these communities together.

Aboriginal Alliances

The Huron-Wendat strengthened many of their relationships with nearby Aboriginal people over the post-conquest period. The use of the term Seven Fires to describe the connections among the St. Lawrence villages merely named the practices that had developed during the French Regime. The British focused much more on Kahnawake, making it the centre of their policy towards Aboriginal people in the region, while the Seven Fires confederacy developed a much closer relationship with the Haudenosaunee. Further afield, the community continued its ties with both Detroit in the west and the Abenaki and Mi'kmaq in the east. Acting in more of a political capacity than in the past, these connections were occasionally used to sway more distant communities to make peace with the British. The Aboriginal world of the St. Lawrence, which existed beyond the reach of Europeans, continued. Over the course of this period, however, the British and the Americans began to slowly influence these relationships and shape them to their advantage.

The connections between the domicilié communities were strengthened by the treaties signed in September 1760 and through their integration into the British-Haudenosaunee Covenant Chain. Linking these communities together was a much

clearer approach towards Aboriginal people than had been taken in Mi'kma'ki. Indian Department officials played a similar role to the Jesuits during the French Regime. These two aspects of the post-conquest world drew the common interests of the St. Lawrence communities together and minimized the points of tension.

The first post-conquest example of these communities working together occurred in the spring of 1766 when 107 people from all of the communities along the St. Lawrence met with Brigadier General Ralph Burton. They gave him a wampum belt signifying their mutual commitment to one another and asking him to remember their needs as he travelled back to England.³⁰ The document does not disclose why these people felt that it was important to meet with Burton. But the desire for him to speak in their favour in England suggests that perhaps they hoped he would convey a more direct message to the crown. The important point here is that the villages sought to send a message overseas using a collective voice.

Huron-Wendat participation in this type of larger meeting was structured by the hierarchy of the Covenant Chain. The British policy of indirect rule, which had much in common with the Haudenosaunee concept of the covenant chain, was focused on streamlining British-Aboriginal relations through key communities. Kahnawake was the principal community of the Seven Fires, but often the Haudenosaunee spoke on their behalf.³¹ The 1768 peace negotiations between the Haudenosaunee and the Cherokee

³⁰ Les chefs Guerriers du Sault St Louis & lac de Deux Montagnes, Népisingues algoniens Abenakis Huron & Nontagué de la présentation, s'Etant assemblé au nombre de Cent sept, alhosel [?'alhoret?'] de vaudreuil Portoient les Parolles suivantes aux Sieurs Pertier & Pellet en l'absence du Capn Claus pout Etre rendre a son Excellence le mājor General Burton, 16 Apr 1766, CO 42-26, ff. 20-21.

³¹ On the Covenant Chain see Daniel Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the era of European Colonization*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 136-

demonstrate how this diplomacy worked. Although representatives from Kahnawake attended the negotiations on behalf of the Seven Fires, the Haudenosaunee were the principal spokespeople. Speaking and giving wampum belts on their behalf, the Haudenosaunee delegate revealed a longer relationship between the Cherokee and Mohawk village in the St. Lawrence:

Younger Brothers, You say that you have had a Belt of the Coghnowageys in your Village these 20 years past on the Subject of Peace. We are well pleased that you have taken such good care of our Words delivered to you at that time, and as they are Religious Indians they will by no means Exasperate the Great Spirit and Master of Life by speaking otherwise than from their hearts, and we hope that you speak with the same Sincerity.³²

Although there is no indication that the Huron-Wendat were present at this 1768 meeting, the structures of the covenant chain did not preclude their participation. In 1770, the Haudenosaunee, Seven Fires, and Cherokee met again at German Flatts. This time delegates from all of the villages attended.³³ As in 1768, Abraham, a Mohawk chief, spoke on behalf of “The Six Nations and their Dependants from Ohio to Canada...”³⁴ By structuring their meetings and alliances in this way, the British filtered the divergent perspectives that must have existed among communities, making the management of British Indian policy easier to implement. This structure was also beneficial to Aboriginal communities, by giving them a voice on non-local issues of which they otherwise would not have been a part.

147; and Jean-Pierre Sawaya, *Alliances et dépendances: comment la couronne britannique a obtenu la collaboration des Indiens de la vallée du Saint-Laurent entre 1760-1774*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 2002), 40.

³² Proceedings of a General Congress of the Six Nations &^{ch} The Chiefs of Coghnowagey and of the Seven Confederate Nations of Canada and the Deputys sent from the Cherokee Nation to treat of Peace with the former before Sir William Johnson Baronet at Johnson Hall in March 1768, in *DRCHSNY*, vol.8, 44.

³³ Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with the Indians, German Flatts, July 1770, in *DRCHSNY*, vol.8, 229.

³⁴ Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with the Indians, German Flatts, July 1770, in *DRCHSNY*, vol.8, 235.

The 1770 meeting at German Flatts helps to illuminate some of the internal workings of the Seven Fires. A delegate from the Seven Fires told the assembly how their confederacy interacted with neighbouring peoples: “the Caghnawagees should have their eyes on the Council Fire of the Six Nations at Onondaga, and the other Council fire at your house, whilst our Brethren at Canasadaga should have their eyes upon all the Nations up the Ottawa or great River to the Westward.”³⁵ This statement, though emphasizing the role of the Mohawk who lived in both communities, illustrates how the Seven Fires served as a point of connection for a series of broader relationships in the northeast and Great Lakes.

William Johnson’s death occasioned the most detailed explanation of the contours of these relationships. In a report on the structure of Aboriginal alliances in the Northern District Daniel Claus emphasized how the relationship between the Haudenosaunee and Seven Fires was divided:

It is a mistaken notion to pretend dividing the grand Confederacy of the Northern District and having it superintended by persons independent of each other; which may occasion much confusion in Indians Affairs. That there were two Confederacies of Indians in the Northern District is very true, viz the Iroquois or Six Nations who claime an alliance with the Hurons at Detroit, and all the Indians to the West and South West of them to the Illinois [sic] including the Ohio; and the Seven Nations in the Province of Quebec, who claim an alliance with all the Indian Nations to North and North West of them. These two Confederacies however have since the conquest of Canada united themselves.³⁶

Claus’s observations on the division of the department reflect the fur trading alliances of the mid-to-late seventeenth century. Through their alliance with the Haudenosaunee, the

³⁵ Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with the Indians, German Flatts, July 1770, in *DRCHSNY*, vol.8, 240.

³⁶ Colonel Claus Remarks on the Management of the Northern Indian Nations, n.d., in *DRCHSNY*, vol.8, 702.

British were able to knit these networks together, building on the structure of pre-existing relationships. The shape of the department's alliances was not merely a function of British colonial ambitions.

The strength and autonomy of the Seven Fires' alliance with the Haudenosaunee was best seen during the American Revolution, when many of the communities along the St. Lawrence were divided over whether to support the British or Americans. When Captain Frazer attempted to attack Fort Stanwix, many of the Aboriginal people from Canada fighting with him refused to support the attack. They would not engage in any fight that involved the Oneidas, who had decided to join with the Americans.³⁷ The bonds linking these communities were often stronger than those allying them to European empires.

Not all decisions involved the Haudenosaunee. The Seven Fires also had their own internal decision-making mechanisms. In 1819, Tsawanhonhi described the process through which chiefs were selected by the community:

when a Chief dies the Council names another and announces him to the assembled Tribe; but when the Captain or Great Chief dies, Messengers are sent with the intelligence to the seven Nations or Villages of Christian Indians in Lower-Canada, to say that the Mast is fallen, and to tell them to come and help to put it up; a deputation from each assembles at the Village. The Great Chief is named by the Council of the Tribe, and presented to the Deputies of the other Villages.³⁸

These communities were politically linked to each other, and had a stake in the leadership decisions of their neighbours. By granting input on the selection of a new leader to the other communities, it was easier for the villages to take common decisions. The absence

³⁷ Colonel Guy Johnson to Lord George Germain, 11 Nov 1779, in *DRCHSNY*, vol.8, 779.

³⁸ *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly*, 12-13.

of the Haudenosaunee and British is also revealing as it demonstrates that the Seven Fires operated autonomously from the larger workings of the covenant chain.

The Huron-Wendat also maintained the relationships that they had developed with Aboriginal communities outside of the St. Lawrence valley during the French regime. These relationships were not formed through their connection to the British, Seven Fires, or Haudenosaunee. The Seven Fires was just one of a series of different inter-community relationships in which the Huron-Wendat engaged. Members of the community also continued to interact with the Huron-Wendat at Detroit, as well as the Abenaki and Mi'kmaq along the Atlantic Coast.

In the aftermath of the conquest, Jeune-Lorette helped to broker a peace with the Ottawa leader Pontiac and the Aboriginal people living in the Great Lakes region.³⁹ Although their role is not entirely clear, it seems likely that their connection to the Huron-Wendat at Detroit put them in a good position to broker peace. Members from the community were part of a British delegation that travelled to the western Great Lakes in the late summer of 1763. Two groups of Seven Fires delegates were sent with four wampum belts each. One group travelled through Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, the other up the Ottawa River to Michilimackinac.

The first wampum belt was all white and sent on behalf of Daniel Claus. It notified the western nations of the peace, which the St. Lawrence delegates advised them to keep. The second wampum belt, for which no physical description was given, was sent on behalf of the Seven Fires and emphasized that they had incorporated the western

³⁹ Joseph Vincent to Matthew, Lord Aylmer, 1 Nov 1832, LAC, RG 10-85, p. 33791 in Delâge and Sawaya, 93.

nations into their confederacy and were disappointed with the eruption of violence against the British. The third belt requested that the western nations inform the Seven Fires of their intentions. And the fourth belt, representing the Indian Department, presented what had become their standard refrain. The British intended:

to establish a fair and reasonable trade with all Indian nations in his American dominions. He does not mean to claim your lands as his property and desires no more privileges than the King of France had, which is to carry on the trade among you for your own good and welfare; but if you behave as you have now done, he certainly will deprive you of it...⁴⁰

The Indian Department's interest in peace with the Aboriginal people in the west provided the opportunity for the Seven Fires to cement their relationship with the British by brokering a peace while also reinforcing connections with the western communities.

The Huron-Wendat played a similar role at the beginning of the American Revolution, communicating British messages from Niagara to Detroit. In 1775, William Johnson's son-in-law, Guy Johnson, met with representatives from Jeune-Lorette to give them a wampum belt that was to be distributed throughout the lower Great Lakes. The belt informed these communities of the escalating tensions with the Americans. It stated:

that Last night he [Johnson] had Recd Letters from the Kings Minister of State – telling him that his Majesty finding the Bad + Rebellious behaviour of his Subjects was sending over a Large Force to Chastize them + Bring them to a Sense of their Duty and that the King Expected his faithful Allies the Indians would heartily Join + Cooperate with his troops in fast measure as they Should like for that purpose.⁴¹

The choice of the Huron-Wendat as messengers speaks to the broader connections between Jeune-Lorette and the west. It may also reflect that both the Mohawk at

⁴⁰ Message of the Canada to the Western Indians, n.d. in *DRCHSNY*, vol. 7, 544-545; see also Canada Indians to Western Indians, Contemporary Copy, 25 Aug 1763, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, vol. 10, 792-794.

⁴¹ At a Meeting with a Deputation from the Hurons of Lorette, 30 Nov 1775, LAC, MG 19 F35: Superintendent of Indian Affairs, lot 611, 4.

Kahnawake and the Abenaki at St. François had meetings with the Americans earlier in the year, and that Johnson felt only the Huron-Wendat could be trusted. Although Jeune-Lorette was no loyalist stronghold, there is no evidence that they met with the Americans.

Personal connections also continued to link Jeune-Lorette and Detroit. Perhaps the most significant evidence of a continued connection between these two places is a 1773 letter written by Paul Ota8enhoheri, a Huron-Wendat chief, to his nephew, André Otehiondi, living at Detroit.⁴² This document not only demonstrates that Huron-Wendat from Jeune-Lorette were still living in the Detroit area, but it also suggests that connections were maintained between the two places (this was the fourth of a series of unreturned letters sent by Ota8enhoheri). Ota8enhoheri asked whether he should sell his nephew's land around Jeune-Lorette because he had been away for such a long time – his uncle had been taking care of his house since at least 1769.⁴³ In 1775 Nicolas Carron, from Detroit, arrived in the village with news of Otehiondi's death. He was empowered to act on behalf of Otehiondi's widow in administering his affairs. Although there is no concrete evidence linking Otehiondi to the Huron-Wendat community at Detroit, the letter which Carron brought authorizing him to act on behalf of Otehiondi was signed by Pierre Potier, the missionary to the Huron-Wendat at Detroit, suggesting that this was where Otehioni was living.⁴⁴

The British felt that the relationship between the two communities was important. In 1783, John Johnson rejected a proposal to reduce the gifts and supplies sent to Jeune-

⁴² Paul Ota8enhoheri to André Otehiondi, 11 June 1773, Division des archives de l'Université de Montréal, Baby Collection, U 5266.

⁴³ Andre Genest, 8 July 1775, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s115.

⁴⁴ Andre Genest, 1 July 1775, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s115.

Lorette after the American Revolution on the grounds that such an action could compromise their relationship with the Huron-Wendat at Detroit.⁴⁵ British decisions affecting one community could influence the other's political disposition. Gifts continued to flow to Jeune-Lorette not because of their military importance or its previous agreements with the British, but rather because the people at Detroit were deemed too important to alienate.

The relationship between the Huron-Wendat and the Mi'kmaq, Wulstukwiuk and Abenaki also continued into the post-conquest period. Only a handful of documents demonstrate these connections, but their significance should not be dismissed. These documents illustrate that like Kahnawake's and Kanesatake's relationship with western communities, outlined by Daniel Claus, Jeune-Lorette was an important point of connection among the Atlantic Aboriginal peoples, British administrators, and Aboriginal communities further west.

Shortly after the conquest the Huron-Wendat approached James Murray on behalf of the Innu, Wulstukwiuk, and Abenaki to request that a missionary presence be continued in their villages.⁴⁶ Given that the document was written by Girault and that it placed a strong emphasis on the importance of missionaries, it is likely that the letter's contents were heavily influenced by the missionary's sentiments. Nonetheless, it marks a clear continuity with the pre-conquest period. By advocating on behalf of these people,

⁴⁵ John Johnson to R. Matthews, 3 April 1783, British Library, Haldimand Papers, 21775 ff. 88.

⁴⁶ Très humble adresse à sa Majesté par Les hurons de La Jeune Lorette et Les autres sauvages Domiciliers qu'ils représenter, n.d., CO 42-86, ff. 198-200. The document is signed by Girault but claims to be the words of the Huron-Wendat. The letter was also accompanied by wampum.

this letter suggests that the relationship that developed as part of the Abenaki resistance against the British in the 1720s lasted beyond official French influence.

During the American Revolution, the Huron-Wendat also served as a point of connection in the exchange of wampum belts between the British and eastern and western Aboriginal communities.⁴⁷ In 1778, the Huron-Wendat conveyed a wampum belt from the Wulstukwiuk to Frederick Haldimand. The Wulstukwiuk informed the British governor that they no longer sought war with the Ottawa over an incident that had occurred seven or eight years earlier.⁴⁸ It is unclear what brought about this desire for peace, or if they ever acted on their desires for vengeance in the intervening eight years. Nonetheless, the role of the Huron-Wendat in bringing the belt to Haldimand demonstrates the trust that the Wulstukwiuk placed in the community.

Another set of belts was exchanged in the late summer of 1780. The Huron-Wendat met with the Mohawk from Kahnawake to trade wampum belts from the Mi'kmaq and Wulstukwiuk. The belts, which replied to a set of Haudenosaunee belts sent earlier through St. François and Jeune-Lorette, confirmed that these communities supported the British king during the American Revolution.⁴⁹ This meeting is important because the Huron-Wendat refer to the Mi'kmaq as their nephews, suggesting a close kin-based relationship that likely developed at the beginning of the eighteenth century and through their mutual connection to the Abenaki.

⁴⁷ Jonathan Lainey argues that the Huron-Wendat became the principal intermediaries between the British and their Aboriginal allies after the Mohawk at Kahnawake had opened negotiations with Albany in 1775. See Jonathan Lainey, *La 'Monnaie des Sauvages': Les colliers de wampum d'hier à aujourd'hui*, (Sillery : Septentrion, 2004), 219.

⁴⁸ Girault to Haldimand, 10 Aug 1778, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21755, f. 7.

⁴⁹ Wills Croft to Haldimand, 13 Jan 1780, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21777, ff. 176-177.

One belt that the Mi'kmaq sent in reply to the Haudenosaunee illustrates the importance of Catholicism in drawing these people together. It intended to connect the communities as "one tribe;" the cross in the middle symbolized their wish for "all the Christian Nations to be of the same mind."⁵⁰ Although it was sent through Jeune-Lorette, the passage of this belt confirms Kahnawake's central role in the Seven Fires Confederacy. Before the belts were carried on to the Haudenosaunee, their message was to be conveyed through Kahnawake to the other members of the Seven Fires Confederacy. The exchange of these belts reflects the oral evidence recorded by Frank Speck on the interconnections between the members of the Wabanaki Confederacy and the Seven Fires and helps to demonstrate how these communities maintained communication.⁵¹

The skills of Huron-Wendat school teacher Sawantanan confirm the relationship between these communities. He could speak both the Mi'kmaw and Abenaki languages. In 1778 he served as an interpreter to these communities for the Revolutionary Army.⁵² Although it is possible that he learned these language skills while attending Dartmouth College in New Hampshire, where he had a number of Abenaki colleagues, the connections between Jeune-Lorette, the Mi'kmaq and Abenaki make it likely that these skills were learned at Jeune-Lorette.

⁵⁰ A Counsel of the Lorrets held in Montreal August 31st 1780. Present Lieutt Houghton + Johnson of the Indian department and the Chiefs of Cachnawaga and Lorrets, LAC, MG 19 F35: Superintendent of Indian Affairs, series 2, lot 624. As an addendum to part one, this document notes that the belt travelled to all twenty-five Mi'kmaq communities. It is unclear where these communities were or what made these communities distinct.

⁵¹ See Frank Speck, "The Eastern Algonkian Wabanaki Confederacy," *American Anthropologist*, new series, vol. 17, no. 3(Jul-Sept 1915), 492-508.

⁵² John Wheelock to the Continental Congress, 3 Jan 1780, Dartmouth College Archives, doc. 780103.1; "Death Notices", *Salem Gazette*, vol. 39, no. 39. May 17 1825, p. 3; US National Archives and Records, Military Service Records, 'Vincent, Louis, Bedel's New Hampshire Regiment.'

An account of the school at Jeune-Lorette in the mid-nineteenth century demonstrates the inter-cultural nature of the village. German traveller Johann Georg Kohl, a visitor to the community in the mid-nineteenth century, described the school population as comprised of mostly Huron-Wendat children but also including Algonquin, Iroquois, Abenaki, Wulstukwiuk and Mi'kmaq.⁵³ Sawantanan's successor at the school provided insight into how a Huron-Wendat could learn about these other communities and Aboriginal societies:

The school-master told me that among the Indian villages in Canada, few and widely scattered as they are, a tolerably active intercourse is maintained. An Indian of Upper Canada, or New Brunswick, or Nova Scotia, should his affairs bring him to Quebec, seldom fails to pay a visit to the men of his race at St Lorete, and thence arise frequently marriages or other connections, which account for the circumstance that the offspring of so many other tribes are to be found here.⁵⁴

Although the evidence linking the Huron-Wendat to the people living along the Atlantic coast is relatively weak, the evidence presented here suggests that these were not communities isolated from one another.

The Huron-Wendat maintained, and perhaps even strengthened, their relationships with neighbouring Aboriginal communities over the course of the post-conquest period. The arrival of the British and the temporary lull in imperial rivalry created the conditions in which the Huron-Wendat and Seven Fires more generally could be integrated into the British-Haudenosaunee Covenant Chain. This relationship was not all encompassing and it did not preclude the continuity of separate relationships between the Huron-Wendat and their older allies. But collectively, the end of imperial rivalry and their common

⁵³ J. G. Kohl, *Travels in Canada, and Through the States of New York and Pennsylvania*, vol. I, Mrs. Percy Sinnett, trans., (London: George Manwaring, 1861), 177.

⁵⁴ Kohl, 177-178.

interaction with the British created the conditions that fostered similar and common Aboriginal interests. In many ways this was the opposite of what occurred in Mi'kma'ki where the arrival of the British had divided Mi'kmaw communities between the French and British.

The (D)evolving Relationship with the British

The decreasing connection to French institutions over the 1760s, 1770s, and 1780s was mirrored by similar erosion in the community's connections to British power structures. Unlike the French regime, Jeune-Lorette was no longer an active part of the colony's defence. Conversely, the community was now part of a more institutionalized and hierarchical world of Indian Affairs, whose focus was the British-Haudenosaunee Covenant Chain;⁵⁵ rather than being at the heart of an empire, the Huron-Wendat were increasingly on its margins.⁵⁶ This transition was slow and drawn out over many decades. Initial changes took place immediately with the introduction of the Indian Department to the St. Lawrence valley, but it was really the American Revolution that marked a significant change in how the British treated the village.

The British swiftly introduced the Indian Department into the St. Lawrence valley following the fall of Montreal. Michel Lavoie has argued that the British used this department strategically to slowly change the position of Aboriginal people from one of

⁵⁵ Sawaya, *Alliances et dépendance*, 40.

⁵⁶ Sawaya and Delâge make a compelling argument in *Les Traités des Sept Feux avec les Britanniques* that the military role of these villages was an important component to the British-Seven Fire relationship. It was often military service that drew out the important rights and obligations under the agreements that these communities had with the British. Their examples run throughout this period. The point here, however, is that I have been able to find little evidence that the community was engaged with supplying the military or that military roles were a primary form of identification for the community during this period.

alliance to subjecthood.⁵⁷ Like the double diplomacy discussed in part one, the department acted as a buffer between the British decision-makers who saw Aboriginal people as subjects and Aboriginal communities who viewed themselves as allies. This difference in perspective continued throughout this period. British control of gift giving and supply, though, reveals how they slowly sought to erode Huron-Wendat autonomy and their engagement with the Aboriginal world.

As with their broader approach in the region, the Indian Department employed a policy of indirect rule based on the Haudenosaunee Covenant Chain. By centring diplomatic discussions on their relationship with the Haudenosaunee and more locally with the Mohawk at Kahnawake, the British empowered these communities to draw together much broader coalitions of dependent communities. By limiting the amount of people with whom the British would engage, this hierarchical form of alliance was highly beneficial for colonial administrators and Indian Department officials.

Not only did the Covenant Chain facilitate diplomacy by limiting the number of people involved in negotiations, it also provided an opportunity for better surveillance and regulatory control. Deputy superintendants such as Claus kept abreast of what was taking place at the local level, while broader decisions were made by the superintendant. There was little room for Aboriginal decision-making without the knowledge of the department. William Johnson aimed to limit any amount of independent diplomacy and communication. After learning about diplomatic discussions that took place without him during the 1768 peace negotiation with the Cherokee, he immediately told the delegates:

⁵⁷ Lavoie, 87-88; Sawaya has made a similar point. See Sawaya, *Alliances et dépendance*, 52.

We are not ignorant of some private Conferences you have held, and of others which are intended shortly, we have heard of the loss of some of our own People and of the threats of yours. We acknowledge that some of the English have lately injured you, but these whenever apprehended will meet with Just punishment... At the same time let me observe to you that it is the duty of all those who are bound by the same Chain in the Bond of friendship to communicate their Grievances without taking any private resolutions of their own...⁵⁸

Despite the Indian Department's desire to be involved in key decisions, the department kept a relatively low profile in Jeune-Lorette. Aside from their presence at occasional meetings at Fort Johnson and Kahnawake, the Huron-Wendat had relatively infrequent contact with the Indian Department. It was not until 1767 that any record shows direct contact between the Huron-Wendat and department officials. In that year, the community complained that Daniel Claus had not yet come to visit them, and sent a messenger to Montreal to ask that he appear.⁵⁹ There is no evidence that Claus made this trip; the earliest record of a visit to the village is from July 1769.⁶⁰

In 1773 it was clear that Jeune-Lorette had begun to fit into the British world of Indian Affairs. At a meeting with Claus, the community sought his acknowledgement of a newly appointed leader:

Then the old Speaker N [ft: Blank in manuscript] addressed himself to me saying that as their head Man [*Outaghtidarrio*] was dead he beg'd to recommend an other in his Place naming Simonet alias Onhegtiidarrio who by the unanimous Opinion & Consent of the whole Village was looked upon equal to the Task being a sensible Man & well acquainted wth. their Affairs // Gave a Belt.⁶¹

In seeking British approval of Simonet as the new leader of the village, the

Huron-Wendat acknowledged their relationship with the British and their position

⁵⁸ Proceedings of a General Congress of the Six Nations &^{ch} The Chiefs of Coghnowagey and of the Seven Confederate Nations of Canada and the Deputys sent from the Cherokee Nation to treat of Peace with the former before Sir William Johnson Baronet at Johnson Hall in March 1768, in *DRCHSNY*, vol.8, 45.

⁵⁹ From Daniel Claus, Montreal, 22 Aug 1767, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, vol. 5, 635.

⁶⁰ Account of Daniel Claus, 20 July-21 Sept 1769, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, vol. 13, 488.

⁶¹ Journal of Daniel Claus, 19 June-27 July 1773, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, vol. 13, 626.

within the covenant chain. It is unclear, though likely, that Simonet's appointment was also ratified by the Seven Fires.

None of this meant that the Huron-Wendat lost the special status that they had during the French Regime. People living in these communities continued to be treated differently from French settlers. In 1771, for example, a Huron-Wendat man stabbed another man, originally thought to be a Mi'kmaq from the Bay of Chaleurs, while they were drinking together. Although a Justice of the Peace threw the Huron-Wendat man into prison, Cramahé (the lieutenant governor) sought Claus's advice before proceeding with prosecution.⁶² Claus replied with regret. He wrote back that "I could have wished most sincerely the Quarrell between the Huron + Mikmac to have happened so as that no Notice had been taken of it by the whites, as the like Accidents between Indian + Indⁿ frequently happen [and] are always settled by the respective [Indians] the parties belong to."⁶³ Like Jan Grabowski has demonstrated for the area around Montreal, Aboriginal people and European settlers were treated differently by the law.⁶⁴ Unlike in Montreal, however, the British justification did not hinge on the importance of the Huron-Wendat to the Quebec region. Rather Claus worried about the message that would be sent west. If the Mi'kmaw man were to die Claus feared "the good Intention of our Laws would not be the thing echoed thro the distant Indⁿ Nations but that the English sold the Ind^{ns} Liquor to murder one another in order to get rid of their race."⁶⁵ The issue was resolved by the time Claus and Cramahé next corresponded. Cramahé noted that the person stabbed was

⁶² Cramahé to Claus, 15 Aug 1771, LAC, MG 19 F1, Daniel Claus Fonds, vol. 1, f. 120-121.

⁶³ Claus to Cramahé, 20 Aug 1771, LAC, MG 19 F1, Daniel Claus Fonds, vol. 1, f. 124-125.

⁶⁴ Jan Grabowski, *The Common Ground: Settled Natives and French in Montreal, 1667-1760*, (Ph.D. diss., University of Montreal, 1993), 179, 189.

⁶⁵ Claus to Cramahé, 20 Aug 1771, LAC, MG 19 F1, Daniel Claus Fonds, vol. 1, f. 125.

not Mi'kmaq but another man from Jeune-Lorette; the two had returned to the village, but the stabbed man died shortly thereafter.⁶⁶ No additional information exists about how the community treated his murderer.

The role of the Indian Department in removing Aboriginal people from the purview of colonial governments did not disrupt all ties between the Huron-Wendat and colonial authority. Ceremonial interaction and gift giving continued to take place. In 1778, Girault wrote to the governor telling him that a group of Huron-Wendat had come into the city to wish him a happy new year and to collect their presents. This is the only example I have been able to find of Huron-Wendat interacting with a British governor. But given the nature of their visit, this may have been an annual event.⁶⁷ The governor also supplied the community. Shortly after the Huron-Wendat visited the governor, Girault requested powder and lead so that they could go on their annual hunt.⁶⁸ In the summer, he also asked Haldimand to continue Carleton's policy of supplying Huron-Wendat women and children while their husbands and fathers joined the British war effort.⁶⁹ All of these examples took place during the American Revolution, suggesting that these interactions may have been more a function of war-time necessity than everyday diplomacy. In either case, the community made little effort at this time to bring grievances before the governor, choosing instead to address them through the Indian Department.

⁶⁶ Cramahé to Claus, 30 Aug 1771, LAC, MG 19 F1, Daniel Claus Fonds, vol. 1, f. 127; Cramahé to Claus, 6 Aug 1772, LAC, MG 19 F1, Daniel Claus Fonds, vol. 1, f. 145.

⁶⁷ Girault to Haldimand, 6 Jan 1778, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21777, ff. 7-8.

⁶⁸ Girault to Haldimand, 30 Jan 1778, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21777, f. 13.

⁶⁹ Girault to Haldimand, 10 Aug 1778, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21755, f. 8

The British military purchased supplies from the community, just as the French had before the conquest. Although there is no clear evidence indicating the size of this trade, it seems to have been fairly regular. In September 1778, Girault told Haldimand that it was a good time for him to order snowshoes because many of the people able to build them were currently at the village.⁷⁰ Girault's letter suggests that he knew beforehand that the British desired these tools. Without the value of goods exchanged it is difficult to assess the overall importance of this trade.

British/Huron-Wendat interactions during the 1760s and early 1770s demonstrate how the new colonial power maintained many of the imperial relationships from the French regime. The Indian Department reinforced many French practices and minimized the transition to British administration. Daniel Claus's response to the 1771 murder demonstrates that just like the French, British policy sought to treat Aboriginal communities differently than the colonial population. But where the Huron-Wendat had a much more special status during the French regime, their influence slowly eroded over the course of the American Revolution.

After a mere fifteen years of peace, the American Revolution brought conflict back to the St. Lawrence valley. The Seven Fires were well located to play a role in both defending the colony from invasion and participating more offensively during the later years of the conflict. This conflict was much more complicated than the Seven Years' War. With much tighter links to Albany, and Abenaki and Mohawk hunting territory in land claimed by the rebelling colonies, the Aboriginal communities along the St.

⁷⁰ Girault to Haldimand, 20 Sept 1778, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21777, f. 36

Lawrence were much more divided than they had been in the past. To exist within this divided political world many communities adopted a policy of neutrality that allowed individual members to participate on either side of the conflict. This approach complicated their relationship with the British.

From the conflict's beginning, the Continental Congress had been trying to woo the Seven Fires. British intelligence had intercepted a number of letters from American officials seeking their support.⁷¹ In May 1775 delegates from Kahnawake, Oswegatchie, Kanesatake and St. François met with Ethan Allan, a representative from the Revolutionary Army. Allan took an approach similar to William Johnson's in 1760. He first sought the neutrality of the Seven Fires if fighting moved north (which it did later that summer), then he hoped they would take up arms with the Americans.⁷²

The communities responded by adopting a policy of neutrality. When they were asked by the British to help defend Montreal from invading American troops, the leaders from these villages told Claus they were still uncertain over how to proceed:

They replied that this being an Affair of Moment & surprise they must first consult upon it, being Strangers to the Nature of the Dispute between the King and his children the Colonists and in short were at a loss how to act, that at our taking of Canada in [?] they were desired and treated with to consider the Kings english subjects as their friends and Brothers.⁷³

This response evoked the governor's anger. He warned that they risked losing their lands if they were disloyal. They responded with words that were a familiar refrain in eighteenth-century Mi'kma'ki, Wabanakia and Canada: "They answered [to the

⁷¹ Carleton to Dartmouth, 15 May 1775, CO 42-34, ff. 123-124; Benedict Arnold to Thomas Walker, 20 May 1775, CO 42-34, f. 148.

⁷² Speech/communication by Ethan Allan to the principal villages along the St. Lawrence, 24 May 1775, CO 42-34, ff. 149-150.

⁷³ Daniel Claus, Memorandum of the Rebel Invasion of Canada in 1775, CO 42-36, f. 37v.

governor] that if their Lives were at Stake, they could not rashly & inconsiderably enter into a War the nature of which they were unacquainted with that they considered themselves independent & free Agents in that Respect, and could say no more abt it.”⁷⁴ Like in Mi’kma’ki, the conquest did not extinguish the Seven Fires’ belief that they operated autonomously from British power structures. This was neither a rejection nor affirmation of the British or Americans; rather it reflected the challenge that the American Revolution posed for a people who up until this point had seen both the colonists and imperial administrators as representing the British crown.

Eventually several people living among the Seven Fires joined with the British. Although there is little indication that Aboriginal people were involved in defending Quebec from the American attack in 1775, Etienne Ondiaraété claimed that he and many others actively helped the British in 1776 and 1777 by running dispatches for Carleton and fighting alongside major-general John Burgoyne and thirty five other Huron-Wendat, Iroquois, and Algonquin warriors.⁷⁵ It is likely that Ondiaraété fought in the 1777 campaign, which was directly under Burgoyne’s command.⁷⁶ If so, Ondiaraété was at the Battle of Saratoga – a key British loss. Ondiaraété reflected:

About half an hour before the surrender we succeeded in effecting our retreat under cover of the smoke and the wood. The battle began at seven o’clock in the morning, and lasted with great violence till one in the afternoon. General Burgoyne was taken in the afternoon. We then returned to our Camp – about a

⁷⁴ Daniel Claus, Memorandum of the Rebel Invasion of Canada in 1775, CO 42-36, f. 37v.

⁷⁵ ‘Indian Lorette’, *Star and Commercial Advertiser/L’Étoile et Journal du Commerce*, 13 February 1828; Carleton to Germain, 26 June 1777, CO 42-36, ff. 172-174.

⁷⁶ ‘Indian Lorette’, *Star and Commercial Advertiser/L’Étoile et Journal du Commerce*, 13 February 1828. Burgoyne only participated in two campaigns based out of Quebec; the first was the British push against the invading American army in 1776 and the second in 1777 when the British troops pushed back into the American colonies. See James Stokesbury, “John Burgoyne,” DCB online.

third of a mile in the rear of the two armies concealed in the thick woods – and proceeded from thence to our Village at Lorette.⁷⁷

If Ondiaraété's memory was correct, his story demonstrates that many people from the region became deeply involved in the conflict and directly participated in some of the war's most important events.

Even after Burgoyne's defeat, the Huron-Wendat continued to fight for Britain. In September 1779, twenty-seven Aboriginal people drew on the rations distributed by the government of Quebec, suggesting that some men from the village continued to support the British.⁷⁸ The following year, Haldimand reported that a contingent of two hundred 'Canadian Indians' attacked settlements along the Connecticut River, taking thirty-two prisoners.⁷⁹ That summer the Huron-Wendat, Mi'kmaq and Wulstukiuk indicated their support for the crown and their willingness to join with the Haudenosaunee against the Americans.⁸⁰

The British supported their allies in ways that were similar to the French. In 1777, when most of the Seven Fires sent people out to fight, Haldimand requested supplies to make up for the lost hunting season. He told the Board of Trade: "having been prevented from hunting last year they and their Families will be in want of every necessary, and if we expect their further Service we must supply them amply..."⁸¹ A year later, the Huron-Wendat requested that the governor provide for the people who had

⁷⁷ 'Indian Lorette', *Star and Commercial Advertiser/L'Étoile et Journal du Commerce*, 13 February 1828.

⁷⁸ Monthly Returns of the number denomination of People victuall'd, Number of rations drawn between the 25th August & 24th of Sept 1779, CO 42-39, f. 445.

⁷⁹ Haldimand to Germain, 25 Oct 1780, CO 42-40, ff. 334-335.

⁸⁰ A Counsel of the Lorrets held in Montreal August 31st 1780. Present Lieutt Houghton + Johnson of the Indian department and the Chiefs of Cachnawaga and Lorrets, LAC, MG 19 F35: Superintendent of Indian Affairs, series 2, lot 624.

⁸¹ Haldimand, 20 Sept 1777, CO 42-37 ff. 6.

fought in this campaign and their families.⁸² Similarly in 1779, nine mothers, two grandmothers and twenty-six children came down to Quebec to demand the provisions that the governor had promised when he sent the men from the village on a scouting mission.⁸³ The women were given a quart of flour, a quarter of a cow and money for firewood, which lasted about fifteen days.⁸⁴ The administration seemed to be open to supporting any people who had been loyal to the crown.

But not all Huron-Wendat supported the British during the war. People from all communities, like Captain Lewie from Kahnawake, fought for the Continental Army.⁸⁵ About five Huron-Wendat men helped the Americans. In a letter to Haldimand, Girault described Jean Vincent as a ‘Huron Bostonais’ and accused him of running correspondence between American forces and their allies in the St. Lawrence valley.⁸⁶ Another Huron-Wendat, Jacko, was considered the principal guide for General Montgomery when he came to attack the colony.⁸⁷ John Wineat, “a Lorette Indian”, and Breton, from Lorette, were accused of helping an escaped prisoner in 1779 or 1780.⁸⁸ In his account of travelling through North America, John Long met a man from Jeune-Lorette during his visit to New York in 1785. Known only as ‘Indian John’, this man –

⁸² Girault to Haldimand, 26 Mar 1778, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21777, f. 23.

⁸³ Girault to Haldimand, 23 Sept. 1779, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21777, f. 160.

⁸⁴ Girault to Haldimand, 7 Oct 1779, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21777, ff. 162-163.

⁸⁵ Davenport Phelps to Eleazar Wheelock, 1 Jan 1776, Dartmouth College Archives, doc. 776101. It is tempting to think that this Capt. Lewie is Sawantanan (Louis Vincent), who was also a Captain in the Revolutionary Army. However, this seems unlikely. Sawantanan died in 1826 and was likely born in the late 1740s. If he had a twelve-year-old son, he would have been born in the early 1760s when Sawantanan was in his mid-to-late teenage years. There is no evidence indicating that this was the case. Delâge and Sawaya note that Chief Atiatoharongwen from Akwesasne was also called “Col. Lewis” and allied with the Americans. It seems likely that this was the person to which this document refers. See Delâge and Sawaya, 126.

⁸⁶ Girault to Haldimand, 28 July 1779, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21777, f. 150.

⁸⁷ A. Fraser to Haldimand, 5 Feb 1781, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21772 f. 8.

⁸⁸ Interrogation of William Flood, 3 Mar 1780, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21844 f. 521.

who may have been Jean Vincent – was in the city seeking the land and money that the Americans had promised for his support.⁸⁹ The participation of these Huron-Wendat in aligning themselves with the Continental Congress raised problems for the village in 1779 when Haldimand asked them directly which side they were on. They replied that they knew nothing about the Americans, with the exception of the participation of Jean Vincent, whom they disowned.⁹⁰

Sawantanan, who later became the village school teacher, also fought for the Americans. His career with the Continental Army is the best documented of these men and helps to illustrate the role that they might have played in the conflict and how the community responded to people who fought on the other side of this conflict. Sawantanan was recruited by the Americans while studying at Dartmouth College. On learning that the American invasion to Canada had failed, Eleazar Wheelock sent Sawantanan and two other representatives familiar with Canada to the St. Lawrence valley to advocate for the American cause.⁹¹ In 1778 he was actively working on behalf of the Americans as a translator among the Abenaki and Mi'kmaq.⁹² A decade later, Sawantanan had returned to Jeune-Lorette to teach school. He was a prominent member of the Huron-Wendat community. If Sawantanan serves as any example, people from the Seven Fires served as important liaisons between the Americans and Aboriginal

⁸⁹ J. Long, *Voyages and Travels of an Indian Interpreter and Trader*, (London: 1791), 169-170.

⁹⁰ Girault to Haldimand, 30 July 1779, Haldimand Papers, vol. 21777, ff. 150-151.

⁹¹ Eleazar Wheelock To Wooster, 6 Feb 1776, Dartmouth College Archives, doc. 776156. This document confirms that Capt. Lewie was not Sawantanan, because Sawantanan was clearly still at the school in 1775. As an interesting aside, Sawantanan's role in the American Revolution was popularized in the historical novel *Rabble in Arms*, by well-known American historical novelist Kenneth Roberts.

⁹² John Wheelock's Petition to the Continental Congress, 3 Jan 1780, Dartmouth College Archives, doc. 780103.1; "Death Notices", *Salem Gazette*, vol. 39, no. 39, May 17 1825, p. 3; US National Archives and Records, Military Service Records, 'Vincent, Louis, Bedel's New Hampshire Regiment.'

communities in British-held territory and their actions had minimal consequences when they returned home.

The relationship between the Seven Fires and the Haudenosaunee and Huron-Wendat at Detroit demonstrate that these communities had more than just a handful of American supporters. One report in the Dartmouth College archives observed: “The Kagnawagas, as mentioned, have more influence than any in the Confederacy. This tribe, that at St. François, & that at Lorette, are as nations well attached to the United States, which has not or little influenced the other Canadians.”⁹³ The Haudenosaunee felt similarly. In 1779 they sent a wampum belt to Jeune-Lorette to counter rumours that the community might side with the Americans.⁹⁴ Another belt was sent to the Seven Fires later that year imploring them to support the British. This belt was accompanied by another from the Clan Mothers asking Seven Fires women to direct the community to support the British.⁹⁵ In each of these cases, the reply to these belts was positive, repeating Seven Fires’ loyalty to Britain.

That the Haudenosaunee sent wampum belts in the first place, however, suggests that even the Seven Fires’ Aboriginal allies were uncertain of their loyalty. A meeting of people from around the Great Lakes in the 1790s sheds additional light onto the support that these communities gave to the Americans. Duyante, a Huron-Wendat chief from Detroit told M. Lormier who represented the Seven Fires, “Father Listen to your Children and you Brothers of the 7 Nations hear us you Send messages to us which makes us think

⁹³ The present state & situation of the Indian Tribes in the Province of Quebec, 9 May 1779, Dartmouth College Archives, doc. 779301.

⁹⁴ Haldimand to Campbell, 15 Feb 1779, Haldimand Papers, ms. 21773 f. 6.

⁹⁵ Langan to Claus, 12 Aug 1779, LAC, MG19. F1, Daniel Claus Fonds, vol. 25 fol. 114-115.

you have forgot what has passed between us, you know when you were Listening to the Americans we Set you Right by insisting that you should be True to your Father the King.”⁹⁶ Although it took some time, it seems that the Seven Fires eventually gave more support to the British. For much of the war, though, they were divided on how to proceed. Jeune-Lorette only had a population of about forty men during this period. That the Huron-Wendat were implicated on five separate instances of directly supporting the American cause suggests that there were significant differences between the official position of the community and the actions of its individuals.

The division within Jeune-Lorette and many other Seven Fires communities did not lead to an internal schism. In fact, the return of Sawantanan as the community school teacher in the 1790s suggests that the positions that individual members took during the war caused no hard feelings. There were no large divisions because of the different political stance that community members took. This overall unity, in the face of political division during the war, shares many similarities with the divisions that occurred in Mi’kma’ki a half century earlier. People in these communities made different political decisions without fragmenting their own internal cohesion.

Huron-Wendat and Seven Fires participation in the American Revolution is a story that cannot be told simply. Their response to the outbreak of war was complex and varied. This complexity had a broader effect on British perceptions of Jeune-Lorette.

⁹⁶ At a meeting with the Principal Chiefs of the Confederacy (Detroit), Capt. Brant and several of the Five Nations, Capt Snake and Several Shawanees and Delawares, Mr. Lormier for the 7 Nations of Canada, Harry Thigh a Miami Chief, 15 Aug 1790, LAC, MG19 F35, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, series 2, lot 686.

British administrators like Haldimand would not trust them. After the Revolution, their ability to influence British decision-makers declined.

This decline began as the war neared its end. The 1780s brought a desire to lessen Indian Department expenses. In 1781, Lord Germain, the Secretary of State for the American colonies, told Haldimand that he had reduced the amount of gifts being sent over for Aboriginal people because of their 'enormous' cost.⁹⁷ Haldimand asked that fiscal responsibility be placed on the superintendent of the Indian Department.⁹⁸ The following year, two letters from Haldimand to Charles Townshend, the Treasurer of the Navy, emphasized the need to continue cutting these expenses, particularly in the west.⁹⁹ These reductions marked the beginning of nearly a decade of cost savings within the Indian Department.

Once the war ended, Haldimand made it clear that the Indian Department would need to make further cutbacks. He placed importance on reducing "the immense Expence and difficulties that attend our furnishing them with Provisions."¹⁰⁰ A 1787 list outlining these reductions illustrates the depth of these cuts. The Indian Department cut over £14,000 during the 1780s. Lower Canada saw a reduction of about sixty-five percent.¹⁰¹ This was the context in which John Johnson, the head of the Indian Department in Quebec, argued against the 1783 proposal to end the British practice of

⁹⁷ Germain to Haldimand, 12 Apr 1781, CO 42-41, ff. 32-32v.

⁹⁸ Haldimand to Germain, 23 Oct 1781, CO 42-42, ff. 101-102.

⁹⁹ Haldimand to Townshend, 22 Oct 1782, CO 42-43, ff. 182-189.

¹⁰⁰ Haldimand to Johnson, 6 Feb 1783, CO 42-44, f. 93.

¹⁰¹ General Return of Officers, Interpreters + employed at the following posts + districts of the Indian department... CO 42-18, f. 1. In 1782 the Indian Department spent £4013.2.6 on Lower Canadian employees while in 1787 it spent around £1280.

giving gifts to Jeune-Lorette.¹⁰² Johnson seems to have been successful. As late as 1819, the community still received gifts of clothing, rations, arms, and ammunition.¹⁰³

Rather than trying to sustain a relationship with the Seven Fires, the reduction in gifts marks Britain's declining interest in the region's Aboriginal people. Haldimand emphasized that Aboriginal people along the St. Lawrence had not fully submitted to British authority. He told John Johnson "these People consider Themselves, and in fact are, free and independent, unacquainted with Control and Subordination, their Passions and Conduct are alone to be governed by Persuasion [sic.] and Address."¹⁰⁴ Despite these concerns, Johnson's primary job was to reduce the expenditures of the Indian Department.¹⁰⁵ By 1791, these cuts resulted in a lack of British interest in the region. Looking westward, the Seven Fires – represented by the chiefs at Kahnawake – saw the compensation paid to the Mississauga for their land, and the grant of the Grand River to the Haudenosaunee, and they asked John Campbell, the Superintendent for Indian Affairs, "pourquoi que mon père ne m'aime pas comme mon frère."¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² John Johnson to R. Matthews, 3 April 1783, Haldimand Papers, ms.21775, f. 88.

¹⁰³ *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly*, 17. Joseph Bouchette cited this almost directly in his discussion of the community in Joseph Bouchette, *A Topographical Dictionary of the Province of Lower Canada*, (London: Published by Longman, Rees, Orme et al., 1831), s2.

¹⁰⁴ Instructions for Brigr General Sir John Johnson, Superintendent General and Inspector General of Indian Affairs in the Northern District of North America, 6 Feb 1783, CO 42-44, f. 95.

¹⁰⁵ Instructions for Brigr General Sir John Johnson, Superintendent General and Inspector General of Indian Affairs in the Northern District of North America, 6 Feb 1783, CO 42-44, f. 95v.

¹⁰⁶ Recit du Conseil adressé à Monsieur le Colonel Campbell Surint Genl des Affaires Sauvages, 16 Dec 1791, LAC, MG 19 F35, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, series 2, lot 694. Author's translation: "why does my father not love me like my brother." Delâge and Sawaya have observed the difference between the treatment of Aboriginal land in Upper and Lower Canada was significant. Although Lord Dorchester (Guy Carleton) told some of these communities that they would be compensated, there is no evidence that any compensation ever took place. See Delâge and Sawaya, *Les Traités des Sept Feux avec les Britanniques*, 227-233; See also Réponse du Lord Dorchester aux Sauvages du Lac des deux Montagnes..., 28-29 Aug 1794, LAC, MG19, F35, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, series 2, Lot 698 and 699.

This was a question that rang true for the Huron-Wendat. By the 1790s, they found themselves in a completely different position than many of their Aboriginal neighbours. The Seven Fires had a unique legal relationship with the French state. Unlike elsewhere in New France, where relationships were solidified through gift giving and reciprocity, or in New England, where relationships were framed by peace and friendship treaties and legal title 'purchased' by the crown, the mission communities along the St. Lawrence River were anchored in legal seigneurial title. The seigneuries of Sillery (Kamaskda),¹⁰⁷ St. François and Sault St. Louis (Kahnawake) were all granted by the crown to their respective Aboriginal communities; the sole caveat was that they were to be administered through guardianship by the Jesuits.


The British did not dispute the Mohawk claim to Kahnawake, but overlapping boundaries between the seigneuries of Sillery and St. Gabriel (both Jesuit seigneuries) complicated the Huron-Wendat claim to seigneurial title.¹⁰⁸ Sillery had been granted in 1650 to Algonquin, Abenaki and Huron-Wendat migrants after they had been displaced from their homeland; St. Gabriel was donated to their Jesuit guardians nearly two decades later. The core of the problem lay in the date of concession. The title to St. Gabriel was originally made to Robert Giffard in 1647 for an area east of Quebec near Beauport. The grant of Sillery was made west of the town three years later. Giffard's grant conflicted with a pre-existing seignery and was moved north of Sillery with the result that the northern two leagues of Sillery overlapped with the southern two leagues of St. Gabriel.

¹⁰⁷ *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly*, i.

¹⁰⁸ *Indian Treaties and Surrenders from 1680 to 1890*, vol. 2 (Ottawa: B. Chamberlin, 1891), 298-304; Registry of seigneurial titles from the French regime, n.d., CO 42-28, ff. 258-96; List and State of Seigneuries in the hands of New Subjects not signers to the Petition to His Majesty of October 1788, 5 December 1788, CO 42-63 ff. 28-29v; List of seigniors old and new, CO 42-72 ff. 159-64.

Given that few Europeans had begun to settle in the Quebec region during this period, the overlapping seigneuries did not initially raise problems. Seigneurial grants, after all, were made in Europe based on inaccurate maps. In 1667 Giffard donated St. Gabriel to the Jesuits. Being the *de facto* seigneurs of both seigneuries, the Jesuits were assured there would be no conflict over the boundary's location.

Map 7.1: Overlap between Sillery and St. Gabriel



By the turn of the eighteenth century, the problem became even more complicated. The Jesuits not only controlled both seigneuries, but the Abenaki and Algonquin had moved closer to Trois-Rivières, and the Huron-Wendat had moved to Jeune-Lorette. The village was located in the overlapping space. According to

eighteenth-century seigneurial geography, however, the village was well inside the boundaries of St. Gabriel, not Sillery. Two years after their move into St. Gabriel, and without their knowledge, the Jesuits successfully argued that their Aboriginal wards had moved away from Sillery and requested that it be granted directly to them.¹⁰⁹ According to French legal title Sillery was no longer an Aboriginal seignury like Sault St. Louis.

The issue of seigneurial title arose briefly during the early 1760s. Although there is no evidence of what provoked the issue, Girault wrote a short report denying that the Huron-Wendat had a claim on either seignury. The Jesuit asserted: “Jeune-Lorette has no dependencies. It is not a seignory. It is only a small piece of land of the côte Petit St. Antoine, seignory of St. Michel, on which the Jesuit Fathers, to whom the seignory belongs consented to allow the Hurons to settle, about the end of 1697.”¹¹⁰ Although the context and provenience of this document is unknown, it directly addressed Huron-Wendat claims to the seignury. There is no evidence that the Huron-Wendat were aware of this document and its appearance in the late nineteenth century leaves open the possibility that it was a forgery to bolster arguments against Huron-Wendat claims to Sillery.

The Jesuit influence declined in the late 1780s and early 1790s and an increasing scarcity of land and resources became a major issue for the Huron-Wendat. Joseph Bouchette claimed that tensions over access to land came to a head in the late 1780s when the Jesuits discontinued giving the Huron-Wendat an allowance of wheat. He

¹⁰⁹ See Letter by Reverend Father Martin Bouvart to Monseigneur the Count de Pontchartrain, *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 66, 41-47.

¹¹⁰ Etienne Girault, Des Hurons, [1762], *Jesuit Relations*, vol. 70, 207-209. The original of this document was found in *L'Abeille*, 23 Jan 1879, vol. XII, 76.

claimed that “when it [the ½ bushel of wheat] ceased they [the Huron-Wendat] began to ask the Père Giroux [Girault] for their lands at Sillery.”¹¹¹ It was then that they discovered the paper-work left behind by the French indicating they were not the principal holders of the land.

The British refused to accept responsibility for these errors; they would not intervene in the situation.¹¹² In contrast to the experiences of the Mohawk at Sault St. Louis, the Huron-Wendat were ultimately unsuccessful at convincing the British that they had seigneurial title to this land. The British policy of indirect rule had maintained the Jesuit presence and by doing so had prevented the Huron-Wendat from learning the convoluted history of St. Gabriel and Sillery until it was too late. By the 1790s, the Huron-Wendat required a different strategy to maintain and sustain their community.

Education and the petitions of the 1790s

By the beginning of the 1790s, the community needed to take a more direct approach to ensure their survival. Their approach was deeply shaped by Sawantanan, his experience at Dartmouth College and the overall culture of education in Jeune-Lorette. With Sawantanan’s knowledge of French and English, and the diplomatic skills he honed during the American Revolution, the community began a series of petitions to the British crown in an effort to receive compensation for the loss of Sillery. Sawantanan bridged the two worlds, using his knowledge of the colonial world to support his Aboriginal community.

¹¹¹ Bouchette, s2.

¹¹² *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly*, 43-4.

Sawantanan and his brother Bastien began at Dartmouth in 1772.¹¹³ It is not known what happened to Bastien, but his brother continued at the school until he graduated in 1781. In the entire early-American college system only fifty Aboriginal students attended a colonial college; by 1800 just five had graduated.¹¹⁴ Not only did this make Sawantanan unique among his peers in the northeast, but his high-level of education would have put him in a distinct position among the French settlers as well. In a letter to William Johnson, Wheelock claimed that Sawantanan and Bastien “appeared to have an uncommon thirst for Learning, have been diligent at their Studies, and have made good Proficiency for the Time therein. They appear to be rational. Manly Spirited, courteous, graceful and Obliging, far beyond What I have found common to Indians...”¹¹⁵ Likewise, George Washington told Wheelock that he was “Pleased with the Specimen you have given in M^r Vincent [Sawantanan], of the improvement and cultivation which are derived from an education in your Seminary of Literature...”¹¹⁶ Whether these were unique traits, or whether they reflected the culture of education in Jeune-Lorette has not been determined. It is likely, though, that Jesuit education and the community’s proximity to Quebec helped the Huron-Wendat develop the skills that garnered the approval of these colonial leaders.

¹¹³ Eleazar Wheelock to the Dartmouth College trustees, 6 July 1773, Dartmouth College Archives, doc. 773406; Certificate for Bastien and Lewis, 27 Feb 1773, Dartmouth College Archives, doc. 773177.

¹¹⁴ Cary Michael Carney, *Native American Higher Education in the United States* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 38.

¹¹⁵ From Eleazar Wheelock, 27 February 1773, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, vol. 12, 1012.

¹¹⁶ To the Rev’d John Wheelock, 9 June 1781, *The Papers of George Washington*, series 3c, Varick Transcripts, Letterbook 4, 153; Sawantanan seems to have visited with Washington around this time. Another letter written by Washington on 9 June 1781 claims that Sawantanan asked Washington for an officer’s commission in the ‘Corps of Indians’. Washington claimed that there were too many officers already; Sawantanan replied by asking for the horse he rode in on. See To General Bayley, 9 June 1781, *The Papers of George Washington*, series 3b, Varick Transcripts, Letterbook 13, 424.

Wheelock sought to cultivate students who would return to their communities – particularly those managed by the Jesuits – to serve as Protestant intermediaries.¹¹⁷

Although his ultimate goal was assimilation, his more immediate aim was to train his students as evangelical teachers. This is almost exactly what Sawantanan set out to do after his graduation in 1782.¹¹⁸ Initially, in the 1780s, Sawantanan assisted a school master in the Montreal area.¹¹⁹ Later in the decade he taught school to the Mohawk living in the Bay of Quinte area.¹²⁰ In 1791 he returned to Jeune-Lorette to start a school.

Like earlier transitions in this community, the changes that took place with Sawantanan's return reshaped, rather than replaced, the community's focus on education. The community's literacy rate in the years after he returned demonstrates that Sawantanan built on a local culture of European-based education. In the early 1790s, Huron-Wendat men signed a petition to the Bishop of Quebec regarding the shared use of their church with their surrounding French neighbours.¹²¹ Following the methodologies of Allan Greer and Michel Verrette, whose separate studies on literacy in New France

¹¹⁷ James Axtell, *The Invasion Within: The Conquest of Cultures in Colonial North America* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1985), 208; J. David Hoeveler, *Creating the American Mind: Intellect and Politics in the Colonial Colleges*, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 204-205; Jean-Pierre Sawaya, "Les Amérindiens domiciliés et le protestantisme au XVIIIe siècle: Eleazar Wheelock et le Dartmouth College," *Historical Studies in Education/Revue d'histoire de l'éducation*, vol. 22 (Fall 2010), 26.

¹¹⁸ At an annual meeting of the honorable board of trustees of Dartmouth College at said College, 17 September 1782, Archives du Conseil de la Nation Huron-Wendat (ACNHW), Collection Francois Vincent, FV/34/3/h4.

¹¹⁹ Louis Vincent to President Wheelock, 20 February 1784, ACNHW, Collection Francois Vincent, FV/37/3/K.

¹²⁰ Église d'Angleterre, BANQ-QUE, P1000, s3, d2735, f. 30; State of religion in Canada, n.d., CO 42-72, f. 234; John Wheelock to John Forrest, 15 June 1785, Dartmouth College Archives, doc. 785365; From Quebec to Niagara in 1794: Diary of Bishop Jacob Mountain, in *Rapport de l'archiviste de la province de Québec*, (Roch Lefebvre: Imprimeur de Sa Majesté la Reine, 1959-1960), 164-165; John Wheelock to Jedidiah Morse, 25 February 1811, Dartmouth College Archives, doc. 811175.1. Reference is also made to Sawantanan teaching at the Bay of Quinte and helping translate the Gospel of Matthew in C.M. Johnston, "John Deserontyon, (Odeserundiye)," in *DCB* (online)

¹²¹ Précis des conventions entre les Hurons du village de Lorette et une partie des habitants de Charlesbourg, 11 Nov 1793, AAQ, 61, Loretteville, CD I-177A à E.

were defined by the ability of individuals to sign petitions and parish registers, the signatures on this document suggest that adult Huron-Wendat men had a literacy rate of about twenty-two percent.¹²² To a certain degree this reflects the influence of the Jesuits on the community.¹²³ As Colin Calloway observed of eighteenth-century Aboriginal students at Dartmouth College, many people in Jeune-Lorette had likely developed an appreciation for the power of print.¹²⁴

Although Jeune-Lorette's literacy rate was average for the St. Lawrence valley, it was likely higher than their surrounding French neighbours. Only three of 128 of the Huron-Wendat's neighbours physically signed a 1795 petition to create a new parish separate from the mission church.¹²⁵ This suggests that the literacy rate in the neighbouring parish was only about two percent. Significantly, of the three men who could sign their names, one was English and another was the notary; the rest of the habitants signed with an 'x'.

The fact that there was a school house in Jeune-Lorette at the turn of the nineteenth century also makes this community different from its French neighbours. Similar schools did not appear elsewhere in Lower Canada until well into the nineteenth

¹²² Allan Greer, 'The Pattern of Literacy in Quebec, 1745-1899,' *Histoire sociale/Social History*, vol.11 no. 2 (1978), 295-335; Michel Verrette, *L'Alphabétisation au Québec, 1660-1900* (Sillery: Septentrion, 2002).

¹²³ The Jesuits created a Huron-Wendat orthography in the late seventeenth century that continued to be used well into the nineteenth century, long after the Jesuits had ceased to have any influence in the community.

¹²⁴ Colin Calloway, *The Indian History of an American Institution: Native Americans and Dartmouth*, (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2010), xxi. Lisa Brooks has recently published a fascinating study of Abenaki literacy. She argues for a wider conception of literacy connecting birch bark messages, wampum and maps with letters, petitions and treaties. In this way, she removes the connection between literacy and European culture and demonstrates the connection between reading and writing and Abenaki culture. See Lisa Brooks, *The Common Pot: The Recovery of Native Space in the Northeast*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).

¹²⁵ Requête des habitants de la Jeune Lorette, 22 April 1795, AAQ, 61, Loretteville, CD I-5A à E.

century.¹²⁶ According to Verrette, the development of a school system was a slow process that involved more than the writing of reports and the passing of legislation.¹²⁷ It was not until the 1824 Fabriques Act and subsequent Syndics Acts (1829 and 1832) that schooling in French communities became more prominent. The ‘watershed’ moment, according to Antony Di Mascio, was the 1841 Common School Act, which laid the foundation for a divided Protestant/Catholic system of education.¹²⁸ While a formal school began in Jeune-Lorette in the early 1790s, only in the late 1820s did local schools become the norm in French communities.

The return of Sawantanan and the creation of a school at Jeune-Lorette coincided with the end of the Jesuit presence, the rising European population, the noticeable decline in Huron-Wendat influence with the British, and most importantly the realization that they would not be compensated for the loss of Sillery. These four factors led to a new strategy for cultural survival. In 1791, Etienne Ondiaraété and three other chiefs sent a petition to Lower Canadian governor Lord Dorchester (Guy Carleton) asking for title to their lands and access for their children to the Petit Séminaire in Quebec.¹²⁹ Although signed by Ondiaraété and the other chiefs, there is a community tradition that argues that

¹²⁶ There was at least one other school like the one at Jeune-Lorette at St. François. Like Sawantanan, the school master, Francis Annance, attended Moor’s Indian Charity School. Also like Sawantanan, the school had some financial difficulty. See The Humble Petition of the Abanaquis Indians to John Johnson, 27 May 1805, LAC, MG 19 F35, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, series 2, lot 726; John Wheelock to [?], 15 Jan 1805, Dartmouth College Archives, doc. 805115.

¹²⁷ Verrette, 107.

¹²⁸ Anthony Di Mascio, ‘Forever Divided? Assessing the ‘National’ question and the governance in education through a re-examination of Québec’s 1789 Report on Education,’ *McGill Journal of Education*, 42, 3 (Fall 2007), 470.

¹²⁹ At the Council Chambers in the Bishop’s Palace, 15 Aug 1791, Centre de Référence de l’Amérique française, SME 1/2/12.

Sawantanan was its principal author.¹³⁰ Although there is no definitive proof, the date of his arrival in the community and his prior cultural experiences at Dartmouth College and among the Mohawk in the Bay of Quinte support this idea. This petition marked the beginning of over forty years of Huron-Wendat engagement with the Lower Canadian governor, Lower Canadian Assembly, British parliamentarians, and the British crown for title to the seigneurie of Sillery.

These petitions were fundamentally different from earlier interactions with European powers. The contrast is best observed by comparing the claims after 1791 with a 1773 complaint about settler encroachment near the Huron-Wendat village.¹³¹ The earlier claim was addressed to the Indian Department through Daniel Claus and was focused on specific grievances related to settler use of village lands. Rather than reacting to these sorts of specific issues, the petitions after 1791 were directed to the colony's governor and referred to the overall title of the land. The Huron-Wendat sought the seigneurial income from Sillery and St. Gabriel. As such, these later claims included the land granted during the French regime to hundreds of French farmers and not just during recent expansion onto their village lands.¹³²

¹³⁰ 'Timeline of the Huron community,' n.d., ACNHW, Collection Francois Vincent, FV/104/6/b6; see also Georges Boiteau, "Les chasseurs hurons de Lorette," (MA thesis: Université Laval, 1954), 56-57, 61; Denis Vaugeois, *The Last French and Indian War: an inquiry into a safe-conduct issued in 1760 that acquired the value of a treaty in 1990* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 74.

Boiteau went so far as to suggest that Sawantanan became someone on whom all of the hope of the community was placed (61). This is clearly an exaggeration, though; many of his contemporaries were equally involved in these claims and, based on some of their signatures, may have been similarly educated. Nonetheless, his role in the community was important, as was the emphasis that he placed on education.

¹³¹ Journal of Daniel Claus, 19 June-27 July 1773, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, vol. 13, 623-6.

¹³² A good summary of these claims can be found in the *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly* and the *Continuation of the Appendix to the XLIInd Volume of the Journals of the House of Assembly of the Province of Lower Canada, session 1832-3*, appendix OO.

The claims after 1791 also differed in form and reflect the importance of literacy in the community. Unlike earlier claims, which were orally presented and followed Aboriginal protocols, the petitions after 1791 increasingly began to follow conventions that reflected the community's access to European-based education; they were written, signed, and by the early nineteenth century, accompanied by supporting written documentation.¹³³ The difference between these two approaches symbolized the changes that had taken place since the conquest. In ways similar to earlier adaptations to French agriculture, architecture and language, the Huron-Wendat selectively used European diplomatic conventions (which drew heavily on the power of writing) to address the community's changing geopolitical position in the St. Lawrence valley.

Conclusion

The 1791 petition marked the beginning of a new phase in the community's life. It illustrates the greater convergence of the two worlds in which the Huron-Wendat lived. Although the separation of the French population from the Huron-Wendat and their indecisive support of the British in the American Revolution suggest that their ties to the European world had diminished, the petition for Sillery demonstrated a greater desire to ensure their survival as a distinct community by engaging with the European world. None of this meant that the community rejected the Aboriginal world of the St. Lawrence valley. But even here, the arrival of the Indian Department drew this world into a much closer orbit around British interests. From 1791 onwards it was difficult to avoid

¹³³ *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly*, 12.

engaging with the colonial world of the St. Lawrence valley. Though both worlds continued to exist separately, they were also increasingly intertwined.

Part 2: Conclusion

The world in 1791 was considerably different from the world into which William Pote was taken captive. As life along the St. Lawrence River changed after the conquest, the Huron-Wendat adapted and learned from their new colonial relationship with the British. Rather than being rapid and quick, the change that took place after 1760 continued a process that had begun with the arrival of the Jesuit missionaries in early Wendaké. From the mid-1620s onward there was seldom a decade that was not marked by adaptations to the new European presence in the region. Slowly, they engaged with the French colonial world developing in the St. Lawrence valley. By the time that General Wolfe appeared downstream from Quebec, the Huron-Wendat were accustomed to adapting to new contexts. Although the events of 1759 had the potential to make a dramatic impact and cause significant change, the British policy of indirect rule and Sawantanan's access to Dartmouth College slowed the process of change and equipped the community with new tools to ensure its survival.

Focusing on the more social and cultural ways that this event affected the Huron-Wendat raises important questions about how historians and anthropologists approach Aboriginal communities. As Susan Neylan's work on Christian missionaries among and within Tsimshian communities demonstrates, preconceived notions about European and Aboriginal roles and behaviours can be helpful when there is a dearth of source material, but making assumptions about these societies can also distract historians from important

sources that shed light on the complexity of Aboriginal-European interaction.¹ In the case of Jeune-Lorette, it is important to understand how the community used notaries, surveyors, and European forms of education to establish and maintain their presence around Quebec. These aspects of the community have not been rigorously studied; instead scholars have focused more on hunting territories and diplomatic alliances. Clearly these aspects of the community's history had considerable influence on Jeune-Lorette at the end of the eighteenth century and they deserve to be studied in greater detail in the future.

Even in the heart of New France a hybrid landscape existed where Aboriginal people selectively engaged with colonial power structures to maintain their livelihood and connection to place. The Huron-Wendat straddled the European and Aboriginal worlds of the St. Lawrence. Although the turn-of-the-century petitions can be seen as conforming to European standards, and coincide with a general increase in Aboriginal engagement with the British justice system,² they were also deeply entrenched in a Huron-Wendat way of understanding their community as both part of, and yet separate from, the colonial world of the St. Lawrence. Similarly, the participation of the Huron-Wendat in both the seigneurial regime and the governance of Aboriginal hunting territories demonstrate that they occupied a position in the valley where vastly different forms of relating to each other could co-exist, conflict and be drawn upon.

¹ Susan Neylan, *The Heavens are Changing: Nineteenth Century Protestant Missionaries and Tsimshian Christianity*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), 5. Neylan challenges Canadian historians to make a fuller inquiry into the ways that Europeans and Aboriginal people responded to each other. She highlights the need "to recognize the subtler forms of colonization, one must appreciate the active and frequently willing participation of First Nations."

² Denys Delâge et Étienne Gilbert, "La justice coloniale britannique et les Amérindiens au Québec 1760-1820 : I – En terres amérindiennes," *Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. 32, no. 1, (2002), 64.

It is in this sense that I think the community is best understood. Similar to the practices of other Aboriginal groups whose lands were quickly diminished by settler colonialism, the Huron-Wendat sought to maintain their presence in the Quebec area by any means necessary. They engaged in multiple and varied strategies, such as using European forms of education and building relationships with neighbouring Aboriginal and European communities, which strengthened their position in the region. Cole Harris has made a similar point in his work on Aboriginal people in British Columbia, who also ended up living on very small reserves. “For many,” Harris wrote, “their challenge, rather, was to find some mix of on- and off-reserve occupations that would allow them to keep body and soul together while maintaining a connection with the particular land of their ancestors.”³ By understanding the many ways that the Huron-Wendat engaged with the pre- and post-conquest world, a richer and more dynamic picture of this community’s past comes into focus. It is a picture that helps us to understand the processes of colonialism more deeply, while also providing a window into how individuals within the community engaged with a rapidly changing environment.

³ Cole Harris, *Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance and Reserves in British Columbia*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002), 274.

Conclusion: Comparing Mi'kmaq and Huron-Wendat responses to the fall of New France

The differences between Mi'kmaq, Huron-Wendat, French and British spatial practices shaped the regional dynamics of the eighteenth-century northeast. Aboriginal reaction to the conquest varied depending on the relative influence of European imperial practices and Aboriginal land use around European administrative centres. Overlapping definitions of landscape – one defined by Europeans, the other by Aboriginal people – shaped these communities' experiences. These were not mutually constructed spaces. In Mi'kma'ki, Europeans sought to define and control a landscape that was principally occupied and controlled by the Mi'kmaq. In Quebec, the parallel development of French and Aboriginal worlds during the seventeenth century allowed the Huron-Wendat to selectively engage both cultures with a degree of autonomy.

This political geography deeply influenced how the two communities reacted to the new British presence. In Mi'kma'ki, the British initially made little effort to win Mi'kmaw support. After the Treaty of Utrecht, the Mi'kmaq slowly migrated away from Louisbourg and Annapolis Royal and conflict with the British raged until the late 1720s. Along the St. Lawrence River there was no such resistance. The new British administration at Quebec took a different course, which more closely mirrored French diplomatic practices. No sooner was France defeated than the new regime made clear its adherence to the old rules. There was less likelihood of tension. The Huron-Wendat felt the conquest slowly. In the long run, through education and the end of Jesuit influence, it shaped Jeune-Lorette's society and culture just as much as it influenced their politics and

diplomacy. The Mi'kmaq, meanwhile, responded to British attacks along the coast with violence in an effort to preserve their autonomy.

The differences between how these two communities responded to the conquest suggest some larger patterns in eighteenth-century Aboriginal-European relations. Both before and after British conquest, imperial agents focused on specific peoples and places, rather than on indigenous peoples as a single category. They adapted local policies to the political, socio-economic and military needs of empire. Some relationships were fragile, while others were more substantial, built on alliances or attempted subjugation to European will. The discussion that follows demonstrates how local variations in imperial practices shaped the geo-politics of the eighteenth-century northeast and suggest possible avenues for future study.

Historians customarily have defined northeastern spaces by their colonial boundaries and borders. Until recently, they have placed the Mi'kmaq in Acadia and Nova Scotia; the Abenaki in Maine; and the Huron-Wendat in Canada.¹ Eighteenth-century evidence urges a more flexible and multi-layered definition of territory: the French lived in Mi'kma'ki, New Englanders in Wabanakia, and the French and Huron-Wendat occupied a shared space around Jeune-Lorette. Rather than borderlands, these were spaces where European and Aboriginal spatial definitions co-existed more than they

¹ William C. Wicken's work provides a good counter-example. Arguing against scholars who use the terms 'Acadia' and 'Nova Scotia' to describe eighteenth-century Mi'kma'ki, Wicken writes: "the bulk of the land mass of what we know today as mainland Nova Scotia, cannot be so easily called 'Acadia' or 'Nova Scotia,' as those terms were legal fictions used by France and Great Britain to justify the exclusion of other European nations from the region. This land was not Acadia, or Nova Scotia, but Mi'kma'ki, the land of the Mi'kmaq..." William C. Wicken, "Mi'kmaq Decisions: Antoine Tecouenemac, the Conquest, and the Treaty of Utrecht," in *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions*, John G. Reid et al., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 90.

competed. The Aboriginal landscape was being re-inscribed, but not erased, by Europeans. If we abandon the idea of borderlands, with its focus on colonial centres and competing geographies, and see these vast tracts as native spaces, aboriginal responses to empire begin to make much better sense.

Geography shaped European and Aboriginal interaction in Mi'kma'ki and the St. Lawrence valley. The Atlantic coast north of Boston provided few incentives for European development. Aside from the fur trade, easily pursued in tandem with the fisheries, neither France nor England had reason to settle in the region. Western fur trade alliances with the Haudenosaunee, based along the Hudson River, and with the Anishinaabe in the north, based along the St. Lawrence, effectively kept the Mi'kmaq, Wulstukwiuk and Abenaki from developing large fur-trading networks along the Atlantic coast. These people could trade furs, but these two river valleys hemmed in their hunting grounds. They could not build fur-trading networks comparable to those of the Haudenosaunee or Anishinaabe. As a result, Europeans were slow to settle in the region.

Unlike the Mi'kmaq, the Huron-Wendat were well integrated into the St. Lawrence fur trade and interior Aboriginal trading networks. Even before the Huron-Wendat moved to Quebec, Wendaké's position at the northern edge of fertile soil made it a prime location for trade with the Algonquin and Nipissing, whose territory stretched down to the St. Lawrence River but was mostly on the Canadian shield and therefore had little agricultural potential. The French built on this pre-contact trading and communication network, establishing Montreal as a central hub for the fur trade. When disease and Haudenosaunee attacks forced the Huron-Wendat to leave Wendaké, many of

them initially moved to the St. Lawrence because of the cultural and economic benefits derived from their relationship with the French. Those who remained in the valley settled near the French administration at Quebec. Their central location and continued connections to peoples living to the north and west granted them greater opportunities than the Mi'kmaq to build both a military and a trading relationship with the French.

Similarities between Huron-Wendat and French subsistence strategies also made it easier for these societies to live closer together than the Mi'kmaq and French in Acadia. Although agricultural practices differed, both the French and Huron-Wendat lived in sedentary communities and relied on agriculture to support their population. The Huron-Wendat lived in more permanent year-round villages than the Mi'kmaq and often moved only once the soil was exhausted. Although not spurred by a decline in soil quality, their immigration to Quebec fit within this pattern. Village life in Quebec shared many similarities with that in Wendaké. Their settlements around the French town – at least initially – maintained their agricultural focus, and their seasonal hunting patterns used unoccupied land north of the French seigneuries. This use of space was compatible with the spread of French agriculture, which made no claim on the land the Huron-Wendat used for hunting and fishing. By the eighteenth century, the Huron-Wendat had begun to adopt French structures for administering land through the use of local notaries and surveyors, though they also continued many customary practices, such as canoe building and snowshoe manufacture, as well as seasonal hunting, gathering and fishing.

After the conquest, it took nearly three decades for these relationships to change. In Jeune-Lorette, the Royal Proclamation made change unlikely. In claiming, but

protecting, Aboriginal land, the Royal Proclamation reinforced the Treaties of Oswegatchie and Kahnawake. It set forth a policy that had many similarities with French practices. Land on either side of the proclamation line, which had never been ceded to Europeans, effectively remained under Aboriginal control. From the British perspective, the land was both British North America and Aboriginal territory. The British vision almost mirrored the French view of Wabanakia and later Mi'kma'ki.

At the end of the eighteenth century a surge in European immigration changed the Huron-Wendat relationship with the neighbouring population. Immigration around Jeune-Lorette began to deplete resources that the Huron-Wendat had once shared with French settlers. Amidst this local pressure, European settlement in New Hampshire and Vermont pushed the Abenaki onto hunting territory north of the St. Lawrence where they competed with the Algonquin and Huron-Wendat. In response to these changes, the community began to formally petition the crown. As original title holders to the seigneurie of Sillery, the Huron-Wendat sought the dues paid by the French farmers for the use of seigneurial land.

Mi'kmaw spatial practices were less compatible with large-scale European settlement. French farming communities, particularly along key estuaries, could easily disrupt the Mi'kmaw way of life and economy. Before the conquest, though, French settlement in Mi'kma'ki was limited to a handful of scattered little villages lining the marshy shores of the Bay of Fundy and its tributaries. This land was not very important for the Mi'kmaw economy. Though sufficient to make an impact in the Mi'kmaw communities living near Minas, Port Royal and Cape Sable, these settlements were so

insignificant that conflict was relatively rare. Although not ignorant of the threat posed by Europeans, especially given English northward encroachment in Wabanakia, the Mi'kmaq were only beginning to feel the effects of European colonialism at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

While the conquest initially made little difference to the Huron-Wendat, increased French and British investment in Mi'kma'ki transformed the region. The Treaty of Utrecht divided Mi'kma'ki and introduced the same conditions that had fuelled the three-decade old conflict in Wabanakia. Despite French statements to the contrary, the co-existence of Mi'kma'ki and Acadia was no longer possible. Britain and France sought to redefine Mi'kma'ki as Nova Scotia and Île Royale. The unprecedented arrival of permanent British troops at Annapolis Royal and the creation of Louisbourg and the French missions encouraged the Mi'kmaq to move away from imperial centres, while the increase in British troops at Annapolis and Canso, British territorial claims to peninsular Mi'kma'ki, and their inconsistent and ineffective Indian policy led to violent clashes.

The British intrusion into Aboriginal spaces, and the resulting reduction in resources available to these communities, was the most important component shaping these two communities' responses to the conquest. In Mi'kma'ki, many tensions were fuelled by the New England fishery and British attempts to expand beyond Annapolis Royal. Local tensions could quickly spark conflict, as they did in 1715. But it was the British military presence, coupled with their policy of hostage taking and limited gift giving and diplomacy, which made this transition much more palpable and painful than in Jeune-Lorette.

It took until the 1790s for the Huron-Wendat to feel similar pressure. The diplomatic relationship established with the British through the Indian Department and Seven Fires helped to minimize tensions over resources. Access to the market at Quebec also provided the Huron-Wendat with economic alternatives, such as manufacturing small crafts, which likely also made up for the decline of resources. Moreover, unlike in Mi'kma'ki, the British did not intrude on, or directly claim, Huron-Wendat hunting territory, nor did they attempt to change the dynamics of everyday life in the village. The Huron-Wendat continued to live in a region defined by the mixture of settler and Aboriginal spatial practices. These processes directly conflicted with each other in Mi'kma'ki.

Mi'kmaw spatial practices did not bring them into regular contact with European settlers or imperial officials. Relatively high fertility ratios demonstrate that they lived healthy lives with few restrictions limiting their population growth. Lower fertility ratios around Cape Sable, Port Royal and Minas, however, suggest that these communities had greater difficulty reproducing themselves than the Mi'kmaq living further from French settlement. Even before the conquest, greater access to resources and less disease, the cause for their higher fertility ratios, likely served as an incentive to live further from the French population.

Comparing the Mi'kmaq and the Huron-Wendat suggests that this is exactly what many Mi'kmaq did. Although there are a number of anecdotal examples of positive Mi'kmaw-French interaction, especially during the seventeenth century, comparing the parish registers from Port Royal with Jeune-Lorette demonstrates the chasm between the

French and the Mi'kmaq. Between 1702 and 1740, only two percent of the baptisms, marriages and burials recorded at Port Royal involved the Mi'kmaq, whereas between 1760 and 1795, twenty-seven percent of the entries at Jeune-Lorette involved the Huron-Wendat. Both places paled compared to the West. Between 1698 and 1765, twenty-seven percent of the marriages at Michilimackinac involved a French and Aboriginal spouse.² This was significantly higher than in either Jeune-Lorette or Port Royal.³ Given that we know the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq were poorly served by French priests, this comparison demonstrates that the Mi'kmaq did not regularly seek out the priest at Port Royal, choosing instead to remain separate from the French settlers. When compared with other situations where Aboriginal and French people lived close together, the parish registers emphasize that the Mi'kmaq were less likely to interact with the French than Aboriginal people living further west.

Although Mi'kma'ki and Jeune-Lorette were considered part of the French and then British empires, their relationship to each empire was very different. This disparity was partially caused by the evolution of French and British imperial policy. Over the first half of the eighteenth century, France and Britain paid increasing attention to their overseas empires as rivalry between the two crowns intensified. The imperial context was different in 1759 than it had been in 1710. But, depending on the perceived political, socio-economic and military needs of empire and the willingness of Aboriginal

² Harriet Gorham, "Families of Mixed Descent in the Western Great Lakes Region," in Bruce Alden Cox, ed., *Native People, Native Lands*, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992), 44-45.

³ Only twenty percent of the marriages in Jeune-Lorette between 1760 and 1795 were between a Huron-Wendat and French settler. There was no direct intermarriage in the Port Royal parish registers, though two of the ten marriages recorded in the parish register involved daughters born to French fathers and Mi'kmaw mothers. If these are included, half a percent of the marriages at Port Royal involved a couple linking the French and Mi'kmaq.

communities to interact with them, imperial officials also varied in their treatment of Aboriginal people. These empires, as many historians have observed, were heterogeneous entities.⁴ This, as much as their growing cross-Atlantic interest, explains the differences in how imperial officials interacted with Aboriginal people.

The lack of Mi'kmaw interest was of little concern for the French. Around the Bay of Fundy, the French were much more interested in building a relationship with the Abenaki than they were in cultivating ties with the Mi'kmaq. The Mi'kmaw-French relationship was secondary to, and significantly weaker than, the Abenaki-French relationship. The differences between France's attitude to the Mi'kmaq and Abenaki are striking. France used its alliance with the Abenaki as a way of claiming their territory as part of New France and protecting the St. Lawrence River. The Abenaki gained military support in their own fight against encroaching New England settlement. The Abenaki-French relationship was based on mutuality; without the imperial conflict between France and Britain, neither France nor the Mi'kmaq had similar incentives on which to build a relationship until the first decade of the eighteenth century. A similar situation developed in Mi'kma'ki only after the conquest; before then the Mi'kmaq and French had few common interests.

The Huron-Wendat were in the exact opposite situation. Rather than living separately from the French, Jeune-Lorette was integrated into the European world around

⁴ For examples see William Eccles, *The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983); James Pritchard, *In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Linda Colley, *Captives: The story of Britain's pursuit of empire and how its soldiers and civilians were held captive by the dream of global supremacy, 1600-1850*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002); and Elizabeth Mancke, *Fault Lines of Empire: Political Differentiation in Massachusetts and Nova Scotia, 1760-1830*, (New York: Routledge, 2005).

Quebec. The parish registers help to illustrate this point. Seventy-three percent of the entries in Jeune-Lorette's parish registers did not include any Aboriginal people. The church – located at the heart of the village – was used more by the French settlers than the Huron-Wendat. This relationship symbolized Huron-Wendat integration into the colonial world. If the Mi'kmaq had a weak relationship and the Abenaki had a mutual relationship, the Huron-Wendat had an integrated relationship with the French.

This relationship developed because of their proximity to the French, the economic benefit derived from participating in these conflicts and their growing relationship with the Abenaki, which drew them into the conflicts in New England. Their willingness to fight and supply the French military made them useful allies whose position vis-à-vis the French mattered more than their numbers would suggest. In the winter of 1759, with Quebec in British hands, most of these incentives evaporated. Within a year they began to build a similar relationship with the British.

The British took a completely different approach to their relationship with the Huron-Wendat than they had with the Mi'kmaq. Where they had effectively ignored the Aboriginal presence in Mi'kma'ki until the situation became so violent it was untenable, in Quebec, they sought to establish a relationship with the domicilié communities even before France was beaten.

The British-Aboriginal relationships that developed in Mi'kma'ki and Jeune-Lorette differed in five ways. First, the growth of the Indian Department and William Johnson's experience among the Haudenosaunee provided the British with the knowledge they needed to successfully accommodate the Seven Fires. Second, Huron-Wendat

connections to the Mohawk village of Kahnawake made it relatively easy to integrate them into the pre-existing British-Haudenosaunee Covenant Chain. Third, Aboriginal people had a more prominent role in 1760 than they had during earlier events. Aboriginal people were specifically mentioned in the Capitulation of Montreal and Royal Proclamation, where they had not been at all considered in the Capitulation of Port Royal, Treaty of Utrecht or Capitulation of Quebec. Fourth, there was already a lucrative trading relationship between the western domicilié villages and the British at Albany, assuring that this part of the Huron-Wendat economy would not end. Fifth, many of the Aboriginal villages along the St. Lawrence, particularly Jeune-Lorette, had connections to Aboriginal communities around the Great Lakes with whom the British wished to make peace. In Mi'kma'ki, no such conditions existed. The British had no officials who could liaise with the Mi'kmaq and no plan to build a trading relationship.

The first of these five differences is the most important. The 1755 creation of the Indian Department marked the British adoption of an approach like that taken by the French in Wabanakia and post-conquest Mi'kma'ki. Rather than with the governor, diplomacy was conducted primarily with the superintendents, the most effective of whom was William Johnson. Locally, rather than use missionaries, the British used deputy superintendants such as Daniel Claus to represent their interests. Although meetings with the superintendant did not take place as often as they had with the French governor in Mi'kma'ki, the appointment of deputy superintendants allowed for regular diplomacy and the building of constructive relationships. This continual nurturing of the Aboriginal-British relationship mitigated many of the tensions seen decades earlier in Mi'kma'ki.

The introduction of Indian Department officials into the St. Lawrence valley did not make the political role of missionaries obsolete. Unlike in Mi'kma'ki, where missionaries sought to link the Mi'kmaw to the French, the Jesuit missionary at Jeune-Lorette supported British interests. Alongside the Indian Department's deputy superintendant, Girault also interceded on the community's behalf. Despite fear that the Jesuits would push the Huron-Wendat and others towards support for the American colonies in the 1770s and 1780s, the global abolition of the Jesuit Order and the tolerance that they received in Canada made them unlikely enemies of the new administration. There was no LeLoutre or Maillard in post-conquest Canada wooing the Huron-Wendat to resist the British.

So far we have stressed the changes that took place in British policy, as opposed to how or why these communities arrived at their decisions. There was little reason for the Mi'kmaq to interact with the British. Britain's failure to implement policies for cultivating a relationship with the Mi'kmaq stoked the tensions that had developed in Wabanakia and strengthened the post-conquest Mi'kmaw-French relationship. Without interaction, local tensions with New England fishers flared up, further complicating British-Mi'kmaw relations. Aside from the Mi'kmaq near Port Royal, who could see tangible material benefits to making peace, there were few reasons for the Mi'kmaq elsewhere to reconcile with the British.

Like the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq, the Huron-Wendat had little incentive to resist the new British presence. In 1760, a quick peace was in the community's best interest; they were so small that resistance – like when the Abenaki at St. François captured a British

messenger in 1759 – could have dire economic and political consequences. The Royal Proclamation, and their legal claim to Sillery, suggested that their communal land – including their hunting territory – would not be threatened. Easier access to the American colonies meant new opportunities for trade and education. And, at least initially, the British seemed interested in integrating them into their military operations and diplomacy with western Aboriginal peoples. To the Huron-Wendat, there were few indications that this European regime change would have a significant effect on their day-to-day life.

In both places tensions with Britain emerged over access to land and resources. Because the French had never claimed or really occupied Mi'kma'ki, the Mi'kmaq were quick to react to British claims to sovereignty. Up until the mid-1730s, the Mi'kmaq resisted each of Britain's attempts to expand beyond Annapolis Royal. At Quebec, such conflict was avoided by William Johnson's Indian Policy, which mirrored French diplomatic practices. The period of extended British gift giving and diplomacy was brief, however. The flood of settlers after the American Revolution threw British Indian Policy back to its pre-1755 form. The Colonial Office sought to curb its expenditures on Aboriginal people and slowly over the first half of the nineteenth century Aboriginal people and their concerns became less important to colonial policy-makers. Britain had achieved the dominance that it had unsuccessfully assumed after it first conquered Port Royal nearly a century earlier.

There was no single way in which the fall of New France made an impact on Aboriginal peoples in the northeast. For some, like the Mi'kmaq, France's defeat in

North America brought about a significant redefinition of their relationship to European imperial power. For the first time, after the Treaty of Utrecht, they discovered that their exclusion from European negotiations could radically alter the geopolitical landscape of their territory. For others, like the Huron-Wendat, the conquest brought changes similar to those already taking place during the seventeenth- and early-eighteenth century.

The differences between Mi'kmaw and Huron-Wendat experiences were not just caused by the evolution in French and British approaches to North America. During the eighteenth century, the British empire was a heterogeneous entity whose policies were often determined more by imperial officials in North America than by the Colonial Office.⁵ Although William Johnson had taken a different approach in the St. Lawrence valley from that taken in Mi'kma'ki, Jeffrey Amherst's policy in the Great Lakes during the early 1760s had more in common with the early days of British Nova Scotia. As in Mi'kma'ki, British policy in the region after the Seven Years' War sought to extend British sovereignty westward, while avoiding French gift giving practices and abandoning diplomatic approaches.⁶ Following the Peace of Paris, Amherst sought to restrict trading locations, ban weapons, and end diplomacy.⁷ Unlike in Mi'kma'ki, however, resistance to the new British power was much more widespread, co-ordinated and violent. An alliance of western Aboriginal peoples captured British forts around the Great Lakes and Ohio valley, killing more British soldiers and settlers than had even been

⁵ Colley, 186.

⁶ Colin Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2006), 69.

⁷ Daniel Richter, "Native Peoples of North America and the Eighteenth-Century British Empire," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. II, P.J. Marshall, ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 364.

stationed at Annapolis Royal in 1710.⁸ Amherst's disastrous approach in the Great Lakes demonstrates that the differences between Mi'kmaw and Huron-Wendat experiences of the conquest were as much a function of personality as policy.

Nonetheless, the influence of the Indian Department marked a more general shift in the British relationship with Aboriginal people. Although it was too weak to prevent Amherst from implementing his policies in the west, after he left in 1763, Britain was slowly able to bring about peace in the region. It did so by adopting policies similar to those already in place along the St. Lawrence. With the Seven Fires' help and the intervention of the Indian Department, an alliance was built with the peoples living around the Great Lakes. In future conflicts – particularly the American Revolution and War of 1812 – many of these communities would take Great Britain's side.

The variety of ways that Aboriginal people experienced the conquest of New France makes this a subject ripe for more community and local studies. Even among the Jesuit mission communities in the St. Lawrence valley the conquest brought about some fundamentally different experiences. For example, St. François was the only Aboriginal village to be attacked by the British. By the early 1760s, long before the other villages, Kahnawake campaigned hard for full title to the seigneurie of Sault St. Louis. Briefly between 1763 and the American Revolution both communities' hunting territory ceased to be an imperial borderland. Although English settlers continued to migrate into their hunting territory, this change created a pause between the French-English and later American-British tensions in the region. The differences between how the Abenaki,

⁸ Calloway, 71-72. According to Calloway over five hundred British soldiers and hundreds of settlers died during the conflict.

Mohawk and Huron-Wendat experienced the conquest invite additional case studies and would help to add nuance to the broad patterns drawn out by the comparison in this dissertation.

Although there was no single Aboriginal experience of the fall of New France, Mi'kmaw and Huron-Wendat experiences of the British conquest offers important insights into the dynamics of the eighteenth-century northeast. As European conflicts that took place in what were still primarily Aboriginal landscapes, nearly every Aboriginal community in the region was deeply affected by the arrival of British power. Whether change took place rapidly or more slowly, no community could skirt the long-term impact of this political transition. Over the century that followed, the diversity of relationships between the British and Aboriginal people became increasingly unified as the purview of the Indian Department grew in geographic and bureaucratic scope and European immigrants flooded Aboriginal lands. By the 1830s Aboriginal communities in the northeast were in a similar position: they saw their lands and economic resources reduced and they had few remaining options for recourse.

Though they occurred in different places and time periods, Mi'kmaw and Huron-Wendat experiences of the conquest illustrate the interconnected nature of the eighteenth-century northeast. Using 'spaces of power' has helped to demonstrate how Europeans capitalized on Aboriginal definitions of space to bolster their claims to North America and how Aboriginal people engaged with the colonial world and landscape in order to sustain their economy and culture. There was no clear line between Aboriginal and colonial worlds. European and Aboriginal spatial definitions in both places sometimes

brought about conflict, while at other times fostered cooperation. Bringing together the historiographies of these communities reveals the historical, thematic and interpretive connections between them, emphasizing the importance of methodological flexibility when studying the eighteenth century northeast. Through these connections, I suggest that 'conquest' is better seen as a widely dispersed process encompassing much of northeastern North America during the eighteenth century rather than a solitary event affecting a limited group of people and taking place within a limited geography.

By taking this regional scope and emphasizing the importance of Aboriginal concepts of territory, this dissertation adds to the field of borderland studies by demonstrating its Eurocentric nature. Borderland scholars tend to focus on European conceptions of space, usually the borderland created by European empires. Few spaces in the eighteenth-century northeast, though, were wholly defined by imperial or colonial authorities. Aboriginal communities played an important role in defining the spaces in which they lived, often knitting together competing European geographies.

Incorporation of Aboriginal spatial practices, however, causes problems for a borderland analysis. In the heart of New France (hardly a traditional borderland) the overlapping colonial and Aboriginal worlds at Jeune-Lorette created a borderland-like atmosphere where the Huron-Wendat selectively engaged with both the colonial and Aboriginal worlds. They had a good deal of economic and political flexibility, choosing whether to engage more with one world or the other. In Mi'kma'ki, which after the conquest was perhaps a text-book example of a borderland, there was much less flexibility. It was the Eurocentric division of Mi'kmaw territory, not the creation of a

borderland that shaped how the Mi'kmaq responded to European powers. French success in building their alliance with the Mi'kmaq after the conquest was not only about their diplomatic acumen in winning the Mi'kmaq to their side – although this certainly helped – but also because, like in Wabanakia, they articulated a unified vision of Mi'kmaw territory. Where the British sought to claim Kespukwitk, Sipekne'katikik, Esk'kewaq and Piktukewaq as Nova Scotia, the French argued that they had only ceded Annapolis Royal to the British and that the rest of this space remained part of Mi'kma'ki. It was the unified and threatened nature of Aboriginal space, rather than its competing European definitions, that defined the relationships in the post-conquest environment.

Using the concept of 'spaces of power' to study these communities helps to get around these conceptual difficulties by employing a multi-layered approach that accommodates competing spatial definitions. Unlike a more traditional borderlands analysis, which implies an overt and usually binary competition over space, 'spaces of power' helps to focus on the multiple, though sometimes contradictory, ways that individuals, communities and empires attempted to define northeastern spaces. Focusing on the European borderland struggle in Mi'kma'ki, for example, minimizes Mi'kmaw attempts to retain control over their space. For Jeune-Lorette, many scholars would likely dismiss a borderlands analysis because the Huron-Wendat lived completely within the French colony of Canada. By emphasizing the territorial nature of how these communities lived in these places, 'spaces of power' demonstrates that how Europeans perceived and conceived of these spaces did not undermine their Aboriginal nature. In each place Aboriginal, French and British people sought to define and re-define the

nature of northeastern space; in some places they succeeded, in others they did not.

'Spaces of power' balances these influences through its attentiveness to the tensions and contradictions caused by the complexities of colonialism.

In both cases, however, the arrival of British power significantly modified the Mi'kmaw and Huron-Wendat relationship to space and territory. Despite their different approaches, British officials were less willing than the French to maintain their stake in the northeast on the back of Aboriginal spatial claims. This was somewhat veiled along the St. Lawrence River by William Johnson's effective Indian Policy. Even he made it clear, however, that resistance to the British would be met with a very firm hand. From the British perspective all Aboriginal people lived on crown land, regardless of whether the British had negotiated for those spaces with local Aboriginal peoples. Mi'kma'ki was not compatible with Nova Scotia, just as Huron-Wendat hunting territory could not be reconciled with colonization.

There were two conquests in the eighteenth century. The best known was the British conquest of New France and its effects on the French settlers in Acadia and along the St. Lawrence. The other, the European effort to colonize indigenous peoples, has been the focus of this dissertation. The fall of New France had a significant – but varied – effect on Aboriginal communities in the northeast. It forced the Mi'kmaq and Huron-Wendat to confront European territorial claims that had not been made explicit during the French Regime. They responded to the British using new strategies that differed based on their past experiences with the French. For the Mi'kmaq, who had limited interaction with the French before the conquest, the British arrival brought about uncertainty,

violence and migration. For the Huron-Wendat, who over the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries had become deeply integrated into the French colonial world, change occurred much more slowly and had many similarities with the French regime, allowing them to better adapt to the British presence. In both Kespukwitk and Jeune-Lorette, though, these people struggled to retain their territory and livelihoods in the face of what turned out to be a series of dramatic geopolitical transformations. This was indeed a conquest; but it was not one that either community passively accepted, or whose outcome was fore-ordained.

Appendix A: Guideposts

Place names and terminology shifted with the arrival of British power in Acadia and Canada. Below is a short list of terms that changed with the conquest but mean the same thing or refer to the same place:

- **English/British** – Following common scholarly practice I have replaced the term ‘English’ with ‘British’ when discussing events that took place after the 1707 Treaty of Union between England and Scotland. Chapters one and two use the term ‘English’ while later chapters refer solely to the ‘British’. Whenever the context is ambiguous, I have used ‘British’.
- **Domicilié villages/Seven Fires** – Both of these terms refer to the eight Aboriginal villages located along the St. Lawrence River. Each village was associated with a Catholic mission. Over the course of the French Regime, the relationship between these villages tightened, eventually forming a confederacy.¹ The villages are not described as such until after 1760; the term ‘Seven Fires’ does not appear in the historical record until 1761.² Reflecting the difference in terminology, I refer to these villages as ‘domicilié villages’ in the chapters which pre-date the fall of Montreal and as the ‘Seven Fires’ afterwards. The term Seven Fires refers to the principal seven villages, although they were at times also called the eight nations

¹ Jean-Pierre Sawaya dates its creation back to the late-seventeenth century. See Jean-Pierre Sawaya, *La Fédération des Sept Feux de la Vallée du Saint-Laurent: XVIIe au XIXe siècle*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 1998), 13.

² Sawaya, 24.

reflecting the eight villages in the valley. The seven key villages were Kahnawake, Kanesatake, St. François, Jeune-Lorette, Akwesasne, Becancour and Oswegatchie.

- **Port Royal/Annapolis Royal** – In the aftermath of the fall of Port Royal, the British changed the town's name to Annapolis Royal in honour of the reigning monarch in England, Queen Anne.
- **Mi'kma'ki/Acadia/Nova Scotia** – Unlike the other shifts in language, the use of place names in this dissertation is not chronologically based. Rather, I have chosen to use place names that reflect the society whose spatial practice most clearly defined the landscape. Depending on the context, I use Mi'kma'ki, Acadia and Nova Scotia to refer to the geography of modern-day Maritime Canada. Mi'kma'ki refers to the homeland of the Mi'kmaq. I have opted to use this term rather than Acadia or Nova Scotia whenever referring generally to the region. Europeans made few inroads into this territory during the period under study. Where Europeans had begun to attach new meaning to the landscape, or when discussing European perceptions or conceptions of Mi'kmaw space, I have employed the terms 'Acadia' or 'Nova Scotia'; both were in regular use during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I have made similar decisions for other geographies, such as Wabanakia (the land of the Abenaki) and Wulstukwik (the land of the Wulstukwiuk).

Other terms also require discussion. Most importantly I have chosen to refer to the inhabitants of Acadia and Canada as French settlers rather than as Acadians and Canadians. The main reason is to emphasize the similarity between Mi'kmaq and Huron-

Wendat experiences. The term ‘French settlers’ better emphasizes the Acadian and Canadian role in introducing settler colonialism to North America. The identity of Euro-North Americans is also somewhat contested. There is a fairly clear debate among historians of Acadia about when (and if) the Acadians saw themselves as anything other than French subjects.³ The term ‘French settlers’ does not preclude the existence of a more specific group identity, while also suggesting that the use of this terminology to describe the pre-deportation period may be premature.

The terms I use to describe the people living on the Atlantic coast also need elaboration. I use the terms ‘Abenaki’ to refer to the people living between the coast and the Saco, Penobscot and St. Lawrence Rivers (in Wabanakia); ‘Mi’kmaq’ to describe the people living between the St. John River, Gulf of St. Lawrence and Atlantic coast (in Mi’kma’ki); and ‘Wulstukwiuk’ to describe the people living in between (in Wulstukwik). Using these terms draws together groups of people that had many internal differences. Indeed, part one emphasizes the different political choices the Mi’kmaq made after the conquest. I have opted to use the general terms for these people, in recognition that many primary sources only provide vague descriptions of them and that they interacted relatively frequently. Using more general language does not affect my analysis of how the Kespukwitk Mi’kmaq experienced the conquest. That there are

³ For the basic parameters of this debate see N.E.S. Griffiths, *From Migrant to Acadian: A North American Border People 1604-1755*, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005); John Mack Faragher, *A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the French Acadians from their American Homeland*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005); Jean-François Mouhot, *Les réfugiés Acadiens en France: 1758-1785: l’impossible réintégration?*, (Sillery: Septentrion, 2009). Griffiths and Faragher argue that the Acadians formed an ethnic identity that separated them from their French cousins. Mouhot challenges this perspective by emphasizing that language and religion continued their connection to French identity.

important differences and contradictions within each of these groupings, however, is an important point to bear in mind.

One final housekeeping note: I have opted to leave all dates in the form they appear in the primary documents. During the eighteenth century France and Britain used two different calendars. The British used the Julian calendar until 1752, when they joined the French in using the Gregorian calendar. There are two consequences of keeping the dates in place. Under the Julian calendar, the year changed on 25 March, rather than on 1 January. British officials often write both years in their correspondence between January and March. The Julian and Georgian calendars were also about eleven days apart at the beginning of the eighteenth century, meaning that although the changeover in power took place on the same day, the British captured Port Royal on 5 October 1710 while France capitulated on 16 October.⁴

⁴ John G. Reid et al., *The 'Conquest' of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 211.

Appendix B: Using Censuses, Parish Registers and Notarial Records

In addition to eighteenth-century letters and memoirs, this dissertation uses three types of sources to assess the Mi'kmaq and Huron-Wendat population: nominal censuses, parish records, and notarial records. Each type of document provides unique and important information about these societies that cannot be found elsewhere. Together, they help illuminate Mi'kmaq and Huron-Wendat reproduction, marriage patterns, social relationships, and ways of interacting with the land. The merits of using these documents are borne out over the preceding chapters. This appendix primarily discusses the limitations and challenges to working with these sources and using them to explore Aboriginal communities.

Challenges common to all three sources

Censuses, parish registers, and notarial records are difficult sources to work with. The historian is faced with poor and often faded writing, small print, and often little supporting evidence pointing to the context in which a document was created. These problems are magnified when a source involves Aboriginal people. Few Europeans spent enough time in Aboriginal communities to fully understand how they functioned or to consider the problems inherent to recording information about these societies. Often Aboriginal people were missed and their culture ignored.

The most apparent manifestation of this can be seen in how Europeans recorded Aboriginal names. Aboriginal people are often listed only by a European name, like Louis, rather than the name given to them by their family or community. When their Aboriginal name was recorded, often as a last name following their European given

name, there is rarely consistency in how it was spelt. Both practices make it difficult to identify individuals. Without additional personal information, it is nearly impossible to determine one Louis from another, or to be certain that two phonetically similar names spelt differently actually refer to the same person.

As a result of these challenges, I have only used information for which I can be certain. For example, if you wanted to know how many Mi'kmaw women named Marie appear in the St. Jean Baptiste parish registers, I would include only one Marie without a last name, and all of the other women named Marie with different last names or who could be clearly distinguished using additional information. For example a mother and child named Marie in the same baptismal record can easily be distinguished from one another and should count as two people. Using this method, I estimate that there were only ten unique individuals named Marie (of twenty-five entries) in the registers. It is likely that there were more than this, but without additional information, it is impossible to be certain. This technique under-represents the number of Aboriginal people in these societies, but prevents people from being counted twice. Taking this approach reduces the likelihood that Aboriginal-European relations will be over-emphasized and anchors this research into relationships that actually existed. These documents, therefore, form a foundation on which broader conclusions can be drawn.

This technique is not perfect. Many Aboriginal societies have a culture of changing names as a person passes through various stages in life or takes on additional responsibilities. Some names in Huron-Wendat society, for example, were hereditary and

often referred to the position a person occupied in the community.¹ There was, for example, more than one Sawantanan in Jeune-Lorette, although there was never more than one at a time. This makes determining the role of particular individuals in these records even more difficult. Without a genealogical guide, which I have had access to for the French settlers in Mi'kma'ki, following individual people through these records is a somewhat approximate exercise.

1) Censuses

Even the best eighteenth-century censuses are highly problematic. The image of the population painted by these documents is veiled by problems of enumeration. The most serious of these problems stems from uncertainty about how most censuses were conducted. For example, the Gargas census in the 1680s was taken while travelling from village to village, though other censuses were likely taken by village leaders when the community gathered together for worship or other communal rituals. Both methods inevitably missed people who were away from the village trading or visiting family and friends. If on an extended visit, it is possible that people may have been enumerated in villages with which they were not associated. The two families from Jeune-Lorette living in Detroit may illustrate this point. Different census-takers may have also conducted their work differently, varying how they defined territorial boundaries and family composition. A census was also shaped by the willingness of the population to participate. There was little a census-taker could do if a person refused to reveal their age or other personal information. Each of these factors shaped the censuses used in this

¹ Bruce Trigger, *The Children of Aataentsic*, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press), 55 and 366.

dissertation. They are imperfect windows into these communities and need to be used cautiously.

These problems make censuses inconsistent and difficult to compare. Even closely spaced censuses for well-known European communities reveal that not all of the population was included. The 1700 and 1701 censuses from Port Royal, for example, vary by nine families and sixty-eight people. Focusing on male heads of households illustrates the problem well. Only thirty-nine men (about fifty-five percent) appear on both censuses. Of the men that were enumerated in both years, only eight of them had similar ages in both censuses. Fifteen men had ages that were between two and ten years higher than their age in 1700 and another fifteen were listed as two years or younger than they were the year before. Only one person had an age discrepancy so significant (twenty-one years) that it is unlikely that he was actually the same person.

If the French had this much difficulty enumerating the relatively stable and well-known French population, caution must be taken when working with Gaulin's Mi'kmaw census. Gaulin only visited Mi'kmaw communities a handful of times before enumerating them in 1708. Although he certainly knew them better than most Europeans, his grasp of the community was imperfect. It is clear, for example, that he estimated the age for most adults. The ages of fifty-three percent of the people twenty years or older were listed on the decade or half decade, clearly reflecting an estimation of birth years rather than an exact assessment. The age of children was much more specific, only sixteen percent were listed as being five, ten or fifteen years of age. This is almost exactly what one would expect if the same number of children were born annually. Age

specific conclusions in this dissertation must be used cautiously. They have only been made in the absence of other evidence and methodologies to assess the Mi'kmaw population.

Comparing Gaulin's enumeration of the Mi'kmaq with Pierre La Chasse's census of the Abenaki at Pentagouet – which is included as part of this document – presents some additional challenges. Gaulin enumerated the Mi'kmaq by nuclear family, while La Chasse enumerated the Abenaki by cabin. La Chasse's Abenaki cabins included multiple generations. In Mi'kma'ki people were grouped into family units of about 4.5 people, whereas in Wabanakia cabins averaged fifteen people. La Chasse did not record their ages. La Chasse's enumeration better reflects household composition. The absence of a separate list of orphans and widows suggests that these people were also included in each household.

The different form of enumeration demonstrates the problems inherent in using census material for Aboriginal peoples. Gaulin's enumeration is useful for its information about age and nuclear family relationships, but it is difficult to ascertain exactly how widows and orphans fit into this society. By including multiple generations in his list of households, La Chasse's census better reflects the actual composition of both Abenaki and Mi'kmaw society. These were multi-generational family units, which enhance our understanding of the family-hunting band. There is no clear explanation why the two censuses differed. It is possible that French officials sought a more detailed understanding of family relationships in Mi'kmaw society because of their relative

inexperience, while in Pentagouet, where the French had been for decades, a more general census sufficed.

Europeans had similar problems enumerating the Huron-Wendat. It was very difficult to learn how many people actually lived at Jeune-Lorette. A comparison of families supporting the British during the 1779 campaign against the Continental Congress with the 1784 household census demonstrates that like the 1700 and 1701 censuses of Port Royal, European observations of the population could vary considerably. The 1779 list – based on only eight families – suggests that the average family size was 5.3 people, whereas in 1784 it was four. Although the difference in these numbers can partly be explained by the larger sample size in the census, it still does not fully account for the drop in family size. Only three people on the 1779 list have the same number of children in the 1784 census, the other six people are listed as having one or fewer children than they had in 1779.²

Notarial records reflect an even wider gap between the census and the number of people identified as part of the village. Combining the individuals listed in the 1784 census with post-conquest notarial records demonstrates that for the ten years before and after the census, there were twenty-nine men associated with the community. This was five men more than were included in the census. In total, during the thirty-five years after the conquest, there were eighteen more men who were considered part of the Huron-Wendat community than appeared in the census. This number is in keeping with the number of men listed on an 1819 petition to the house of assembly. There were forty-two

² Girault to Haldimand, 21 Oct 1779, Haldimand Papers, vol. 21777, ff. 165-167.

men listed in the notarial records and census and thirty-seven men in this petition, suggesting the British only enumerated about half of the Huron-Wendat population in 1784.³

This discrepancy was caused by the difference in how the British and the Huron-Wendat defined the village population. Censuses and visitor observation only discuss the population living within the village boundaries, but kin and family connections knit together the Huron-Wendat community. These connections were not accounted for by Europeans. Tsawanhonhi (Nicolas Vincent), a community leader in the early nineteenth century, explained this difference to a committee of the Lower Canadian Assembly. In 1819 he testified that the village population was “About 35 Families, 20 persons or thereabouts are absent – those who are absent and even settled out of the Village would have the same right to the Land belonging to the Tribe as those that remain, on their returning among us.”⁴ By including those people living elsewhere (even on nearby seigneurial land) it was very difficult for European observers to clearly understand the dynamics of Huron-Wendat population. This created considerable variation in the enumeration of the village and observations of the Huron-Wendat population.

Overall a census was only as good as its enumerator. No European in either Kespukwitk or Jeune-Lorette was sufficiently connected to the Mi'kmaq or Huron-Wendat to accurately assess their populations. Missionaries provide the best approximation of village populations because of the close proximity in which they lived,

³ E21, S64, SS5, SSS1, D288, Nominal Census, 1784; Petition of the Huron for the seigneurie of Sillery. Written at Lorette on the 26th January 1819, in *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly, on that part of the speech of His Excellency the Governor in Chief which relates to the settlement of the crown lands with the minutes of evidence taken before the committee*, (Quebec: Neilson & Cowen, 1824), i.

⁴ *Eighth Report of the Committee of the House of Assembly*, 13.

but it is likely that their enumeration frequently missed a large portion of the population.

It was to their advantage to make it appear that they had a firm grasp of Aboriginal populations. When coupled with other records, however, it is apparent that these documents can only be used to provide a foundational number for population size.

Table B-1) Mi'kmaw Censuses

	Total 1708	Men over 15 - 1708	Men over 15 - 1721	Total 1722	Men over 15 - 1722	Men over 15 - 1735	Men over 15 - 1737
Port Royal	102	28		47	14	30	
Minas	59	14	58	44	12		
La Hève	126	33	60	157	57	58	58
Cape Sable	97	32	40	94	29	50	50
Chignecto	97	30					
Musquidoboit	159	44					
Richibucto						26	26
Ste Marie				50	19		
Miramichi						98	98
Restigouche						65	66
Shediac						39	39
Beaubassin			47	86	34	48	48
Shubenacadie				115	34	95	95
Antigonish			48	93	30	40	40
Tatamagouch				45	13		20
Cape Breton	196	55	36	107	33	45	45
Malpec						46	46
Total	836	236	289	838	275	640	631
Total Kespukwitk	325	93	100	298	100	138	108

Sources: "Recensement général fait au mois de novembre mille Sept cent huit de tous les sauvages de l'Acadie," 1708, Newberry Library, Edward E. Ayer, MSS 4, no. 751 (Transcription consulted at LAC, MG 18 F18); Monsieur de Saint-Ovide au Conseil, concernant les relations avec les Sauvages, 15 Sept 1721, C11B-5, f. 359; Monsieur Le Normant de Mézy au ministre concernant les présents et la mission des Sauvages, 10 Dec 1722, C11B-6, ff. 73-74; Recensement fait en 1722 par monsieur Gaulin, 27 Dec 1722, C11B-6, f. 77; Recensement fait des sauvages portant les armes en 1735, CAOM, G1, vol. 466, no. 71; Recensement du nombre de sauvages "Miquemaques" (Micmacs) portant les armes conformément aux états qui ont été remis par les missionnaires, 1737, C11D-8, f. 76.

Table B-2) 1784 Huron-Wendat Census

Name	Age	House	Married Women	Bachelors above 15	Boys under 15	Unmarried women above 14	Girls under 14	Arpents
Jacquary	54	1	1	5	1	1		1
Simon	40	1	1			1		3
Louis	19	1	1	1				
Paul	66	1	1		1	1		1.5
Joseph	28	1	1		1	1		2
Bastien	35	1	1		1		1	
Petit Etienne	42	1	1		3	1		
Veuve Petit Louis								
Pierre	47	1	1	1	3	1	3	2
Augustein	44	1	1		4		1	
Pierre	64	1	1	1	1			3
Geromes	25		1					
Simon Imase	44	1	1	2			1	
Jean Vincent	56	1	1		1			
Joseph	51	1	1	1				1
Nicolas	60	1	1			2		
Joseph	27	1	1					
Veuve Setansetase		1			2		2	
Raphael	41	1	1	1	1			
Charle Simonete	32	1	1		1	1	2	
Zacarie Thomas	44	1	1	1				1
Nicolas	57	1	1					
Andre	26	1	1	1				2.5
Atanase	67	1	1					2.5
Lauison	24		1					1
Thomas Martin	54	1	1			2		
Veuve Simon								1.5
Veuve Etienne								3
Total		23	24	14	20	11	10	25
Total pop.	107							

2) Parish Registers and Notarial Records

Parish and notarial records share many similarities. They are highly formulaic legal records created by trained professionals to document important moments of an individual's life such as a birth, death, marriage or transfer of property. Individuals recorded in these records had one of three roles. They were either subjects of an act, directly related to the subject of an act (such as parents or neighbours), or witnesses. Finally, the legal nature of these documents required that they be kept safe. Often, multiple copies were made and at least one copy was stored securely, making them useful, reliable and relatively complete historical documents.

The standardization of these documents is somewhat deceiving, however. Although very similar, the way individuals were recorded in these documents varied depending on the notary or priest. This is most apparent in how these records describe a person's ethnicity. Usually, the ethnicity of a French settler was not listed, but outsiders were often noted. Aboriginal people were referred to both generally as a *sauvage* or *sauvagesse*, or more specifically by their tribal or village name. The problem with these documents is that an Aboriginal person was not always distinguished from the French settlers. For example, Sawantan, who had a relatively common Europeanized name (Louis Vincent), was a witness in the 1761 baptism of Prisque Verret but is not listed as Huron-Wendat. That same year he also attended the baptism of Marie Marguerite Atonchiouann and was listed as Huron-Wendat.⁵ The marriage between François Vigné and Marie Muis in Ouikmakagan serves as another good example. Muis was the

⁵ PRDH, ID 259874 and 259878.

daughter of a Mi'kmaw woman. But aside from Ouikmakagan being listed as their place of residence, there is no other indication of Muis's Mi'kmaw heritage.⁶ In order to get around this problem I have only included entries which clearly indicate that a person was part of the Mi'kmaw or Huron-Wendat community.

Parish Registers

The parish registers for both St. Jean Baptiste parish and the Huron-Wendat mission are much easier to work with than the censuses. They were created with greater standardization and considerable continuity over time. The records help to illustrate social networks, both inside and outside of the community, and community patterns of reproduction. There are, however, a number of draw backs to using these sources. They do not attempt to cover the entire population, they are chronologically incomplete, and they contain a much larger amount of information that must be carefully organized to be useful. Mindful of these problems, though, these records shed some important light on the eighteenth-century Mi'kmaq and Huron-Wendat.

The parish registers for both communities are incomplete. The parish registers from St. Jean Baptiste are found in two volumes. The first begins in 1702 and ends in 1728 and the second begins in 1727 and ends in 1755. The parish registers at Jeune-Lorette are much more extensive and run from 1761 to 1795, when the parish of St. Ambroise-de-la-Jeune-Lorette was created. Neither of these parishes have registers that

⁶ See the registration of baptism for François Vignée 23 May 1705; Marie Vignée on 23 Oct 1705; Charles Vignée on 27 October 1705. Marie Mius was the daughter of Philippe Mius d'Azit. See also Bona Arsenault, *Histoire et Généalogie des Acadiens*, vol. 4, (Ottawa: Leméac, 1978), 1597, 1608.

survive from an earlier date. In both cases, the volumes that were created before 1702 and 1761 were likely destroyed or lost during the final British attack.

Aside from this similarity, the two parishes varied considerably. The parish of St. Jean Baptiste served a French population, which was occasionally visited by the Mi'kmaq. The registers were created in French by parish priests. The mission church at Jeune-Lorette served the Huron-Wendat and was frequently used by neighbouring French settlers. The parish registers there were written in Latin by the Jesuit missionary. These differences make the parish registers difficult to compare. Over a forty-year period, there were fifty-five entries which involved the Mi'kmaq, whereas at Jeune-Lorette there were four-hundred-and-five entries involving the Huron-Wendat. Being located in their village, the parish registers at Jeune-Lorette likely recorded most of the Huron-Wendat who sought out the church's services, while travelling missionaries and Mi'kmaw mobility gave Catholic Mi'kmaq more options to receive ecclesiastical services than just in Port Royal.

The biggest challenge in using parish registers to understand Aboriginal communities is that they require their subjects to opt in to Catholic practices. These records are much more reliable for Jeune-Lorette than for Mi'kma'ki. Nearly the entire population of Jeune-Lorette were recorded in the parish registers compared to only one-third of the Kespukwitk Mi'kmaq. In both places, though, some people participated in religious ceremonies more than others. Many Huron-Wendat, for example, only appear in one or two entries over this forty-year period. This hardly makes for regular use of the church. Any conclusion reached using these sources only reflects the part of the

population that followed Catholic traditions. There were many people who were not recorded in these documents.

Most of my research used parish register databases created by the *Programme de recherche en démographie historique* (PRDH) and Nova Scotia Archives and Research Management. I am very grateful to Bertrand Desjardins, Lois Yorke and Paul Maxner for granting me access to these databases. This dissertation would likely have taken another year to complete without access to these useful tools. These databases allowed me to sort individuals by ethnicity, date of birth and place of residence in order to discuss patterns of reproduction, marriage and inter-village relationships. The drawback to using databases in lieu of the primary documents is that marginal notes and other information that could not be categorized may have been missed. I have tried to avoid this by surveying the parish records and consulting the originals when referring in my text to a specific entry. I did not do this with the Latin entries.

Despite these challenges, the parish registers are a useful source for evaluating the extent of Aboriginal-French interaction. As a key part of French culture, the Catholic Church played an important role in bringing these societies together. In Jeune-Lorette, the church brought French parishioners into the Huron-Wendat village, while in Kespukwitk it provided a reason for the Mi'kmaq to visit the French village. The number of people involved in these entries serves as a good index of the amount of interaction between the two societies. When used alongside the work of genealogists like Bona Arsenault, these records also shed light on métissage. I chose not to address this important issue in *Two Conquests*. Doing so would have been very time consuming,

involving family reconstruction of multiple generations and a large number of families. Although historiographically useful, I do not think that this type of study will change my overall conclusions. Nonetheless, with the help of these databases, a deeper understanding of métissage can certainly be developed.

Notarial Records

During the eighteenth century few notaries had prestige or influence. Most of them had other appointments and were selected by the intendant partially because of their social standing, but mostly because they were over the age of majority, Catholic and knew how to write.⁷ Most notaries were born in Europe.⁸ Literacy in New France, after all, declined as the Canadian-born population, which had less access to schooling than their French cousins, increased.⁹ André Genest, the principal notary in this dissertation, fits this pattern. He was a French soldier who emigrated from Toulouse between 1710 and 1730. He began serving as the notary for the parish of Charlesbourg in 1738. The other notaries in this study were mostly born in Canada. They followed in the professional footsteps of their fathers, as was typical in French society at the time.

Notarial practices were regulated and standardized between 1717 and 1733. The crown established guidelines governing the type of information these records contained, their format, and how the documents should be preserved.¹⁰ Despite the change in imperial administration in 1760, these practices remained in place throughout the eighteenth century. All of the notarial records that I used in this dissertation were related

⁷ André Vauchon, *Histoire du Notariat Canadien: 1621-1960*, (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1962), 50.

⁸ Vauchon, 64-65.

⁹ Michel Verrette, *L'Alphabétisation au Québec, 1660-1900* (Sillery: Septentrion, 2002), 93 and 161.

¹⁰ Vauchon, 26-34.

to land transfers. These legal documents recorded seigneurial concessions, donations, partitions and sales. Usually they included information about the size and location of a parcel of land, its neighbours and seigneurial obligations. Although the regulation of notarial practices standardized these records, the documents do not consistently provide all of this information. Variation between documents requires more study.

In order to standardize these documents, I have made a few alterations to the data found within them. Most importantly, I have monetized all material goods that were included in the payment of seigneurial dues. Often the payment of the cens and rentes included a castrated male chicken (a capon). Usually these goods had a monetary value assigned to them in the contract, but when they did not I followed Cole Harris who priced an eighteenth-century capon at one livre.¹¹ When possible I have also calculated the overall area in order to compare total property size. This has allowed me to compare the largest number of properties possible.

These records were sampled using key-word searches in the Parchemin database. This database contains the basic information in each act, but does not include more specific details about neighbours and witnesses. As I went through these documents on microfilm, I continued to find additional Huron-Wendat records that are not described as such in the database. A systematic search of these documents would likely yield even more documents, but this would require a considerable investment of time and energy as the records are sometimes very difficult to access. The historian who tackles this job will

¹¹ Cole Harris, *The Seigneurial System in Early Canada*, (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1966), ix.

need to contend with poor hand writing, water damage, and their diffusion among thousands of similar records.

The haphazard nature of these sources has also meant that some basic information is missing in a number of these documents. Sometimes the size of a parcel of land was not provided or its area would be listed but not its frontage. Similarly, many of these documents did not list the amount of seigneurial dues that would be paid on the property. This was especially the case when land was bought and sold rather than conceded by the seigneur. The aveux and dénombrements and papiers terriers for St. Gabriel seigneurie provide additional information about the size of land and amount of seigneurial dues, allowing the information from the notarial records to be cross referenced. Connecting these sources will be useful for a more complete study reconstructing the spatial relationships between the Huron-Wendat and French settlers.

Transcription B-1) A typical notarial record

Source: André Genest, 3 Sept 1761, BANQ-QUE, CN 301, s115

Par devant Le notaire Royal Dans le Gouvernement De La Ville de quebec Residant dans la paroisse de Charlesbourg soussigné et Temoins cy Bas nommer furent presents Tres R.P. Jean Baptiste S^{te} Pé, tres digne prestre Religieuse de la compagnie de Jesus Recteur et Superieur des missions Des R.R.P.P. de la d^e Compagnie Et Tres R.P. augustin Louïs De Glapion Leur procureur Seigneurs Des Terres et Seigneuries De notre Dame des anges, S^t Gabriel, Sillery, Belair et autres Lieux Lesquels De Leur Bon Gré, pur, libre Et franche Volonté ont Reconnu et confessé en nom, avoir baillé et concedé par ses presentes des maintenant et a Toujours a titres de cens et rentes foncieres et sieigneurialles perpetuelles et non rachatables et promessents faire Jouir aux d^{ts} Titres à Vincent fils, huron en la mission de La nouvelle Lorette a ce present et acceptants, preneur et Reteants aux d. Tites pour luy ses hoirs et ayant causes a lavenir.

scavoir une terre et concession Contenant quatre arpents de front sur vingt arpents de profondeur, de Laquelle Le d. front nest pas Egal a cause des anses former par la Riviere S^t charles qui La borne seise au Troisieme Rang des Terres de la coste S^t antoine Seigneurie de S^t Gabriel, Laquelle est Bornée du costé du Nord Est a la d. Riviere S^t Charles et D'autre costé au Sud d'ouest a celle de françois darveau par un bout du Costé

du Sud d'Est a la terre des Representants et heritiers De feu Jean Bergevin Et par L'autre Bout au nord ouest en Terres non concedées, Laquelle d. Terre a Est Cy devant Concedée a nous dit No^r qui Recoit Ses presenter par Tres R.P. pierre René floquet pour Les procureur des d. R.R.P.P. par contrat passé devants M^{es} Sanguinet et Lanoullier No^{res} Royeayx En la Prevoté de quebec la onze may mil Sept Cent Cinquante Trois.

En Laquelle appartient aux d. R.R.P.P. Bailleurs en noms, par Echange faits Entre Les d. R.R.P.P. Et nous d. no^{re} Verbalement Duquel d. Echange sera passé Incessament Titre En Bonne et dûe forme pour Lordre Entre Les parties

Ainsy que Le d. concession Se poursuit, Comporte et Etend de toute par la Declarent Le d. preneur La bien sçavoir Et connoitre pour Lavoir Vu et visitée cy ayant même Travaillé avant ses presentes Laquelle est faite aux charges, Clauses et Conditions suivantes

Scavoir que le d. preneur, Ses hoirs et ayant causes a Lavenir seront Tenus et obliges de payer et fournier par Chaqu'un an aperpetuité aux d. R.R.P.P. En leur maison Collegialle de quebec Le onze Novembre Jour En feste de S^t Martin un sol par Chaque arpent de terre en superficie Que peut contenir La presente concession avec un bon Chapon Vif par chaque Vingt arpents ou Vingt Sols par chaque Chapon au Choix des d. R.R.P.P. Seigneurs Et quatre Sols marques de cens pour toute La d. concession Le tout monaye de France De cens et Rentes foncieres et Seigneurialles, Les d. cens portant Lod et Ventes Saisire Et amande quand Le Cas y Echoira Suivant La coutume de Paris suivie En ce paye, Envers les R.R.P.P. Seigneurs du Domaine desquels Releve La presente concession Le premier payement des d^{ts} cens et Rentes Echoira au jour et feste de La S^t Martin de lannée prochain mil Sept cent Soixante deux et Continuera à Lavenir Dannée En année au d. Jour.

De deffricher et mestre En valeur Les Terres d'Icelle; de Donner Du decouvert a Ses Voisins de sorte que ses Bois ne portent préjudice aux fruits de Leurs Terres; De porter Les Grains quil Recueillera Sur La d. Concession moudre au plus proche moulin de la d. Seigneurie sans pourvoie Les faire moudre ailleurs qu'en payant au meunier du d. moulin Le d. rate de moulinage ordinaire; De faire, Souffrir et en retenir en Bon Etat Sur et au devant de la d. concession Touts Les chemins Et ponts qui Seront Jugés Nécessaires pour L'utilité Publique.

Se Reservent Les d. R.R.P.P. Les Bois de Chesnes propres a la construction Des Vaisseaux Et le faculté de prendré sur la d. concession sans dedomagements Touts Les Bois quil leur Seront nécessaires tant pour La constuction de L'Eglise que des batiments Du manoir Seigneurial et moulins Lors quil Sagira den faire construire sur La d. Seigneurie au Cas que Sen Trouve de propres et pour le Retablissement de ceux qui y Sont deja Construit Et Le droit de Retrait En cas de Vente, en Remboursant Le fort principal de la main a la main, Derogeant a cest Effet Touttes coutumes a ce Contraires.

Ne pourra Le d. preneur ny ayant cause Donner, Vendre ny Echanger Le Tout ou partie de la presente concession a Gens de main morts qu'a La Charge de représenter homme vivant et mourant que autres Sans Le consentement Expres et par Ecrit des d. R.R.P. Et sera le d. preneur Tenû et oblige de faire mesurer et Bornée a ses fraix la presente concession ou de Remboursé aux d. R.P. Ce quil Leurs en aura coûte pour le faire faite, Comme aussy de leur fournir pariellement a Ses fraix une Grosse des presentes en forme Executoire Car Sans celle La presente concession nauroit Jamais Este faite Car ainsy &^{re} Promettant &^{re} obligéant &^{re} Renoncant &^{re} fait et passé en notre Etude Lan mil Sept cent Soixante Un avant midy En presence des M^{es} Etienne Bedard Capitaine de Milice et Jacques Paul Gillaizeau huissier Royal qui ont avec Les d. R. P. Bailleurs et noms et nous Notaire Signé ayant Le d. preneur déclaré ne sçavoir signé De ce Bien et dûement Enquis Lecture faite suivant Lordonnance [?] Le Trois Septembre.

Table B-3) Huron-Wendat Land Transactions: 1730-1800

Document Information				Measurements							Cens et Rentes		
Notary	Date	Seigneurie	Type	Super (a)	Front (a)	F (per)	F (pied)	Length (a)	L (per)	L (pied)	cens (l)	cens (s)	cens (d)
Duprac, N	21/10/1733	Gaudarville	C	45.00	1.5			30			3	16	9
Duprac, N	21/10/1733	Gaudarville	C	60.00	2			30			5	2	
Duprac, N	21/10/1733	Gaudarville	C	60.00	2			30			5	2	
Duprac, N	21/10/1733	Gaudarville	C	60.00	2			30			5	2	
Duprac, N	21/10/1733	Gaudarville	C	75.00	2.5			30			6	7	7
Duprac, N	21/10/1733	Gaudarville	C	60.00	2			30			5	2	
Duprac, N	21/10/1733	Gaudarville	C	90.00	3			30			7	13	
Duprac, N	28/12/1733	Gaudarville	C	60.00	2			30			5	2	
Duprac, N	16/10/1736	Gaudarville	S	58.00	2			29			5	2	
Duprac, N	06/10/1737	Gaudarville	C		2						5	2	
Duprac, N	14/09/1745	Gaudarville	T	75.00	2.5			30			6	7	6
Vaucour, J-N	15/09/1745	St. Gabriel	C	20.58							1	16	
Vaucour, J-N	04/10/1746	St. Gabriel	C	20.00	2			10					
Vaucour, J-N	04/11/1746	Jeune-Lorette	C	3.00	1	2		2.5				4	
Genest, A	23/05/1747	Jeune-Lorette	S			6							
Genest, A	04/08/1748	St. Gabriel	S	40.00	2			20					
Genest, A	31/08/1749	St. Gabriel	S	60.00	3			20					
Genest, A	07/01/1752	St. Ignace	C	130.00							9	18	
Genest, A	19/03/1752	St. Gabriel	S	20.00	1			20					
Genest, A	15/11/1754	St. Gabriel	S	30.00	1.5			20					
Genest, A	25/06/1758	St. Gabriel	C	35.00	1			15			3	4	1
Genest, A	14/08/1758	St. Gabriel	S										
Genest, A	29/08/1758	St. Gabriel	S										
Genest, A	03/09/1761	St. Gabriel	C	80.00	4			20			6	4	
Genest, A	02/01/1762	Jeune-Lorette	S	17.00	1			17					
Genest, A	14/06/1762	St. Gabriel	S	15.00	0.75			20					
Genest, A	28/12/1764	St. Gabriel	C	80.00							4	4	
Genest, A	07/01/1774	St. Gabriel	S	90.00	3			30			8		6
Genest, A	01/06/1775	St. Gabriel	S										
Genest, A	07/07/1775	St. Gabriel	S		1			2					
Panet, J-B	07/06/1790	St. Gabriel	C	60.00	2			30			1	12	
Panet, J-B	07/06/1790	St. Gabriel	C	60.00	2			30			1	12	
Panet, J-B	10/07/1790	St. Gabriel	C	90.00	3			30					
Panet, J-B	12/07/1790	St. Gabriel	C	90.00	3			30					
Panet, J-B	12/07/1790	St. Gabriel	C	90.00	3			30			2	5	
Panet, J-B	16/08/1790	St. Gabriel	C	21.00	3			7					
Panet, J-B	16/08/1790	St. Gabriel	C	3.16	1	3		2	4	6			
Panet, J-B	09/12/1790	St. Gabriel	C	60.00	2			30			1	10	
Panet, J-B	21/12/1792	St. Gabriel	C	54.00	2			27				15	
Panet, J-B	26/02/1794	St. Gabriel	O	9.00	40			40				15	
Panet, J-B	03/05/1794	St. Gabriel	C	90.00	3			30			2	5	
Panet, J-B	02/09/1794	St. Gabriel	C	120.00	4			30			3		
Panet, J-B	10/09/1794	St. Gabriel	C	21.00	3			7				10	
Panet, J-B	10/09/1794	St. Gabriel	C	90.00	3			30			2	5	
Panet, J-B	21/10/1794	St. Gabriel	C	90.00	3			30			2	5	
Panet, J-B	18/11/1794	St. Gabriel	C	90.00	3			30			2	5	
Panet, J-B	08/04/1799	St. Gabriel	S	1.00									
Panet, J-B	01/06/1799	St. Gabriel	C	90.00	3			30			6	18	
Panet, J-B	01/06/1799	St. Gabriel	C	90.00	3			30			6	18	
Panet, J-B	03/06/1799	St. Gabriel	C	75.00	2.5			30			5	15	
Panet, J-B	03/06/1799	St. Gabriel	C	75.00	2.5			30			5	15	
Panet, J-B	04/06/1799	St. Gabriel	C	90.00	3			30			6	18	

Guide to symbols

O	Other	Super	Surface area	l	Livre
C	Concession	a	Arpents	s	Sol (20 sols make up a livre)
S	Sale	per	Perches (10 perches make up 1 arpent)	d	Denier (12 deniers make up a sol)
T	Transfer	pied	18 pieds make up 1 perche		

B-4) Huron-Wendat in Notarial Records

First Name	Last Name	Date	Notary	First Name	Last Name	Date	Notary
Louis		21/10/1733	Duprac, N.	Zacharie-Thomas	Taquimlachen	01/08/1775	Genest, A.
Vincent		21/10/1733	Duprac, N.	André	Taquiondy	01/07/1775	Genest, A.
André	Le Vieux	21/10/1733	Duprac, N.	André	Taquiondy	07/07/1775	Genest, A.
Antoine		21/10/1733	Duprac, N.	François	Simon	07/07/1775	Genest, A.
Paul		21/10/1733	Duprac, N.	Monique	Ouhanon	07/07/1775	Genest, A.
Ignace		28/12/1733	Duprac, N.	Paul	Hacoumhoheouil	08/07/1775	Genest, A.
Antoine		18/10/1736	Duprac, N.	Stanislas	Koika-Omhatetalaok	08/07/1775	Genest, A.
Antoine		08/10/1737	Duprac, N.	Anne	Omehavane	13/12/1775	Genest, A.
Athanasie		14/08/1745	Duprac, N.	Ignace	Derehanite	13/12/1775	Genest, A.
Louis		14/08/1745	Duprac, N.	Joseph	Araoundonte	13/12/1775	Genest, A.
Barthelemy	Picard	10/10/1746	Genest, A.	Zacharie	Oulais	17/08/1777	Genest, A.
Ignace		10/10/1746	Genest, A.	Zacharie	Holais	27/10/1782	Genest, A.
François-Simon		23/05/1747	Genest, A.	François	Vincent	20/03/1784	Pinet, J-B
Pierre		23/05/1747	Genest, A.	André	Alohonnet	28/03/1784	Pinet, J-B
Françoise-Marquerite		04/08/1748	Genest, A.	Nicolas	Hannoutatah	28/03/1784	Pinet, J-B
Vincent		04/08/1748	Genest, A.	Antoine		04/07/1734	Duprac, N.
Anne		31/08/1749	Genest, A.	Jean	Langlois	15/08/1745	Pinquet de Vaucour, J-N
Nicolas		31/08/1749	Genest, A.	Athanasie	Atainmonkeuara	07/02/1787	Pinet, J-B
Athanasie		25/10/1750	Genest, A.	Isabelle	HBechendele	07/02/1787	Pinet, J-B
Marie-Barbe		25/10/1750	Genest, A.	Zacharie-Thomas	Hondarronche	07/02/1787	Pinet, J-B
Athanasie		07/01/1752	Genest, A.	Etienne		27/12/1787	Pinet, J-B
André-Antoine		19/03/1752	Genest, A.	Marquerite Veronique		27/12/1787	Pinet, J-B
Jean	Langlois	03/03/1754	Genest, A.	Zacharie Thomas	Hondarronche (fils)	27/12/1787	Pinet, J-B
Nicolas	Anenonok	15/11/1754	Genest, A.	Louise		25/10/1788	Pinet, J-B
Etienne		24/12/1754	Genest, A.	Pierre	Oronyovo	25/10/1788	Pinet, J-B
Pierre	Oronyovo	24/12/1754	Genest, A.	Jacques		05/08/1781	Genest, A.
Jean	Langlois	28/12/1754	Genest, A.	Raphael-Nicolas		05/08/1781	Genest, A.
Athanasie		28/12/1754	Genest, A.	Barthelemy		21/08/1751	Adhemar dit Saint Martin, J-B
Jean	Langlois	25/08/1758	Genest, A.	Charles		21/08/1751	Adhemar dit Saint Martin, J-B
Jacques	Touratsly	13/08/1758	Genest, A.	André		24/05/1752	Foucher, A.
Joseph	Lannontour	13/08/1758	Genest, A.	Antoine		24/05/1752	Foucher, A.
Joseph	Kennontona	13/08/1758	Genest, A.	Jacques		25/08/1735	Lapelleur de LaFerte, F.
Zacharie	Oulais	14/08/1758	Genest, A.	Jean	Langlois	28/12/1764	Genest
Zacharie	Oulais	28/08/1758	Genest, A.	Louis	Glapon	28/12/1764	Genest
Vincent		09/08/1761	Genest, A.	Zacharie	Thomas	07/06/1790	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Louis	Axyhuronnuy	02/01/1762	Genest, A.	Etienne	Ondiaraste	07/06/1790	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Nicolas	Nahorak	02/01/1762	Genest, A.	Louis	Monique	10/07/1790	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Petit Louis	Athleannounion	02/01/1762	Genest, A.	Louis	Grande Marie	12/07/1790	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Raphael	Xlehouy	02/01/1762	Genest, A.	Louise		12/07/1790	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Jacques	Vincent	14/08/1762	Genest, A.	Joseph	Vincent	16/08/1790	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Jacques	Vincent (?)	14/08/1762	Genest, A.	Charles-Simon	Ignace dit Noel	08/12/1790	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Louis		14/08/1762	Genest, A.	Louis	Monique	10/09/1794	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Raphael-Nicolas		14/08/1762	Genest, A.	Simon	Helene	10/09/1794	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Vincent		30/04/1764	Genest, A.	Louis	Vincent	03/05/1794	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Vincent		30/04/1764	Genest, A.	François	Vincent	02/09/1794	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Zacharie	Oulais	30/06/1764	Genest, A.	Michel	Sioul	21/10/1794	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Jacques	Touratsly	04/10/1746	Pinquet de Vaucour, J-N	Zacharie	Ottave	21/12/1792	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Petit-Louis		04/11/1746	Pinquet de Vaucour, J-N	Joseph	Vincent	18/11/1794	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Paul		21/08/1767	Genest, A.	Louis	Monique	08/04/1799	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Vincent		25/08/1767	Genest, A.	Marie-Dorothee	Atanasie (Ottave)	08/04/1799	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Vincent	Vincent	25/08/1767	Genest, A.	Nicolas	Vincent	08/04/1799	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Jean	Langlois	02/04/1768	Genest, A.	André	Romain	04/08/1799	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Louis		23/12/1768	Genest, A.	Stanislas	Koika	03/08/1799	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Fernie		23/12/1768	Genest, A.	Barthelemy	Koika	03/08/1799	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Veronique		28/01/1772	Genest, A.	Antoine	Zacharie	01/08/1799	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Zacharie	Oulais	28/01/1772	Genest, A.	Martin	Zacharie	01/08/1799	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Jean	Vincent	28/12/1771	Genest, A.	Antoine	Zacharie	01/08/1799	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Nicolas	Hannoutatah	07/01/1774	Genest, A.	Martin	Zacharie	01/08/1799	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Paul	Blaouenohi	24/05/1775	Genest, A.	Louison	Monique	02/04/1799	Jean-Baptiste Panet
Simon	Onnourouten	24/05/1775	Genest, A.	Monique	Ouhanon	02/04/1799	Jean-Baptiste Panet

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